[ { "id": "1.1.1.", "t": "Name of the vessel", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Name of ship)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.2.", "t": "Vessel IMO number", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (LR/IMO number)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.3.", "t": "Date the inspection was completed", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Inspection Completed Date", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.4.", "t": "Was a full inspection of the vessel completed", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Inspection Completed", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.5.", "t": "Port of Inspection", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Port of Inspection", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.6.", "t": "Flag", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Flag)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.7.", "t": "Deadweight", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Summer Deadweight)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.8.", "t": "Date the vessel was delivered", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Delivery date as recorded in Form A or Form B Q1.8.3 of the IOPPC)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.9.", "t": "Name of the OCIMF inspecting company", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• SIRE 2.0 Inspection Booking", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.10.", "t": "Date and time the inspector boarded the vessel", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Inspection Commenced Date/Time", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.11.", "t": "Date and time the inspector departed the vessel", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Inspection Completed Date/Time", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.12.", "t": "Time taken for the inspection", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Inspection Duration in Hours", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.13.", "t": "Name of the inspector", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• SIRE 2.0 Inspection Booking", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.14.", "t": "Date the HVPQ was last updated", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Date last published)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.15.", "t": "Vessel’s operation at the time of the inspection", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• Inspection Record > Operation", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.16.", "t": "Products being handled", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 inspection submission:\n• Inspection Record > Product", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.17.", "t": "Vessel type", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• Pre-Inspection Questionnaire > Type of Vessel", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.18.", "t": "Hull Type", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Type of Hull)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.19.", "t": "Name of the vessel’s operator", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• SIRE 2.0 Inspection Booking", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.20.", "t": "Date the current operator assumed responsibility for the vessel", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Date current operator assumed technical control of the ship)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.21.", "t": "Date of the last port state control inspection", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• PIQ (Date of last port state control inspection)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.22.", "t": "Name of the classification society", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Classification Society)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.23.", "t": "Date of departure from the last dry dock", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Date of last dry dock)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.24.", "t": "With the vessel’s designation as recorded on IOPP certificate", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (What is the type of ship as described in Form A or Form B Q1.11 of the IOPPC?)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "1.1.25.", "t": "Name of the vessel’s P&I club", "c": "Data Source\nSIRE 2.0 core data download:\n• HVPQ (Name of P and I Club)\n2. Certification and Documentation\n2.1. Certification", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "maintaining the vessel’s statutory certification up to date, were all certificates and\ndocuments carried onboard up to date and was the vessel free of conditions of class or\nsignificant memoranda?\nShort Question Text\nMaintenance of Statutory Certification\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nIACS: Information Paper. Classification societies – what\nwhy and how?\nIMO: FAL.2/Circ.131 MEPC.1/Circ.873 MSC.1/Circ.1586 LEG.2/Circ.3. LIST OF CERTIFICATES AND DOCUMENTS\nREQUIRED TO BE CARRIED ON BOARD SHIPS\n2017.\nIMO: FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 20 April 2016 GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATES\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel had been surveyed in accordance with all statutory requirements and that\ncertification is onboard to confirm compliance.\nIndustry guidance:\nIACS: Information Paper. Classification societies – what, why and how?\nTMSA KPI 4.2.1 requires that a procedure is in place to ensure the validity and accuracy of statutory and/or\nclassification certificates.\nIMO: ISM Code\n11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to\nthe SMS.\n11.2 The Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nvalid documents are available at all relevant locations,\nchanges to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel, and\nobsolete documents are promptly removed.\nIMO: FAL.2/Circ.131 MEPC.1/Circ.873 MSC.1/Circ.1586 LEG.2/Circ.3. LIST OF CERTIFICATES AND\nDOCUMENTS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED ON BOARD SHIPS, 2017.\nIMO: FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 20 April 2016 GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATES\n4.3 Shipowners, operators and crews on ships that carry and use electronic certificates should ensure that these\ncertificates are controlled through the safety management system, as described in section 11 of the International\nSafety Management Code.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which defined the process for the vessel to monitor the\nvalidity of all major and minor certificates required to be carried on board, specifically identifying those required to be\ncarried in accordance with the List of Certificates and Documents Required to be Carried On Board Ships, 2017.\nWhere the vessel carried electronic certificates, these should be controlled through a process described in the\nvessel’s safety management system.\nThe vessel operator should have provided data relating to the vessel’s certification and survey status through the\nHarmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) and pre-inspection questionnaire (PIQ) in addition to uploading\na recent copy of the class status report* to the document repository.\n*Where the Classification Society offers Class Survey Status Reports (CSSR) for the owner then this version should\nbe provided.\nThe vessel operator should have declared in the PIQ the date of, and reason for, the last visit by a class surveyor.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nPrior to boarding:\n• •\nReview the CSSR and identify any conditions of class and/or significant memoranda and copy the details\ninto the observation tool.\nVerify that the dates and data declared within the HVPQ were accurate as compared to the CSSR.\nDuring the inspection:\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing the vessel’s statutory certification\nand supporting documents.\nVerify that any defective structure, machinery or equipment identified through the issue of a condition of\nclass, memoranda or issue of a short-term certificate had been entered in the defect reporting system for\nfollow up and later closeout.\nVerify that the onboard system for the tracking of statutory and classification certificates was being\nmaintained up to date by random sampling and review of no more than five certificates.\nVerify that the outcome from any recent class surveys had been registered in the CSSR.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for managing statutory certification and supporting documents.\nFolders containing statutory and classification certificates and supporting surveys/test reports.\nCertificate index indicating the expiry date all statutory certification, supporting surveys and inspections.\nThe Class Survey Status Report (CSSR)*.\nList of open defects as reported in the defect reporting system.\nDetails of class attendance during the past twelve months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There was no company procedure which defined the process for managing (indexing and filing) vessel\ncertificates and documents to ensure compliance with SOLAS, Class and Flag requirements.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for indexing and filing certificates and\ndocuments.\nThere was no systematic process in place to track the validity and file all statutory and classification\ncertificates.\nA sampling of onboard certificates identified that a required (class or flag) certificate or a supporting\nsurvey/test report had expired or was missing.\nThe onboard tracking or filing of statutory and classification certificates had not been maintained in\naccordance with company procedures.\nThe operator had not uploaded a recent copy of the CSSR to the document repository and a copy had not\nbeen made available onboard.\nThe data entered in the HVPQ or PIQ was not accurate as compared to the CSSR and vessel records.\nThe vessel had been issued with:\no A condition of class.\no Memoranda relating to a defect to structure, machinery or equipment.\no A short-term certificate as a result of a defect or damage to the ship's structure, machinery or\nequipment.\n2.2. Management Oversight", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.2.1.", "t": "Had the vessel been attended by a company Superintendent at approximately sixmonthly intervals and were reports available to demonstrate that a systematic vessel", "c": "inspection had been completed during each attendance declared through the preinspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nSuperintendent vessel inspection and report\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nNone\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel had been periodically and systematically inspected by company Marine and\nTechnical Superintendents to provide shore management with a complete technical and operational\nappraisal of their managed vessel.\nTMSA KPI 12.1.2 requires that an inspection plan covers all vessels in a fleet, with at least two inspections onboard\neach vessel a year.\n• •\n• The inspection is conducted by suitably experienced superintendent(s) and may be carried out in\nconjunction with other inspections/audits.\nFollowing each inspection, a report is made and is reviewed/signed off by shore management.\nThe inspection process provides company management with a comprehensive overview of the condition of\nthe fleet at specified intervals.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have established a vessel inspection program which requires a vessel to be inspected at\nleast twice a year by a combination of Marine and Technical Superintendent visits. It is expected that:\n• •\nInspections are scheduled at six-month intervals, with a tolerance of one month, but intervals between\ninspections should not normally exceed seven months.\nThe interval between successive inspections conducted by either a Marine Superintendent or a Technical\nSuperintendent should not normally exceed fourteen months.\n• •\n• •\nAn inspection report should record the findings of each inspection in a defined format which gives an\noverview of the true state of all operational and accessible areas of the vessel and its equipment in addition\nto providing an overview of onboard management to shore-based management.\nThe inspection report should summarise structural, machinery and equipment defects identified during the\ninspection which should be transferred to the vessel’s defect reporting system for follow up and closure.\nThe inspection report should summarise any procedural weaknesses identified for follow up through the\nnon-conformity process.\nA copy of the full inspection report for each superintendent visit should be maintained on board the vessel.\nRemote inspections\nWhere a vessel operator had developed a formal remote vessel inspection programme to cover vessels which could\nnot reasonably be visited by a company superintendent, the inspector should accept these as qualifying visits\nprovided:\n• •\nThere was a company procedure for conducting remote vessel inspections which defined:\no The circumstances in which a remote inspection may be used to substitute for a physical\ninspection.\no The condition verification processes for all areas of the ship under inspection.\no The required content of the final inspection report.\nCompleted inspection reports in accordance with the company procedure were available for each remote\nsuperintendent inspection.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the attendance dates for all qualifying vessel inspections by company\nMarine and Technical Superintendents during the previous eighteen months through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nAdditional vessel visits by senior management, Electrical Superintendents or those by Marine and Technical\nSuperintendents to deal with a specific issue which did not result in a full inspection and subsequent report being\ncompleted are not considered under this question.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the vessel inspection reports completed by Marine and Technical Superintendents and verify that:\n• •\n• •\nVessel inspection reports were available onboard for each of the declared qualifying vessel inspections\ncompleted during the previous eighteen months.\nEach vessel inspection report recorded the observed condition of all operational and accessible areas of the\nvessel and its equipment.\nWhere areas for improvement or defects were identified, the defect or non-conformity reporting system was\nutilised to track the corrective actions through to closure.\nAny remote inspections had been performed as required by the company procedure.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Qualifying vessel inspection reports completed by company Marine or Technical Superintendents during the\nprevious eighteen months.\nEvidence that defects and areas for improvement had been followed up through the company defect\nreporting or non-conformity reporting systems.\nThe company procedure for conducting remote inspections, if applicable.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• Reports were not available onboard for each declared qualifying vessel inspection conducted by a company\nMarine or Technical Superintendent.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The inspection report format did not cover all operational and accessible areas of the vessel and its\nequipment.\nThe interval between successive qualifying inspections by either a Marine or Technical Superintendent\nexceeded seven months.\nIt was more than fourteen months since either the previous Marine or Technical Superintendent inspection.\nWhere the vessel was new to management there had been no Marine or Technical inspection completed\nsince handover or delivery.\nRemote inspections had been conducted but there was no company procedure which defined:\no The circumstances in which a remote inspection may be used to substitute for a physical\ninspection.\no The condition verification processes for all areas of the ship under inspection.\no The required content of the final inspection report.\nMore than one remote inspection had been conducted when a physical inspection could reasonably have\nbeen carried out.\nThere was no evidence that each area for improvement or defect identified within the vessel inspection\nreports had been followed up through the documented company processes either as non-conformities or\ndefect reports.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.2.2.", "t": "Were recent ISM internal audit reports available on board, had corrective action", "c": "been taken on board to close-out any non-conformities and had this corrective action\nbeen verified by shore management?\nShort Question Text\nInternal ISM audit\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo provide assurance that the vessel had been operated in compliance with the company Safety\nManagement System.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 12A.1.1 requires that the company has documented audit procedures and standard audit formats. The\nformats are designed, as required, for ISM, the ISPS Code, ISO Standards and any company internal audits.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.1 The Company should carry out internal safety audits on board and ashore at intervals not exceeding 12 months\nto verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the SMS. In exceptional circumstances, this\ninterval may be exceeded by not more than 3 months.\n12.4 The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in accordance with documented procedures.\n12.6 The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the attention of all personnel having responsibility in\nthe area involved.\n12.7 The management personnel responsible for the area involved should take timely corrective action on\ndeficiencies found.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have established a procedure for scheduling and performing internal ISM audits at\nintervals not exceeding twelve months. The procedure should include\n• •\nStandard formats and/or checklists for the performance of audits.\nA system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to closure.\nThis system, which may be paper based or electronic, should\n• •\n• •\nBe available to all those on board responsible for the areas audited.\nInclude a time limit for corrective action.\nInform the operator when corrective action has been completed.\nRecord the operator’s verification of corrective action and final close-out.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for scheduling and performing internal ISM\naudits including standard audit formats and/or checklists.\nReview the latest two internal ISM audit reports under the current operator.\nReview the system for recording and tracking ISM audit non-conformities to closure.\nInterview the Master or a senior officer to confirm their familiarity with the system for recording and tracking\nISM audit non-conformities to closure.\nIn the case that the vessel had recently been taken over by the vessel operator and had not yet undertaken\nan internal audit, interview the Master or a senior officer to confirm their familiarity with the preparations\nnecessary for the first internal audit.\nInspectors must not use operator’s audit reports as a means to identify Negative Observations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure for scheduling and performing internal ISM audits.\nThe latest two internal ISM audit reports under the current operator.\nThe system for recording and tracking non-conformities to closure.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for scheduling and performing internal ISM audits.\nNo internal ISM audit had taken place for more than:\no 15 months\no 12 months, with no documentation supporting exceptional circumstances.\nThe latest two internal ISM audit reports under the current operator, where completed, were not available on\nboard.\nThere was no system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to closure.\nRecords in the system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to closure were incomplete.\nThe system for recording and tracking any non-conformities to closure:\no Was not readily available to those responsible for implementing corrective action for any nonconformities.\no Did not impose a time limit for corrective action to be taken.\no Did not record when corrective actions were completed.\no Did not record the operator’s verification of corrective action completed, or the evidence upon\nwhich verification was based, for example, a superintendent’s visit or photographs.\nA non-conformity had not been closed-out within the imposed time limit.\nThere was no objective evidence for the corrective action recorded to close-out a non-conformity.\nThe Master or senior officer interviewed was not familiar with the system for recording and tracking any\ninternal ISM audit non-conformities to closure.\nThe Master or senior officer interviewed was not familiar with the internal audit programme process.\nWhere the vessel operator had recently taken over management of the vessel and an internal audit had not yet taken\nplace, enter a comment in the Process response tool indicating when the internal audit was planned for completion.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.2.3.", "t": "Was the Master fully conversant with the company’s Safety Management System", "c": "and had Master’s Reviews of the system taken place in accordance with the ISM Code\nand company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nMaster's Review of the SMS.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS Recommendation No.41 (Rev.5 Oct 2019) Guidance for Auditors to the ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master is fully conversant with the Safety Management System and that Master’s Reviews\ncontribute to the improvement of its effectiveness.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS Recommendation No.41 (Rev.5 Oct 2019) Guidance for Auditors to the ISM Code\n‘ISM Code - paragraph 5.1.5\n5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the Master’s responsibility with regard to:\n.5 periodically reviewing the safety management system and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based\nmanagement.’\nThe Master, as responsible person onboard, should inform the Company whenever there are deficiencies in the SMS\nrelevant to the ship's operation.\nInformation on SMS deficiencies should include proposals for corrective action and recommendations for improving\nthe SMS, as far as possible.\nThe auditor should expect that the Company has defined when and how the Master carries out the SMS reviews\naboard ship. The word \"periodically\" clarifies that the \"master’s review\" is not an isolated activity, it is an ongoing\ndynamic process aimed at continually improving the effectiveness of the safety management system.\nExamples of objective evidence found at office may include:\n- evidence that Master’s Reviews of SMS have been received from ships at defined intervals (at least annually);\n‘ISM Code - paragraph 6.1.2\n6.1 The Company should ensure that the Master is:\n.2 fully conversant with the Company’s safety management system;’\nThe Company should ensure that the Master is “fully conversant” with all requirements relating to the Company’s\nsafety and environmental protection policies.\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.2 requires that policy and procedures are formally reviewed at regular intervals to ensure robustness\nand effectiveness. Policy and procedures are reviewed at company defined intervals and amended as necessary.\nThis review may include feedback from:\n• Master’s review of the SMS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to:\n.5 periodically reviewing the SMS and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based management.\n6.1 The Company should ensure that the Master is:\n.2 fully conversant with the Company’s safety management system.\nInspection Guidance\nThe Master should be familiar with the layout and contents of the SMS and proficient in accessing the information it\ncontains, whether in hard copy or digital format. However, the Master should not be expected to have detailed\nknowledge of every procedure in the SMS.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure requiring the periodic review of the Safety Management\nSystem (SMS) by the Master, including:\n• •\n• The format and agenda for the review.\nThe frequency of the review (at least annual).\nA specified time frame for company responses to the review.\nThe review does not need to be done all at once, provided the complete SMS is reviewed within a twelve-month\nperiod. The review may include input from the shipboard management team and the safety committee.\nThe review should identify deficiencies in the SMS and suitable corrective action. It should contain suggestions for\nimprovement in the effectiveness of the SMS and should not simply be a tick box exercise.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Interview the Master to verify their overall knowledge of, and proficiency in using, the SMS.\nReview the last two Master’s Reviews of the SMS.\nReview the company responses to the last two Master’s Reviews.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The Safety Management System.\nThe last two Master’s Reviews.\nThe company responses to the last two Master’s Reviews.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• The Master was not familiar with the layout and contents of the SMS.\nThe Master was not proficient in accessing the information contained in the SMS, whether in hard copy or\ndigital format.\nThere was no company procedure requiring the periodic review of the Safety Management System (SMS)\nby the Master, including:\n• •\n• •\n• o\no\no\nThe format and agenda for the review.\nThe frequency of the review (at least annual).\nA specified time frame for company responses to the review.\nThe Master was not familiar with the company procedure requiring the periodic review of the Safety\nManagement System (SMS).\nMaster’s Reviews had not been performed at the frequency required by the company procedure.\nThe Master’s Review(s) had not been fully completed according to the company format and/or agenda.\nThe Master’s Review did not:\no Identify deficiencies in the SMS and suitable corrective action and/or,\no Contain suggestions for improvement in the effectiveness of the SMS.\nThe operator had not responded to the Master’s Review(s) within the specified timeframe.\n2.3. Structural Assessment", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the company procedure to", "c": "maintain the Enhanced Survey File in accordance with Classification Society rules, and\nwas the vessel free of any visible or documentary evidence of concerns with the\nstructural condition of the hull or cargo and ballast tank coatings?\nShort Question Text\nStructural concerns and Enhanced Survey File.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nPre-board, Main Deck, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.215 (82) Performance Standard for Protective Coatings for Dedicated Seawater Ballast Tanks.\nIMO: ESP Code\nIACS: Double Hull Tankers. Guidelines for Surveys Assessment and Repair of Hull Structures\nIACS: UR Z10.4 Rev\n16 May 2019 Hull Surveys of Double Hull Oil Tankers\nIACS: UR Z10.3 Rev\n19 May 2019 Hull Surveys of Chemical Tankers\nObjective\nTo ensure that the structure of oil and chemical tankers was subject to enhanced survey and complete\nhistorical records of any damage, deterioration and subsequent repairs to their hull structure were available\nonboard.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS: Double Hull Tankers Guidelines for Surveys Assessment and Repair of Hull Structures.\nIMO: ESP Code - International Code on the Enhanced Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers\nand Oil Tankers, 2011 (Resolution A.1049(27).\nIMO: MSC.215 (82) Performance Standard for Protective Coatings for Dedicated Seawater Ballast Tanks in All\nTypes of Ships…\n3.4 Coating Technical File.\n3.4.1 Specification of the coating system applied to the dedicated seawater ballast tanks and double skin spaces,\nrecord of the shipyard’s and shipowner’s coating work, detailed criteria for coating selection, job specifications,\ninspection, maintenance and repair shall be documented in the Coating Technical File and the Coating Technical File\nshall be reviewed by the Administration.\n3.4.3 In-service maintenance, repair and partial re-coating\nIn-service maintenance, repair and partial re-coating activities shall be recorded in the Coating Technical File, in\naccordance with the Guidelines for coating maintenance and repair.\n3.4.5 The Coating Technical File shall be kept on board and maintained throughout the life of the ship.\nIACS: UR Z10.4 Rev, 16 May 2019 Hull Surveys of Double Hull Oil Tankers\n2.2.3.1\nWhere provided, the condition of the corrosion prevention system of cargo tanks is to be examined.\nA Ballast Tank is to be examined at subsequent annual intervals where:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\na hard protective coating has not been applied from the time of construction, or\na soft or semi-hard coating has been applied, or\nsubstantial corrosion is found within the tank, or\nthe hard protective coating is found to be in less than GOOD condition and the hard protective coating is not\nrepaired to the satisfaction of the Surveyor.\nThickness measurements are to be carried out as deemed necessary by the surveyor.\nIACS: UR Z10.3 Rev, 19 May 2019 Hull Surveys of Chemical Tankers\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nThe frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of Class, Flag State and national authorities.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-2\n3. All dedicated seawater tanks arranged in oil tankers and bulk carriers constructed on or after 1 July 1998, for which\nparagraph 2 is not applicable, shall comply with the requirements of regulation II-1/3-2 adopted by resolution\nMSC.47(66).\n4. Maintenance of the protective coating system shall be included in the overall ship’s maintenance scheme…\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that the Enhanced Survey File is maintained up to\ndate as required by the vessel’s classification society.\nThe survey report records, which may be in electronic format, should be on board for the lifetime of the ship from at\nleast one year prior to the first special survey onwards and should include:\n• •\n• Reports of structural surveys.\nCondition evaluation reports.\nThickness measurement reports.\nSupporting documents should also be available onboard including:\n• •\nSurvey program.\nMain structural plans for cargo holds and ballast tanks.\n• •\n• •\nPrevious repair history.\nInspections by ship’s personnel with reference to:\no Structural deterioration in general,\no Leakages in bulkheads and piping,\no Condition of coating or corrosion prevention system, if any.\nAny other information that would help identify critical structure areas and/or suspect areas requiring\ninspection.\nThe Coating Technical File. (All oil tankers built after 1 July 1998)\nWhere the vessel had completed the first or subsequent special surveys, the vessel operator will have uploaded the\nmost recent Condition Evaluation Report to the document repository.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nReview the Enhanced Survey File and verify that all sections had been maintained up to date with the detail\nrequired by the vessel’s classification society.\nReview the previous repair history and identify any structural repairs completed during the preceding twelve\nmonths for comparison with the vessels defect reporting system.\nReview the condition evaluation report and note any spaces where the coating condition of cargo or ballast\ntanks was reported as fair or poor.\nReview the condition evaluation report and note any substantially corroded tanks/areas or areas with deep\npitting recorded in the extract of thickness measurements.\nReview the coating technical file and note any spaces where coating repairs had been recorded as having\nbeen undertaken.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel note any concerns with hull structural integrity such as cracking,\ndenting, distortion, significant* corrosion or thinning of structural members. (Significant* in this context is\nwastage which has visibly reduced the profile of a structural member.)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The Enhanced Survey File (which must be onboard for the lifetime of the ship from at least one year prior to\nthe first special survey).\nThe Coating Technical File, where required to be carried.\nSupporting documents required to be carried onboard according to the ESP Code.\nInspection reports for cargo, ballast and void spaces by ships personnel.\nIncident investigation reports relevant to structural damage and repair within the scope of the enhanced hull\nsurvey.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which required that the enhanced survey file, or electronic record, was\nmaintained in accordance with classification society guidance.\nThere was no company procedure which required that the coating technical file was maintained in\naccordance with classification society guidance.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for maintaining the enhanced survey\nfile, or electronic record, and the coating technical file.\nThe enhanced survey file was found to be missing required surveys and/or reports.\nInspections by ship’s staff had not been recorded.\nStructural repairs were recorded as having taken place during the previous twelve months within the\nenhanced survey file, but the vessel’s defect reporting system did not include a similar report.\nStructural repairs were reported to have taken place following a casualty/incident but there was no incident\ninvestigation report available onboard.\n• •\n• •\n• The condition evaluation report contained reports of substantially corroded tanks/areas or there were areas\nwith deep pitting recorded within the extract of thickness measurements. (summarize the extract)\nThe condition evaluation report or any subsequent classification society reports recorded fair or poor cargo\nand/or ballast tank coating condition. (report which tank(s) and rating assigned).\nCoating repairs were reported to have taken place within ballast tanks, but the coating technical file had not\nbeen updated accordingly.\nPhysical inspection of the vessel identified concerns with hull structural integrity such as cracking, denting,\ndistortion, significant* corrosion or thinning of structural members which had not been subject to an\noccasional class survey. (Where there is doubt as to whether corrosion or thinning is significant* use the\nHardware - slight superficial deterioration – comment option)\nWhere the vessel had completed a special survey and the condition evaluation report was not available\nonboard, record a comment within the Process response tool, recording the number of days elapsed since\nthe survey was completed.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.3.2.", "t": "Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar with the company procedure to", "c": "maintain the Class Survey File, and was the vessel free of any visible or documentary\nevidence of concerns with the structural condition of the hull or hold space and ballast\ntank coatings?\nShort Question Text\nStructural concerns and Class Survey File.\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Pre-board, Documentation\nPublications\nIACS: UR Z7.2 Rev\n6 Feb 2015 Hull Surveys of Liquefied Gas Carriers\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.215 (82) Performance Standard for Protective Coatings for Dedicated Seawater Ballast Tanks.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the structure of gas carriers was subject to the required surveys and complete historical\nrecords of any damage, deterioration and subsequent repairs to the hull structure were available on board.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-2\nProtective coatings of dedicated seawater ballast tanks in all types of ships and double-side skin spaces of bulk\ncarriers.\n1.\nParagraphs 2 and 4 of this regulation shall apply to ships of not less than 500 gross tonnage:\n1. for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 July 2008; or\n2. in the absence of a building contract, the keels of which are laid, or which are at a similar stage of\nconstruction on or after 1 January 2009; or\n3. the delivery of which is on or after 1 July 2012.\n4.Maintenance of the protective coating system shall be included in the overall ship’s maintenance scheme. The\neffectiveness of the protective coating system shall be verified during the life of a ship by the Administration, or an\norganization recognised by the Administration, based on the guidelines developed by the Organization.\nIMO: MSC.215(82) Performance standard for protective coatings for dedicated seawater ballast tanks in all\ntypes of ships and double-side skin spaces of bulk carriers.\n3.4 Coating Technical File\n3.4. 1 Specification of the coating system applied to the dedicated seawater ballast tanks and double-side skin\nspaces, record of the shipyard's and shipowner's coating work, detailed criteria for coating selection, job\nspecifications, inspection, maintenance and repair shall be documented in the Coating Technical File, and the\nCoating Technical File shall be reviewed by the Administration.\n3.4.3 In-service maintenance, repair and partial re-coating\nIn-service maintenance, repair and partial re-coating activities shall be recorded in the Coating Technical File, in\naccordance with the Guidelines for coating maintenance and repair.\n3.4.5 The Coating Technical File shall be kept on board and maintained throughout the life of the ship.\nIACS: UR Z7.2 Rev, 6 Feb 2015 Hull Surveys of Liquefied Gas Carriers\n4.2.2 Ballast tanks\n4.2.2.1 For ships between 5 and 10 years of age, an overall survey of representative ballast tanks is to be carried out.\nIf there is no hard protective coating, soft or semi-hard coating or POOR coating condition, the examination is to be\nextended to other ballast tanks of the same type.\n4.2.2.2 For ships over 10 years of age, an overall survey of all ballast tanks is to be carried out.\n4.2.2.3 If such examinations reveal no visible structural defects, the examination may be limited to a verification that\nthe corrosion prevention system remains efficient.\n4.2.2.4 For ballast tanks, excluding double bottom tanks, if there is no hard protective coating, soft or semi-hard\ncoating, or POOR coating condition and it is not renewed, the tanks in question are to be internally examined at\nannual intervals.\n4.2.2.5 When such conditions are found in double bottom ballast tanks, the tanks in question may be internally\nexamined at annual intervals.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nThe frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of Class, Flag State and national authorities.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the vessel’s Survey File is maintained complete\nand up to date. The file should include:\n• •\n• •\nClass status reports.\nSurvey reports.\nRepair history.\nCoating technical file, where required to be carried.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the Survey File and verify it has been maintained complete and up to date.\nReview the previous repair history and identify any structural repairs completed during the preceding twelve\nmonths for comparison with the vessel’s defect reporting system.\nReview the Coating Technical File, where required to be carried, and note any spaces where coating repairs\nhave been recorded as having been undertaken.\n• During the physical inspection of the vessel note any concerns with hull structural integrity such as cracking,\ndenting, distortion, significant* corrosion or thinning of structural members. (*‘Significant’ in this context is\nwastage which has visibly reduced the profile of a structural member.)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nSurvey File.\nCoating Technical File, where required to be carried.\nInspection reports for cargo, ballast, hold and void space inspections by ship’s personnel.\nIncident investigation reports relevant to structural damage and repair.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure to ensure the vessel’s Survey File is maintained complete and up to date.\nThe Master and/or Chief Engineer were not familiar with the company procedure to ensure the vessel’s\nSurvey File is maintained complete and up to date.\nThe Survey File was incomplete and did not include:\no Class status reports.\no Survey reports.\no Repair history.\no Coating Technical File, where required to be carried.\nMaintenance of the protective coating system was not included in the overall ship’s maintenance plan.\nStructural repairs were recorded within the Survey File as having taken place during the previous twelve\nmonths, but the vessel’s defect reporting system did not include a similar report.\nStructural repairs were recorded as having taken place following a casualty/incident but there was no\nincident investigation report available onboard.\nPhysical inspection of the vessel identified concerns with hull structural integrity such as cracking, denting,\ndistortion, significant* corrosion or thinning of structural members which had not been subject to an\noccasional class survey. (*Where there is doubt as to whether corrosion or thinning is significant, use the\nHardware - slight superficial deterioration – comment option.)\nA survey report contained details of substantially corroded tanks/areas or areas with deep pitting.\n(Summarise the relevant section of the report.)\nClassification society reports recorded fair or poor ballast tank coating condition. (Report which tank(s) and\nrating assigned).\nCoating repairs were reported to have taken place within ballast tanks, but the coating technical file, where\nrequired to be carried, had not been updated accordingly.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.3.3.", "t": "Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the company cargo, ballast & void", "c": "space inspection and reporting procedure and, were records available to demonstrate\nthat all inspections had been accomplished within the required time frame with reports\ncompleted in accordance with company instructions?\nShort Question Text\nCargo, ballast & void space inspection\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIACS Recommendation 87. Guidelines for Coating Maintenance and Repairs for Ballast Tanks.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the condition of cargo, ballast and void spaces was properly evaluated with defects to\nstructure, coating or fittings effectively managed.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS: Recommendation 87. Guidelines for Coating Maintenance and Repairs for Ballast Tanks and Combined\nCargo/Ballast Tanks on Oil Tankers.\n3. Coating maintenance and repairs\nb) Principles for maintenance and repair\niii In-service Condition Monitoring\nIt is therefore a pre-requisite that the owner initiate, as a minimum, an annual inspection of all tanks and spaces by\nthe ship’s crew, sometimes assisted by additional inspectors.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nThe frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of Class, Flag State and national authorities.\nIn addition, industry recommendations are taken into account.\nGuidance for inspection of compartments is provided, which may include industry/Class publications.\nRecords are compartment specific and made to a standard format that may include photographs as evidence of the\ncompartment’s condition.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\n2.\n3.\n4.\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for cargo, ballast and void space inspection which:\n• •\n• •\n• Define the frequency of inspections required for each type of space which includes, but is not limited to:\no Cargo tanks.\no Ballast tanks.\no Hold spaces.\no Void spaces, which includes pipe trunks and cofferdams.\nDefine the actions to be taken when an inspection cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nRequires that the condition of each space is reported in a standard format which includes details of:\no Structural deterioration and failure.\no The extent of any corrosion, pitting and wastage.\no The extent of any deterioration of the coating.\no Any leakages in bulkheads or pipework.\no The condition of cargo handling and monitoring equipment.\no The extent of sediment build-up.\nProvide guidance on the assessing and reporting of tank coating condition.\nRequire that defects relating to structure, coating or fittings are entered into the vessel’s defect reporting\nsystem for follow up.\nCargo tanks on oil and chemical tankers should be inspected by vessel staff at intervals of 2.5 years with a six-month\nwindow either side. The intention is that these inspections should align with the renewal and intermediate survey\nregimes.\nHold spaces on gas carriers should be inspected annually.\nBallast tanks, void spaces, pipe trunks and cofferdams on all vessel types should be inspected annually.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the required inspection frequency and date ranges for the previous cycle\nof inspections for cargo, ballast and void spaces through the pre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be\ninserted in the published inspection report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for cargo, ballast & void space inspection and\nreporting.\nVerify that the date ranges for the inspection of cargo, ballast and void spaces provided by the operator in\nthe pre-inspection questionnaire were accurate by spot checking inspection reports.\nReview several recent cargo, ballast or void space inspection reports and verify that the detail required by\nthe company inspection procedure had been recorded for each space on the dedicated inspection report\nforms.\nWhere defects relating to the structure, coating or fittings of a cargo, ballast or void space had been noted\nwithin an inspection report, verify that a defect report had been generated to follow up with the required\ncorrective actions.\nWhere conditions of class, memoranda or coating condition required more frequent inspections of cargo,\nballast and/or void spaces, confirm that required inspections had been completed and documented as\nrequired.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures, and any referenced industry publications, for inspection of cargo, ballast and void\nspaces.\nThe inspection reports for all cargo, ballast and void spaces for the previous full inspection cycle.\nOpen defect reports for any defects to tank structure, coatings or fittings.\nCommunications with class relating to any defects to tank structure since the previous renewal or\nintermediate survey.\nThe enclosed space entry records and permits for recent cargo, ballast and void space inspections.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the inspection of cargo/ballast/void spaces which gave clear\nguidance on the inspection frequency, the inspection process and reporting criteria.\nThe required inspection frequency for ballast and void spaces exceeded twelve months.\nThe required inspection frequency for cargo spaces on oil and chemical tankers exceeded thirty-six months.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company cargo/ballast/void space inspection procedure\nand/or reporting criteria.\nCargo, ballast or void space inspection(s) for any single space was overdue by more than a month\naccording to the company defined inspection period for the space(s) in question.\nAny cargo, ballast or void space had been omitted from the onboard inspection regime.\nThe cargo, ballast and/or void space inspection reports were not prepared in a standard format which\npermitted the reporting of coating and structural condition in defined areas of the space in question.\nDefects to tank structure, coating or fittings were reported in an inspection report but the defects(s) had not\nbeen transferred to the defect reporting system for subsequent corrective action.\nThere were open defect reports specifically related to damage or defects to tank structure.\nDefects to tank structure had not been reported to the vessel's Class Society for evaluation.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.3.4.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "detecting leakage of liquids between cargo, bunker, ballast, void and cofferdam spaces\nwhich included inspecting the surface of ballast water prior to discharge, and were\nrecords available to show that the necessary checks had been performed?\nShort Question Text\nMonitoring cargo, ballast & void spaces for leakage and contamination\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that leakage of liquids between adjacent cargo, bunker, ballast, void and cofferdam spaces or\nfrom pipelines passing through such spaces is detected.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.3.4 Monitoring of Void and Ballast Spaces.\nVoid and ballast spaces in the cargo tank block should be regularly monitored for leaks from nearby tanks. Monitoring\nshould include regular atmosphere checks for hydrocarbon content and regular sounding/ullaging of the empty\nspaces.\n12.6.5 Discharging Segregated Ballast.\nTo prevent contaminated segregated ballast causing pollution, where possible the surface of the ballast should be\nsighted before deballasting.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which described:\n• •\n• The requirement to inspect the surface of ballast water in tanks adjacent to cargo or bunker tanks, or where\noil pipes, including hydraulic lines, pass through the tank, prior to discharge overboard.\nThe requirement to sound empty tanks and spaces periodically to detect the migration of liquids from\nadjacent or remote spaces through either structural failure or pipeline leakages.\nThe requirement to monitor the level in full, or partially full, tanks periodically to detect the migration of\nliquids between adjacent or interconnected spaces.\n• •\n• The requirement to test ballast lines where they pass through cargo tanks or fuel tanks and record the\nresults.\nThe actions to take when ballast water is found contaminated.\nThe actions to take when there is evidence of migration of liquid between cargo, ballast, bunker, void or\ncofferdam spaces.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for checking for leakage of cargo, bunker oil,\nhydraulic oil and ballast into empty spaces and, for inspecting the surface of segregated ballast water prior\nto discharge.\nReview the sounding records for empty spaces and verify that soundings had been taken in accordance with\ncompany procedure.\nReview the records for ballast water discharge and verify that the surface of the ballast in each tank adjacent\nto a cargo or bunker tank or, with cargo, bunker or hydraulic lines passing through it, had been inspected for\ncontamination prior to discharge.\nReview the records of ballast line tests where they pass through cargo tanks or fuel tanks, if applicable.\nInspect the ballast tank sighting arrangements and verify that each tank adjoining a cargo or bunker tank, or\nwith cargo, bunker or hydraulic lines passing through it, could be readily inspected without the need to\nremove numerous bolts to remove the inspection hatch or, to make an enclosed space entry.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for sighting the surface of ballast water prior to discharge where the ballast tanks\nwere adjacent to a cargo or bunker tank or where oil pipes and/or hydraulic lines pass through the tanks.\nThe company procedure to periodically sound empty tanks to detect liquid migration due to structural failure\nor pipeline leakage.\nRecords demonstrating that the surface of ballast water had been inspected prior to discharge.\nRecords demonstrating that periodic soundings of empty spaces had been taken in accordance with\ncompany procedures.\nRecords demonstrating that the level in full and partially full tanks had been periodically verified to detect the\nmigration of liquid between adjacent or interconnected spaces.\nRecords of ballast line tests where they pass through cargo tanks or fuel tanks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure to periodically check empty spaces for ingress of liquids from adjoining\nspaces or pipeline leakage or, to check the surface of ballast water for contamination prior to discharge.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for periodically checking empty\nspaces for liquid ingress or monitoring the levels of full or partially full tanks for migration of liquid between\nspaces.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for inspecting the surface of ballast\nwater prior to discharge when a ballast tank adjoined a cargo or bunker tank or had piping containing oil\npassing through it.\nRecords determined that periodic checks to identify the ingress of liquids into empty spaces had not been\nconducted as required by the company procedures.\nRecords determined that the surface of ballast water contained in tanks adjacent to cargo or bunker tanks,\nor which had pipes containing oil passing through them, had not been inspected prior to discharge.\nRecords determined that ballast lines had not been tested where they passed through cargo tanks or fuel\ntanks.\nInspection of the ballast tank sighting arrangements determined that numerous bolts were required to be\nremoved from the inspection hatch or, an enclosed space entry was needed to be made, to inspect the\nsurface of the ballast water within a full tank.\nRecords determined that liquid leakage was detected in an empty space as a result of structural or pipeline\nfailure during the previous twelve months.\n• Records determined that ballast water or a ballast tank was contaminated by oil from an adjacent space or\npipeline leakage during the previous twelve months.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.3.5.", "t": "Had the vessel been enrolled in a Classification Society Condition Assessment", "c": "Programme (CAP)?\nShort Question Text\nCondition Assessment Program (CAP)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nNone\nObjective\nTo provide an objective assessment of the operational reliability of a vessel in critical areas at the request of\na vessel’s owner, typically at the third special survey and periodically thereafter.\nIndustry Guidance\nEach Classification Society has its own Condition Assessment Program criteria.\nTMSA KPI 4.3.4 requires that the frequency and extent of structural inspection of the vessel’s cargo, ballast and void\nspaces is determined on risk criteria which includes vessel’s age and type.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nEnrolment in a Condition Assessment Programme is voluntary and, where utilised, may provide a complete view of a\nship addressing the risks of pollution, structural failure and machinery downtime.\nA CAP rating has no validity date, but only reflects the condition of the vessel on the date of the onboard inspection.\nEach charterer defines the time validity of a CAP certificate within its own vetting and marine assurance procedures.\nCondition Assessment Programmes differ depending upon which classification society is commissioned to assess the\ncondition of a vessel, but common modules are:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nHull structure.\nPropulsion and auxiliary systems.\nCargo equipment and systems.\nCargo containment systems (for LPG and LNG Carriers).\nMachinery and cargo systems combined.\nBridge, navigation and radio equipment.\nThis question will only be generated for vessels that have passed their fifteenth anniversary from the initial delivery\ndate and, where the vessel operator had declared that the vessel had been awarded a CAP rating in at least one\nmodule.\nWhere a vessel had been subject to a Condition Assessment Programme, the vessel operator should have declared\nthe following through the pre-inspection questionnaire:\n• •\nThe date range of the survey upon which the CAP certificate had been based.\nThe CAP rating achieved for each module the survey was commissioned to evaluate.\nThe operator should have uploaded the CAP certificate to the document store.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nPre-Inspection\n• Review the CAP certificate uploaded to the document store and verify that the information contained therein\nmatched the date and rating for each module as declared by the operator.\nOn-board\n• Where the operator had not uploaded the CAP certificate to the document store, review the CAP certificate\navailable onboard and verify that the information contained within the pre-inspection questionnaire was\naccurate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The CAP certificate showing the completion date of the assessment survey and the final ratings for the\nmodules completed.\nWhere the CAP certificate only showed the issue date rather than the survey completion date, evidence to\nsupport the date(s) that the onboard survey was completed.\nAny information or records that supplemented the CAP certificate.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThe information provided by the operator in the pre-inspection questionnaire was inaccurate.\nThe vessel operator had claimed a CAP rating for modules that were still pending completion.\nThe date of the CAP survey was inaccurately declared as the CAP certificate issue date.\nThe operator did not upload the CAP certificate to the document store and the CAP certificate was not\navailable onboard for review.\n2.4. Defect Management", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.4.1.", "t": "Were the senior officers familiar with the company procedure for reporting defects", "c": "to vessel structure, machinery and equipment to shore-based management through the\ncompany defect reporting system and was evidence available to demonstrate that all\ndefects had been reported accordingly?\nShort Question Text\nDefect reporting system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Chief Engineer's Office, Anywhere\nPublications\nIACS: A Guide to Managing Maintenance in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS: Information Paper. Classification societies – what\nwhy and how?\nObjective\nTo ensure that defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment are documented and reviewed by\nmanagement.\nIndustry Guidance:\nIACS Information Paper. Classification Societies – what, why and how?\nSection B1 – The effectiveness of classification depends upon the shipbuilder, during construction, and the\nshipowner, once the vessel enters service, cooperating with the Class Society in an open and transparent manner on\nall issues which may affect its class status. For the shipowner, this particularly requires acting in good faith by\ndisclosing to the Class Society any damage or deterioration that may affect the vessel’s classification status. If there\nis the least question, the owner should notify class and schedule a survey to determine if the vessel is in compliance\nwith the relevant class standard.\nIACS: Rec. 2001/Rev.2 2018 A guide to managing maintenance in accordance with the requirements of the\nISM code\nReporting and investigation of technical deficiencies and non-conformities\nClause 10.2 of the ISM Code states that the company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported, with its\npossible cause, if known, and that appropriate corrective action is taken.\n(In this context, \"non-conformity\" should be taken to mean a technical deficiency which is a defect in, or failure in the\noperation of, a part of the ship's structure or its machinery, equipment or fittings. See also clause 9 of the ISM Code.)\nProblems reported may be discovered during routine technical inspections or maintenance, following a breakdown or\nan accident, or at any other time.\nThe Company’s responses should be aimed not only at the rectification of the immediate technical deficiency, but\nalso at addressing the underlying maintenance management system failures (non-conformities) that led to the\nproblem in the first place. Any lessons learned from the investigation of these failures should be examined for their\napplicability to other ships in the fleet, and the resulting trends and patterns should be used to identify opportunities\nfor continual improvement.\nThe fundamental elements of an effective defect- or non-conformity investigation process are shown in the following\ndiagram. Note that it is not enough simply to take corrective action. The effectiveness of such action must be verified\nTMSA KPI 4.1.2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet.\nThe defect reporting system covers all onboard equipment and includes Conditions of Class.\nThe defect reporting system may be linked to the planned maintenance system and may be computer-based.\nCompanies strive to correct any Conditions of Class without delay.\nThe defect reporting system includes:\n• •\n• •\nGuidance as to the nature of defects that are recorded and reported.\nRecording of any equipment failures or breakdowns including those identified by third parties, e.g. SIRE,\nPSC, CDI and barge inspection schemes.\nReporting defects to the shore management as appropriate.\nTracking of defects from failure to repair.\nIMO: ISM Code.\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a defect reporting system, which may be incorporated within the planned\nmaintenance system, that will be utilised to record all defects to structure, machinery and equipment as defined within\nthe company defect reporting procedure.\nThe procedure should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhat constitutes a defect to structure, machinery and equipment that must be reported through the defect\nreporting system. This should include:\no Navigation equipment.\no Engine machinery.\no Deck machinery.\no Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\no Hull structure.\no Electronic equipment.\nThe process for entering defects into the defect reporting system.\nThe timeline for entering a defect into the defect reporting system and then transmitting the report to the\nshore-based management.\nThe process for shore-based management to acknowledge a defect and assign a timeline for corrective\naction to be taken.\nThe process for establishing mitigating actions where the reported defect adversely affects the safe\noperation of the vessel.\nThe requirement to submit an incident report where a defect resulted in, or was the cause of, an incident as\ndefined elsewhere within company procedures.\nThe vessel should have prepared a printed list of all open defect reports existing onboard the vessel at the time of the\ninspection for the inspector’s use. The list of open defect reports should identify any defects that have resulted in a\nnotification to the vessel’s Classification Society and/or Flag Administration.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which described the management and\noperation of the defect report system.\nReview the entries in the defect reporting system and verify that they had been entered in accordance with\ncompany expectations, communicated to the shore management within the time frame specified and had\nbeen acknowledged.\nDuring the balance of the inspection note any obviously defective structure, machinery or equipment that\nwas not subject to a defect report for inclusion as an observation under this question.\nReview a sample defect report and confirm that a timeline for corrective action had been assigned and any\nmitigating actions had been conducted as directed by shore-based management.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for managing defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment through the\ndefect reporting system.\nThe defect reporting system or the planned maintenance system where the systems were integrated.\nShore based acknowledgement of each defect entered into the defect reporting system.\nA printed list of all open defects reports entered into the defect reporting system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no defect reporting system.\nThere was no company procedure for managing defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment\nthrough the defect reporting system.\nThe accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the company defect reporting procedure.\nDefects entered in the defect reporting system had not been acknowledged by shore management.\nDefects were evident onboard the vessel during the inspection that were required to be entered in the defect\nreporting system but were not.\no In such cases identify the defective equipment in the negative observation module of the Hardware\nresponse tool.\no Such observation should be limited to items listed on the supplements to the statutory certification\nor subject to class survey.\nDefects which had either caused an incident or were caused by an incident that had not been reported\nthrough the company incident reporting system for further investigation.\nWhere defects were properly recorded in the defect reporting system and acknowledged by shore management such\ndefects should not result in a negative observation under this question.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.4.2.", "t": "Where defects existed to the vessel’s structure, machinery or equipment, had the", "c": "vessel operator notified class, flag and/or the authorities in the port of arrival, as\nappropriate to the circumstances, and had short term certificates, waivers, exemptions\nand/or permissions to proceed the voyage been issued where necessary?\nShort Question Text\nDefect reporting to class, flag etc\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nIACS: Information Paper. Classification societies – what\nwhy and how?\nObjective\nTo ensure that defects affecting statutory certification or class required equipment are reported to the\nvessel’s Classification Society, Flag Administration and any affected stakeholders as appropriate.\nIndustry Guidance:\nIACS: Information Paper. Classification societies – what, why and how?\nSection B1 – The effectiveness of classification depends upon the shipbuilder, during construction, and the\nshipowner, once the vessel enters service, cooperating with the Class Society in an open and transparent manner on\nall issues which may affect its class status. For the shipowner, this particularly requires acting in good faith by\ndisclosing to the Class Society any damage or deterioration that may affect the vessel’s classification status. If there\nis the least question, the owner should notify class and schedule a survey to determine if the vessel is in compliance\nwith the relevant class standard.\nIACS: Unified Requirement Z13. Voyage repairs and Maintenance.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet.\nThe defect reporting system covers all onboard equipment and includes Conditions of Class.\nIMO : ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter I. Regulation 11\nMaintenance of conditions after survey.\nc) Whenever an accident occurs to the ship or a defect is discovered, either of which affects the safety of the ship or\nthe efficiency or completeness of its lifesaving appliances or other equipment, the master or owner of the ship shall\nreport at the earliest opportunity to the Administration…\nChapter II-1. Regulation 3-1 Structural, Mechanical and electrical requirements for ships.\nIn addition to the requirements contained elsewhere in the present regulations, ships shall be designed, constructed\nand maintained in compliance with the structural, mechanical and electrical requirements of a classification society\nwhich is recognized by the Administration in accordance with the provisions of regulation XI-1/1, or with applicable\nnational standards of the Administration which provide an equivalent level of safety.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for evaluating defects to a vessel’s structure, machinery and\nequipment to determine whether, when and how the vessel’s Classification Society, Flag Administration and/or other\nexternal stakeholders should be informed.\nThe procedure should define:\n• •\n• •\nWhich defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment should be reported to the vessel’s\nClassification Society, Flag Administration and/or other external stakeholders.\nWhen the defects are required to be reported to the vessel’s Classification Society, Flag Administration\nand/or other external stakeholders and by whom.\nWhere short term certificates and/or flag waivers have been issued, the external stakeholders that may need\nto be notified and by whom.\nThe records that must be maintained onboard to demonstrate that the appropriate notifications had been\nmade to the vessel’s Classification Society, Flag Administration and/or other external stakeholders.\nThe vessel should have prepared a printed list of all open defect reports existing onboard the vessel at the time of the\ninspection for the inspector’s use. The list of open defect reports should identify any defects that have resulted in a\nnotification to the vessel’s Classification Society and/or Flag Administration.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nReview the Class Status report and identify any conditions of class, memoranda or short-term certificates\nthat may indicate that there was a defect in the vessel’s structure, machinery or equipment.\nReview the vessel’s defect reporting system and identify any defects that would be reportable to the vessel’s\nClassification Society or Flag Administration and verify that they were either reported in the class status\nreport or communications were available to demonstrate that class and/or flag had been advised and that no\nfurther action was required.\nWhere the vessel had a short-term certificate or Flag Administration waiver verify that the vessel had notified\nexternal stakeholders of the vessel deficiency, where required to do so, through the pre-arrival processes\napplicable to the port of arrival or transit of controlled navigational areas.\nWhere the vessel’s Classification Society or Flag Administration had required that specific mitigating\nmeasures were taken as a condition of the issuing a short-term certificate or flag waiver, verify that the\nvessel had complied with the required measures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure for notifying the vessel’s Classification Society, Flag Administration and/or other\nexternal stakeholders of defects to the vessel’s structure, machinery and equipment.\nThe class status report – uploaded to the document portal.\n• •\n• •\n• The defect reporting system, or the planned maintenance system where systems were integrated.\nA printed list of open defect reports identifying any defects which had been reported to the vessel’s\nClassification Society and/or Flag Administration.\nCommunications from the shore-based management indicating the defect reports had been evaluated and\nthat no external reporting to the vessel’s Classification Society and/or Flag Administration was necessary or\nthat notifications had been made and no further reporting was required.\nCommunications from the vessel’s Classification Society or Flag Administration relating to any mitigating\nactions required as a condition of issuing a short-term certificate or flag waiver.\nPre-arrival notifications required by the port of arrival to demonstrate that defects affecting the vessels\noperations had been reported in accordance with local requirements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that defects to vessel structure, machinery and equipment\nwere evaluated by shore management to determine whether notifications to Class, Flag and/or other\nexternal stakeholders were required.\nThe senior officers were not familiar with the company procedure for notifying Class, Flag and/or other\nexternal stakeholders of defects to the vessel’s structure, machinery or equipment after shore management\nevaluation.\nThere were open defect reports in the defect reporting system which were of a significant nature but there\nwas no evidence that class, flag and/or external stakeholders had been informed in accordance with the\ncompany procedure. In this case identify the defective equipment in the negative observation module of the\nHardware response tool.\nClass, Flag or external stakeholders had imposed conditions on the vessel as a result of a defect to the\nstructure, machinery or equipment but the vessel had no evidence that the conditions had been complied\nwith.\nWhere no defects existed that had been notified to, or would have required notification to, the vessel’s Classification\nSociety, Flag Administration and/or other external stakeholders select \"Not Answerable\" in the Hardware response\ntool, then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".\n2.5. Management of Change", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.5.1.", "t": "Had the company Management of Change procedure been effectively implemented", "c": "for changes affecting structure, machinery and equipment governed by Classification\nSociety rules or statutory survey?\nShort Question Text\nManagement of Change\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAnywhere, Documentation\nPublications\nNone\nObjective\nTo ensure that any change made to the vessel structure, machinery or equipment is properly managed to\navoid an undesirable outcome.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS Information Paper. Classification societies – what, why and how?\nSection B1 – The effectiveness of classification depends upon the shipbuilder, during construction, and the\nshipowner, once the vessel enters service, cooperating with the Class Society in an open and transparent manner on\nall issues which may affect its class status.\nTMSA KPI 7.1.1 requires that there is a documented procedure for management of change.\nThe procedure addresses both permanent and temporary changes onboard and ashore. These may include:\n• Installation of new equipment and modification of existing equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a Management of Change (MOC) procedure which required that\nchanges to vessel structure, machinery and equipment follow a defined process. The procedure should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhat changes are subject to the MOC process.\nWhat changes can be excluded from the MOC process such as like for like replacements.\nThe process of documenting a request for change, the format of the request and the means of\ncommunicating the request to shore management.\nThe approval process before a change can be carried out.\nThe notification process for communicating approved changes to stakeholders.\nThe supplementary documentation required to support a change request.\n• •\nThe process to identify and document drawings, manuals, procedures, checklists etc. which will be affected\nby a change along with confirmation that updates to such documents have been undertaken on completion\nof the change.\nHow all changes subject to the MOC process will be indexed onboard through a database, register of\nchanges or traditional filing system.\nThe vessel operator should have declared any changes to vessel structure, machinery or equipment conducted within\nthe previous twelve months through the pre-inspection questionnaire. Details of the changes undertaken will be\ninserted in the inspection editor and reproduced in the final report.\nChanges of existing machinery and equipment for new ones with similar dimensions and characteristics, which do not\nentail changes in the vessel’s systems performance or operations or modifications of existing structures, may not be\nsubject to MOC process.\nThe scope of this question is limited to vessel structure, machinery and equipment regulated under any aspect of the\napplicable classification society rules or statutory survey of a vessel.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company MOC procedure.\nReview the pre-inspection questionnaire and identify whether the vessel operator had declared that any\napplicable changes have been carried out onboard within the previous twelve months.\nReview the vessel’s MOC register or database index.\nWhere changes falling within the scope of the company MOC procedure and this question had taken place,\nreview the provided management of change request, risk assessment and associated documentation.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel and review of documentation for other questions note any\napparent recent changes to vessel structure, machinery or equipment which may be within scope of this\nquestion but had not been declared.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s MOC register or database index.\nThe MOC requests for all changes to vessel structure, machinery and equipment conducted onboard the\nvessel during the previous twelve months.\nSupporting documents such as risk assessments, training plans, updated drawings lists etc. as identified\nwithin each MOC request form.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company MOC procedure covering changes affecting class and/or flag regulated structure,\nmachinery and equipment.\nThe accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the company MOC process, as it applied to changes\nfalling within the scope of this question, to structure, machinery and equipment onboard the vessel.\nChanges falling within the scope of this question to vessel structure, machinery or equipment, regulated by\nclass and/or flag, had been conducted within the previous twelve months but had not been declared on the\npre-inspection questionnaire.\nChanges to vessel structure, fittings or equipment, within the scope of this question, had been conducted\nwithin the previous twelve months but there was no approved MOC request form and supporting\ndocumentation onboard.\n2.6. Statutory Management Plans", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and engineer officers familiar with the vessel’s", "c": "Ballast Water Management Plan and were records available to demonstrate that ballast\nhandling had been conducted in accordance with the plan?\nShort Question Text\nBallast Water Management Plan\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: Ballast Water Management Convention and BWMS Code\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.252(67) Guidelines for port state control under the BWM Convention\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.288(71) 2017 Guidelines for ballast water exchange\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that ballast is always safely handled in accordance with the Ballast Water Management\nConvention and BWMS Code.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 12.6 - Ballast operations\nTMSA KPI 6.2.3 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of ballast handling operations.\nThese procedures may include :\n• •\nBallast water exchange.\nBallast water treatment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Ballast Water Management Convention and BWMS Code\nRegulation B-1\nBallast water management plan.\nEach ship shall have on board and implement a ballast water management plan. Such a plan shall be approved by\nthe Administration taking into account guidelines developed by the Organization. The ballast water management plan\nshall be specific to each ship and shall at least:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\ndetail safety procedures for the ship and the crew associated with ballast water management as required by\nthis Convention;\nprovide a detailed description of the actions to be taken to implement the ballast water management\nrequirements and supplemental ballast water management practices as set forth in this Convention\ndetail the procedures for the disposal of sediments:\n1. at sea, and\n2. to shore\ninclude the procedures for coordinating shipboard ballast water management that involves discharge to the\nsea with the authorities of the State into whose waters such discharge will take place;\ndesignate the officer on board in charge of ensuring that the plan is properly implemented;\ncontain the reporting requirements for ships provided for under this Convention; and\nbe written in the working language of the ship. If the language used is not English, French or Spanish, a\ntranslation into one of these languages shall be included.\nRegulation B-3 Ballast Water Management for Ships provides details of the dates by which ships must meet\nregulation D-2 (the provision and use of a ballast water treatment plant)\nIMO Resolution MEPC.252(67) Guidelines for port state control under the BWM Convention.\n1.3.2.10 a ship is required to report accidents or defects that affect its ability to manage ballast water to the flag state\nand the port state.\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.288(71) 2017 Guidelines for ballast water exchange.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have arranged for the vessel to be provided with a Ballast Water Management Plan\napproved by the Flag Administration and an International Ballast Water Management Certificate issued by the flag\nadministration.\nThe International Ballast Water Management Certificate will identify the principal ballast water management method\nto be used by the vessel.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which defined:\n• •\n• •\nWhen, where and how ballast is permitted to be loaded, discharged and exchanged and the processes that\nthe vessel is required to follow.\nHow ballast operations are to be recorded and by whom.\nThe actions the vessel must take if it cannot comply with any aspect of the approved Ballast Water\nManagement Plan.\nThe actions the vessel must take if the ballast water treatment plant, where fitted, becomes defective.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the Ballast Water Management Plan.\nSight the Ballast Water Management Certificate and identify the principal ballast water management\nmethod.\nReview the ballast water record book (which may be an electronic record system or be integrated into\nanother record book or system) and verify that recent ballast handling operations were conducted and\ndocumented in accordance with the Ballast Water Management Plan and Ballast Water Management\nCertificate.\nWhere ballast exchange had been undertaken, either as the principal ballast water management method or\nin addition to the use of a ballast water treatment plant, verify that the exchange was planned and conducted\nto minimize longitudinal and torsional stresses and other safety considerations identified in the IMO\nGuidelines for Ballast Water Exchange.\nWhere ballast water treatment or exchange had not been completed in accordance with the Ballast Water\nManagement Plan due to damage or defect to the ballast water treatment plant, review any communications\nwith the Flag and Port State Authorities and verify that any conditions placed on the vessel in respect of\nballast water management had been complied with and documented accordingly.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The Ballast Water Management Plan along with a copy of the Ballast Water Management Certificate.\nThe Ballast Water Record Book or equivalent.\nRecent cargo and ballast plans along with supporting operational records to verify the times and duration of\nballast operations.\nWhere ballast water exchange had taken place, the exchange plan showing the sequence of exchange and\nthe longitudinal stresses, draughts and trim at each stage of the operation.\nWhere the ballast water treatment system could not be used to conduct ballast water exchange in\naccordance with the Ballast Water Management Plan, notifications to the Flag and Port State Authorities\nadvising of the non-conformance.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel did not have a Ballast Water Management Plan or a valid Ballast Water Management Certificate.\nThe Ballast Water Management Plan was not approved by the Flag Sate or recognised organisation such as\na class society.\nThe Ballast Water Management Plan was not ship-specific.\nThe officer designated in the Ballast Water Management Plan to be in charge of ensuring that the plan was\nproperly implemented was not familiar with its contents.\nThe Ballast Water Management Plan was not written in the working language of the ship.\nThe accompanying deck or engineering officer was unfamiliar with the Ballast Water Management Plan, or\nthe entries required to be made in the ballast water record book.\nThe Ballast Water Record Book had not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.\nWhere ballast water exchange had taken place there was no plan showing the sequential exchange of\nballast which included the longitudinal stress at each stage of the operation.\nThe ballast water treatment plant was reported to be defective in any respect.\nWhere ballast operations had not been completed in accordance with the Ballast Water Management Plan\ndue to defect or accident to the ballast water treatment plant there was no evidence that the Flag and / or\nPort State Authorities had been notified.\nWhere Flag or Port State Authorities had imposed conditions on the vessel due to the failure of the ballast\nwater treatment plant, the vessel had not complied with the conditions imposed.\nThere was evidence that the ballast water treatment plant had been bypassed in contravention to the Ballast\nWater Management Plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.6.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the VOC Management Plan, and had the", "c": "procedures for minimising VOC emissions set out in the Plan been implemented and\ndocumented as required?\nShort Question Text\nVOC Management Plan.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.185(59) Guidelines for the development of a VOC Management Plan\nOCIMF: Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Cargo Systems on Oil Tankers. First Edition 2019.\nObjective\nTo ensure VOC emissions are minimised by implementation of the VOC Management Plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Cargo Systems on Oil Tankers. First Edition 2019.\n7. Operational procedures and Volatile Organic Compound Management Plan.\nThe purpose of the VOC Management Plan is to ensure that tanker operations, to which regulation 15.6 of MARPOL\nAnnex VI applies, prevent or minimise VOC emissions as much as possible…\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.185(59) Guidelines for the development of a VOC Management Plan\n1 Objectives\n.1 The purpose of the VOC management plan is to ensure that the operation of a tanker, to which regulation 15 of\nMARPOL Annex VI applies, prevents or minimizes VOC emissions to the extent possible.\n.2 Emissions of VOCs can be prevented or minimized by:\n1.\n2.\noptimizing operational procedures to minimize the release of VOC emissions; and/or\nusing devices, equipment, or design changes to prevent or minimize VOC emissions.\n.3 To comply with this plan, the loading and carriage of cargoes which generate VOC emissions should be evaluated\nand procedures written to ensure that the operations of a ship follow best management practices for preventing or\nminimizing VOC emissions to the extent possible. If devices, equipment, or design changes are implemented to\nprevent or minimize VOC emissions, they shall also be incorporated and described in the VOC management plan as\nappropriate.\n.4 While maintaining the safety of the ship, the VOC management plan should encourage and, as appropriate, set\nforth the following best management practices:\n1.\nthe loading procedures should take into account potential gas releases due to low pressure and, where\npossible, the routing of oil from crude oil manifolds into the tanks should be done so as to avoid or minimize\nexcessive throttling and high flow velocity in pipes;\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nthe ship should define a target operating pressure for the cargo tanks. This pressure should be as high as\nsafely possible, and the ship should aim to maintain tanks at this level during the loading and carriage of\nrelevant cargo.\nwhen venting to reduce tank pressure is required, the decrease in the pressure in the tanks should be as\nsmall as possible to maintain the tank pressure as high as possible.\nthe amount of inert gas added should be minimized. Increasing tank pressure by adding inert gas does not\nprevent VOC release but it may increase venting and therefore increased VOC emissions; and\nwhen crude oil washing is considered, its effect on VOC emissions should be taken into account. VOC\nemissions can be reduced by shortening the duration of the washing or by using a closed cycle crude oil\nwashing programme.\n2 Additional considerations\n.1 A person in charge of carrying out the plan\n1.\nA person shall be designated in the VOC management plan to be responsible for implementing the plan and\nthat person may assign appropriate personnel to carry out the relevant tasks.\n.2 Procedures for preventing or minimizing VOC emissions\n1.\n2.\nShip-specific procedures should be written or modified to address relevant VOC emissions, such as the\nfollowing operations:\n1. Loading.\n2. Carriage of relevant cargo; and\n3. Crude oil washing.\nIf the ship is equipped with VOC reduction devices or equipment, the use of these devices or equipment\nshould be incorporated into the above procedures as appropriate.\n.3 Training\n1.\nThe plan should describe the training programmes to facilitate best management practices for the ship to\nprevent or minimize VOC emissions.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels. Procedures may include\n• VOC management\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nChapter 3 Regulation 15\n6. A tanker carrying crude oil shall have on board and implement a VOC management plan approved by the\nAdministration. Such a plan shall be prepared taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization. The\nplan shall be specific to each ship and shall at least:\n1.\nProvide written procedures for minimizing VOC emissions during the loading, sea passage and discharge of\ncargo.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nGive consideration to the additional VOC generated by crude oil washing\nIdentify a person responsible for implementing the plan, and\nFor ships on international voyages, be written in the working language of the Master and officers and, if the\nworking language of the master and officers is not English, French or Spanish, include a translation into one\nof those languages.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a VOC Management Plan, to be implemented when carrying crude oil.\nThis Plan should be ship specific and include:\n• •\n• •\n• Written procedures for minimising VOC emissions during the loading, carriage and discharge, including\ncrude oil washing, of crude oil cargoes.\nThe identity of the person on board responsible for implementing the Plan.\nThe records that are required to be maintained to demonstrate compliance with the Plan.\nA target operating pressure for the cargo tanks during loading and carriage of crude oil cargoes.\nTraining programmes for ship’s crew involved in cargo operations.\nThe cargo and ballast transfer plan and crude oil washing plan should be developed to include the requirements of\nthe VOC Management Plan.\nThe target operating pressure for the cargo tanks should be clearly indicated in the cargo control room.\nThis question will only be allocated to oil tankers where the vessel operator had declared that the vessel was\nprovided with a VOC Management Plan through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the VOC Management Plan.\nReview the records of cargo operations and tank pressures at different stages of the voyage required to be\nmaintained by the VOC Management Plan.\nReview the records required to be maintained by the VOC Management Plan and verify that they were being\nmaintained for all stages of the voyage and cargo handling operations.\nReview the cargo plan and verify that it considered any requirements of the VOC management plan\napplicable to the operation.\nReview the VOC Management Plan training records.\nInterview the person identified as responsible for implementing the Plan to verify their familiarity with the\ncontents and any specific record keeping requirements.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their awareness of:\no The VOC Management Plan.\no Any actions required to be completed during the ongoing cargo operation to comply with the Plan.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The VOC Management Plan.\nVOC Management Plan training records.\nRecords required to be maintained to demonstrate compliance with the Plan.\nThe cargo plan for the ongoing cargo operation.\nThe deck logbook.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe VOC Management Plan was not approved by the Flag State or recognised organisation such as a Class\nSociety.\nThe VOC Management Plan was not ship specific.\nThe VOC Management Plan was not in a language readily understood by the Master and officers.\nThe person identified as responsible for implementing the VOC Management Plan was not familiar with its\ncontents.\nThe accompanying officer was not aware of the VOC Management Plan or familiar with the actions\nnecessary to comply with the provisions of the Plan (which may be incorporated in the cargo transfer plan).\nThere was no evidence that the training programmes set out in the VOC Management Plan had been\nimplemented.\nThere was no evidence that the procedures for minimising VOC emissions set out in the Plan had been\nimplemented during routine crude oil loading, carriage, discharge and crude oil washing.\nThe target operating pressure for the cargo tanks was not clearly indicated in the cargo control room.\nRecords required to be maintained by the VOC Management Plan had not been maintained for all occasions\nwhen crude oil was being loaded, carried and discharged, including crude oil washing.\nCargo tank pressure was maintained significantly below the target operating pressure during loading and/or\ncarriage of crude oil, by venting to atmosphere.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.6.3.", "t": "Were the Master and senior officers familiar with the contents and requirements of", "c": "the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and had these been fully\nimplemented?\nShort Question Text\nShip Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.282(70) 2016 Guidelines for the development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan\n(SEEMP)\nObjective\nTo ensure the measures set out in the SEEMP to improve fuel efficiency and collect fuel consumption data\nhave been fully implemented.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.282(70) 2016 Guidelines for the development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management\nPlan (SEEMP)\n3.6 Part I of the SEEMP should be developed as a ship-specific plan by the company and should reflect efforts to\nimprove a ship's energy efficiency through four steps: planning, implementation, monitoring, and self-evaluation and\nimprovement. These components play a critical role in the continuous cycle to improve ship energy efficiency\nmanagement. With each iteration of the cycle, some elements of part I will necessarily change while others may\nremain as before.\n4.1.2 Recognizing that there are a variety of options to improve efficiency – speed optimization, weather routing and\nhull maintenance, for example – and that the best package of measures for a ship to improve efficiency differs to a\ngreat extent depending upon ship type, cargoes, routes and other factors, the specific measures for the ship to\nimprove energy efficiency should be identified in the first place. These measures should be listed as a package of\nmeasures to be implemented, thus providing the overview of the actions to be taken for that ship.\n6.2 With respect to part II of the SEEMP, these Guidelines provide guidance for developing a ship-specific method to\ncollect, aggregate, and report ship data with regard to annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours\nunderway and other data required by regulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to be reported to the Administration.\n7.1 Fuel oil consumption should include all the fuel oil consumed on board including but not limited to the fuel oil\nconsumed by the main engines, auxiliary engines, gas turbines, boilers and inert gas generator, for each type of fuel\noil consumed, regardless of whether a ship is underway or not.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.1 requires that an environmental protection policy and management plan is in place. The policy,\nwhich is signed by senior management, includes a commitment to minimising the environmental impact of operations.\nThe policy is conspicuously posted onboard vessels and in company offices ashore. All company personnel including\nthird party contractors are aware and familiar with the policy.\nThe environmental management plan may include:\n• Energy management and efficiency.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nChapter 4 Regulation 6\nIssue of endorsement of Certificates and Statement of Compliance related to fuel oil consumption reporting\nStatement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting\n6. Upon receipt of reported data pursuant to regulation 22A.3 of this Annex, the Administration or any organisation\nduly authorized by it* shall determine whether the data has been reported in accordance with regulation 22A of the\nAnnex and, if so, issue a Statement of Compliance related to fuel oil consumption to the ship no later than five\nmonths from the beginning of the calendar year. In every case the Administration assumes full responsibility for this\nStatement of Compliance\nRegulation 22\nShip Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP)\n1. Each ship shall keep on board a ship-specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). This may form\npart of the Ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).\nOn or before 31 December 2018, in the case of a ship of 5,000 gross tonnage and above, the SEEMP shall include a\ndescription of the methodology that will be used to collect the data required by regulation 22A.1 of this Annex and the\nprocesses that will be used to report the data to the ship’s Administration.\nThe SEEMP shall be developed taking into account guidelines adopted by the Organization.\nRefer to 2016 Guidelines for the development of a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) (resolution\nMEPC.282(70)\nRegulation 22A\n1 From calendar year 2019, each ship of 5,000 gross tonnage and above shall collect data specified in Appendix IX\nto this Annex, for that and each subsequent calendar year or portion thereof, as appropriate according to the\nmethodology included in the SEEMP.\n2 except as provided for in paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of this regulation, at the end of each calendar year, the ship shall\naggregate the data collected in that calendar year or portion thereof, as appropriate.\n3 except as provided for in paragraphs 4,5 and 6 of this regulation, within three months after the end of each calendar\nyear, the ship shall report to its Administration or any organization duly authorised by it, the aggregated value for\neach datum specified in appendix IX to this Annex, via electronic communication and using a standardized format to\nbe developed by the Organization.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a ship-specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). This\nmay form part of the Ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).\nPart I of the SEEMP should contain ship-specific measures to improve the ship's energy efficiency, and details for\ntheir implementation, such as:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Improved voyage planning.\nWeather routeing.\nJust in time arrival.\nSpeed optimization.\nOptimum trim.\nOptimum use of rudder and heading control systems (autopilots).\nHull maintenance.\nPart II should set out the method of collecting, aggregating and reporting the ship’s annual fuel consumptions to the\nflag administration, including the:\n• •\n• •\n• List of the ship’s engines and other fuel consumers and the fuel types used.\nMethod to measure fuel consumption.\nMethod to measure distance travelled.\nMethod to measure hours underway.\nProcesses to be used to report the data to the flag administration.\nThe vessel should have been issued with a Statement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting, which will\nconfirm that the requirements of the SEEMP Part II had been met during the previous year.\nThe vessel's EEDI number will be extracted from HVPQ 1.1.12 and inserted in the inspection editor and the final\nreport.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and review the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).\nSight and review the documentary evidence that the package of measures listed in the SEEMP Part I to\nimprove the ship’s energy efficiency had been implemented and/or monitored.\nSight and review, where applicable, records of the collection, aggregation, and reporting of ship data with\nregard to annual fuel oil consumptions.\nInterview the Master and/or the Chief Engineer to verify their familiarity with the contents and requirements\nof the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nShip Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).\nDocumentary evidence that the package of measures listed in the SEEMP Part I to improve the ship’s\nenergy efficiency had been implemented and/or monitored, which may be contained in bridge and engine\nlogbooks etc.\nOn ships of 5,000 gross tonnage or above, records of the collection, aggregation, and reporting of ship data\nwith regard to annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours underway and other data required by\nregulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to the flag Administration.\nStatement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting, for ships of 5,000 gross tonnage or above.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The Master and/or the Chief Engineer were not familiar with the contents and requirements of the Ship\nEnergy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).\nThe SEEMP Part I did not contain a package of measures to improve the ship's energy efficiency, and\ndetails for their implementation, such as:\no Improved voyage planning.\no Weather routeing.\no Just in time arrival.\no Speed optimization.\no Optimum trim.\no Optimum use of rudder and heading. control systems (autopilots).\no Hull maintenance.\nThe package of measures listed in the SEEMP Part I to improve the ship’s energy efficiency was not ship\nspecific.\nThere was no evidence that the package of measures listed in the SEEMP Part I to improve the ship’s\nenergy efficiency had been implemented and/or monitored.\nOn a ship of 5,000 gross tonnage or above:\no The SEEMP Part II did not include a description of the ship-specific method to collect, aggregate,\nand report ship data with regard to annual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours underway\nand other data required by regulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to be reported to the flag\nadministration.\no A Statement of Compliance – Fuel Oil Consumption Reporting had not been issued.\no There were no records of the collection, aggregation, and/or reporting of ship data with regard to\nannual fuel oil consumption, distance travelled, hours underway and other data required by\nregulation 22A of MARPOL Annex VI to the flag administration.\no Records of fuel consumptions did not include all the fuel oil consumed on board, regardless of\nwhether the ship was underway or not:\n By the main engines, auxiliary engines, gas turbines, boilers and inert gas generator, if\nfitted, and any other fuel consumer.\n For each type of fuel oil consumed e.g. HFO, DO, LNG etc.\n2.7. Safety Management System", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.7.1.", "t": "Was the relevant content of the SMS manuals easily accessible to all personnel on", "c": "board in a working language(s) understood by them?\nShort Question Text\nAvailability of SMS content to all crew.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that all personnel on board can access and understand the procedures and instructions relevant\nto them, set out in the ship’s SMS manuals.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.4 requires that procedures and instructions are easily accessible to personnel and available at\nappropriate locations. Sufficient electronic or hard copies of procedures and instructions are easily accessible to all\npersonnel, including contractors, at appropriate locations which may include:\n• Onboard vessels.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.6 The Company should establish procedures by which the ship’s personnel receive relevant information on the\nSMS in a working language or languages understood by them.\n11 Documentation\n11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to\nthe SMS.\n11.2 The Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nvalid documents are available at all relevant locations;\nchanges to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and\nobsolete documents are promptly removed.\n11.3 The documents used to describe and implement the SMS may be referred to as the Safety Management\nManual. Documentation should be kept in a form that the Company considers most effective. Each ship should carry\non board all documentation relevant to that ship.\nInspection Guidance\nThe content of the SMS manuals:\n• •\nMay be provided in electronic format or in hard copy.\nMust be available to all personnel on board, in whatever form.\n• •\n• Must be in a working language(s) understood by all the crew.\nShould be in a ‘user friendly’ format and easily accessible.\nShould be relevant to the ship.\nIf the manuals are only available in electronic format, all personnel must have ready access to a work-station and\nadequate training in accessing the SMS in that manner.\nIn any case, the operator’s navigation procedures and instructions must be available on the bridge. If provided there\nin electronic format only, a back-up independent means of power supply to the work-station must be provided.\nProcedures should be in place:\n• •\nFor the control of all documentation, including the SMS manuals. All copies on board must be up to date,\nand obsolete documentation should be removed from all locations.\nTo ensure that changes to the SMS are promptly brought to the attention of the appropriate on- board\npersonnel and understood.\nThe vessel operator should have declared in which language(s) the SMS had been prepared through the PreInspection Questionnaire. This information will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the SMS manuals, whether in electronic format or in hard copy.\nSight, and where necessary review, evidence that changes to the SMS are promptly brought to the attention\nof the appropriate on-board personnel and understood (which may be documentary or electronic).\nVerify there is easy access to the navigation procedures and instructions on the bridge, whether in electronic\nformat or in hard copy.\nDuring the inspection, note versions of procedures and checklists etc. in use for consistency.\nInterview a rating at random to verify that they have easy access to the relevant content of the SMS manuals\nin a working language they understand and are familiar with the means of accessing the SMS manuals.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nSMS manuals.\nEvidence that changes to the SMS are promptly brought to the attention of the appropriate on-board\npersonnel and understood (which may be documentary or electronic).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The SMS manuals were not ‘user friendly’ and ship staff found it difficult and/or time consuming to navigate\nto the appropriate information.\nA significant proportion of the content of the SMS manuals was not relevant to the ship e.g. described\nprocedures for general cargo ships, container ships or bulk carriers.\nManuals were in hard-copy format but there were insufficient copies at appropriate locations.\nManuals were only available in electronic format, but not all personnel had ready access to a work-station\nand/or adequate training in accessing the SMS.\nThe operator’s navigation procedures and instructions were not available on the bridge.\nThe operator’s navigation procedures and instructions were available on the bridge in electronic format only,\nbut a back-up independent means of power supply to the work-station was not provided.\nAll or some of the copies of the SMS manuals had not been updated with the latest changes.\n• •\n• •\n• Obsolete documentation, such as procedures or checklists which had been revised and superseded, were in\nuse on board.\nThere was no procedure to ensure that changes to the SMS were promptly brought to the attention of the\nappropriate on- board personnel and understood.\nThere was no evidence that changes to the SMS had been promptly brought to the attention of the\nappropriate on-board personnel and understood.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the process to access the sections of the SMS relevant to their\nrole.\nAn interviewed rating was not able to understand the sections of the SMS manuals relevant to their role\nonboard in the language(s) in which they were provided.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.7.2.", "t": "Did the SMS identify clear levels of authority and lines of communication between", "c": "the Master, ship's officers, ratings and the company, and were all onboard personnel\nfamiliar with these arrangements as they related to their position?\nShort Question Text\nCommunication lines with the company and DPA.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating, Interview Senior Officer\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS Recommendation No.41 (Rev.5 Oct 2019) Guidance for Auditors to the ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure all onboard personnel understand the levels of authority and lines of communication between the\nMaster, ship's officers, ratings and the company as they relate to their position.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\n1.3 Company policy and procedures\nThe ISM Code requires every company to have an SMS which covers instructions and procedures to ensure safe\noperation of ships and protection of the environment. This should include practical guidance on navigational safety\nincluding:\n• Company contacts, including the Designated Person Ashore (DPA);\nThe SMS should identify clear levels of authority and lines of communication between the Master, ship's officers,\ncrew and the Company.\nIACS Recommendation No.41 (Rev.5 Oct 2019) Guidance for Auditors to the ISM Code\n4. Designated Person(s)\nIt is commonly believed that the DP must be made responsible for the entire administration of the management\nsystem documentation, for the planning and conduct of internal audits, and must act as the sole conduit for all\ncontacts between the ships’ staff and the organization ashore. This is not the case. It is better to think of the DP as\nthe person responsible for ensuring that such processes are in place and operating as required, a role that is more\nlikely to be effective when separated from the practical implementation.\nTMSA KPI 1A.2.2 requires that managers’ roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for achieving objectives are\ndefined within the SMS. Ways of demonstrating that roles and responsibilities are defined may include\n• •\nOrganisational charts, including reporting lines.\nJob descriptions, including responsibilities and accountability.\nIMO: ISM Code\n3.2 The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who\nmanage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting safety and pollution prevention.\n4 Designated Person(s)\nTo ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company and those on board, every\nCompany, as appropriate, should designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of\nmanagement. The responsibility and authority of the DP or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution\nprevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are\napplied, as required.\n5 Master’s responsibility and authority\n5.2 The company should ensure that the safety management system operating onboard the ship contains a clear\nstatement emphasizing the master’s authority. The company should establish in the safety management system that\nthe master has overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution\nprevention and to request the company’s assistance as may be necessary.\nInspection Guidance\nThe SMS manuals should identify clear levels of authority and lines of communication between the Master, ship's\nofficers, ratings and the company. Schematics or flowcharts to document lines of authority and inter-relations\nbetween roles are acceptable.\nAll officers and ratings should be aware of the identity, contact details and role of the DPA.\nSenior officers should also be familiar with the key members of the operator’s organisation ashore to facilitate\neffective communication in matters relating to safety and environmental protection. Examples are the person(s)\nresponsible for navigational standards and the vessel’s technical superintendent.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the documented levels of authority and lines of communication between\nthe Master, ship's officers, ratings and the company documented in the SMS manuals.\n• Interview a senior officer to verify that they are familiar with the lines of communication with the key\nmembers of the operator’s organisation ashore, including the DPA.\nInterview a junior officer or rating to verify that they are aware of the identity, contact details and role of the\nDPA.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\nThe SMS manual showing documented levels of authority and lines of communication between the Master,\nship's officers, ratings and the company.\nThe means of informing all officers and ratings of the identity and contact details of the DPA.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• The SMS did not identify clear levels of authority and lines of communication between the Master, ship's\nofficers, ratings and the Company.\nA senior officer was not familiar with the lines of communication with the key members of the operator’s\norganisation ashore.\nAn interviewed junior officer or rating was not aware of the identity, contact details and role of the DPA.\n2.8. General Information", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.8.1.", "t": "Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) available", "c": "through the OCIMF SIRE Programme database completed accurately to reflect the\nstructure, outfitting, management and certification of the vessel?\nShort Question Text\nHVPQ accurately completed.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nNone\nObjective\nTo ensure that the information contained within the OCIMF HVPQ provides an accurate dataset for use by\nSIRE 2.0 programme participants.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have updated the HVPQ in preparation for the inspection to ensure that all static and\ndynamic information is complete and accurate.\nThe HVPQ will not be released to the inspector through the inspection editor unless the vessel operator had declared\nthrough the inspection booking process that the information contained within the HVPQ was updated, complete and\naccurate.\nThe CVIQ used during the inspection will be compiled in part from the data contained within the HVPQ, therefore it is\ncritical that the information provided is accurate.\nThe inspection editor software will receive the information necessary to complete the inspection when the inspector\nsynchronises the tablet software with the OCIMF database prior to the inspection.\nTo ensure that the information provided through the HVPQ is correct as far as can be determined, and the inspector\nhas familiarised themselves with the vessel, the inspector is required to review the HVPQ and other supporting\ndocumentation prior to boarding the vessel.\nTo assist in the review, all certificates and documents available within the OCIMF certificate repository will be\nuploaded to the inspection editor software.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nPrior to boarding the vessel:\n• Review the HVPQ downloaded to the inspection editor, and with reference to documents and certificates\nmade available through the inspection editor:\no Verify, as far as possible, the accuracy of:\n 1 General information.\n 2 Certificates.\n 3 Crew.\n 4 Navigation.\n 7 Structural condition.\no\n 12 Propulsion.\nConduct a general review of the HVPQ and make a note of:\n Any information which appears inconsistent with the type and specialisation of the vessel.\n Any information which will assist in better understanding the background of the questions\nassigned to the bespoke VIQ for the inspection.\nWhile onboard the vessel:\n• •\n• Clarify any inconsistencies identified within the HVPQ with the Master or an appropriate officer.\nInform the Master of any verified errors or omissions within the HVPQ.\nDocument any verified errors or omissions within the HVPQ in accordance with the guidance provided.\nExpected Evidence\nThe following certificates and documents will be provided, as applicable to the vessel, through the inspection\nsoftware:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nHVPQ.\nSIRE Crew matrix.\nClass Status Summary Report (CSSR) (Owners version).\nBallast Water Management Certificate.\nCertificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Chemicals or Gas.\nCertificate of Registry.\nCivil Liability Convention (1992) Certificate.\nCondition Assessment Programme (CAP) Certificate.\nContinuous Synopsis Record.\nDocument of Compliance (DOC).\nInternational Ship Security Certificate.\nIOPP Certificate, supplemented by Form A or B.\nLoad Line Certificate.\nMaritime Labour Convention (2006).\nMinimum Safe Manning Document.\nNoxious Liquid Substances (NLS) Certificate.\nP & I Club entry document.\nSafety Construction Certificate.\nSafety Equipment Certificate, supplemented by Form E.\nSafety Management Certificate.\nSafety Radio Certificate, supplemented by Form R.\nStatement of Compliance supplement.\nU.S. Coastguard Certificate of Financial Responsibility.\nU.S. Coastguard Certificate of Compliance.\nU.S. Coastguard Letter of Compliance.\nU.S. Coastguard Vessel Spill Response Plan approval letter.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\nWhere the information provided within the HVPQ misrepresented the details of the vessel through multiple systemic\ninaccuracies or omissions relating to ownership, class status, validity of certification or outfitting of the vessel:\n• Make an observation within the process response tool and add a comment to identify which questions were\nprovided with inaccurate information.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "2.8.2.", "t": "Were records of the most recent Port State Control inspection available onboard,", "c": "and where deficiencies had been recorded had these been corrected and closed out in\naccordance with the company procedure for defects or non-conformities?\nShort Question Text\nLast Port State Control Inspection.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nNone\nObjective\nTo provide an accurate record of the most recent Port State Control (PSC) Inspection.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: PSC Inspection Repository.\nThe PSC inspection Repository is an addition to the SIRE database to provide a convenient way for ship operators to\ndisseminate details of PSC inspections on board their vessels.\nShip operators are invited to, on a voluntary basis, upload details of PSC inspections that have occurred on board\ntheir vessels. Ship operators upload these documents at their own risk in the full knowledge that any OCIMF member,\nSIRE Programme Recipient, member of registered port state entities who participate in the SIRE system can view,\ndownload, save or print any or all of these documents.\nIMO: Port State Control (IMO Website)\nPort State Control (PSC) is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship and\nits equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in\ncompliance with these rules.\nThese inspections were originally intended to be a back up to flag State implementation, but experience has shown\nthat they can be extremely effective. The Organization adopted resolution A.682(17) on Regional co-operation in the\ncontrol of ships and discharges promoting the conclusion of regional agreements. A ship going to a port in one\ncountry will normally visit other countries in the region and it can, therefore, be more efficient if inspections can be\nclosely coordinated in order to focus on substandard ships and to avoid multiple inspections.\nThis ensures that as many ships as possible are inspected but at the same time prevents ships being delayed by\nunnecessary inspections. The primary responsibility for ships' standards rests with the flag State - but port State\ncontrol provides a \"safety net\" to catch substandard ships.\nNine regional agreements on port State control - Memoranda of Understanding or MoUs - have been signed: Europe\nand the north Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar);\nCaribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the\nMediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU. The United States\nCoast Guard maintain the tenth PSC regime.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.2 requires that a defect reporting system is in place for each vessel within the fleet.\nThe defect reporting system covers all onboard equipment and includes Conditions of Class.\nThe defect reporting system may be linked to the planned maintenance system and may be computer-based.\nCompanies strive to correct any Conditions of Class without delay.\nThe defect reporting system includes:\n• •\n• •\nGuidance as to the nature of defects that are recorded and reported.\nRecording of any equipment failures or breakdowns including those identified by third parties, e.g. SIRE,\nPSC, CDI and barge inspection schemes.\nReporting defects to the shore management as appropriate.\nTracking of defects from failure to repair.\nIMO: ISM Code.\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have provided the details of the last three Port State Control Inspections through the PreInspection Questionnaire (PIQ) as follows:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDate of inspection.\nPort of inspection.\nPSC MOU Authority.\nNumber of deficiencies recorded.\nWas the vessel detained.\nWas the inspection data entered in the OCIMF PSC Database.\nThe information provided through the PIQ will be included in the inspection editor and reproduced in the final report.\nThe inspector will be able to sign into their OCIMF inspection account and review any information provided by the\nvessel operator in the OCIMF PSC Database. An inspector can only access OCIMF PSC Database to view the PSC\ninformation for the vessel being inspected while an active inspection is assigned to them.\nWhere the vessel operator had not uploaded the details of PSC inspections carried out onboard the vessel being\ninspected, or the vessel had changed management or name since the last SIRE 2.0 inspection, data collection and\nverification will be based on the information provided through the PIQ.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for managing PSC inspections which included:\n• •\nThe conduct and supervision of a PSC inspection.\nThe process to correct and close out deficiencies recorded during a PSC inspection.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing PSC inspections.\nWhere the vessel operator had uploaded the details of Port State Control Inspections to the OCIMF PSC Inspection\nRepository:\n• Prior to boarding:\no Review the details of the PSC inspection report and verify that the data transferred to the\ninspection editor was correct.\no\no\n• Review the PSC inspection report and any supporting documents.\nReview the documented evidence for the correction and close out of any deficiencies recorded\nduring the last PSC inspection.\no Consider checking vessel’s IMO number against the regional PSC MOU databases to confirm that\nthe PSC report uploaded to the inspection editor was the most recent.\nWhen onboard:\no Verify that the PSC inspection report uploaded to the OCIMF PSC Inspection Repository was the\nsame as the most recent report available onboard.\nWhere the vessel had changed management or name since the previous SIRE 2.0 inspection:\n• •\nPrior to boarding:\no Check the vessel’s IMO number against the regional PSC MOU databases and identify the most\nrecent PSC inspection recorded against the vessel.\nWhen onboard:\no Review the most recent PSC inspection report available onboard, but if none had taken place since\nthe change of management or name, record the data for the last recorded PSC Inspection against\nthe IMO number. Add a comment in the Process response tool to record that the inspection was\nconducted under a different name or different operator.\nWhere the vessel operator was not utilising the OCIMF PSC Inspection Repository:\n• •\nPrior to boarding:\no Consider checking vessel’s IMO number against the regional PSC MOU databases to identify the\nmost recent PSC inspection.\nWhile onboard:\no Review the PSC inspection reports available onboard.\no Review the documented evidence for the correction and close out of any deficiencies recorded\nduring the last PSC inspection.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure for managing PSC inspections.\nAll PSC inspection reports for the previous three years, or if no PSC inspections had been carried out in that\nperiod, the report for the last inspection conducted.\nDocumented evidence that any deficiencies raised during the last PSC inspection had been corrected and\nclosed out with approval from shore management through either the non-conformity reporting system or\ndefect reporting system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for managing PSC inspections.\nWhere the vessel operator was utilising the OCIMF PSC Inspection Repository, the most recent PSC\nInspection Report had not been uploaded (an allowance of five days since the completion of the inspection\nprior to the synchronisation of the inspection editor should be allowed)\nThe PSC inspection reports available onboard did not include the most recent PSC inspection available on\none of the PSC MOU databases.\nWhere there were documented deficiencies during the last PSC inspection, there was no documented\nevidence that the deficiencies had been corrected and closed out with shore management approval.\nThe PSC data provided for the last inspection through the PIQ was incorrect in any respect.\nRecord a comment in the Process response tool to record the circumstances where the last inspection was\nconducted under a different name or different operator.\n3. Crew Management\n3.1. Crew Qualification", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.1.1.", "t": "Were the officers and ratings suitably qualified to serve onboard the vessel and did", "c": "the officer matrix posted on the OCIMF website accurately reflect the qualifications,\nexperience and English language capabilities of the officers onboard at the time of the\ninspection?\nShort Question Text\nCrew qualifications and matrix verification.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: STCW Code\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Completion of the On-Line Officer Matrix\nObjective\nTo ensure that all officers and crew onboard are properly qualified for the type of vessel and the position\nthey hold onboard.\nIndustry Guidelines\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Completion of the On-Line Officer Matrix.\nAvailable within the SIRE operator account.\nTMSA KPI 3.2.3 requires that the company verifies that vessel personnel quality requirements are consistently met.\nIrrespective of whether this function is performed internally or by a manning agency, verification may include:\n• •\nCertification and experience.\nCompliance with manning procedures and legislative requirements.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:\n1.\n2.\nmanned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements; and\nappropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.\nIMO: STCW Code\nPart A\nChapter II – Standards regarding the Master and deck department.\nChapter III- Standards regarding the engine department.\nChapter IV – Standards regarding radio operators.\nChapter V – Standards regarding special training requirements for personnel on certain types of ships:\nSection A-V/1-1 – Mandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualifications of masters, officers and ratings\non oil and chemical tankers.\nSection A-V/1-2 – Mandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualifications of masters, officers and ratings\non liquified gas tankers.\nPart B\nChapter V – Guidance regarding special training requirements for personnel on certain types of ship\nSection B-V/1 Guidance regarding the training and qualifications of tanker personnel.\nPerson with immediate responsibility\n1 The term “person with immediate responsibility” as used in paragraphs 3 and 5 of regulation V/1-1 and paragraph 3\nof regulation V1-2 means a person being in a decision-making capacity with respect to loading, discharging, care in\ntransit, handling of cargo, tank cleaning and other cargo-related operations.\nOfficers and ratings assigned duties and responsibilities related to cargo or cargo equipment of oil, chemical or\nliquified gas tankers shall hold a certificate on basic training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations.\n(STCW Reg V/1-1.1 and 2.1).\nMasters, Chief Engineers, Chief Mates, Second Engineers and any person with immediate responsibility for loading,\ndischarging, care in transit, handling of cargo tank cleaning or other cargo-related operations on oil, chemical or\nliquified gas tankers shall hold a certificate in advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations.\n(STCW Reg V/1-1.3, 1.5 or 2.3).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have uploaded the updated crew matrix to the OCIMF website to reflect the complement\non board at the time of inspection booking. The crew matrix should be updated if there are any crew changes before\nthe inspection takes place.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that:\n• •\n• Each crew member is in possession of all statutory and company mandatory certification and course\ncompletion certificates required for their role onboard.\nCertification for each individual is presented in a standard order with an index indicating which certificates\nwere mandatory for the role onboard.\nA consolidated record of sea service is available for each officer.\nOCIMF interprets a “person with immediate responsibility” to include all watchkeeping officers in charge of cargorelated operations whether the vessel is at sea or in port. This includes the 2nd Officer, 3rd Officer, 4th Officer and\nGas/Cargo Engineer. It may also include the pumpman and other ratings if engaged in direct supervision of cargo\noperations. These crew members should have advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker cargo\noperations applicable to the type of vessel served on.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Review the officer matrix uploaded to the OCIMF website by the vessel operator and verify that:\no\n• •\n• The information included in the matrix is accurate by randomly selecting one senior officer and\njunior officer from each of the deck and engine departments (to include electricians, cargo\nengineers and other specialist engineer officers, where carried) and cross checking their\ncertificates of competency, endorsements and sea service records (for time in rank only).\no All senior officers, junior deck officers and cargo/gas engineers hold a certificate in advanced\ntraining for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.\no All junior engineer officers hold a certificate in basic training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker\noperations as applicable to the vessel type.\nWhere ratings, including the pumpman, are assigned duties with direct supervision of cargo operations verify\nthat they hold a certificate in advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as\napplicable to the vessel type.\nSelect one deck rating assigned duties and responsibilities related to cargo or cargo equipment and verify\nthat they hold a certificate of basic training for oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as applicable to\nthe vessel type.\nDuring the inspection and while interviewing the Master, Chief Engineer and other officers pay attention to\nthe standard of English comprehension and spoken English. Where there are concerns with communication\nin the English language with any officer, note the degree of English recorded against the individual’s rank in\nthe published officer matrix.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe updated officer matrix available on the OCIMF website reflecting all changes in crew that had occurred\nmore than four days before the inspection. (it is not expected that the vessel provides a paper or electronic\ncopy)\nThe relevant documentation for each person onboard, in the following order or a standard order as defined\nby the vessel operator, including:\no National certificate of competency (CoC).\no National certificate of basic or advanced training in oil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations.\no Flag state endorsement of national certificate of competency (proof of application is acceptable for\na period not exceeding three months).\no Flag state endorsement of certificate of basic or advanced training for oil, chemical or liquified gas\ntanker operations.\no National radio operator license.\no Flag State endorsement of radio operator license.\no Consolidated record of sea service supported by seaman’s book(s).\no Bridge Resource Management simulator based training course certificate (3.3.1).\no Engine Room Resource Management simulator based training course certificate (3.3.4).\no Cargo Operations simulator based training course certificate (3.3.3).\no Ship Handling Training certificate (3.3.2).\no Safety Officer Training certificate.\no Security Officer Training certificate.(7.4.1)\no Polar Navigation Training certificate (12.1.1).\no Ice Navigation Training certificate.(12.6.1)\no DP Operator Certification (3.3.5).\no High Voltage Training certificate (3.3.5).\no DP Control System Maintenance Course certificate (3.3.5).\no Integrated DP/Power Management Control System Training Course certificate (3.3.5).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• The officer matrix had not been updated to reflect the officers who were on board at the time of the\ninspection (an allowance will be made for any officer that had changed within the previous four days).\nThe accompanying senior officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance of officer and rating certification\nrecords onboard.\nThe details contained in the officer matrix were inaccurate in terms of:\no National Certificate of Competency (CoC).\n• •\n• •\n• •\no\no\no\no\nNational Certificate in advanced or basic training for oil, gas or chemical service.\nFlag endorsements of CoC or training for oil, gas or chemical service.\nNational radio operator license or flag endorsement.\nThe sea service in rank.\nAn officer's CoC or Flag Endorsement included a limitation that would prevent them from performing their\nduties on the inspected vessel.\nA senior officer, junior deck officer or cargo/gas engineer did not hold a certificate in advanced training for\noil, chemical or liquified gas tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.\nA rating, including the pumpman, with immediate responsibility for loading, discharging, care in transit,\nhandling of cargo tank cleaning or other cargo-related operations on oil, chemical or liquified gas tankers did\nnot hold a certificate in advanced training for tanker operations as applicable to the vessel type.\nThe sea time in rank for any officer whose records were sampled was found to be inaccurate or records\nwere not available to verify sea time in rank. (verification checks will only cover up to thirty-six months sea\nservice onboard).\nThe flag endorsement for any individual officer did not reflect the details of the national CoC on which they\nwere based.\nThere was a concern with the standard of English language comprehension or spoken English with an\nofficer who was recorded as having a “good” standard of English within the published officer matrix.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.1.2.", "t": "Were procedures and instructions contained within the Safety Management System", "c": "and signs posted around the vessel available in the designated working language of the\nvessel or a language(s) understood by the crew and, were the Master, officers and\nratings able to communicate verbally in the designated working language?\nShort Question Text\nDesignated working language.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAnywhere\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that the Master, officers and ratings can read and understand procedures, instructions and safety\nsigns onboard, and can communicate verbally in the designated working language of the vessel.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers. 2015 Edition.\n9 Safety signs and their use\n9.1.3 Where a language other than English is the working language of the ship, any text used in conjunction with a\nsign should also be displayed in that language.\n18.10 Training\n18.10.4 All instructions or information must be in the working language of the vessel.\n18.9 Information and instructions\n18.9.3 Where any seafarer likely to use any item of work equipment does not understand the language in which such\ninformation and instructions are provided, appropriate measures should be taken to ensure that the\ninformation/instructions are provided in the working language of the vessel or in a language that the seafarer\nunderstands.\nTMSA KPA 1A.1.3 requires that procedures and instructions are written in plain language and contain sufficient detail\nto ensure that tasks can be completed correctly and consistently.\nProcedures and instructions are clear, simple to use and are in the working language of the vessel.\nInstructions are arranged in a clear and logical manner and in a way that makes it easy to identify each step.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.6 The company should establish procedures by which the ship’s personnel receive relevant information on the\nsafety management system in a working language or languages understood by them.\n6.7 The company should ensure that the ship’s personnel are able to communicate effectively in the execution of their\nduties related to the safety management system\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 14\nShip’s manning\n3. On all ships, to ensure effective crew performance in safety matters, a working language shall be established and\nrecorded in the ship’s logbook. The company, as defined in regulation IX/1, or the master, as appropriate, shall\ndetermine the appropriate working language. Each seafarer shall be required to understand and, where appropriate,\ngive orders and instructions and to report back in that language. If the working language is not an official language of\nthe State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly, all plans and lists required to be posted shall include a translation into\nthe working language.\n4. On ships to which chapter I applies, English shall be used on the bridge as the working language for bridge-tobridge and bridge-to-shore safety communications as well as for communication on board between the pilot and\nbridge watchkeeping personnel, unless those directly involved in the communication speak a common language other\nthan English.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have designated the working language of the vessel and documented it within the Safety\nManagement System.\nThe designated working language should be recorded in the ship’s logbook.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the designated common working language and the language(s) of the\nSMS in the pre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be inserted in the inspection editor and reproduced in\nthe final report.\nIt is recognised that officers and ratings may speak a language that is convenient to them when engaged in nonsafety related activities. However it is expected that:\n• •\n• •\nThe officers will communicate with the Inspector in English.\nWhile in the presence of the inspector, the officers should communicate with each other in English while\ndiscussing matters relating to the inspection. An exception can be made when the level of English had been\ndeclared as poor through the OCIMF crew matrix for one or more of the officers concerned, in which case,\nthey should use the designated working language.\nThe officers and ratings should communicate with each other in the designated working language and/or\nEnglish while working with the Inspector.\nWhere the inspector can conduct the inspection in the designated working language of the vessel, this is\nacceptable, providing sufficient English communication between officers is observed to verify the level of\nEnglish declared in the OCIMF crew matrix for vessels that must use it for communication when navigating\nor interacting with a terminal.\nNote: SOLAS Ch V Reg 14.4 clarifies when spoken English shall be used for navigational related communication.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Observe the communications between the officers and between officers and ratings, during the inspection\nand verify that:\no They were able to verbally communicate effectively in the designated working language of the\nvessel.\no\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was able to translate a question, and the subsequent reply, directed at a\nrating, into English consistent with the standard of English declared within the OCIMF crew matrix.\nObserve safety signs and instructions posted around the vessel and verify that:\no The signs or safety instructions were posted in the designated working language.\no Where ratings were not able to read the designated working language, the safety signs or\ninstructions were additionally posted in a language that they could read and understand.\nObserve the content of the SMS and where it had been developed in a language other than the designated\nworking language, verify that:\no Sections of the SMS containing safety instructions that were required to be understood by the\nwhole crew had been translated into the designated working language and, any other languages\nnecessary, to ensure that all officers and ratings were able to read and understand the content.\no Checklists and safe working procedures were translated into the designated working language.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe deck log book (or ship’s log book where different) which recorded the designated working language of\nthe vessel.\nThe Safety Management System documentation, checklists etc.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The designated working language of the vessel had not been determined by the vessel operator.\nThe designated working language in use during the inspection was not the same as declared through the\nHVPQ and/or entered in the logbook.\nAn officer or rating was observed to be unable to communicate verbally in the designated working language\nof the vessel.\nAn officer or rating was observed to be unable to read a safety sign or instruction in any of the language(s)\nin which it was displayed.\nWhere the common working language was not an official language of the Flag State, plans and notices\nrequired to be posted did not include a translation into the designated working language.\nThe sections of the Safety Management System required to be read and understood by all onboard had not\nbeen translated into the designated working language of the vessel and, where necessary, another\nlanguage(s).\nChecklists and/or safe working procedures were not available in the designated working language of the\nvessel.\nWhere there was a concern around the standard of spoken English with any officer, address the concern based on\nthe guidance provided in question 3.1.1.\nAny observation(s) arising from this question should be entered into the Process response tool.\nAn observation that relates to an officer or rating being unable to communicate verbally in the designated working\nlanguage of the vessel is related to a deficiency in procedures and not the individual(s). The supporting comment\nshould describe the general circumstances and not identify the personnel involved beyond officer or rating.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.1.3.", "t": "Did the complement of officers and ratings onboard at the time of inspection meet", "c": "or exceed the requirements of the Minimum Safe Manning Document and the declared\ncompany standard manning for routine operations, and had senior officers been relieved\nto ensure continuity of operational knowledge?\nShort Question Text\nMinimum, standard and enhanced manning levels.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nIMO: Resolution A.1047(27). Principles of Safe Manning\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel is always adequately manned for the operations expected to be undertaken based\non the normal trading pattern and any foreseeable specialist operations or periods of heightened workload.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Resolution A.1047(27) Principles of Safe Manning\nAnnex 2 Guidelines for determination of safe minimum manning\n1.1 The minimum safe manning of a ship should be established taking into account all relevant factors, including the\nfollowing:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\n9.\n10.\n11.\n12.\nsize and type of ship;\nnumber, size and type of main propulsion units and auxiliaries;\nlevel of ship automation;\nconstruction and equipment of the ship;\nmethod of maintenance used;\ncargo to be carried;\nfrequency of port calls, length and nature of voyages to be undertaken;\ntrading area(s), waters and operations in which the ship is involved;\nextent to which training activities are conducted on board;\ndegree of shoreside support provided to the ship by the company;\napplicable work hour limits and/or rest requirements; and\nthe provisions of the approved Ship's Security Plan.\n1.4 In determining the minimum safe manning of a ship, consideration should also be given to:\n1.\n2.\nthe number of qualified and other personnel required to meet peak workload situations and conditions, with\ndue regard to the number of hours of shipboard duties and rest periods assigned to seafarers; and\nthe capability of the master and the ship's complement to coordinate the activities necessary for the safe\noperation and for the security of the ship and for the protection of the marine environment.\nAnnex 3 Responsibilities in the application of principles of minimum safe manning\n1 Responsibilities of companies\n1.2 In preparing a proposal for the minimum safe manning of a ship, the company should apply the principles,\nrecommendations and guidelines contained in this resolution and should be required to:\n.1 make an assessment of the tasks, duties and responsibilities of the ship's complement required for its safe\noperation, for its security, for protection of the marine environment, and for dealing with emergency situations;\n.5 ensure that the minimum safe manning is adequate at all times and in all respects, including meeting peak\nworkload situations, conditions and requirements, and is in accordance with the principles, recommendations and\nguidelines contained in this resolution; and\n.6 prepare and submit to the Administration a new proposal for the minimum safe manning of a ship in the case of\nchanges in trading area(s), construction, machinery, equipment, operation and maintenance or management of the\nship, which may affect the safe manning.\nTMSA KPI 3A.1.1 requires that procedures ensure that each vessel is appropriately manned in order to maintain safe\noperation onboard.\nManning levels are adequate, in terms of number and qualifications, to ensure the safety and security of the vessel\nand its personnel under all operating conditions.\nDocumentary evidence of manning level assessments is kept. This may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Flag State and/or national requirements.\nVessel type.\nVessel trading pattern.\nAdditional security requirements.\nAdditional operational requirements, such as Ship to Ship (STS), or operations in ice.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The company should ensure that each ship is:\n.1 manned with qualified, certified and medically-fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements; and\n.2 appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations onboard\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed policies and procedures for the safe manning of the vessel which set out:\n• •\n• The approved manning levels for routine operations.\nThe approved manning levels for defined specialist operations and high workload situations.\nThe minimum interval between the relief of the senior officers from the same department.\nThe full manning policies and procedures may not be available onboard, but the data provided through the preinspection questionnaire should reflect the content.\nThe vessel operator should provide manning details through the pre-inspection questionnaire as follows:\n• Manning required by the Minimum Safe Manning Document:\no Number of deck officers including the Master.\no Number of watchkeeping engineer officers including the Chief Engineer when operating in UMS\nmode.\no\no\no\no\no\nNumber of watchkeeping engineer officers including the Chief Engineer when operating in manned\nmode.\nNumber of deck ratings.\nNumber of engine room ratings.\nNumber of general purpose ratings, where carried.\nNumber of catering ratings.\n• Company standard manning level for the vessel during routine operations:\no Number of deck officers including the Master.\no Number of watchkeeping engineer officers including the Chief Engineer.\no Number of electricians, ETOs and specialist cargo engineers.\no Number of deck ratings including bosun and pump man.\no Number of engine room ratings including machinists and fitters.\no Number of general purpose ratings, where carried.\no Number of catering ratings.\n• Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for\ncontinuous/extended/repeated STS operations, if any:\no Number of additional deck officers.\no Number of additional engineer officers.\no Number of additional deck ratings.\n• Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for\ncontinuous/extended/repeated inter-harbour operations and/or short voyages of less than 24 hours, if any:\no Number of additional deck officers.\no Number of additional engineer officers.\no Number of additional deck ratings.\n• Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for\noperations requiring implementation of additional security measures, if any:\no Number of additional deck officers.\no Number of additional engineer officers.\no Number of additional deck ratings.\n• Company enhanced manning provision, over and above the company standard manning level, for other\nspecialist operations (free text to describe), if any:\no Number of additional deck officers.\no Number of additional engineer officers.\no Number of additional deck ratings.\no Number of additional engine room ratings.\n• The minimum interval required between the relief of the senior officers from the same department.\nThe information provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final inspection report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Review the information provided by the vessel operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire and\ncompare against:\no The minimum safe manning document.\no A copy of the arrival crew list provided by the Master.\no The current OCIMF crew matrix available on the OCIMF SIRE database.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The Minimum Safe Manning Document.\nA copy of the arrival crew list provided by the Master.\nThe current OCIMF crew matrix available on the OCIMF SIRE database.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The crew onboard on arrival at the port of inspection did not meet the requirements of the Safe Manning\nDocument in any respect.\nThe crew onboard on arrival at the port of inspection did not:\no Meet the standard manning level declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire, or\no Meet the company enhanced manning provision when conducting:\n Continuous/extended/repeated STS operations.\n Continuous/extended/repeated inter-harbour operations and/or short voyages of less than\n24 hours.\n Operations requiring implementation of additional security measures.\n Other specialist operations\nThe number of officers onboard on arrival at the port of inspection was less than declared through the\nOCIMF crew matrix.\nThe machinery space was routinely operated in the manned mode at sea while the actual number of\nengineers onboard was insufficient to meet the requirements of the Safe Manning Document.\nBoth senior officers from a single department were being relieved at the port of inspection with no overlap or\nparallel sailing period for at least one of the officers to cover the minimum relief interval declared through the\npre-inspection questionnaire.\n3.2. Crew Evaluation", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.1.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a static navigational", "c": "assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative had been\ncompleted as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nStatic navigational assessment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of navigational standards onboard managed\nvessels\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.\n3.2.1 Static Assessment.\nA static assessment, which may be conducted in port, should include as a minimum a review of passage plans, chart\ncorrections, navigational records, navigational equipment, compliance with company procedures and documentation.\n4.2 Selection of assessors\nNavigation assessments should be conducted by an experienced senior deck officer (preferably a Master Mariner\nwith command experience), who is fully up to date with company navigational practices, the International Regulations\nfor Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide and industry best practices\nTMSA KPI 5.2.2 requires that there is a procedure in place for appropriate shore-based personnel to conduct\nnavigational verification assessments.\nThe assessment, which may be conducted in port, includes as a minimum a review of passage plans, chart\ncorrections, navigational records, navigational equipment, compliance with company procedures and verification of\nthe master’s navigational audit.\nAll fleet vessels are assessed at intervals not exceeding 12 months.\nThe navigational verification assessment is followed by a report where identified corrective actions are assigned,\nverified and closed out in a specified time period.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when:\n• •\nThe vessel operator had indicated that an appropriate static navigational assessment had been conducted\non board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months and,\nA dynamic navigational audit had not been completed by a member of the company staff within the previous\ntwelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a navigational\nverification assessment by an appropriate member of the shore-staff will be carried out on any vessel at any\nparticular time.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the assessment report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and\npertinent seafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the static navigation assessment report beyond the specific guidance\ncontained herein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the company representative\nundertaking the assessment beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the static navigation assessment and verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• The assessment was conducted on the date declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nThe report was in a similar format, and covered the review items suggested by, the OCIMF publication “A\nGuide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits”.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualifications and experience were included within the report.\nThe report contained information relating to the best practice guidance points from TMSA KPI 5.2.2\nWhere the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nwithin a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The report for the static navigational assessment declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the static\nnavigational assessment.\nSupporting evidence for each closed area for improvement identified and included in the corrective action\nplan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThe report for the static navigational assessment declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire was not\navailable onboard.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\n• •\n• •\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and / or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer.\nThe static navigational assessment report was not substantially in alignment with the guidance document “A\nGuide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” and the best practice guidance under\nTMSA KPI 5.2.2.\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe dynamic navigational assessment.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the dynamic navigational\nassessment had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.2.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic navigational", "c": "assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative had been\ncompleted while on passage as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nDynamic navigational assessment by a company representative\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Documentation\nPublications\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of navigational standards onboard managed\nvessels\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.\n2 Purpose of a navigational assessment\nThe purpose of a navigational assessment should be to identify poor practices, to continuously improve navigational\nstandards to ensure safe and efficient voyages and to assure companies that high standards of navigation and\nwatchkeeping are being maintained.\nThe purpose of closely observing the interaction and effectiveness of the bridge team during pilotage and standby is\nto evaluate:\n• •\n• Key behaviours of members of the bridge team.\nSkills of the bridge team\nInteractions between the master and pilot.\n4.2 Selection of assessors\nNavigation assessments should be conducted by an experienced senior deck officer (preferably a Master Mariner\nwith command experience), who is fully up to date with company navigational practices, the International Regulations\nfor Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide and industry best practices.\nTMSA KPI 5.3.3 requires that comprehensive navigational audits* are conducted while on passage by a suitably\nqualified and experienced company representative.\nIn addition to a navigational verification assessment*, the purpose of the audit* is to:\n• •\n• •\nReview and confirm that bridge practices are in compliance with international regulations and company\nprocedures.\nReview and assess the skills and proficiency levels of the bridge team members.\nReview and evaluate the effective functioning of the bridge team during all sections of a voyage.\nUse the opportunity to promote robust navigational practices, chart-work, passage planning and good\nseamanship.\n• •\n• Identify any additional training needs, whether this be specific to an individual or a vessel, or a fleet wide\nneed.\nVerify adequate supervision of Junior Officers and training of cadets during critical passages.\nVerify that accurate logs are kept, and that adequate record keeping is being undertaken.\n*The terminology used in the OCIMF paper \"A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\" will\ntake precedence throughout the balance of guidance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nIndustry Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that an appropriate dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous two years.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a dynamic\nnavigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative will be carried out on any\nvessel at any particular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a dynamic navigational\nassessment, should remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the assessment report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and\npertinent seafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the navigation assessment report beyond the specific guidance contained\nherein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the company representative\nundertaking the assessment beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative and verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• The assessment was conducted during the period declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nThe assessment covered all sections of a voyage as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report was in a similar format, and covered the review items suggested by, the OCIMF guidance paper\n“A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits”.\nThe report contained information relating to the majority of the best practice guidance points from TMSA KPI", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.3.", "t": "•", "c": "Where the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nwithin a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative as declared in the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Bridge Log Book to cover the period of the reported dynamic navigation assessment (for geographical\nverification purposes only).\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the navigational\nassessment.\nSupporting evidence for each closed area for improvement identified and included in the corrective action\nplan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The report for the dynamic navigational assessment declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire was\nnot available onboard.\nThe dynamic navigational assessment did not cover the stages of the voyage or was not completed during\nthe date range as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer.\nThe dynamic navigational assessment report was not substantially in alignment with the guidance document\n“A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” and the best practice guidance under\nTMSA KPI 5.3.3.\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe dynamic navigational assessment.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the dynamic navigational\nassessment had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.3.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a dynamic navigational", "c": "assessment by a suitably qualified specialist contractor had been completed while on\npassage as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nDynamic navigational assessment by a specialist contractor\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of navigational standards onboard managed\nvessels\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.\n2 Purpose of a navigational assessment\nThe purpose of a navigational assessment should be to identify poor practices, to continuously improve navigational\nstandards to ensure safe and efficient voyages and to assure companies that high standards of navigation and\nwatchkeeping are being maintained.\nThe purpose of closely observing the interaction and effectiveness of the bridge team during pilotage and standby is\nto evaluate:\n• •\n• Key behaviours of members of the bridge team.\nSkills of the bridge team\nInteractions between the master and pilot.\n4.2 Selection of assessors\nNavigation assessments should be conducted by an experienced senior deck officer (preferably a Master Mariner\nwith command experience), who is fully up to date with company navigational practices, the International Regulations\nfor Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide and industry best practices.\nTMSA KPI 5.4.1 requires that comprehensive navigational audits are conducted while on passage by a suitably\nqualified and experienced person.\nThe audit may be\n• An independent navigational audit by a suitably qualified specialist contractor.\nThe fleet audit programme includes a combination of company and independent audits.\n(Best Practice Guidance under TMSA KPI 5.3.3 applies)\nIn addition to a navigational verification assessment*, the purpose of the audit* is to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Review and confirm that bridge practices are in compliance with international regulations and company\nprocedures.\nReview and assess the skills and proficiency levels of the bridge team members.\nReview and evaluate the effective functioning of the bridge team during all sections of a voyage.\nUse the opportunity to promote robust navigational practices, chart-work, passage planning and good\nseamanship.\nIdentify any additional training needs, whether this be specific to an individual or a vessel, or a fleet wide\nneed.\nVerify adequate supervision of Junior Officers and training of cadets during critical passages.\nVerify that accurate logs are kept and that adequate record keeping is being undertaken.\n*The terminology used in the OCIMF paper “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” will\ntake precedence throughout the balance of guidance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that an appropriate dynamic navigational assessment by a suitably qualified specialist contractor had\nbeen conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a dynamic\nnavigational assessment by a suitably qualified and experienced specialist will be carried out on any vessel at any\nparticular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a dynamic navigational\nassessment, should remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the assessment report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and\npertinent seafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the navigation assessment report beyond the specific guidance contained\nherein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the contractor undertaking the\nassessment beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced\nspecialist contractor and verify that:\n• The assessment was conducted during the period declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\n• •\n• •\n• The assessment covered all sections of a voyage as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report was in a similar format, and covered the review items suggested by, the OCIMF guidance paper\n“A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits”.\nThe report contained information relating to the majority of the best practice guidance points from TMSA KPI", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.3.", "t": "Where the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken", "c": "within a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the dynamic navigational assessment conducted by a suitably qualified specialist contractor\nas declared in the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Bridge Log Book to cover the period of the reported dynamic navigation assessment. (for geographical\nverification purposes only)\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the navigational\nassessment.\nSupporting evidence for each closed area for improvement identified and included in the corrective action\nplan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The report for the dynamic navigational assessment declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire was\nnot available onboard.\nThe dynamic navigational assessment did not cover the stages of the voyage or was not completed during\nthe date range as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer.\nThe dynamic navigational assessment report was not substantially in alignment with the guidance document\n“A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” and the best practice guidance under\nTMSA KPI 5.3.3.\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe dynamic navigational assessment.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the dynamic navigational\nassessment had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.4.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that an unannounced remote", "c": "navigational assessment, which included review of VDR & ECDIS data by an independent\ncontractor or specialist company representative, had been completed as declared\nthrough the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nUnannounced remote navigational assessment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nOCIMF: Recommendations on the Proactive Use of Voyage Data Recorder Information (revised edition August 2020)\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of navigational standards onboard managed\nvessels.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.\n5.2 Remote navigational assessments using Voyage Data Recorders\nCompanies may consider using Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs) to conduct remote assessments of navigational\npractices. This may be supplemented by downloading data from ECDIS and other electronic navigation aids.\nRemote navigational assessments may be useful when:\n• •\n• •\nThe trading pattern of a vessel makes it difficult to conduct a traditional assessment.\nFollowing up to verify the correction of non-conformances noted during a traditional assessment.\nCompanies want to assess the bridge team in a more natural environment, without them being influenced by\nthe presence of an assessor. Although everyday practices may be more accurately observed through\nremote assessment, subtler interactions within the bridge team may not be picked up.\nHighlighting where to focus their resources in terms of either assessment or mentoring specific subject\nmatter with traditional assessors.\nUsing the VDR for remote navigational assessments should be seen as an additional assessment tool, not as a\nreplacement for traditional navigation assessments. Both types of assessment have advantages and limitations and\nshould not be considered mutually exclusive.\nOCIMF: Recommendations on the Proactive Use of Voyage Date Recorder Information (revised edition\nAugust 2020)\nNavigational assessments using VDR data could be undertaken on board by Masters with their bridge teams, by\nvessel operators in managing offices, or by using services of an independently contracted third-party company. VDR\ndata will be replayed and analysed against the company SMS, industry best practices and regulatory requirements.\nThe VDR data is normally used to cover one or more high-risk sections of the voyage, such as canal transits, pilotage\nduring arrival/departure and/or passage through high traffic density areas such as the Singapore/Malacca Straits or\nthe English Channel.\nTMSA KPI 5.4.1 requires that comprehensive navigational audits* are conducted while on passage by a suitably\nqualified and experienced person.\nThe audit* may be:\n• A company navigational audit* as per 5.3.3; or\n• An independent navigational audit* by a suitably qualified specialist contractor.\nThis fleet audit programme includes a combination of company and independent audits. Where it is impractical for a\nvessel to be audited within the 12-month period due to trading pattern then an unannounced remote audit by an\nindependent contractor, including VDR downloads may be used. All fleet vessels are audited while on passage at\nintervals not exceeding 12 months.\n*The terminology used in the OCIMF paper “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” will\ntake precedence throughout the balance of guidance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that a remote navigational assessment had been undertaken for the vessel being inspected within the\nprevious twelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a remote\nnavigation assessment will be carried out on any vessel at any particular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a remote navigational assessment,\nshould remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the assessment report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and\npertinent seafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the remote navigation assessment report beyond the specific guidance\ncontained herein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the independent contractor or\nspecialist company representative undertaking the assessment beyond the specific guidance contained\nherein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the remote navigational assessment report and verify that:\n• The remote navigational assessment included the phases of a voyage as declared in the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\n• •\n• •\nThe remote navigational assessment was unannounced and included the download and review of VDR and\nECDIS data.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report was substantially in alignment with the format, and contained information, as suggested by the\nOCIMF publication “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits”.\nWhere the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nby the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the remote navigational assessment conducted by either an independent contractor or\nspecialist company representative as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Bridge Log Book to cover the period of the reported remote navigation assessment (for geographical\nverification purposes only).\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the remote\nnavigational assessment.\nSupporting evidence for each closed area for improvement identified and included in the corrective action\nplan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The remote navigational assessment report for the assessment declared through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire was not available onboard.\nThe remote navigational assessment did not include review of downloaded VDR and ECDIS data as well as\nsupporting material such as passage plans, under-keel clearance calculations and copies (photos) of paper\ncharts where no ECDIS was carried.\nThe remote navigational assessment covered a period solely at anchor or open sea navigation where no\nnavigational challenges were present.\nThe remote navigational assessment did not cover the phases of the voyage as declared by the operator\nthrough the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer.\nThe remote navigational assessment report was not substantially in alignment with the OCIMF guidance\ndocument “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits”\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe remote navigational assessment.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the remote navigational assessment\nhad been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.5.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive cargo audit", "c": "by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative had been completed as\ndeclared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nComprehensive cargo audit by a company representative\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of cargo, ballast and bunkering operational\nstandards onboard managed vessels\nOCIMF Guidance: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits.\nTo align the expectations for comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines, the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive cargo audit.\nTMSA KPI 6.4.2. requires that comprehensive cargo audits are completed by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative at least annually. The audit includes observation of cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunker\nhandling operations.\nAll fleet vessels are audited annually. This audit may look at:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Operational practices and compliance with industry guidelines and company procedures.\nSkills and proficiency levels of the personnel.\nEffectiveness of the team during all stages of the operations.\nThe opportunity to promote robust practices.\nIdentifying additional training needs, whether individual, vessel or fleet wide.\nSupervision of Junior Officers and training of cadets.\nRecord keeping.\nThe audit is followed by a report where identified corrective actions are assigned, verified and closed out in a\nspecified time period.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance\nTo align the expectations for comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines, the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive cargo audit.\nPurpose of a comprehensive cargo audit.\nThe purpose of a comprehensive cargo audit should be to identify poor practices, to continuously improve cargo\noperational standards to ensure safe and efficient cargo transfer, bunker transfer and tank cleaning operations, and\nto assure companies that high standards of cargo and bunker operations and deck watchkeeping are being\nmaintained onboard and across the fleet.\nThe purpose of closely observing the interaction and effectiveness of the cargo control room and deck teams and\ntheir interactions with the terminal staff during all stages of cargo operations is to evaluate:\n• •\n• Key behaviours of members of the cargo control room and deck teams during cargo, bunkering and tank\ncleaning operations.\nSkills of the cargo control room and deck teams.\nInteractions between the cargo control room and deck teams and the terminal staff.\nSelection of assessors\nComprehensive cargo audits should be conducted by a company representative who was, or had been, an\nexperienced senior deck officer (preferably a Master Mariner with command experience), who was fully up to date\nwith company cargo operational practices, the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals and industry\nbest practices.\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that an appropriate comprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company\nrepresentative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a\ncomprehensive cargo audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative will be carried out on any\nvessel at any particular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a comprehensive cargo audit,\nshould remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the audit report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and pertinent\nseafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the comprehensive cargo audit report beyond the specific guidance\ncontained herein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the company representative\nundertaking the assessment beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nThe inspector should sight the comprehensive cargo audit report and verify that:\n• The comprehensive cargo audit was conducted during the period declared through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\n• •\n• •\nThe comprehensive cargo audit covered the cargo, ballast and bunkering operations as declared through\nthe pre-inspection questionnaire.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report contained information relating to the majority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI 6.4.2.\nWhere the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nwithin a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the comprehensive cargo audit conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced company\nrepresentative as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Deck Log Book and/or Cargo Log Book to cover the period of the reported comprehensive cargo audit\n(for geographical and operational verification purposes only).\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the comprehensive\ncargo audit.\nSupporting evidence, which may include lessons learnt documents shared across the fleet, for each closed\narea for improvement identified and included in the corrective action plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The report for the comprehensive cargo audit declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire was not\navailable onboard.\nThe comprehensive cargo audit did not cover the cargo or bunker operations or was not completed during\nthe date range as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer onboard tankers.\nThe comprehensive cargo audit report was not substantially in alignment with the suggested best practice\nguidance of TMSA KPI 6.4.2\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe comprehensive cargo audit.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the comprehensive cargo audit had\nbeen closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.6.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive engineering", "c": "audit by a suitable qualified and experienced company representative had been\ncompleted as declared in the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nComprehensive engineering audit by a company representative\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of machinery space management, engineering and\nmaintenance standards onboard managed vessels.\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n11.8.2 Routine Operations\nAll routine operations on board should be covered by written procedures as part of the company’s SMS.\nThese procedures should be based on applicable statutory requirements, classification society requirements, industry\ngood practice guidance and recognised standards. They should fully address the risks involved in carrying out routine\noperations, and the safeguards put in place to prevent injury or damage. The procedures should be audited regularly\nto ensure that they remain fir for purpose and comply with relevant regulations. Auditing should also check that\nprocedures are followed on board and are subject to continuous improvement.\nExamples of routine operations in the engine room are arrival and departure, starting and stopping an engine, and\nUMS rounds.\nOCIMF Guidance: A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits. First Edition 2018\nTo align the expectations for comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines, the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive engineering audit.\nTMSA KPI 4.4.5 requires that comprehensive engineering audits are completed by a suitably qualified and\nexperienced company representative. The audit includes observation of engineering practices while on passage.\nThe purpose of the audit is to:\n• •\n• •\n• Review and confirm that engineering practices are in compliance with industry standards and company\nprocedures.\nReview and assess the skills and proficiency levels of the engineering team members.\nReview and evaluate the effective functioning of the engineering team during all sections of a voyage, e.g.\nmanoeuvring, operations when unmanned, cargo operations.\nUse the opportunity to promote robust engineering practices and good seamanship.\nIdentify any additional training needs, whether they are specific to an individual, a vessel, or a fleet wide\nneed e.g. familiarity with the planned maintenance system.\n• •\nVerify adequate supervision of Junior Officers and training of cadets during critical operations.\nVerify that accurate logs are kept, and that adequate record keeping is being undertaken.\nThe audit is followed by a debrief to the engineering team. All fleet vessels are audited while on passage at intervals\nnot exceeding one year. The audit is followed by a report where identified corrective actions are assigned, verified\nand closed out in a specified time period.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance.\nTo align the expectations of comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive engineering audit.\nPurpose of a comprehensive engineering audit.\nThe purpose of a comprehensive engineering audit should be to identify poor practices, to continuously improve\nengineering operational standards to ensure safe and efficient machinery operation and to assure companies that\nhigh standards of machinery space management and watchkeeping are being maintained onboard and across the\nfleet.\nThe purpose of closely observing the interaction and effectiveness of the machinery space management team, the\nwatchkeeping team and their interactions with the navigational and cargo operational teams is to evaluate:\n• •\n• Key behaviours of members of the machinery space management and watchkeeping teams during\nmanoeuvring, cargo and maintenance operations.\nSkills of the machinery space management and watchkeeping teams.\nInteractions between the machinery space management and watchkeeping teams and the navigational and\ncargo operational teams.\nSelection of assessors.\nComprehensive engineering audits should be conducted by a company representative who was, or had been, an\nexperienced senior engineer officer (preferably a qualified Chief Engineer with time in rank of Chief Engineer), who\nwas fully up to date with company machinery operational and maintenance practices, the International Safety Guide\nfor Oil Tankers and Terminals and industry best practices.\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that an appropriate comprehensive engineering audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company\nrepresentative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous twelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a\ncomprehensive engineering audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative will be carried out\non any vessel at any particular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a comprehensive engineering\naudit, should remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the audit report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and pertinent\nseafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the comprehensive engineering audit report beyond the specific guidance\ncontained herein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the company representative\nundertaking the audit beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nThe inspector should sight the comprehensive engineering audit report and verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• The comprehensive engineering audit was conducted during the period declared through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire.\nThe comprehensive engineering audit covered the cargo, ballast and bunkering operations as declared\nthrough the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report contained information relating to the majority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI 4.4.5.\nWhere the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nwithin a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the comprehensive engineering audit conducted by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Engine Room Log Book to cover the period of the reported comprehensive engineering audit (for\ngeographical and operational verification purposes only).\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the comprehensive\nengineering audit.\nSupporting evidence, which may include lessons learnt documents shared across the fleet, for each closed\narea for improvement identified and included in the corrective action plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The report for the comprehensive engineering audit declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire was\nnot available onboard.\nThe comprehensive engineering audit did not cover the machinery space operations or was not completed\nduring the date range as declared by the operator through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior engineering officer licence and/or had not sailed as a\nsenior engineer officer onboard tankers.\nThe comprehensive engineering audit report was not substantially in alignment with the suggested best\npractice guidance of TMSA KPI 4.4.5\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe comprehensive engineering audit.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the comprehensive engineering\naudit had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.7.", "t": "Was a report available onboard which confirmed that a comprehensive mooring", "c": "and anchoring audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative had\nbeen completed as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire?\nShort Question Text\nComprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a company representative\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nOCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nINTERTANKO: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of mooring and anchoring operational standards\nonboard managed vessels.\nIndustry Guidance:\nIntertanko: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nLive anchoring audits\nIt is necessary to check and verify the behaviour of personnel engagement for anchoring operations to identify the\ndeviations from standard practices. The live anchoring audits could be carried out by a competent person such as\ninternal auditor or company’s representative or nominated person by the company.\nThey should observe the anchoring operation to monitor the performance. The operation on the bridge can also be\nmonitored when an additional auditor is available.\nThe stages of various operations such as preparation for anchoring, walking back/let go and heaving up anchor can\nbe monitored during the live audit process.\nOCIMF: Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition\nSection 2 Issues Associated with Anchoring Systems and Procedures.\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. (MEG4)\nSection 2 Human Factors.\nOCIMF A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits. First Edition 2018.\nTo align the expectations for comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines, the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit.\n2 Purpose of a navigation assessment.\nTMSA KPI 6A.4.3 requires that comprehensive audits are completed by a suitably qualified and experienced\ncompany representative. The audit uses observation of mooring operations.\nAll fleet vessels are audited annually. The audit specifically observes behaviour and may look at:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nOperational practices and compliance with industry guidelines and company procedures.\nSkills and proficiency levels of the personnel.\nLeadership and effectiveness of the team during all stages of the operations.\nThe opportunity to promote robust practices and good seamanship.\nIdentifying additional training needs, whether individual, vessel or fleet wide.\nSupervision of Junior Officers and training of cadets.\nThe audit is followed by a report where identified corrective actions are assigned, verified and closed out in a\nspecified time period.\nIMO: ISM Code\n12.2 The Company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM related tasks are acting in\nconformity with the Company's responsibilities under the Code\n12.3 The Company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the SMS in accordance with procedures\nestablished by the Company.\nInspection Guidance\nTo align the expectations of comprehensive operational audits across onboard disciplines, the guidance provided in\nthe OCIMF document “A Guide to Best Practice for Navigational Assessments and Audits” is adapted to reflect the\nrequirements for a comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit.\nPurpose of a comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit.\nThe purpose of a comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit should be to identify poor practices, to continuously\nimprove mooring and anchoring operational standards to ensure safe and efficient mooring and anchoring operations\nand, to assure companies that high standards of mooring and anchoring oversight and management are being\nmaintained onboard and across the fleet.\nThe purpose of closely observing the interaction and effectiveness of the mooring and anchoring teams, the bridge\nteam and their interactions with the terminal mooring teams is to evaluate:\n• •\n• Key behaviours of members of the mooring and anchoring teams during mooring and anchoring operations.\nSkills of the mooring and anchoring teams.\nInteractions between the mooring and anchoring teams, the bridge team and the terminal mooring teams.\nSelection of assessors\nComprehensive mooring and anchoring audits should be conducted by a company representative who is, or had\nbeen, an experienced senior deck officer (preferably a Master Mariner with command experience), who is fully up to\ndate with company mooring and anchoring operational practices, the OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines, OCIMF\nAnchoring Systems and Procedures, and industry best practices.\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had indicated, through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire, that an appropriate comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a suitably qualified and\nexperienced company representative had been conducted on board the vessel being inspected within the previous\ntwelve months.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that a\ncomprehensive mooring and anchoring audit by a suitably qualified and experienced company representative will be\ncarried out on any vessel at any particular time.\nIt is not expected that sensitive personal data relating to the assessment of individual performance is contained within\nthe report available onboard. Such assessment, although expected to form part of a comprehensive mooring and\nanchoring audit, should remain confidential.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the audit report will include brief details of the assessor’s qualifications and pertinent\nseafaring experience.\nThe inspector is not expected or required to:\n• •\nMake a qualitative assessment of the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit report beyond the\nspecific guidance contained herein.\nMake a qualitative assessment of the qualification and/or experience of the company representative\nundertaking the audit beyond the specific guidance contained herein.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nThe inspector should sight the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit report and verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• The comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit was conducted during the period declared through the preinspection questionnaire.\nThe comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit covered the mooring and anchoring operations as\ndeclared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nBrief details of the assessor’s qualification and experience were included within the report.\nThe report contained information relating to the majority of the best practice points from TMSA KPI 6A.4.3.\nWhere the report identified areas for improvement there was evidence that follow up had been undertaken\nwithin a specified timeframe by the company and/or vessel as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe report for the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit conducted by a suitably qualified and\nexperienced company representative as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe Deck Log Book to cover the period of the reported comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit (for\ngeographical and operational verification purposes only).\nA corrective action plan with due dates for each area for improvement identified during the comprehensive\nmooring and anchoring audit.\nSupporting evidence, which may include lessons learnt documents shared across the fleet, for each closed\narea for improvement identified and included in the corrective action plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThe report for the comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit declared through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire was not available onboard.\nThe comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit did not cover the type of mooring and anchoring\noperations or was not completed during the date range as declared by the operator through the preinspection questionnaire.\n• •\n• •\n• The details of the qualifications and pertinent seafaring experience of the assessor were not included within\nthe report.\nThe assessor did not hold or had not held a senior deck officer licence and/or had not sailed as a senior\ndeck officer onboard tankers.\nThe comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit report was not substantially in alignment with the\nsuggested best practice guidance of TMSA KPI 6A.4.3.\nThere was no corrective action plan with defined due dates for all areas for improvement identified during\nthe comprehensive mooring and anchoring audit.\nThere was no evidence that the areas for improvement identified during the comprehensive mooring and\nanchoring audit had been closed out within the due dates indicated within the corrective action plan.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.2.8.", "t": "Had the vessel operator implemented a Behavioural Competency Assessment", "c": "Programme onboard and was there evidence available that assessments were being\nconducted for navigation, cargo, mooring and engineering operations by approved\nassessors?\nShort Question Text\nBehavioural Competency Assessment Programme\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nOCIMF/INTERTANKO: Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification for Vessel Operators\nObjective\nTo verify the extent of company evaluation and oversight of competency standards onboard managed\nvessels.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/INTERTANKO: Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification for Vessel Operators\n4.3 Methods of competency-based assessment\nWhile observation will usually be the main method of assessment, a number of different methods can be used (either\nindividually or in a combination) to assess a behavioural competency.\nThese include:\n• •\n• •\nObservation of work activities on site or in a simulator (if in a simulator, the assessor should have received\nappropriate guidance in instructional techniques involving the use of simulators).\nQuestioning techniques (oral and written).\nProjects and assignments.\nComputer-based questions or tests.\nTMSA KPI 3.4.1 requires that procedures to assess crew members for job competency are in place.\nDocumented procedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• On the job observation.\nRecord books.\nWritten/oral assessments.\nComputer-based assessments.\nScenario-based simulator assessments.\nCompany specific assessments.\nPsychometric assessments.\nAny identified competency gaps are addressed.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a competency assessment programme which is broadly in alignment\nwith the guidance document, Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification for Vessel Operators, with\nassessments being conducted by approved assessors against defined standards. Assessments should be carried out\nin the following areas:\n• •\n• •\nNavigation\nMooring operations.\nCargo operations.\nEngineering operations.\nThe question will only be generated when the operator had declared that a Behavioural Competency Assessment\nand Verification programme was in operation onboard through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification programme and verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• The assessment programme covered as a minimum; navigation, cargo operations, mooring operations and\nengineering operations\nThe vessel operator had defined who was considered qualified to be an approved assessor\nThe vessel operator had defined the training requirement for an approved assessor\nIf vessel staff onboard at the time of the inspection were considered as approved assessors, then they had\nevidence of the required training for an approved assessor.\nThere was evidence that the staff onboard at the time of the inspection were actively involved in the\ncompetency assessment programme with historical records of their competency assessments available for\ntheir company service since the inception of the programme.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification Programme Guide.\nThe qualifications for any approved assessors onboard at the time of the inspection.\nThe records (summary) of competency assessments completed for all staff onboard at the time of the\ninspection who were included in the competency assessment programme since they joined the company or\nthe inception of the programme.\nSample assessments for cargo, navigation, mooring and engineering competencies.\nIndividual crew member records may be electronic or hard-copy but must allow the inspector to see the full training\nhistory for everyone included in the programme.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no evidence that there was a functional Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification\nProgramme in operation onboard.\nThe Behavioural Competency Assessment and Verification Programme did not cover navigation, cargo\noperations, mooring operations and engineering operations.\nOnboard staff identified as approved assessors were not in possession of the company defined training for\napproved assessors.\nThere were no summary records available for the staff included in the Behavioural Competency Assessment\nand Verification Programme which showed their achievements since joining the company or the inception of\nthe programme.\n3.3. Crew Training", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.1.", "t": "Had the Master and all navigation officers attended a shore-based Bridge Team", "c": "Management training course within the previous five years?\nShort Question Text\nShore-based Bridge Team Management training\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO Model Course 1.22. Ship Simulator and Bridge Teamwork\nObjective\nTo ensure that all navigation officers have been trained in the practical application of crew resource\nmanagement in a realistic navigational environment.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO Model Course 1.22 Ship Simulator and Bridge Teamwork.\nTMSA KPI 5.4.4 requires that navigation officers undertake periodic refresher bridge resource management simulator\ntraining at a national or industry accredited shore establishment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated that the Master and all navigation\nofficers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a Bridge Team Management training course within the\nprevious five years. The course must have included practical navigational exercises in a bridge simulator, with the\nsimulator time being at least equivalent to IMO Model Course 1.22.\nThe operator should verify the following if relying on the STCW qualifications of their seafarers:\n• •\nThat the flag state issuing the qualification required the bridge resource training element to be retaken or\nrefreshed at each revalidation of the officer’s certificate of competency.\nThat the required bridge resource management training element included training within a bridge simulator\nwhich met, as a minimum, IMO Model Course 1.22 requirements of at least 19 hours bridge simulator time.\nThe terms Bridge Team Management and Bridge Resource Management may be considered interchangeable,\nhowever, in the context of this question, the shore-based training course must have included exercises in a\nnavigational simulator as outlined in IMO Model Course 1.22.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the Bridge Team Management training certificates for the Master and navigation officers and verify that:\n• •\nThe training was completed within the previous five years by each officer.\nThe training was stated as being in accordance with IMO model course 1.22.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe Bridge Team Management training certificates for the Master and navigation officers.\nWhere the Bridge Team Management training certificate did not state that it was in accordance with IMO\nModel Course 1.22, evidence that the training course included a bridge simulator element which required\nthat simulator based navigational exercises were at least equivalent to the requirements of IMO Model\nCourse 1.22. (19 hours simulator time).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• The Master and/or any one of the navigation officers onboard during the inspection did not have evidence of\nattending a Bridge Team Simulator training course at least equivalent to IMO Model Course 1.22 within the\nprevious five years.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.2.", "t": "Had the Master received formal ship handling training prior to promotion or when", "c": "being assigned to a new type of ship having significantly different handling\ncharacteristics to ships in which they had recently served?\nShort Question Text\nFormal ship handling training\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: STCW Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master is familiar with the ship handling characteristics of the type of ship to which they have\nbeen assigned.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 5.3.2 requires that a formal program ensures that Senior Officers receive appropriate ship-handling\ntraining before promotion to Master or assignment to a new vessel type.\nShip-handling experience is gained by training under supervision on board, as a part of a documented competency\ndevelopment system, and may be supplemented by:\n• •\nParticipation in manned models and/or simulator training.\nSpecialist training e.g. navigation in ice, DP operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nIMO: STCW Code\nPart B Chapter V Special training requirements\nSection B-V/a\nGuidance regarding additional training for Master and Chief Mates of large ships and ships with unusual manoeuvring\ncharacteristics.\n1 It is important that Masters and Chief Mates should have had relevant experience and training before assuming\nduties of Master or Chief Mate of large ships or ships having unusual manoeuvring and handling characteristics\nsignificantly different from those in which they have recently served. Such characteristics will generally be found in\nships which are of considerable deadweight or length or of special design or of high speed.\n3 Before initially assuming command of one of the ships referred to above, the prospective Master should have\nsufficient and appropriate general experience as Master or Chief Mate, and either:\n.1 Have sufficient and appropriate experience manoeuvring the same ship under supervision or in manoeuvring a\nship having similar characteristics or,\n.2 have attended an approved ship handling simulator course on an installation capable of simulating the\nmanoeuvring characteristics of such a ship.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to identify the necessary mandatory and non-mandatory\ntraining required to be completed by each individual onboard before being assigned to a vessel and/or prior to\npromotion. For the Master this should define:\n• •\n• The ship handling training required prior to promotion to the rank of Master onboard any fleet vessel.\nThe ship handling training required prior to being reassigned to a vessel with handling characteristics\nsignificantly different from those of the vessels in which they have recently served.\nWhere the required training included a shore-based ship handling training course, the maximum period for\nwhich a course may be considered valid prior assignment to a vessel type before the training would need to\nbe refreshed or repeated.\nTraining may consist of supervision onboard company vessels which is formally documented through a competency\ndevelopment process or may be delivered at an approved shore-based training centre.\nWhere training is delivered during a parallel voyage prior to taking over command on a vessel with significant different\nhandling characteristics the vessel operator should have defined the activities that must have been completed by the\nincoming Master and assessed and documented by the incumbent Master or a suitably qualified Superintendent prior\nto the incoming Master taking command.\nThe vessel operator should have evaluated the handling characteristics of the vessel types under its management\nand identified the circumstances in which additional ship handling training will be required when a Master is\nreassigned to a vessel type having significantly different handling characteristics to those which they had recently\nserved.\nWhen evaluating the handling characteristics of vessels under management considerations should include the\nnumber and types of propellers / drives, the number and types of rudders and the number and types of thrusters fitted\nto each vessel and not be limited solely to size.\nService as Master on a vessel with a specific set of handling characteristics within the previous five years will be\nconsidered as sufficient and appropriate experience when transferring from one vessel type to another.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nCompare the sea service record of the Master through the tabulated record of sea service prepared by the vessel\noperator with their discharge book and verify the time served as Master corresponded to the value provided in the\nOfficer Matrix uploaded to the OCIMF website.\nWhere the Master had served less than thirty-six months sea service in rank, request evidence that ship handling\ntraining had been provided prior to promotion to Master. This may consist of either;\n• •\nA formal in-house training program designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.\nAttendance at a shore-based training course designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.\nWhere the Master had transferred between vessel types having significantly different handling characteristics within\nthe previous twelve months of sea service, request evidence that additional ship handling training had been provided\nto the Master prior to taking command of the new type of vessel. This may consist of either;\n• •\nA formal in-house training program designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.\nAttendance at a shore-based training course designed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.\nWhen considering what constitutes significantly different handling characteristics, be guided by the company training\nmatrix and groupings of vessel types having similar handling characteristics. It is not expected that the inspector will\ncomment on the evaluation of ship handling characteristics made by the vessel operator.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The Master’s sea service record and discharge book.\nThe company training matrix showing the mandatory and non-mandatory training requirements for the\nMaster.\nThe company matrix of the handling characteristics of vessels under management considering the number\nand type of propellers, rudders and thrusters fitted to a vessel as well as the vessel size, and the training\nrequirements for transfer between vessel types.\nWhere the Master had less than thirty-six months sea service in the rank of Master evidence that they had\nundergone a formal in-house ship handling competency development programme and/or a shore-based\ntraining course which had been developed to meet the objectives of the STCW Code B-V/a.\nWhere the Master had been reassigned to a vessel type with significantly different handling characteristics,\nas identified by the vessel operator, evidence that they had undergone a formal in-house ship handling\ncompetency development programme and/or a shore-based training course which had been developed to\nmeet the objectives of the STCW Code B-Va prior to taking command.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe time in rank for the Master entered in the OCIMF Officer Matrix was inaccurate in that the time in rank\ndeclared was greater than thirty-six months sea service, but the Master had less than thirty-six months sea\nservice in rank.\nThere was no company training matrix available which clearly identified the circumstances in which ship\nhandling training was required to be completed by a Master both at promotion and when being reassigned to\na vessel having significantly different handling characteristics.\nThe vessel operator had not provided an evaluation of the handling characteristics of vessels under\nmanagement and identified where training was necessary when transferring between vessel identified as\nhaving specific handling characteristics due to size or number and type of propellers, rudders or thrusters.\nThe Master had less than thirty-six months sea service in rank but was not in possession of evidence of ship\nhandling training, designed to meet the objective of STCW Code B-Va, provided through an in-house\ncompetency development programme or a shore-based training course.\nThe Master had been reassigned to a vessel identified by the company as having significantly different\nhandling characteristics within the previous twelve months of sea service but was not in possession of\nevidence of ship handling training, relevant to the new vessel’s characteristics, designed to meet the\nobjective of STCW Code B-Va, provided through an in-house competency development programme or a\nshore-based training course.\nWhere the Master had more than thirty-six months sea service in rank and had served on the same type of\nvessel for the more than the previous twelve months sea service select “Not Answerable” in the Process\nresponse tool then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.3.", "t": "Had the Master, deck officers, and cargo/gas engineer where carried, attended a", "c": "shore-based simulator course covering routine and emergency cargo operations within\nthe previous five years?\nShort Question Text\nCargo operations shore-based simulator course\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: Model Course 1.35 – Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 1.36 – Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 1.37 – Chemical Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 2.06 – Oil Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nObjective\nTo establish whether all officers involved in cargo operations had been practically trained in routine and\nemergency cargo operations in a realistic simulator environment.\nIndustry guidance:\nIMO: Model Course 1.35 – Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 1.36 – Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 1.37 – Chemical Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nIMO: Model Course 2.06 – Oil Tanker Cargo & Ballast Handling Simulator.\nTMSA KPI 6.4.1 requires that officers attend shore-based simulator courses covering routine and emergency cargo\noperations. These courses may be used to:\n• •\n• •\nTrain junior officers.\nAssess suitability for promotion.\nEnsure continued competency of senior officers.\nFamiliarise personnel with new equipment and systems.\nProcedures specify the time frame for initial and refresher training.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the Master, all deck officers and cargo/gas engineers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a shorebased cargo operations simulator course applicable to the vessel type within the previous five years.\nThe shore-based cargo simulator courses should have been developed around the guidance provided in the\nappropriate IMO model course for the vessel type.\nThe inclusion of this question does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that any or all of the Master,\ndeck officers and cargo/gas engineers onboard will be required to have attended a shore-based cargo simulator\ncourse.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the shore-based cargo system simulator training course certificates for the Master, deck officers,\nand cargo/gas engineer where carried, and verify that:\n• •\n• The training had been completed within the previous five years for the Master, each deck officer and\ncargo/gas engineer. The training may be a refresher training course where a full course had been\nundertaken previously.\nThe training course was conducted in a simulator representing the type of vessel being inspected i.e. oil,\nchemical, LPG or LNG.\nThe training certificates indicated that the course content was at least equivalent to the appropriate IMO\nmodel course for the vessel type.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The shore-based cargo system simulator training certificates for the Master, deck officers and cargo/gas\nengineer where carried.\nWhere the shore-based cargo system simulator training had been completed more than five years\npreviously, a certificate for a refresher training course with an appropriate cargo simulator element.\nWhere a refresher training course was undertaken, the supporting full course certificate must also be\navailable for review.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThe Master and/or any one of the deck officers or cargo/gas engineers onboard during the inspection did not\nhave evidence of attending either a full or refresher cargo system simulator training course within the\nprevious five years.\nThe training courses attended by the Master and/or any one of the deck officers or cargo/gas engineers was\nfor a vessel type other than the type of vessel being inspected.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.4.", "t": "Had the Chief Engineer and all engineer officers attended a shore-based engine", "c": "room management simulator course covering routine and emergency machinery\noperations within the previous five years?\nShort Question Text\nShore-based engine room management simulator course\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: Model Course 2.07 – Engine-Room Simulator.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the Chief Engineer and all engineer officers involved in manoeuvring operations had been\npractically trained in routine and emergency machinery operations in a realistic simulator environment.\nIndustry guidance:\nIMO: Model Course 2.07 – Engine-Room Simulator.\nTMSA KPI 3.2.2 requires that procedures are in place to provide company specific additional training for all\nranks. The procedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• The type of training.\nFrequency of refresher training.\nRecords of training.\nA rank specific matrix.\nPersonnel career development requests.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated that the Chief Engineer and all engineer\nofficers onboard at the time of inspection had attended a shore-based engine room management simulator course\nwithin the previous five years. The course should cover routine and emergency machinery operations for the type of\nmain propulsion onboard the vessel.\nThe course should have been developed around the guidance given within the IMO model course 2.07 for the main\npropulsion type fitted onboard.\nThe inclusion of this question in the CVIQ does not imply an expectation by OCIMF or its members that any or all the\nengineer officers onboard will be required to have attended a shore-based engine room management simulator\ncourse.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the shore-based engine room management simulator training certificates for the Chief Engineer and all\nengineers onboard and verify that:\n• •\nThe training had been completed within the previous five years for the Chief Engineer and each engineer\nofficer onboard. The training may be a refresher training course where a full course had been undertaken\npreviously.\nThe training course was conducted in a simulator representing the main propulsion type of vessel being\ninspected.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe shore-based engine room management simulator training certificates for the Chief Engineer and all\nengineers.\nWhere the shore-based engine room management simulator training had been completed more than five\nyears previously, a certificate for a refresher training course with an appropriate engine room simulator\nelement.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThe Chief Engineer and/or any one of the engineer officers onboard during the inspection did not have\nevidence of attending either a full or refresher engine room management simulator course within the\nprevious five years.\nThe training courses attended by the Chief Engineer and/or any one of the engineer officers was for a\npropulsion type other than the type fitted to the vessel being inspected.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.5.", "t": "Did all key personnel onboard involved in Dynamically Positioned (DP) operations", "c": "have appropriate training in accordance with IMO and International Marine Contractors\nAssociation (IMCA) guidelines and local regulations applicable to the area of operations?\nShort Question Text\nTraining for Dynamically Positioned (DP) operators\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nIMCA: Guidelines for The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel. Rev. 2.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.738/Rev.2. Guidelines for Dynamic Positioning System (DP) Operator Training.\nIMO: STCW Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that all key personnel onboard are properly experienced, trained and qualified to participate in\nDynamically Positioned (DP) operations in accordance with industry recommended best practice and local\nregulation.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMCA: Guidelines for The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel – Rev. 2 2016.\nChapter 5 Key DP Personnel Identified\n5.1 Master/OIM The master or offshore installation manager (OIM) has overall responsibility and authority for the\nsafety of the vessel, all onboard and for the protection of the marine environment.\n5.2 Senior DP Operator (SDPO) The person fulfilling the role of senior DPO is the lead DP watchkeeper with\nresponsibility for the navigational safety and the DP control required to achieve the effective and efficient progression\nof the industrial mission of the vessel during the period of time on duty.\n5.3 DP Operator (DPO) The person fulfilling the role of DPO is the second person on a DP watch and is not in\ncharge of the watch. The DPO is responsible for fulfilling their duty as a DP control system operator during their time\non watch to the extent enabled by their level of training, vessel DP system knowledge and experience.\n5.4 Chief Engineer The chief engineer is the head of the technical department onboard and is responsible for\nensuring all the mechanical and electrical systems of the vessel are operated and maintained in a safe and efficient\nmanner in order to support the safe navigation and operation of the vessel.\n5.5 Senior Engine Room Watchkeeper The person fulfilling the role of senior engineer on watch is responsible for\nensuring that all machinery and systems necessary to maintain the DP status of the vessel are functioning correctly.\nThey should also ensure that effective communication channels to the bridge are available.\n5.6 Engine Room Watchkeeper A second engine room watchkeeper may assist the senior watchkeeper to the extent\nenabled by their level of knowledge and experience.\n5.7 DP Electrical and Electronics Technicians Personnel fulfilling the role of electrical and electronics technicians are\nresponsible for carrying out maintenance, repairs and replacements to systems and components with reference to the\nmanufacturer’s approved operation and maintenance procedures.\n6.4 Training Courses for Key Technical DP Personnel\nA good understanding of the DPO’s responsibilities by technical DP personnel and onboard familiarisation with the\nDPO’s task in controlling specific DP operations will aid quick and appropriate response to problems associated with\nany equipment that affects DP. It is recommended that engineers and electrical and electronics technicians attend a\nstructured DP familiarisation course either arranged onboard or at a recognised training establishment. Details of a\ngeneric DP familiarisation course is given in Appendix 3.\nAll training should be appropriate to the vessel the individual works on and may include subjects covering vessel\ncontrol systems, high voltage (HV) safety, DP maintenance, power management systems (PMS), fire and gas\ndetection, emergency shutdowns (ESD) and emergency drills. Electrical technicians on vessels with HV systems\nshould attend a course in the safe operation of HV systems2 .\nKey DP electrical and electronics technicians responsible for maintaining the DP control system should attend a\nmanufacturer approved DP control system maintenance course. Guidelines covering the content of a course\ndesigned to enable understanding of the control system and the procedures necessary for fault finding is given in\nAppendix 2. Training on vessel-specific equipment is necessary if the equipment is sufficiently unique that training on\nsimilar equipment does not provide an adequate level of skill, knowledge and ability. It is in the interest of the vessel\nowners/operators to continuously improve the ability of the relevant personnel to fault find and repair the control\nsystem.\nEffective training should enable key DP technical personnel to respond quickly and appropriately to equipment\nfailures and faults that may result in DP incidents and to effectively recover the vessel to a safe DP equipment state.\nWhen considering the training requirements, the importance of a team response to situations should be taken into\naccount. Vessel owners/operators are advised to have onboard at least one person who has received appropriate\nmaintenance training on the vessel’s DP control systems\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.738/Rev.2. Guidelines for Dynamic Positioning System (DP) Operator Training.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.3 requires that procedures are in place to identify and manage mandatory training, including refresher\ntraining, for all vessel personnel.\nThe procedure may include a training matrix that clearly shows the mandatory training for all vessel personnel.\nRecords of such training are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:\n1.\nmanned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements;\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nIMO: STCW Code\nSection B-V/f Guidance on the training and experience for personnel operating dynamic positioning systems.\n3. The content of training and experience should include coverage of the following components of a DP system:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nDP control station;\nPower generation and management;\nPropulsion units;\nPosition reference systems;\nHeading reference systems;\nEnvironmental reference systems; and\nExternal force reference systems, such as hawser tension gauges.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have identified an industry-recognized body which will be utilised to issue DP Operator\ncertification to those staff who had completed the necessary training and obtained and maintained the requisite DP\nexperience.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a training matrix for all onboard roles required to have any form of DP\ntraining according to IMO/IMCA guidance or local regulations applicable to the area in which the vessel conducts DP\noperations. The training matrix should include, as appropriate to the vessel:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDP operator training course.\nDP refresher training either utilising an approved onboard programme or through shore-based training\ncourses.\nIntegrated DP/power management control system training course.\nHigh voltage training course.\nThe relevant DP control system maintenance training course.\nThe relevant position reference system training courses.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nReview the vessel’s completed DP training matrix for all staff onboard at the time of the inspection and verify\nthat each person had completed the required training for their role onboard within the time frame specified\nby the company training matrix.\nReview the DP logbook and DP Operator certificate for one randomly selected DP operator and verify that\nthe logbook had been maintained up to date with DP experience since gaining the DP operator certificate.\nWhere the vessel operator required periodic refresher DP training, either by utilising the vessel’s own DP\nequipment while not conducting actual DP operations or by attendance at a shore-based course, verify that\nthe refresher training had been completed within the required time frame.\nReview the High Voltage, DP/Power Management or DP control system training certificate for one individual\nand verify that the training certificate was valid, and any refresher or top-up training required to maintain\nvalidity had been completed within the required time frame.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company training matrix which identified the DP related certification and training requirements for each\nDP related role onboard.\nThe vessel’s populated training matrix which showed the current status of all DP related certification and\ntraining for all onboard staff having a DP related role.\nThe DP Operator certificates and DP logbooks for everyone identified as a qualified DP operator.\nThe DP refresher training course certificates or scheme records where onboard refresher activities had\ntaken place as part of a recognised programme.\nThe High Voltage, DP/Power Management and DP control system training certificates for each member of\nonboard staff required to have such training.\nThe position reference system training course certificates for each member of staff required to have such\ntraining.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel operator had not developed a training matrix which identified all DP related training and\ncertification that was required to be completed by each onboard position with a DP related role.\nThe vessel had not prepared a record of training and certification to demonstrate that all DP related\ncertification and training had been completed by each individual onboard with a DP related role.\nThe required training certificates or DP Operator certificates were found to be missing, expired or outdated\nfor any individual with a DP related role.\nThere was no process to provide DP refresher training to the DP operators through a periodic shore-based\ncourse or an approved onboard process.\n• The High Voltage, DP/Power management or DP control system training courses required to be undertaken\nby the Senior Engine Room Operator and, the Electrical and Electronics Technicians in accordance with the\ncompany training matrix had not been completed.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.3.6.", "t": "Had the Master, officers and ratings received the required training and", "c": "familiarisation before being assigned duties related to handling LNG or other lowflashpoint fuel?\nShort Question Text\nLNG or other low-flashpoint fuel training and familiarisation.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGF Code\nICS: Training requirements for personnel on ships subject to the IGF code\nObjective\nTo ensure that personnel on board ships using LNG or other low-flashpoint fuels are adequately qualified,\ntrained, and experienced.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Training requirements for personnel on ships subject to the IGF code\nAmendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers\n(STCW), 1978, were developed to support the requirement for training in the International Code of Safety for Ships\nUsing Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code).\nThe purpose of this document is to provide information and guidance on the special training requirements for\npersonnel on ships subject to the IGF Code. It is intended to assist shipowners and operators with preparations for\ncompliance with the IGF Code and the associated training and certification requirements in the STCW Convention,\n1978, as amended.\nBackground\nThe IGF Code established an international standard for ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels for propulsion\nand entered into force on 1 January 2017. It contains mandatory provisions for the arrangement, installation, control\nand monitoring of machinery, equipment and systems using low-flashpoint fuels, focusing currently on LNG.\nThe IGF Code applies to ships using low-flashpoint fuels for which the building contract is placed on or after 1\nJanuary 2017, the keels of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 July 2017 (in the\nabsence of a building contract), or the delivery of which is on or after 1 January 2021. Ships which commence a\nconversion on or after 1 January 2017 to use low-flashpoint fuels (or use additional or different low-flashpoint fuels\nother than those for which the ship was originally certified) will also be required to comply with the IGF Code (see\nSOLAS regulation II-1/56).\nA functional requirement in the IGF Code (see Part D, section 19) provides that companies shall ensure that\nseafarers on board ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels shall have completed training to attain the abilities\nthat are appropriate to the capacity to be filled and duties and responsibilities to be taken up, taking into account the\nprovisions given in the STCW Convention, 1978, as amended. As such, new mandatory minimum requirements in the\nSTCW Convention and Code for the training and qualifications of relevant personnel on ships subject to the IGF\nCode entered into force on 1 January 2017.\nFamiliarization and Training Requirements\nNew mandatory minimum requirements for the familiarization and training of Masters, officers, ratings and other\npersonnel on ships subject to the IGF Code are established by Regulation V/3 of the STCW Convention and detailed\nin Section A-V/3 of the STCW Code.\nAll personnel serving on board ships subject to the IGF Code are to receive, prior to being assigned shipboard duties,\nappropriate ship and equipment specific familiarization. The training and qualification requirements apply to Masters,\nofficers, ratings and other personnel on ships subject to the IGF Code, in accordance with their capacity, duties and\nresponsibilities on board. Only personnel on ships subject to the IGF Code are addressed by Regulations V/3.\nThe new requirements establish two levels of training and resulting certification:\n• •\nCertificate in Basic Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code.\nCertificate in Advanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code.\nA Certificate of Proficiency (CoP) will be issued to persons qualified in accordance with the requirements.\nApplicable personnel are required to have successfully completed the required level of training and hold the\nappropriate CoP prior to being assigned shipboard duties. CoPs may be issued by training providers and there is no\nrequirement that they be issued by Administrations.\nCoPs issued under Regulation V/3 are not required to be issued with endorsements attesting to the recognition of the\ncertificate (i.e., flag State endorsement). This differs from the requirements for CoPs issued to Masters and officers in\naccordance with the provisions of Regulations V/1-1 and V/1-2 (special training for oil, chemical and liquefied gas\ntankers), which require endorsement by the flag State.\nBasic Training\nSeafarers responsible for designated safety duties associated with the care, use or emergency response to the fuel\non board ships subject to the IGF Code are to hold the CoP in Basic Training. Every candidate for the CoP in Basic\nTraining for service on ships subject to the IGF Code is to have completed an approved course. There are no special\nseagoing service or experience requirements for this level of training.\nAdvanced Training\nMasters, engineer officers and all personnel with immediate responsibility for the care and use of fuels and fuel\nsystems on ships subject to the IGF Code, are to hold the CoP in Advanced Training.\nA person/personnel with “immediate responsibility” is defined in Section B-V/3 as “a person being in a decisionmaking capacity with respect to handling of fuel addressed by the IGF Code or other fuel-related operations.”\nEvery candidate for the CoP in Advanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code, whilst holding the\nCoP in Basic Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code, is to have:\n• •\nCompleted an approved advanced training course and meet the standard of competence specified in the\nSTCW Code; and\nCompleted at least 1 month of approved seagoing service that includes a minimum of 3 bunkering\noperations on board ships subject to the IGF Code, where two of the three bunkering operations may be\nreplaced by approved simulator training on bunkering operations.\nContinued Professional Competence Requirements\nPersonnel holding CoPs in accordance with Regulation V/3 shall, at intervals not exceeding 5 years, undertake\nappropriate refresher training or be required to provide evidence of having achieved the required standard of\ncompetence within the previous 5 years.\nRecognition of Qualifications Related to Liquefied Gas Tankers\nPersonnel who have been qualified and certificated for service on liquefied gas tankers in accordance with Regulation\nV/1-2 (Basic Training for liquefied gas tanker cargo operations and Advanced Training for liquefied gas tanker cargo\noperations) are to be considered as having met the requirements for service on ships subject to the IGF Code, as\nappropriate (see paragraphs 6 and 9 of Regulation V/3).\n• •\nPersonnel holding a CoP in Basic Training for liquefied gas tanker cargo operations or a CoP in Advanced\nTraining for liquefied gas tanker cargo operations are considered as having met the requirements for Basic\nTraining for service on ships subject to the IGF Code.\nPersonnel holding a CoP in Advanced Training for Cargo Operations on liquefied gas tankers are\nconsidered as having met the requirements for Advanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF\nCode, provided specific seagoing service and experience requirements are met:\no Completed seagoing service of 3 months in the previous 5 years on board: ships subject to the IGF\nCode; tankers carrying as cargo, fuels covered by the IGF Code; or ships using gases or lowflashpoint fuel as fuel.\no Participated in conducting 3 cargo operations onboard a liquefied gas tanker; or completion of a\nminimum of 3 bunkering operations on a ship subject to the IGF Code, where two of the three\nbunkering operations may be replaced by approved simulator training on bunkering operations.\nExisting Qualifications for Service on Gas-Fuelled Ships\nAdministrations are to compare the standards of competence required of persons serving on gas-fuelled ships before\n1 January 2017 with the standards of competence in Section A-V/3, and determine the need, if any, for requiring\nthese personnel to update their qualifications (see paragraph 10 of Regulation V/3). As such, Administrations may\nrecognize existing qualifications for service on gas-fuelled ships or require that relevant personnel update their\nqualifications.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.3 requires that procedures are in place to identify and manage mandatory training, including refresher\ntraining, for all vessel personnel.\nThe procedures may include a training matrix that clearly shows the mandatory training for all vessel personnel.\nRecords of such training are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:\n1.\n2.\nManned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements; and\nAppropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.\nIMO: IGF Code\n19.2 Functional requirements\nCompanies shall ensure that seafarers on board ships using gases or other low-flashpoint fuels shall have completed\ntraining to attain the abilities that are appropriate to the capacity to be filled and duties and responsibilities to be taken\nup, taking into account the provisions given in the STCW Convention and Code, as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question will only be generated when the vessel operator has indicated through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel is outfitted in accordance with the IGF Code to use LNG as fuel.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to identify which officers and ratings are required to hold a\ncertificate for Basic and Advanced training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code. This information may be\nprovided within a company mandatory training matrix.\nThe IGF Code applies to ships using low-flashpoint fuels for which the building contract is placed on or after 1\nJanuary 2017, the keels of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 July 2017 (in the\nabsence of a building contract), or the delivery of which is on or after 1 January 2021.\nCrew members responsible for designated safety duties associated with the care, use or emergency response to the\nfuel on board ships subject to the IGF Code are to hold a certificate in Basic Training (IMO Model Course 7.13).\nMasters, engineer officers and all personnel with immediate responsibility for the care and use of fuels and fuel\nsystems on ships subject to the IGF Code, are to hold a certificate in Advanced Training (IMO Model Course 7.14).\nA person/personnel with “immediate responsibility” is defined as “a person being in a decision-making capacity with\nrespect to handling of fuel addressed by the IGF Code or other fuel-related operations.”\nThere is no requirement for the certificates to be endorsed by the vessel’s flag state or any other authority and they\nmay be issued by training providers.\nFor existing vessels using LNG or other low-flashpoint fuel that are not subject to the IGF Code, training and\ncertification requirements will be as required by the vessel’s flag state.\nIn all cases, personnel involved in handling LNG or other low-flashpoint fuels should have received ship-specific\nfamiliarisation with the systems fitted.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the requirement for Basic and\nAdvanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code, which may be in the form of a training\nmatrix.\nReview:\no A Basic Training Certificate for one engine room rating.\no Two Advanced Training Certificates sampled from the Master, Chief Engineer and engineer\nofficers.\no Ship-specific familiarisation records for the LNG or low-flashpoint fuel system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which defined the requirement for Basic and Advanced Training for service on\nships subject to the IGF Code, which may be in the form of a training matrix.\nBasic and Advanced Training Certificates of Proficiency for service in vessels subject to the IGF Code.\nOn existing vessels, alternative certification as required by the flag state.\nRecords of familiarisation for the LNG or low-flashpoint fuel system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the requirement for Basic and Advanced Training for\nservice on ships subject to the IGF Code.\nA crew member with responsibilities associated with the fuel or fuel system on board had not received shipspecific familiarisation with the systems fitted before being assigned duties.\nOn a vessel subject to the IGF Code:\no A crew member responsible for designated safety duties associated with the care, use or\nemergency response to the fuel on board had not received the required Basic Training.\no The Master, an engineer officer or any other person with immediate responsibility for the care and\nuse of the fuel and fuel systems on board had not received the required Advanced Training.\nOn an existing vessel using LNG or other low-flashpoint fuel:\no A crew member had not received the training required by the vessel’s flag state administration.\nA crew member had not received training in accordance with the company procedure which defined the\nrequirement for Basic and Advanced Training for service on ships subject to the IGF Code.\n3.4. Crew Compliance", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.4.1.", "t": "Was there an effective system in place to record and monitor the hours of rest for", "c": "all personnel onboard in compliance with STCW, MLC or the regulatory requirements\napplicable to the vessel?\nShort Question Text\nHours of rest, records and monitoring\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1598 Guidelines on Fatigue\nILO: Convention on Seafarers’ Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships’ (ILO 180)\nOCIMF: Recommendations Relating to the Application of Requirements Governing Seafarers’ Hours of Work and\nRest\nIMO: STCW Code\nIMO/ILO: Guidelines for the development of tables of seafarers’ shipboard working arrangements and formats of\nrecords of seafarers’ hours of work and rest\nObjective\nTo ensure that there is an effective system in place to manage crew rest hours and fatigue.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF: Recommendations Relating to the Application of Requirements Governing Seafarers’ Hours of Work\nand Rest.\nIMO: MSC./Circ.1598. Guidelines on Fatigue.\nIMO/ILO: Guidelines for the development of tables of seafarers’ shipboard working arrangements and\nformats of records of seafarers’ hours of work and rest\nTMSA KPI 3A.1.3 requires that procedures ensure that working and rest hours of all personnel are in line with the\nSTCW, applicable flag state requirements or any relevant authority guidelines for the vessel trade and are being\naccurately recorded and monitored.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\n.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations, classification\nsocieties and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: STCW Code\nChapter VIII Watchkeeping\nRegulation VIII/1 Fitness for duty.\n1. Each Administration shall, for the purpose of preventing fatigue:\n1.1 establish and enforce rest periods for watchkeeping personnel and those whose duties involve designated safety,\nsecurity and prevention of pollution duties in accordance with the provisions of section A-VIII/1 of the STCW Code.\nPart A Chapter VIII Standards regarding watchkeeping\nSection A-VIII/1 Fitness for duty\n2. All persons who are assigned duty as officer in charge of a watch or as a rating forming part of a watch and those\nwhose duties involve designated safety, prevention of pollutions and security duties shall be provided with a rest\nperiod of not less than:\n.1 minimum of 10 hours of rest in any 24-hour period; and\n.2 77 hours in any 7-day period.\n3. The hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at least 6 hours in length,\nand the intervals between consecutive periods of rest shall not exceed 14 hours.\n9. Parties may allow exceptions from the required periods of rest in paragraphs 2.2 and 3 above provided that the\nrest period is not less than 70 hours in any 7-day period.\nException from the weekly rest period provided for in paragraph 2.2 shall not be allowed for more than two\nconsecutive weeks. The intervals between the two periods of exceptions onboard shall not be less than twice the\nduration of the exception.\nThe hours of rest provided for in paragraph 2.1 may be divided into no more than three periods, one of which shall be\nat least six hours in length, and neither of the other two shall be less than one hour in length. The intervals between\nconsecutive periods of rest shall not exceed 14 hours. Exceptions shall not extend beyond two 24-hour periods in any\n7-day period.\nExceptions shall, as far as possible, take into account the guidance regarding prevention of fatigue in section B-VIII/1.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to define how hours of rest were to be managed and\nrecorded based on the governing requirements of STCW, MLC, or the regulatory requirements applicable to the\nvessel.\nThe vessel operator should have provided a system that permits the recording of rest hours and the consequential\ncalculation of conformance in any 24-hour and 7-day periods for each individual onboard taking into account any\nexceptions permitted. The system should identify any non-conformance with the governing requirements.\nIndividuals should record notes against their daily records to identify the duties they performed outside their normal\nworking hours.\nHours of rest non-conformance reports should be provided to shore management at least monthly. Shore\nmanagement should be expected to acknowledge any significant levels of non-conformance.\n\"Significant\" in relation to this question is considered to be 3 or more days containing non-conformance for any\nindividual(s) in any 30-day period.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined how hours of rest were to be\nmanaged and recorded.\nReview the hours of rest records form and verify that it was in alignment with the prescribed IMO/ILO format.\nReview hours of rest records and compare them against log books and other records for a recently\ncompleted operation and verify that the hours of rest records realistically reflected the activities conducted\nby the vessel and individual seafarers.\nReview the hours of rest record summary report provided to shore management and verify that the\nmanagement had acknowledge receipt and responded with an action plan where significant nonconformities were present in the summary report.\nSuggested activities to review include :\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Bunkering operations including anchoring and the berthing of the bunker barge.\nLoading / discharging operations including inbound/outbound passages and mooring operations.\nTransit of straits or inland waterways with considerable standby requirements such as Singapore/Malacca\nStraits, Turkish Straits, English Channel / Dover Straits or similar.\nPost drydock departure and preparations to return to commercial service.\nNavigation during extended periods of restricted visibility.\nExtensive tank cleaning operations.\nExtensive enclosed space operations.\nConsideration should be given to compliance with company procedures relating to:\n• •\n• •\n• Bridge team composition.\nEngine room status and, when required to be manned, engine room team composition.\nSupervision and management of cargo and bunker operations.\nSupervision and management of mooring and anchoring operations.\nThe conduct of emergency response drills.\nThe suggested activities and considerations are not exhaustive, and the inspector should exercise professional\nexperience when conducting cross checks against records while limiting the document review to a single operation or\nperiod not exceeding three days.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure that defined how hours of rest were to be managed and recorded.\nCompleted hours of rest records for the preceding three months signed, physically or digitally as acceptable\nto the vessel’s Administration, by the individual crewmembers and approved by the Master or their\nauthorised representative.\nThe monthly hours of rest record summary reports for the previous three months showing each hours of rest\nnon-conformance.\nCommunication with vessel operator relating to significant* hours of rest non-conformance.\nLog books and other records which will allow review of vessel activities over the previous three months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure that defined how hours of rest were to be managed and recorded.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure that defined how hours of rest were\nto be managed and recorded and/or the process for recording and monitoring hours of rest and any nonconformance.\nThe hours of rest records were not in the ILO/MLC format which clearly identified the hours of rest\nconformance in any twenty-four hour or seven-day period.\nPhysically or digitally signed hours of rest records were not available for all crew members onboard which\nhad been approved by the Master or their authorised representative.\n• •\n• •\nReviewed of hours of rest records indicated that personnel had not completed the hours of rest records to\naccurately reflect their work and rest hours.\nThere was no evidence of hours of rest conformance/non-conformance calculations.\nThere was no evidence that shore management was informed at least monthly of hours of rest conformance\nlevels on board.\nThere was no evidence that the shore-based management had acknowledged significant levels of hours of\nrest non-conformance.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.4.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the company policy and", "c": "procedures for drug and alcohol abuse prevention and had unannounced drug and\nalcohol testing taken place onboard in accordance with the policy?\nShort Question Text\nDrug and alcohol abuse prevention\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Control of Drugs and Alcohol Onboard Ship. 1995.\nIMO: STCW Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that no seafarer will navigate a ship or operate its onboard equipment whilst impaired by drugs or\nalcohol.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Control of Drugs and Alcohol Onboard Ship. 1995.\nOCIMF recommends that officers and ratings observe a period of abstinence from alcohol prior to scheduled\nwatchkeeping duty or work periods. This may be either a fixed period, such as the 4 hours required by the USCG, or\na minimum period of 1 hour of abstinence for each unit of alcohol consumed. Whichever method is used to determine\nthe abstinence period, the objective should always be to ensure that, prior to going on scheduled duty, the blood\nalcohol content of the seafarer is theoretically zero. Officers and ratings should be aware that local regulations may\nbe in place and where this is the case, it is recommended that these be strictly adhered to where they exceed these\nguidelines.\nTMSA KPI 3A.1.4 requires that a formal D & A (drug and alcohol) policy is implemented and a system is in place to\nmonitor it on a regular basis.\nThe policy complies with OCIMF guidelines. The frequency and type of testing is defined.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.4 The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company’s SMS have an adequate understanding\nor relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.\nIMO: STCW Code\nPart A Chapter VIII\nStandards regarding watchkeeping\nSection A-VIII/1 – Fitness for duty.\n10. Each Administration shall establish, for the purpose of preventing alcohol abuse, a limit of not greater than 0.05%\nblood alcohol level (BAC) or 0.25 mg/l alcohol in the breath or a quantity of alcohol leading to such alcohol\nconcentration for masters, officers and other seafarers while performing designated safety, security and marine\nenvironmental duties.\nPart B Chapter VIII Watchkeeping\nChapter VIII\nGuidance regarding watchkeeping\nSection B-VIII/1 – Guidance regarding fitness for duty\n8. Companies should consider the implementation of a clearly written policy of drug and alcohol abuse prevention,\nincluding prohibition to consume alcohol within four hours prior to serving as member of a watch either by inclusion in\nthe company’s quality management system or by means of providing adequate information and education to the\nseafarers.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a policy and supporting procedures to prevent drug and alcohol abuse\nwhich should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Whether alcohol may be consumed on board, and if so:\no The types of alcohol beverages and the strength and maximum container size that may be served\non board.\no The maximum permitted issue to an individual during any 24 hour period in standard alcohol units\n(1 unit = 10ml alcohol).\no The person responsible for issuing alcohol to vessel staff and visitors.\no The means of recording the issue of alcohol to each staff member and visitor.\no The places onboard where the consumption of alcohol is permitted.\no The process to avoid stockpiling of issued alcohol.\no The period of abstinence before any scheduled duty.\nWhere alcohol may be consumed while on shore leave:\no The expected period of abstinence before returning to the vessel.\no The period of abstinence before any scheduled duty.\nThe documented training necessary to use the onboard alcohol testing device.\nThe frequency of calibration or testing of the onboard alcohol testing device.\nThe frequency of unannounced alcohol testing initiated by the company.\nThe persons who are responsible for conducting and witnessing alcohol tests, including the testing of the\nMaster.\nThe means of recording the results of an alcohol test.\nThe time frame within which unannounced testing must be completed after the initial notification from the\ncompany.\nThe circumstances, other than unannounced testing, when an individual or group of individuals will be tested\nfor alcohol and samples collected for drug screening where onboard sample collection equipment is\nprovided.\nThe frequency of unannounced drug screening by an independent agency or, the controlled collection of\nsamples onboard for analysis by an independent agency.\nWhere controlled collection of samples for drug screening is required as part of the company procedure, the\nminimum stock of sample collection kits that must be maintained on board.\nThe vessel operator’s Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy should be prominently displayed at appropriate\nlocations onboard.\nThe vessel operator will supply information relating to the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Policy and procedure\nthrough the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nSight, and where necessary review, the company policy and supporting procedures to prevent the abuse of drugs\nand alcohol and verify that prior to the commencement of the inspection:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe supply of alcohol had been managed and documented in accordance with company expectations.\nThe onboard alcohol testing device had been calibrated and/or tested in accordance with the company\nprocedure and manufacturer’s instructions.\nEvidence was available that the persons required to use the onboard alcohol testing device had received\ntraining in its use.\nRecords were available to demonstrate that unannounced alcohol testing had been completed in\naccordance with the company procedure and included;\no The initial instruction from the company,\no The documented breath test values for each individual tested,\no The message to the company confirming that the tests had been completed.\nRecords were available to demonstrate that the frequency of the unannounced alcohol testing was in\naccordance with the company procedure.\nUnannounced drug screening tests had been conducted in accordance with the frequency defined by the\ncompany procedure by either onboard collection of samples for later analysis or by the attendance of an\nindependent agency.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The company policy and supporting procedures to prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol.\nWhere alcohol was permitted onboard, the records of alcohol issue to onboard personnel and visitors.\nThe alcohol breath testing device.\nThe calibration or testing records for the alcohol breath testing device.\nRecords, including results, of company initiated unannounced alcohol tests including initial instruction and\nvessel advice that tests were complete.\nRecords, including results and chain of custody documentation, for unannounced or “for cause” drug\nscreening either by the attendance of an independent agency or by the onboard collection of samples.\nThe inventory of drug screening sample collection kits where required to be carried by the company\nprocedure.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company policy or supporting procedures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and alcohol.\nThe company policy to prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol was not prominently displayed at appropriate\nlocations onboard.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company policy or supporting procedures for the\nprevention of abuse of drugs and alcohol.\nThe accompanying officer or responsible individual was unfamiliar with the use and testing of the alcohol\nbreath testing device.\nThe vessel did not have a breath testing device.\nThe breath testing device was defective.\nThe onboard supply of consumable test pieces was insufficient for the resupply period.\nThe breath testing device had not been tested or calibrated in accordance with the company procedure or\nmanufacturer’s instructions.\nThe onboard supply of alcohol had not been administered and/or documented in accordance with company\nprocedure.\nRecords indicated that issue of alcohol had exceeded the permitted allowance to an individual on any single\nday.\nCompany initiated unannounced alcohol testing had not been completed at the frequency required by the\ncompany procedure.\nThe interval between company initiated unannounced alcohol tests was more than six months.\nThe records of company initiated unannounced alcohol testing indicated that not all personnel onboard at\nthe time of the test had been tested or the tests had not been completed within the required timeframe.\nThe records of unannounced drug screening indicated that samples had not been collected and analysed\nfrom all persons onboard at the time of the screening.\nThe records of unannounced drug screening indicated that the frequency of the screening was not in\naccordance with the company procedure.\n• •\n• The interval between unannounced drug screenings was greater than twelve months.\nThe vessel did not have the stipulated number of drug screening sample collection kits where these were\nrequired by the company procedure.\nWhere an incident had taken place, there were no records of post incident drug and alcohol tests having\ntaken place where required to be carried out by the company drug and alcohol abuse prevention policy.\n3.5. Crew Familiarisation", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.5.1.", "t": "Had the company developed an effective familiarisation programme that covered", "c": "the personal safety and professional responsibilities of all onboard personnel, including\nvisitors and contractors, and were records available to demonstrate that the\nfamiliarisation had been completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nFamiliarisation of crew, visitors and contractors\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Anywhere\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that all onboard personnel, including contractors and visitors, are fully familiarised with their\nonboard duties, responsibilities and the equipment and machinery fitted to the vessel relevant to their role.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\nChapter 2 Safety Induction.\n2.1.2 It is recommended that each Company should design and implement a standard induction programme for each\nvessel, covering the STCW and MLC requirements, and incorporating any expanded detail specific to that vessel’s\nparticular needs.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• •\n• •\nOnboard HSSE requirements.\nThe company SMS.\nVessel specific operations and equipment.\nRoles and responsibilities.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to define what familiarisation is required to be undertaken by\neach role onboard, including visitors and contractors, and the timeframe for completion.\nThe procedures should define, and checklists for each person should record, the following:\n• •\n• •\n• The specific familiarisation tasks that an individual crewmember, visitor or contractor are required to\nundertake to ensure that they are familiar with general safety, emergency responsibilities and role specific\nduties.\nWhich visitors and/or contractors are required to undertake familiarisation and any exceptions permitted.\nThe ship specific equipment that must be included in the familiarisation programme.\nThe time frame by which each familiarisation task must be completed.\nThe rank of the person required to deliver the familiarisation and, where different, the rank of the person\nrequired to verify the effectiveness of the familiarisation delivered.\nWhere crewmembers are on short contracts to the same vessel, the familiarisation procedure will define any\nexceptions permitted for returning staff. In such cases, initial familiarisation records must be available to support any\nabridged familiarisation process.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the familiarisation process for\neach role onboard, including visitors and contractors.\nReview the familiarisation records for the following, chosen at random, and verify that familiarisation was\nconducted as required by the company procedure:\no One navigation/deck officer.\no One engineer officer.\no One specialist officer (ETO, Electrician, Gas/Cargo Engineer), where carried.\no One rating.\no One contractor or visitor.\no One individual who had been promoted onboard or changed roles, where this has occurred.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which defined the onboard familiarisation process for each role onboard, including\nvisitors and contractors.\nRecords of completed familiarisation as follows:\nFor all individuals\n• •\nEssential Initial safety training necessary prior to sailing on joining, or upon taking over new safety related\nassignments onboard.\nOnboard training in the use of ship’s lifesaving equipment, firefighting equipment and survival craft\ncompleted within the first two weeks onboard.\nFor navigation/deck officers\n• •\nFamiliarisation with the navigational equipment fitted onboard the vessel prior to taking over a navigational\nwatch.\nFamiliarisation with the vessel’s cargo, ballast and mooring equipment before taking over a cargo watch.\nFor engineer officers\n• Familiarisation with the main propulsion, manoeuvring, cargo and ballast management and power\ngenerating equipment fitted onboard the vessel prior to undertaking scheduled duties.\nFor specialist officers\n• Familiarisation with the specialist equipment under their responsibility.\nFor contractors\n• Familiarisation completed before any work was carried out onboard.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the familiarisation process for onboard staff, contractors\nand visitors.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company familiarisation procedure and/or processes.\nFamiliarisation records, in accordance with the company procedure, were not available for any one of the\nselected personnel.\nEvidence was available that contractors, as defined by company procedures, had worked onboard but there\nwas no documented record of their familiarisation prior to commencing work.\nThe necessary familiarisation had not been carried out within the required time frame or prior to the\ncrewmember starting the first duty period utilising the equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe familiarisation process did not address the principal safety, environmental, navigation, cargo, mooring\nand propulsion machinery and equipment fitted to the vessel relevant to an individual role.\nAn officer or crew member demonstrated a poor understanding or familiarity with key equipment or systems\nunder their responsibility during the balance of the inspection - which resulted in an observation under\nanother question.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.5.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the ship’s lifesaving and fire", "c": "extinguishing appliances and, had ongoing onboard training and instruction taken place\nto maintain familiarity?\nShort Question Text\nTraining and instruction LSA and FFA\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Anywhere\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that all crew can use the ship’s life- saving (LSA) and fire extinguishing (FFA) appliances in\naccordance with the equipment manufacturer’s instructions to respond effectively to an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nSection 3 Familiarisation and Training.\nA significant factor in survival craft incidents occurring in the industry has often been identified as a lack of on-board\nfamiliarisation with the equipment fitted. It is imperative that a strong focus be given by the operator to the\nfamiliarisation and training of all ship’s staff in the handling of survival craft, with the aim of minimising risk factors\nassociated with human error.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS Reg III/19\n4 On-board training and instruction\n4.1 On-board training in the use of the ship’s life-saving appliances, including survival craft equipment, and the use of\nthe ship’s fire extinguishing appliances shall be given as soon as possible but not later than two weeks after a crew\nmember joins the ship. However, if the crew member is on a regularly scheduled rotating assignment to the ship,\nsuch training shall be given not later than two weeks after the time of first joining the ship. Instructions in the use of\nthe ship’s fire-extinguishing appliances, life-saving appliances, and in survival at sea shall be given at the same\ninterval as the drills. Individual instruction may cover different parts of the ship’s life-saving and fire-extinguishing\nappliances, but all the ship’s life-saving and fire-extinguishing appliances shall be covered within any period of two\nmonths.\n4.2 Every crew member shall be given instructions which shall include but not necessarily be limited to:\n• •\n• •\n.1 operation and use of the ship’s inflatable liferafts.\n.2 Problems of hypothermia, first aid treatment for hypothermia and other appropriate first-aid procedures.\n.3 Special instructions necessary for the use of the ship’s life-saving appliances in severe weather and\nsevere sea conditions.\n.4 Operation and use of fire-fighting appliances.\n4.3 On-board training in the use of davit-launched liferafts shall take place at intervals of not more than 4 months on\nevery ship fitted with such appliances. Whenever practicable this shall include the inflation and lowering of a liferaft.\nThis liferaft may be a special liferaft intended for training purposes only, which is not part of the ship's life-saving\nequipment; such a special liferaft shall be conspicuously marked.\nIMO: SOLAS Reg III/35.2 (Life-saving appliances and arrangements)\nTraining manual and on-board training aids.\n1.\n2.\n3.\nA training manual complying with the requirements of paragraph 3 shall be provided in each crew mess\nroom and recreation room or in each crew cabin.\nThe training manual, which may comprise several volumes, shall contain instructions and information, in\neasily understood terms, illustrated wherever possible, on the life-saving appliances provided in the ship and\non the best methods of survival. Any part of such information may be provided in the form of audio-visual\naids in lieu of the manual…\nThe training manual shall be written in the working language of the ship.\nIMO: SOLAS Reg II-2/15.2.3 (Construction – Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction.)\nTraining manuals\n.1 A training manual shall be provided in each crew mess room and recreation room or in each crew cabin.\n.2 The training manual shall be written in the working language of the ship.\n.3 the training manual, which may comprise several volumes, shall include the instructions and information required in\nparagraph 2.3.4 in easily understood terms and illustrated wherever possible. Any part of such information may be\nprovided in the form of audio visual aids in lieu of the manual.\n.4 The training manual shall explain the following in detail:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• .1 general fire safety practice and precautions related to the dangers of smoking, electrical hazards,\nflammable liquids and similar common shipboard hazards;\n.2 general instructions on fire-fighting activities and fire-fighting procedures, including procedures for\nnotification of a fire and use of manually operated call points;\n.3 meanings of the ship's alarms;\n.4 operation and use of fire-fighting systems and appliances;\n.5 operation and use of fire doors;\n.6 operation and use of fire and smoke dampers; and\n.7 escape systems and appliances.\nIMO: SOLAS Reg II-2/16.2 (Operations)\nFire safety operational booklets\n.1 The required fire safety operational booklet shall contain the necessary information and instructions for the safe\noperation of the ship and cargo handling operations in relation to fire safety. The booklet shall include information\nconcerning the crew's responsibilities for the general fire safety of the ship while loading and discharging cargo and\nwhile under way. Necessary fire safety precautions for handling general cargoes shall be explained. For ships\ncarrying dangerous goods and flammable bulk cargoes, the fire safety operational booklet shall also provide\nreference to the pertinent fire-fighting and emergency cargo handling instructions contained in the International\nMaritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code, the International Bulk Chemical Code, the International Gas Carrier\nCode and the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, as appropriate.\n.2 The fire safety operational booklet shall be provided in each crew mess room and recreation room or in each crew\ncabin.\n.3 The fire safety operational booklet shall be written in the working language of the ship.\n.4 The fire safety operational booklet may be combined with the training manuals required in regulation 15.2.3.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Updated fire training manuals, fire safety operational booklets and lifesaving training manuals in the working\nlanguage of the ship are provided in each crew messroom and recreation room, or each crew cabin.\nAll LSA, including survival craft equipment, and FFA, including fixed firefighting installations, provided onboard a vessel is identified and included in the onboard training and instruction program.\nCrew members are properly familiarised with the vessel’s LSA & FFA by onboard training and instruction\nwithin two weeks of joining the vessel.\nAll crew members received further training and instruction in the use of each item of the ship’s LSA & FFA at\nintervals not exceeding two months.\nWhere a vessel is outfitted with davit-launched liferafts, instructions are available to guide the onboard\ntraining required to take place at intervals of not more than four months.\nWhere onboard training and instruction is carried out during routine fire and abandon ship drills, the LSA &\nFFA items covered are recorded in the standard format drill record.\nA process is in place to track and record the training and instruction provided to the crew for each item of\nLSA & FFA provided onboard.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the requirements for delivering\nongoing training and instruction in the use of LSA & FFA provided onboard.\nReview the list of LSA & FFA included in the onboard training and instruction program and verify that all\nlifesaving appliances, including survival craft equipment, and firefighting appliances, including fixed\nfirefighting installations provided onboard were included.\nSight a fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet and a lifesaving training manual and verify that\nthey were written in the working language of the ship and updated to include the equipment and appliances\nprovided onboard. (The fire training manual and fire safety operational booklet may be combined)\nReview the records of onboard training and instruction for the LSA & FFA and verify that training and\ninstruction had been provided to the crew for each item of FFA & LSA listed within two weeks of joining the\nvessel and, then at intervals not exceeding two months thereafter.\nWhere the vessel was provided with a davit-launched liferaft, review the instructions for delivering the\nrequired onboard training and instruction, paying attention to any guidance on the use of a training liferaft,\nwhere carried.\nReview the records of onboard training and instruction and verify that training and instruction in the use of\nthe davit-launched liferafts, where carried, had been undertaken within the previous four months.\n• During the course of the inspection, request an officer or rating to describe the use, operation and safety\nconsiderations of a nearby item of LSA or FFA and verify that they were familiar with the item selected.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nA fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet and lifesaving training manual.\nThe company procedures defining the requirement for delivering ongoing training and instruction for the LSA\nand FFA provided onboard.\nThe instructions for delivering onboard training for the davit-launched liferaft and the use of a training liferaft,\nwhere provided.\nThe records of LSA and FFA training and instruction provided to the crew within two weeks of joining the\nship and at intervals not exceeding two months thereafter.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the requirement for delivering and recording ongoing\ntraining and instruction for each piece of LSA & FFA provided onboard.\nThe fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manuals were not written in the working\nlanguage of the ship.\nThe fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manual were not provided in each crew\nmess room and recreation room, or in each crew cabin.\nThe fire training manual, fire safety operational booklet or lifesaving manuals were not updated to reflect the\nLSA & FFA provided onboard.\nThe onboard training and instruction records did not include all items of LSA, including survival craft\nequipment, and FFA, including fixed firefighting installations, provided onboard.\nThere was no process to track that each crewmember had received training and instruction in each piece of\nLSA & FFA carried onboard within the timeframes defined within SOLAS.\nOnboard training and instruction had not been completed for all crew within the timeframes defined by\nSOLAS.\nOnboard training and instruction in the use of davit-launched liferafts, where carried, had not been\ncompleted within the previous four months.\nThere were no instructions available for the safe use of a “training liferaft”, where one was carried.\nThe training liferaft, where carried, was not conspicuously marked as such.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting and recording ongoing\ntraining and instruction in the use of the ship’s LSA & FFA.\nAn interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use, operation or safety considerations of any piece\nof LSA or FFA provided onboard.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.5.3.", "t": "Had the Master and navigation officers been familiarised with the ECDIS equipment", "c": "installed on board and were documented records of this familiarisation available?\nShort Question Text\nFamiliarisation with ECDIS equipment installed on board.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nNautical Institute: Industry Recommendations for ECDIS Familiarisation\nIMO: STCW.7/Circ.24 Training requirements for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) and\nprovision of the documentation for verification\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and navigation officers are fully familiar with the specific type of ECDIS equipment\ninstalled on board prior to taking charge of a navigational watch.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First edition.\n3.2 Recommendations\n• Generic ECDIS training must be undertaken by all Masters and Bridge Officers. This training should as a\nminimum include provisions as per IMO model course 1.27.\n• Additionally, ECDIS familiarisation for all Masters and Bridge Officers should be undertaken to include typespecific training as well as on board familiarisation. The familiarisation should include:\no a) Type-specific ECDIS training for the specific system fitted on board, and developed by the\nrespective ECDIS makers, should be provided by the company to all Masters and Deck Officers\nbefore they take charge of a navigational watch. Type-specific training could either be a course\ntaken ashore or online training, as long as it is specific and targeted at effective use of the\nmake/type of ECDIS fitted on board. Verification of trainee’s ability to use ECDIS should be\nincorporated as part of the type-specific training module.\no b) ECDIS familiarisation should be provided to all on-signing Deck Officers before they keep an\nindependent navigational watch, and each time they join any vessel.\n• Onboard ECDIS familiarisation should also include ship-specific contingency scenarios, such as power\nfailure; loss of inputs from heading, speed, and electronic position-fixing systems; as well as spoofing and\njamming errors.\n• Once the Masters and Bridge Officers have been trained and are fully familiar with the use of ECDIS\n(including but not limited to ENCs, chart symbols, safety contours, no-go areas, passage planning policies\nand procedures), the challenge of retaining ECDIS proficiency remains. Masters and Officers are\nrecommended to maintain and improve their ECDIS knowledge and proficiency regularly through\ncontinuation and refresher training. They should be capable of using ECDIS effectively at all times and to\ndemonstrate this during navigational assessments, audits and external inspections such as Port State\nControl (PSC) and SIRE.\nIMO: STCW.7/Circ.24 Training requirements for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)\nand provision of the documentation for verification\n11 The STCW Code contains requirements for approved training on ECDIS. In cases where the approved training\nhas not been completed, a limitation shall be included on the certificate and endorsements issued to the seafarer.\nWhere such a limitation is not specified, the certificate and endorsements are evidence of having successfully\ncompleted the required approved training and that the standard of competence has been achieved.\n12 No requirement exists for the approved training on ECDIS equipment to be type-specific. The knowledge,\nunderstanding and proficiency required to be demonstrated is generalized to ensure seafarers have the necessary\nskills for basic operation of all types of equipment.\n13 In accordance with regulation I/14, companies are responsible for ensuring that seafarers employed on their ships\nare familiarized with the installed equipment, including ECDIS.\n14 It is agreed that seafarers required to have training in the use of ECDIS:\n1.\n2.\nshould not be required to provide documentation of training in ECDIS that is specific to the installed\nequipment; and\nare required to be familiarized with the ECDIS equipment installed on board.\nNautical Institute: Industry Recommendations for ECDIS Familiarisation\nFamiliarisation: Following the successful demonstration of competencies contained in the ECDIS Generic Training,\nFamiliarisation is the process required to become familiar with any onboard ECDIS (including back-up) in order to\nassure and demonstrate competency in relation to a specific ship’s ECDIS installation, prior to taking charge of a\nnavigation watch.\nFamiliarisation should cover:\n• •\n• •\nInitial Preparation.\nBasic Operations.\nNavigational Tools and Functions.\nRoute Planning and Route Monitoring.\nFamiliarisation includes any pertinent information required for the safe operation of the ECDIS, including all updates\nand alterations. Companies should have clear procedures for using ECDIS and assisting the navigators in completion\nof the familiarisation process.\nA ‘Company’ can consider a wide variety of options for achieving familiarisation both onboard and ashore. These\ninclude but are not limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Shore based manufacturer training followed by installation-specific familiarisation onboard;\nIndependent training on specific systems followed by installation-specific familiarisation;\nComputer Based Training (CBT), followed by installation-specific familiarisation onboard;\nInternet / Intranet Based Training (eLearning) followed by installation specific familiarisation onboard;\nOnboard training by appropriately trained crew or training personnel;\nManufacturer provided training mode on the ECDIS, followed by installation-specific familiarisation onboard;\nCompany bridge procedures and manuals.\nFull familiarisation needs to be specific to the installation and may require a mix of the above methods and\nconsideration should be given to allow adequate time for this activity, whether done ashore or onboard or both.\nRegardless of the method(s) used, it is essential that all watchkeeping officers must be competent in the use of the\nonboard ECDIS prior to taking charge of a navigational watch and remain so thereafter. It is recognised that\nmanufacturer-provided tools for structured onboard familiarisation will enhance and possibly add value to onboard\nECDIS.\nAnnex I (Familiarisation Checklist) of this guidance provides a detailed description of ECDIS tasks the industry\nexpects officers of the watch of ships using ECDIS to be able to demonstrate competency in. These tasks should be\nconsidered a minimum requirement.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nInspection Guidance\nECDIS Training required by STCW\nThe STCW Code contains requirements for approved training on ECDIS. In cases where the approved training has\nnot been completed, a limitation shall be included on the certificate of competency and endorsements issued to the\nseafarer.\nECDIS Familiarisation\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure the Master and all watchkeeping officers are\ncompetent in the use of the ECDIS equipment installed on board prior to taking charge of a navigational watch. The\nprocedures should include the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nTime scale for the familiarisation.\nMethod(s) of familiarisation with the ECDIS equipment.\nLocation of the familiarisation, on board or ashore.\nIdentity of the appropriately trained crew or training personnel authorised to deliver the familiarisation.\nMeans of demonstrating competency upon completion of the familiarisation and before taking charge of a\nnavigational watch.\nRecords to be maintained.\nThe checklist contained as an annex to “ECDIS - Industry Recommendations for ECDIS Familiarisation\" (published\nby the Nautical Institute) or an equivalent document produced by the operator or equipment manufacturer may be\nutilised to demonstrate an officer’s familiarisation with the onboard ECDIS installation.\nFormal structured familiarisation is required and simply observing a more experienced officer is not an acceptable\nmethod.\nThe vessel operator should have identified the principal method of delivering ECDIS familiarisation for the type of\nECDIS equipment installed onboard through the pre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be inserted in the\ninspection editor and reproduced in the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that ensured the Master and all watchkeeping\nofficers are competent in the use of the type of ECDIS installed onboard prior to taking charge of a\nnavigational watch.\nReview the onboard ECDIS installation familiarisation checklists for the Master and deck officers.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the onboard ECDIS installation by selecting\nat least two items from the onboard familiarisation checklist and requesting that they demonstrate the\nrequired actions/knowledge.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures that ensured all watchkeeping officers are competent in the use of the onboard ECDIS\nprior to taking charge of a navigational watch.\nECDIS installation specific training certificates, where required by the company familiarisation process\nOnboard ECDIS installation specific familiarisation checklists for the Master and deck officers.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures that ensured all watchkeeping officers are competent in the use of the\nonboard ECDIS prior to taking charge of a navigational watch, that included the:\no Time scale for the familiarisation.\no Method of familiarisation with the ECDIS equipment.\no Location of the familiarisation, on board or ashore.\no Identity of the appropriately trained crew or training personnel authorised to deliver the\nfamiliarisation.\no Means of demonstrating competency upon completion of the familiarisation and before taking\ncharge of a navigational watch.\no Records to be maintained.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that ensured that the Master and\nall watchkeeping officers are competent in the use of the onboard ECDIS prior to taking charge of a\nnavigational watch.\nThe accompanying officer was found to be unfamiliar with the onboard ECDIS installation through review of\nitems contained within the onboard ECDIS installation familiarisation checklist.\nThe Master and/or deck officer(s) had not received approved training on ECDIS indicated by a limitation\nbeing included on the certificate of competency and endorsements issued to the seafarer.\nThe Master and/or deck officer(s) had not been familiarised with the ECDIS equipment installed on board in\naccordance with company procedures.\nThere were no records available, or records were incomplete, of the familiarisation of the Master and deck\nofficers with the ECDIS equipment installed on board.\nThere was evidence that the Master or a deck officer had taken charge of a navigational watch prior to being\nfamiliarised with the ECDIS equipment installed on board.\nThe onboard ECDIS installation familiarisation checklist did not substantially cover the items included in the\nfamiliarisation checklist included as an annex to the Nautical Institute paper “ECDIS - Industry\nRecommendations for ECDIS Familiarisation”.\nDo not give an observation if there is no Flag Administration approved ECDIS type specific training certificate\navailable.\n4. Navigation and Communications\n4.1. Navigation Equipment", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the set up and operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel and were records\navailable to demonstrate that the ECDIS had been operated in accordance with company\nprocedures at all stages of a voyage?\nShort Question Text\nECDIS set up and operation\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that ECDIS units fitted to the vessel were used to effectively navigate the vessel.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\n1.2 Analysis of ECDIS-related incident findings and SIRE observations\nTable 1.1 summarises contributing factors identified from analysis of navigational incidents as well as Ship Inspection\nReport Programme (SIRE) findings related to ECDIS…\n… Gaps in ECDIS-related knowledge and practical application by Navigating Officers and Masters remain a recurring\ntheme when analysing incidents, as well as SIRE observations.\n4.1.3 ECDIS displays\nECDIS displays can be broadly divided into four types:\n• •\n• •\nDisplay base.\nStandard display.\nCustom display.\nFull display.\n…Although standard display shows more information compared to display base, information shown on standard\ndisplay may still be insufficient for safe navigation under different navigational conditions.\nRecommendations\n• •\nStandard displays or display base should not be used on their own, without the additional layers required for\nsafe navigation.\nThe minimum layers to be displayed for safe navigation (those other than standard display) should be\nincluded in the company SMS for different navigational conditions. For example, a company SMS might list\nthe following layers to be displayed:\no Under any navigational condition:\n -IMO standard display, plus:\n -Depth soundings and contours.\n -Wrecks, obstructions and danger marks.\n -Light characteristics (at night).\nAdditionally, when anchoring:\n -Submarine cables and pipelines.\n -Seabed characteristics.\n -Anchorage identification.\nThe company SMS should detail the procedure for customising ECDIS display layers for various navigation\nsituations, watch handover procedures and Master’s standing orders.\nFull display should be switched on when the vessel is due to breach the limiting boundaries of the XTC, the\nsafety contour, the manual safety contour, or whenever the risk of missing navigational data could\njeopardise safer navigation. Navigating officers should be aware that switching on all layers will lead to\nexcessive data cluttering on the ECDIS. In this case, bridge manning levels should be increased, and the\nMaster should be called immediately.\nNavigating Officers should be familiar with ECDIS symbols and how they differ from symbols on traditional\npaper charts.\no\n• •\n• 4.2.8 Look-ahead zone\nThe look ahead zone, also referred to as the safety frame, anti-grounding cone or look-ahead time, angle or width,\nneeds to be set correctly, taking into account factors that include vessel speed, proximity to navigational hazards,\navailability of sea room, traffic concentration, geographical limitations and manoeuvrability. Correctly setting the lookahead zone and associated alarms enables the system to generate warnings or alarms in case of navigational\nhazards.\nThis feature does not provide alarms for radars, ARPA, AIS targets or for navigational hazards on Raster\nNavigational Charts (RNCs).\nRecommendations\n• •\n• The parameters for the look-ahead zone should be planned so that the size of the zone is appropriate for the\nvessel’s speed and manoeuvring characteristics. They should be set for each leg of the passage and should\nconsider conditions such as proceeding from ocean to coastal wates, pilotage areas or speed.\nThe look-ahead zone should be reassessed in CATZOC areas that have reduced position accuracy (such as\nB, C, D, U) to ensure the vessel has sufficient safety margin…\nThe look-ahead zone should be highlighted on the display.\n5 Alarm management\nFor Navigating Officers and the bridge team, proper alarm management is very important. Alarm functionality can\nvary from one make to another. Some ECDIS systems allow the operator to disable alarm sounds, thus downgrading\nto a visual indication only.\n5.4 Recommendations\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Alarm setting parameters should be agreed by the Master and Bridge team at the passage planning stage\nand captured in the relevant passage plan form.\nThe criteria for setting alarms, warnings and cautions should be decided on board the vessel in accordance\nwith the company SMS procedures for various navigational conditions.\nThe alarms should be set to assist the Master and officers in maintaining their awareness and understanding\nof potential dangers to the vessel in a manner that reduces alarm fatigue.\nOnce the alarm settings are determined this should be clearly communicated to all navigating officers.\nAlarms should not be physically or routinely disabled.\nIf an alarm is to be disabled for any reason, this should be recorded on a formal tracking form to be handed\nover to subsequent watches and approved by the Master.\nBefore acknowledging the alarm, Masters and Officers should always understand and confirm the type of\nalarm. The habit of acknowledging alarms for the purpose of eliminating noise and disturbance shall be\navoided. The bridge team should review the alarm log on a regular basis to make sure that critical alarms\nhave not been inadvertently overlooked.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.13 Electronic Chart Display and Information System\nChecklist B5 ECDIS Setup.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nWhere a vessel is fitted with an ECDIS, the vessel operator should have developed procedures, which include\nappropriate checklists, to ensure that the unit(s) are operated and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s\ninstructions and industry best practice.\nThe procedures should address:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDisplay management.\nAlarm management.\nCreating and uploading passage plans.\nChanging passage plans.\nRecalling previous voyages.\nRoute checking.\nPlotting manual fixes (visual bearing and radar range).\nCreating parallel index lines.\nSetting safety depths and safety contours as appropriate to the draught of the vessel.\nSetting of safety frame/safety cone.\nAIS and or radar overlay, if fitted.\nLimitations of operating in RCDS mode.\nSCAMIN and how it is displayed.\nCATZOCs and how the information should be used in operation.\nContingency action in case of single or multiple ECDIS failure.\nUpdating software in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe vessel operator should indicate whether ECDIS is the primary means of navigation through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire. The information provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for ECDIS operation and management.\nReview the company procedures to verify that the required safety settings meet industry standards.\nReview the setup of an ECDIS unit with the accompanying officer and verify that settings, alarms and\ndisplays were in accordance with the provided checklists and quick reference guides.\nReview the alarm history, if available, and identify whether alarms were being generated that should have\nbeen addressed through proper set up and passage planning.\n• •\nWhere the vessel is fitted with additional ECDIS, verify that all units have been set up in an identical manner.\nReview navigational records and confirm that there was a process in place to verify the ECDIS settings and\nrecord the outcome periodically throughout the voyage.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures that defined how ECDIS units should be operated and managed.\nECDIS checklists and quick reference guides.\nRecords to demonstrate that software updates had been completed in accordance with manufacturer’s\ninstructions.\nRecords to demonstrate periodic tests required by the manufacturer’s instructions had been completed.\nRecords to demonstrate that the ECDIS settings had been checked periodically during each voyage.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for operating and managing the ECDIS fitted.\nThe company procedures did not provide clear guidance regarding:\no Display management\no Alarms & warnings.\no Safety contours and depths.\no Safety frame or safety cone.\no Route checking.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company ECDIS management and operation\nprocedures.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the ECDIS units fitted to the vessel\nAn ECDIS unit was defective in any respect. (Where the vessel carried an additional ECDIS in excess of the\nECDIS carriage requirements then record as a comment providing an entry had been made in the defect\nreporting system. Indicate the number of ECDIS required to be carried and the total fitted onboard.)\nThe second ECDIS, where required to be fitted, was not set up as a backup unit.\nThere was evidence that ECDIS settings had been incorrectly entered at any stage of a voyage.\nThere was no indication in the passage plan regarding required changes to ECDIS settings.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.2.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel, and were records\navailable to demonstrate that the units had been operated and tested in accordance with\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nOperation and testing of radar/ARPA\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel are used effectively for navigation and collision\navoidance.\nIndustry Guidance:\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.11 Radar and Radar Plotting Aids.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7.The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\nCarriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment\nInspection Guidance\nSOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 requires the following:\n(2.3.2) all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards, a 9 GHz radar.\n(2.5.5) all ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, an automatic tracking aid\n(2.7.1) all ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards, a 3 GHz radar or, where considered appropriate by the\nAdministration, a second 9GHz radar.\n(2.7.2) all ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards, a second automatic tracking aid\n(2.8.1) all ships of 10,000 gross tonnage and upwards, an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA), or other means, to\nautomatically plot the range and bearing of at least 20 other targets, connected to a device to indicate speed and\ndistance through the water, to determine collision risk and simulate trial manoeuvre.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the management and operation of the radar and ARPA\nunits fitted to the vessel. The procedures should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhen the radar/ARPA units are required to be in operation.\nWhen and how periodic performance checks are to be carried out and recorded.\nThe required settings of ARPA audible and visual alarms and warnings for Closest Point of Approach (CPA)\nand Bow Crossing Range (BCR) where fitted.\nThe required ARPA speed and heading input for collision avoidance purposes.\nThe process for parallel indexing set-up and use – particularly for complex passages with multiple sets of\nindexes.\nThe use of the ARPA trial manoeuvre function.\nThe danger of displaying AIS data (vectors) on ARPA units for collision avoidance purposes.\nThe effect of blind sectors and clutter suppression on the radar performance.\nRestrictions in the use of radar during cargo operations.\nThe planned interval for changing the magnetron in 3 GHz and 9 GHz radars.\nThe inspector should be aware of terminal/operational restrictions controlling the operation of the radar units during\nthe inspection.\nThe operator/vessel staff should establish what functionality can be demonstrated while the radar units are on\nstandby, particularly as it relates to the pre-programming of parallel indexing.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA\nunits fitted to the vessel.\nWhere possible, review the ARPA alarm settings for CPA ,and BCR where fitted, and verify that they were\nset in accordance with company procedures with the audible and visual alarms functioning.\nWhere possible, review the process for programming individual, and sets of parallel index lines into the radar\nand compare with the inbound passage plan to verify that the parallel indexing was used as indicated by the\npassage plan.\nReview onboard records and verify that the radars/ARPAs were in operation in accordance with company\nprocedures and performance checks were conducted as required with satisfactory results.\nReview the heading, speed and positional inputs to each radar and/or ARPA and verify that the information\nwas consistent with the master equipment.\nReview the radar maintenance records and verify that the magnetrons for each radar had been changed in\naccordance with the required schedule.\nVerify that the accompanying navigation officer was aware of the difference in performance between X-band\n(9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz) radars, particularly the impact of environmental conditions on the performance\nof each type.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.\nAny checklists or quick reference charts for the operation of the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.\nOnboard records demonstrating that the radar/ARPA units had been in operation and tested in accordance\nwith company procedures.\nInformation relating to any blind sectors affecting the fitted radars.\nOnboard records relating to the routine changing of the magnetrons for each radar fitted.\nThe parallel index information used for programming the radars for the previous passage.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing and\noperating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the hazards of using AIS data (vectors) for collision\navoidance.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the difference between the performance\ncharacteristics of X-band (9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz) radars.\nThe radar/ARPA units had not been in operation in accordance with company procedures.\nThe radar/ARPA units had not been tested in accordance with company procedures.\nThe radar/ARPA units were defective in any respect.\nThe heading, speed or positional feeds to the radar/ARPA units were inaccurate when compared to the\nmaster devices.\nThere was no indication of the scanner blind sectors affecting the radar coverage for each radar unit.\nThe radar magnetrons had not been changed in accordance with the planned maintenance schedule.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.3.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "operating and testing the steering control systems fitted to the vessel and were records\navailable to demonstrate that operation and testing had been carried out in accordance\nwith the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nOperating and testing the steering control systems\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nIMO SOLAS\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the steering control systems fitted to the vessel are tested and used in an appropriate manner with\nchangeover procedures understood.\nIndustry Guidance:\nICS Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.2 Steering Gear and Automatic Pilot.\nAnnex 3 Checklists\nSection B – Bridge\nB1 Steering Gear Test Routines\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n§ 164.25 Tests before entering or getting underway.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section no person may cause a vessel to enter into or get\nunderway on the navigable waters of the United States unless no more than 12 hours before entering or getting\nunderway, the following equipment has been tested:\n(1) Primary and secondary steering gear. The test procedure includes a visual inspection of the steering gear and its\nconnecting linkage, and, where applicable, the operation of the following:\n(i) Each remote steering gear control system.\n(ii) Each steering position located on the navigating bridge.\n(iii) The main steering gear from the alternative power supply, if installed.\n(iv) Each rudder angle indicator in relation to the actual position of the rudder.\n(v) Each remote steering gear control system power failure alarm.\n(vi) Each remote steering gear power unit failure alarm.\n(vii) The full movement of the rudder to the required capabilities of the steering gear.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• •\nActions upon equipment failure.\nSupporting checklists.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V\nRegulation 24 Use of Heading and/or Track Control Systems.\nRegulation 25 Operation of Steering Gear.\nRegulation 26 Steering Gear: Testing and Drills.\n1 Within 12 hours before departure, the ship's steering gear shall be checked and tested by the ship's crew. The test\nprocedure shall include, where applicable, the operation of the following:\n.1 the main steering gear;\n.2 the auxiliary steering gear;\n.3 the remote steering gear control systems;\n.4 the steering positions located on the navigation bridge;\n.5 the emergency power supply;\n.6 the rudder angle indicators in relation to the actual position of the rudder;\n.7 the remote steering gear control system power failure alarms;\n.8 the steering gear power unit failure alarms; and\n.9 automatic isolating arrangements and other automatic equipment.\n2 The checks and tests shall include:\n.1 the full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the steering gear;\n.2 a visual inspection for the steering gear and its connecting linkage; and\n.3 the operation of the means of communication between the navigation bridge and steering gear compartment\n3.1 Simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change-over procedures for remote steering gear\ncontrol systems and steering gear power units shall be permanently displayed on the navigation bridge and in the\nsteering compartment.\n3.2 All ships' officers concerned with the operation and/or maintenance of steering gear shall be familiar with the\noperation of the steering systems fitted on the ship and with the procedures for changing from one system to another.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the onboard management of the steering gear and control\nsystems, which provided guidance on the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe steering modes available for use which may include;\no automatic steering.\no track steering.\no hand steering.\no remote conning position steering.\no non-follow up steering.\nChanging between the steering modes available.\nLimitations of and any restrictions imposed on any mode of steering. (speed, rudder limit, location etc.)\nThe testing of steering control systems and power units prior to departure, prior to arrival and periodically\nduring the voyage.\nChanging from one steering control system to another in the event of an alarm or failure.\nActions required on the bridge to engage/permit remote emergency steering.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where required review, the company procedure for managing, testing and operating the steering\ncontrol systems provided.\nReview the records for the testing of the steering control systems provided and verify that all steering modes\nhad been tested from each location, as appropriate, in accordance with the company procedure.\nConfirm that the procedure for changing over steering control systems and operating the emergency\nsteering system were available and posted on the bridge, including the block diagram required.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for managing, testing and operating the steering control systems provided.\nThe vessel specific procedures for changing between steering control modes and systems.\nThe vessel specific procedure for changing over to emergency steering control.\nThe block diagram showing the change-over procedures for remote steering gear control systems and\nsteering gear power units.\nRecords for a recent voyage to demonstrate that steering control system tests had been completed in\naccordance with company procedures.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for managing, testing and operating steering control systems fitted to the\nvessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing, testing and\noperating the steering control systems fitted to the vessel.\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the changeover procedure between modes of\nsteering control or action to take when steering system alarms activate.\nSimple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change-over procedures for remote steering\ngear control systems and steering gear power units were not permanently displayed on the navigation\nbridge\nThe steering control systems had not been operated or tested in accordance with the company procedure.\nThe steering control systems were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.4.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) fitted to the vessel and were records\navailable to confirm that periodic checks and tests had been carried out in accordance\nwith the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nAutomatic Identification System (AIS)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO Resolution A.1106(29) Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational use of Shipborne Automatic\nIdentification Systems (AIS)\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) fitted to the vessel was used to safely enhance\nsituational awareness during navigation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.10 Automatic Identification System\nIt is important that AIS is operated correctly and that watchkeepers are familiar with the equipment, including how to\ncheck that all information being transmitted by AIS is both accurate and updated. Poor quality broadcast data can\nsignificantly reduce the potential value of this system.\nIMO: Resolution A.1106(29) Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational use of Shipborne Automatic\nIdentification Systems (AIS).\nOperation of the transceiver unit\nActivation\n22 AIS should always be in operation when ships are underway or at anchor. If the master believes that the continual\noperation of AIS might compromise the safety or security of his/her ship or where security incidents are imminent, the\nAIS may be switched off. Unless it would further compromise the safety or security, if the ship is operating in a\nmandatory ship reporting system, the master should report this action and the reason for doing so to the competent\nauthority. Actions of this nature should always be recorded in the ship's logbook together with the reason for doing so.\nThe master should however restart the AIS as soon as the source of danger has disappeared. If the AIS is shut\ndown, static data and voyage-related information remains stored. Restart is done by switching on the power to the\nAIS unit. Ship's own data will be transmitted after a two-minute initialization period. In ports AIS operation should be\nin accordance with port requirements.\nUse of AIS in collision avoidance situations\n40 The potential of AIS as an assistance for anti-collision device is recognized and AIS may be recommended as\nsuch a device in due time.\n41 Nevertheless, AIS information may merely be used to assist in collision avoidance decision-making. When using\nthe AIS in the ship-to-ship mode for anti-collision purposes, the following cautionary points should be borne in mind:\n.1 AIS is an additional source of navigational information. It does not replace, but supports, navigational systems\nsuch as radar target-tracking and VTS; and\n.2 the use of AIS does not negate the responsibility of the OOW to comply at all times with the Collision Regulations,\nparticularly rule 7 when determining whether risk of collisions exists.\n42 The user should not rely on AIS as the sole information system but should make use of all safety-relevant\ninformation available.\n43 The use of AIS on board ship is not intended to have any special impact on the composition of the navigational\nwatch, which should continue to be determined in accordance with the STCW Convention.\n44 Once a ship has been detected, AIS can assist in tracking it as a target. By monitoring the information broadcast\nby that target, its actions can also be monitored. Many of the problems common to tracking targets by radar, namely\nclutter, target swap as ships pass close by and target loss following a fast manoeuvre, do not affect AIS. AIS can also\nassist in the identification of targets, by name or call sign and by ship type and navigational status.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n4.13.4 Automatic Identification Systems\nThe Automatic Identification System (AIS) is required to operate while a tanker is underway and at anchor. Some port\nauthorities may ask for the AIS to be kept on when a tanker is alongside. The AIS operates on a VHF frequency and\ntransmits and receives information automatically, and the output power ranges between 2.0W and 12.5W. Automatic\npolling by another station, e.g. by port authority equipment or another tanker, could cause equipment to transmit at\nthe higher (12.5W) level, even when it is set to low power (typically 2.0W).\nWhen alongside a terminal or port area where hydrocarbon gases may be present, either the AIS should be switched\noff or the aerial isolated and the AIS given a dummy load. Isolating the aerial preserves manually inputted data that\nmay be lost if the AIS is switched off. If necessary, the port authority should be informed.\nWhen alongside a terminal or port area where no hydrocarbon gases are likely to be present, and if the unit has the\nfacility, the AIS should be switched to low power.\nAt a Single Point Mooring (SPM) or Multi-Buoy Mooring (MBM), the AIS may be kept on, if requested by the terminal,\nat an adequate power level to transmit information to the terminal safety monitoring system. Tanker and terminal\nrepresentatives should agree on the AIS settings.\nIf the AIS is switched off or isolated while alongside, it must be reactivated on leaving the berth.\nThe use of AIS equipment may affect the security of the tanker or the terminal at which it is berthed. The use of AIS\nmay be determined by the port authority, depending on the security level in the port.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.4 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross\ntonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted\nwith an automatic identification system (AIS)…:\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of navigation\nequipment, including Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS which include\nguidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAIS configuration.\nStatic and dynamic data input.\nPeriodic checks and performance tests.\nThe use of AIS data during collision avoidance.\nLimitations for operating the unit during cargo operations.\nSwitching the unit on and off.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS\nequipment fitted onboard.\nReview checklists and records to verify that testing of the AIS system had been carried out in accordance\nwith the company procedure.\nVerify that the navigational data feeds provided to the AIS were consistent with the output from the master\nequipment for heading, speed and position.\nConfirm that the vessel static data was correctly entered in the unit.\nDetermine whether AIS data was transferred to the ARPA for display and verify that the vessel operator\nprovided guidance relating to the use of AIS data for collision avoidance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure for the operation and testing of the AIS equipment fitted onboard.\nRecords of the checks and performance tests required to be carried out on the AIS equipment fitted.\nCompany guidance related to the use of AIS information in collision avoidance situations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS system fitted onboard.\nThere was no company guidance related to the use of AIS information in collision avoidance situations.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for the operation and\ntesting of the AIS system fitted onboard\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company guidance related to the use of AIS\ninformation in collision avoidance situations.\nThere were no records of the checks and performance tests required to be carried out on the AIS equipment\nfitted.\nThe AIS unit was defective in any respect.\nThere was as an error in the navigational data feeds to the AIS unit.\nThe vessel static data was incorrectly entered in the AIS unit.\nWhile alongside a terminal or port area where hydrocarbon gases may be present, the AIS was not switched\noff, or the aerial isolated and the AIS given a dummy load (unless at the request of the shore authorities).", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.5.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "the use of the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) and were records\navailable to demonstrate that it had been operated and tested in accordance with the\nprocedure?\nShort Question Text\nBridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.128(75) Performance Standards for a Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)\nObjective\nTo ensure that the bridge was continually manned throughout a voyage, and at anchor, by vigilant\nwatchkeeping staff.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 3.5 Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System\nThe Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) should be in operation whenever the ship is at sea, including\nwhen the ship’s heading or track control system is in use. The OOW should ensure that the BNWAS is operational\nand set correctly in accordance with the SMS and the Master’s Standing orders.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These\nprocedures may include:\n• Use of BNWAS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with:\n.3 a bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS)…\nThe bridge navigational watch alarm system shall be in operation whenever the ship is underway at sea.\nIMO: MSC.128(75) Performance Standards for a Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)\n4.1.3 Reset function\n4.1.3.1 It should not be possible to initiate the reset function or cancel any audible alarm from any device, equipment\nor system not physically located in areas of the bridge providing proper look out.\n4.1.3.2 The reset function should, by a single operator action, cancel the visual indication and all audible alarms and\ninitiate a further dormant period. If the reset function is activated before the end of the dormant period, the period\nshould be re-initiated to run for its full duration from the time of the reset.\n4.1.3.3 To initiate the reset function, an input representing a single operator action by the OOW is required. This input\nmay be generated by reset devices forming an integral part of the BNWAS or by external inputs from other equipment\ncapable of registering physical activity and mental alertness of the OOW.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to define:\n• •\n• •\n• When the BNWAS is required to be in operation.\nWho will activate the BNWAS and the process for doing so.\nHow the system will be protected from unauthorised deactivation.\nWhat to do if a BNWAS stage 2 or 3 alarm is activated.\nThe periodic tests and checks required to verify correct functioning of the BNWAS.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that the BNWAS shall be activated at anchor in addition to while the vessel is at sea.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for operating and testing the Bridge Navigation\nWatch Alarm System (BNWAS) fitted to the vessel.\nReview vessel records and verify that the BNWAS had been operated and tested in accordance with\ncompany procedure.\nRequest that the process for activating and deactivating the BNWAS is described or demonstrated.\nVerify that any tests required to confirm proper functioning of the BNWAS were understood by the\naccompanying officer.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the use and testing of the BNWAS.\nBridge Log Book.\nBridge checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for operating and testing the Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System\n(BNWAS) fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for the operation and\ntesting of the BNWAS.\nThe BNWAS was defective in any respect.\nThe password or activation key was available to others beyond the Master and their authorised deputy.\nThere were no records available to confirm that the BNWAS had been in operation in accordance with\ncompany procedures.\n• •\n• There were no records available to confirm that the BNWAS had been tested in accordance with company\nprocedures.\nThere was evidence that modifications or adaptions designed to defeat the BNWAS were in use.\nRecord a negative observation under the Process response tool if the vessel operator’s navigational\nprocedures did not require the BNWAS to be activated while the vessel was at anchor.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.6.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures", "c": "governing the management and operation of the Global Navigation Satellite System\n(GNSS) receivers fitted onboard and was the fitted equipment configured, used and\nchecked in accordance with the procedure?\nShort Question Text\nGlobal Navigation Satellite System(s)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers provide reliable and accurate positional\ninformation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.9 Electronic Position Fixing Systems\n4.9.3 GNSS receivers\nWhether as stand-alone equipment or as part of an integrated system, GNSS receivers provide:\n• •\n• Position (including service quality information and geodetic datum corrections);\nGround referenced course and speed; and\nRoute storage and cross track distance (XTD) monitoring. By entering the passage plan into the GNSS\nreceiver, the OOW has an independent method of monitoring the passage.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.1 All ships, irrespective of size, shall have:\n.6 a receiver for a global navigation satellite system or a terrestrial radionavigation system, or other means, suitable\nfor use at all times throughout the intended voyage to establish and update the ship’s position by automatic means.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of navigation\nequipment, including Global Navigation Satellite System receivers. The procedure should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe configuration of the equipment.\nThe periodic checks and performance tests to be conducted.\nWhere more than one receiver is fitted, the process to switch the output from one receiver to another.\nThe periodic checks to verify that all equipment is receiving an accurate positional input.\nThe actions to take in the event of a single GNSS receiver failure.\nThe actions to take in the event of multiple GNSS receiver failures.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)\nreceiver operation and management\nReview the configuration of the GNSS receivers and verify that the settings were in accordance with the\ncompany procedures.\nVerify that the antenna offset data was available and had been correctly entered in the GNSS receiver\nconfiguration.\nVerify that the GNSS receiver(s) had been set to WGS84 datum.\nReview onboard records to confirm that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out to the GNSS\nreceivers had been completed as required.\nVerify that the GNSS position feed to two or more navigational systems was correct.\nVerify that onboard instructions were posted for any GNSS receiver output inter-switch arrangements.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure that defined how GNSS units should be operated and managed\nOnboard records to demonstrate that the required checks and tests had been completed\nThe measurements to allow the checking / reprogramming of the antenna offset position in the GNSS\nreceiver configuration.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for operating and managing the GNSS receivers fitted.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the GNSS receiver management and operation\nprocedures, or the equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe GNSS receiver(s) were not configured in accordance with company requirements, or the antennae\ncoordinates were incorrectly entered.\nPeriodic checks and tests had not been carried out in accordance with procedures.\nA GNSS receiver was defective in any respect.\nThe positional data provided to another piece of navigation or communication equipment such as AIS, ARPA\nor a GMDSS transceiver was erroneous.\nThe vessel was not fitted with a GNSS receiver, in which case comment on what alternative terrestrial\nnavigation system was fitted.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.7.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "operating and managing the echo sounder and were records maintained to demonstrate\nthat the equipment fitted to the vessel had been tested and operated in accordance with\nthe company expectations?\nShort Question Text\nEcho sounder\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the echo sounder is used effectively to monitor the under-keel clearance.\nIndustry Guidance:\nICS Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.5 Echo Sounders\nThe echo sounder should always be used when making a landfall and kept switched on in coastal and pilotage\nwaters. If the echo sounder is fitted with a shallow water alarm, the alarm should be set to an appropriate safe depth\nto warn of approaching shallow water.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size, shall in addition to the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.2 be fitted with:\n.1 an echo-sounding device, or other electronic means, to measure and display the available depth of water;\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of the echo sounder,\nor other electronic means to measure the depth of water, and the associated means to record depth history. The\nprocedure should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhen the echo sounder is required to be in operation.\nWhere forward and aft transducers were fitted to the vessel, considerations for the set up and display of\ninformation.\nWhen the echo sounder recording device was required to be operational and any time/position marking\nnecessary.\nWhere a separate printer was provided, the times the printer is required to be recording.\nThe criteria for the setting of the depth alarm – where fitted.\nThe requirements for periodic checks to confirm the proper functioning and accuracy of the echo sounder\nwhen compared to water of a known depth.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder\nand its associated recording device(s).\nReview a recent passage and verify that the echo sounder and its recording device were in use in\naccordance with company procedures.\nReview the depth alarm setting and verify that it was in accordance with company procedures for the time of\nthe inspection or while manoeuvring to the berth.\nReview onboard records and confirm that the accuracy of the echo sounder had been confirmed by periodic\ncomparison in accordance with company procedures.\nRequest that the accompanying navigation officer demonstrate that the echo sounder is showing the\nexpected depth indication under the keel at the time of the inspection.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and its associated recording\ndevice.\nOnboard records demonstrating that the echo sounder and its recording device were in operation as\nrequired by the company procedures.\nOnboard records demonstrating that the accuracy of the echo sounder had been verified.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and its associated recording\ndevice.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for managing and\noperating the echo sounder and its associated recording device.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process to calculate the depth under the keel\nand verify the accuracy of the echo sounder.\nThe echo sounder had not been operated or tested in accordance with the company procedures and\nmanufacturer’s instructions.\nThe echo sounder was not showing the expected depth indication under the keel at the time of the\ninspection.\nThe echo sounder or recording device was defective in any respect.\nThe echo sounder depth alarm had not been set in accordance with the company procedures.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.8.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the\nvessel and were records available to demonstrate that periodic tests had been completed\nas required by the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nSpeed and distance measuring devices\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that accurate speed data is available to navigational equipment.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.4.2 Types of Speed Log.\nElectromagnetic and doppler type logs can be either single-axis and measure speed in the fore and aft direction\n(longitudinal) or dual-axis and measure fore and aft (longitudinal) and also athwartships (transverse) movement.\nWhen connected to rate of turn data, dual-axis logs are also able to calculate the speed and direction of movement of\nthe bow and stern.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n(Ships constructed on or after 1 July 2002)\n2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size, shall in addition to the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.2 be fitted with:\n.4 speed and distance measuring device, or other means, to indicate speed and distance through the water.\n2.9 All ships of 50,000 gross tonnage and upwards shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of paragraph 2.8,\nhave:\n.2 a speed and distance measuring device, or other means, to indicate speed and distance over the ground in the\nforward and athwartships direction.\n(Ships constructed before 01 July 2002 but after 01 September 1984 and over 500 gross tonnage shall have a speed\nand distance indicator when engaged on international voyages.)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, taking into account manufacturer’s instructions, which\ndefined:\n• •\n• The periodic checks to verify the functionality of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the\nvessel.\nThe periodic checks to verify that the speed output to remote displays and navigational equipment, such as\nARPA, AIS and ECDIS, is accurate.\nThe speed input(s) required to be used for navigational equipment such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and\ndistance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.\nVerify that the speed outputs from the speed and distance measuring devices were being correctly displayed\nat each remote display.\nVerify that the water speed displayed by the ARPA & ECDIS units was consistent with the output from the\nwater speed log.\nWhere a dual axis doppler log was fitted, verify that the ground speed displayed by the ECDIS units was\nconsistent with output from the dual axis log.\nVerify that function and performance checks required by the company procedures had been completed as\nrequired.\nVerify that operational verification checks for the speed input to ARPA, AIS and ECDIS had been completed\nas required by the company procedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to\nthe vessel.\nRecords of the periodic accuracy and function tests for the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to\nthe vessel.\nRecords of periodic verification that the speed input to navigational equipment such as ARPA, AIS and\nECDIS was accurate.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring\ndevices fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation and\ntesting of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.\nPeriodic tests to verify the accuracy and/functionality of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to\nthe vessel required by the company procedures had not been completed as required.\nPeriodic checks to verify the accuracy of the speed input to navigational equipment had not been completed\nin accordance with company procedures.\nThe speed values displayed by remote display units and ARPA, AIS or ECDIS units were inconsistent with\nthe master water speed and or dual axis logs as appropriate.\n• A speed and distance measuring device fitted to the vessel was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.9.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the use and testing of the navigation lights and shapes, and was there evidence that the\nnavigation lights had been tested to confirm full functionality and correct visibility?\nShort Question Text\nNavigation lights and shapes\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: Resolution MSC.253(83) Adoption of the performance standards for navigation lights\nnavigation light controllers and associated equipment.\nIMO: COLREG\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel always displays navigation lights & shapes in accordance with the International\nRegulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.7 Navigation Lights and Signalling Equipment\nThe OOW is responsible for ensuring that the navigation lights, emergency navigation lights and signalling equipment\nare in working order and are ready for immediate use at all times.\nThe condition of lights, flags and shapes should be checked at regular intervals.\nChecklists B3, B6, B7 & B16.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.253(83) Adoption of the performance standards for navigation lights, navigation light\ncontrollers and associated equipment.\n4.3 Special requirements for lights using LEDs\nThe luminous intensity of LEDs gradually decreases while the electricity consumption remains unchanged. The rate\nof decrease of luminous intensity depends on the output of LEDs and temperatures of LEDs. To prevent shortage of\nluminous intensity of LEDs:\n.1 An alarm function should be activated to notify the Officer of the Watch that the luminous intensity of the light\nreduces below the level required by COLREGs;\nor\n.2 LEDs should only be used within the lifespan (practical term of validity) specified by the manufacturer to maintain\nthe necessary luminous intensity of LEDs. The lifespan of LEDs should be determined and clearly notified by the\nmanufacturer based on the appropriate test results on the decrease of luminous intensity of the LEDs under various\ntemperature conditions and on the temperature condition of LEDs in the light during operation, taking the appropriate\nmargin into account.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that ensure all navigational equipment is maintained as\noperational.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: COLREG\nPart C. Lights and Shapes.\nAnnex 1. Positioning and technical details of lights and shapes.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to define the periodic checks and tests that are required to\nbe carried out on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller and navigational shapes. The checks should\ninclude:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Primary and secondary navigation lights are fully operational.\nPrimary and secondary power supplies to the navigational light controller are operational.\nPower supply failure alarm is operational.\nWhere LED lamps are fitted, they are within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity. This may be\nachieved by integrated luminous intensity or usage monitoring systems with alarms or by manual recording\nof usage.\nAdequate spare lamps are onboard meeting the navigation light manufacturer’s specification for luminosity,\nor wattage, and focal plane.\nRequired navigational shapes are onboard and in good condition. (three balls, one cylinder & one diamond)\nPortable navigation lights, where required to be carried, are in good working order and fitted with the\nnecessary lanyards to permit hoisting.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the checks and tests that were\nrequired to be carried out on the navigation lights, navigation light controller and navigational shapes.\nReview the pre-departure, pre-arrival and daily navigational checklists and verify that navigation light checks\nand tests had been completed as required by the company procedures.\nRequest that the navigation officer demonstrates the functionality of the navigation light controller and\nnavigation lights.\nReview the inventory of spare navigation light lamps and verify that they conform to the manufacturer’s\nspecification and luminosity for each navigation light fitted to the vessel.\nReview the method of ensuring LED lamps, if fitted, are within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity.\nWhere possible, and safe to do so from the deck of the vessel, sight individual navigational lights and verify\nthat the screens, lamps and lenses were in apparent good condition.\nSight the navigational shapes and verify that they were in good condition.\nSight the portable navigation lights, where carried, and verify that they were in good condition and\nfunctioning.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedures which defined the checks and tests required to be carried out on the navigation\nlights, navigation light controller and navigational shapes.\n• •\n• Checklists to confirm that the checks and tests required to be conducted on the navigation lights (fixed and\nportable), navigation light controller and navigational shapes had been completed as required.\nThe inventory of spare navigational lamps identifying the luminosity or wattage and the navigation lights to\nwhich they may be fitted.\nRecords of LED lamp usage and lifespan, where required.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure defining the checks and tests required to be carried out on the\nnavigational lights, the navigational light controller and navigational shapes.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting checks and\ntests on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller or navigational shapes.\nThe navigation lights and navigation light controller had not been tested in accordance with the company\nprocedure.\nThe navigation lights or navigation light controller were defective in any respect. (a single bulb failure on a\nsingle light would not generate an observation).\nNavigation lights or their screens were damaged, relocated or obscured in such a way that the required\nspacing and/or arc of visibility of any lights was apparently no longer in compliance with COLREG Annex 1\nrequirements.\nThe required navigational shapes were not onboard or were in an unusable condition.\nPortable navigation lights, where required to be carried, were defective or not ready for rigging.\nThe vessel did not have an inventory of spare lamps for each type and luminosity of navigation light fitted.\nThe inventory of spare lamps did not conform to the navigation light manufacturer’s specifications. (incorrect\nsize, focal plane, luminosity, wattage or type).\nProcedures did not include guidance on the use of LED lamps, where fitted.\nThere was no effective method of ensuring LED lamps were within their usable lifespan for luminous\nintensity\nLED lamps were in use beyond the lifespan specified by the manufacturer or were in an alarm condition for\nreduced luminous intensity.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.10.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "managing Marine Safety Information broadcasts by NAVTEX and SafetyNET and were\nwarnings affecting the vessel’s route plotted on the voyage charts?\nShort Question Text\nNAVTEX and SafetyNET\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO MSC.1/Circ. 1310/Rev.1 Revised Joint IMO/IHO/WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information (MSI)\nObjective\nTo ensure that broadcast navigation warnings affecting a vessel’s planned route are effectively managed.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\n2.4.9 Maritime Safety Information\nWeather information (including gale warnings), NAVAREA warnings and coastal navigational warnings are broadcast\nby radio-telephony from coast radio stations and by NAVTEX. Long range weather warnings are broadcast via\nsatellite communications systems, such as SafetyNET, along with NAVAREA navigational warnings as part of the\nWorld-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS).\nDetails of weather routeing services for ships and information for shipping are contained in lists of radio signals and in\nVolume D of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Publication No 9.\n3.15.3 Maritime Safety Information\nA continuous MSI watch should be kept at sea at all times by all ships. NAVTEX should be used to meet this\nrequirement whilst the ship is within range of a coast station broadcasting NAVTEX. Beyond this range, a watch\nshould be kept on the appropriate MF or HF frequencies or on the ship earth station (SES) in order to receive MSI.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1310/Rev.1 Revised Joint IMO/IHO/WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information (MSI).\n2.3 Broadcast methods\n2.3.1 Two principal methods are used for broadcasting maritime safety information in accordance with the provisions\nof the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, in the areas covered by these\nmethods, as follows:\n.1 NAVTEX: broadcasts to coastal waters; and\n.2 SafetyNET: broadcasts which cover all the waters of the globe except for Sea Area A4, as defined by IMO\nresolution A.801(19), annex 3, as amended.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter IV Regulation 12\n.2 Every ship, while at sea, shall maintain a radio watch for broadcasts of maritime safety information on the\nappropriate frequency or frequencies on which such information is broadcast for the area in which the ship is\nnavigating.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1310/Rev.1 Revised Joint IMO/IHO/WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information (MSI).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to require that the Marine Safety Information received\nthrough the NAVTEX and SafetyNet systems is promptly reviewed and, where appropriate, applied to the voyage\ncharts and passage planning documentation.\nThe procedure should define the process for:\n• •\n• •\n• Setting up the NAVTEX and SafetyNET EGC receivers to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts\napplicable to the vessel’s location and route.\nReviewing incoming messages and transferring pertinent information to the passage charts and\ndocumentation.\nWhere information is transferred directly from NAVTEX to an ECDIS unit the process for identifying warnings\nthat will affect the vessel’s route.\nFiling, retaining and disposing of Marine Safety Information broadcasts.\nRemoving Marine Safety Information from electronic and paper charts once the warning has expired or is\ncancelled.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing Marine Safety Information\nreceived through NAVTEX and SafetyNET.\nInspect the NAVTEX receiver and verify that it was correctly set to receive navigational warnings from\nrelevant coast radio stations.\nReview the messages received through the NAVTEX and verify they were reviewed upon receipt and, where\napplicable to the vessel’s route, applied to the paper and / or electronic charts.\nInspect the SafetyNET EGC receiver and verify that it was set up to receive Marine Safety Information\nbroadcasts for the correct NAVAREA and Coastal Warning Area.\nVerify that all current NAVAREA and Coastal Warning Area warnings were available onboard and, where\napplicable to the vessel’s route, applied to the paper and/or electronic charts.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure for managing Marine Safety Information received through NAVTEX and\nSafetyNET.\nNAVTEX and SafetyNET broadcast warnings filed in accordance with company procedures.\nPaper and electronic charts showing charted Marine Safety Information warnings.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for managing Marine Safety Information received through NAVTEX and\nSafetyNET.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing Marine\nSafety Information received through NAVTEX and SafetyNET, or the equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe NAVTEX and/or SafetyNET EGC receiver was defective in any respect.\nThe NAVTEX receiver was not programmed to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts from coast\nradio stations appropriate to the vessel’s route.\nThe SafetyNET EGC receiver was not programmed to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts for\nNAVAREAs and Coastal Warning Areas appropriate to the vessel’s route.\nThe Marine Safety Information messages received through NAVTEX and SafetyNET had not been\nacknowledged and filed in accordance with the company procedure.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.11.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "preserving data from the VDR/S-VDR and were records available to demonstrate that\ntests of the equipment had been completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nPreserving data from the VDR/S-VDR\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: Resolution MSC.333(90) Adoption of Revised Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders\n(VDRs)\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Recommendations on the Proactive Use of Voyage Data Recorder Information (revised edition August 2020)\nIMO: MSC.163(78) Recommendations on Performance Standards for Shipborne Simplified Data Recorders (S-VDRs)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1222/Rev.1 14 June 2019 Guidelines on annual testing of voyage data recorders (VDR) and\nsimplified voyage data recorders (S-VDR)\nObjective\nTo ensure that the VDR fitted to the vessel is continually recording all required data streams and procedures\nare in place to preserve records in the event of an incident.\nIndustry Guidance:\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.8 Voyage Date Recorder.\n4.8.3 Preserving Records\nVDR and S-VDR recordings provide important information for marine accident investigators. All watchkeeping officers\nshould be familiar with the procedures for preventing these records being overwritten.\n4.8.4 VDR Testing\nThe system should include functions to carry out a performance test at any time. Testing is required annually and\nshould always be carried out following repair or maintenance work to the VDR or to any source providing data to the\nVDR. This test may be conducted using the playback equipment and should ensure that all the required data items\nare being correctly recorded.\nOCIMF: Recommendations on the Proactive Use of Voyage Data Recorder Information (revised edition\nAugust 2020).\n3.2 Data not being recorded\nTypically, the VDR data is only examined following an incident or accident. As a result, when an incident does\nhappen, it is not uncommon to find that the VDR was not fully operational at the time of the incident and some or all\ndata was not recorded correctly.\nTMSA KPI 5.2.3 requires that the person(s) responsible for navigational standards ensures that navigational\nprocedures are regularly reviewed and updated.\nThe procedures are updated to reflect new legislation, technology and updated industry standards.\nExamples may include:\n• ECDIS and VDR including data recovery.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.3 The SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the Company’s organization can respond at any time to\nhazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 20\nVoyage data recorders\n1 To assist in casualty investigations, ships, when engaged on international voyages, subject to the provisions of\nregulation 1.4, shall be fitted with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) as follows:\n.4 ships, other than passenger ships, of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002.\n(Cargo ships built prior to 1July 2002 shall be fitted with a VDR which may be a simplified voyage data recorder (SVDR))\nIMO: Resolution MSC.333(90) Adoption of Revised Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data\nRecorders (VDRs)\n2 Recommends Governments to ensure that VDRs:\n.1 if installed on or after 1 July 2014, conform to performance standards not inferior to those specified in the annex to\nthe present resolution; and\n.2 if installed before 1 July 2014, conform to performance standards not inferior to those specified in the annex to\nresolution A.861(20), as amended by resolution MSC.214(81).\n5.4.3 Recording should be continuous unless terminated in accordance with 5.4.2. The time for which all stored data\nitems are retained should be at least 30 days/720 hours on the long-term recording medium and at least 48 hours on\nthe fixed and float-free recording media. Data items which are older than this may be overwritten with new data.\nIMO: MSC.163(78) Recommendations on Performance Standards for Shipborne Simplified Data Recorders (SVDRs)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1222/Rev.1 14 June 2019 Guidelines on annual testing of voyage data recorders (VDR) and\nsimplified voyage data recorders (S-VDR)\n1 The annual testing of VDR/S-VDR required by SOLAS regulation V/20 should be carried out by the manufacturer or\na person authorized by the manufacturer.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• The VDR / S-VDR is subject to an annual performance test by an approved testing or servicing facility.\nThe VDR / S-VDR is tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair of the VDR /\nS-VDR itself.\nThe VDR / S-VDR is tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair of\nnavigational or communications equipment providing data feeds.\nInstructions are posted near to the VDR / S-VDR controls for preserving data to prevent it being overwritten.\nThe circumstances in which VDR / S-VDR data is to be preserved to capture any data that may be of value\nto incident investigation irrespective of whether the incident related to navigational situations.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the period that the long-term storage within the VDR or S-VDR retains\ndata before being overwritten through the pre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be inserted in the final\nreport.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which governed the setup, use and testing of\nthe VDR / S-VDR system fitted onboard the vessel.\nVerify that instructions for saving and preserving data were posted near the VDR / S-VDR controls.\nVerify that the annual performance testing of the VDR / S-VDR had been completed in accordance with\ncompany procedure.\nVerify that the VDR / S-VDR had been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or\nrepair of the VDR / S-VDR itself.\nVerify that the VDR / S-VDR had been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or\nrepair of navigational or communications equipment providing data feeds.\nVerify that the data retention period for the long-term storage stated in the pre-inspection questionnaire was\ncorrect.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which governed the setup, use and testing of the VDR / S-VDR system fitted\nonboard the vessel.\nThe company procedure that defined when data was required to be preserved to support investigations into\nnavigation and any other incidents onboard.\nAt least one emergency response checklist from the vessel operator’s response plan indicating that VDR /\nS-VDR data preservation was required.\nRecords demonstrating that the VDR / S-VDR annual performance tests had been completed by an\napproved testing or service facility.\nRecords demonstrating that the VDR / S-VDR had been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade,\nmaintenance or repair of the VDR / S-VDR itself.\nRecords demonstrating that the VDR / S-VDR had been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade,\nmaintenance or repair of navigational or communications equipment providing data feeds.\nInstructions posted near to the VDR / S-VDR recording controls on how to save event data to prevent it\nbeing overwritten.\nThe VDR / S-VDR specifications showing the period that data was retained onboard before being\noverwritten.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedure which governed the setup, use and testing of the VDR / S-VDR system\nfitted onboard the vessel.\nThere was no company procedure which clearly defined the company expectation for data preservation in\nthe event of an incident onboard.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for VDR / S-VDR\nmanagement and data preservation.\nThe VDR / S-VDR was defective in any respect.\nAnnual performance checks by an authorised service agent or facility had not been carried out.\n• •\n• The VDR / S-VDR had not been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair\nof the VDR / S-VDR itself.\nThe VDR / S-VDR had not been tested as per maker's instruction after any upgrade, maintenance or repair\nof navigational or communications equipment providing data feeds.\nThe declaration made within the pre-inspection questionnaire relating to the VDR / S-VDR data retention\nperiod was less than required.\no If installed before 1st July 2014, minimum 12 hours before being overwritten.\no If installed after 1st July 2014, minimum of 720 hours before being overwritten.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.12.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures", "c": "relating to the magnetic and gyro compasses carried onboard, and were records\navailable to demonstrate their accuracy and reliability?\nShort Question Text\nMagnetic and gyro compasses\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that standard, gyro and GNSS compasses and their heading output to navigational equipment are\naccurate and reliable\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.3 Compass Systems\n4.3.2 Gyro compass\nThe gyro compass should be run continuously. Should a gyro compass stop for any reason, it should be restarted\nand subsequently regularly checked and only relied on again when it has “settled” and the error is known.\nWhere the gyro has no direct speed log or position input, manual corrections should be made as required.\nThe gyro will usually support a number of repeaters, including a required repeater at the emergency steering position.\nGyro repeaters on the bridge should be checked against the main gyro at least once per watch and after significant\nmanoeuvring. Other repeaters should be checked frequently.\n4.3.3 GNSS compass\nA Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) compass provides an alternative to a gyro compass as a non-magnetic\ntransmitting heading device able to provide heading data to AIS, radar and automatic plotting aids. A GNSS compass\nor equivalent is required on ships navigating in Polar Waters at latitudes above 80 degrees.\n4.3.4 Compass errors\nAs a safeguard against any wandering from the correct heading going undetected, gyro and gyro repeater headings\nshould be frequently checked.\nMagnetic and gyro compass errors should be checked and recorded each watch, where possible, using either\nazimuth or transit bearings.\nA deviation card for the magnetic compass should be maintained and be available to the Bridge Team.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.1 All ships irrespective of size, shall have:\n2.1.1 a properly adjusted standard magnetic compass, or other means, independent of any power supply, to\ndetermine the ship’s heading and display the reading at the main steering position.\n2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with:\n2.2.1 a spare magnetic compass, interchangeable with the magnetic compass as referred to in paragraph 2.1.1, or\nother means to perform the function referred to in paragraph 2.1.1 by means of replacement or duplicate equipment.\n2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to meeting\nthe requirements of paragraph 2.2, be fitted with:\n2.3.5 a properly adjusted transmitting heading device, or other means, to transmit heading information for input to the\nequipment referred to in paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.4. (radar, electronic plotting aid and AIS)\n2.5 All ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards shall….have:\n2.5.1 a gyro-compass, or other means, to determine and display their heading by shipborne non-magnetic means,\nbeing clearly readable by the helmsman at the main steering position. These means shall also transmit heading\ninformation for input to the equipment referred to in paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.4 and 2.5.5 (radar, electronic plotting aid and\nAIS).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nStandard magnetic, gyro and GNSS compasses carried onboard are properly maintained and serviced.\nHeading information for each compass is frequently checked through terrestrial, celestial and/or comparative\nobservation.\nFrequent checks are made for heading accuracy output to all navigational equipment.\nA record of error for each compass is maintained\nAn up to date deviation card is available on the bridge for the standard magnetic compass.\nThe standard magnetic compass is adjusted when;\no the deviation consistently exceeds a defined value,\no becomes unreliable,\no suffers damage,\no records of compass error have not been maintained over the preceding two years.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for standard, gyro and GNSS compass\nmanagement as applicable.\nInspect the various compasses and repeaters and verify that the heading output is consistent, and\nillumination is functional.\nReview the deviation card and compass error records and verify that the company expectation for compass\nadjustment had been complied with.\nReview the service records for the gyro compass(s) and verify that servicing had been carried out in\naccordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for standard, gyro and GNSS compass management\nThe standard compass adjustment and residual deviation certificate.\nCompass error records.\nService records for the gyro compass(s).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for managing the standard magnetic, gyro and GNSS compasses as\napplicable.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures, or the equipment fitted to\nthe vessel.\nA record of compass error for each compass fitted to the vessel was not maintained as required by the\ncompany procedure.\nThe compass error log book recorded a deviation of the standard magnetic compass consistently exceeding\nthe tolerance permitted by the company procedure as compared to the deviation certificate from the\nprevious official compass adjustment.\nThe heading shown by a compass, or a repeater, was erroneous.\nWhere required, manual speed and latitude corrections for a gyro compass were incorrectly set.\nA standard magnetic, gyro or GNSS compass was defective in any respect.\nThe service records for a gyro compass indicated that periodic service was overdue by more than 5% of the\nservice interval.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.13.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the operation and testing of the VHF/DSC transceivers fitted to the vessel, and were\nrecords available to demonstrate that periodic tests and checks had been completed in\naccordance with company expectations?\nShort Question Text\nVHF/DSC transceivers\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.131 (75) Maintenance of a continuous listening watch on VHF channel 16 by SOLAS ships whilst at sea\nIMO: Resolution A.954 (23). Proper use of VHF Channels at Sea\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that VHF radio is used to enhance navigation safety and support the obligations of the vessel\nunder SOLAS to render assistance to non-SOLAS vessels in distress.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nSection 3.15 GMDSS watchkeeping\n3.15.1 Radio watchkeeping\nThe OOW is responsible for ensuring compliance with the ship’s watchkeeping requirements.\nSection 3.12.2 Risk of Collision\nDue to the risk of confusion and error, VHF radio and AIS should not be relied on for collision avoidance.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n4.13.2.2 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency equipment\nPermanently and correctly installed VHF and UHF equipment are safe to use when the tanker is at the terminal, but it\nis recommended that the transmission is set to low power (one watt or less). The use of portable VHF/UHF radios in\na terminal or on board a tanker presents no hazards if the equipment is certified and kept intrinsically safe and the\npower output is one watt or less.\nThe use of VHF/UHF radio equipment as a means of communication between tanker and terminal personnel is\nrecommended.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter IV Regulation 7\n1 Every ship shall be provided with :\n.1 a VHF radio installation capable of transmitting and receiving ;\n.1 DSC on the frequency 156.525 MHz(channel 70). It shall be possible to initiate the transmission of distress alerts\non channel 70 from the position from which the ship is normally navigated ; and\n.2 radiotelephony on the frequencies 156.300 MHz (channel 6), 156.650 MHz (channel 13) and 156.800 MHz\n(channel 16) ;\n.2 a radio installation capable of maintaining a continuous DSC watch on VHF channel 70 which may be separate\nfrom, or combined with, that required by subparagraph .1.1 ;\nIMO: MSC.131 (75) Maintenance of a continuous listening watch on VHF channel 16 by SOLAS ships whilst at\nsea…\n1 Determines, having regard to SOLAS regulation IV/12.3, that every ship while at sea, shall continue to maintain,\nwhere practical, continuous listening watch on VHF channel 16, until such time as the Maritime Safety Committee\nmay determine the cessation of this requirement…\nIMO: Resolution A.954 (23). Proper use of VHF Channels at Sea\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which define how the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to the\nvessel will be used, operated and tested. These procedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe VHF frequencies and/or channels that must be monitored on a continuous basis while the vessel is at\nsea and/or at anchor.\nThe periodic checks and tests to be carried out to verify that the VHF/DSC equipment is fully functional.\nThe record-keeping requirements for the routine and emergency use of the VHF/DSC equipment.\nThe company expectations regarding radio etiquette when using the VHF/DSC equipment.\nThe use of VHF and compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea\n(COLREG).\nThe need to identify any VHF units not connected to the Voyage Data Recorder and any restrictions on their\nuse for critical communications.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use and operation of the VHF/DSC\nequipment fitted to the vessel.\nReview the records for the testing of the VHF/DSC equipment and verify that the equipment was tested and\nfound functional in accordance with company expectations.\n• •\n• Review the GMDSS Radio Log Book or other operational records for the previous voyage and verify that the\nappropriate VHF channels were being monitored and records were being maintained of all significant\ncommunications as defined by the company procedure.\nReview the data inputs to the VHF/DSC equipment and verify that the static data was correctly programmed,\nand the dynamic data was being correctly received from external feeds.\nInterview the accompanying navigation officer to verify their understanding of the company procedure and\nMaster’s standing orders relating to the use of VHF radio in collision avoidance situations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the use and operation of the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book or other records which documented which VHF channels were being\nmonitored and details of significant communications.\nThe Master’s standing orders.\nChecklists that demonstrated that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out on the\ncommunications equipment, including VHF/DSC units had been completed as required by the company\nprocedures.\nWhere the vessel was fitted with multiple VHF units which were not all connected to the VDR, clear\nidentification of the units not connected, with instructions on their use for significant communications.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the expectations for the use and periodic testing of the\nVHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for the use or testing of the\nVHF/DSC units fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the VHF/DSC units fitted to the\nvessel.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the hazards and limitations of using VHF radio\nduring collision avoidance situations.\nRecords indicated that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out for the VHF/DSC units had not\nbeen completed as required by the company procedure.\nRecords indicated that details of critical communications had not been documented as required by company\nprocedures.\nRecords indicated that the vessel had not been monitoring the correct VHF channels as required by SOLAS,\ncompany expectations and as identified within the passage plan.\nThe VHF and/or DSC units fitted to the vessel were defective in any respect.\nThe static and/or dynamic data displayed by the VHF and/or DSC units were inaccurate.\nWhere multiple VHF units were fitted on the bridge which were not all connected to the VDR, there was no\nindication of which units were connected and no instructions restricting the use of non-connected units for\ncritical communications.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.14.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "testing and using the daylight signalling lamp?\nShort Question Text\nDaylight signalling lamp\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: Resolution MSC.95(72) Performance Standards for Daylight Signalling Lamps.\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that there is a means of attracting the attention of other vessels by visual means both during\ndaylight and during darkness.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 3.12 Compliance with the COLREGs.\nThe conduct of a ship’s navigation should always comply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of\nCollisions at Sea (COLREGS). This includes displaying correct lights and shapes and making the correct sound and\nlight signals.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with:\n.2 a daylight signalling lamp, or other means, to communicate by light during day and night using an energy source of\nelectrical power not solely dependent upon the ship’s power supply.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.95(72) Performance Standards for Daylight Signalling Lamps.\n8 Back-up and fall-back arrangements\nEach daylight signalling lamp should be provided with at least three spare illuminants (i.e., bulbs) complying with the\ntype-tested illuminant.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed navigational procedures which define:\n• •\nThe company expectations for preventing the risk of collision and the means at the disposal of the\nnavigation officer to attract the attention of another vessel in accordance with the International Regulations\nfor Preventing Collisions at Sea.\nThe checks and tests required to be undertaken to ensure all navigation equipment is available for\nimmediate use including the daylight signalling lamp and its battery.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the procedure which defined the company expectations when attracting\nthe attention of another vessel in a collision avoidance situation.\nReview that bridge equipment testing records and verify that the daylight signalling lamp had been\nperiodically tested in accordance with company expectations.\nTest the daylight signalling lamp on both battery and mains power and verify that the unit is fully functional.\nCheck the availability of spare bulbs and verify that at least three spare bulbs are available that comply with\nthe manufacturer’s specifications.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe procedure which defined the company expectations for the use and testing of the daylight signalling\nlamp.\nThe bridge equipment testing records demonstrating that periodic tests had been carried out for the daylight\nsignalling lamp.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no procedure which defined the company expectations for the use and testing of the daylight\nsignalling lamp.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for the use and testing of\nthe daylight signalling lamp.\nThe daylight signalling lamp was defective in any respect.\nThere were less than three spare bulbs on board and/or the spare bulbs did not meet the manufacturer’s\nspecifications.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.1.15.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the use and testing of the sound signalling equipment fitted to the vessel and were\nrecords available to confirm that periodic tests had been completed and the equipment\nused in accordance with company expectations?\nShort Question Text\nSound signalling equipment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: COLREG\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel was able to make sound signals to comply with the International Regulations for\nPreventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG).\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nSection 3.12 Compliance with the COLREGS.\nThe conduct of a ship’s navigation should always comply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of\nCollisions at Sea (COLREGS). This includes displaying correct lights and shapes and making the correct sound and\nlight signals.\nChecklist B13 – Restricted Visibility.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\nNavigating in heavy weather/restricted visibility/ice.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: COLREG\nPart D -Sound and Light Signals.\nRule 33 Equipment for sound signals\n• A vessel of 12m or more in length shall be provided with a whistle, a vessel of 20 m or more in length shall\nbe provided with a bell in addition to a whistle, and a vessel of 100 m or more in length shall, in addition, be\nprovided with a gong, the tone and sound of which cannot be confused with that of the bell. The whistle, bell\nand gong shall comply with the specifications in annex III to these Regulations. The bell or gong or both may\nbe replaced by other equipment having the same respective sound characteristics, provided that manual\nsounding of the required signals shall always be possible.\n(Annex III Technical details of sound signal appliances.)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to define:\n• •\n• The expected use of the vessel’s sound signalling equipment to comply with the COLREGs in or near an\narea of restricted visibility, during collision avoidance and while manoeuvring.\nThe Bridge Log Book entries or checklists that will be used to confirm that sound signalling equipment was\nused in compliance with the COLREGs and company expectations during restricted visibility.\nThe periodic tests required to be conducted to verify the effectiveness of the sound signalling equipment,\nincluding automation, provided to the vessel.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the expected use and testing of\nthe sound signalling equipment fitted to the vessel.\nReview the bridge equipment testing records and verify that periodic tests had been completed to confirm\nthe functionality of whistles, bells and gongs and, their automation, to conform to the requirements of the\nCOLREGs.\nReview the Bridge Log Book and/or checklists for restricted visibility (BPG checklist B13 or equivalent) to\nidentify any recent period of restricted visibility whilst the vessel was underway or at anchor and verify that\nsound signals were recorded as being sounded as required by the COLREGs.\nThe inspector will only be required to look back through records for the previous month to confirm that sound signals\nhad been made during restricted visibility.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures which defined the expectations for the use and testing of sound signalling\nequipment fitted to the vessel.\nBridge Log Book.\nCompleted bridge checklists including restricted visibility and bridge equipment testing.\nThe accompanying officer should be ready to show the inspector the evidence for the previous three occasions where\nthe sound signalling equipment was used during restricted visibility.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the company expectation for the use of sound signals\nduring restricted visibility, collision avoidance and manoeuvring in compliance with the COLREGs.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company expectation for the use of sound\nsignals during restricted visibility, collision avoidance and manoeuvring in compliance with the COLREGs.\nThere were no records available to demonstrate that the sound signalling equipment and any automation\nprovided had been periodically tested to verify its effectiveness and compliance with the COLREGs.\nThe sound signalling equipment, or its automation, was defective in any way.\nThere was no documented evidence that the sound signalling equipment had been used in accordance with\nthe COLREGs during periods of restricted visibility.\n4.2. Navigational Procedures", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and navigating officers familiar with the company passage", "c": "planning procedures and had all voyages been appraised, planned, executed and\nmonitored in accordance with company procedures, industry best practice and both\nlocal and international rules?\nShort Question Text\nPassage planning\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that passages are planned and executed from berth to berth in accordance with international/local\nrules and industry best practice guidance.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\n4.2.2 Berth-to-berth passage plan\nThe IMO Assembly resolution A.893(21) Guidelines for Voyage Planning includes appraisal (gathering all information\nrelevant to the voyage or passage); detailed planning of the whole voyage or passage from berth to berth, including\nthe areas where a pilot is needed; execution of the pan; and monitoring the vessel’s progress during implementation\nof the plan.\nWhen it comes to making berth-to-berth passage plans, the principles of passage planning are broadly similar to\nthose followed when using paper charts.\nRecommendations\n• If the destination has not been confirmed, passage should be planned from berth to a point the vessel is\nexpected to sail towards.\nAll sections of the passage must be properly planned and validated on ECDIS before executing a route.\n4.3 Route validation\nRoute validation involves the following stages:\n• •\n• Visual checks\nManual and auto-validation features.\nCross-checks by the bridge team.\n• •\nFinal validation and authorisation by the Master.\nRe-validation along the route.\n4.3.1 Recommendations\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoute validation should be conducted before every voyage.\nRoute validation should be conducted by at least the Navigating Officer and the Master, using both visual\nchecks and route validation functions within ECDIS.\nAlarms, cautions and indications should be appropriately checked and actioned. Those that cannot be\nresolved and that affect the passage plan should be discussed with the Master.\nThe route validation procedure should be defined in the company SMS.\nThe Master should only authorise the plan once all stages of visual checks and route validation have been\ncompleted.\nThe Company SMS should define the procedure for recording the Navigating Officer’s route validation and\nthe Master’s passage plan authorisation.\nRoute re-validation should be undertaken by the Navigating Officer after any subsequent route changes,\nENC updates, software/hardware, navigational warning changes. Once complete the Master should check\nand then re-authorise the plan.\nThe company SMS should include the procedure for post-voyage review, so that any hazards or useful\ninformation can be incorporated in future passage plans.\n4.4 Route execution and monitoring\nRoute execution and monitoring stages occur after the passage plan has been finalised and after the route validation\nstage is complete, including the latest supplementary information, before passage begins. This involves configuring\nall ECDIS, including displays, safety contour and safety depth settings and look-ahead zones, uploading manual\nlayers, and managing overlays, according to the authorised passage plan.\n4.4.2 Position verification and monitoring\nIt is critical that the navigator is constantly aware of the vessel’s position and its accuracy. The Global Navigation\nSatellite System (GNSS) is the standard source of position data for ECDIS, but navigators must always be aware of\nits limitations. The vessel’s position on ECDIS can be verified using a combination of techniques that include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRadar Image Overlay (RIO).\nVisual or radar bearings.\nRadar range and bearings.\nParallel indexing.\nCelestial observations.\nDepth comparison using an echo sounder.\nRecommendations\n• •\n• •\n• The company SMS should define the frequency of, and preferred methods for, position verification while\nusing ECDIS.\nA combination of techniques should be used, including RIO, radar/visual fixes, parallel indexing and celestial\nnavigation, as per the company SMS.\nRegular and frequent position verification should help to safeguard against GNSS errors, as well as jamming\nand spoofing.\nParallel indexing should be used on radars as opposed to the ECDIS.\nMasters and Bridge Officers should be aware that hardware or software used discrepancies might arise on\nan ECDIS, and they should use traditional position-fixing and navigational techniques to cross-check\nnavigational information.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 2 Passage Planning\nChapter 2.1 Principles\nThe purpose of passage planning is to develop a comprehensive navigation plan for the safe conduct of the ship from\nberth to berth.\nThe plan for the intended passage should identify a route which:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRecognises hazards and assesses associated risks and decision points.\nEnsures that sufficient sea room and depth of water is available.\nIncludes appropriate position fixing opportunities.\nComplies with relevant reporting requirements and routeing measures for ships.\nTakes into account anticipated traffic and weather conditions.\nComplies with all applicable environmental protection measures.\nChecklist B9 Passage Planning.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include\n• •\nBerth to berth passage planning.\nSupporting checklists.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 34\nSafe navigation and avoidance of dangerous situations\n1.\n2.\nPrior to proceeding to sea, the Master shall ensure that the intended voyage has been planned using the\nappropriate nautical charts and nautical publications for the area concerned, taking into account the\nguidelines and recommendations developed by the Organization*.\nThe voyage plan shall identify a route which:\n1. takes into account any relevant ships’ routeing systems;\n2. ensures sufficient sea room for safe passage of the ship throughout the voyage;\n3. anticipates all known navigational hazards and adverse weather conditions; and\n4. takes into account the marine environmental protection measures that apply, and avoids, as far as\npossible, actions and activities which could cause damage to the environment.\n*Refer to Guidelines for Voyage Planning (resolution A.893(21)).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that onboard staff appraise, plan, execute and\nmonitor all passages from berth to berth in accordance with international/local rules and industry best practice.\nThe procedures should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The format of the passage plan and the minimum information that must be included which should include,\nbut not be limited to:\no Parallel indexing (not from floating objects unless they have first been checked for position).\no Chart changes.\no Methods and frequency of position fixing and/or position verification.\no Prominent navigation and radar marks.\no No-go areas.\no Landfall targets and lights.\no Clearing lines and bearings.\no Transits, heading marks and leading lines.\no Significant tides or current.\no Safe speed and necessary speed alterations.\no Changes in machinery space status, i.e. manned/unmanned.\no Changes in machinery status, i.e. standby for manoeuvring.\no Changes in bridge watch composition.\no Changes to fuel and/or scrubber use.\no Changes in security arrangements.\no Minimum under keel clearance.\no Positions where the echo sounder should be activated.\no Crossing and high-density traffic areas.\no Safe distance off navigational hazards or marks.\no Anchor clearance.\no Contingency plans.\no Abort positions.\no VTS and reporting points, etc.\no Air draught when passing under bridges/power lines/cable cars etc.\no Alternative or contingency routing that may be required at short notice.\no Specific guidance provided by local routing publications where applicable to the vessel and its\nroute.\nThe process to verify that all navigational and environmental considerations have been included in the final\npassage plan.\nThe review and approval process for a passage plan including utilising the ECDIS route checking function.\nThe record keeping requirements as they relate to the progress of the passage and navigational events.\nThe actions to take to update the passage plan when circumstances change requiring the vessel to deviate\nfrom the originally agreed plan.\nThe requirement for preparing the passage plan on both paper charts and ECDIS where the vessel has a\nsingle ECDIS unit or has nominated paper charts as the primary means of navigation.\nThe requirement for a passage plan briefing including the Master, all navigation officers and a representative\nfrom the engineering department.\nA vessel should be expected to deviate from the planned passage to the extent necessary to safely comply with the\ncollision regulations. Due consideration should be given to such when appraising the passage and developing the\nplan to ensure that there is adequate sea room, and the watch conditions are appropriate.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company passage planning procedure.\nSight, and where necessary review, the company record keeping procedures as they relate to navigational\nactivities.\nReview a recent passage plan and verify that it was in the format defined by the company passage planning\nprocedure and contained, as a minimum, the information identified by the company procedure.\nReview the same passage plan on the paper and/or electronic charts and verify that the information required\nto be displayed in accordance with the company passage planning procedure had been included.\nReview the records for the same passage and verify that the records maintained contained the information\nrequired to be recorded in accordance with the company passage planning procedure.\nVerify that where two ECDIS units are fitted, both units had been loaded with the passage plan.\nVerify that route checking and scanning had been carried out utilising the ECDIS route checking function or\nin the case of paper charts, manually, prior to commencing a voyage and at any time changes had been\nmade to the approved plan.\n• Verify that a passage plan briefing had been attended by the Master, all navigation officers and a member of\nthe engineering department prior to commencing a voyage or, prior to each significant portion of a voyage.\nWhen reviewing the frequency of manually applied position fixing on an ECDIS equipped vessel, be guided by the\nfrequency defined by the vessel operator within their navigation procedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company passage planning procedures.\nThe company record keeping procedures relating to navigational activities.\nThe company passage plan appraisal form / checklist for a recently completed voyage.\nThe passage plan for a recently completed voyage approved by the Master and signed by the navigation\nofficers.\nThe ECDIS passage planning station and/or paper charts showing the reviewed passage plan and\nmonitoring history.\nThe Bridge Log Book, movement book and other records documenting the progress of the voyage.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company passage planning procedures.\nThere were no company record keeping procedures relating to navigational activities.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company passage planning or navigational\nrecord keeping procedures.\nThere was no standard passage planning form which required the passage plan to be documented in a\nconsistent manner, capturing all data identified within the procedures.\nThere was no passage plan appraisal form / checklist to verify that all information pertinent to the passage\nhad been considered.\nThe passage was planned or executed in clear contravention to collision regulations, company navigation\nprocedures or guidance provided on the charts, routing guides or sailing directions.\nThe charted passage plan did not include all pertinent information required to be displayed in accordance\nwith the company procedures.\nThe passage plan was not reviewed and approved in accordance with company procedures.\nRoute checking and scanning had not been conducted prior to commencing a voyage or when a planned\nvoyage had been changed or updated.\nThe passage plan was not substantially followed, such as passing an island or navigational mark on the\nunplanned side, unless the passage plan identified alternative routes for contingency use.\nThe vessel’s position was not manually fixed in accordance with company navigational procedures and the\nplanned position fixing method and interval.\nRecords of the progress of a voyage had not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.2.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company under keel", "c": "clearance (UKC) policy and procedure, and were records available to demonstrate that\nthe required calculations had been completed at the appropriate points during each\nvoyage and the vessel had remained in compliance with the UKC policy?\nShort Question Text\nUnder keel clearance (UKC) policy\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Resolution A.893(21) Guidelines for Voyage Planning\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel always maintains a safe under keel clearance.\nIndustry guidance\nIMO: Resolution A.893(21). Guidelines for Voyage Planning.\n3 Planning\n3.1 On the basis of the fullest possible appraisal, a detailed voyage or passage plan should be prepared which should\ncover the entire voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas where the services of a pilot will be\nused.\n3.2 The detailed voyage or passage plan should include the following factors:\n3.2.2.2 necessary speed alterations en route, e.g., where there may be limitations because of night passage, tidal\nrestrictions, or allowance for the increase of draught due to squat and heel effect when turning;\n3.2.2.3 minimum clearance required under the keel in critical areas with restricted water depth;\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\n4.2.5 Identification of safe water\nAs identified in table 1.1, there are several contributing factors to the inappropriate understanding or application of\nsafety contour and safety depth settings, in trying to identify safe navigable water.\nIdentification of safe water can be broken down into the following sub-categories:\n• •\n• •\n• Under Keel Clearance (UKC) Calculations and Category Zone of Confidence (CATZOC).\nSafety depth and safety contour.\nManual safety contour with alarmable features.\nNo-go areas with alarmable features.\nTwo-shade and four-shade depth display.\nUnder Keel Clearance and Category Zone of Confidence\nOnce the UKC calculations have been completed, the resulting safety settings should be entered into the ECDIS to\ncreate the safety contour.\nCATZOC gives an indication of survey reliability, like the source data diagrams on paper charts. Note that CATZOC\nvalues indicate both position and depth accuracy and provide details of seafloor coverage and survey characteristics.\nThe accuracy of CATZOC data should be considered in the vessel’s UKC calculation, unless more accurate, up-todate information is available…\nRecommendations\nThe company SMS should include navigational procedures, including a UKC policy and ECDIS-specific procedures,\nincluding passage plan forms, waypoint sheets and sample UKC calculations, and how to establish the safety contour\nand the safety depth settings.\nMasters and Navigating Officers should have a clear understanding of CATZOC and how it affects the ENC data,\nconsidering both depth and position accuracy. There is no minimum allowance currently recommended for different\nCATZOCs, but Masters and Navigating Officers should make an informed decision that considers factors such as\nadditional information available from local Port Authorities, available UKC allowances as per charted depths on\nENCs, the latest bathymetric data and height of tides. The CATZOC input or alternative source used should be\nidentified within the plan…\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include\n• Under keel clearance requirements.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed an under keel clearance (UKC) policy and procedure which defined:\n• •\nThe minimum dynamic UKC required to be maintained;\no During open sea passage.\no During coastal / restricted waters passage.\no Within port limits.\no While alongside.\no While at SBM/CBM berths.\no At anchor.\nThe factors to be considered when calculating and evaluating UKC, which should include;\no The predicted height of the tide.\no Changes in the predicted tidal height, which may be caused by wind speed and direction and/or\nhigh or low barometric pressure.\no Nature and stability of the bottom e.g. sand waves, siltation etc.\no Accuracy of hydrographic data, (references to reliability are often included on charts or in the form\nof CATZOC on ENCs).\no Change of water density and the corresponding increase in draught.\no The vessel's size and handling characteristics and the increase in draught due to heel.\no Wave response allowance, which is the vertical displacement of the hull due to heave, roll and pitch\nmotions.\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The reliability of draught observations and calculations, including estimates of hogging and\nsagging.\no Reduced depths over pipelines and other obstructions.\no The predicted increase in draught due to squat. (Squat information relevant to the vessel for both\nloaded and ballast passages should be readily available on the bridge.)\nWhen UKC calculations are to be completed.\nThe method of calculating and documenting the calculations performed.\nWhere the results of the UKC calculations must be communicated, e.g., Master/pilot information exchange.\nWhere the results of the UKC calculations shall be used, i.e. ECDIS depth or echo sounder alarm settings.\nThe need to update UKC calculations to reflect the new predicted time of passing over critical hydrographic\nfeatures where a passage is delayed.\nThe actions to be taken when the required UKC could not be maintained at all stages of a planned voyage.\nThe required action where an external party requires an UKC in excess of the company requirement.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the required minimum required UKC applicable to the vessel within the\npre-inspection questionnaire. This information will be inserted in inspection editor and the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nReview the company under keel clearance (UKC) policy and procedure and verify that the values uploaded\nto the pre-inspection questionnaire were accurate.\nReview the UKC calculations for a recent voyage and verify that all factors required to be considered by the\ncompany procedure had been included in the calculation and evaluation and that the resulting UKC\ncomplied with company expectations.\nReview the voyage records, including echo sounder printer or electronic records, for the same voyage and\nverify that the calculations were completed for the time that the vessel passed over the critical hydrographic\nfeatures.\nReview a recent Master/Pilot information exchange checklist and verify that the UKC information had been\nrecorded in accordance with company expectations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure that defined the company under keel clearance (UKC) policy and the requirement\nfor conducting calculations and recording the results.\nThe passage planning documentation for recent voyages.\nThe UKC calculation documentation to support recent voyages.\nMaster/Pilot information exchange documentation which included the supporting UKC calculations.\nBridge Log Books, bell books, echo sounder records and charted passage history to permit verification of\nthe time of passing critical hydrographic features.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure defining the company under keel clearance (UKC) policy and expectations for\nconducting UKC calculations at defined stages of the voyage.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for conducting and documenting\nUKC calculations.\nReview of records indicated that the UKC calculations required to be carried out by the company procedures\nhad not been completed.\nReview of records indicated that the UKC policy had been violated without explicit permission from the\nvessel operator.\nReview of sample calculations indicated that they had not been carried out for the predicted time of passing\na critical hydrographic feature as set out in the passage plan.\nReview of sample calculations indicated that the speed used for calculation had been exceeded by more\nthan 10% when actually passing the critical hydrographic feature.\nReview of sample calculations determined that an error had been made in either the source data or resulting\ncalculation when passing a critical hydrographic feature.\n• •\nThere was no evidence that UKC calculations had been reviewed during the Master/Pilot information\nexchange.\nSquat information relevant to the vessel for both loaded and ballast passages was not readily available on\nthe bridge.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.3.", "t": "Had the Master prepared Master's Standing Orders, supplemented by Daily Orders,", "c": "which emphasised and reinforced the company expectations with regards to navigational\nrequirements including restricted visibility, CPA/BCR and minimum passing distance\nfrom navigational dangers and navigational aids and, if so, had all navigation officers\nsigned to acknowledge their understanding of the same?\nShort Question Text\nMaster's Standing Orders and Daily Orders\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: STCW Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that all deck/navigating officers are aware of the key expectations of both the company and the\nMaster with respect to the navigation of the vessel.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\n1.3.2.1 Master’s Standing Orders\nLines of authority on board should be in accordance with the SMS and operational procedures manuals. The Master\nshould explain particular requirements to the Bridge Team in Master’s Standing Orders. These orders should be\ndrafted to support the SMS.\nCompany and Master’s Standing orders should be read by all Bridge Team members upon joining the ship, signed\nand dated. A copy of the orders should be available on the bridge for reference.\n1.3.2.2 Bridge Order Book\nIn addition to Master’s Standing orders, specific instructions will be needed. At least at daily intervals, the Master\nshould write in the Bridge Order Book what is expected of the OOW for that period. These orders should be signed by\neach OOW when taking over a watch, to confirm that they have read, understood and will comply with the orders.\nThe OOW should brief other members of the Bridge Team, as appropriate, on any particular activities or\nrequirements for the forthcoming watch.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These\nprocedures may include:\n• Calling the Master.\nIMO: ISM Code\n5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to:\n.3 issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner,\nIMO: STCW Code\nPart A Chapter VIII – Watchkeeping\nTaking over the watch\n22 Relieving officers shall personally satisfy themselves regarding the:\n.1 standing orders and other special instructions of the master relating to navigation of the ship;\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required the Master to issue Master’s Standing\nOrders, giving guidance on the mandatory and desirable content. The Master’s Standing Orders should be prepared\nand signed by the Master upon appointment to the vessel and signed for understanding by each navigation officer\nwhen they join the vessel and before undertaking their first navigation duties.\nThe orders, as written, should reference company navigational procedures and identify any circumstances where the\nMaster wishes his instructions to be stricter than the company requirement documented within the SMS. The content\nshould include, but not be limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Defining restricted visibility and the actions to be taken by the officer of the watch upon encountering it.\nDefining the minimum Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and Bow Crossing Range (BCR) acceptable during\nnormal* navigational watches and the actions to be taken if these cannot be maintained.\nThe minimum passing distance to navigational dangers and/or navigational aids during normal* navigational\nwatches and the actions to be taken if these cannot be maintained.\nDefining how the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS are required to be set, checked and in what\ncircumstances they may be changed.\nThe hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision avoidance situations.\nCalling the Master.\nThe process of the Master taking over the con of the vessel.\n*Normal navigational watches are when the Master or his deputy, as defined by the company, are not required to be\non the bridge as part of the official bridge team composition.\nThe SMS procedures should require supplementary orders to be issued by the Master each day in a Bridge Order\nBook to cover periods when the Master may be resting or otherwise engaged. The daily orders should also be used\nto give additional instruction relevant to the operation of the vessel in the short term and prior to the next time the\nMaster expects to be present or to provide further instructions. These orders should be signed by each OOW when\ntaking over a watch, to confirm that they have read, understood and will comply with the orders.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the requirement for the Master to\nprepare Master's Standing Orders and Daily Orders\nReview the Master’s Standing Orders and verify that:\no They included the content defined by the company procedure.\no They defined what constituted restricted visibility.\no They defined the minimum CPA and BCR permitted during normal* navigational watches.\no They defined the minimum passing distance from navigational dangers and / or navigational\nhazards during normal* navigational watches.\no They defined how the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS are required to be set and\nchecked, and in what circumstances they can be changed.\no\n• They contained guidance on the hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision\navoidance situations.\no They defined the circumstances in which the Master must be called.\no They defined the process by which the Master would take over the con on the vessel.\no They had been signed and dated by the existing Master upon being assigned to the vessel, or at\nlater revision.\no They had been signed by each navigation officer on joining the vessel and before taking any\nnavigational duties.\nReview the Bridge Order Book and verify that:\no Entries had been made by the Master at least daily.\no Information was entered which was consistent with the operation and voyage of the vessel such as\npreparations for approaching critical areas due to piracy concerns, fishing vessel activity, increased\ntraffic density or expected deteriorations in weather conditions.\no Each entry had been dated, timed and signed by the Master.\no The entries had been signed for understanding by each navigation officer prior to taking their\nwatch.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure defining the requirement for the Master to develop their own Standing and Daily\nOrders.\nThe Master’s Standing Orders signed by the Master and all navigation officers.\nThe Bridge Order Book with each dated and timed entry signed by the Master, and subsequently, each\nOOW before taking over their watch.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure which required the Master to prepare Standing or Daily Orders.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the Master’s Standing or Daily Orders.\nThe Master had not prepared their own Standing Orders which were signed and dated on being assigned to\nthe vessel or at subsequent update.\nThe navigation officers onboard at the time of the inspection had not signed the Master's Standing Orders\n(unless they had only joined that day).\nThe content of the Master’s Standing Orders degraded the company expectations documented anywhere\nwithin the Safety Management System.\nThe content of the Master's Daily Orders degraded the company expectations documented anywhere within\nthe Safety Management System.\nThe Standing Orders did not define the Master’s expectations in respect of:\n• o\no\no\nWhat was considered to be restricted visibility and the actions to take on encountering it.\nMinimum CPA/BCR permitted during normal* navigational watches.\nMinimum passing distances from navigational dangers and/or navigational aids during normal*\nnavigational watches.\no How the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS were required to be set, checked and in what\ncircumstances they may be changed\no Calling the Master.\no The process for the Master to formally take the con of the vessel from the officer of the watch.\no The hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision avoidance situations.\nThe Master had not prepared Daily Orders which were signed, dated and timed, to supplement their\nStanding Orders.\nThe Master’s Daily Orders did not address the navigational concerns or preparations relevant to the period\nunder review.\nAn OOW had not signed the Master’s Daily Orders for understanding.\nReview of any onboard records indicated that instructions contained within the Master’s Standing or Daily\nOrders had not been followed.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.4.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company electronic chart", "c": "management procedures and were onboard ENCs and RNCs managed, corrected and\nused appropriately?\nShort Question Text\nElectronic chart management.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nIHO: Information on IHO Standards related to ENC and ECDIS (Ver 2.1 Feb 2020)\nUKHO: Guide to ECDIS audits and inspections\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that only fully corrected official electronic charts are used for navigation where ECDIS is required\nto be carried\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.12. Charts and Nautical Publications.\nOnly up to date official charts and publications should be used for appraisal, planning, execution and monitoring of a\npassage plan.\n4.12.3 Electronic Charts\nUsers of electronic charts should be aware that:\n• •\nENC and RNC are official charts produced by a hydrographic office; and\nAll other commercially available alternatives are unofficial or private charts.\n4.13.2 Chart Updates\nProcedures for updating ENCs and RNCs should be included in the SMS. Chart updates should be controlled and\nmonitored using the on-board chart management system.\nIHO: Information on IHO Standards related to ENC and ECDIS (Ver 2.1 Feb 2020)\nIHO Advice for PSC Inspectors concerning IHO Standards\nii) use up to date electronic navigational charts (ENC);\nHydrographic Authorities are required to keep nautical charts up to date to include all information considered to be\nrelevant to safety of navigation (including temporary or preliminary information); and as such regularly issue updates\nto their ENCs. For an ECDIS to be used for navigation it must have the correct up to date ENCs for the intended\nvoyage. Therefore the only indicator that the ENC data in the ECDIS is up to date is that the latest ENC update\navailable for an ENC as issued by the Hydrographic Authority has been applied to the SENC.\nThere are currently two chart distribution services an international mariner can sign up to for delivery of ENCs (noting\nthere are also several national distribution services for mariners operating exclusively in national waters).\n1) Standard subscription - ENC permits are purchased for a known operating area for a fixed periods of time (3 to 12\nmonths). This enables the decryption of these ENCs in ECDIS and enables their use for planning and navigation.\n2) Pay As You Sail (PAYS) – Mariners pay a minimal planning fee for upfront use of the entire global ENC data set. A\ntracking service is fitted to the vessel and as they navigate across ENCs they are charged accordingly. PAYS\nservices can give instant access to most ENC chart across the globe.\nTo facilitate PSC inspections and to assist mariners in satisfying themselves that their ENC data is “up to date” S-63\nwas updated to Edition 1.2, adding an additional annex covering the ENC Status Report. Only ECDIS type approved\naccording to Edition 4.0 of IEC 61174 will be capable of displaying the report. The report is a concise and\nstandardized format designed for two individual use cases:\na) To ensure that all ENC cells loaded into the ECDIS SENC are up to date for the next leg of a particular route; and\nb) To ensure that all ENCs loaded into the SENC are up to date.\nUKHO: Guide to ECDIS audits and inspections.\nECDIS audit checklist\n• •\n• •\n• 8. Are official electronic charts (ENC/RNC) being used?\n9. Are the electronic charts in use up-to-date (latest edition and updates)?\n10. Are T&P NMs being used correctly in voyage planning and monitoring?\n11. Is the ADMIRALTY Information Overlay (AIO) in use?\n12. Has Weekly Notice to Mariners Section VIII and the README.TXT file been consulted?\nSee also Explanatory notes and references\n(representative only as other Hydrographic Organizations and electronic chart suppliers exist)\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents. First Edition.\n4.2.4 Temporary and Preliminary Notices to Mariners, ENC Preliminary Notices to Mariners and Admiralty Information\nOverlay.\nNot all ENC producers include Temporary and Preliminary Notices to Mariners (T&P NMs) as part of their ENC\nupdates. The UKHO provides a list of countries that include T&P NMs in their ENCs. In cases where T&P NMs are\nnot included in local ENCs, T&P NMs issued for admiralty paper charts are available through a service called\nAdmiralty Information Overlay (AIO).\nAIO displays T&P NMs and Electronic Navigation Chart Preliminary Notices to Mariners (EP NMs), as well as areas\nwhere there is no admiralty paper chart, at an equivalent ENC scale on the ECDIS. T&P Ns and EP NMs are\ndisplayed as coloured polygons, whereas a grey hatched polygon labelled No Overlay is used where there is no\npaper chart at an equivalent ENC scale.\nNote that there may be delays in updating AIOs from the time a T&P or EP NM has been published, updated or\ncancelled.\nIt is also important to note that AIO is a visual layer over an ENC and does not display details of the actual notice.\nWhere conflicts of scale occur between UKHO products and the areas covered by T&Ps, AIO will display No Overlay.\nIn such circumstances, AIO users should gather information from other sources, such as local NMs to determine\nwhether there are any relevant T&P notices.\nRecommendations\n• •\n• The company SMS should define policies and procedures for the OOW to display T&P NMs and use of the\nAIO function.\nSpecific details of a T&P/EP NM should be plotted as a manual layer as opposed to a generic text box and\nmade alarmable to highlight any navigational hazards. For example, the company SMS may require\nNavigating Officers to manually plot and display all T&P NMs within the XTC or within a specific number of\nmiles either side of the planned track.\nNavigating officers should not entirely rely on AIO as they may not be updated, and applicable T&P notices\nshould be verified against weekly notices to mariners.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\n• Charts and publications management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19.\n2.1 All ships, irrespective of size, shall have:\n.4 nautical charts and nautical publications to plan and display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot\nand monitor positions throughout the voyage. An electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) is also\nacceptable as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph. Ships to which paragraph 2.10 applies\nshall comply with the carriage requirements for ECDIS therein.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to manage the procurement and updating of Electronic\nNavigation Charts (ENCs) and Raster Navigation Charts (RNCs) to ensure compliance with the SOLAS carriage of\nnautical publications requirements.\nThe procedure should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhich electronic charts must be available on board the vessel at all times.\nThe process to determine which electronic charts must be available on board for a voyage.\nHow to obtain or update chart permits to ensure the electronic charts required to be carried by the company\nor for use during a voyage are available onboard and remain valid throughout a proposed voyage.\nHow to track which charts have current permits.\nHow to obtain electronic chart corrections and apply them to available charts.\nHow to track or view the electronic chart update history to verify that each ENC is fully corrected.\nHow to manage passage planning and monitoring where full ENC coverage is not available.\nHow to manage Temporary and Preliminary (T&P) notices applicable to ENCs or RNCs.\nThe company procedures may refer to instructions provided by a third-party supplier but the procedures available\nonboard must define all necessary steps and record-keeping requirements to ensure that the management of\nelectronic charts is complete.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Confirm the primary means of navigation as declared in the pre-inspection questionnaire was correctly\nstated.\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing, ordering and updating ENCs and\nRNCs.\nReview the onboard electronic chart management system for ENC and RNC and verify that the charts\nrequired for the previous voyage were available and permitted for use on each ECDIS.\nVerify that where RNCs had been used;\no The ECDIS had been used in RCDS mode.\no That ENCs were not available for the area.\no That fully corrected paper charts were also available and in use.\nReview the chart update records and verify that each ENC and RNC in use for navigation had been\nmaintained up to date to the most recently published Notices to Mariners, including T&P corrections.\nReview an individual ENC or RNC from the previous voyage which was identified as being affected by a\nT&P correction and verify that the correction was shown in the appropriate location.\nRequest the accompanying officer to demonstrate how T&P notices were applied:\no Manually.\no By use of an overlay.\no Incorporated as part of the update of the ENC database. (CAES and CEES S93 charts)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure that defined how ENCs and RNCs were to be managed\nThe onboard records identifying which ENCs and RNCs were active with current permits or were available\non a Pay As You Sail (PAYS) basis.\nENC Status Report, where available.\nThe previous voyage passage plan records showing which ENCs and RNCs had been used.\nWhere ENC coverage was incomplete for a recent voyage, passage planning records demonstrating how\nthe gap in coverage was addressed.\nRecords demonstrating that ENCs and RNCs had been corrected to the latest notice to mariners, including\nthe application of T&P notices.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for managing ENCs and RNCs\nThe declaration relating to the primary means of navigation was incorrect\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the electronic chart management and correction\nprocedures.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for applying T&P notices to ENCs and\nRNCs.\nThere was no onboard management system to track the permits held by the vessel for ENCs and RNCs.\nIndividual ENC or RNC permits had expired prior to or during the predicted phase of a voyage.\nThe vessel had completed a voyage with missing ENC or RNC coverage.\nThe vessel had not updated the ENCs and RNCs to the latest available notice to mariners (subject to a\nreasonable allowance for vessel activities and workload).\nA vessel had completed a part of a voyage with RNCs when ENCs were available for the area in question.\nThe vessels had operated in RCDS mode without availability of an appropriate folio of up to date paper\ncharts.\nThere was no onboard management system to track Notices to Mariners corrections applied to ENCs and\nRNCs.\nWhere a vessel was less than 3,000 gt and was not fitted with an ECDIS select “Not Answerable” in each of the\nresponse tools then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.5.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company paper chart", "c": "management procedures and were onboard paper charts managed, corrected and used\nappropriately?\nShort Question Text\nPaper chart management\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the only fully corrected official paper charts are used for navigation when required to be\ncarried or used.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 4.12 Charts and Nautical Publications\n4.12.1 Carriage Of Charts And Nautical Publications\nIt is required that all ships carry adequate and up to date official nautical charts, sailing directions, lists of lights and\nradio signals, Notices to Mariners, tide tables and all other nautical publications necessary to appraise, plan, execute\nand monitor a passage.\nUse of a chart and publication management system will help ensure that charts and publications are effectively\nmaintained. A management system should record the charts, publications and licences/permits carried, and also\nwhen the charts and other publications were last corrected.\n4.12.2 Official Charts and Nautical Publications\nOfficial nautical charts can be either in paper or electronic format. Official nautical publications can also be in either\npaper or digital form.\nIn order for a nautical chart or publication to be considered official, it must be produced or approved by an authorised\nhydrographic office or relevant government institution in accordance with International Hydrographic Organization\n(IHO) resolutions and recommendations.\nOnly up to date official charts and publications should be used for appraisal, planning, execution and monitoring of a\npassage plan.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\n• Charts and publications management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 19\n2.1 All ships, irrespective of size, shall have:\n.4 nautical charts and nautical publications to plan and display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot\nand monitor positions throughout the voyage. An electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) is also\nacceptable as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph. Ships to which paragraph 2.10 applies\nshall comply with the carriage requirements for ECDIS therein.\n.5 back-up arrangements to meet the functional requirements of subparagraph .4 if this function is partly or fully\nfulfilled by electronic means.\nInspection Guidance\nWhere a vessel carries paper charts to comply with the carriage of charts and nautical publications regulations, to\nmitigate gaps in ENC coverage, or for any other reason where paper charts will be used for navigational purposes,\nthe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the paper charts are the latest edition and fully\ncorrected before use.\nThe procedure should define the process for:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCorrectly identifying the paper charts required for an intended voyage.\nEnsuring paper charts required for an intended voyage are corrected prior to commencing passage\nplanning.\nTracking the correction status of paper charts not in use.\nManaging Temporary and Preliminary (T&P) notices.\nProcuring new editions and additional paper charts.\nThe actions to be taken when directed to a port where appropriate paper charts are not onboard.\nObtaining weekly and cumulative Notices to Mariners.\nReplacing damaged or worn paper charts.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for paper chart management.\nReview the paper chart portfolio records and verify that all paper charts onboard were listed with their edition\ndate.\nReview a recent passage plan and verify that paper charts used for the voyage were fully corrected by spot\nsampling at least two charts.\nVerify that applicable T&P corrections and NAVTEX and NAVAREA warnings had been applied to the paper\ncharts used and that a system existed to remove them once they were cancelled.\nVerify that all paper charts, including the largest scale charts applicable to the passage reviewed, were\navailable onboard and had been used for navigation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for paper chart management.\nThe paper chart portfolio records.\n• •\n• •\nThe paper chart correction records.\nRecent passage plan records showing which paper charts had been used.\nThe paper charts, where applicable, used on the previous passage\nCommunications and mitigation plan agreed with the company where a vessel had been directed to a port\nand the required paper charts were not onboard, if available.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for managing paper charts.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the paper chart management and correction\nprocedures.\nThe vessel had completed a voyage with missing or inappropriate scale charts without any evidence that the\ncompany had been involved in identifying mitigating actions.\nThere was no systematic process to apply and remove T&P notices and NAVTEX and NAVAREA warnings.\nThe vessel had not updated voyage paper charts to the latest available Notice to Mariners (subject to a\nreasonable allowance for vessel activities and workload) or had used outdated editions.\nPaper charts in use were torn, stained or worn such that detail was likely to be obscured from the user.\nWhere the vessel is fitted with ECDIS as both the primary and back up means of navigation chart provision, and no\npaper charts at all are carried, then select “Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select \"Not Applicable\n- as instructed by question guidance\".", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.6.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "testing the navigational equipment, main propulsion, steering gear and thrusters prior to\nuse and prior to critical phases of a passage or operation and, did checklists or logbook\nentries confirm the required tests had been completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nTesting navigational equipment, main propulsion, steering gear and thrusters\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery is confirmed as fully operational prior to\ncritical phases of a passage or operation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 3.18 Periodic Checks of Navigational Equipment.\n3.18.1 Operational checks on navigational equipment should be undertaken when preparing for sea and prior to port\nentry and at any other time required by the SMS.\nBefore entering restricted or coastal waters, it is important also to check that full control of engine and steering\nfunction is available.\nChecklist B1 Steering Gear Test Routines.\nChecklist B6 Preparations For Sea.\nChecklist B7 Preparations For Arrival.\nChecklist B10 Navigation in Coastal Waters.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n§ 164.25 Tests before entering or getting underway.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section no person may cause a vessel to enter into or get\nunderway on the navigable waters of the United States unless no more than 12 hours before entering or getting\nunderway, the following equipment has been tested:\n(1) Primary and secondary steering gear. The test procedure includes a visual inspection of the steering gear and its\nconnecting linkage, and, where applicable, the operation of the following:\n(i) Each remote steering gear control system.\n(ii) Each steering position located on the navigating bridge.\n(iii) The main steering gear from the alternative power supply, if installed.\n(iv) Each rudder angle indicator in relation to the actual position of the rudder.\n(v) Each remote steering gear control system power failure alarm.\n(vi) Each remote steering gear power unit failure alarm.\n(vii) The full movement of the rudder to the required capabilities of the steering gear.\n(2) All internal vessel control communications and vessel control alarms.\n(3) Standby or emergency generator, for as long as necessary to show proper functioning, including steady state\ntemperature and pressure readings.\n(4) Storage batteries for emergency lighting and power systems in vessel control and propulsion machinery spaces.\n(5) Main propulsion machinery, ahead and astern.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 26\n1. Within 12 hours before departure, the ship’s steering gear shall be checked and tested by the ship’s crew. The test\nprocedure shall include, where applicable, the operation of the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\n9.\nThe main steering gear,\nThe auxiliary steering gear,\nThe remote steering gear control systems,\nThe steering positions located on the navigation bridge,\nThe emergency power supply,\nThe rudder angle indicators in relation to the actual position of the rudder,\nThe remote steering gear control system power failure alarms,\nThe steering gear power unit failure alarms, and\nAutomatic isolating arrangements and other automatic equipment.\n2.The checks and tests shall include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nThe full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the steering gear,\nA visual inspection of the steering gear and its connecting linkages, and\nThe operation of the means of communication between the navigating bridge and steering gear\ncompartment.\n5. The administration may waive the requirements to carry out the checks and tests prescribed in paragraph 1 and 2\nfor ships which regularly engage on voyages of short duration. Such ships shall carry out these checks and tests at\nleast once every week.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which require navigational and manoeuvring equipment to be\nfunctionally tested at defined points prior to, and during, a passage or operation.\nThe procedures should define the extent of the testing required to be carried out based on regulation, local rules, risk\nassessment and the vessel’s operation at the time of the required test.\nThe vessel operator should have developed checklists, adapted to reflect the equipment and systems fitted to the\nvessel, to ensure that comprehensive tests are carried out systematically.\nWhere a vessel operator had developed its procedures based on an administrative waiver of repetitive steering tests,\ndocumented evidence of such a waiver should be available onboard.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary, review the company procedures which defined the requirement for testing\nnavigational and manoeuvring equipment.\nVerify that the vessel operator had provided vessel specific checklists to address the following:\no Steering Gear Test Routines (modelled on BPG B1 and supporting notes).\no Preparations for Sea (modelled on BPG B6 and supporting notes).\no Preparations for Arrival (modelled on BPG B7 and supporting notes).\nReview completed checklists for the testing of navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery to verify\nthat testing during a recent passage or, sequence of operations, had been performed in accordance with the\ncompany procedures.\nVerify that where a vessel was operating under an administrative waiver to conduct steering gear tests on a\nweekly basis, rather that prior to each departure, that the waiver was available onboard.\nVerify that any defects, detected in either navigational equipment or manoeuvring machinery during the\nrequired testing processes, had been followed up through the onboard defect reporting system.\nReview an individual checklist with the accompanying navigation officer to verify that they were familiar with\nindividual checks or tests that were required to be carried out.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures which defined the requirements for testing navigational equipment and\nmanoeuvring machinery.\nCompleted checklists for the testing of navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery for recent\nvoyages.\nBridge Log Book.\nEngine Log Book.\nAny waivers issued by the Flag Administration relating to the periodicity of steering gear tests for vessels on\nshort voyages.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no procedure that required navigational equipment and manoeuvring equipment to be\nfunctionally tested at defined points prior to and during a voyage or operation.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company procedures for testing navigational\nequipment and manoeuvring equipment.\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any check or test required to be carried out according to the\ncompany navigational and manoeuvring equipment checklist(s).\nThere was no evidence that the timing of the rudder movement from hard-over to hard-over, using each\nsteering gear power unit singly and together, had been checked to ensure consistency with previous tests\nand the manufacturer’s specification.\nTests required to be carried out by the company procedure had not been completed as required.\nThere was no evidence that the governing administration had issued an appropriate waiver for a vessel on\nfrequent voyages of short duration, where tests were not being carried out within 12 hours prior to departure.\nDefects with navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery identified through the testing process,\nwhich could not be immediately corrected by onboard staff, had not been entered into the vessel’s defect\nreporting system.\nWhere a defect(s) with an item of navigational and/or manoeuvring equipment had been identified during these tests\nbut had NOT been rectified at the time of inspection:\n• •\nCreate a negative observation in the Hardware response tool for this question 4.2.6, and\nCreate a negative observation in the Hardware response tool of the question relating to the particular\nequipment if it is included in the CVIQ for the inspection.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.2.7.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "the carriage and management of nautical publications and was evidence available to\ndemonstrate that publications had been managed in accordance with the procedure?\nShort Question Text\nNautical publications\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nUK Admiralty: Guidance on the Use of ADMIRALTY Digital Publications (ADP) and ADMIRALTY e-Nautical\nPublications (e-NPs)\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.2 IMO requirements on carriage of publications on board ships\nObjective\nTo ensure nautical publications used for navigational purposes provide the most accurate information\navailable.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 2.3.2 Official Nautical Publications and Additional Information.\nA full appraisal of the passage plan should include a review and consideration of information additional to that on\nnavigational charts, including but not limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sailing Directions.\nNotices to Mariners.\nLists of Radio Signals.\nLoad Line Charts.\nOcean Passage/Routeing Charts and Guides.\nPort Guides.\nLists of Lights.\nTide Tables and Tidal Stream Atlases.\nMaritime Security Charts.\nUK Admiralty: Guidance on the Use of ADMIRALTY Digital Publications (ADP) and ADMIRALTY e-Nautical\nPublications (e-NPs)\n3 Flag and Port State Acceptance\n3.1. Where the UKHO’s digital nautical publications are used to meet the SOLAS carriage requirement, the Record of\nEquipment attached to the ship’s Safety Equipment Certificate should be appropriately endorsed to show that digital\npublications are being used and that appropriate backup is fitted. This endorsement can be provided by a Flag State\nAdministration’s (FSA’s) Recognised Organisations (ROs), where authorised, who will also ensure that any specific\nFSA requirements have been implemented. It is recommended that ships carry copies of any documentation issued\nby their FSAs along with a copy of these guidance notes. It is also recommended that a notice of intention to use\ndigital nautical publications is provided to the FSA\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\n• Charts and publications management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 27\nNautical charts and nautical publications.\nNautical charts and nautical publications, such as sailing directions, lists of lights, notice to mariners, tide tables and\nall other nautical publications necessary for the intended voyage, shall be adequate and up to date.\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.2 IMO requirements on carriage of publications on board ships.\n4 The publications may be carried in the form of electronic media such as CD-ROM in lieu of hard copies. Acceptable\npublications in electronic form should be those issued by IMO or an Administration or a body authorized by an\nAdministration to ensure correctness of their contents and to safeguard against illegal copying. A medium could either\ncontain a publication or as many publications as possible. In any case, the media should be treated in accordance\nwith the document control procedures in the ship’s SMS including procedures for timely update.\n5 Notwithstanding paragraph 4 above, the publications for emergency use, such as the International Code of Signals\nand the IAMSAR Manual should always be available in the form of hard copies, bearing in mind that such\npublications need to be readily available for use in case of emergency without being restricted to a specific place and\nby the availability of a computer.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that identified which mandatory and discretionary nautical\npublications were required to be carried on board and the process for updating them to the latest information or\nedition available.\nWhere regulations allow for the carriage of mandatory publications in electronic format the procedure should indicate\nhow backup provisions were to be provided onboard.\n.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical\npublications.\nVerify that the company procedure had defined which nautical publications were required to be carried,\nwhether in hard or electronic form, and identified both mandatory and discretionary titles.\nReview the onboard nautical publication management system and verify that latest editions of nautical\npublications were available on board and that they had been maintained up to date.\nVerify that nautical publications carried in the electronic format required to comply with SOLAS Regulation\n27 were acceptable to the flag and that the required back up provision were in place. (as indicated on the\nSafety Equipment Certificate Form E).\n• Verify that nautical publications required to be carried in hard copy, such as the International Code of\nSignals and the IAMSAR Manual, were onboard.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe nautical publications.\nThe company procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical publications.\nThe inventory of nautical publications indicating their edition date and latest correction applied, where\napplicable.\nWhere electronic publications were carried to comply with SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 27, evidence that\nthe publications were approved by flag and the means of back up were in accordance with the Safety\nEquipment Certificate Form E)\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical publications.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing, ordering\nand updating nautical publications.\nThere was no inventory of mandatory and discretionary nautical publications required to be carried.\nNautical publications required to be carried, in either electronic or hard copy, in accordance with the\ncompany procedure were found to be missing, obsolete or uncorrected.\nWhere electronic nautical publications were carried, there was no evidence that the publications were\napproved by flag or that the required back up publications were available and maintained as required.\n4.3. Bridge and Machinery Space Team Management", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures", "c": "defining the minimum bridge team composition and engine room operating mode and\nwere records available to demonstrate that recent voyages had been planned and\nexecuted in accordance with company expectations?\nShort Question Text\nMinimum bridge team composition\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the bridge team is adequately resourced, and the machinery space operated appropriately at\nall stages of a voyage including while at anchor, conducting STS operations or drifting.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nSection 1 Effective Bridge Organization\n1.2.1 Composition of the Bridge Team\nThe Bridge Team should be sufficiently resourced to meet the operational requirements of the passage plan. When\nconsidering the composition of the Bridge Team and ensuring that the bridge is never left unattended at sea, the\nMaster should take into account the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nVisibility, sea state and weather conditions;\nTraffic density;\nActivities occurring in the area in which the ship is navigating;\nNavigation in or near traffic separation schemes or other routeing measures;\nNavigation in or near fixed or mobile installations;\nShip operating requirements, activities and anticipated manoeuvres;\nOperational status of bridge equipment including alarm systems;\nWhether manual or automatic steering is anticipated;\nAny demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of exceptional circumstances; and\nAny other relevant standard, procedure or guidelines relating to watchkeeping arrangements or the activities\nof the vessel.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These\nprocedures may include:\n• Bridge manning levels.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which consider the areas within which a ship will operate and\ndefine:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe minimum required bridge team composition considering the proximity of the vessel to navigational\nhazards, traffic density, weather conditions, and state of visibility.\nThe minimum required bridge team composition for activities such as sitting at anchor, drifting, “at sea” STS\noperations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer\noperations.\nThe role of each bridge team member for each defined bridge team composition.\nThe circumstances in which the helm will be manned.\nThe circumstances in which the officer of the watch may be the sole lookout.\nThe substitution of the Master during prolonged periods of enhanced bridge team composition.\nThe operational status of the machinery space considering the proximity of the vessel to navigational\nhazards, traffic density, weather conditions and state of visibility.\nThe passage planning requirement to identify the anticipated change in bridge team composition and\nmachinery space status and, when manned, the requirement to be on standby for manoeuvring.\nThe requirement to record when the bridge team composition changes from one defined level to another.\nThe requirement to record when the machinery space status changes from unattended to attended and\nwhen the machinery space is on standby for manoeuvring.\nWhen determining the bridge team composition, careful consideration should be given to non-navigational activities to\nensure that the bridge team is never degraded by duties such as escorting the pilot to the embarkation station or the\ncompletion of administrative tasks.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which define the bridge and machinery space\nteam compositions.\nReview a recent passage plan and verify that the anticipated changes in bridge team composition and\nmachinery space operating status had been identified and documented in alignment with the company\nprocedure.\nReview the records for the same voyage and verify;\no That the bridge team composition and machinery space operating mode had been maintained in\naccordance with the passage plan.\no That the helm had been operated in manual mode in accordance with company procedures.\no That the bridge team composition had been adapted to address changes in visibility or other\nenvironmental conditions.\no The actual bridge team composition at any stage of the voyage was appropriate to the proximity of\nthe vessel to navigational hazards, traffic density weather conditions, and state of visibility.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure(s) that defined bridge team composition and machinery space operating mode\nduring all stages of a voyage .\nPassage plan documentation for recent voyages, (not necessarily the last voyage).\nBridge Log Book, bell books, bridge checklists and any other supporting bridge records, either paper or\nelectronic,\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure defining the required bridge team composition during all stages of a voyage,\nincluding while at anchor, drifting, or conducting “at sea” STS operations, DP operations or underway\nstoring/personnel transfer operations, considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards, weather\nconditions and visibility.\nThere was no procedure defining the engine room status, and when required to be manned the engine room\nteam composition, during all stages of a voyage including while at anchor or drifting, or conducting “at sea”\nSTS operations, DP operations or underway storing/personnel transfer operations, considering traffic\ndensity, proximity to navigational hazards, weather conditions and visibility.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company procedures which defined the\nrequired bridge team composition and engine room operating mode at all stages of the voyage.\nThe company procedure was ambiguous with regards to the need for hand steering in any defined watch\ncomposition.\nThe passage plan did not identify the required bridge team composition for all stages of a voyage.\nThe passage plan did not identify the required engine room operating mode for all stages of a voyage.\nThe reviewed passage plan(s) incorrectly identified the required bridge team composition or machinery\nspace operating mode as defined by company procedure at any stage of a voyage.\nRecords indicated that the required bridge team composition, as documented within the passage plan, was\nnot complied with at any single stage of a voyage.\nRecords indicated that the bridge had been operated with the officer of the watch as the sole lookout in\ncontravention to company procedures at any stage of a voyage.\nRecords indicated that the required engine room operating mode, as documented within the passage plan,\nwas not complied with at any stage of a voyage.\nChanges in the bridge team composition from one level to another and the times of each change were not\nrecorded in the log book or bell book\nWhere the review of bridge and engine room team composition identified observations relating to hours of rest nonconformance, these should be addressed under question 3.4.1", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.3.2.", "t": "Were the engineer officers familiar with the company procedures defining", "c": "machinery space operating mode and, where required to be attended, the machinery\nspace team composition during the various stages of a voyage, and were records\navailable to confirm the machinery space had been operated accordingly?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery space team composition\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Bridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the machinery space is adequately manned or monitored at all stages of a voyage or\noperation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n7.1 Manning Level Changes\nThe Chief Engineer or designated representative should increase manning levels when required, whether planned or\nunplanned. As far as possible, the work/rest hour requirements should still be met.\n7.1.1 Planned Changes\nThe Chief Engineer should identify planned changes in consultation with the Master. The planned changes should be\nidentified for every passage of the ship. Examples of events/operations requiring planned manning changes are :\n• •\n• •\n• •\nArrival/departure;\nCargo operations;\nBunkering;\nFuel changeovers;\nPlanned machinery overhauls; and\nDocking for surveys and trial runs.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 1.2.6 The Bridge Team and Internal Communication.\nThe Bridge Team has the central role in maintaining communications with the engine room and all other operating\nareas.\nIt is essential that bridge and engine room personnel communicate regularly on matters including:\n• Machinery and propulsion status, including defects;\n• •\n• Any existing or anticipated circumstances, including fuel changeover procedures and planned maintenance,\nwith the potential to affect machinery performance or the manoeuvrability of the ship;\nAny planned or anticipated speed changes; and\nAny environmental regulatory requirements.\nThe Bridge Team will co-ordinate the activities of the whole ship on behalf of the Master. This will be aided by good\ninternal communications and a well briefed plan. This is particularly important during emergency situations when an\neffective response will depend on good communication and co-ordinated actions by all personnel.\nChecklist B2: Example of a Bridge Manning Matrix.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nAdditional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\nChapter II-1 Regulation 46\nGeneral\n1 The arrangements provided shall be such as to ensure that the safety of the ship in all sailing conditions, including\nmanoeuvring, is equivalent to that of a ship having the machinery spaces manned.\n2 Measures shall be taken to the satisfaction of the Administration to ensure that the equipment is functioning in a\nreliable manner and that satisfactory arrangements are made for regular inspections and routine tests to ensure\ncontinuous reliable operation.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The circumstances in which the machinery space may be operated in the unattended mode.\nWhere the machinery space is required to be attended, the required machinery space team composition\nconsidering proximity to navigational hazards, traffic density and the state of visibility.\nThe minimum engine room manning requirements for activities such as drifting, “at sea” STS operations,\nDynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.\nWhen the machinery space is required to be attended for navigational safety, the role of each machinery\nspace team member.\nThe substitution of the Chief Engineer during prolonged periods of enhanced machinery space team\ncomposition.\nThe record keeping requirements for the change of machinery space status and/or machinery space team\ncomposition.\nThe communication of the required machinery space status and/or manning level to the engineer officers at\nthe passage planning stage and daily.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the required machinery space\noperating mode for the various stages of a voyage.\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the machinery space team\ncomposition considering the proximity to navigational hazards, the traffic density and the state of visibility\nand other operations such as drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo\noperations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.\nReview the Engine Room Log Book for a recent voyage, including periods at anchor, to verify that the\nmachinery space was attended, when required, with the appropriate team composition in accordance with\nthe company procedure.\nReview the Engine Room Daily Order Book to verify that the anticipated times of changing the status of the\nmachinery space from unattended to attended had been communicated to the engine room staff.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure that defined the required machinery space status during all stages of a voyage,\nincluding while at anchor, considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards and the state of\nvisibility.\nThe company procedure that defined the required machinery space team composition considering traffic\ndensity, proximity to navigational hazards and the state of visibility and, during other operations such drifting,\n“at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel\ntransfer operations.\nEngine Room Log Book, Engine Room Daily Order Book and any other supporting machinery space\nrecords.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure defining company expectations for operating the machinery space in either the\nunattended or attended mode considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards and state of\nvisibility and, other operations such as at while at anchor, drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically\nPositioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.\nThere was no company procedure which defined the required machinery space team composition\nconsidering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards and environmental conditions.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the company procedures which defined the\nexpectations for the operating status of the machinery space or when required to be attended, the\nmachinery space team composition.\nThe required machinery space status had not been communicated to engineering staff to permit effective\nresource management.\nRecords indicated that the required machinery space status, as documented within the passage plan, was\nnot complied with at any stage of a voyage.\nRecords indicated that when operating in the attended status for navigational purposes, the machinery\nspace team composition was not in accordance with the company procedure.\nRecords of the machinery space status or team composition were not available.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.3.3.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "integrating a pilot (or similar role*) into the bridge team and were records available to\ndemonstrate that the process had been followed?\nShort Question Text\nIntegrating a pilot (or similar role) into the bridge team\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMPA: Guidance on the Master - Pilot Exchange (MPX)\nObjective\nTo ensure that there is an effective process to integrate the pilot (or similar role*) into the bridge team.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\n5 Pilotage\n5.1 Overview\nEfficient pilotage will depend on:\n• •\n• •\nEffective communication between the Master, Bridge Team and Pilot.\nAccurate exchange of information between the Master, Bridge Team and the Pilot, particularly on matters\nrelating to safety, helm and telegraph orders.\nMutual understanding of duties and responsibilities; and\nA complete awareness and understanding of the ship's systems, equipment and any deficiencies which may\naffect handling characteristics and manoeuvrability.\nChecklist A1 Master/Pilot Information Exchange\nChecklist A2 Pilot Card\nIMPA: Guidance on the Master-Pilot Exchange (MPX)\nAs with all properly constructed supporting text on pilotage, it is necessary to begin with the core foundation of IMO\nResolution A960 (23) Section 5:\n5 Master – pilot information exchange.\n5.4 This exchange of information should include at least:\n• •\nPresentation of a completed standard Pilot Card. In addition, information should be provided on rate of turn\nat different speeds, turning circles, stopping distances and, if available, other appropriate data;\nGeneral agreement on plans and procedures, including contingency plans, for the anticipated passage.\n• •\n• •\n• Discussion of any special conditions such as weather, depth of water, tidal currents and marine traffic that\nmay be expected during the passage.\nDiscussion of any unusual ship-handling characteristics, machinery difficulties, navigational equipment\nproblems or crew limitations that could affect the operation, handling or safe manoeuvring of the ship;\nInformation on berthing arrangements; use, characteristics and number of tugs; mooring boats and other\nexternal facilities;\nInformation on mooring arrangements, and.\nConfirmation of the language to be used on the bridge and with external parties.\n5.5 It should be clearly understood that any passage plan is a basic indication of preferred intention and both the\npilot, and the master should be prepared to depart from it when circumstances so dictate.\n5.6 Pilots and competent pilotage authorities should be aware of the voyage planning responsibilities of masters\nunder applicable IMO instruments.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place. These\nprocedures may include:\n• Navigation with Pilot on board.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the pilot (or similar role*) is integrated into the\nbridge team and that specific information is documented and discussed prior to any transfer of conn or responsibility\ntakes place. The information should include but not be limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel particulars and manoeuvring characteristics.\nThe planned passage.\nThe review of the ECDIS and the status of safety depth alarms and layers in use.\nThe use of any navigational aids provided by the pilot.\nMooring and/or anchoring requirements.\nTowage and/or tug assistance.\nUnder keel clearance.\nRelevant defects and/or constraints.\nThe Master/Pilot exchange should be documented, discussed and agreed before any transfer of conn or\nresponsibility takes place. The Master/Pilot exchange should be repeated whenever there is a change of pilot.\nThe vessel should utilise checklists which have been adapted to the specific needs of the company and vessel type,\nand which were aligned with:\nICS Bridge Procedures Guide – Annex 3 - Checklists\n• •\nA1 Master/Pilot Information Exchange\nA2 Pilot Card\nThe vessel should record the time of completion of the Master/Pilot information exchange, and where different, the\ntime of the transfer of the conn between the Master and Pilot. The time of the transfer of the conn between Pilots and,\nas applicable, between the Pilot and Master on an outbound passage should also be recorded.\n*Similar role: Mooring Master, Lightering Master, Marine Advisor, Deep Sea Pilot, etc.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.\nReview the Master/Pilot information exchange and pilot checklists from two recent operations and verify that\nthe information required to be included had been fully and accurately entered and the pilot* had\nacknowledged the handover of information, or where the pilot had refused to sign, the time of the completion\nof the handover had been recorded.\nReview Bridge Log Books, bell books or other records and verify that the time of the transfer of the conn\nbetween the Master and Pilot, between pilots and between the pilot and the Master had been recorded.\nInterview the accompanying navigation officer to verify that they understood the source, intent and meaning\nof the information required to be entered on the Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.\nThe Master/Pilot information exchange and pilot card checklists for recent operations.\nThe Bridge Log Book, bell book and other operational records covering recent operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.\nThe vessel operator had not developed Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists for use onboard.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not fully familiar with the company procedure for integrating a\npilot* into the bridge team.\nThe accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the practical requirements for each item included\non the Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists.\nThe Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists were not available for all operations where a pilot*\nwas engaged.\nThe Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists reviewed were either missing, incomplete or\ncontained erroneous safety related information pertinent to the operations being undertaken.\nThe time of the completion of the Master/Pilot information exchange was not recorded for the operation(s)\nreviewed.\nThe times of the transfer of the conn between the Master and pilot, between pilots and between the Pilot and\nMaster, as applicable, were not recorded.\nDefective equipment affecting safe navigation, manoeuvring or mooring operations, where it existed, had not\nbeen recorded on the pilot card checklist for the reviewed operations.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.3.4.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the company procedures to", "c": "prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge, and were these procedures being\ncomplied with?\nShort Question Text\nBridge distractions.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the bridge team can always maintain a safe navigational watch, free from disruption and\ndistraction.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\n1.2.7 Duties within the Bridge Team\nMaintaining Bridge Team performance will be aided by a bridge environment which is free from distractions. To avoid\ndisruption and distraction on the bridge it is recommended that:\n• •\n• Unrestricted bridge access is limited to only those with operational bridge responsibilities;\nThe use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices should be strictly controlled (see Section\n1.4); and\nInternal and external communications should generally be restricted to those related to the safe navigation\nof the ship (see Section 1.5).\nThe Bridge should be free from distractions and all non-essential activity should be avoided.\n1.3 Company policy and procedures\nThe ISM Code requires every company to have an SMS which covers instructions and procedures to ensure safe\noperation of ships and protection of the environment. This should include practical guidance on navigational safety\nincluding:\n• Bridge access and distraction prevention procedures.\n1.4 Mobile phones and personal electronic devices\nThe company should have a written policy requiring that mobile phones and other personal electronic devices should\nonly be used on the bridge in circumstances approved by the Master.\nNotwithstanding occasions when use of mobile phones or personal electronic devices may be permitted, the\nCompany policy should minimise the distraction resulting from such devices by, in general, limiting their use to\noperationally necessary circumstances.\n1.5 Bridge internet and email\nWhere internet and email services are available on the bridge, the Company should have a policy to manage their\nuse. Access to internet and email use by bridge watchkeepers should generally be limited to those circumstances\nwhere it is necessary for the safe navigation of the ship, in order to minimise distraction that might be caused to the\nBridge Team.\nInternet access and email on the bridge should usually be restricted to:\n• •\n• •\nUpdates to nautical charts and publications, licences and permits;\nWeather information;\nNavigational warnings; and\nInformation relevant to the ship’s operations and passage plan.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.4 Functional requirements for a Safety Management System (SMS)\nEvery Company should develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) which includes the\nfollowing functional requirements:\n1.\n2.\na safety and environmental protection policy,\ninstructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in\ncompliance with relevant international and flag State legislation,\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge including\nguidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nBridge access by personnel with no operational bridge responsibilities.\nThe use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices.\nInternal and external communications.\nNon-essential activity.\nInternet and email access on the bridge.\nThe effective management of the bridge space where it was combined with the cargo and/or machinery\ncontrol and monitoring functions.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the\nbridge.\nDuring the inspection of the bridge note any evidence of non-compliance with the company procedures.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to prevent\ndisruption and distraction on the bridge.\nExpected Evidence\n• Company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge including guidance\non:\no Bridge access by personnel with no operational bridge responsibilities.\no The use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices.\no Internal and external communications.\no Non-essential activity.\no Internet and email access on the bridge.\no The effective management of the bridge space where it was combined with the cargo and/or\nmachinery control and monitoring functions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to prevent disruption and\ndistraction on the bridge.\nThere was evidence of non-compliance with the company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction\non the bridge – give details.\nWhere a multifunctional bridge space was provided, an observation should not be made relating to non-navigational\nactivities occurring on the bridge provided that:\n• •\nThe company procedure specifically addressed the management of potential distractions to the bridge team\nresulting from the operation and monitoring of the cargo and/or machinery systems.\nThe bridge space was laid out and divided up such that the operation and monitoring of the cargo and/or\nmachinery systems could be undertaken without distraction to the bridge team.\n4.4. Communications Equipment and Procedures", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the Emergency Position", "c": "Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and was the EPIRB in good order with records available\nto demonstrate that had it been inspected, tested and maintained as required?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1039 Guidelines for shore-based maintenance of satellite EPIRBs\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1040/Rev.2 Guidelines on annual testing of 406 mhz satellite EPIRBs\nObjective\nTo ensure the Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) will function correctly in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1039 Guidelines for shore-based maintenance of satellite EPIRBs\n4 Maintenance service interval\n4.1 406 MHz satellite EPIRBs should be inspected and tested in accordance with MSC/Circ.1040.\n4. 2 Shore-based maintenance of all satellite EPIRBs, as defined in paragraph 1.2, should be carried out in\naccordance with these guidelines at intervals specified by the flag Administration and not exceeding 5 years. It is\nrecommended that the maintenance be performed at the time when the battery is to be changed.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1040/Rev.2 Guidelines on annual testing of 406 mhz satellite EPIRBs\n1 These Guidelines are applicable to the annual testing of emergency position-indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) that\nare approved to comply with the provisions of SOLAS regulation IV/15.9.\n2 The testing should be carried out by appropriately trained and approved personnel using suitable test equipment\ncapable of performing all the relevant measurements required in these Guidelines (this testing normally will be done\nby a radio surveyor as part of the annual radio survey). All tests of electrical parameters should be performed in the\nself-test mode, if possible.\n3 If a distress signal is transmitted accidentally, the transmission should immediately be stopped, and the local rescue\ncoordination centre (RCC)1 should be contacted immediately and informed. The nearest Cospas-Sarsat mission\ncontrol centre (MCC) should also be informed (see also Guidelines for the avoidance of false distress alerts\n(resolution A.814(19), as may be updated)).\n4 The examination of the installed EPIRB should include:\n.1 checking position and mounting of the bracket to ensure unimpeded float-free operation;\n.2 carrying out visual inspection of the EPIRB and the bracket for defects, any signs of damage, degradation or\ncracks to the casing, or of water ingress;\n.3 carrying out the beacon self-test routine, including the GNSS self-test, if applicable;\n.4 checking that the EPIRB identification (15 Hex ID for first-generation beacons and 23 Hex ID for second-generation\nbeacons and other required information, including, if applicable, the AIS identity (User ID)) is clearly marked on the\noutside of the equipment;\n.5 decoding the EPIRB hexadecimal identification digits (15 Hex ID for first-generation beacons and 23 Hex ID for\nsecond-generation beacons) and other information from the transmitted signal, including, if applicable, the AIS\nidentity (User ID), checking that the decoded information (Hex ID or MMSI/call sign data, as required by the\nAdministration) is identical to the identification marked on the beacon;\n.6 verifying that the MMSI number or radio call sign, if encoded in the beacon, corresponds with that assigned to the\nship;\n.7 verifying registration in an appropriate beacon registration database through documentation or through the point of\ncontact associated with that country code;\n.8 checking the battery expiry date;\n.9 checking the hydrostatic release and its expiry date, as appropriate;\n.10 verifying the emission in the 406 MHz band using the self-test mode or an appropriate device to avoid\ntransmission of a distress call to the satellites;\n.11 if possible, verifying emission on the 121.5 MHz frequency using the self-test mode or an appropriate device to\navoid activating the SAR system;\n.12 verifying emission on the appropriate AIS frequencies, if applicable, using the self-test mode or an appropriate\ndevice to avoid creating false alerts;\n.13 verifying that the EPIRB has been maintained by an approved shore-based maintenance provider at intervals\nrequired by the Administration, in accordance with the most recent revision of MSC/Circ.1039;\n.14 after the test, remounting the EPIRB in its bracket, checking that no transmission has been started;\n.15 verifying the presence of a firmly attached lanyard in good condition; the lanyard should be neatly stowed, and\nshould not be tied to the vessel or the mounting bracket;\n.16 checking the presence of beacon operating instructions manual; and\n.17 checking the presence of pictorial instructions for manual operation visible at the location of the beacon.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter IV Regulation 7\n1 Every ship shall be provided with:\n.6 subject to the provisions of regulation 8.3, a satellite emergency position-indicating radio beacon (satellite EPIRB)\nwhich shall be:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\ncapable of transmitting a distress alert through the polar orbiting satellite service operating in the 406 MHz\nband.\ninstalled in an easily accessible position.\nready to be manually released and capable of being carried by one person into a survival craft.\ncapable of floating free if the ship sinks and of being automatically activated when afloat; and\ncapable of being activated manually.\nChapter IV Regulation 15\n9. Satellite EPIRBs shall be:\n.1 annually tested for all aspects of operational efficiency, with special emphasis on checking the emission on\noperational frequencies, coding and registration, at intervals as specified below:\n.1.2 on cargo ships, within 3 months before the expiry date, or 3 months before or after the anniversary date, of the\nCargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate.\nThe test may be conducted on board the ship or at an approved testing station; and\n.2 subject to maintenance at intervals not exceeding five years, to be performed at an approved shore-based\nmaintenance facility.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically inspected, tested\nand maintained, and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nMost EPIRB's have a self-test facility which is usually a spring-loaded switch. When activated a light will indicate that\nthe test circuits are operating correctly and sometimes this will also activate the strobe light. It is recommended that\nthe self-test switch be held for no more than 2 flashes of the strobe light, or no longer than 1 minute after the first selftest mode burst transmission. When the self-test is activated on a 406 MHz EPIRB, the EPIRB is allowed to radiate a\nsingle burst which is specially coded so that it is ignored by the COSPAS-SARSAT system. The EPIRB must never\nbe tested by actual operation.\nHowever, self-tests will use some of the beacon’s limited battery power and should only be performed in accordance\nwith the beacon manufacturer’s guidance.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically\ninspected, tested and maintained, and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the EPIRB.\nInspect the EPIRB and associated fittings.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no How to conduct the self-test for the EPIRB.\no The manufacturer's instructions on the frequency of conducting the self-test function to preserve\nbattery life.\no The procedure to follow should the EPIRB be activated in non-emergency circumstances.\no Manual operation of the EPIRB.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically inspected, tested and maintained and\nready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book.\nRecords of periodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the EPIRB.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the EPIRB.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to explain:\no How to perform the self-test.\no The procedure to follow if the EPIRB was accidentally activated in a non-emergency situation.\no How to manually operate the EPIRB.\nThe EPIRB was not:\no Armed and ready for automatic activation.\no Capable of floating-free unimpeded or being easily manually released.\no Clearly marked with the required information and operating instructions.\no Free of visible defects, signs of damage, degradation or cracks to the casing, or of water ingress.\nThe EPIRB battery was past its expiry date\nThe hydrostatic release was not in good order or past its expiry date.\nThe lanyard was:\no Tied to the vessel or the mounting bracket.\no Not in good condition and neatly stowed.\nRecords were incomplete for:\no Periodic inspections and self-tests of the EPIRB\no Annual tests for all aspects of operational efficiency.\no Five-yearly maintenance at an approved shore-based maintenance facility (or more frequent if\nrequired by the flag state).\nThe EPIRB was defective in any respect.\nThere was no beacon operating instructions manual available.\nThere were no pictorial instructions for manual operation visible at the location of the beacon.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the Search and Rescue", "c": "Transmitters (SARTs), and were the SARTs in good order with records available to\ndemonstrate that had they had been inspected and tested as required?\nShort Question Text\nSearch and Rescue Transmitters (SARTs)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: Resolution A.802(19) Recommendation on performance standards for survival craft radar transponders for use\nin search and rescue operations\nIMO: Resolution MSC.246(83) Performance standards for survival craft AIS search and rescue transmitters (AISSART) for use in search and rescue operations\nObjective\nTo ensure the Search and Rescue Transmitters (SARTs) will function correctly in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Resolution A.802(19) Recommendation on performance standards for survival craft radar transponders\nfor use in search and rescue operations\n2 General\nThe SART should be capable of indicating the location of a unit in distress on the assisting units radars by means of a\nseries of equally spaced dots (see resolution A.530(13)).\n2.1 The SART should:\n.10 be equipped with buoyant lanyard, suitable for use as a tether, if it is capable of floating.\n* If an on-board test is performed using a shipborne 9 GHz radar, activation of the SART should be limited to a few\nseconds to avoid harmful interference with other shipborne radars and excessive consumption of battery energy.\n4 Labelling\nIn addition to the items specified in resolution A. 694(17) on general requirements, the following should be clearly\nindicated on the exterior of the equipment:\n1.\n2.\nbrief operating instructions; and\nexpiry date for the primary battery used.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.246(83) Performance standards for survival craft AIS search and rescue transmitters\n(AIS-SART) for use in search and rescue operations\n2 General\nThe AIS-SART should be capable of transmitting messages that indicate the position, static and safety information of\na unit in distress. The transmitted messages should be compatible with existing AIS installations. The transmitted\nmessages should be recognized and displayed by assisting units in the reception range of AIS-SART, and clearly\ndistinguish the AIS-SART from an AIS installation.\n2.1 The AIS-SART should:\n.9 be equipped with buoyant lanyard, suitable for use as a tether, if it is capable of floating.\n.17 be capable of being tested for all functionalities using specific test information.\n4 Labelling\nIn addition to the items specified in resolution A.694(17) **, the following should be clearly indicated on the exterior of\nthe equipment:\n.1 brief operating and test instructions; and\n.2 expiry date for the primary battery used.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 6\n2.2 Search and rescue locating devices\nAt least one search and rescue locating device shall be carried on each side of every passenger ship and of every\ncargo ship of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. At least one search and rescue locating device shall be carried on\nevery cargo ship of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 500 gross tonnage. Such search and rescue\nlocating devices shall conform to the applicable performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the\nOrganization*. The search and rescue locating devices** shall be stowed in such location that they can be rapidly\nplaced in any survival craft other than the liferaft or liferafts required by regulation 31.1.4. Alternatively, one search\nand rescue locating device shall be stowed in each survival craft other than those required by regulation 31.1.4. On\nships carrying at least two search and rescue locating devices and equipped with freefall lifeboats one of the search\nand rescue locating devices shall be stowed in a free-fall lifeboat and the other located in the immediate vicinity of the\nnavigation bridge so that it can be utilized on board and ready for transfer to any of the other survival craft.\n* Refer to the Recommendation on performance standards for survival craft radar transponders for use in search and\nrescue operations, adopted by the Organization by resolution MSC.247(83) (A.802(19)), as amended) and the\nRecommendation on performance standards for survival craft AIS Search and Rescue transmitter (AIS SART),\nadopted by the Organization by resolution MSC.246(83).\n** One of these search and rescue locating devices may be the search and rescue locating device required by\nregulation IV/7.1.3.\nChapter IV Regulation 7\n1 Every ship shall be provided with:\n.3 a search and rescue locating device capable of operating either in the 9 GHz band or on frequencies dedicated for\nAIS, which:\n.3.1 shall be so stowed that it can be easily utilized; and\n.3.2 may be one of those required by regulation III/6.2.2 for a survival craft.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that SARTs were periodically inspected, tested\nand ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nAll ships must be provided with at least one search and rescue transmitter (SART). Ships over 500 gross tonnage\nmust carry two SARTs. A SART may operate either in the 9 GHz band or on frequencies dedicated for AIS.\nSART self-tests will use some of the beacon’s limited battery power and should only be performed in accordance with\nthe transponder manufacturer’s guidance.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that SARTs were periodically\ninspected, tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections and tests of the SART(s).\nInspect the SART(s).\nInterview the accompanying officer and verify their familiarity with:\no The purpose and operation of the SARTs carried onboard.\no How to conduct the self-test function for each type of SART carried.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure to ensure that SARTs were periodically inspected, tested and ready for immediate\nuse in an emergency.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book.\nRecords of periodic inspections and tests of the SART(s).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure to ensure that SARTs were periodically inspected, tested and ready for\nimmediate use in an emergency.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of the SARTs.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to explain/demonstrate how to mount a SART on a lifeboat or liferaft.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to describe how a SART transmission would be displayed on a radar\nscreen.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the SARTs.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to explain how to perform the self-tests on the SART units provided\nonboard.\nThe stowage location(s) of SARTs were not clearly marked with the recommended symbols.\nA SART was not clearly marked with the required operating and/or testing instructions.\nA SART battery was past its expiry date.\nThe lanyard was missing from a SART.\nRecords of periodic inspections and self-tests of the SARTs were incomplete.\nOne or more SART was not located as required.\nOne or more SART was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios and were they in good order with records\navailable to demonstrate that had they been inspected and tested as required?\nShort Question Text\nSurvival craft portable two-way VHF radios\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: Resolution MSC.149(77) Adoption of the revised performance standards for survival craft portable two-way vhf\nradiotelephone apparatus\nObjective\nTo ensure the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios will function correctly in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Resolution MSC.149(77) Adoption of the revised performance standards for survival craft portable twoway vhf radiotelephone apparatus\n2.1 The equipment should be portable and capable of being used for on-scene communication between survival craft,\nbetween survival craft and ship and between survival craft and rescue unit. It may also be used for on-board\ncommunications when capable of operating on appropriate frequencies.\n2.3 The equipment should:\n.11 have provisions for its attachment to the clothing of the user and also be provided with a wrist or neck strap. For\nsafety reasons, the strap should include a suitable weak link to prevent the bearer from being ensnared.\n.13 be either of a highly visible yellow/orange colour or marked with a surrounding yellow/orange marking strip.\n3.1 The two-way radiotelephone should be capable of operation on the frequency 156.800 MHz (VHF channel 16)\nand on at least one additional channel.\n12.1 The source of energy should be integrated in the equipment and may be replaceable by the user. In addition,\nprovision may be made to operate the equipment using an external source of electrical energy.\n12.2 Equipment for which the source of energy is intended to be user-replaceable should be provided with a\ndedicated primary battery for use in the event of a distress situation. This battery should be equipped with a nonreplaceable seal to indicate that it has not been used.\n12.3 Equipment for which the source of energy is intended to be non-user-replaceable should be provided with a\nprimary battery. The portable two-way radiotelephone equipment should be fitted with a non-replaceable seal to\nindicate that it has not been used.\n12.5 Primary batteries should have a shelf life of at least 2 years, and if identified to be user replaceable should be of\na colour or marking as defined in 2.3.13.\n12.6 Batteries not intended for use in the event of a distress situation should be of a colour or marking such that they\ncannot be confused with batteries intended for such use.\n13.1 In addition to the general requirements specified in resolution A.694(17), the following should be clearly\nindicated on the exterior of the equipment:\n1.\n2.\nbrief operating instructions; and\nexpiry date for the primary batteries.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 6\n1 Paragraph 2 applies to all passenger ships and to all cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards.\n2.1.1 At least three two-way VHF radiotelephone apparatus shall be provided on every passenger ship and on every\ncargo ship of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. At least two two-way VHF radiotelephone apparatus shall be provided\non every cargo ship of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 500 gross tonnage. Such apparatus shall\nconform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the Organization. * If a fixed two-way VHF\nradiotelephone apparatus is fitted in a survival craft it shall conform to performance standards not inferior to those\nadopted by Organization. *\n* Refer to the Performance Standards for Survival Craft Two-Way VHF Radiotelephone Apparatus, adopted by the\nOrganization by resolution A.809(19), as it may be amended, annex 1 or annex 2 as applicable, and resolution\nMSC.149(77).\nChapter III Regulation 7\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that survival craft portable two-way VHF radios\nwere periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency. Procedures should also\nprovide guidance on the use of the radios for non-emergency communications.\nThe survival craft portable two-way VHF radios may be used for routine on-board communications when capable of\noperating on appropriate frequencies. There is no requirement for them to be Ex-rated or of an intrinsically safe type,\nbut if the units are being used for shipboard operations, then there must be effective measures in place to prevent\nthem being used in the gas hazardous area.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that survival craft portable two-way\nVHF radios were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections and tests of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios.\nInspect the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios and replaceable primary batteries, if provided, and\nverify that:\no Brief operating instructions were clearly indicated on the exterior of the equipment.\no The expiry date of the primary battery was clearly indicated.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, inspection and\ntesting of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure to ensure survival craft portable two-way vhf radios were periodically inspected and\ntested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book.\nRecords of periodic inspections and tests of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure to ensure that survival craft portable two-way VHF radios were\nperiodically inspected, tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nCompany procedures did not provide guidance on the use of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios\nfor non-emergency communications.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of the survival craft portable twoway VHF radios.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the survival craft\nportable two-way VHF radios.\nThere were insufficient survival craft portable two-way VHF radios on board.\nThe stowage location of survival craft portable two-way VHF radios was not clearly marked with the\nrecommended symbols and the number of radios.\nSurvival craft portable two-way vhf radios or replaceable primary batteries were not of a highly visible\nyellow/orange colour or marking.\nA survival craft portable two-way VHF radio was not clearly marked with the required operating instructions.\nA survival craft portable two-way VHF radio battery was past its expiry date.\nThe seal on a replaceable primary battery or radio was broken.\nOther batteries were not clearly distinguished from primary batteries by colour or marking.\nA survival craft portable two-way VHF radio did not have provision for attachment to clothing.\nA survival craft portable two-way VHF radio did not have a wrist or neck strap with a weak link.\nRecords of periodic inspections and tests of the survival craft portable two-way VHF radios were incomplete.\nThe survival craft portable two-way VHF radios were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.4.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the procedures for sending", "c": "and receiving distress, urgency and safety messages and were suitable instructions\nposted by the GMDSS equipment?\nShort Question Text\nSending and receiving distress, urgency and safety messages\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO/ICAO International aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual (IAMSAR) Vol III\nObjective\nTo ensure effective communications will be made by the vessel in an emergency situation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\n3.15 GMDSS Watchkeeping\nTo enable a ship to send and receive distress, urgency and safety information, the OOW should hold a General or\nrestricted Operator’s Certificate (GOC/ROC) as appropriate and be familiar with the requirements and procedures for\nGMDSS watchkeeping….\nThe International telecommunications Union (ITU) publication Manual for Use by the Maritime Mobile and Maritime\nMobile Satellite Services contains relevant extracts from the ITU Radio Regulations, setting out the correct\nprocedures to be followed.\n3.15.1 Radio watchkeeping\nThe OOW is responsible for ensuring compliance with the ship’s radio watchkeeping requirements. In general, a radio\nwatch should be maintained on all frequencies necessary to receive distress, urgency and safety messages\nappropriate to the sea area in which the ship is operating.\n3.15.2 Emergency Communications\nThe OOW should be familiar with the procedures for sending distress, urgency and safety messages contained in the\nInternational Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Volume III, (IAMSAR Vol III), Section 4.\nParticular care should be taken to ensure that alerts and messages sent by DSC, radio-telephony and satellite\ncommunications are given an appropriate priority.\nIn addition, it is important for the OOW to ensure that:\n• During a distress, a qualified operator is designated as being responsible for radio communications….\nEvery precaution should be taken to avoid false distress alerts being sent.\nIMO/ICAO: International aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual (IAMSAR) Vol III\nSection 2 On Distress alerts and messages\nMethods of alert - Distress alert from a vessel\nUse any of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) equipment to transmit a distress alert:\n• •\n• •\nInmarsat distress call\nVHF channel 16 (156.8 MHz FM)\nDSC on (VHF/MF or HF)\nEPIRB\nAny distress transmissions on the frequency VHF channel 16, 2,182 kHz could be preceded by a digital selective call.\nIn remote oceans areas, the distress call should also be transmitted on a ship-to-shore HF circuit to a CRS,\nespecially when distress calls on 2,182 kHz, or channel 16 are not replied to by other stations.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for emergency communications which gave guidance on, and\ndesignated responsibility for distress communications in an emergency situation using the vessel’s GMDSS\nequipment.\nInstructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS equipment\nshould be clearly displayed by the equipment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for emergency communications using the\nGMDSS equipment.\nReview the entries in the GMDSS Radio Log Book and verify that distress, urgency and safety\nmessages received had been recorded in accordance with company procedures.\nInterview the accompanying officer to assess their familiarity with the procedures for sending and receiving\ndistress, urgency and safety messages using the GMDSS equipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for emergency communications.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book.\nInternational Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR) Vol III.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for emergency communications which gave guidance on, and\ndesignated responsibility for, distress communications in an emergency situation.\nA qualified GMDSS operator had not been designated in the emergency station bill as being responsible for\nradio communications in a distress.\nInstructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS\nequipment were not clearly displayed by the equipment.\nThere was no copy of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Volume III,\nlatest edition, (IAMSAR Vol III) available at the GMDSS radio station.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:\no Company procedures for emergency communications which gave guidance on distress\ncommunications in an emergency situation.\no Requirements for GMDSS radio watchkeeping on their vessel.\no Procedures for sending distress, urgency and safety messages contained in the International\nAeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Volume III, (IAMSAR Vol III), Section 4.\no Process of preparing and transmitting distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS\nequipment.\no The process for recording the details of distress, urgency and safety messages received.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.5.", "t": "Were the Master and navigation officers familiar with the operation, testing and", "c": "maintenance of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications\nequipment and were records available to demonstrate the equipment was in good order?\nShort Question Text\nOperation and testing of GMDSS station.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: RESOLUTION A.702(17) Radio maintenance guidelines for the global maritime distress and safety system\n(GMDSS) related to sea areas A3 and A4\nObjective\nTo ensure effective communications in routine or emergency situations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. 5th Edition.\n3.15.5 GMDSS Log keeping\nA GMDSS radio log should be kept in order to provide a record of all events connected with the radio\ncommunications facilities on board. As a minimum the following should be recorded:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA summary of communications relating to distress, urgency and safety. This includes any period when a\nradio watch is discontinued and the reasons for doing so.\nThe position of the ship at least daily\nThe identities of other stations with which the ship communicates or attempts to communicate.\nRecords of any difficulties experienced with communications.\nIncidents involving unnecessary transmissions with the identities of the stations concerned, if known; and\nCancellation of any false alerts.\nThe requirement relating to the retention of radio logs are determined by the flag state and the ITU radio regulations\nand should be included in the SMS.\n3.15.6 Communications Equipment tests\nRadio equipment should be tested in accordance with the SMS (including flag state requirements) and the\nmanufacturers’ maintenance and operation manuals. Particular care should be taken to avoid the transmission of\nfalse/distress/urgency alerts when testing GMDSS equipment.\nDaily, weekly and monthly radio tests should be recorded in the GMDSS radio log and demonstrate continued\ncompliance with the functional requirements of SOLAS, and should include but not be limited to:\n• Daily:\no\no\nFunction of DSC facilities (VHF, MF and HF) using built in test functions\nBattery supplies to GMDSS equipment including charging condition\n• Weekly:\n• Monthly:\no\no\nFunction of DSC facilities by way of a test call with a coastal station (if in range or at the earliest\nopportunity if out of range).\nReserve power supplies to GMDSS equipment other than batteries.\no\no\no\nEnhanced group calling (EGC) function.\nCondition and security of batteries.\nCondition of aerials and insulators.\nIMO: RESOLUTION A.702(17) Radio maintenance guidelines for the global maritime distress and safety\nsystem (GMDSS) related to sea areas A3 and A4\n3 Shore-based maintenance for ensuring availability\n3.1 If availability is ensured by using a combination of methods which includes shore-based maintenance, an\narrangement acceptable to the Administration should be established to ensure adequate support of the ship for the\nmaintenance and repair of its radio installations. For example, the following arrangements, among others, may be\nsuitable:\n1.\n2.\nan agreement with a company known to cover the trading area of the ship to provide maintenance and\nrepair facilities on a call-out basis.\nprovision of facilities at the main base of ships engaged on a regular trading pattern.\nRecords of Equipment (Form P, R or C) should include an indication of the types of arrangements for shore-based\nmaintenance.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that ensure all navigational equipment is maintained as\noperational. Procedures include:\n• •\n• Defect reporting.\nSuitably trained personnel to maintain navigational equipment or shore-based maintenance support.\nProvision of spares as appropriate.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter IV Regulation 2\n1 For the purpose of this chapter, the following terms shall have the meanings defined below:\n.12 Sea area A1 means an area within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one VHF coast station in which\ncontinuous DSC alerting is available, as may be defined by a Contracting Government.\n.13 Sea area A2 means an area, excluding sea area A1, within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one MF coast\nstation in which continuous DSC alerting is available, as may be defined by a Contracting Government.\n.14 Sea area A3 means an area, excluding sea areas A1 and A2, within the coverage of an INMARSAT geostationary\nsatellite in which continuous alerting is available.\n.15 Sea area A4 means an area outside sea areas A1, A2, and A3\nChapter IV Regulation 13\nSources of energy\n1 There shall be available at all times, while the ship is at sea, a supply of electrical energy sufficient to operate the\nradio installations and to charge any batteries used as part of a reserve source or sources of energy for the radio\ninstallations.\n2 A reserve source or sources of energy shall be provided on every ship, to supply radio installations, for the purpose\nof conducting distress and safety radio communications, in the event of failure of the ship's main and emergency\nsources of electrical power.\n6 Where a reserve source of energy consists of a rechargeable accumulator battery or batteries:\n1.\n2.\na means of automatically charging such batteries shall be provided which shall be capable of recharging\nthem to minimum capacity requirements within 10 hours; and\nthe capacity of the battery or batteries shall be checked, using an appropriate method, at intervals not\nexceeding 12 months, when the ship is not at sea.\nChapter IV Regulation 15\nMaintenance requirements\n5 The Administration shall ensure that radio equipment required by this chapter is maintained to provide the\navailability of the functional requirements specified in regulation 4 and to meet the recommended performance\nstandards of such equipment.\n6 On ships engaged on voyages in sea areas A1 and A2, the availability shall be ensured by using such methods as\nduplication of equipment, shore-based maintenance or at-sea electronic maintenance capability, or a combination of\nthese, as may be approved by the Administration.\n7 On ships engaged on voyages in sea areas A3 and A4, the availability shall be ensured by using a combination of\nat least two methods such as duplication of equipment, shore-based maintenance or at-sea electronic maintenance\ncapability, as may be approved by the Administration, taking into account the recommendations of the Organization\n8 While all reasonable steps shall be taken to maintain the equipment in efficient working order to ensure compliance\nwith all the functional requirements specified in regulation 4, malfunction of the equipment for providing the general\nradiocommunications required by regulation 4.8 shall not be considered as making a ship unseaworthy or as a\nreason for delaying the ship in ports where repair facilities are not readily available, provided the ship is capable of\nperforming all distress and safety functions.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and log keeping of the\nGMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment. These should include the method chosen to\nensure availability of GMDSS equipment at sea.\nDetails of equipment fitted can be found in the Record of Approved GMDSS Radio Installation.\nSOLAS defines three methods to ensure availability of GMDSS equipment at sea.\n• •\n• At sea electronic maintenance, requiring the carriage of a qualified radio/electronic officer and adequate\nspares and manuals.\nDuplication of certain equipment\nShore based maintenance\nShips engaged on voyages in sea areas A1 and A2 are required to use at least one of the three maintenance\nmethods outlined above, or a combination as may be approved by their administration. Ships engaged on voyages in\nsea areas A3 and A4 are required to use at least two of the methods outlined above.\nIn most cases, A3 ships carry duplicate equipment and use shore-based maintenance, A1 and A2 ships use shorebased maintenance only. The choice of using shore-based maintenance does not infer there should necessarily be a\ncontract and/or agreement, but that maintenance should be carried out annually by a shore-based 'expert'\norganisation.\nGMDSS equipment is required to be powered from three sources of supply:\n• •\n• The ship's normal supply.\nThe ship's emergency generator (if fitted)\nA dedicated radio battery supply.\nThe batteries must be charged by an automatic charger that is powered by the main and emergency generators.\nThe batteries are required to have the capacity to power the equipment for 1 hour on ships with an emergency\ngenerator, and 6 hours on ships not fitted with an emergency generator.\nThe capacity of the battery or batteries should be checked, using an appropriate method, annually. One method of\nchecking the capacity of an accumulator battery is to fully discharge and recharge the battery, using normal operating\ncurrent and period (e.g. 10 hours), when the ship is not at sea. (i.e. will not require the GMDSS equipment for\nwatchkeeping purposes until the batteries are fully charged after the test)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and log\nkeeping of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment.\nInspect the:\no GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment, including aerials and\nantennae.\no GMDSS battery locker.\no Emergency lighting for the radio station and verify that it is functioning.\nReview:\no The GMDSS Radio Log Book.\no A copy of the record of equipment for the cargo ship safety radio certificate Form R or Form C.\no Any separate test and maintenance records for the GMDSS reserve batteries.\no Any shore-based maintenance agreement for the GMDSS equipment.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no Routine operation of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment.\no Daily, weekly and monthly radio equipment tests.\no GMDSS radio log keeping.\no The chosen arrangement to ensure availability of GMDSS equipment at sea.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and log keeping of the GMDSS VHF, MF\nand HF radio and satellite communications equipment.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book.\nA copy of the record of equipment for the cargo ship safety radio certificate Form R or Form C.\nTest and maintenance records for the GMDSS reserve batteries.\nAny shore-based maintenance agreement for the GMDSS equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and log keeping of the GMDSS\nVHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and\nsatellite communications equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to describe the daily, weekly and monthly radio tests required in\naccordance with the SMS (including flag state requirements) and the manufacturers’ maintenance and\noperation manuals.\nThere was no evidence that the required daily, weekly and monthly radio tests had been performed.\nThe GMDSS reserve batteries were not charging correctly.\nThere was no evidence that the capacity of the GMDSS reserve batteries had been tested within the last 12\nmonths.\nThe GMDSS reserve battery locker:\no Contained damaged batteries.\no Was not weather tight.\no Was not properly ventilated.\no Contained inappropriate material.\nGoggles, rubber gloves, a protective apron and an eye-wash bottle were not available in the GMDSS\nreserve battery locker where lead-acid/alkaline batteries were installed.\nThe GMDSS Radio Log Book did not provide a record of all events connected with the radio\ncommunications facilities on board including:\nThere was no evidence of a shore-based maintenance programme to ensure availability of the radio\nequipment where this was one of the documented maintenance choices for the vessel, or the certificate had\nexpired.\nAn item of the GMDSS VHF, MF and HF radio and satellite communications equipment was not operational\nor defective in any respect.\nA GMDSS printer was defective, printouts were unreadable or there were no paper rolls available.\nGMDSS equipment aerials or antennae were in poor condition, damaged or defective in any way.\nThe emergency lighting for the radio station was not functioning.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.4.6.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew aware of the potential danger of using radio or", "c": "mobile telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling operations and was there\na sufficient number of intrinsically safe portable radios for use in operational areas?\nShort Question Text\nUse of radio or mobile telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Main Deck, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure a hazard is never created by the inappropriate use of radio or mobile telephone equipment during\ncargo or ballast operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n4.12.5 Mobile telephones and pagers\nMost mobile telephones and pagers are not intrinsically safe and are only considered safe for use in non-hazardous\nareas. They should be restricted to designated areas of the accommodation space where they are unlikely to interfere\nwith the tanker’s equipment. Mobile telephones should only be used on board a tanker or in the terminal as permitted\nby the applicable SMS. Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones should be prominently displayed at\naccess locations.\nMobile telephones and pagers should be switched off when carried onto a tanker or into a terminal and only switched\nback on again in a non-hazardous area. The batteries can cause an incendive spark if they are damaged and then\nactivated by a call. Intrinsically safe mobile phones and pagers are available, and these may be used in hazardous\nareas. They should be clearly identified as being intrinsically safe for all aspects of their operation. Terminal staff\ngoing on board a tanker, and tanker staff going into a terminal, should be able to prove their mobile telephones and\npagers are intrinsically safe. Visitors to the tanker or terminal should not use mobile telephones or pagers unless prior\npermission has been received from the tanker or terminal, as appropriate.\n4.13.2 Ship’s radio equipment\nThe use of a tanker’s radio equipment during cargo or ballast handling operations is potentially dangerous.\n4.13.2.1 Medium and high frequency radio transmissions\nSignificant energy is radiated during medium and high frequency radio transmission (300KHz-30MHz). This energy\ncan travel 500m from the transmitting antenna and can induce an electrical potential in unearthed equipment, e.g.\ncranes, derricks, rigging, mast stays, etc., that can produce an incendive spark. Transmissions can also cause arcing\nover the surface of antenna insulators when they have a surface coating of salt, dirt or water.\nIt is recommended:\n• All cranes, derricks, rigging and mast stays should be earthed.\n• •\nTransmissions should not be allowed when flammable gas is likely in the region of the transmitting antenna\nor if the antenna comes within the terminal hazardous area.\nMain transmitting antennae should be earthed or isolated when the tanker is alongside the berth.\nIf the tanker’s radio transmitter needs to be operated in port for servicing, the tanker and terminal should agree on\nprocedures to ensure safety in the pre-transfer conference (see chapter 24). Precautions might include operating at\nlow power or using a dummy antenna load to eliminate all radio transmissions to atmosphere. A safe system of work\nshould be agreed and implemented before turning the equipment on.\n4.13.2.2 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency equipment\nPermanently and correctly installed VHF and UHF equipment is safe to use when the tanker is at the terminal, but it is\nrecommended that the transmission is set to low power (one watt or less). The use of portable VHF/UHF radios in a\nterminal or on board presents no hazards if the equipment is certified and kept intrinsically safe and the power output\nis one watt or less.\nThe use of VHF/UHF radio equipment as a means of communication between the tanker and terminal personnel is\nrecommended.\n4.13.2.3 Satellite communications equipment\nSatellite communications equipment normally operates at 1.6GHz and the power generated is not enough to present\nan ignition hazard. Satellite communications equipment may be used to transmit and receive messages while a\ntanker is in port.\nLong range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) systems are normally integrated into satellite communication systems\nand also do not present an ignition hazard.\n4.13.3 Tanker radar equipment\nRadar sets, operating on 3cm and 10cm wavelengths, are designed with peak power output of 30kW. If they are\nproperly sited, they do not present a radio ignition hazard due to induced currents.\nRadar scanner motors are not rated for use in the hazardous areas but are usually positioned above terminal\nhazardous zones, apart from on smaller vessels. It is, therefore, safe to test radars when alongside. However, it is\ngood practice to switch the radar off or place it on standby when alongside a terminal and to consult with the terminal\nbefore testing radar equipment during cargo operations.\n21.1.1 Communications equipment (between the tanker and the terminal)\nTelephone and portable Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) and radiotelephone systems should\ncomply with the appropriate safety requirements.\nThe terminal is responsible for providing the means of communication, including a back-up system.\nWhen dedicated telephones are used between the tanker and terminal, they should be continuously monitored by\npersonnel on board and ashore, allowing immediate communication according to agreed procedures. Most mobile\ntelephones and pagers are not intrinsically safe and are only considered safe for use in non-hazardous area (see\nsection 4.12.5 on mobile telephones and pagers).\nTMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations is in\nplace for all types of vessel within the fleet.\nThe planning procedure is specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. This may include:\n• Ship/shore interface and communications.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo and\nballast handling operations, ensuring:\n• While the vessel is at a terminal:\no No MF/HF radio transmissions are made\no Main transmitting antennae are earthed or isolated\no Fixed VHF and UHF equipment is switched to low power (one watt or less).\no Portable VHF or UHF radios have a power output of one watt or less.\no Any damaged portable VHF or UHF radios are withdrawn from service and clearly marked as such.\no Sufficient intrinsically safe VHF or UHF portable radios are provided to coordinate cargo, ballast\nand bunker handling operations.\nIn addition, procedures should ensure:\n• •\n• Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones are prominently displayed at the gangway.\nNon-intrinsically safe mobile phones, including any provided by the terminal for ship/shore communications,\nare not used outside of the accommodation block.\nIf the use of intrinsically safe mobile phones is allowed outside of the accommodation block, they are clearly\nidentified, and proper certification is provided.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone\nequipment during cargo and ballast handling operations.\nDuring the course of the inspection, confirm:\no Sufficient VHF or UHF portable radios in good working order were available to properly coordinate\ncargo, ballast and bunker handling operations.\no Non-intrinsically safe mobile phones were not in use outside the accommodation block.\no Main transmitting antennae were earthed or isolated during cargo and ballast handling operations\nand that no transmissions were being made for test or other purposes.\no Fixed VHF and UHF equipment was switched to low power (one watt or less) during cargo and\nballast handling operations, and that portable VHF or UHF radios in use had a power output of one\nwatt or less.\no Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones were prominently displayed at the gangway.\nIf MF/HF radio or radar equipment was under repair/service, confirm this had been discussed at the pretransfer conference and a safe system of work agreed.\nIf the use of intrinsically safe mobile phones was allowed outside the accommodation block, verify any\nequipment observed in use was clearly marked as intrinsically safe and/or properly certificated.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The procedure for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling\noperations.\nCertification for any intrinsically safe mobile phones in use outside of the accommodation block.\nThe inventory of intrinsically safe portable VHF/UHF radios used for cargo, ballast and bunker operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo and\nballast handling operations.\nThe Master, an officer or a rating was unfamiliar with the company procedures for the safe use of radio and\ntelephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling operations.\nThere were insufficient intrinsically safe VHF or UHF portable radios available in good working order to\nproperly coordinate cargo, ballast and bunker handling operations.\nMF/HF radio or radar equipment was under repair/service, but this had not been discussed at the pretransfer conference and a safe system of work agreed.\nMF/HF radio transmissions were observed being made during cargo and ballast handling operations.\nMain transmitting antennae were not earthed or isolated during cargo and ballast handling operations.\nFixed VHF and UHF equipment was not switched to low power (one watt or less) during cargo and ballast\nhandling operations.\nPortable VHF or UHF radios in use had a power output of more than one watt.\nA damaged portable VHF or UHF radio was observed in use.\nDetails of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones were not prominently displayed at the gangway.\nNon-intrinsically safe mobile phones were observed in use outside of the accommodation block.\nWhere use of intrinsically safe mobile phones was permitted outside of the accommodation block, the\nequipment in use was not clearly marked or properly certified as being intrinsically safe.\n4.5. DP & Shuttle Tanker Specialist Procedures and Equipment", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.5.1.", "t": "Was the latest Annual DP Trial report available on board, were the Master and", "c": "officers familiar with the contents, and had they taken part in onboard training and drills\ninvolving various DP scenarios?\nShort Question Text\nAnnual DP Trial report and supporting exercises.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMCA M 117 Rev. 2 Guidelines for The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\nIMCA: M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels. Rev 2.1\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel’s DP system is fully operational, and that the vessel is fault tolerant according to\nthe equipment class requirements.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMCA: M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels. Rev 2.1\n4 Development of the DP Annual Trials Programme\nAnnual testing of the DP system, to demonstrate that the vessel remains fit for purpose for DP operations, may be\nconducted during an annual DP trial, incremental tests, or a combination of both. The DP annual trials programme\nmight also provide for rolling tests that are not necessarily repeated on an annual basis. The approach to testing is to\nbe clearly identified within the DP annual trials programme. Refer to the example matrix template of tests contained\nwithin Appendix 1.\n4.1 Difference Between an Annual DP Trial and an FMEA Proving Trial\nThe purpose of an FMEA proving trial is, as its name suggests, to prove the findings of the failure modes and effects\nanalysis. Although an annual DP trial is closely related, the two trials have a different focus, and this will influence the\ntypes of tests included and the way they are carried out.\nTests performed on an annual basis focus on proving that the DP system is fully functional and well maintained and\nthe redundancy concept remains intact. In addition to being a functional test of the DP system the tests, whilst not\nbeing of a destructive nature, should also seek to establish continued compliance of the system with respect to the\nworst case failure design intent (WCFDI) for its defined operating modes. FMEA proving trials generally focus on\nproving that the worst-case failure design intent is not exceeded and that failure effects are as expected. There may\nalso be a greater degree of uncertainty regarding failure effects and the provision of alarms to indicate that the\nredundancy concept has been compromised. FMEA proving trials may include exploratory trials designed to provide\nclarity of assumptions made during the analysis or additional information about how the redundancy concept\nfunctions. Once the assumption or particular function of the redundancy concept has been verified, there may be no\nneed to repeat those particular tests again. It should be noted that some tests during FMEA proving trials might be\nconsidered to be high risk to personnel and/or equipment.\n4.2 Responsibility for Developing the DP Annual Trials Programme\nThe vessel operator has overall responsibility to ensure that an effective DP annual trials programme is developed\nand implemented. The vessel operator is further responsible to ensure the competence and experience of vessel\ncrew, persons, organisations and third parties developing, conducting and witnessing the trials.\n5 Conduct of Annual DP Tests\n5.1 Scheduling of Annual DP Tests\nGuidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning systems (IMO MSC.1Circ.1580) states that annual DP tests\nshould be carried out within three months before or after each anniversary date of the initial complete test of all\nsystems and components. If, for example, major upgrades or conversions are carried out on a vessel or that a vessel\nhas been reactivated following layup, all requiring a complete new FMEA proving trial, then the anniversary date may\nbe adjusted to that date.\n5.2 Independent Witnesses\nIndependent verification of testing intended to prove the integrity of systems where the consequences of failure can\nbe severe is desirable.\nThe independent witnesses should be sufficiently removed from day to day operational control or responsibility for the\nDP system and vessel. They should also be familiar with the vessel or type of vessel and with the DP annual trials\nprogramme.\nThe degree of independence is a matter for the vessel operator and should be such that it provides confidence to all\nintended users of the Annual DP Trials Report that the results can be accepted without further verification or testing.\nFailure to provide users of the report with the necessary level of confidence may limit the acceptance of the document\nand lead to costly repetition of tests.\nThe independent witness should not carry out any of the tests themselves.\nIMCA recommends that the independent witness is accredited according to the IMCA DP Practitioner Accreditation\nScheme.\n5.10 Generating Findings from Test Results\n5.10.1 Categorisation\nThree categories of finding have been widely adopted and are often prefixed with a letter A, B or C. However, there is\nsometimes inconsistency in the categorisation of findings, and it is the intention of this document to give guidance in\nthe categorisation of failure effects and the implications of ‘findings’ in each category.\n5.10.1.1 A – For Immediate Attention\nA valid ‘A’ finding indicates that the vessel’s DP system does not comply with requirements for the appropriate DP\nequipment class. Only regulatory bodies such as flag states have the authority to prevent a vessel from conducting\nany type of operation but an ‘A’ finding has serious implications as any client would likely be unwilling to allow the\nvessel to carry out DP operations until any ‘A’ findings are addressed. Naturally, this can have considerable financial\nconsequences.\n5.10.1.2 B – For Action When Reasonably Convenient\nA valid ‘B’ finding indicates a fault or failure that requires attention, but also recognises that the vessel’s DP system\ndoes still comply with requirements for the appropriate DP equipment class.\n5.10.1.3 C – For Future Attention/Consideration\nIt needs to be recognised that findings in this category may be of a subjective nature and will by definition not relate\nto a clear breach of the relevant DP rules and guidelines. Category C findings may make reference to features,\nfunctions or practices which are generally expected by the industry while recognising that they are not an absolute\nrequirement on the subject vessel. They may also refer to recent changes in industry guidelines or class rules which\nagain may not apply to the subject vessel, but which may offer tangible benefits if applied to the vessel. Category C\nfindings should only be made where they represent genuine added value and close out actions are reasonably\nachievable.\n5.10.2 Open Findings from the FMEA or Previous Annual DP Trials\nAs part of the assurance aspect of the DP annual trials programme, the findings of the FMEA and the previous\nannual DP trial should be reviewed.\nIf the vessel operator has an effective audit or non-conformity tracking system, then any findings arising from these\nsources should be documented with close out actions (even where the decision has been to take no action, along\nwith the justification).\nAny open items should be noted prior to commencing the current trials, particular care should be taken when\nperforming incremental testing as part of the annual trials programme and the trials programme should ensure that\nthe open item is either closed out or confirmed as a still open ‘finding’. Such items which cannot be closed out should\nbe included in the findings section of the updated annual DP trials report.\n6 Format of the Annual DP Trials Report\n6.1 Description of Essential Information to be Included in the Final Report\nWhen preparing the annual DP report, it is important to clearly identify the method used to conduct each test:\n• •\n• •\nAnnual DP trial;\nIncremental test;\nRolling test;\nReview of planned maintenance.\nAn example of an annual DP trials report is included at Appendix 1 to this document, but the general sections are\nbriefly described below:\n• •\n• •\n• Executive summary…\nIntroduction…\nVessel particulars…\nConclusions – Statement that the trials showed compliance with the witnesses’ interpretation of the relevant\nrules and guidelines, i.e., IMO, IMCA and class…\nFindings – Description of categories A, B and C. List of findings from the trials. Open findings carried forward\nfrom previous trials. Items that should be considered for updating the FMEA.\nIMCA M 117 Rev. 2 Guidelines for The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel\nAppendix 6\nDP system emergency drills\nIntroduction\nEmergency drill scenarios should be developed from the experience gained during the conduct of annual DP trials\nand FMEA reviews undertaken onboard the vessel. The annual trials and revised FMEA documents provide the\nbackground for specific vessel drills, and these should always be readily available for information and reference by\noperational personnel. Drill scenarios can also be developed from DP station keeping events reported as part of the\nIMCA DP reporting scheme.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Actions upon equipment failure.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10. Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\n4 Operational requirements\n4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instructions should be incorporated into the vessel-specific\nDP operations manuals:\nAnnual tests and procedures.\n5.1 Surveys and testing\n5.1.1.3 An annual survey should be carried out within three months before or after each anniversary date of the\nDynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document. The annual survey should ensure that the DP system has\nbeen maintained in accordance with applicable parts of the Guidelines and is in good working order. The annual test\nof all important systems and components should be carried out to document the ability of the DP vessel to keep\nposition after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class and validate the FMEA and operations\nmanual. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board.\n5.1.3 These surveys and tests should be witnessed by officers of the Administration. The Administration may,\nhowever, entrust the surveys and testing either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organizations\nrecognized by it. In every case, the Administration concerned should guarantee the completeness and efficiency of\nthe surveys and testing. The Administration may entrust the company of the vessel to carry out annual and minor\nrepair surveys according to a test programme accepted by the Administration.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures giving guidance on the performance of Annual DP Trials\nwithin +/- 3 months of the anniversary date of the original FMEA Proving Trials or following any modifications to the\nonboard DP Systems.\nA copy of the Annual DP Trials report should be available on board. DP operators should be familiar with the\nprocedures for conducting Annual DP Trials and the content of the report(s).\nOnboard training and drills involving various DP scenarios, (ideally based on the experience gained from the Annual\nDP Trials), should be conducted, and records maintained.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and review the latest annual DP Trial Report, including:\no List of findings, and closeout actions.\no Summary statement confirming the fitness of the vessel to carry out DP operations equivalent to its\nDP class.\no Test sheets from the PMS if a rolling test program is utilised.\nSight and review previous Annual DP Trial reports.\nSight and review records of training and/or drills involving DP scenarios.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the annual DP trial procedures and the\ncontents of the report.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe latest Annual DP Trials report.\nIf the Annual DP trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year, test sheets\nand/or other documented evidence of compliance from the Planned Maintenance System.\nPrevious Annual DP Trials reports.\nRecords of training and/or drills involving DP scenarios.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures giving guidance on the performance of Annual DP Trials.\nThe latest DP Annual Trials report was not available on board.\nPrevious Annual DP Trials reports were not available on board.\nThe latest DP Annual Trials had not been carried out within three months before/after the anniversary date\nof the initial FMEA proving trial.\nThe Annual DP Trials date had not been synchronised following a new FMEA proving trial conducted after a\nmajor upgrade or conversion.\nThere was no evidence that the Annual DP Trials had been witnessed by a competent and independent third\nparty.\nThe Annual DP Trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year as part of the\nplanned maintenance system, but there was no documentary evidence to show that the test results were\nsubject to independent scrutiny and approval.\nWhere the Annual DP Trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year as part\nof the planned maintenance system, test sheets for items tested were either incomplete, lacking detail or not\nsigned off by the person carrying out the test.\nIt could not be shown that following the Annual DP Trials, the listed category ‘A’ findings had been rectified.\nFindings from previous Annual DP Trials were found to be ‘open’ with no documented close out actions,\nand/or had not been recorded as deficiencies in the onboard SMS.\nThe latest Annual DP Trials report did not contain a statement that the vessel was considered fit to carry out\nDP operations equivalent to its DP class.\nThe latest Annual DP Trials report did not contain list of findings.\nThere was no evidence that the Master and officers had taken part in onboard training and drills involving\nvarious DP scenarios.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for conducting Annual DP Trials and/or the\ncontent of the report(s).", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.5.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of", "c": "Position Reference Systems (PRS), and was the equipment in satisfactory condition with\nsensor offset data readily available to the DPO?\nShort Question Text\nDP Position Reference Systems\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMCA: Guidelines on the Shared Use of Sensors for Survey and Positioning Purposes\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\nObjective\nTo ensure Position Reference Systems are in satisfactory condition with sensor offset data readily available\nto the DPO.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n6.6.8 Position Reference System\nIt is recommended that in accordance with other critical DP operations, when a DP bow loading tanker is operating in\nauto DP mode, independent PRS operating on different principles are used. The following should be taken into\naccount:\n• •\n• •\n• The DP system should be equipped with a set of PRS, and sensors optimised for the location and\ncontractual scope of work.\nIt is recommended to have a minimum of three different PRS in use at any time while on DP offtake\noperation.\nSensors and antennae should be located to reduce risk of interference and shadow zones.\nThe DP system should be equipped with a minimum of two independent differential satellite positioning\nsystems. The differential correction signals should be from different sources and have totally different signal\npaths.\nThe use and interface of differential satellite positioning systems should be in accordance with latest IMCA\nguidance.\nThe field operations manuals and the DP bow loading tanker’s operating guidelines should provide guidance on PRS\nat particular locations.\nIMCA: Guidelines on the Shared Use of Sensors for Survey and Positioning Purposes\n6.3 Documentation\nVessel equipment configuration and calibration records should include as a minimum:\n• sensor offsets including clear description of CRP (common reference point) or CoG (centre of gravity), and\nsign convention;\n• records of system or sensor changes with dates;\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\n3.4.3 Position reference systems\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nPosition reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements, both with\nregard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations.\nFor equipment class 1, at least two independent position reference systems should be installed and\nsimultaneously available to the DP control system during operation.\nFor equipment classes 2 and 3, at least three independent position reference systems should be installed\nand simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation.\nWhen two or more position reference systems are required, they should not all be of the same type, but\nbased on different principles and suitable for the operating conditions.\nThe position reference systems should produce data with adequate accuracy and repeatability for the\nintended DP operation.\nThe performance of position reference systems should be monitored, and warnings should be provided\nwhen the signals from the position reference systems are either incorrect or substantially degraded.\nFor equipment class 3, at least one of the position reference systems should be connected directly to the\nbackup control system and separated by an A-60 class division from the other position reference systems.\nInspection Guidance\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during\nDP operations at each offtake location and/or the procedure should reference procedures provided by the\nfield operator.\nThere should be a minimum of three different, operational, Position Reference Systems (PRS) available to\nthe DP operator during an offtake operation.\nControls for PRS should be accessible within easy reach of the DP control station.\nPRS sensor offsets including a clear description of the common reference point and sign convention should\nbe adequately filed and readily available to DPOs. All offset measurements for transducers, GNSS antenna,\nscanner heads, taut wire gimbals etc. should be measured relative to the common reference point. This data\nshould be updated after any change to sensor location on board.\nThese procedures may form part of the vessel-specific DP operations manuals and/or field operations\nmanuals.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during\nDP operations at each offtake location.\nSight and where necessary review, the sensor offset data file.\nReview the DP logbook and data log for any indication of PRS faults.\nInspect the PRS equipment recognising that it might not be possible to run or demonstrate while alongside a\nterminal.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during DP operations at each offtake\nlocation.\nSensor offset data file.\nDP logbook.\nDP data log.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during DP operations at\neach offtake location.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the use of Position Reference\nSystems during DP operations at each offtake location.\nOne or more of the PRS was not in satisfactory operational condition.\nOn a DP2 or DP3 vessel, fewer than three different, operational, Position Reference Systems (PRS) had\nbeen available to the DP operator during an offtake operation.\nThe DP system was not equipped with a minimum of two independent differential satellite positioning\nsystems.\nControls for PRS were not accessible within easy reach of the DP control station.\nPRS sensor offsets were not adequately filed and readily available to DPOs.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.5.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for reporting", "c": "and recording DP events and incidents, and were all DP parameters being logged and\nrecorded?\nShort Question Text\nDP events and incidents\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nOCIMF: Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effect Analysis Assurance Framework Risk-based Guidance 1st Ed 2020\nIMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 5 June 2021\nObjective\nTo ensure DP events and incidents are recorded, reported and investigated, and lessons learnt from\nincidents used to increase industry safety standards.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effect Analysis Assurance Framework Risk-based Guidance 1st\nEd 2020\n2.1 Introduction\nCodes, standards and practices applied to DP vessels are based on redundancy to ensure that no single failure leads\nto a loss of position and/or heading, for vessels assigned DP Equipment Classes 2 and 3. Loss of Position (LOP)\nincidents occur when the DP redundancy concept is defeated. Investigations have revealed that common points\nbetween redundant equipment groups are significant causal and contributory factors.\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n10.9 Primary field risk management methodology: field operator and offtake tanker technical operator interface\nA field operator’s SMS should ensure that:\n• Field managers, offtake tanker technical managers and key offshore terminal and tanker personnel are\ngiven the opportunity to learn from previous experiences. A process should be in place to ensure open\ncommunication and information sharing about incidents and near misses.\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\n10.6 Incident reports, investigations, and industrial experience transfer\nThe OLST (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) owner or operator should have a DP incident reporting system for\nreporting in accordance with IMCA M 103, latest edition.\nA PMS data logger should be provided as a part of the DP system. Recorded data should be electronically stored and\nmade available for Charterer(s) or field operator(s) on request.\nDP related events and incidents should be investigated, and reports should be made available to Charterer(s) or field\noperator(s). The OLST owner or operator should identify a qualified individual within its management structure with\nresponsibility for DP incident and occurrence investigation and closeout.\nThe OLST owner or operator should be member of IMCA and actively participate in IMCA’s performance and\nimprovement schemes. The OLST owners or operators should have in place a system for experience transfer of\noperational knowledge.\nE.8 Independent position monitoring and logging system\nThe OLST should have an independent Position Monitoring System data logger unit (Parker or equivalent) fitted for\nreal-time data acquisition, calculation, logging and displaying designed to monitor DP controlled offshore loading.\nWhen in loading phase, the system should give an alarm (both audible and visual) if calculated speed ahead is higher\nthan a pre-set limit. All data from the independent position monitoring system should be made available to field\noperator(s) in the event of incident investigations. Crude oil flow-monitoring should also be displayed and logged via\nthis system.\nThe data should be stored for a period of minimum 1 year.\nIMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 4 January 2019\n3.3.2 Recommended Documentation\nThe documents in Table 2 should be kept on board and in addition, where feasible, at the shore-based centres of\ntechnical and operational management. Where a periodicity for document storage is recommended, this is not to be\ntaken as superseding any applicable regulatory requirements for the minimum storage period for such documents.\n10. DP incident reports – Records of all DP station keeping and other DP related incidents, including investigation\nrecords and close outs should be retained on board permanently.\n14. DP fault log – Records of all faults related to the DP system should be retained on board permanently.\n15. Data logging – Records should be retained on board for the period set by the owner/operator and, where relating\nto a DP incident, permanently stored.\nAppendix 19 DP Station Keeping Event Reporting\n2016 Review\nThe review concluded that the scheme should have a maximum of three well defined categories and, so as to\nencourage the reporting of all events, not just incidents, the scheme would be renamed ‘The IMCA DP station\nkeeping event reporting scheme’.\nThe three categories are listed below:\n• •\n• DP incident – A major system failure or human factor which has resulted in total loss of DP capability;\nDP undesired event – A system failure or human factor which has caused a loss of redundancy and/or\ncompromised DP capability;\nDP observation – An event that has not resulted in a loss of redundancy or compromised DP operational\ncapability but is still deemed worthy of reporting.\nTMSA KPI 8.1.1 requires that procedures ensure prompt reporting and investigation of incidents and significant near\nmisses. Procedures may include:\n• •\n• Clear definitions of reportable incidents and significant near misses.\nPerson/department responsible for investigation.\nDescription of the investigation process.\nIMO: ISM Code\n9.1 The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are\nreported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related\nincidents, undesired events and observations:\n• •\n• DP incidents – A major system failure or human factor which has resulted in total loss of DP capability.\nDP undesired events – A system failure or human factor which has caused a loss of redundancy and/or\ncompromised DP capability.\nDP observations – An event that has not resulted in a loss of redundancy or compromised DP operational\ncapability but is still deemed worthy of reporting.\nIf an independent data logger unit that records all DP parameters is not fitted, procedures should ensure relevant\ndata is secured in the event of a DP incident.\nReports can be made either according to the vessel’s ISM system or via the method set out in IMCA M 103, latest\nrevision.\nThe procedures should include a system to actively transfer industry experience and operational knowledge gained\nfrom DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP\nrelated incidents, undesired events and observations.\nSight and review:\no Records of DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.\no Independent data logger records, if readily accessible.\no DP fault log.\nInspect the independent data logger.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for recording,\nreporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and\nobservations.\nRecords of DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.\nIndependent data logger records.\nDP fault log.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents,\nundesired events and observations.\nDP related incidents, undesired events and observations had not been reported according to the vessel’s\nISM system or via the method set out in IMCA M 103, latest revision.\nDP related incident, undesired event and observation reports had not been retained on board.\nAn investigation into a DP related incident, undesired event or observation had not been closed out within a\nreasonable time frame.\nRecords of faults related to the DP system had not been retained on board.\nThe vessel was provided with an independent data logger that recorded all DP parameters; however, data\nwas not being retained on board for a minimum of 1 year.\nThe vessel was not provided with an independent data logger unit that recorded all DP parameters, and\nprocedures did not ensure relevant data would be secured in the event of a DP incident.\nThe independent data logger was defective in any respect.\nThe company procedures did not include a system to actively transfer industry experience and operational\nknowledge gained from DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for recording, reporting and\ninvestigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.5.4.", "t": "Was the vessel provided with a comprehensive DP operations manual and were the", "c": "Master and officers familiar with its contents, including DP checklists, capability plots,\nconsequence analysis and activity specific operating guidelines (ASOG)?\nShort Question Text\nDP operations manual\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\nIMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 5 June 2021\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and officers are provided with comprehensive procedures for conducting DP\noperations.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 4 January 2019\n3.3.2 Recommended Documentation\n4. DP Capability Plots - These should be hard copy plots of the vessel’s calculated capability to maintain position in\nvarious operational scenarios. They should be readily available at the DP control location.\n9. DP Operations Manual - Vessel-specific DP operations manual, to be readily accessible at the DP control location.\nIt is recommended that owner/operators develop a standardised DP operations manual table of contents for vessels\nin their fleet based on the requirements of section 4.6 of IMO MSC.1/Circ 1580. Modifications and amendments to the\nDP operations manual should be subject to MoC processes.\n3.6 DP Capability Analysis and DP Footprints\n3.6.1 DP Capability Analysis\nDetailed explanation and description of DP capability analysis are given in Specification for DP capability plots (IMCA\nM 140).\nThe calculated station keeping capabilities which are provided by the DP capability analysis should be supplemented\nby real time measurements and observations. These real time observations and measurements are used to develop\nDP footprint plots.\nDP footprint plots measure the vessel’s real station keeping performance (accuracy) in specific equipment\nconfigurators and environmental conditions. They determine the vessel’s actual position keeping ability in various\nthruster configurations and environmental conditions and can be used for comparison with DP capability plots.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• •\n• Actions upon equipment failure.\nActions upon encountering adverse weather...\nSupporting checklists.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\n3.4 DP control system\n3.4.2 Computers\n.4 For equipment classes 2 and 3, the DP control system should include a software function, normally known as\n\"consequence analysis\", which continuously verifies that the vessel will remain in position even if the worst-case\nfailure occurs. This analysis should verify that the thrusters, propellers and rudders (if included under DP control) that\nremain in operation after the worst-case failure can generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as\nrequired before the failure. The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst-case\nfailure were to lead to a loss of position and/or heading due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing environmental\nconditions (e.g., wind, waves, current, etc.). For operations which will take a long time to safely terminate, the\nconsequence analysis should include a function which simulates the remaining thrust and power after the worst-case\nfailure, based on input of the environmental conditions.\n4 Operational requirements\n4.5 DP capability polar plots should be produced to demonstrate position keeping capacity for fully operational and\npost worst-case single failure conditions. The capability plots should represent the environmental conditions in the\narea of operation and the mission-specific operational condition of the vessel.\n4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instructions should be incorporated into the vessel-specific\nDP operations manuals:\n1. location checklist;\n2. watchkeeping checklist;\n3. DP operating instructions;\n4. annual tests and procedures;\n5. initial and periodical (5-year) tests and procedures;\n6. examples of tests and procedures after modifications and non-conformities;\n7. blackout recovery procedure;\n8. list of critical components;\n9. examples of operating modes;\n10. decision support tools such as ASOG; and\n11. capability plots.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed comprehensive procedures for DP operations contained within a DP\noperations manual. Procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\nDP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists.\nDP operating instructions.\nRisk assessment reviews.\nGuidance on the use of:\n• o\no\no\nCapability plots.\nDP footprints.\nConsequence analysis.\nActivity specific operating guidelines (ASOG).\nActivity specific operating guidelines should include, for example, direction on:\n• •\n• The number of generators to be online.\nIncreasing the power output of generators that are already online.\nPolicy on standby generators.\nRisk assessment reviews should reflect changes in operating locations, position reference sensors and/or Field\nOperations Manuals.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight and review:\no DP operations manual.\no Completed DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists.\no Hard copy capability plots.\no DP footprint records.\no DP operations risk assessments.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the contents of the DP operations manual,\nincluding:\no Capability plots.\no DP footprints.\no Consequence analysis.\no Activity specific operational guidelines (ASOG).\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• DP operations manual.\nCompleted DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists.\nHard copy capability plots.\nDP footprint records.\nDP operations risk assessments.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no DP operations manual available on board.\nThe DP operations manual was not vessel specific.\nThe DP operations manual was not in a language that could be understood by the DP operators.\nProcedures in the DP operations manual did not include:\no DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists.\no DP operating instructions.\no Risk assessment reviews.\no Guidance on the use of:\n Capability plots.\n DP footprints.\n Consequence analysis.\no Activity specific operating guidelines.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the contents of the DP operations manual, including\ncapability plots, DP footprints, consequence analysis and activity specific operational guidelines (ASOG).\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists had not been completed as required.\nThere were no risk assessments for specific DP operations/locations.\nThe DP operations manual was not readily accessible at the DP control station.\nOn a DP2 or DP3 vessel, the DP control system did not include ‘consequence analysis’ software.\nFollowing a failure of a DP component, a risk assessment had not been completed prior to resuming\noperations.\nDP capability plots were not readily available at the DP control location.\nHard copies of the DP capability plots were not available.\nDP footprint plots were not available for comparison of the vessels actual position keeping ability compared\nwith DP capability plots.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "4.5.5.", "t": "Were up to date Field Operations Manuals on board for each offshore terminal to", "c": "which the vessel trades, were the Master and officers familiar with their content, and\nwere records available of the regular communication checks with terminal installations\nas required by Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG)?\nShort Question Text\nField Operations Manuals\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and officers are aware of the procedures and regulations at each offshore terminal to\nwhich the vessel trades, and that regular communications are established as required by Field Specific\nOperating Guidelines (FSOG).\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n8.21.5 Field operations manual\nField-specific operations manuals can provide the main procedures controlling cargo transfer operations across the\nfield. Such manuals can address all terminals within a field or location and can incorporate both field operations\nprocedures and regulations information. The field operations manual should include the following information:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA summary of field position, field layout and offshore terminal information including plans of cargo transfer\nconfigurations and appropriate photographs, contact numbers, call signs and communications channels for\nboth operational and emergency use.\nDescription of cargo transfer equipment on each offshore terminal.\nStep by step plan covering the entire operation in-field.\nDescription of standard and occasional joint operations including cargo transfer rates, line flushing, etc.\nParticulars of all tankers nominated for regular cargo transfer operations at that field.\nTendering and accepting Notice of Readiness (NOR) and any special requirements for cargo quality, bills of\nlading and cargo calculations.\nSpeed reduction sequence and limits on approaching offshore terminal.\nOperational limits and executive actions on exceeding limits.\nESD systems and executive actions at each ESD level, both for the offshore terminal ESD system and any\njoint cargo transfer ESD system.\nDetailed checklists for the offshore terminal covering each stage of pre-transfer activities, monitoring and\npreparations for conventional tanker approach, hose and hawser connection, cargo transfer, conventional\ntanker disconnection and post transfer checking of systems and equipment.\nDetailed checklists for each type of conventional tanker covering field-specific actions and requirements not\ncovered by the conventional tanker’s own detailed checklists.\nEmergency responsibilities and procedures. This section of the field operations manual should be prepared\njointly between the field management team responsible for running the terminal and offtake tanker’s\ntechnical operators to ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in cover. Some field managers may address\nemergency procedures by a separate bridging document or emergency response manual.\n• •\n• •\nA short synopsis describing key requirements and where to find more detailed information on each topic\nwithin the manual. This overview may be used by conventional tanker Masters to quickly obtain key\ninformation on the offshore terminal and cargo transfer operations.\nA station keeping sector limits diagram giving key operational and station keeping limits and key\ncommunications channels. This information may be on a single sheet suitable for posting on the\nconventional tanker bridge for immediate information.\nFSOG which list the reporting requirements for the field.\nReferences to the ISPS Security Plan and promulgation of security level for each terminal.\n8.21.6 Field Specific Operating Guidelines\nFSOG help to ensure effective interaction between the offshore terminal and conventional tanker.\nDevelopment of the FSOG should be undertaken by the offshore terminal operator. Ownership of the FSOG lies with\nthe offshore terminal and demonstrates specific requirements for cargo transfers at that field. The FSOG should be\nincluded in the field operations manual.\n9.3.2 Communications\nAs with conventional tankers, for most marine related operations, the primary means of communication between\nterminal, DP bow loading tanker and other vessels will be UHF or VHF radio. UHF radio is recommended as the\nmeans of communication between offshore terminals, offtake tankers and support vessels. Private UHF channels are\nsubject to less interference than public VHF channels. VHF signals can be blocked by the large amount of steel on\nF(P)SOs. Other systems used at offshore fields, e.g., trunking radio systems, can be used if the terminal provides the\nofftake tanker with a portable station.\n9.7 Pre-transfer conference\nOn completion of mooring and hose connection, the F(P)SO OIM or CRO and the DP bow loading tanker Master\nmust agree cargo transfer procedures by radio and confirm any email document transfers before starting the cargo\ntransfer. Pre-transfer conference documentation should include:\n• Communications methods and procedures, including periodic prescribed communications checks.\nTMSA KPI 1A.2.3 requires that relevant reference documents are provided as a supplement to the SMS both\nonboard and ashore. Reference documents may include regulatory publications and industry guidelines. The\ncompany has a procedure for maintaining the most up-to-date editions in all locations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to\nthe SMS.\n11.2 The Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nvalid documents are available at all relevant locations;\nchanges to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and\nobsolete documents are promptly removed.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the most up-to-date editions of the field\noperations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades. The Master and officers\nshould be familiar with the content of these manuals, including Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG) and\ncontact numbers, call signs and communications channels for both operational and emergency use.\nRecords of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by FSOG should be maintained.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that the most up-to-date editions of\nthe field operations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.\nSight the field operations manuals for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.\nSight the records of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by Field\nSpecific Operating Guidelines (FSOG).\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the content of the manuals, including FSOG\nand contact numbers, call signs and communications channels for both operational and emergency use.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures to ensure that the most up-to-date editions of the field operations manuals are on\nboard for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.\nField operations manuals for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.\nRecords of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by Field Specific\nOperating Guidelines (FSOG).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to ensure that the most up-to-date editions of the field operations\nmanuals for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades are available on board.\nThere was no field operations manual available on board for an offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedure for verifying that the field operation manual in\nuse was the latest edition.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the content of the field operation manual, including Field\nSpecific Operating Guidelines (FSOG) and contact numbers, call signs and communications channels for\nboth operational and emergency use, for the last offshore terminal visited.\nThere were no records of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by FSOG\nat the last offshore terminal visited.\n5. Safety Management\n5.1. Emergency Response Plans and Drills", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the onboard emergency response plans,", "c": "and were records available to demonstrate that all mandatory and company defined\nemergency drills had been completed and documented as required by company\nprocedures?\nShort Question Text\nRecords of mandatory and company defined emergency drills\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nObjective\nTo ensure that vessel staff can manage onboard emergencies through a consistent and structured process.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised Guidelines for the Structure of an Integrated System of Contingency Planning\nfor Shipboard Emergencies\n2.1.1 The integrated system of shipboard emergency plans (hereinafter referred to as the \"system\") should provide a\nframework for the many individual contingency plans (hereinafter referred to as the \"plans\"), tailored for a variety of\npotential emergencies, for a uniform and modular designed structure.\n2.1.2 Use of a modular designed structure will provide a quickly visible and logically sequenced source of information\nand priorities, which can reduce error and oversight during emergency situations.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been used.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nIdentified all credible emergency scenarios for each vessel type under its management.\nDeveloped onboard contingency plans for each credible emergency scenario applicable to the ship type.\nIdentified the frequency that each contingency plan is required to be subject to an onboard emergency\nresponse drill as required under the provisions of ISM, SOLAS, MARPOL, IGC, IGF or ISPS.\nDeveloped a procedure to instruct the vessel when to conduct drills, how to record the details of a drill, and\nwhat to do if a drill could not be completed within the required time frame.\nDeveloped a consistent procedure to record the details of drills completed onboard which included, but was\nnot necessarily limited to:\no The contingency plan(s) used for a drill.\no The drill scenario.\no Any safety considerations for conducting the drill.\no A summary of the drill activities.\no The equipment used or demonstrated during the drill.\no Any lessons learnt from the drill.\no Any training requirements identified during the drill.\no Any areas for improvement to the contingency plan identified during the drill (and communicated to\nthe company).\no Any supplementary information that must be attached to the drill record, such as, risk assessments,\npermits etc.\nDeveloped a system to track completed drills to ensure that all drills applicable to the vessel type had been\ncompleted as required by legislation or company procedure.\nOnboard contingency plans and records of drills will depend on the vessel type, these may include but will not be\nlimited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAbandon ship (SOLAS Reg III/19)\nMan overboard (SOLAS reg III/19))\nFire and explosion (SOLAS Reg III/19)\nFailure of steering gear (SOLAS Reg V/26)\nEmergency towing (ISM 8.1)\nRescue from enclosed spaces (SOLAS Reg III/19)\nRecovery of persons from the water (SOLAS Reg III/17-1)\nTerrorism or piracy (ISPS Reg A/13.4)\nOil or NLS spills (MARPOL Annex I/5 Reg 37 & Annex II/7 Reg 17)\nHazardous cargo reaction (ISM 8.1)\nHazardous vapour release (ISM 8.1)\nHazardous cargo gas release (ISM 8.1)\nRelease of LNG as fuel from an oil/chemical tanker (IGF Reg 17)\nHull failure (ISM 8.1)\nExcessive list (ISM 8.1)\nContainment system failure (IGC 18.7.1)\nMain engine failure (ISM 8.1)\nFailure of electrical power (ISM 8.1)\nOther critical machinery failures (ISM 8.1)\nCollision (ISM 8.1)\nGrounding (ISM 8.1)\nFlooding (ISM 8.1)\nHeavy weather damage (ISM 8.1)\nTreatment of serious injury (ISM 8.1)\nHelicopter operations for medical evacuation (ISM 8.1)\nEmergency assistance to another vessel\nAn emergency shipboard situation may involve following a number of these contingencies simultaneously. To avoid\nconfusion and duplication of effort, the company will have developed a coherent system of shipboard emergency\nplans to include all identified emergency scenarios which integrate ship and shore response. This system may be\nbased upon an existing SOPEP or SMPEP.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined:\no The requirement to conduct emergency response drills.\no The requirement to record the outcome of an emergency response drill in a consistent manner.\no The requirement to track the completion of completed drills to ensure that mandatory and company\nrequired drills were completed within the required time frame.\no The actions to take if a drill could not be completed within the required timeframe.\nReview the records of completed onboard emergency response drills and verify that each required drill had\nbeen completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\nThis question is designed to gain an overview of the drills required to be conducted onboard and the process for\nrecording the planning and outcome from drills. Supplementary rotational questions will be assigned to investigate the\nconduct of drills in detail.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures which defined the requirements to conduct onboard emergency response drills,\nrecord the outcome and track drills to ensure completion within the defined time frame.\nThe vessel’s system of shipboard emergency contingency plans.\nThe tracking records for completed onboard emergency response drills.\nWhere a drill had not been completed within the defined time frame, communications with the company\ndescribing the reasons for deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the requirements to conduct onboard emergency response\ndrills, record the outcome and track drills to ensure completion within the defined time frame.\nThere was no uniform system of shipboard emergency contingency plans available.\nThere was no requirement to record the details of a drill which included:\no The contingency plan(s) used for a drill.\no The drill scenario.\no Any safety considerations for conducting the drill.\no A summary of the drill activities.\no The equipment used or demonstrated during the drill.\no Any lessons learnt from the drill.\no Any training requirements identified during the drill.\no Any areas for improvement to the contingency plan identified during the drill (and communicated to\nthe company).\no Any supplementary information that must be attached to the drill record, such as, risk assessments,\npermits etc.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the system of shipboard emergency contingency plans.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting drills, recording the\ndetails of drills and what to do if a drill could not be completed within the required due date.\nThere was no schedule of emergency response drills required to be conducted on board to test the\nshipboard contingency plans.\nThe schedule of drills was not aligned with the requirements of ISM, SOLAS, MARPOL, IGC, IGF or ISPS.\nDrills were overdue for completion.\n• Where a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and, the vessel operator had\nacknowledged the vessel’s notification of a postponement, record as a comment in the Process response\ntool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for the", "c": "principal fire scenarios for the vessel type, and had drills taken place to test the\neffectiveness of the plans in accordance with the company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plans & drills for principal fire scenarios\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond to a fire situation in accordance with the vessel’s shipboard emergency\nresponse plans.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C7 Fire\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3 Implementing the emergency response plan\n3.1 General\nDo what is necessary to manage the situation. Activate the most appropriate contingency plans in the SMS. Tailor\ndecision making to the severity of the emergency by prioritising tasks and using resources where they are most\neffective. Use the ship’s own resources where they will be most effective. Be realistic about what can be achieved\nbefore help arrives.\n3.3.2 Assess a fire\nWhen there is a fire/explosion, the Master should identify the location of the fire, the factors that will help contain it\nand any hazards close by that may feed the fire or cause it to spread.\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\nCoordination of response effort.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nResponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property.\nThe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities.\nThe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts.\nInformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment.\nReporting and communication procedures on board ship.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 19\n3.2 Every crew member shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire drill every month. The drills of\nthe crew shall take place within 24 hours of the ship leaving a port if more than 25% of the crew have not participated\nin abandon ship and fire drills on board that particular ship in the previous month…\n3.5 Fire drills\n3.5.1 Fire drills should be planned in such a way that due consideration is given to regular practice in the various\nemergencies that may occur depending on the type of ships and the cargo.\n3.5.3 The equipment used during drills shall immediately be brought back to its fully operational condition and any\nfaults and defects discovered during the drills shall be remedied as soon as possible.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for each of the principal fire\nscenarios which are appropriate to the vessel type, which should include, but will not necessarily be limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Fire on the cargo deck.\nFire in a cargo tank.\nFire in the main machinery space.\nFire in the cargo pump room or compressor room.\nFire in the accommodation.\nFire in a store-room.\nFire in the galley.\nThe plans should identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control and,\nthen in the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plans for the principal fire scenarios\nwhich were appropriate to the vessel type, which should include:\no Fire on the cargo deck.\no Fire in a cargo tank.\no Fire in the main machinery space.\no Fire in the cargo pump room or compressor room.\no Fire in the accommodation.\no Fire in a store-room.\no Fire in the galley.\nReview the records of completed fire drills and verify that:\no The required drills had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\no Each of the emergency response plans for fire scenarios applicable to the vessel type had been\nexercised within the previous six months.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plans for the principal fire scenarios as applicable to the vessel type.\nThe records for completed fire drills during the previous six months.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no shipboard emergency plan available for fire for one or more of the principal fire scenarios\napplicable to the vessel type.\nThe shipboard emergency plans for the principal fire scenarios were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plans for the principal fire scenarios\napplicable to the vessel.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plans for the principal fire\nscenarios applicable to the vessel type.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the bridge Log Book.\nOne or more of the emergency response plans for the principal fire scenarios had not been exercised during\na drill within the previous six months.\nOne or more emergency response drill for fire required by the company onboard emergency response\nprocedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nA fire drill had not taken place within 24 hours of leaving port after a crew change that had resulted in more\nthan 25% of the crew having not participated in a fire drill on that ship within the previous month.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the vessel’s SOPEP or SMPEP, and had", "c": "drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the onboard emergency response actions\nrequired by the Plan and company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nPollution prevention drills required by SOPEP or SMPEP\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Guidelines for the development of Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans. 2010 edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a spill situation in accordance with the vessel’s Shipboard\nOil Pollution Plan (SOPEP) or Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plan (SMPEP).\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Guidelines for the development of Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans. 2010 edition.\nAs a minimum the Plan (i.e. SOPEP or SMPEP) should provide the Master with guidance to address the following:\n2.5.2.1 Operational spills….\n• •\n• Pipe leakage….\nTank overflow….\nHull leakage….\n2.5.2.2 Spills resulting from casualties…\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Grounding\nFire/explosion\nCollision with fixed or moving object\nHull failure\nExcessive list\nContainment system failure\nSubmerged/foundered\nWrecked/stranded\nHazardous vapour release\n3.10 Plan testing: The Plan will be of little value if it is not made familiar to the personnel who will use it. Regular\nexercises will ensure that the Plan functions as expected and that the contacts and communications specified are\naccurate. Such exercises may be held in conjunction with other shipboard exercises and appropriately\nlogged. Where ships carry response equipment, hands-on experience with it by crew members will greatly enhance\nsafety and effectiveness in an emergency situation. Procedures for training and exercise may be defined.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex 1 Chapter 5, Regulation 37 Shipboard oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP).\n1.\nEvery oil tanker of 150 gross tonnage and above and every ship other than an oil tanker of 400 gross\ntonnage and above shall carry on board a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan approved by the\nAdministration\nAnnex II Chapter 7, Regulation 17 Shipboard marine pollution emergency plan for noxious liquid substances\n(SMPEP)\n1.\n2.\nEvery ship of 150 gross tonnage and above certified to carry noxious liquid substances in bulk shall carry on\nboard a shipboard marine pollution emergency plan for noxious liquid substances approved by the\nAdministration\nIn the case of ships to which regulation 37 of Annex 1 of the Convention also applies, such a plan may be\ncombined with the shipboard oil pollution emergency plan required under Regulation 37 of Annex 1. In this\ncase, the title of such Plan shall be “Shipboard marine pollution emergency plan” (SMPEP).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator will have developed a SOPEP or SMPEP as appropriate. This may form the basis of an\nintegrated system of contingency planning for all shipboard emergencies. The Master and officers should be familiar\nwith the contents and be aware of their duties and responsibilities within the Plan.\nThe Plan should be kept up to date, including the list of National Operational Contact Points responsible for the\nreceipt, transmission and processing of urgent reports on incidents involving harmful substances, including oil from\nships to coastal states, which is available from the IMO website in the MSC-MEPC.6 Circular series. The official\nformat of the circular is electronic and providing the file is readily accessible in an identified location need not be\nprinted out in hard copy.\nThe vessel operator should require that a list of specific contact details should be prepared for each port visit and be\ndisplayed on the bridge and in the cargo control room. The list should at least contain contact details for the following:\no\no\no\no\no\no\nThe DPA or the operator’s emergency contact details.\nThe port authorities.\nThe vessel’s P & I Club.\nThe Agent.\nThe national pollution reporting centre.\nAny additional contact details required by the USCG Vessel Response Plan when trading in US\nwaters.\nThe vessel operator will have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of spill response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRequire that the details of emergency response drills are recorded in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the SOPEP or SMPEP.\nSight the shipboard emergency response plans for operational cargo and bunker spills.\nSight the list of specific contact details posted on the bridge or cargo control room.\nReview the records of completed spill response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview an officer during the balance of the inspection and verify that they were familiar with their expected\nduties in the event of a spill incident.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel’s SOPEP or SMPEP.\nThe shipboard emergency response plans for defined spill situations, if not contained within the SOPEP or\nSMPEP.\nThe list of specific contact details for the port of inspection.\nThe records for completed spill emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no SOPEP or SMPEP available.\nThe SOPEP or SMPEP had not been maintained up to date with national operational contact points or any\nother information that may have become outdated over time or at change of management.\nThe vessel had not prepared a list of specific contact details for the port of inspection.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the vessel’s SOPEP or SMPEP.\nAn interviewed officer was unfamiliar with their duties during a spill incident.\nThe drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the Plan.\nThe drill scenarios did not cover operational spills for both cargo and bunker operations.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for a spill situation required by the SOPEP, SMPEP and/or company onboard\nemergency response procedure was overdue or, had not been completed in accordance with the defined\ndrill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "enclosed space rescue, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the\nshipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEnclosed space rescue emergency response drill.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Rating, Documentation, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Resolution A.1050(27) Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond to an enclosed space rescue situation in accordance with the vessel's\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 10.2 Safety management for entering enclosed spaces.\n10.2.2 Managing controlled entry into enclosed space\nResponding to a crisis.\nInjuries and deaths from entering enclosed spaces often occur when personnel give in to a strong instinct to help. A\ndelayed response from the rescue team can make this worse. It may take them several minutes to muster and ready\nthemselves, during which Attendants may become increasingly concerned for those in the space. They may believe –\nwrongly – that they can hold their breath or are fit enough not to be affected in the same way as those inside. Giving\nthem a clear list of tasks at this time (e.g. raise the alarm but do not enter the space/opening; keep talking to the\npeople inside; set up equipment outside; brief the command centre and rescue team when they arrive) is a proven\ntechnique for keeping them focused. Reinforce this during the toolbox talk with scenarios asking them what they\nwould do if someone collapsed and if the rescue team was delayed.\nIMO: Resolution A.1050(27) Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships.\n6.4 Only trained personnel should be assigned the duties of entering, functioning as attendants or functioning as\nmembers of rescue teams. Ships' crews with rescue and first aid duties should be drilled periodically in rescue and\nfirst aid procedures. Training should include as a minimum:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nIdentification of the hazards likely to be faced during entry into enclosed spaces.\nRecognition of the signs of adverse health effects caused by exposure to hazards during entry, and\nKnowledge of personal protective equipment required for entry.\n8.5 Only properly trained and equipped personnel should perform rescue operations in enclosed spaces.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 19, as amended by MSC. 350(92)\n3.3 Crew members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities shall participate in an enclosed space entry\nand rescue drill to be held onboard the ship at least once every two months.\n3.6.1 Enclosed space entry and rescue drills should be planned and conducted in a safe manner, taking into account,\nas appropriate, the guidance provided in the recommendations developed by the Organization.\n3.6.2 Each enclosed space entry and rescue drill shall include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nChecking and use of personal protective equipment required for entry.\nChecking and use of communication equipment and procedures.\nChecking and use of instruments for measuring the atmosphere in enclosed spaces.\nChecking and use of rescue equipment and procedures.\nInstructions in first aid and resuscitation techniques.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan to identify the actions that vessel\nstaff must take to conduct a rescue from an enclosed space in a safe manner without further endangering those\ninvolved in the operation.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for enclosed space rescue.\nReview the records of completed enclosed space rescue drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no Where the drill had been conducted utilising a defined enclosed space, the permit for the space\nhad been attached to the drill records.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• During the physical inspection:\no Sight the enclosed space rescue hoisting arrangement(s) provided for cargo, ballast, bunker, void\nand cofferdam spaces.\no Interview an officer or rating to verify that they were familiar with the rigging and operation of the\nprovided hoisting arrangement(s).\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for enclosed space rescue.\nThe records for completed enclosed space rescue drills, supplemented by enclosed space entry permits\nwhere appropriate.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the postponement.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no shipboard emergency plan for enclosed space rescue available.\nThe shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for enclosed space rescue.\nAn interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the rigging and use of the provided enclosed space\nrescue hoisting arrangement(s).\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nThe drill records had not been completed in accordance with the company procedures or were missing the\nassociated enclosed space entry permit, where required.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for enclosed space rescue required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nThe enclosed space rescue hoisting arrangements and any associated loose equipment provided for cargo,\nballast, bunker, void and cofferdam spaces was defective in any respect.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.5.", "t": "Were the Master and Ship Security Officer (SSO) familiar with the vessel’s Ship", "c": "Security Plan (SSP), and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the measures\nand procedures specified by the Ship Security Plan?\nShort Question Text\nDrills required by the Ship Security Plan (SSP)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Security Officer\nPublications\nIndustry : BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea\nGulf of Aden\nIndian Ocean and Arabian Sea\nIndustry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast\nof West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2012 edition\nIMO: ISPS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a security threat in accordance with the vessel’s Ship\nSecurity Plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code. 2012 edition.\nPlanning and conducting ship security drills and exercises\n4.8.12 The regular conduct of ship security drills and exercises is an important aspect of ensuring that ships comply\nwith the requirements of the maritime security measures.\n4.8.13 Drills may be defined as supervised activities that are used to test a single measure or procedure in the SSP.\nExercises are more complex activities which test several measures and procedures at the same time.\n4.8.14 To ensure the effective implementation of the measures and procedures specified in SSPs, drills should be\nconducted at least every three months. They are usually organised by SSOs, who are responsible for ensuring that\nall shipboard personnel have received adequate training. In addition, in cases where more than 25% of the ship’s\npersonnel has been changed at any one time with personnel that have not previously participated in any drill on that\nship within the last three months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change.\n4.8.15 As a minimum, SSOs should organise drills to cover such scenarios as:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nIdentification and search of unauthorised visitors on board the ship.\nRecognition of materials that may pose a security threat.\nMethods to deter attackers from approaching the ship.\nRecognition of restricted areas.\nMustering for evacuation.\nIndustry: BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea,\nGulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea\n(Industry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off\nthe Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.)\nSection 4\nPlanning\nPrior to entering the High Risk Area\nBrief crew and conduct drills\nThe crew should be fully briefed on the preparations, and drills should be conducted with the SPM (Ship Protection\nMeasures) in place. The plan should be reviewed, and all crew briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the\nalarm that signals an attack, an all-clear situation and the appropriate response to each. The drills should test:\n• •\n• •\nThe SPM, including testing the security of all access points.\nLock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.\nThe bridge team’s security knowledge.\nThe crew’s understanding of any different actions required in the event of a pirate attack compared to other\ntypes of attack.\nTMSA KPI 13.1.3 requires that measures have been developed to mitigate and respond to all identified threats to\nvessels and shore-based locations.\nMitigating measures may include:\n• Access control.\n• Physical security measures.\n• Drills and training.\n• Security patrols.\n• Searches.\nContingency plans are in place to respond to any potential breaches of security.\nIMO: ISPS Code\nDrills and exercises\n13.5 The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security\nlevels and the identification of any security related deficiencies which need to be addressed.\n13.6 To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills should be conducted at\nleast once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25% of the ship’s personnel has been changed\nat any one time with personnel that have not previously participated in any drill on that ship within the last three\nmonths, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test individual elements of the\nplan such as the security threats listed in paragraph 8.9\n8.9 ………\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nDamage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g., by explosive devises, arson, sabotage or\nvandalism.\nHijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board.\nTampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores.\nUnauthorised access or use, including presence of stowaways.\nSmuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction.\nUse of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and/or their equipment.\nUse of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction.\nAttacks from seaward whilst at a berth or anchor, and\n9.\nAttacks whilst at sea.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure that:\n• •\n• Required the vessel to conduct drills or exercises at defined intervals to test the effectiveness of security\nrelated contingency plans identified within the Ship Security Plan.\nRequired the vessel to record the details of security drills or exercises in a defined format.\nDefined the action to take if a drill or exercise cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight the schedule of security drills or exercises required to be conducted in accordance with the Ship\nSecurity Plan (SSP) and identified within the drill schedule.\nDo not request to sight either the SSP or the security contingency plans.\nReview the records of completed security drills or exercises and verify that:\no The latest drill or exercise had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no All drill or exercise scenarios required to be undertaken by the SSP had been completed within the\ntime frame defined by the company.\no The details of the drill or exercise had been recorded in the defined format required by the\ncompany procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe schedule of security drills or exercises required to be carried out by the Ship Security Plan.\nThe records for completed security drills or exercises.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill or exercise had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the\ncompany relating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no schedule of security drills or exercises required to be undertaken by the Ship Security Plan\n(SSP).\nThe Master or Ship Security Officer was unfamiliar with security drills or exercises required to be undertaken\nto test the effectiveness of the SSP and its contingency plans.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nDrill or exercise dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe latest security drill or exercise was overdue for completion.\nSecurity drill or exercise scenarios required to be undertaken according to the company drill schedule had\nnot been completed within the defined time frame.\nWhere the ship had entered a High Risk Area in the last twelve months, suitable security drills had not been\nconducted with the SPM (Ship Protection Measures) in place, prior to entering the High Risk Area.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.6.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the procedure for launching the", "c": "lifeboat(s), and had abandon ship drills taken place in accordance with company\nprocedures and the requirements of SOLAS and the Flag Administration?\nShort Question Text\nLaunching the lifeboat(s) and abandon ship drills\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nLifeboat deck, Documentation, Bridge, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats.\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew were able to safely launch the vessel’s lifeboat(s) in an emergency, and conduct\nabandon ship drills strictly in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft. A Seafarer’s Guide.\nFamiliarisation and Training\nA significant factor in survival craft incidents occurring in the industry has often been identified as a lack of onboard\nfamiliarisation with the equipment fitted. It is imperative that a strong focus be given by the operator to the\nfamiliarisation and training of all ship’s staff in the handling of survival craft, with the aim of minimizing risk factors\nassociated with human error.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats.\nANNEX 2 Guidelines on Safety During Abandon Ship Drills Using Lifeboats.\n1.3 Drills must be safe\n1.3.1 Abandon ship drills should be planned, organized and performed so that the recognized risks are minimized\nand in accordance with relevant shipboard requirements of occupational safety and health.\n1.3.2 Drills provide an opportunity to verify that the life-saving system is working and that all associated equipment is\nin place and in good working order, ready for use.\n1.3.3 Before conducting drills, it should be checked that the lifeboat and its safety equipment have been maintained in\naccordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, as well as noting all the precautionary measures necessary.\nAbnormal conditions of wear and tear or corrosion should be reported to the responsible officer immediately.\n1.4 Emphasis on learning\nDrills should be conducted with an emphasis on learning and be viewed as a learning experience, not just as a task\nto meet a regulatory requirement to conduct drills. Whether they are emergency drills required by SOLAS or\nadditional special drills conducted to enhance the competence of the crew members, they should be carried out at\nsafe speed. During drills, care should be taken to ensure that everybody familiarizes themselves with their duties and\nwith the equipment. If necessary, pauses should be made during the drills to explain especially difficult elements. The\nexperience of the crew is an important factor in determining how fast a drill or certain drill elements should be carried\nout.\n1.5 Planning and organizing drills\n1.5.1The 1974 SOLAS Convention requires that drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there was an\nactual emergency. This means that the entire drill should, as far as possible, be carried out. The point is that, at the\nsame time, it should be ensured that the drill can be carried out in such a way that it is safe in every respect.\nConsequently, elements of the drill that may involve unnecessary risks need special attention or may be excluded\nfrom the drill.\n1.5.2 In preparing for a drill, those responsible should review the manufacturer’s instruction manual to assure that a\nplanned drill is conducted properly. Those responsible for the drill should assure that the crew is familiar with the\nguidance provided in the life-saving system instruction manual.\n1.5.3 Lessons learned in the course of a drill should be documented and made a part of follow-up shipboard training\ndiscussions and planning the next drill session.\n1.5.4 The lowering of a boat with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of a drill that may,\ndepending on the circumstances, involve an unnecessary risk. Such drills should only be carried out if special\nprecautions are observed.\n2 Abandon Ship Drills\n2.2 Guidance to the shipowner\n2.2.2 Procedures for holding safe drills should be included in the Safety Management System (SMS) of the shipping\ncompanies. Detailed procedures for elements of drills that involve a special risk should be evident from workplace\nassessments adjusted to the relevant life-saving appliance.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 19\nEmergency training and drills\n3.2 Every crew member shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire drill every month. The drills of\nthe crew shall take place within 24 h of the ship leaving a port if more than 25% of the crew have not participated in\nabandon ship and fire drills on board that particular ship in the previous month.\n3.4 Abandon ship drill\n3.4.1 Each abandon ship drill shall include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\n9.\nsummoning of passengers and crew to muster stations with the alarm required by regulation 6.4.2 followed\nby drill announcement on the public address or other communication system and ensuring that they are\nmade aware of the order to abandon ship.\nreporting to stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list.\nchecking that passengers and crew are suitably dressed.\nchecking that lifejackets are correctly donned.\nlowering of at least one lifeboat after any necessary preparation for launching.\nstarting and operating the lifeboat engine.\noperation of davits used for launching liferafts.\na mock search and rescue of passengers trapped in their staterooms.\ninstruction in the use of radio life-saving appliances.\n3.4.2 Different lifeboats shall, as far as practicable, be lowered in compliance with the requirements of paragraph\n3.4.1.5 at successive drills.\n3.4.3 Except as provided in paragraphs 3.4.4 and 3.4.5, each lifeboat shall be launched, and manoeuvred in the\nwater by its assigned operating crew, at least once every three months during an abandon ship drill.\n3.4.4 In the case of a lifeboat arranged for free-fall launching, at least once every three months during an abandon\nship drill the crew shall board the lifeboat, properly secure themselves in their seats and commence launch\nprocedures up to but not including the actual release of the lifeboat (i.e., the release hook shall not be released). The\nlifeboat shall then either be free-fall launched with only the required operating crew on board or lowered into the water\nby means of the secondary means of launching with or without the operating crew on board. In both cases the\nlifeboat shall thereafter be manoeuvred in the water by the operating crew. At intervals of not more than six months,\nthe lifeboat shall either be launched by free-fall with only the operating crew on board, or simulated launching shall be\ncarried out in accordance with the guidelines developed by the Organization*.\n* Refer to Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1).\n3.4.9 Emergency lighting for mustering and abandonment shall be tested at each abandon ship drill.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed detailed procedures to identify the actions that vessel staff must take to\nconduct a lifeboat abandon ship drill in a safe manner without endangering those involved in the operation.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the emergency procedure for abandoning ship.\nSight, and where necessary review, the ship specific procedure for launching a lifeboat as part of a drill.\nReview the records of completed abandon ship drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The lifeboat(s) has been exercised and launched (simulated or actual) in accordance with SOLAS\nregulation for the type of lifeboat fitted.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview one rating and verify they were familiar with the ship specific procedure for the launching of the\nlifeboat during an abandon ship drill.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The shipboard emergency procedure for abandoning ship.\nThe ship specific procedure for launching a lifeboat as part of an abandon ship drill.\nThe records for completed abandon ship drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the postponement.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no emergency procedure for abandoning ship.\nThere was no ship specific procedure for launching a lifeboat as part of an abandon ship drill.\nThe shipboard procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the procedure for abandon ship or the launching of a lifeboat\nduring an abandon ship drill.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the ship specific procedure for the launching of a lifeboat during an\nabandon ship drill.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drills for abandon ship required by the company onboard emergency response\nprocedure and SOLAS regulation were overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined\ndrill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for a", "c": "cargo vapour or liquid release, Including potential fire, and had drills taken place to test\nthe effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for a cargo vapour or liquid release, Including potential fire\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a cargo vapour or liquid release, including potential fire, in\naccordance with the vessel’s shipboard emergency response plans.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and Terminals. Fourth Edition\n9.5.2 Ship Emergency Procedures.\nIncident Plans\nIn developing plans for dealing with incidents, the following scenarios will commonly be considered:\n• •\n• •\nCargo containment leakage\nCargo connection rupture, pipeline fracture or cargo spillage.\nLifting of a cargo system relief valve.\nFire following leakage of cargo.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.3.1 information shall be on board and available to all concerned in the form of cargo information data sheet(s)\ngiving the necessary data for the safe carriage of cargo. Such information shall include, for each product carried:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nA full description of the physical and chemical properties necessary for the safe carriage and containment of\nthe cargo.\nReactivity with other cargoes that are capable of being carried on board in accordance with the International\ncertificate of Fitness for the carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk.\nThe actions to be taken in the event of cargo spills or leaks.\nCountermeasures against accidental personal contact.\nFirefighting procedures and firefighting media.\nSpecial equipment needed for the safe handling of the particular cargo, and\nEmergency procedures.\n18.3.3 Contingency plans in accordance with 18.3.1.3, for spillage of cargo carried at ambient temperature, shall take\naccount of potential local temperature cooling such as when the escaped cargo has reduced to atmospheric pressure\nand the potential effect of this cooling on hull steel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed shipboard emergency response plans applicable to the types of vessel\nunder management which may include, but will not necessarily be limited to:\n• •\n• •\nCargo containment leakage.\nCargo connection rupture, pipeline fracture or cargo spillage.\nLifting of a cargo system relief valve.\nFire following leakage of cargo.\nThe plans will identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control, and then,\nin the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nWhere specialist equipment, such as barrier punching devices, are required to be used in the mitigation or recovery\nfrom a loss of containment, the emergency response plans should include the precautions for their use.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid release,\nIncluding potential fire.\nReview the records of completed cargo vapour or liquid release drills and verify that:\no The required drills had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The shipboard emergency response plans for a cargo vapour or liquid release.\nThe records for completed cargo vapour or liquid release drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous 12 months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no shipboard emergency plans for a cargo vapour or liquid release available.\nThe shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid release were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plans for cargo vapour or liquid\nrelease.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe latest drill for cargo vapour or liquid release was overdue for completion.\nOne or more of the emergency response plans for cargo vapour or liquid release scenarios had not been\nexercised during a drill within the previous 12 months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.8.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "collision, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency\nresponse plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for collision\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a collision situation in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C4 Collision\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3 Implementing the emergency response plan\n3.1 General\nDo what is necessary to manage the situation. Activate the most appropriate contingency plans in the SMS. Tailor\ndecision making to the severity of the emergency by prioritising tasks and using resources where they are most\neffective. Use the ship’s own resources where they will be most effective. Be realistic about what can be achieved\nbefore help arrives.\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nCoordination of response effort.\nResponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property.\nThe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities.\nThe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts.\nInformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment.\nReporting and communication procedures on board ship.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for a vessel in a collision situation\nto identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control and, then in the short\nand medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct an emergency response drill to test the crew familiarity with each credible\nemergency scenario applicable to the vessel type at a defined frequency.\nRequire that the details of emergency response drills are recorded in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for a collision situation.\nReview the records of completed collision emergency response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for a collision situation.\nThe records for completed collision emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no shipboard emergency plan developed for a collision situation.\nThe shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for a collision situation.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\n• The emergency response drill for a collision situation required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\n• Where a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "grounding, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard\nemergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for grounding\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a grounding situation in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C5 Stranding or Grounding\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3 Implementing the emergency response plan\n3.1 General\nDo what is necessary to manage the situation. Activate the most appropriate contingency plans in the SMS. Tailor\ndecision making to the severity of the emergency by prioritising tasks and using resources where they are most\neffective. Use the ship’s own resources where they will be most effective. Be realistic about what can be achieved\nbefore help arrives.\nChapter 3.5 Action to take when the ship is aground\n3.5.6 Consider stress and stability\nThe Master will have no accurate way of knowing whether the ship will remain stable and intact while aground or\nwhen attempting to refloat. In this case, specialist technical advice is required to predict the likely effects on the ship.\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\n2.\nCoordination of response effort.\nResponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nThe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities.\nThe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts.\nInformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment.\nReporting and communication procedures on board ship.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for a vessel in a grounding\nsituation to identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control and, then in\nthe short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct an emergency response drill to test the crew familiarity with each credible\nemergency scenario applicable to the vessel type at a defined frequency.\nRequire that the details of emergency response drills are recorded in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for a grounding situation.\nReview the records of completed grounding emergency response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for a grounding situation.\nThe records for completed grounding emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no shipboard emergency plan developed for a grounding situation.\nThe shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The shipboard emergency plan for grounding did not consider:\no Assessing a grounding situation and gathering data for evaluation by a specialist technical advisor\non its impact on buoyancy, stability and structural strength and the later decisions on mitigating\nactions.\no Preserving ECDIS and VDR evidence.\no Communications with the company and third parties.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for a grounding situation.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for a grounding situation required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.10.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for loss", "c": "of propulsion, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard\nemergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for loss of propulsion\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a loss of propulsion in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C1 Main engine failure.\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3.4. Action to take when the ship is disabled but still afloat.\n3.4.3 Understand the drift characteristics of a disabled ship.\nIf propulsion has been lost with no immediate prospect of restoring it, assess the ship’s proximity to navigational or\nother hazards and plot the rate and direction of drift on a suitably scaled chart (paper or electronic), in conjunction\nwith the ship’s records for any previously recorded drift patterns.\nTables 1 to 5 give the ship's heading and drift directions relative to the wind and wave directions, with the ship lying\nwith the wind on the port and starboard sides.\nUse the tables to guide decisions to optimise drift behaviour:\n• •\nPlacing the relative wing on the port or starboard side before momentum and steerage are lost can alter drift\ndirection by up to 60°. This can gain a lot of sea room and might be the best step to positively influence drift\ndirection without calling on outside help.\nIf steerage has been lost, the rate and direction of drift can still be influenced by:\no Giving the ship a list\no Adjusting the trim, increasing or decreasing the existing trim, or even by changing from trim by the\nstern to trim by the head.\no Locking the rudder hard over to the downwind side. (During model testing, locking the rudder hard\nover to the upwind side produced no meaningful change in drift compared to the rudder being\nlocked amidships.).\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\ncoordination of response effort\nresponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property\nthe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities\nthe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts\ninformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment\nreporting and communication procedures on board ship\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for a loss of propulsion which\nidentifies the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control and, then in the short\nand medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for a loss of propulsion.\nReview the records of completed loss of propulsion emergency response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview one navigation officer and verify that they were familiar with a method for estimating the predicted\ndrift of a disabled tanker, taking into account the wind, current and ship’s head.\n• Interview one engineer officer and verify that they were familiar with the loss of propulsion emergency\nresponse plan.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for the loss of propulsion.\nThe records for completed loss of propulsion emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the postponement.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no shipboard emergency plan for the loss of propulsion.\nThe shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for the loss of propulsion.\nAn interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for estimating the predicted drift of a\ndisabled tanker, taking into account the wind, current and ship’s head.\nAn interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with the location and content of the vessel’s loss of\npropulsion emergency response plan.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for a loss of propulsion required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.11.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "failure of electrical power, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the\nshipboard emergency response plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for failure of electrical power\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Documentation, Bridge, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a failure of electrical power in accordance with the\nvessel’s shipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C3 Total electrical power failure (Blackout)\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3.4. Action to take when the ship is disabled but still afloat.\n3.4.3 Understand the drift characteristics of a disabled ship.\nIf propulsion has been lost with no immediate prospect of restoring it, assess the ship’s proximity to navigational or\nother hazards and plot the rate and direction of drift on a suitably scaled chart (paper or electronic), in conjunction\nwith the ship’s records for any previously recorded drift patterns.\nTables 1 to 5 give the ship's heading and drift directions relative to the wind and wave directions, with the ship lying\nwith the wind on the port and starboard sides.\nUse the tables to guide decisions to optimise drift behaviour:\n• •\nPlacing the relative wind on the port or starboard side before momentum and steerage are lost can alter drift\ndirection by up to 60°. This can gain a lot of sea room and might be the best step to positively influence drift\ndirection without calling on outside help.\nIf steerage has been lost, the rate and direction of drift can still be influenced by:\no Giving the ship a list\no Adjusting the trim, increasing or decreasing the existing trim, or even by changing from trim by the\nstern to trim by the head.\no Locking the rudder hard over to the downwind side. (During model testing, locking the rudder hard\nover to the upwind side produced no meaningful change in drift compared to the rudder being\nlocked amidships.).\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\ncoordination of response effort\nresponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property\nthe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities\nthe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts\ninformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment\nreporting and communication procedures on board ship\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for a failure of electrical power\nwhich identifies the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control and, then in the\nshort and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for failure of electrical power may reference:\n• •\nA shipboard procedure for feeding back power from the emergency switchboard to the main switchboard.\nA shipboard procedure for recovering after a black out.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for a failure of electrical power.\nReview the records of completed failure of electrical power emergency response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no\n• •\nThe date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nInterview one navigation officer and verify that they were familiar with a method for estimating the predicted\ndrift of a disabled tanker taking into account the wind, current and ship’s head.\nInterview one engineer officer and verify that they were familiar with the failure of electrical power\nemergency response plan including shipboard procedures for recovering after a blackout.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for the failure of electrical power including any supplementary\nengineering procedures referenced by the plan.\nThe records for completed failure of electrical power emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no shipboard emergency plan for the failure of electrical power available.\nThe shipboard emergency plan was insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for the failure of electrical\npower.\nAn interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process of estimating the predicted drift of a\ndisabled tanker taking into account the wind, current and ship’s head.\nAn interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with the location and content of the vessel’s failure of\nelectrical power emergency response plan.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for a failure of electrical power required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.12.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "steering gear failure, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard\nemergency response plan in accordance with company procedures.\nShort Question Text\nSteering gear failure emergency drill.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Steering Gear, Interview - Deck Officer\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a failure of the steering gear in accordance with the\nvessel’s shipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C2 Steering failure\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 3.4. Action to take when the ship is disabled but still afloat.\n3.4.2 Assess the ship's manoeuvring capability.\nIf it looks like propulsion will be lost, the Master must decide how to manoeuvre the ship to the best advantage to take\nit away from any navigational hazards.\n3.4.2.1 Use the engines\nIf steering has been lost but propulsion is retained, consider the following:\n• •\n• Lock the rudder in a fixed position.\nTests have shown that with full or emergency full astern revolutions the stern of a single screw ship can be\nbrought up into the weather. It will vary by ship, but generally, one the stern has been brought up to the\nweather, it is possible to maintain heading and stern way using lower revolutions. This is a useful option\nwhen closing a lee shore.\nIf the rudder is locked in a hard-over position, it should be possible to keep the ship’s head into the weather\nusing careful engine manoeuvres.\n3.4.3 Understand the drift characteristics of a disabled ship.\nIf propulsion has been lost with no immediate prospect of restoring it, assess the ship’s proximity to navigational or\nother hazards and plot the rate and direction of drift on a suitably scaled chart (paper or electronic), in conjunction\nwith the ship’s records for any previously recorded drift patterns.\nTables 1 to 5 give the ship's heading and drift directions relative to the wind and wave directions, with the ship lying\nwith the wind on the port and starboard sides.\nUse the tables to guide decisions to optimise drift behaviour:\n• •\nPlacing the relative wing on the port or starboard side before momentum and steerage are lost can alter drift\ndirection by up to 60°. This can gain a lot of sea room and might be the best step to positively influence drift\ndirection without calling on outside help.\nIf steerage has been lost, the rate and direction of drift can still be influenced by:\no Giving the ship a list\no Adjusting the trim, increasing or decreasing the existing trim, or even by changing from trim by the\nstern to trim by the head.\no Locking the rudder hard over to the downwind side. (During model testing, locking the rudder hard\nover to the upwind side produced no meaningful change in drift compared to the rudder being\nlocked amidships.).\nIMO: Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\ncoordination of response effort\nresponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property\nthe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities\nthe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts\ninformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment\nreporting and communication procedures on board ship\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 26\n4 In addition to the routine checks and tests prescribed in paragraphs 1 and 2, emergency steering drills shall take\nplace at least once every three months in order to practice emergency steering procedures. These drills shall include\ndirect control within the steering gear compartment, the communications procedure with the navigation bridge and,\nwhere applicable the operation of alternative power supplies.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for steering gear failure which\nidentifies the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control, and then in the short\nand medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan should consider:\n• •\n• Failure of the steering control systems from the navigation bridge.\nA single steering system failure, either electrical or hydraulic.\nA complete failure of all steering systems and or the rudder(s).\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for steering gear failure.\nReview the records of completed emergency response drills for the failure of the steering gear and verify\nthat:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The drill included the testing of the emergency steering systems by direct control.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview one navigation officer and verify that they were familiar with a method for estimating the drift of a\ndisabled tanker taking into account the wind, current and ship’s head.\nIf safe to do so, request that an accompanying officer demonstrate the operation of the emergency steering\nsystem and describes the use of the communication system and alternative power supplies.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for steering gear failure.\nThe records for completed steering gear failure and emergency steering drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• The shipboard emergency plan for steering failure was insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plan for steering gear failure.\nAn interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the process for estimating a vessel’s drift rate taking\ninto account the wind, current and ship's head.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• An officer requested to demonstrate the operation of the emergency steering system was unfamiliar with the\noperation of the emergency steering gear.\nThe emergency steering gear was defective in any respect.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for a steering gear failure required by the company onboard emergency\nresponse procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.13.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plan for", "c": "emergency towing, including the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB), and had drills taken\nplace to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance\nwith company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plan & drills for emergency towing\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Forecastle, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond to an emergency towing situation in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan and Emergency Towing Booklet.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\n5 Towage and salvage\n5.1 General\nIf the ship is disabled and cannot manoeuvre, efforts must be concentrated on staying clear of navigational hazards.\nSee Chapter 3 for more guidance.\nIf the ship is drifting into danger, emergency towage will be needed. The most suitable salvage vessel available\nshould be engaged under a salvage contract designed to save a ship in danger. The choice may be limited by the\ntime available to connect a tow before the ship is endangered.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures.\n1 Purpose\nThe purpose of these Guidelines is to assist owners/operators in preparing ship-specific emergency towing\nprocedures for ships subject to SOLAS regulation II-1/3-4. The procedures should be considered as part of the\nemergency preparedness required by paragraph 8 of part A of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.\n4 Emergency Towing Booklets.\n4.1 The Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB) should be ship specific and be presented in a clear, concise and ready-touse format (booklet, plan, poster, etc.).\n4.3 All procedures developed in accordance with section 5 should be presented in a clear and easy to understand\nformat, which will aid their smooth and swift application in an emergency situation.\n4.4 Comprehensive diagrams and sketches should be available and include the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nassembly and rigging diagrams.\ntowing equipment and strong point locations; and\nequipment and strong point capacities and safe working loads (SWLs).\n4.5 A copy should be kept at hand by the owners/operators in order to facilitate the passing on of information to the\ntowage company as early as possible in the emergency. A copy should also be kept in a common electronic file\nformat, which will allow faster distribution to the concerned parties.\n4.6 A minimum of three copies should be kept on board and located in:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nthe bridge.\na forecastle space; and\nthe ship’s office or cargo control room.\n5.1 Ship-specific procedures should be identified during the ship’s evaluation and entered accordingly in the ETB.\nThe procedures should include, as a minimum, the following:\n1.\na quick-reference decision matrix that summarizes options under various emergency scenarios, such as\nweather conditions (mild, severe), availability of shipboard power (propulsion, on-deck power), imminent\ndanger of grounding, etc.;\n2. organization of deck crew (personnel distribution, equipment distribution, including radios, safety equipment,\netc.);\n3. organization of tasks (what needs to be done, how it should be done, what is needed for each task, etc.);\n4. diagrams for assembling and rigging bridles, tow lines, etc., showing possible emergency towing\narrangements for both fore and aft. Rigged lines should be lead such that they avoid sharp corners, edges\nand other points of stress concentration;\n5. power shortages and dead ship situations, which must be taken into account, especially for the heaving\nacross of heavy towing lines;\n6. a communications plan for contacting the salvage/towing ship . This plan should list all information that the\nship’s master needs to communicate to the salvage/towing ship. This list should include but not be limited to:\n1. damage or seaworthiness;\n2. status of ship steering;\n3. propulsion;\n4. on deck power systems;\n5. on-board towing equipment;\n6. existing emergency rapid disconnection system;\n7. forward and aft towing point locations;\n8. equipment, connection points, strong points and safe working loads (SWL);\n9. towing equipment dimensions and capacities; and\n10. ship particulars;\n7. valuation of existing equipment, tools and arrangements on board the ship for possible use in rigging a\ntowing bridle and securing a towline;\n8. identification of any minor tools or equipment providing significant improvements to the “towability” of the\nship;\n9. inventory and location of equipment on board that can be used during an emergency towing situation;\n10. other preparations (locking rudder and propeller shaft, ballast and trim, etc.); and\n11. other relevant information (limiting sea states, towing speeds, etc.).\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-4\n1 Emergency towing arrangements on tankers\n1.1 Emergency towing arrangements shall be fitted at both ends on board every tanker of not less than 20,000 tonnes\ndeadweight.\n1.2 For tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002:\n.1 the arrangements shall, at all times, be capable of rapid deployment in the absence of main power on the ship to\nbe towed and easy connection to the towing ship. At least one of the emergency towing arrangements shall be prerigged ready for rapid deployment; and\n.2 emergency towing arrangements at both ends shall be of adequate strength taking into account the size and\ndeadweight of the ship, and the expected forces during bad weather conditions. The design and construction and\nprototype testing of emergency towing arrangements shall be approved by the Administration, based on the\nGuidelines developed by the Organization*.\n1.3 For tankers constructed before 1 July 2002, the design and construction of emergency towing arrangements shall\nbe approved by the Administration, based on the Guidelines developed by the Organization*.\n2 Emergency towing procedures on ships\n2.2 Ships shall be provided with a ship-specific emergency towing procedure. Such a procedure shall be carried\naboard the ship for use in emergency situations and shall be based on existing arrangements and equipment\navailable on board the ship.\n2.3 The procedure shall include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ndrawings of fore and aft deck showing possible emergency towing arrangements.\ninventory of equipment on board that can be used for towing.\nmeans and method of communication.\nsample procedures to facilitate the preparation for and conducting of emergency towing operations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific emergency towing procedures contained within an\nEmergency Towing Booklet (ETB).\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB).\nReview the records of completed emergency towing drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview one navigation and one engineer officer to verify that they were familiar with the location of the\nETB and the deployment process for the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the vessel.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard Emergency Towing Booklets.\nThe records for completed emergency towing drills\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no Emergency Towing Booklets available.\nCopies of the ETB were not available on the bridge, in a forecastle space or in the ship’s office or cargo\ncontrol room.\nThe emergency towing procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing procedures.\nAn interviewed navigation or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the location of the ETB or the deployment\nprocess for the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the vessel.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the emergency towing procedures.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for emergency towing required by the company onboard emergency response\nprocedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.14.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the shipboard emergency", "c": "response plan for man overboard, including the launching and recovering the rescue\nboat, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency\nresponse plan in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nMan overboard emergency drill.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats.\nIMO/ICAO International aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual (IAMSAR) Vol III\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a man overboard situation in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft. A Seafarer’s Guide.\nFamiliarisation and Training\nA significant factor in survival craft incidents occurring in the industry has often been identified as a lack of onboard\nfamiliarisation with the equipment fitted. It is imperative that a strong focus be given by the operator to the\nfamiliarisation and training of all ship’s staff in the handling of survival craft, with the aim of minimising risk factors\nassociated with human error.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats.\nANNEX 2 Guidelines on Safety During Abandon Ship Drills Using Lifeboats.\n1.3 Drills must be safe\n1.3.1 Abandon ship drills should be planned, organized and performed so that the recognized risks are minimized\nand in accordance with relevant shipboard requirements of occupational safety and health.\n1.3.2 Drills provide an opportunity to verify that the life-saving system is working and that all associated equipment is\nin place and in good working order, ready for use.\n1.4 Emphasis on learning\nDrills should be conducted with an emphasis on learning and be viewed as a learning experience, not just as a task\nto meet a regulatory requirement to conduct drills. Whether they are emergency drills required by SOLAS or\nadditional special drills conducted to enhance the competence of the crew members, they should be carried out at\nsafe speed. During drills, care should be taken to ensure that everybody familiarizes themselves with their duties and\nwith the equipment. If necessary, pauses should be made during the drills to explain especially difficult elements.\nThe experience of the crew is an important factor in determining how fast a drill or certain drill elements should be\ncarried out.\n1.5 Planning and organizing drills\n1.5.1 The 1974 SOLAS Convention requires that drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there was an\nactual emergency. This means that the entire drill should, as far as possible, be carried out. The point is that, at the\nsame time, it should be ensured that the drill can be carried out in such a way that it is safe in every respect.\nConsequently, elements of the drill that may involve unnecessary risks need special attention or may be excluded\nfrom the drill.\n1.5.2 In preparing for a drill, those responsible should review the manufacturer’s instruction manual to assure that a\nplanned drill is conducted properly. Those responsible for the drill should assure that the crew is familiar with the\nguidance provided in the life-saving system instruction manual.\n1.5.3 Lessons learned in the course of a drill should be documented and made a part of follow-up shipboard training\ndiscussions and planning the next drill session.\n1.5.4 The lowering of a boat with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of a drill that may,\ndepending on the circumstances, involve an unnecessary risk. Such drills should only be carried out if special\nprecautions are observed.\n2.2.2 Procedures for holding safe drills should be included in the Safety Management System (SMS) of the shipping\ncompanies. Detailed procedures for elements of drills that involve a special risk should be evident from workplace\nassessments adjusted to the relevant life-saving appliance.\nIMO/ICAO International aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual (IAMSAR) Vol III\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 19\n3.4.3 Except as provided in paragraphs 3.4.4 and 3.4.5, each lifeboat shall be launched, and manoeuvred in the\nwater by its assigned operating crew, at least once every three months during an abandon ship drill.\n3.4.6 As far as is reasonable and practicable, rescue boats other than lifeboats which are also rescue boats, shall be\nlaunched each month with their assigned crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water. In all cases this requirement\nshall be complied with at least once every 3 months.\n3.4.7 If lifeboat and rescue boat launching drills are carried out with the ship making headway, such drills shall,\nbecause of the dangers involved, be practiced in sheltered waters only and under the supervision of an officer\nexperienced in such drills.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan to identify the actions that vessel\nstaff should take in a man overboard situation.\nThe vessel operator should have developed detailed procedures to identify the actions that vessel staff should take to\nlaunch and recover the rescue boat and to conduct a rescue boat launching drill in a safe manner without\nendangering those involved in the operation.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for man overboard.\nSight, and where necessary review, the ship specific procedure for launching and recovering the rescue\nboat as part of a drill.\nReview the records of completed man overboard and rescue boat launching drills and verify that:\no The latest drill(s) had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill(s) had been recorded in the defined format required by the company\nprocedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill(s) were consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within\nthe Bridge Log Book.\nInterview one navigation officer and verify they were familiar with the ship specific procedure for the\nlaunching and subsequent recovery of the rescue boat.\nInterview one rating and verify that they were familiar with their role as identified in the muster list during a\nman overboard situation.\nIf the vessel had exercised the man overboard and rescue boat launching elements of the man overboard emergency\nresponse drill separately, consider the records of both elements when reviewing the evidence and assessing the\nfamiliarity of the interviewed officer/rating.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The shipboard emergency response plan for man overboard.\nThe ship specific procedure for launching and recovering the rescue boat as part of a drill.\nThe records for completed man overboard and rescue boat launching drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the postponement.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no emergency response plan for man overboard.\nThere was no ship specific procedure for launching and recovering the rescue boat as part of a drill.\nThe shipboard procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency response plan for man overboard.\nAn interviewed navigation officer was unfamiliar with the ship-specific procedure for launching and\nrecovering the rescue boat during a drill.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with their role, as defined by the muster list, during a man overboard\nsituation.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe man overboard drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drills for man overboard and launching the rescue boat required by the company\nprocedures and SOLAS regulation were overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined\ndrill schedule.\nWhere a rescue boat launching and recovery drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions\nand the vessel had notified the company, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.15.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the shipboard emergency", "c": "response plan for recovery of persons from the water, and had drills taken place to test\nthe effectiveness of the shipboard emergency response plan in accordance with\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency response plan & drills for recovery of persons from the water\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Rating, Documentation, Bridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1447 Guidelines for the development of plans and procedures for recovery of persons from the\nwater.\nICS: Recovery of persons from the water. Guidelines for the development of plans and procedures.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will be able to safely recover persons from the water in accordance with the vessel's\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Recovery of persons from the water. Guidelines for the development of plans and procedures.\nIn the majority of cases, the carriage of additional dedicated equipment will probably be unnecessary.\nThese guidelines have been developed to assist companies when preparing to comply with the new SOLAS\nRegulation III/17.1 and should be used together with the IMO Guidelines for the Development of Plans and\nProcedures for the Recovery of Persons from the Water (MSC.1/Circ.1447), the Guide to Recovery Techniques\n(MSC.1/1182) and the Guide for Cold Water Survival (MSC.1/Circ.1185/Rev.1)\nMSC.1/Circ.1447 Guidelines for the development of plans and procedures for recovery of persons from the water.\n1.5 The plans and procedures should be considered as a part of the emergency preparedness plan required by\nparagraph 8 of part A of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code\n2.7 Ship-specific procedures for the recovery of persons from the water should specify the anticipated conditions\nunder which a recovery operation may be conducted without causing undue hazard to the ship and the ship's crew,\ntaking into account, but not limited to:\n1. manoeuvrability of the ship.\n2. freeboard of the ship.\n3. points on the ship to which casualties may be recovered.\n4. characteristics and limitations of equipment intended to be used for recovery operations.\n5. available crew and personal protective equipment (PPE).\n6. wind force, direction and spray.\n7. significant wave height (Hs).\n8. period of waves.\n9. swell; and\n10. safety of navigation.\n3 Competence and familiarization\nDrills should ensure that crew are familiar with the plans, procedures and equipment for recovery of persons from the\nwater. Such drills may be conducted in conjunction with routine man-overboard drills.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 17-1\nRecovery of persons from the water\n1.\nAll ships shall have ship-specific plans and procedures for recovery of persons from the water, taking into\naccount the guidelines developed by the Organization. The plans and procedures shall identify the\nequipment intended to be used for recovery purposes and measures to be taken to minimize the risk to\nshipboard personnel involved in recovery operations...\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan to identify the actions that vessel\nstaff must take to recover persons from the water in a safe manner without further endangering those involved in the\noperation.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plan for recovery of persons from\nthe water\nReview the records of completed recovery from the water drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\n• Interview one rating and verify that they were familiar with the recovery of persons from the water plan and\ntheir expected role in such an emergency response.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of persons from the water.\nThe records for completed recovery of persons from the water drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of persons from the water available.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of persons from the water was insufficiently shipspecific.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency response plan for the recovery of\npersons from the water.\nAn interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the recovery of persons from the water plan and their\nexpected role in such an emergency response.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency response plan for the\nrecovery of persons from the water.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe emergency response drill for recovery of persons from the water required by the company procedures\nwas overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill schedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.16.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans for", "c": "flooding, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of the shipboard emergency\nresponse plans in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plans & drills for flooding\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency planning for\nshipboard emergencies.\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage – A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to a flooding situation in accordance with the vessel’s\nshipboard emergency response plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChecklist C8 Flooding / Hull Failure\nOCIMF/ICS: Peril at Sea and Salvage: A Guide for Masters. Sixth Edition.\n3.4.1 Control accidental flooding\nAny damage causing flooding of the machinery spaces must be dealt with urgently. The consequences of flooding in\nthe machinery spaces can be catastrophic, including:\n• •\n• •\nLoss of buoyancy, compromising the ship’s ability to stay afloat in the conditions.\nLoss of propulsion, power generating capacity, and other safety critical equipment/systems.\nReduced capability of the ship to contain the emergency, e.g. loss of bilge pumps and/or firefighting pumps.\nLoss of the ship.\nIMO Resolution A.1072(28) Revised guidelines for a structure of an integrated system of contingency\nplanning for shipboard emergencies\n3.2.4.12 In summary, the module should guide those responsible for developing the system on what should be\nincluded in emergency plans, namely:\n• •\n• •\n• coordination of response effort.\nresponse procedures for the entire spectrum of possible accident scenarios, including methods that protect\nlife, the marine environment and property.\nthe person or persons identified by title or name as being in charge of all response activities.\nthe communication lines used for ready contact with external response experts.\ninformation concerning the availability and location of response equipment.\n• reporting and communication procedures on board ship.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been\nused.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a shipboard emergency response plan for each of the principal flooding\nscenarios which are appropriate to the vessel type, which will include where applicable, but will not necessarily be\nlimited to:\n• •\n• •\nMachinery space flooding.\nPumproom flooding.\nForecastle space flooding.\nHull breach.\nThe plans will identify the steps that vessel staff must take immediately to bring the situation under control, and then\nin the short and medium-term, to address the dangers to personnel, the environment and property.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\n• Require the vessel to conduct an emergency response drill to test the crew familiarity with each credible\nemergency scenario applicable to the vessel type at a defined frequency.\nRequire that the details of emergency response drills are recorded in a defined format.\nDefine the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the shipboard emergency response plans for the principal flooding\nscenarios which were appropriate to the vessel type, which should include:\no Machinery space flooding.\no Pumproom flooding (where fitted).\no Forecastle space flooding.\no Hull breach/failure.\nReview the records of completed flooding emergency response drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\no Each of the emergency response plans for flooding scenarios applicable to the vessel type had\nbeen exercised within the previous twelve months.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe shipboard emergency response plans for the flooding scenarios applicable to the vessel type.\nThe records for completed flooding emergency response drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions, communications with the company\nrelating to the deferment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no shipboard emergency plan available for one or more of the flooding scenarios applicable to\nthe vessel type.\nThe shipboard emergency plans were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the shipboard emergency plans for flooding situations.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenarios were unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nOne or more of the emergency response drills for a flooding scenario required by the company onboard\nemergency response procedure was overdue or had not been completed in accordance with the defined drill\nschedule.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the company,\nrecord as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.17.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the shipboard emergency plans", "c": "regarding LNG bunker operations, and had drills taken place to test the effectiveness of\nthe shipboard emergency response plans in accordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency plans and drills for LNG bunker operations\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGF Code\nIACS: Rec 142. LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\nObjective\nTo ensure that the crew will respond effectively to an emergency situation involving LNG bunker operations\nin accordance with the vessel’s shipboard emergency response plans.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS: Rec 142 LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\nChapter 1 Section 4.1.3.2 Emergency Response Plan\nAn Emergency Response Plan should be prepared to address cryogenic hazards, potential cold burn injuries to\npersonnel and firefighting techniques for controlling, mitigating and elimination of a gas cloud fire, jet fire and/or an\nLNG pool fire.\nThe Emergency Response Plan should cover all emergency situations identified in the LNG Bunkering Operations\nRisk Assessment and may designate responsibilities for local authorities, hospitals, local fire brigades, PIC, Master\nand selected personnel from the bunkering facility. As a minimum, the following situations should be covered where\nappropriate:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• LNG leakage and spill on the receiving ship, on the bunkering facility or from the LNG transfer system\nGas detection\nFire in the bunkering area\nUnexpected movement of the vessel due to failure or loosening of mooring lines\nUnexpected moving of the truck tanker\nUnexpected venting on the receiving ship or on the bunkering facility\nLoss of power\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details,\nvessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have been used.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\n8.2 The company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.\nIMO: IGF Code\n17 Drills and emergency exercises\nDrills and emergency exercises on board shall be conducted at regular intervals.\nSuch gas-related exercises could include for example:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\ntabletop exercise.\nreview of fuelling procedures based in the fuel handling manual required by 18.2.3.\nresponses to potential contingencies.\ntests of equipment intended for contingency response, and\nreviews that assigned seafarers are trained to perform assigned duties during fuelling and contingency\nresponse.\nGas related exercises may be incorporated into periodical drills required by SOLAS.\nThe response and safety system for hazards and accident control shall be reviewed and tested.\n18 Operation\n18.2.3 the ship shall be provided with operational procedures including a suitably detailed fuel handling manual, such\nthat trained personnel can safely operate the fuel bunkering, storage and transfer systems; and\n18.2.4 the ship shall be provided with suitable emergency procedures.\n18.4.2.1 The fuel handling manual required by 18.2.3 shall include but is not limited to:\n5 firefighting and emergency procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of extinguishing\nagents.\n8 emergency shutdown and emergency release systems, where fitted: and\n9 a description of the procedural actions to take in an emergency situation, such as leakage, fire or potential fuel\nstratification resulting in rollover.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a fuel handling manual for LNG bunkers that includes emergency\nprocedures to identify the actions that vessel staff must take in the short and medium term to address the dangers to\npersonnel, the environment and property in the event of an incident. These emergency procedures may be\nincorporated into an integrated system of shipboard emergency plans\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to:\n• •\nRequire the vessel to conduct each type of emergency response drill applicable to the vessel at a defined\nfrequency.\nRecord the details of emergency response drills in a defined format.\n• Define the action to take if a drill cannot be completed within the required timeframe.\nLNG bunker operations related exercises may be incorporated into other required drills such as fire drills.\nThe emergency response plans should have been developed to identify any actions that require the crew to respond\nin a counter intuitive manner such as identifying hose and pipe coupling connections that open and close in opposite\ndirections from normal couplings in common use.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the emergency procedures contained in the fuel handling manual for\nLNG bunkers.\nReview the records of completed LNG bunker related drills and verify that:\no The latest drill had been completed within the timeframe defined by the drill schedule.\no All drill or exercise scenarios required to be undertaken by company procedures or the fuel\nhandling manual had been completed within the time frame defined by the company.\no The details of the drill had been recorded in the defined format required by the company procedure.\no The date and time of the latest drill was consistent with the vessel’s activities as recorded within the\nBridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel’s fuel handling manual for LNG bunkers.\nThe emergency response plans for LNG bunkers if not contained within the fuel handling manual.\nThe records for completed LNG bunker related drills.\nThe vessel’s Bridge Log Book for the previous twelve months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no fuel handling manual for LNG bunkers available.\nThe fuel handling manual did not include emergency procedures.\nThe emergency procedures were insufficiently ship-specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency procedures contained in the fuel handling\nmanual for LNG bunkers.\nThe drill records were not maintained in the format defined by the company procedure.\nThe drill scenario was unrealistic or inadequate to test the shipboard emergency plan.\nDrill dates were inconsistent with the vessel activities as recorded within the Bridge Log Book.\nThe latest drill was overdue for completion.\nLNG bunkering drill or exercise scenarios required to be undertaken according to the company drill schedule\nhad not been completed within the defined time frame.\nWhere a drill had been deferred due to poor weather or sea conditions and the vessel had notified the\ncompany, record as a comment within the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.18.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures setting out the", "c": "actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank, and was all\nrequired equipment available and in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo leak into double hull spaces.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the crew can respond promptly and effectively in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n12.7 Cargo leaks into double hull tanks\n12.7.1 Action to be taken\nIf hydrocarbon gas is detected in a tank, there are a number of options for maintaining a safe tank atmosphere:\n• •\n• •\n• Continuous ventilation.\nFilling or partially filling with ballast.\nSecuring with P/V valves.\nSecuring with vent valves fitted with flames screens.\nA combination of these.\nThe chosen option will depend on several factors, especially the degree of confidence in the hydrocarbon content of\nthe atmosphere, bearing in mind the potential problems already identified.\nIf inerting, fitting a P/V valve will be a way of pressing up the tank with IG after inerting to less than 8% oxygen.\nWhen ventilating a tank, consider fitting flame screens to allow air to flow safely and maintain a non-flammable\natmosphere in the air space.\nOperators should develop procedures that account for the tank structure and any limitations of the available\natmosphere monitoring system. These procedures should help the crew to choose the most appropriate way to make\nthe atmosphere safe.\nShips should have written procedures on board that set out the steps to take to safely transfer the cargo from the\nballast space.\n12.7.2 Inerting double hull tanks\nThe complexity of the structure in double hull and double bottom tanks makes them more difficult to inert than\nconventional tanks. The operator should use these guidelines as a basis for developing procedures (similar to those\nin section 12.4.7) for inerting such tanks. If possible, the procedures should be developed with the ship builder and be\nbased on actual tests and experiments as well as calculations. They should describe the process for each tank, the\nequipment to be used and its configuration, and the time it takes to reduce the oxygen level in the tank to less than\n8% by volume.\nClearly identify the flexible hoses used for inerting double hull tanks. They should be dedicated solely to this use and\nstowed safely and correctly. The hose string should be electrically continuous. Verify this before putting hoses into\nservice. Confirm that the string is properly earthed before inerting starts.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n10.5.3 Tank leaks within the ship\nA leak from a cargo tank into void or ballast spaces may cause damage to the ship’s structure or equipment. It may\nalso create an explosive atmosphere and a risk to personnel.\nThe actions to be taken may differ depending on the product involved and other circumstances such as the weather,\nbut should as a minimum include the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nIdentify the products involved and the risks associated with them;\nClear the area of all non-essential personnel;\nIdentify the location of the leak;\nTransfer the product in the leaking tank to an empty tank, if possible;\nNotifying port and local authorities and the company, as appropriate; and\nTake remedial action.\nSpills in confined spaces such as pumprooms should, where practicable, first be contained and then treated and\ncollected for safe disposal. An acid spill should be prevented from entering mild steel areas of the ship as rapid\ncorrosion can occur. In extreme cases the consequent hull corrosion can cause the ship to sink.\nLeaks from one cargo tank to another, or multiple leaks where there is a risk of mixing incompatible chemicals,\nshould always be thoroughly investigated and may need to be treated as an emergency.\nWhere time allows, expert advice should be sought on the possible risks involved. A non-cargo space that has had a\nchemical leaking into it should be treated as a cargo space and the same precautions taken. It should be cleaned and\ngas freed before any attempt is made for repairs.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Maintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.4 Tankers required to be fitted with inert gas systems shall comply with the following provisions:\n1.\n2.\n3.\ndouble-hull spaces shall be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of inert gas.\nwhere hull spaces are connected to a permanently fitted inert gas distribution system, means shall be\nprovided to prevent hydrocarbon gases from the cargo tanks entering the double hull spaces through the\nsystem; and\nwhere such spaces are not permanently connected to an inert gas distribution system, appropriate means\nshall be provided to allow connection to the inert gas main.\nIACS UI SC 272 Inert gas supply to double-hull spaces (SOLAS II-2/4.5.5.1)\nDouble-hull spaces required to be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of inert gas as per SOLAS II2/4.5.5.1.4.1 are all ballast tanks and void spaces of double-hull and double-bottom spaces adjacent to the cargo\ntanks, including the forepeak tank and any other tanks and spaces under the bulkhead deck adjacent to cargo tanks,\nexcept cargo pump-rooms and ballast pump-rooms.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo\nleak into a double hull tank. These procedures should address the various options for maintaining a safe atmosphere\nin the tank, including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nIdentifying the cargoes involved and the risks associated with them.\nContinuous ventilation.\nFilling or partially filling with ballast.\nSecuring with P/V valves.\nSecuring with vent valves fitted with flames screens.\nA combination of these.\nProcedures should describe the process for each tank, the equipment to be used and its configuration. They should\nalso provide guidance on how to safely transfer the cargo from the ballast space.\nEquipment required by these procedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Emergency ballast/cargo system connection spool piece.\nEmergency ballast/inert gas system connection spool piece.\nFlexible inert gas hoses.\nP/V valves.\nFlame screens.\nPortable standpipes.\nPortable fans.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary, review the company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event\nof a cargo leak into a double hull tank.\nDuring the tour of the deck, inspect the equipment required by these procedures to verify its availability,\nsuitable stowage and satisfactory condition.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures setting out the\nactions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank, and the location of the required\nequipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.\nIf available, an inventory of the equipment required by these procedures.\nRecords of tests for electrical continuity of flexible hoses designated for inerting double hull tanks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a\ndouble hull tank.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures setting out the actions to be taken\nin the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the location of the equipment required by company\nprocedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of a cargo leak into a double hull tank.\nAn item of equipment required by the company procedures setting out the actions to be taken in the event of\na cargo leak into a double hull tank was:\no not available on board.\no not stowed safely and correctly.\no defective in any respect.\nWhere double-hull spaces were not permanently connected to an inert gas distribution system, there were\nno flexible hoses dedicated solely to inerting double hull tanks.\nThere were no records of tests for electrical continuity of the flexible hoses designated for inerting double\nhull tanks.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.1.19.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the emergency arrangements to pump", "c": "out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding and were these\narrangements prominently marked and in good order?\nShort Question Text\nOBO forward space emergency pumping arrangements\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Bridge, Forecastle, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIACS UI SC 179 Dewatering of forward spaces of bulk carriers (Resolution MSC.188(79))\nObjective\nTo ensure forward ballast tanks and dry spaces on OBO and Ore-Oil combination carriers can be pumped\nout safely in the event of flooding.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS UI SC 179 Dewatering of forward spaces of bulk carriers (Resolution MSC.188(79))\n2.1 The valve specified under SOLAS regulation II-1/12.5.1 (12.6.1)is to be capable of being controlled from the\nnavigation bridge, the propulsion machinery control position or enclosed space which is readily accessible from the\nnavigation bridge or the propulsion machinery control position without travelling exposed freeboard or superstructure\ndecks. In this context, a position which is accessible via an under deck passage, a pipe trunk or other similar means\nof access is not to be taken as being in the \"readily accessible enclosed space\".\n5. Bilge wells are to be provided with gratings or strainers that will prevent blockage of the dewatering system with\ndebris.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter XII Regulation 13.1\nAdditional safety measures for bulk carriers\nAvailability of pumping systems\n(This regulation applies to bulk carriers regardless of their date of construction)\nOn bulk carriers, the means for draining and pumping ballast tanks forward of the collision bulkhead and bilges of dry\nspaces any part of which extends forward of the foremost cargo hold shall be capable of being brought into operation\nfrom a readily accessible enclosed space, the location of which is accessible from the navigation bridge or propulsion\nmachinery control position without traversing exposed freeboard or superstructure decks. Where pipes serving such\ntanks or bilges pierce the collision bulkhead, valve operation by means of remotely operated actuators may be\naccepted, as an alternative to the valve control specified in regulation II-1/12, provided that the location of such valve\ncontrols complies with this regulation.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question is only applicable to OBO and Ore/Oil vessel types.\nThe vessel operator should have developed vessel-specific procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the\ncollision bulkhead in the event of flooding, including guidance on:\n• •\nThe use of the pumps/eductors connected to the systems, their direct suctions and overboard valves.\nThe marking of system valves and controls to ensure correct operation and avoid accidental opening.\nThe vessel-specific instructions for pumping out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in an emergency may be\nincluded as part of the vessel emergency response plan for forecastle space flooding.\nThe remote controls for the system should not be accessed via an under deck passage, a pipe trunk or other similar\nmeans of access.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the collision\nbulkhead in the event of flooding.\nInspect the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead including:\no Bilge wells, suctions etc. in the forecastle spaces.\no Remote controls at the navigation bridge, engine control room or enclosed space accessible from\nthe bridge or engine control room without traversing exposed freeboard or superstructure decks.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their understanding of how the forward spaces would be\npumped out in an emergency utilising the system provided onboard. This should include the sequence of\nopening and closing valves and starting the appropriate pump.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for forecastle space flooding.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of\nflooding.\nThere was no shipboard emergency response plan for forecastle space flooding.\nThe company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding\nwere not ship specific.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with company procedures to pump out the spaces forward of the\ncollision bulkhead in the event of flooding.\n• •\n• The condition of the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of\nflooding was unsatisfactory in any respect which might make the operation difficult or impossible in an\nemergency, such as:\no The suction wells in the forecastle dry spaces were obstructed by stores, ropes etc.\no Bilge wells were not provided with gratings or strainers that would prevent blockage of the\ndewatering system with debris.\no Access to the remote controls was obstructed.\nThe remote controls for the arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead were\nnot:\no At the bridge, engine control room or in a location which was accessible from the bridge or engine\ncontrol room without traversing exposed freeboard or superstructure decks.\no Prominently marked as to their purpose.\nThe arrangements to pump out the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead in the event of flooding were\ndefective in any respect.\n5.2. Fixed Fire Protection Systems", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the starting procedure for the", "c": "emergency fire pump, and were records available to demonstrate that the emergency fire\npump and its location had been maintained and tested in accordance with company\nprocedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency fire pump\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nSteering Gear, Aft Mooring Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to emergency fire pumps for:\n• •\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections)\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of standby arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n2.2.3.4 Oil fuel pipes, which if damaged would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank having\na capacity of 500 litres and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the\ntank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the\nspace in which such the tanks are situated.\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n2.2.3.2.1 Location of the space\nThe space containing the fire pump shall not be contiguous to the boundaries of machinery spaces of category A or\nthose spaces containing main fire pumps. Where this is not practicable, the common bulkhead between the two\nspaces shall be insulated to a standard of structural fire protection equivalent to that required for a control station.\n2.2.3.2.2 Access to the emergency fire pump\nNo direct access shall be permitted between the machinery space and the space containing the emergency fire pump\nand its source of power. When this is impracticable, the Administration may accept an arrangement where the access\nis by means of an airlock with the door of the machinery space being of \"A-60\" class standard and the other door\nbeing at least steel, both reasonably gastight, self-closing and without any hold-back arrangements. Alternatively, the\naccess may be through a watertight door capable of being operated from a space remote from the machinery space\nand the space containing the emergency fire pump and unlikely to be cut off in the event of fire in those spaces. In\nsuch cases, a second means of access to the space containing the emergency fire pump and its source of power\nshall be provided.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 12 – Fixed emergency fire pumps\n2.2.1.2 Pressure at hydrants\nWhen the pump is delivering the quantity of water required by paragraph 2.2.1.1, the pressure at any hydrants shall\nbe not less than the minimum pressure required by chapter II-2 of the Convention.\n2.2.1.3 Suction heads\nThe total suction head and the net positive suction head of the pump shall be determined having due regard to the\nrequirements of the Convention and this chapter on the pump capacity and on the hydrant pressure under all\nconditions of list, trim, roll and pitch likely to be encountered in service…\n2.2.2.1 Starting of diesel engine\nAny diesel-driven power source for the pump shall be capable of being readily started in its cold condition down to the\ntemperature of 0°C by hand (manual) cranking. Where ready starting cannot be assured, if this is impracticable, or if\nlower temperatures are likely to be encountered, and if the room for the diesel driven power source is not heated,\nelectric heating of the diesel engine cooling water or lubricating oil system shall be fitted, to the satisfaction of the\nAdministration. If hand (manual) starting is impracticable, the Administration may permit compressed air, electricity, or\nother sources of stored energy, including hydraulic power or starting cartridges to be used as a means of starting.\nThese means shall be such as to enable the diesel-driven power source to be started at least six times within a\nperiod of 30 min. and at least twice within the first 10 min.\n2.2.2.2 Fuel Tank capacity\nAny service fuel tank shall contain sufficient fuel to enable the pump to run on full load for a least 3 h and sufficient\nreserves of fuel shall be available outside the machinery space of category A to enable the pump to be run on full\nload for an additional 15 h.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the starting and testing of the emergency fire pump.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure access to the emergency fire pump space remains\npossible in all circumstances.\nShip-specific starting instructions for the emergency fire pump in the working language of the ship should be\nprominently displayed adjacent to the equipment. These instructions are not for the use of the qualified engineering\npersonnel, but for others who might be required to start the emergency fire pump in an emergency.\nIf necessary, the emergency fire pump fuel tank should be charged with fuel designed for use in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nThe position and identification of the closing devices for the emergency fire pump fuel supply must be clearly marked.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the emergency\nfire pump.\nReview the ship-specific starting instructions posted adjacent to the emergency fire pump.\nWhere the emergency fire pump location is accessed through the machinery space verify that:\no The airlock doors between the machinery space and the space containing the emergency fire pump\nwere closed with no indication that the doors had been held in the open position.\no The second means of access from the deck was not locked or secured to prevent access from the\noutside.\nVerify that the inlet and outlet valves to the emergency fire pump were clearly marked and open.\n• •\n• •\nProvided it is safe to do so, witness the starting of the emergency fire pump and verify that the pump\nreaches and maintains the required pressure while discharging through the anchor washes or other outlet.\nWhere the emergency fire pump was driven by a diesel engine:\no Sight the level in the emergency fire pump fuel tank.\no Where the vessel was operating in sub-zero temperatures verify that the fuel in the tank was\ndesigned for use in sub-zero temperatures.\no Witness a test of the quick closing valve for the emergency fire pump engine where permitted.\nIf necessary, review maintenance records to verify that testing of the emergency fire pump and quick closing\nvalve had taken place in accordance with the maintenance plan.\nWhere it was not possible to start the emergency fire pump, interview an officer or rating to verify their\nfamiliarity with the manual starting of the emergency fire pump and its diesel engine.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation and testing of the emergency fire pump.\nThe ship-specific procedure for starting the emergency fire pump.\nOnboard records for the testing of the emergency fire pump and, where driven by a diesel engine, the\nengine and the fuel quick closing valve.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for starting and testing the emergency fire pump.\nWhere the access to the emergency fire pump space was through the machinery space:\no One or both air-lock doors were either open or there was evidence that they had been held open.\no The second access door was locked or secured to prevent access to the space from the outer\ndecks in the event of a fire in the machinery space.\nThere were no ship-specific starting instructions posted adjacent to the emergency fire pump.\nThe emergency fire pump sea suction or discharge valves were closed when the pump was designed for\nremote operation.\nWhere fitted, the remote hand pump for operating the emergency fire pump sea suction valve was\ninoperative.\nThe posted starting instructions were unclear or inadequate.\nOfficers and/or ratings were not familiar with the ship-specific starting instructions for the emergency fire\npump.\nThe emergency fire pump diesel engine would not start within three attempts by either the primary or manual\nmeans.\nThe emergency fire pump would not gain suction or generate the required pressure and/or flow without\nmanual intervention beyond that described in the starting instructions.\nThe emergency fire pump or, where fitted, its diesel engine was defective in any respect.\nThere were significant water leaks from the emergency fire pump or its pipework.\nEngineer officers were not familiar with the operating and testing procedures for the emergency fire pump,\nits engine or the fuel quick closing valve.\nThere was not enough fuel in the tank to run for 3 hours or the required level had not been established.\nThere was not enough fuel available both in the tank and outside the space to run the emergency fire pump\nat full load for at least 18 hours (3 + 15 h)\nThe vessel was or had been trading in sub-zero temperatures but the fuel in the tank was not designed for\nuse in sub-zero temperatures.\nThe fuel quick closing valve, where required to be fitted, was not located outside the space or did not\noperate correctly.\nRecords of maintenance and/or testing were not available or incomplete.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose, testing and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s fire dampers, the means of closing the main inlets and outlets\nof all ventilation systems and the means of stopping the power ventilation systems from\noutside the space served?\nShort Question Text\nFire dampers & ventilation stops\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Engineer Officer, Exterior Decks, Forecastle, Aft Mooring Deck, Emergency Headquarters., Interview Rating\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1434 Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to ventilation systems and fire dampers for:\n• •\nQuarterly tests of all fire dampers for local operation.\nAnnual tests of:\no all fire dampers for remote operation, and\no all ventilation controls interconnected with fire-protection systems for proper operation.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 5\n1 Purpose\nThe purpose of this regulation is to limit the fire growth potential in every space of the ship. For this purpose, the\nfollowing functional requirements shall be met:\n.1 means of control for the air supply to the space shall be provided.\n2 Control of air supply and flammable liquid to the space\n2.1 Closing appliances and stopping devices of ventilation\n2.1.1 The main inlets and outlets of all ventilation systems shall be capable of being closed from outside the spaces\nbeing ventilated. The means of closing shall be easily accessible as well as prominently and permanently marked and\nshall indicate whether the shutoff is open or closed.\n2.1.2 Power ventilation of accommodation spaces, service spaces, cargo spaces, control stations and machinery\nspaces shall be capable of being stopped from an easily accessible position outside the space being served. This\nposition shall not be readily cut off in the event of a fire in the spaces served.\n2.2 Means of control in machinery spaces\n2.2.1 Means of control shall be provided for opening and closure of skylights, closure of openings in funnels which\nnormally allow exhaust ventilation and closure of ventilator dampers.\n2.2.2 Means of control shall be provided for stopping ventilating fans. Controls provided for the power ventilation\nserving machinery spaces shall be grouped so as to be operable from two positions, one of which shall be outside\nsuch spaces. The means provided for stopping the power ventilation of the machinery spaces shall be entirely\nseparate from the means provided for stopping ventilation of other spaces.\n2.2.3 Means of control shall be provided for stopping forced and induced draught fans…\n2.2.4 The controls required in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 and in regulation 4.2.2.3.4 shall be located outside the space\nconcerned so they will not be cut off in the event of fire in the space they serve.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1434 Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2\nRegulation II-2/5.2.1.1 Closing appliances and stopping devices of ventilation\n2. Where a battery room ventilator is fitted with a closing device, then a warning notice stating, for example \"This\nclosing device is to be kept open and only closed in the event of fire or other emergency – Explosive gas\", should be\nprovided at the closing device to mitigate the possibility of inadvertent closing\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 14\n2.2.3 The maintenance plan shall include at least the following fire protection system and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances, where installed:\n.5 ventilation systems, including fire and smoke dampers, fans and their controls.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which:\n• •\n• Defined the frequency of inspections, tests and maintenance of fire dampers, skylights, closing devices and\nremote fan stops.\nRequired the vessel to identify each closing device for ventilation inlet or outlet and determine whether it\nshould be open or closed while conducting cargo operations.\nRequired each closing device for ventilation inlet or outlet to be marked with its required position of either\nopen or closed while in port and conducting cargo operations.\nWhen determining whether a closing device for ventilation inlet or outlets should be closed in port the following should\nbe considered:\n• •\nThe potential build-up of flammable or explosive gas within a space.\nThe potential build-up of heat from items such as laundry driers.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the vessel specific list of closing devices for ventilation inlets or outlets\nand their required status while conducting cargo operations.\nInspect a representative sample of ventilation closing devices found onboard and verify that they were in\ngood order, operating freely and clearly marked with:\no The spaces they served.\no Their open/shut positions.\n• •\n• o\no\nAny required warning notices e.g. battery lockers.\nTheir required position when conducting cargo operations.\nSight the remote stops for accommodation and machinery space fans and verify that the items served by\neach remote stop were clearly identified.\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out in the maintenance\nplan, confirm fan stops have been tested as required by the company procedure.\nInterview one officer and one rating to verify their familiarity, subject to their normal operational and\nemergency duties, with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing\ndevices and remote fan stops.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on fire dampers, skylights, closing devices\nand remote fan stops.\nThe vessel specific list of closing devices for ventilation inlets or outlets and their required status while\nconducting cargo operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The Master, officers or crew were not familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s fire\ndampers, skylights, closing devices or remote fan stops.\nClosing devices did not operate freely.\nClosing devices were ineffective due to corrosion, worn gaskets, seized dogs etc.\nClosing devices were not clearly marked with the spaces they served or their open/shut positions.\nClosing devices were not marked with required warning notices e.g. battery lockers.\nClosing devices were not marked with the required position when conduction cargo operations.\nAn interviewed officer or rating was not familiar with the required position of each closing device while\nconducting cargo operations.\nAccess to closing devices or fan stops was obstructed.\nRemote operated closing devices were found to be inhibited or prevented from closing fully by obstructions.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include fire dampers, skylights, closing devices and remote fan stops or all the required inspections,\ntests and maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing devices and remote fan stops indicated that\nactions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe vessel’s fire dampers, skylights, closing devices or remote fan stops were defective in any way.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system, and was the equipment in good\nworking order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nFixed fire detection and fire alarm system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Electrician / ETO, Bridge, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: IGF Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n5.8 Automatic fire detection systems\n5.8.1 General\nAutomatic fire detection and alarm systems alert personnel so they can respond promptly to a fire with the aim of\nsaving lives and property. These systems may have one or more circuits connected to automatic fire detectors and\nmanual activation points. They may also have one or more indicating circuits connected to alarm signals, including\ncontrol panel indicator and warning lamps, outdoor flashing lights, bells and horns.\n5.8.2 Types of fire detectors\nAutomatic detection systems consist of mechanical, electrical or electronic devices that detect environmental\nchanges created by fire or by toxic or combustible gases. Fire detectors operate on one of three principles: sensitivity\nto heat, to smoke or gaseous by-products of combustion, or to flame radiation.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems for:\n• •\n• Weekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 7\n1 Purpose\nThe purpose of this regulation is to detect a fire in the space of origin and to provide alarm for safe escape and firefighting activity. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nfixed fire detection and fire alarm system installations shall be suitable for the nature of the space, fire\ngrowth potential and potential generation of smoke and gases.\nmanually operated call points shall be placed effectively to ensure a readily accessible means of notification;\nand\nfire patrols shall provide an effective means of detecting and locating fires and alerting the navigation bridge\nand fire teams.\n2 General requirements\n2.1 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.\n3.2 The function of fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems shall be periodically tested to the satisfaction of the\nAdministration by means of equipment producing hot air at the appropriate temperature, or smoke or aerosol particles\nhaving the appropriate range of density or particle size, or other phenomena associated with incipient fires to which\nthe detector is designed to respond.\n4 Protection of machinery\n4.1 Installation\nA fixed fire detection and fire alarm system shall be installed in:\n.1 periodically unattended machinery spaces; and\n.2 machinery spaces where:\n.2.1 the installation of automatic and remote-control systems and equipment has been approved in lieu of continuous\nmanning of the space; and\n.2.2 the main propulsion and associated machinery including sources of main source of electrical power are provided\nwith various degrees of automatic or remote control and are under continuous manned supervision from a control\nroom; and\n.3 enclosed spaces containing incinerators\n5 Protection of accommodation and service spaces and control stations\n5.5 Cargo ships\nAccommodation and service spaces …. of cargo ships shall be protected by a fixed fire detection and fire alarm\nsystem and/or an automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system as follows depending on a protection\nmethod adopted in accordance with regulation 9.2.3.1. (i.e. depending upon the type of internal divisional bulkheads)\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 9 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems\n2.1.2.4 The system may be arranged with output signals to other fire safety systems including:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\npaging systems, fire alarm or public address systems.\nfan stops.\nfire doors.\nfire dampers.\nsprinkler systems.\nsmoke extraction systems.\nlow-location lighting systems.\n8. fixed local application fire-extinguishing systems.\n9. closed circuit television (CCTV) systems; and\n10. other fire safety systems.\n2.3.1.1 Detectors shall be operated by heat, smoke or other products of combustion, flame, or any combination of\nthese factors. Detectors operated by other factors indicative of incipient fires may be considered by the Administration\nprovided that they are no less sensitive than such detectors.\n2.3.1.6 All detectors shall be of a type such that they can be tested for correct operation and restored to normal\nsurveillance without the renewal of any component.\n2.5.1.1 The activation of any detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire detection\nalarm signal at the control panel and indicating units. If the signals have not been acknowledged within 2 min, an\naudible fire alarm shall be automatically sounded throughout the crew accommodation and service spaces, control\nstations and machinery spaces of category A. This alarm sounder system need not be an integral part of the\ndetection system.\n2.5.1.4 Clear information shall be displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about the spaces covered and the\nlocation of the sections.\n2.5.2 Testing\nSuitable instructions and component spares for testing and maintenance shall be provided. Detectors shall be\nperiodically tested using equipment suitable for the types of fires to which the detector is designed to respond.\nIMO: IGF Code\n11.7.1 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code shall be provided for\nthe fuel storage hold spaces and the ventilation trunk for fuel containment system below deck, and for all other rooms\nof the fuel gas system where fire cannot be excluded.\n11.7.2 Smoke detectors alone shall not be considered sufficient for rapid detection of a fire.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the operation and maintenance of the fixed fire detection\nand fire alarm system which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe frequency of testing individual detectors.\nThe method of testing different types of detectors.\nThe frequency of testing any output signals to other fire safety systems.\nThe frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms on the bridge or in the continuously manned central\ncontrol station.\nThe actions to be taken to ensure safety is not diminished if a zone is isolated. The main machinery spaces\nshould not be operated in the unattended status with any zone or detector in the space isolated.\nAny areas not covered by the fire detection system that required regular fire patrols.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the operation, testing and\nmaintenance requirements for the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system.\nInspect the central control station for the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system and verify that:\no The system was fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\no Where the spaces containing the fire alarm main or repeater control panels were not continuously\nmanned there was no delay in sounding a fire alarm.\no\n• •\n• •\n• Clear information was displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about the spaces covered\nand the location of the sections.\no All zones and detectors were active unless a documented work process was taking place which\nrequired the temporary isolation of a zone or sensor.\nReview inspection and testing data available at the central control station and verify that:\no Detector testing had been completed at the defined frequency.\no Fire safety system tests had been completed at the required frequency.\no The emergency power supply had been verified as functional.\nVerify that the correct testing devices were available to test the types of fire detectors provided onboard.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nWhere the fire detection and alarm system was noted to be defective, verify that the machinery space had\nnot been operated in the unattended status since the system had been reported as defective.\nInterview the responsible officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The purpose, operation and testing of the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system.\no Any delay in sounding the fire alarm programmed into the alarm system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which defined the requirements for operating and testing the fixed fire detection\nand fire alarm system\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system.\nThe inspection, calibration and maintenance records for the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system.\nThe Engine Room Logbook.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the operation and maintenance of the fixed fire detection\nand fire alarm system\nThe Master or officers were not familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed fire\ndetection and fire alarm system\nThe responsible officer was not familiar with the maintenance and testing of the fixed fire detection and fire\nalarm system.\nThe vessel was not provided with the fire detector testing equipment appropriate to each type of fire/smoke\ndetector in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.\nInformation was not displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about the spaces covered and the\nlocation of the sections.\nWhere the fire alarm main or repeater control panels were in a space that was not continuously manned\nthere was a delay between a fire being detected and the fire alarms sounding.\nThe fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was indicating a fault.\nThe fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was not operational.\nOne or more individual fire detector sensor was covered or disabled in any manner.\nThe machinery space had been operated in the unattended status whilst a zone was isolated, or the fire\ndetector and alarm system was defective.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the fixed fire detection and fire alarm system or all the required inspections, tests and\nmaintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe responsible officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and\nfirefighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nSuitable instructions or component spares for testing and maintenance were not available\n• •\n• Inspection of the vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system indicated that actions recorded in the\nplan had not in fact taken place.\nThe vessel’s fixed fire detection and fire alarm system was defective in any way.\nWhere there was evidence that fire rounds had been carried out during the hours of darkness by the\ndesignated bridge lookout, address this issue under question 4.3.1.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment in\ngood working order and available for immediate use, with the release procedure and\noperating instructions displayed at the control stations?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery space fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1318 Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing\nsystems.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n5.3.2.2 Carbon dioxide\nA CO2 system normally consists of a battery of large cylinders. The gas is piped from the cylinder manifold to diffusing\nnozzles. Before the CO2 is released, an alarm should warn personnel in the compartment and give them time to\nevacuate.\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1318 Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing\nsystems.\nThese Guidelines provide the minimum recommended level of maintenance and inspections for fixed carbon dioxide\nfire-extinguishing systems on all ships and are intended to demonstrate that the system is kept in good working order\nas specified in SOLAS regulation II-2/14.2.1.2. These Guidelines are intended to supplement the fire-extinguishing\nsystem manufacturer’s approved maintenance instructions. Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be\nperformed by competent crewmembers, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in the\nmaintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance should be completed by trained personnel.\nFixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems should be kept in good working order and readily available for\nimmediate use. Maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship’s maintenance plan\nhaving due regard to ensuring the reliability of the system. The onboard maintenance plan should be included in the\nship’s safety management system and should be based on the system manufacturer’s recommendations including:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nmaintenance and inspection procedures and instructions.\nrequired schedules for periodic maintenance and inspections.\nlisting of recommended spare parts; and\n4.\nrecords of inspections and maintenance, including corrective actions taken to maintain the system in\noperable condition.\n(These guidelines set out requirements for:\n• •\n• Monthly inspections.\nAnnual inspections.\nMaintenance at each intermediate/periodical and renewal survey.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n4.1.1 A fixed fire extinguishing system required by paragraph 5 below may be any of the following systems:\n.1 a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety Systems Code (i.e. a carbon\ndioxide system)\nMachinery spaces\n5.1.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units shall be provided with any one of the fixed\nfire-extinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1. In each case, if the engine and boiler rooms are not entirely separate, or\nif fuel oil can drain from the boiler room into the engine-room, the combined engine and boiler rooms shall be\nconsidered as one compartment.\n5.2.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing internal combustion machinery shall be provided with one of the fixed fireextinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1.\nCargo pumprooms\n9.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nEach cargo pump-room shall be provided with one of the following fixed fire-extinguishing systems operated from a\nreadily accessible position outside the pump-room. Cargo pumprooms shall be provided with a system suitable for\nmachinery spaces of category A.\n9.1.1 A carbon dioxide system complying with the provisions the Fire Safety Systems Code and with the following:\n.1 the alarms giving audible warning of the release of fire-extinguishing medium shall be safe for use in a flammable\ncargo vapour/air mixture; and\n.2 a notice shall be exhibited at the controls stating that due to the electrostatic ignition hazard, the system is to be\nused only for fire extinguishing and not for inerting purposes.\nIMO: FSS Code.\nChapter 5 Fixed gas fire extinguishing systems\n2.1.1.3 Means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the quantity of the fire-extinguishing medium in the\ncontainers.\n2.1.3.2 Means shall be provided for automatically giving audible and visual warning of the release of the fire\nextinguishing medium into.…. spaces in which personnel normally work or to which they have access…\nThe pre-discharge alarm shall be automatically activated (e.g. by opening of the release cabinet door).\n2.1.3.3 The means of control of any fixed gas fire-extinguishing system shall be readily accessible, simple to operate\nand…. At each location there shall be clear instructions relating to the operation of the system having regard to the\nsafety of personnel.\n2.2.2.2 …. If the box containing the controls is to be locked, a key to the box shall be in a break-glass type enclosure\nconspicuously located adjacent to the box.\nInspection Guidance\nIf the CO2 bottle room is locked, a key to the door should be in a break-glass type enclosure conspicuously located\nadjacent to the door.\nInstructions for safe entry into the CO2 room should be posted at each entrance and should include, but not be limited\nto:\n• •\n• •\nStarting the ventilation fan.\nWaiting for a set period before entering.\nThe use of a personal gas monitor.\nMaking notification of entry and exit\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances which will include the fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Review the CO2 space safe entry instructions.\n• •\n• •\n• Inspect the space(s) containing the machinery space fixed firefighting system carbon dioxide bottles.\nInspect the control station(s) for releasing the machinery space carbon dioxide fixed firefighting system and\nreview the operating instructions.\nReview the inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the system.\nNote. On CO2 systems there are ‘pins’ in the activation assembly, and traditionally, these pins had to be removed for\nthe system to be ready for immediate use. On some modern systems, these ‘pins’ have to be left ‘in’ for the system to\nbe ready for immediate use. When inspecting the CO2 systems, the inspector should determine from the\naccompanying officer whether the pins should be ‘in’ or ‘out’ for the system to be ready for immediate use. If in any\ndoubt reference should be made to the manufacturer's operating instructions.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance for the machinery space fixed carbon dioxide firefighting\nsystem.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no safety procedures for entering the CO2 space posted at each entrance door.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the safety precautions for entering the CO2 space.\nThe CO2 space or release cabinets were locked but there were no keys provided.\nThe machinery space carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system release procedure, operating instructions and\nwarning notices were not posted at the release station.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system or all the required inspections, tests\nand maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed carbon\ndioxide fire extinguishing system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in\nthe maintenance plan had not taken place.\nThe machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system was defective in any respect.\nThe machinery space carbon dioxide fixed fire extinguishing system was not ready for immediate use for\nany reason, such as, branch pipes blanked, nozzles or control levers inhibited, etc.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system, and\nwas the equipment in good working order, available for immediate use, and with\noperating instructions clearly displayed at the control stations?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1312 Revised guidelines for the performance and testing criteria\nand survey of foam concentrates for fixed fire-extinguishing systems.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidelines\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 5 Fire Protection\n5.3.2.1.1 Categories of foam\nTwo categories of foam concentrate are currently in use.\nProtein foam concentrates are used at 3-6% by volume concentration in water. They include:\n• •\n• Protein foam (P) made from hydrolysed protein materials.\nFluoroprotein foam (FP) with added fluorinated surface-active agents.\nAlcohol resistant fluoroprotein foam (FPAR) which is resistant to break down when applied to the surface of\nalcohol or other solvents.\nSynthetic foam concentrates are used at 1-6% by volume concentration in water. They include:\n• •\nAqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), based on a mixture of hydrocarbon and fluorinated surface-active\nagents.\nAlcohol Resistant Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF-AR) for use with alcohols and fuels blended with\nlarge amounts of alcohol.\nTankers that handle biofuel or ethyl alcohol should use alcohol resistant foams.\n5.3.2.1.3 Compatibility and storage\nDifferent foam concentrates are generally incompatible with each other and should not be mixed in storage.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed high-expansion foam systems for:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly tests and inspections\nQuarterly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1312 Revised guidelines for the performance and testing criteria, and survey of foam concentrates\nfor fixed fire-extinguishing systems.\n1.1 Application\n…These Guidelines also apply to foam concentrates for fixed foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery spaces\naccording to chapter 6 of the FSS Code and to portable foam applicators according to chapter 4 of the FSS\nCode. These Guidelines do not apply to the foam generating equipment, only the foam concentrate.\n4 Periodical controls of foam concentrates stored on board\nFor periodical control of foam concentrates, the tests under paragraphs 4.1 to 4.7 should be performed by the\nshipowner or operator. They should be carried out at laboratories or authorized service suppliers acceptable to the\nAdministration.\n4.7 Chemical stability test for protein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates\nProtein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates should be subjected to a stability test with acetone. A foam\nsolution should be prepared at the approved concentration and gently applied to the surface of a tray containing\nacetone. The concentrate is deemed to fail the test if the foam solution mixes with the acetone.\n5 Intervals of periodical controls\nExcept for tests in accordance with paragraph 4.7 the first periodical control of foam concentrates should be\nperformed not more than 3 years after being supplied to the ship, and after that, every year. The tests required by\nparagraph 4.7 should be performed prior to delivery to the ship and annually thereafter\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n4.1.1 A fixed fire extinguishing system required by paragraph 5 below may be any of the following systems:\n.2 a fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety Systems\nCode\nMachinery spaces\n5.1.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units shall be provided with any one of the fixed\nfire-extinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1. In each case, if the engine and boiler rooms are not entirely separate, or\nif fuel oil can drain from the boiler room into the engine-room, the combined engine and boiler rooms shall be\nconsidered as one compartment.\n5.2.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing internal combustion machinery shall be provided with one of the fixed fireextinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1.\nCargo pump rooms\n9.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nEach cargo pump-room shall be provided with one of the following fixed fire-extinguishing systems operated from a\nreadily accessible position outside the pump-room. Cargo pump rooms shall be provided with a system suitable for\nmachinery spaces of category A.\n9.1.2 A high-expansion foam system complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety Systems Code, provided that\nthe foam concentrate supply is suitable for extinguishing fires involving the cargoes carried.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 6\n3 Fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems.\n3.1.1 The system shall be capable of manual release.\n3.1.7 means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the quantity of foam concentrate and take periodic control\nsamples for foam quality.\n3.1.8 Operating instructions for the system shall be displayed at each operating position.\n3.1.15 Onboard procedures shall be established to require personnel re-entering the protected space after a system\ndischarge to wear breathing apparatus to protect them from oxygen deficient air and products of combustion\nentrained in the foam blanket.\n3.1.20 Machinery spaces, cargo pump rooms…. Shall be provided with audible and visible alarms within the\nprotected space warning of the release of the system. The alarms shall operate for the length of time needed to\nevacuate the space, but in no case less than 20 seconds.\nInspection Guidance\nIf the fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system also provides protection to the cargo pump room, the foam\nconcentrate must be suitable for extinguishing fires involving the cargoes carried.\nThe operator should have developed procedures to require personnel re-entering the protected space after a system\ndischarge to wear breathing apparatus to protect them from oxygen deficient air and products of combustion\nentrained in the foam blanket.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances which will include the fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system. This plan\nmay be integrated into the ship’s computerised planned maintenance system or may stand alone. The plan should\ninclude the actions to be taken monthly, quarterly, annually (including testing foam concentrates) and five-yearly to\nensure the system is kept in good working order and available for immediate use.\nThe first test of foam concentrates should be performed not more than 3 years after the date of manufacture, and\nafter that, every year. In addition, for protein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates a stability test should be\nperformed prior to delivery to the ship and annually thereafter.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Inspect the space(s) containing the machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system\nfoam concentrate tanks(s), pump(s) and the system controls and verify that:\no The system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, were posted near the\ncontrol station.\no\n• •\n• The system valves were clearly identified, and the system instructions indicated their required\nstatus in the standby and operational conditions.\no A copy of the foam concentrate annual test certificate indicated that it was fit for continued use.\no Where the system also protected a cargo pump room, the foam contained in the tank was certified\nas compatible with the cargo being carried.\no The foam tank was filled to the required level\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan, including:\no The annual foam concentrate test results.\no The five-yearly test of foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the fixed highexpansion foam fire extinguishing system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the machinery space fixed high-expansion\nfoam fire extinguishing system, including:\no The annual foam concentrate test results.\no The five-yearly test of foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices.\nThe system manual showing the quantity of foam concentrate required to be in the storage tank to meet the\nsystem design criteria.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system release procedure, operating\ninstructions and warning notices, in the working language of the ship, were not posted at the release station.\nThe valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their purpose and required status during\nsystem operation.\nThe foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required time frame.\nThe foam concentrate test certificate indicated that the foam was not fit for continued use.\nWhere the system also provided protection for a cargo pump room, the foam concentrate was incompatible\nwith the cargo being carried and no alternative arrangement, to the satisfaction of the Flag Administration,\nhad been provided.\nThe foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices had not been tested as required during five yearly\nservicing.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system or all the\nrequired inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s machinery space\nfixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system indicated\nthat actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe machinery space fixed high-expansion foam fire extinguishing system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system,\nand was the equipment in good working order and available for immediate use, with\noperating instructions clearly displayed at the control stations?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Engine Room, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1516 Amendments to the revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection\nsystems and appliances.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1165 Revised guidelines for the approval of equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for\nmachinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n5.3.1.2 Water mist\nWater mist fire protection systems use a spray mist to absorb heat and displace oxygen. They are effective in\naccommodation spaces and areas within the engine room. These systems consist of a water supply connected to an\natomising distribution system that can deliver a water mist through one or more nozzles.\nMSC/Circ.1165 Revised guidelines for the approval of equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for\nmachinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms.\n10. The system should be capable of manual release.\n16. The system should be supplied by both main and emergency sources of power and should be provided with an\nautomatic change-over switch. The emergency power supply should be provided from outside the protected\nmachinery space.\n17. The system should be provided with a redundant means of pumping. The capacity of the redundant means\nshould be sufficient to compensate for the loss of any single supply pump. The system should be fitted with a\npermanent sea inlet and be capable of continuous operation using seawater.\n21. The system operation controls should be available at easily accessible positions outside the spaces to be\nprotected and should not be liable to be cut off by a fire in the protected spaces.\n23. A means for testing the operation of the system for assuring the required pressure and flow should be provided.\n24. Activation of any water distribution valve should give a visual and audible alarm in the protected space and at a\ncontinuously manned central control station. An alarm in the central control station should indicate the specific valve\nactivated.\n25. Operating instructions for the system should be displayed at each operating position.\n27. Additives should not be used for the protection of normally occupied spaces unless they have been approved for\nfire protection service by an independent authority. The approval should consider possible adverse health effects to\nexposed personnel, including inhalation toxicity.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\nAs amended by\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1516 Amendments to the revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire\nprotection systems and appliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed. The quality of water in automatic sprinkler systems is of particular\nimportance and should be maintained in accordance with manufacturer guidelines. Records of water quality should\nbe maintained on board in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing system:\n• •\nWeekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\n• •\n• •\nQuarterly tests\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing\nTen-year servicing, including a hydrostatic test and internal examination for gas and water pressure\ncylinders).\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n4.1.1 A fixed fire extinguishing system required by paragraph 5 below may be any of the following systems:\n.3 a fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety Systems\nCode.\nMachinery spaces\n5.1.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units shall be provided with any one of the fixed\nfire-extinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1. In each case, if the engine and boiler rooms are not entirely separate, or\nif fuel oil can drain from the boiler room into the engine-room, the combined engine and boiler rooms shall be\nconsidered as one compartment.\n5.2.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nMachinery spaces of category A containing internal combustion machinery shall be provided with one of the fixed fireextinguishing systems in paragraph 4.1.\nCargo pump rooms\n9.1 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems\nEach cargo pump-room shall be provided with one of the following fixed fire-extinguishing systems operated from a\nreadily accessible position outside the pump-room. Cargo pump rooms shall be provided with a system suitable for\nmachinery spaces of category A.\n9.1.3 A fixed pressure water-spraying system complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety Systems Code.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 7 Fixed pressure water-spraying and water-mist fire-extinguishing systems\n2.1 Fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing systems\nFixed-pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms shall be\napproved by the Administration based on the guidelines developed by the Organization.\n2.2 Equivalent water mist fire-extinguishing systems\nWater mist fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms shall be approved by the\nAdministration based on the guidelines developed by the Organization.\nRefer to the Revised Guidelines for the approval of equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for machinery\nspaces and cargo pump-rooms (MSC/Circ.1165), as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and\nfirefighting systems and appliances which should include the vessel’s fixed pressure water-spray or water-mist\nextinguishing system. This plan may be integrated into the ship’s computerised planned maintenance system or may\nstand alone. The plan should include the actions to be taken weekly, monthly, annually, five-yearly and ten-yearly\n(including a hydrostatic test and internal examination for gas and water pressure cylinders), to ensure the system is\nkept in good working order and available for immediate use.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nInspect the space(s) containing the fixed pressure water-spray equipment and the system controls and verify\nthat:\no The system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, were posted near the\ncontrol station.\no The system valves were clearly identified, and the system instructions indicated their required\nstatus in the standby and operational conditions.\no The system was maintained at the correct pressure.\no Inlet and outlet valves were correctly set.\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan, including quarterly system water quality assessments.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the fixed\npressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist fire extinguishing system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the machinery space fixed pressure waterspraying fire extinguishing system, including quarterly system water quality assessments.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist\nfire-extinguishing system release procedure, operating instructions and warning notices were not posted at\nthe release stations in the working language of the ship.\nThe valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their purpose and required status during\nsystem operation.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist\nfire extinguishing system or, all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nThere were no records of quarterly system water quality assessments, or records showed the system\ncontents did not meet the manufacturers’ water quality guidelines.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed pressure\nwater-spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist fire extinguishing system\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand firefighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water\nmist fire extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken\nplace.\nThe machinery space fixed pressure water-spraying fire extinguishing system or the equivalent water mist\nfire extinguishing system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fire pumps, fire main, fire main isolating valves and fire hydrants, and was\nthe system and its components in good working order and available for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nFire pumps, fire main, fire main isolating valves and fire hydrants\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Engine Room, Exterior Decks, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n5.3.1.1 Water\nAll tankers have a firefighting system that consists of pumps permanently connected to the sea, a fire main with\nhydrant points, fire hoses with couplings and jet nozzles or preferably jet/spray nozzles. Hydrants are located to\nensure that two jets of water can reach any part of the ship.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fire mains, fire pumps and hydrants for:\n• •\n• Monthly tests and inspections.\nQuarterly tests and inspections.\nAnnual tests and inspections.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n2.1.1 General\nThe arrangement of pipes and hydrants shall be such as to avoid the possibility of freezing. Suitable drainage\nprovisions shall be provided for fire main piping. Isolation valves shall be installed for all open deck fire main\nbranches used for purposes other than firefighting.\n2.1.2 Ready availability of water supply\n2.1.2.2 With a periodically unattended machinery space or when only one person is required on watch, there shall be\nimmediate water delivery from the fire main system at a suitable pressure, either by remote starting of one of the\nmain fire pumps with remote starting from the navigating bridge and fire control station, if any, or permanent\npressurization of the fire main system by one of the main fire pumps ….\n2.1.4.1 Isolating valves to separate the section of the fire main within the machinery space containing the main fire\npump or pumps from the rest of the fire main shall be fitted in an easily accessible and tenable position outside the\nmachinery spaces.\n2.1.4.3 Relief valves shall be provided in conjunction with fire pumps if the pumps are capable of developing a\npressure exceeding the design pressure of the water service pipes, hydrants and hoses. These valves shall be so\nplaced and adjusted as to prevent excessive pressure in any part of the fire main system.\n2.1.4.4 In tankers, isolation valves shall be fitted in the fire main at poop front in a protected position and on the tank\ndeck at intervals of not more than 40 m to preserve the integrity of the fire main system in case of fire or explosion.\n2.1.5 Number and position of hydrants\n2.1.5.1 The number and position of hydrants shall be such that at least two jets of water not emanating from the same\nhydrant, one of which shall be from a single length of hose, may reach any part of the ship normally accessible to the\npassengers or crew while the ship is being navigated….\n2.2 Fire pumps\n2.2.1 Pumps accepted as fire pumps\nSanitary, ballast, bilge or general service pumps may be accepted as fire pumps, provided that they are not normally\nused for pumping oil and that if they are subject to occasional duty for the transfer or pumping of oil fuel, suitable\nchange-over arrangements are fitted.\n2.2.2 Number of fire pumps\nShips shall be provided with independently driven fire pumps as follows:\n.2 in cargo ships of: 1,000 gross tonnage and upwards at least two\n2.2.3.3 Additional pumps for cargo ships\nIn addition, in cargo ships where other pumps, such as general service, bilge and ballast, etc., are fitted in a\nmachinery space, arrangements shall be made to ensure that at least one of these pumps, having the capacity and\npressure required by paragraphs 2.1.6.2 and 2.2.4.2, is capable of providing water to the fire main.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of fire\npumps, fire mains, isolating valves and hydrants which defined:\n• •\nThe frequency of inspection, testing and maintenance of the system and its components.\nThe actions to be taken to ensure the ready availability of the systems in sub-zero temperatures.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Provided it is safe to do so, witness the remote starting of a fire pump from the bridge or fire control station\nand verify that the pump reaches and maintains the required pressure while discharging through the anchor\nwashes or other outlet.\nInspect the deck fire main, particularly on the underside, for external indications of corrosion and for\npatching or accelerated wear caused by rope abrasion.\nInspect the fire pumps and verify that the suction and delivery valves were open.\nInspect the fire main in the machinery space for external indications of corrosion and for patching.\nRequest an accompanying crew member to randomly check the fire hydrants and fire main isolating valves\nto ensure they operate freely.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the fire main system with reference to:\no Starting the fire pumps.\no The purpose and location of the fire main isolating valves.\no The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck fire main.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the fire mains, fire pumps, isolating valves\nand hydrants.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe fire pumps could not be started remotely from the navigating bridge or fire control station.\nThere was no means to verify the delivery pressure on the fire main either on the navigating bridge or at the\nfire control station.\nFire hydrant valves or fire main isolating valves did not operate freely.\nFire main isolation valves were found to be closed.\nThere was hard rust, deterioration or temporary repairs to the fire main pipework.\nThe fire pump suction or delivery valves were found to be closed\nThe fire hydrant or fire main isolating valves were not clearly marked.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:\no Starting the fire pumps.\no The purpose and location of the isolating valves.\no The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck fire main.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the fire mains, fire pumps, fire main isolating valves and fire hydrants and all the required\ninspections, tests and maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand firefighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the fire mains, fire pumps, fire main isolating valves and fire hydrants indicated that actions\nrecorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe fire mains, fire pumps, fire main isolating valves or fire hydrants were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.8.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and galley staff familiar with the location, purpose and", "c": "operation of the fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems provided in the galley,\nwere the systems in good working order and available for immediate use, and were\ngalley ranges, exhaust vents, filter cowls free of grease or combustible material?\nShort Question Text\nGalley fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems & fire prevention\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Galley Rating, Internal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1433 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Regulation II-2/10.6.4 and CHAPTER 9 of the FSS CODE.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the fire protection measures provided in the galley are properly maintained and crewmembers\ncan respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n4.10.9 Galley stoves and cooking appliances\nThe use of galley stoves and other cooking appliances that employ naked flames should be prohibited while a tanker\nis at a petroleum berth.\nGalley personnel should be instructed on how to safely operate galley equipment. Unauthorised and inexperienced\npersons should not be allowed to use galley equipment.\nFires are often caused by unburnt fuel or fatty deposits that have collected in galley ranges, flue pipes and filters.\nThese areas should be regularly inspected to make sure they are clean. Oil and deep fat fryers should be fitted with\nthermostats to cut off electrical power and prevent accidental fires.\nGalley staff should be trained on how to handle fires and how to respond appropriately. Training should include how\nto operate fixed fire-extinguishing systems fitted to galley equipment. Appropriate fire extinguishers and fire blankets\nshould be available.\nThe use of portable stoves and cooking appliances on board tankers should be controlled and, when in port, their use\nshould be prohibited.\nSteam cookers and other equipment heated by steam can be used any time.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 9\n7.5.2 Requirements for cargo ships and passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers\nWhen passing through accommodation spaces or spaces containing combustible materials, the exhaust ducts from\ngalley ranges shall be constructed in accordance with paragraphs 7.2.4.1.1 and 7.2.4.1.2. Each exhaust duct shall be\nfitted with:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\na grease trap readily removable for cleaning.\nan automatically and remotely operated fire damper located in the lower end of the duct at the junction\nbetween the duct and the galley range hood and, in addition, a remotely operated fire damper in the upper\nend of the duct close to the outlet of the duct.\narrangements, operable from within the galley, for shutting off the exhaust and supply fans; and\nfixed means for extinguishing a fire within the duct.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n6.4 Deep-fat cooking equipment\nDeep-fat cooking equipment installed in enclosed spaces or on open decks shall be fitted with the following\n1.\n2.\nan automatic or manual extinguishing system tested to an international standard acceptable to the\nOrganization.\na primary and backup thermostat with an alarm to alert the operator in the event of failure of either\nthermostat.\n3.\n4.\n5.\narrangements for automatically shutting off the electrical power upon activation of the extinguishing system.\nan alarm for indicating operation of the extinguishing system in the galley where the equipment is installed;\nand\ncontrols for manual operation of the extinguishing system which are clearly labelled for ready use by the\ncrew.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1433 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Regulation II-2/10.6.4 and CHAPTER 9 of the FSS\nCODE.\nInspection Guidance\nFire extinguishing systems for deep-fat cooking equipment may use different fire-extinguishing mediums including\nwet chemical, AFFF foam and water mist. The vessel’s maintenance plan should contain the weekly, monthly, annual\netc. checks required for the particular system fitted as set out in the manufacturer’s instructions and IMO:\nMSC.1/Circ.1432.\nUnburned fuel or fatty deposits in galley ranges, within flue pipes and in the filter cowls of galley vents can cause fire\nand these must be maintained in a clean condition.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for maintaining fire safety in the galley which defined:\n• •\nThe frequency of inspections, tests and maintenance of fixed and portable fire extinguishing systems, fire\ndampers and fan stop switches fitted in the galley.\nThe frequency of inspection and cleaning of galley ranges, within flue pipes and in the filter cowls of galley\nvents.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Inspect the vessel’s galley and verify that:\no Galley ranges were free of fat or other flammable material.\no Grease traps had been recently cleaned.\no Filter cowls of galley vents were free of accumulated fat or oil.\no Fire dampers were properly marked and free to operate.\no Fan stop activation points in, or near, the galley were clearly marked.\no The deep fat fryer fixed fire extinguishing systems fitted had been serviced in accordance with the\nmaintenance plan.\no The deep fat fryer fixed fire extinguishing nozzles were free of grease build up and were fitted with\ntheir protective blow out caps if required by system design.\no Portable extinguishers and fire blankets were properly stowed and free from obstructions.\no Fire doors and serving hatch shutters were free to close automatically, if so designed, otherwise\nwere closed except for when in use.\no There was no evidence that deep fat frying was taking place in open pans or fryers not fitted with a\nfixed fire extinguishing system.\no Fire detectors were not inhibited or disabled.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview a member of the galley staff to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of one of the\nfollowing:\no The fixed fire extinguishing system,\no The portable fire extinguishing appliances, or,\no The ventilation system stopping and isolation process.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the galley fire extinguishing systems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no instructions posted in the galley describing the use of the fixed fire extinguishing systems\nprovided.\nThe interviewed galley staff were not familiar with the purpose and operation of the fixed or portable fire\nextinguishing or fire protection systems in the galley.\nOily or fatty deposits were found on galley ranges, in grease traps, within flue pipes, around fire\nextinguishing nozzles, around fire detector heads and in the filter cowls of galley vents.\nThere was evidence that deep fat frying had been taking place using open pans or a fixed deep fat fryer with\nno fixed fire extinguishing system.\nAutomatic self-closing fire doors or serving hatch shutters were found to be held back or restricted from\nclosing fully.\nManual self-closing fire doors were found held back.\nPortable fire extinguishing devices were found to be obstructed or missing from their designated stowage.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the fire extinguishing systems for the galley or all the required inspections, tests and\nmaintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the fire-extinguishing systems indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken\nplace.\nA fixed fire extinguishing system provided in the galley was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck, and was\nthe equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nWater-spray system on deck\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed water spray or water mist systems for:\n• •\n• •\nWeekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: IGC Code\n11.3 Water-spray system\n11.3.1 On ships carrying flammable and/or toxic products, a water-spray system, for cooling, fire prevention and crew\nprotection shall be installed to cover:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nexposed cargo tank domes, any exposed parts of cargo tanks and any part of cargo tank covers that may be\nexposed to heat from fires in adjacent equipment containing cargo such as exposed booster\npumps/heaters/re-gasification or re-liquefaction plants, hereafter addressed as gas process units, positioned\non weather decks;\nexposed on-deck storage vessels for flammable or toxic products.\ngas process units positioned on deck.\ncargo liquid and vapour discharge and loading connections, including the presentation flange and the area\nwhere their control valves are situated, which shall be at least equal to the area of the drip trays provided.\nall exposed emergency shut-down (ESD) valves in the cargo liquid and vapour pipes, including the master\nvalve for supply to gas consumers.\nexposed boundaries facing the cargo area, such as bulkheads of superstructures and deckhouses normally\nmanned, cargo machinery spaces, store-rooms containing high fire-risk items and cargo control rooms.\nExposed horizontal boundaries of these areas do not require protection unless detachable cargo piping\nconnections are arranged above or below. Boundaries of unmanned forecastle structures not containing\nhigh fire-risk items or equipment do not require water-spray protection.\nexposed lifeboats, liferafts and muster stations facing the cargo area, regardless of distance to cargo area;\nand\nany semi-enclosed cargo machinery spaces and semi-enclosed cargo motor room.\nShips intended for operation as listed in 1.1.10 (i.e. for periods at a fixed location in a re-gasification and gas\ndischarge mode or a gas receiving, processing, liquefaction and storage mode) shall be subject to special\nconsideration (see 11.3.3.2).\n11.3.2.2 On vertical surfaces, spacing of nozzles protecting lower areas may take account of anticipated rundown\nfrom higher areas. Stop valves shall be fitted in the main supply line(s) in the water-spray system, at intervals not\nexceeding 40 m, for the purpose of isolating damaged sections. Alternatively, the system may be divided into two or\nmore sections that may be operated independently, provided the necessary controls are located together in a readily\naccessible position outside the cargo area. A section protecting any area included in 11.3.1.1 and .2 shall cover at\nleast the entire athwartship tank grouping in that area. Any gas process unit(s) included in 11.3.1.3 may be served by\nan independent section.\n11.3.4 The boundaries of superstructures and deckhouses normally manned, and lifeboats, liferafts and muster areas\nfacing the cargo area, shall also be capable of being served by one of the fire pumps or the emergency fire pump if a\nfire in one compartment could disable both fire pumps.\n11.3.5 Water pumps normally used for other services may be arranged to supply the water-spray system main supply\nline.\n11.3.6 All pipes, valves, nozzles and other fittings in the water-spray system shall be resistant to corrosion by\nseawater. Piping, fittings and related components within the cargo area (except gaskets) shall be designed to\nwithstand 925°C. The water-spray system shall be arranged with in-line filters to prevent blockage of pipes and\nnozzles. In addition, means shall be provided to back-flush the system with fresh water.\n11.3.7 Remote starting of pumps supplying the water-spray system and remote operation of any normally closed\nvalves in the system shall be arranged in suitable locations outside the cargo area, adjacent to the accommodation\nspaces and readily accessible and operable in the event of fire in the protected areas.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances which should include the water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew\nprotection on deck.\nMaintenance tasks may include:\n• •\n• •\nPeriodic removal of the installed orifice plates and piping end caps and flushing any debris from the system.\nCleaning the in-line filters.\nFlushing the system with fresh water.\nDrying the system to prevent internal corrosion.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nInspect the space(s) containing the remote controls for the water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention\nand crew protection on deck.\nReview the operating instructions for the system posted in the space(s) and verify that the system valves\nand controls are properly marked and set.\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space(s).\nInspect the system piping, particularly on the underside, for external indications of corrosion and for\npatching.\nExamine a random sample of nozzles for evidence of clogging by debris.\nRequest an accompanying crew member to randomly check the isolating valves and stop valves to verify\nthey are operating freely.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the water\nspray system with reference to:\no Starting the pumps.\no The purpose and location of the isolating valves and stop valves.\no\nThe purpose and location of the drain point for the deck piping.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the water-spray system for cooling, fire\nprevention and crew protection on deck.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s waterspray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe operating instructions for the water-spray system were not posted at the control station.\nAccess to the system controls was obstructed.\nThe system valves and controls were not properly marked or set.\nStop valves or isolating valves did not operate freely.\nThe stop valves or isolating valves were not clearly marked.\nThere was evidence of clogged nozzles.\nThere was hard rust, deterioration or temporary repairs to the system pipework.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck or, all\nthe required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck indicated that\nactions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThere was no evidence that orifice plates or piping end caps had been removed and pipework flushed\nthrough to clear debris or scale from the system.\nThe water-spray system for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection on deck was defective in any\nrespect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.10.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo\nhandling equipment, and was the equipment in good working order and available for\nimmediate use, with the release procedure and operating instructions displayed at the\ncontrol stations?\nShort Question Text\nCargo handling equipment space(s) fixed fire extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Compressor Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1318 Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing\nsystems.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1318 Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fixed carbon dioxide fireextinguishing systems.\n1 General\nThese Guidelines provide the minimum recommended level of maintenance and inspections for fixed carbon dioxide\nfire-extinguishing systems on all ships and are intended to demonstrate that the system is kept in good working order\nas specified in SOLAS regulation II-2/14.2.1.2. These Guidelines are intended to supplement the fire-extinguishing\nsystem manufacturer’s approved maintenance instructions. Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be\nperformed by competent crewmembers, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in the\nmaintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance should be completed by trained personnel.\n3 Maintenance and inspection plan\nFixed carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems should be kept in good working order and readily available for\nimmediate use. Maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship’s maintenance plan\nhaving due regard to ensuring the reliability of the system. The onboard maintenance plan should be included in the\nship’s safety management system and should be based on the system manufacturer’s recommendations including:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nmaintenance and inspection procedures and instructions.\nrequired schedules for periodic maintenance and inspections.\nlisting of recommended spare parts; and\nrecords of inspections and maintenance, including corrective actions taken to maintain the system in\noperable condition.\n(These guidelines set out requirements for:\n• •\n• Monthly inspections.\nAnnual inspections.\nMaintenance at each intermediate/periodical and renewal survey.)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed fire-extinguishing systems other than CO2.)\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n9.11.4 Carbon dioxide (CO2) systems\nEnclosed spaces, on ships and in terminals, containing cargo plant such as compressors, heat exchangers or pumps,\nwill normally be provided with a fixed and remotely activated fire extinguishing system such as CO2. Provided no\nmajor disruption to the enclosure has occurred, these systems should be immediately effective.\nIt is important to be sure that there is actually a fire in one of these enclosed areas, because CO2 systems are\ndelivered as a ‘single shot’. While CO2 systems are effective in enclosed spaces, they have a major disadvantage in\nthat their fire extinguishing action is achieved by reducing oxygen in the space to a level that will not support\ncombustion or life and it is, therefore, essential that all personnel evacuate the space before injection begins. All\nspaces protected by CO2 extinguishing systems will therefore have a safety placard to this effect.\nA further concern is that the injection of CO2 produces electrostatic charging, which can be an ignition hazard if CO2\nis injected inadvertently or as a precautionary measure into a flammable atmosphere.\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n5.3.4 Clean agent fire suppression systems\nClean agents are compressed gases or vaporising liquids that extinguish fires either by chemically disrupting\ncombustion, smothering or absorbing heat, or a combination of these.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: IGC Code\n1.2 Definitions\n1.2.10 Cargo machinery spaces are the spaces where cargo compressors or pumps, cargo processing units, are\nlocated, including those supplying gas fuel to the engine-room.\n3.3 Cargo machinery spaces and turret compartments\n3.1.1 Cargo machinery spaces shall be situated above the weather deck and located within the cargo area. Cargo\nmachinery spaces and turret compartments shall be treated as cargo pumprooms for the purpose of fire protection\naccording to SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.4, and for the purpose of prevention of potential explosion according to\nSOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.10.\n11.5 Enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.\n11.5.1 Enclosed spaces meeting the criteria of cargo machinery spaces in 1.2.10, and the cargo motor room within\nthe cargo area of any ship, shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of\nthe FSS Code and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for extinguishing gas\nfires.\n11.5.2 Enclosed spaces meeting the criteria of cargo machinery spaces in chapter 3.3, within the cargo area of ships\nthat are dedicated to the carriage of a restricted number of cargoes, shall be protected by an appropriate fire\nextinguishing system for the cargo carried.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 5 – Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems\n2.1.1.3 Means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the quantity of the fire-extinguishing medium in the\ncontainers.\n2.1.3.2 Means shall be provided for automatically giving audible and visual warning of the release of the fire\nextinguishing medium into.…. spaces in which personnel normally work or to which they have access…\nThe pre-discharge alarm shall be automatically activated (e.g., by opening of the release cabinet door).\nConventional cargo spaces and small spaces (such as compressor rooms, paint lockers etc.) with only a local release\nneed not be provided with such an alarm.\n2.1.3.3 The means of control of any fixed gas fire-extinguishing system shall be readily accessible, simple to operate\nand…. At each location there shall be clear instructions relating to the operation of the system having regard to the\nsafety of personnel.\n2.2.2.2 …. If the box containing the controls is to be locked, a key to the box shall be in a break-glass type enclosure\nconspicuously located adjacent to the box.\nInspection Guidance\nThe fire extinguishing medium may be CO2 or an alternative ‘clean agent’.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed\nfire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment that included:\n• •\n• A description of the fixed fire extinguishing system, its components, and its functions.\nInstructions for the operation of the fixed fire extinguishing system.\nA maintenance plan.\nThe above may form part of the cargo system operation manual and the ship’s maintenance plan.\nIf the control station or release cabinet door is locked, a key to the door shall be in a break-glass type enclosure\nconspicuously located adjacent to the door.\nInstructions for safe entry into the bottle space should be posted at each entrance and should include, but not be\nlimited to:\n• •\n• •\nStarting the ventilation fan.\nWaiting for a set period before entering.\nThe use of a personal gas monitor.\nNotifying the OOW of entry into, and exit from, the space\nThe entrances to the enclosed space containing cargo handling equipment e.g., compressor room or motor room,\nshould be marked with a notice indicating the space is protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system.\nWhere a CO2 system is installed, a notice should be exhibited at the controls stating that due to the electrostatic\nignition hazard, the system is to be used only for fire extinguishing and not for inerting purposes.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance\nof the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.\nReview the bottle space safe entry instructions.\nInspect the space(s) containing the machinery space fixed firefighting system bottles.\n• •\n• •\nInspect the control station(s) for releasing the machinery space fixed firefighting system and review the\noperating instructions.\nReview the inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out recorded in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the system\nand the maintenance plan.\nNote. On CO2 systems there are ‘pins’ in the activation assembly, and traditionally, these pins had to be removed for\nthe system to be ready for immediate use. On some modern systems, these ‘pins’ have to be left ‘in’ for the system to\nbe ready for immediate use. When inspecting CO2 systems, the inspector should determine from the accompanying\nofficer whether the pins should be ‘in’ or ‘out’ for the system to be ready for immediate use. If in any doubt reference\nshould be made to the manufacturer’s operating instructions.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing\nsystem installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within\nenclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed fire\nextinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment that included:\no A description of the fixed fire extinguishing system, its components, and its functions.\no Instructions for the operation of the fixed fire extinguishing system.\no A maintenance plan.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo\nhandling equipment or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo\nhandling equipment indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not taken place.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed fire\nextinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the safety precautions for entering the bottle space.\nThere were no safety procedures for entering the bottle space posted at each entrance door.\nThe entrances to the space containing cargo handling equipment e.g., compressor room or motor room\nwere not marked with a notice indicating the space was protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system.\nThe bottle space or release cabinet doors were locked but there were no keys provided.\nThe fixed fire extinguishing system release procedure, operating instructions and warning notices were not\nposted at the release station.\nThe fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment\nwas not ready for immediate use for any reason, such as, branch pipes blanked, nozzles or control levers\ninhibited, etc.\n• The fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment\nwas defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.11.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system, and was the equipment\nin good working order and readily available for immediate use, with operating\ninstructions clearly displayed at the control stations.\nShort Question Text\nFixed dry chemical powder fire extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Cargo Manifold\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1315 Guidelines for the approval of fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing systems for the\nprotection of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing systems for:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nTwo-yearly tests and inspections\nTen-year servicing)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1315 Guidelines for the approval of fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing systems\nfor the protection of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk\n3.5 A means for pressurizing the system using an inert gas, which is normally dry nitrogen, in high pressure cylinders\nshould be provided. …. Pressure gauges should be provided for monitoring the contents of the cylinders.\n3.11 Operating instructions for the system should be placed at each operating station.\n3.12 Recharging instructions should be provided on a permanent nameplate affixed to the fixed dry chemical powder\nunit. As a minimum, the instructions should indicate the required type of dry chemical powder, the manufacturer of the\npowder and the required charge. The required pressurizing medium pressure, number of cylinders and regulator\nvalve setting should also be provided.\n3.13 An approved design, installation, operation and maintenance manual should be provided to the shipowner for\neach type of fixed dry chemical powder unit.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: IGC Code\n11.4.1 Ships in which the carriage of flammable products is intended shall be fitted with fixed dry chemical powder\nfire-extinguishing systems, …. for the purpose of firefighting on the deck in the cargo area, including any cargo liquid\nand vapour discharge and loading connections on deck and bow or stern cargo handling areas, as applicable.\n11.4.2 The system shall be capable of delivering powder from at least two hand hose lines, or a combination of\nmonitor/hand hose lines, to any part of the exposed cargo liquid and vapour piping, load/unload connection and\nexposed gas process units.\n11.4.3 …. A monitor shall be arranged to protect any load/unload connection area and be capable of actuation and\ndischarge both locally and remotely. The monitor is not required to be remotely aimed if it can deliver the necessary\npowder to all required areas of coverage from a single position. One hose line shall be provided at both port- and\nstarboard side at the end of the cargo area facing the accommodation and readily available from the accommodation.\n11.4.4 .... Hand hose lines shall be non-kinkable and be fitted with a nozzle capable of on/off operation …. Hand hose\nlines and nozzles shall be of weather-resistant construction or stored in weather resistant housing or covers and be\nreadily accessible\n18.2 Cargo operations manuals\n18.2.1 The ship shall be provided with copies of suitably detailed cargo system operation manuals approved by the\nAdministration such that trained personnel can safely operate the ship with due regard to the hazards and properties\nof the cargoes that are permitted to be carried.\n18.2.2 The content of the manuals shall include, but not be limited to:\n.5 firefighting procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of extinguishing agents;\nInspection Guidance\nTest, inspection and servicing requirements set out in MSC.1/Circ.1432 include:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly - checking pressure gauges are in the correct range.\nAnnually - agitating the dry chemical charge.\nTwo-yearly - testing a sample of dry chemical powder for moisture content.\nTen-yearly - hydrostatic or non-destructive testing of the dry chemical powder containment vessels.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Inspect the components and operational controls of the cargo area fixed dry chemical powder fireextinguishing system.\nReview the operation instructions for the system posted near the operational controls and verify that the\nsystem valves and controls were correctly marked.\nReview the inspection and servicing data available at the control stations.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained within the\nmaintenance plan, including:\no The annual agitation of the dry powder by nitrogen.\no The two-yearly testing of a sample of dry chemical powder for moisture content.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the cargo area\nfixed dry chemical powder extinguishing system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the cargo area fixed dry chemical powder\nextinguishing system including:\no\no\nThe annual agitation of the dry powder by nitrogen.\nThe two-yearly testing of a sample of dry chemical powder for moisture content.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The cargo area fixed dry chemical powder extinguishing system operating instructions were not posted at\neach operating station in the working language of the ship.\nThe system controls and valves were not clearly marked in accordance with the operating instructions.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing system or all the required inspections,\ntests and maintenance.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed dry chemical\npowder fire-extinguishing system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing system indicated that actions\nrecorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete, including:\no The annual agitation of the dry powder by nitrogen.\no The two-yearly testing of a sample of dry chemical powder for moisture content.\nThe fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.12.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the fixed fire-extinguishing system in the vessel’s paint locker and any other flammable\nliquid locker, and was the system in good working order and available for immediate\nuse?\nShort Question Text\nPaint locker fixed fire-extinguishing system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Exterior Decks\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIACS: UI SC199 Fire-fighting systems in cargo sampling lockers (Reg II-2/10.6.3.2)\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS: UI SC201 Location of paint lockers within cargo block\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n13.2.2 Paint\nStow paint, paint thinners and associated cleaners and hardeners in approved storage areas that are protected by\nfixed fire-extinguishing systems approved by the Administration (SOLAS II-2 regulation 10, section 6.3 covers spaces\ncontaining flammable liquid)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\nIACS: UI SC199 Fire-fighting systems in cargo sampling lockers (Reg II-2/10.6.3.2)\nThe requirements given in SOLAS Reg II-2/10.6.3.2 and 10.6.3.3 are not considered applicable for cargo service\nspaces intended for the stowage of cargo samples, when such spaces are positioned within the cargo area on board\ntankers\nIACS: UI SC201 Location of paint lockers within cargo block\nPaint lockers, regardless of their use, cannot be located above the tanks and spaces defined in SOLAS II-2/4.5.1.2\nfor oil tankers and the cargo area for chemical tankers.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n(applies to ships constructed on or after 01 July 2002)\n6.3 Spaces containing flammable liquid\n6.3.1 Paint lockers shall be protected by:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\na carbon dioxide system designed to give a minimum volume of free gas equal to 40% of the gross volume\nof the protected space.\na dry powder system designed for at least 0.5 kg powder/m³.\na water spraying or sprinkler system, designed for 5 litres/m² min. Water spraying systems may be\nconnected to the fire main of the ship: or\na system providing equivalent protection, as determined by the Administration.\nIn any case, the system shall be operable from outside the protected space.\n6.3.2 Flammable liquid lockers shall be protected by an appropriate fire-extinguishing arrangement approved by the\nAdministration. (Refer to the IACS UI SC 199 Fire-fighting systems in cargo sampling lockers)\n6.3.3 For lockers of a deck area of less than 4 m² , which do not give access to accommodation spaces, a carbon\ndioxide portable fire extinguisher sized to provide a minimum volume of free gas equal to 40% of the gross volume of\nthe space may be accepted in lieu of a fixed system. A discharge port shall be arranged in the locker to allow the\ndischarge of the extinguisher without having to enter into the protected space. The required portable fire extinguisher\nshall be stowed adjacent to the port. Alternatively, a port or hose connection may be provided to facilitate the use of\nfire main water.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to manage the storage of paint and flammable liquids which\ndefined:\n• •\n• The locations in which paints and other flammable liquids should be stored under normal circumstances.\nThe locations where bulk paint or flammable liquids may be stored when the designated lockers are of\ninsufficient capacity in circumstances such as onboard maintenance programs utilizing riding teams.\nThe requirement that paints and flammable liquids must be stored in closed containers.\nNote: The SOLAS requirements do not apply to cargo sample lockers positioned within the cargo area.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Inspect the vessel’s paint locker, and any other flammable liquid locker, including the fixed fire-extinguishing\nsystem, where fitted, and verify that:\no The instructions for releasing the fixed fire extinguishing system were posted outside the space.\no Ventilation fan controls and closing devices were clearly marked.\no Where no fixed extinguishing system was provided that the inlet for the provided portable\nextinguisher was marked.\no Where a fixed carbon dioxide system was provided, a sign warning against using carbon dioxide to\ninert the space due to static ignition hazard was posted outside the space.\no Where a seawater fixed extinguishing system was fitted, spray nozzles were free from salt build up.\no Where a seawater fixed extinguishing system was fitted, the content of the store was not stacked\nabove the height of the spray nozzles.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the fixed fire\nextinguishing system.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the paint or flammable liquid locker fixed\nfire extinguishing systems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no instructions posted outside a paint or flammable liquids locker describing the use of the fixed\nfire extinguishing system provided.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the fixed fire extinguishing\nsystem in a paint or other flammable liquid locker.\nPaints or flammable liquids were found stored in lockers or locations not designed to contain flammable\nliquids.\nPaints or flammable liquids were stored in open containers\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the fixed fire extinguishing system for paint and flammable liquid lockers or all the required\ninspections, tests and maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the fixed fire-extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact\ntaken place.\n• •\n• Storage of items in a paint or flammable liquids locker prevented the proper functioning of the fire\nextinguishing system provided, for example, stored paint tins were stacked above the level of water spray\nnozzles.\nAccess to the controls of a paint or flammable liquid locker fire extinguishing system were obstructed.\nThe fixed fire extinguishing system for the paint locker, or any other flammable liquids locker, was defective\nin any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.13.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the machinery space fixed water-based or equivalent local application fire-fighting\nsystem, and was the equipment in good working order and readily available for\nimmediate use, with operating instructions clearly displayed at the control stations?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery space fixed water-based or equivalent local application fire-fighting system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1516 Amendments to the revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection\nsystems and appliances.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1387 Revised guidelines for the approval of fixed water-based local application fire-fighting systems\nfor use in category A machinery spaces.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan\nIndustry guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n5.3.1.2 Water mist\nWater mist fire protection systems use a spray mist to absorb heat and displace oxygen. They are effective in\naccommodation spaces and areas within the engine room. These systems consist of a water supply connected to an\natomising distribution system that can deliver a water mist through one or more nozzles.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1387 Revised guidelines for the approval of fixed water-based local application fire-fighting\nsystems for use in category A machinery spaces.\n1 General\nFixed water-based local application fire-fighting systems should provide localized fire suppression in areas, as\nspecified in SOLAS regulation II-2/10.5, for category A machinery spaces, without the necessity of engine shut-down,\npersonnel evacuation, shutting down of forced ventilation fans, or sealing of the space.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nAs amended by\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1516 Amendments to the revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire\nprotection systems and appliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed. The quality of water in automatic sprinkler systems is of particular\nimportance and should be maintained in accordance with manufacturer guidelines. Records of water quality should\nbe maintained on board in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed water spray or water mist systems for:\n• •\n• •\n• Weekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing\nTen-year servicing, including a hydrostatic test and internal examination for gas and water pressure\ncylinders).\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\n3.\n4.\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n5.6 Fixed local application fire-fighting systems\n5.6.1 Paragraph 5.6 shall apply to passenger ships of 500 gross tonnage and above and cargo ships of 2000 gross\ntonnage and above.\n5.6.2 Machinery spaces of category A above 500 m³ in volume shall, in addition to the fixed fire extinguishing system\nrequired in paragraph 5.1.1, be protected by an approved type of fixed water-based or equivalent local application\nfire-fighting system, based on the guidelines developed by the Organization*. In the case of periodically unattended\nmachinery spaces, the fire-fighting system shall have both automatic and manual release capabilities. In the case of\ncontinuously manned machinery spaces, the fire-fighting system is only required to have a manual release capability.\n5.6.3 Fixed local application fire-fighting systems are to protect areas such as the following without the necessity of\nengine shutdown, personnel evacuation, or sealing of the spaces:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nthe fire hazard portions of internal combustion machinery or, for ships constructed before 1 July 2014, the\nfire hazard portions of internal combustion machinery used for the ship's main propulsion and power\ngeneration.\nboiler fronts.\nthe fire hazard portions of incinerators; and\npurifiers for heated fuel oil.\n5.6.4 Activation of any local application system shall give a visual and distinct audible alarm in the protected space\nand at continuously manned stations. The alarm shall indicate the specific system activated.\nInspection Guidance\nWhere the vessel was fitted with a fixed water-based or equivalent local application fire-fighting system, the company\nshould have developed a procedure to define when the system was required to be set to the automatic release mode,\nwhere this was an option, and should include whenever the machinery space is operated in the unattended mode.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which described the use of the automatic\nrelease mode of the fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system, where this function was\nprovided.\nInspect the components of the fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system and verify that:\no The system operating instructions were posted at the control stations in the operating language of\nthe ship.\no The water supply valves were open to the system.\no The dedicated tank serving the system was fitted with a low-level alarm or marked with the\nminimum required level.\no All manual branch supply valves were open and marked or colour coded to identify the location\nthey protected.\no The control panel was powered and set for automatic and/or remote operation.\no The local release stations near to the protected equipment were clearly marked as to their purpose.\no The remote monitoring/control panels in the wheelhouse and other locations were powered on with\nall smoke, flame and heat detectors active.\nReview inspection and servicing data available at the main pump unit.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and required release\nmode of the fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system whilst the machinery space was\noperated in the attended and unattended state.\nWhere the vessel was fitted with a machinery space fixed local application fire-fighting system which was not waterbased, address the inspector actions and subsequent sections on equivalency.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the fixed water-based local application firefighting system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which described the use of the automatic release mode of the fixed\nwater-based local application fire-fighting system where this function was provided.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation and required operating mode of the\nsystem.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThere were no operating instructions in the working language of the ship posted at the system control\nstations.\nThe system was not set on automatic release mode when required by the company procedure.\nThe machinery space was being operated in the unattended mode with the system in manual release mode.\nThe system was not ready for immediate activation either automatically or by manual release, locally or\nremotely, for any reason.\nThe dedicated water supply tank was not fitted with a low-level alarm, or the minimum required operating\nlevel was not marked and maintained.\nThe water supply valves, or individual manual branch discharge valves were closed.\nSystem smoke, heat or flame detectors were deactivated.\nThe local release stations near to the protected equipment were not clearly marked as to their purpose.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system indicated that actions\nrecorded in the maintenance plan had not been carried out.\nThe fixed water-based local application fire-fighting system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.14.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose of the cargo, ballast and", "c": "stripping pump temperature sensing devices, and was there evidence that alarm\nactivation points had been correctly set and tested in accordance with company\nprocedures and manufacturer's instructions?\nShort Question Text\nCargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing devices\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nObjective\nTo ensure that measures specifically designed to prevent fires in the cargo pump room are effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.15.7 Miscellaneous\nThe safety of pump rooms can be enhanced in a number of other ways, some of which are mandatory for certain\nships:\n• Temperature monitoring devices fitted to main cargo pumps to provide remote indication of the temperature\nof pump casings, bearings and bulkhead seals. Where such equipment is fitted, procedures should be\ndeveloped for the action to take when alarm is triggered.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms\nPart 4 Cargo pump-rooms Chapter 2\n4.1.1 Except for pump-rooms intended solely for ballast transfer or fuel oil transfer, temperature monitoring systems\nfor pumps should be provided.\n4.1.2 The following pumps installed in cargo pump-rooms, which may be driven by shafts passing through pumproom bulkheads, are included:\n• •\n• •\ncargo pumps including slop pumps.\nballast pumps.\nstripping pumps; and\ntank cleaning pumps.\n4.1.3 The following pumps might be omitted:\n• •\nsmall pumps of 1 m3/h capacity or less; and\nbilge pumps.\n4.2.1 Sensing points should be provided as follows:\n• •\n• bulkhead shaft glands.\nbearings; and\npump casings.\n4.2.3 The range of temperature for sensors is recommended to be from 0°C to 250°C and the setting point to about\n60°C to 80°C in consideration to the kind of pumps, cargoes and environmental condition, which would automatically\nshut down the pump when the set point is reached.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.10 Protection of cargo pump-rooms\n5.10.1 In tankers:\n.1 cargo pumps, ballast pumps and stripping pumps, installed in cargo pump-rooms and driven by shafts passing\nthrough pump-room bulkheads shall be fitted with temperature sensing devices for bulkhead shaft glands, bearings\nand pump casings. A continuous audible and visual alarm signal shall be automatically effected in the cargo control\nroom or the pump control station.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 14\n4 In addition to the fire protection systems and appliances listed in paragraph 2.2.3, tankers shall develop a\nmaintenance plan for:\n.3 fire safety arrangements in cargo pump rooms.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question is only applicable to vessels with pumprooms.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedure for the operation and maintenance of the cargo, ballast and\nstripping pump temperature sensing devices which defined:\n• •\n• •\nThe requirement to periodically record the temperature provided by each cargo, ballast and stripping pump\nsensor while the pumps were in operation.\nThe actions to be taken in the event of the activation of a cargo, ballast or stripping pump high-temperature\nalarm.\nThe frequency of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing device accuracy checks.\nThe alarm activation value for the temperature sensing devices fitted to the bulkhead shaft glands, bearings\nand pump casings for cargo, ballast and stripping pumps.\n• •\n• •\nThe circumstances under which the cargo pump bearing, and pump casing temperature sensing device\nalarm activation points may be altered and by whom.\nThe frequency of each alarm activation point verification check.\nThe frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms required in the cargo control room or the pump\ncontrol station\nThe actions to take in the event that a cargo, ballast or stripping pump temperature sensing device, or the\noverall temperature sensor monitoring and alarm system, fails.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the requirements for the\noperation and maintenance of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing devices.\nInspect the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensor monitoring system panel and verify that:\no The temperature monitoring system was fully operational.\no The system was not displaying any faults or obviously erroneous readings.\no The temperature indicated by sensors from different pumps in a similar service were indicating a\nsimilar reading.\no The alarm activation settings were displayed for each sensor point.\nReview the records of cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing device readings and verify that\nthe records had been maintained for pumps in operation.\nIf safe and practical to do, request that the alarm activation set point for one temperature sensing device is\ndemonstrated to be correctly set.\nReview the inspection and testing data for the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensor\nmonitoring system and verify that:\no The required sensor checks, and tests had been completed at the frequency defined by the\ncompany.\no The alarm activation set points had been confirmed.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nWhere the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing sensor device control panel was fitted in the\nmachinery space with no display in the cargo control room, verify that:\n• •\nThe officer in charge of the cargo operations could identify the temperature sensing device alarm indicator in\nthe cargo control room.\nThere was a process in place to record and assess the readings provided by the temperature sensing\ndevices fitted to pumps in operation.\nWhen in the cargo pumproom\n• •\n• •\nInspect one cargo, ballast or stripping pump and verify that the temperature sensing devices were\nconnected at the appropriate locations.\nVerify that no temporary cooling devices were rigged on any cargo, ballast or stripping pump.\nVerify that there was no leakage of cargo, either in the form of a spray or liquid, from the cargo or stripping\npump mechanical seals.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the actions required in the event of a high\ntemperature alarm activation.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedures for the maintenance and operation of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump\ntemperature sensing system.\n• •\n• The records of temperature sensing device readings for cargo, ballast and stripping pumps while in\noperation.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing\nsystem.\nThe maintenance and testing records for the cargo, ballast and stripping pump temperature sensing system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for the operation and maintenance of the cargo, ballast and stripping\npump temperature sensing system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the cargo, ballast and stripping pump\ntemperature sensing system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the alarm activation settings of the cargo, ballast and stripping\npump temperature sensing system.\nThere were no records maintained for the temperature of bulkhead shaft glands, bearings and pump casings\nfor cargo, ballast or stripping pumps in operation.\nThe temperature sensing devices had not been checked for proper operation and temperature comparison\nat the frequency defined by the company.\nThe audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room or pump control station had not been tested at the\nfrequency defined by the company.\nOne or more temperature sensing devices were out of service.\nOne or more alarm activation points were found to be set to activate at a higher temperature that permitted\nby the company procedure.\nOne or more temperature sensors were found to be disconnected from the required location.\nTemporary cooling devices were found to be in use to cool pump bearings.\nOne or more cargo or stripping pump mechanical seals were leaking cargo either as a liquid or a mist.\nWhere there was no means to observe the temperature being measured by the temperature sensing devices in either\nthe cargo control room or the machinery space record the finding as a comment under the Hardware response tool.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.15.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s deck foam system, including portable applicators, and was the system in\ngood working order and available for immediate use, with operating instructions\ndisplayed at the control station?\nShort Question Text\nDeck foam system, including portable applicators\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Cargo Manifold, Emergency Headquarters., Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1312 Revised guidelines for the performance and testing criteria\nand survey of foam concentrates for fixed fire-extinguishing systems.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 5 Fire Protection\n5.3.2.1.1 Categories of foam\nTwo categories of foam concentrate are currently in use.\nProtein foam concentrates are used at 3-6% by volume concentration in water. They include:\n• •\n• Protein foam (P) made from hydrolysed protein materials.\nFluoroprotein foam (FP) with added fluorinated surface-active agents.\nAlcohol resistant fluoroprotein foam (FPAR) which is resistant to break down when applied to the surface of\nalcohol or other solvents.\nSynthetic foam concentrates are used at 1-6% by volume concentration in water. They include:\n• •\nAqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF), based on a mixture of hydrocarbon and fluorinated surface-active\nagents.\nAlcohol Resistant Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF-AR) for use with alcohols and fuels blended with\nlarge amounts of alcohol.\nTankers that handle biofuel or ethyl alcohol should use alcohol resistant foams.\n5.3.2.1.3 Compatibility and storage\nDifferent foam concentrates are generally incompatible with each other and should not be mixed in storage.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to deck foam systems for:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly tests and inspections\nQuarterly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing)\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1312 Revised guidelines for the performance and testing criteria, and survey of foam concentrates\nfor fixed fire-extinguishing systems.\n1.1 Application\nThese Guidelines apply to the foam concentrates used for fixed deck foam fire-extinguishing systems required for\ntankers by SOLAS regulations II-2/10.8 and chapter 14 of the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS\nCode), and chemical tankers as specified by SOLAS regulation II-2/1.6.2.1.2 and the International Code for the\nConstruction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code). These Guidelines also\napply to foam concentrates for fixed foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery spaces according to chapter 6 of\nthe FSS Code and to portable foam applicators according to chapter 4 of the FSS Code. These Guidelines do not\napply to the foam generating equipment, only the foam concentrate.\n4 Periodical controls of foam concentrates stored on board\nFor periodical control of foam concentrates, the tests under paragraphs 4.1 to 4.7 should be performed by the\nshipowner or operator. They should be carried out at laboratories or authorized service suppliers acceptable to the\nAdministration.\n4.7 Chemical stability test for protein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates\nProtein-based alcohol-resistant foam concentrates should be subjected to a stability test with acetone. A foam\nsolution should be prepared at the approved concentration and gently applied to the surface of a tray containing\nacetone. The concentrate is deemed to fail the test if the foam solution mixes with the acetone.\n5 Intervals of periodical controls\nExcept for tests in accordance with paragraph 4.7 the first periodical control of foam concentrates should be\nperformed not more than 3 years after being supplied to the ship, and after that, every year. The tests required by\nparagraph 4.7 should be performed prior to delivery to the ship and annually thereafter\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 14 Fixed deck foam systems\n2.1.2 The deck foam system shall be capable of simple and rapid operation.\n2.2.1.4 The foam concentrate supplied on board shall be approved by the Administration for the cargoes intended to\nbe carried. Type B foam concentrates shall be supplied for the protection of crude oil, petroleum products and nonpolar solvent cargoes. Type A foam concentrates shall be supplied for polar solvent cargoes, as listed in the table of\nchapter 17 of the IBC Code. Only one type of foam concentrate shall be supplied, and it shall be effective for the\nmaximum possible number of cargoes intended to be carried. For cargoes for which foam is not effective or is\nincompatible, additional arrangements to the satisfaction of the Administration shall be provided.\n2.2.2 Monitors and foam applicators\n2.2.2.1 Foam from the fixed foam system shall be supplied by means of monitors and foam applicators. ……. On\ntankers of less than 4,000 tonnes deadweight the Administration may not require installation of monitors but only\napplicators.\n2.3.1.1 The main control station for the system shall be suitably located outside the cargo area, adjacent to the\naccommodation spaces and readily accessible and operable in the event of fire in the areas protected.\n2.3.3 Applicators\n2.3.3.1 At least four foam applicators shall be provided on all tankers.\n2.3.3.2 Applicators shall be provided to ensure flexibility of action during fire-fighting operations and to cover areas\nscreened from the monitors.\n2.3.4 Isolation valves\n2.3.4.1 Valves shall be provided in the foam main, and in the fire main when this is an integral part of the deck foam\nsystem, immediately forward of any monitor position to isolate damaged sections of those mains.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n8 Cargo tank protection\n8.1 Fixed deck foam systems\n8.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards, a fixed deck foam system shall be provided in\naccordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that, in lieu of the above, the\nAdministration, after having given consideration to the ship's arrangement and equipment, may accept other fixed\ninstallations if they afford protection equivalent to the above, in accordance with regulation I/5. The requirements for\nalternative fixed installations shall comply with the requirements in paragraph 8.1.2.\n8.1.2 In accordance with paragraph 8.1.1, where the Administration accepts an equivalent fixed installation in lieu of\nthe fixed deck foam system, the installation shall:\n1.\n2.\nbe capable of extinguishing spill fires and also preclude ignition of spilled oil not yet ignited; and\nbe capable of combating fires in ruptured tanks.\n8.1.3 Tankers of less than 20,000 tonnes deadweight shall be provided with a deck foam system complying with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances which included the fixed deck foam system. This plan may be integrated into the\nship’s computerised planned maintenance system or may stand alone. The plan should include the actions to be\ntaken monthly, quarterly, annually (including testing foam concentrates) and five-yearly to ensure the system is kept\nin good working order and available for immediate use.\nThe first test of foam concentrates should be performed not more than 3 years after the date of manufacture, and\nafter that, every year. In addition, for protein-based alcohol-resistant (FPAR) foam concentrates a stability test should\nbe performed prior to delivery to the ship and annually thereafter.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Inspect the space(s) containing the deck foam system foam concentrate tanks(s), pump(s) and the system\ncontrols and verify that:\no\n• •\n• •\nThe system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, were posted near the\ncontrol station.\no The system valves were clearly identified, and the system instructions indicated their required\nstatus in the standby and operational conditions.\no A copy of the foam concentrate annual test certificate indicated that it was fit for continued use.\no The foam contained in the tank was certified as compatible with the cargo being carried.\no The foam tank was filled to the required level\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan, including:\no The annual foam concentrate test results.\no The five-yearly test of foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices.\nInspect the deck main and/or foam main, monitors, applicators and isolating valves.\nWhere safe to do so, operate a sample of isolating valves and monitors to verify that they are free to move\nthrough their full range.\n• Where the foam concentrate was not effective, or incompatible, with the cargo being carried, establish what\nadditional arrangements had been provided and that they had been verified as being to the satisfaction of\nthe Administration.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the deck foam\nsystem with reference to:\no Extinguishing spill fires.\no Precluding ignition of spilt oil, not yet ignited.\no Combating fires in ruptured tanks.\nInterview a rating and verify their familiarity with the operation and use of foam applicators and foam\nmonitors.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the deck foam system, including:\no The annual foam concentrate test results.\no The five-yearly test of foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices.\nThe system manual showing the quantity of foam concentrate required to be in the storage tank to meet the\nsystem design criteria.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The deck foam system operating instructions, in the working language of the ship, were not posted in the\nspace containing the foam concentrate tank, pumps and control station.\nThe valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their purpose and required status during\nsystem operation.\nThe foam storage tank was not filled to the required level.\nThe foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required time frame.\nThe foam concentrate test certificate indicated that the foam was not fit for continued use.\nThe foam concentrate was incompatible with the cargo being carried but no alternative arrangement, to the\nsatisfaction of the Flag Administration, had been provided.\nThe foam proportioners or other foam mixing devices had not been tested as required during five yearly\nservicing\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s deck foam fire\nextinguishing system, including portable applicators.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the operation and use of the foam monitors and/or foam\napplicators.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s deck foam system or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete, including the required foam\nconcentrate tests.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s deck foam system indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken\nplace.\nThe deck foam system isolation valves or monitors were not free to move through their full range of motion.\nFoam applicators prepared at the manifold were connected to the fire main rather than the foam main.\nThe deck foam system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.2.16.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose, testing and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s fire doors?\nShort Question Text\nFire doors\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engine Rating, Engine Room, Forecastle, Internal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fire doors for:\nWeekly testing and inspections\n• Verify all fire door control panel indicators, if provided, are functional by operating the lamp/indicator switch.\nQuarterly testing and inspections\n• Test all fire doors located in main vertical zone bulkheads for local operation.\nAnnual testing and inspection\n• Test all remotely controlled fire doors for proper release)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 9\n4.2.2 Doors required to be self-closing shall not be fitted with hold-back hooks. However, holdback arrangements\nfitted with remote release devices of the fail-safe type may be utilized.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 15\n2.2.3 The maintenance plan shall include at least the following fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances, where installed:\n7. fire doors including their controls.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which defined the frequency of inspections, tests and\nmaintenance for fire doors.\nAll fire doors on a ship are important, but when the high risk of Engine Room fires is considered, Engine Room\nfire doors should receive special attention, particularly the fire doors between the Engine Room and Steering\nGear Compartment, which are often found tied open.\nThe inspector should be aware that local operation of a fire door may be affected if air-conditioning is still operating\nduring a test.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Inspect a sample of fire doors throughout the accommodation, machinery and storage spaces and verify\nthat:\no They were free of obstructions.\no No non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other arrangements\nwere used to hold the door open where it was required to be self-closing.\no Self-closing arrangements closed and latched the door without the need for human intervention.\no The door and frame were free of corrosion or wastage.\no There were no inappropriate cable penetrations through the door, its frame or surrounding\nbulkheads.\no There were no inappropriate alterations or modifications.\no There were no gaps between the fire door and frame.\no There was no damage to the lock mechanism, strike plate or hinges preventing the door closing\nproperly.\no There was no damage to the door packing or frame.\no There were no punctures in the outer skin of the door.\nWhere a fire door had apparently been replaced verify that the replacement door was of at least the same\nfire rating as shown on the fire control plan.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out in the maintenance plan.\nIf necessary, review the Fire Control Plan to verify the required specification of a fire door.\nInterview one officer and one rating to verify their familiarity with the location, purpose and operation of the\nvessel’s fire doors.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on fire doors.\nThe Fire Control Plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the frequency of inspections, tests and maintenance for\nfire doors.\nThe Master, officers or ratings were not familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s fire\ndoors.\nA replacement fire door did not meet the minimum fire rating as indicated on the Fire Control Plan.\nFire door self-closing devices did not operate properly.\nFire doors and/or their frames, where appropriate, were:\no Obstructed.\no Held back by non-approved methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other such\narrangements.\no Corroded or wasted.\no Subject to inappropriate cable penetrations.\no Subject to inappropriate alterations or modifications.\no Subject to gaps between fire door and frame.\no Subject to damage to the lock mechanism, strike plate or hinges preventing the door closing\nproperly.\no Subject to damage to the door packing or frame.\no Subject to puncture damage to the outer skin on one or both sides of the door.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include fire doors or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand firefighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the vessel’s fire doors indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.\nOne or more fire door was defective in any respect.\n5.3. Portable fire fighting appliances", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and use of the", "c": "vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and\nwas the equipment maintained in good condition and ready for immediate use in\naccordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nFirefighter’s outfits including self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nSteering Gear, Forecastle, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nUK MCA: MSIS 12 Fire protection arrangements. For the guidance of surveyors in surveying fire protection\narrangements to ensure compliance with requirements covering merchant ships.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIACS: UI SC275 Rev. 1 2016 Suitable number of spare air cylinders to be provided in connection with drills.\nIACS: UI SC291 Safe Type requirements for two-was portable radiotelephone apparatus for fire-fighter’s\ncommunications (SOLAS Regulation II-2/10.10.4)\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire or enclosed space rescue situation in\naccordance with the shipboard emergency plans.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals Sixth Edition\n10.13.4\nEquipment maintenance\nA responsible person should examine all respiratory equipment at regular intervals.\nDefects should be made good promptly and a record should be kept of inspections and repair. Air cylinders should be\nrecharged as soon as possible after use.\nAir cylinders that are damaged or corroded should be removed from service and either repaired or replaced. All\ncylinders should be hydrostatically tested as required by the appropriate administration’s regulation\nMasks and helmets should be cleaned and disinfected after use. Any repair or maintenance must be carried out\nstrictly according to the manufacturer’s instructions.\n10.13.5\nStowage\nBreathing apparatus should be stowed fully assembled in a place where it is readily accessible. Air cylinders should\nbe fully charged, and the adjusting straps kept slack. Units should be available for emergencies in different parts of\nthe ship.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to breathing apparatus for:\n• •\n• Weekly tests and inspections.\nAnnual tests and inspections.\nFive-year hydrostatic testing.\nand firefighter’s outfits for:\n• Monthly tests and inspections.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n10.2.1 Ships shall carry at least two fire-fighter's outfits.\n10.2.3 In addition, in tankers, two fire-fighter's outfits shall be provided.\n10.2.5 Two spare charges shall be provided for each required breathing apparatus. Passenger ships carrying not\nmore than 36 passengers and cargo ships that are equipped with suitably located means for fully recharging the air\ncylinders free from contamination, need carry only one spare charge for each required apparatus.\n10.3 Storage of fire-fighter's outfits\n10.3.1 The fire-fighter's outfits or sets of personal equipment shall be kept ready for use in an easily accessible\nlocation that is permanently and clearly marked and, where more than one fire-fighter's outfit or more than one set of\npersonal equipment is carried, they shall be stored in widely separated positions.\n10.4 Fire-fighter's communication\nFor ships constructed on or after 1 July 2014, a minimum of two two-way portable radiotelephone apparatus for each\nfire party for fire-fighter's communication shall be carried on board. Those two-way portable radiotelephone apparatus\nshall be of an explosion-proof type or intrinsically safe. Ships constructed before 1 July 2014 shall comply with the\nrequirements of this paragraph not later than the first survey after 1 July 2018.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 15\nInstructions, onboard training and drills\n2.2.6 An onboard means of recharging breathing apparatus cylinders used during drills shall be provided or a suitable\nnumber of spare cylinders shall be carried onboard to replace those used.\nIACS: UI SC275 Rev.1 2016 Suitable number of spare air cylinders to be provided in connection with drills.\nSOLAS II-2/15.2.2.6 (as added by Res. MSC.338(91), applicable from 01 July 2014)\nInterpretation\n“A suitable number of spare cylinders” to be carried on board to replace those used for fire drills shall be at least one\n‘set of cylinders’ for each mandatory breathing apparatus, unless additional spare cylinders are required by the\nshipboard safety management system (SMS).\n‘Set of cylinders’ means the number of cylinders which are required to operate the breathing apparatus.\nNo additional cylinders are required for fire drills for breathing apparatus sets required by SOLAS Reg. II-2/19,\nIMSBC Code, the IBC Code or IGC Code.\nIACS: UI SC291 Safe Type requirements for two-was portable radiotelephone apparatus for fire-fighter’s\ncommunications (SOLAS Regulation II-2/10.10.4)\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 3\n2.1 Fire-fighter’s outfit\nA fire-fighter's outfit shall consist of a set of personal equipment and a breathing apparatus.\n2.1.1 Personal equipment\nPersonal equipment shall consist of the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nprotective clothing of material to protect the skin from the heat radiating from the fire and from burns and\nscalding by steam. The outer surface shall be water-resistant.\nboots of rubber or other electrically non-conducting material.\nrigid helmet providing effective protection against impact.\nelectric safety lamp (hand lantern) of an approved type with a minimum burning period of 3 hours. Electric\nsafety lamps on tankers and those intended to be used in hazardous areas shall be of an explosion-proof\ntype1; and\naxe with a handle provided with high-voltage insulation.\n2.1.2 Breathing apparatus\n2.1.2.1 Breathing apparatus shall be a self-contained compressed air breathing apparatus for which the volume of air\ncontained in the cylinders shall be at least 1,200 l, or other self-contained breathing apparatus which shall be capable\nof functioning for at least 30 min. All air cylinders for breathing apparatus shall be interchangeable.\n2.1.2.2 Compressed air breathing apparatus shall be fitted with an audible alarm and a visual or other device which\nwill alert the user before the volume of the air in the cylinder has been reduced to no less than 200 l.\n2.1.3 Lifeline\nFor each breathing apparatus a fireproof lifeline of at least 30 m in length shall be provided. The lifeline shall\nsuccessfully pass an approval test by statical load of 3.5 kN for 5 min without failure. The lifeline shall be capable of\nbeing attached by means of a snap-hook to the harness of the apparatus or to a separate belt in order to prevent the\nbreathing apparatus becoming detached when the lifeline is operated.\nUK MCA: MSIS 12 Fire protection arrangements. For the guidance of surveyors in surveying fire protection\narrangements to ensure compliance with requirements covering merchant ships.\n9.1.11 Cylinder inspection\n9.1.11.1 Each cylinder must be checked to ensure that it is within its recertification period and not due for periodic\ntesting.\n9.1.11.2 Steel cylinders should be inspected internally, externally and hydrostatically tested at intervals not exceeding\n5 years.\n9.1.11.3 Carbon composite cylinders, referred to in paragraph 9.1.9.2, should be similarly inspected and\nhydrostatically tested at intervals specified by the manufacturer or after a period not exceeding 5 years. The normal\ndesign lifetime of a carbon composite cylinder is 15 to 20 years.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the use and maintenance of firefighter’s outfits and selfcontained breathing apparatus which defined:\n• •\n• The frequency and method of inspection and testing of the equipment.\nUse of the compressor for recharging cylinders, where fitted.\nThe provision of two-way portable radiotelephone apparatus for each fire party for firefighter's\ncommunication.\nAlthough SOLAS recommends 'widely separated positions', firefighting training advocates that breathing apparatus\nshould be used by personnel in pairs.\nAnnual inspections should be carried out to ensure that the air quality of breathing apparatus air recharging systems\nis satisfactory.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Check the firefighter’s outfit storage areas and verify that the firefighter’s outfit(s) were prepared for\nimmediate use.\nCheck the inventory and condition of a selected firefighter’s outfit.\nCheck the associated SCBA and verify that:\no It had been serviced and inspected in accordance with the maintenance plan.\no The bottle was fully charged.\no The correct number of fully charged spare bottles were available.\no The harness and facemasks had been extended for ease of donning.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the use and maintenance of the SCBA and\ncompressor with reference to:\no Full cylinder endurance.\no Correct cylinder filling pressure.\no Cylinder changing and recharging.\no Hygiene requirements.\nIf the vessel was provided with a breathing air compressor verify that:\no A usage log was being maintained.\no It had been serviced and inspected in accordance with the maintenance plan.\no A process was in place to test the air quality at a defined interval.\no Where bottles of different pressures were to be filled, detailed instructions for preventing of\noverfilling of bottles were available and understood.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nRequest that an officer or rating demonstrates:\no The donning of the SCBA.\no The test for equipment air leaks.\no The testing of the mask seal with the face.\no The testing of the low air alarm.\nNote: This question is not focused on the additional SCBAs required by the IGC and Chemical Codes.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on:\no The firefighter’s outfits.\no The SCBAs.\no The spare SCBA cylinders.\no The breathing air compressor including air quality checks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The firefighter’s suits or SCBAs were not stored in the correct location in accordance with the fire plan;\nunless they were in position for cargo operations in accordance with company procedures.\nThe firefighter’s outfits were incomplete or defective in any respect.\nThe SCBAs and firefighter's outfits were not prepared for immediate use with a fully charged bottle and the\nrequired spare bottle(s).\nA SCBA was defective in any respect.\nThe electric safety lamps were not explosion proof type 1.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nInsufficient intrinsically safe two-way portable radios were available for the number of fire teams indicated on\nthe muster list.\nNot all SCBA cylinders were fully interchangeable.\nThe SCBAs or the spare bottles had not been serviced or pressure tested in accordance with the\nmaintenance plan.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:\no The firefighter’s outfit or the associated SCBA.\no The process for filling the SCBA bottles with the onboard compressor, where provided.\nAn officer or rating was unable to demonstrate the donning of a SCBA and the safety checks required prior\nto entering a hazardous environment.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the firefighter’s outfits, SCBA and breathing air compressor or all the required inspections, tests\nand maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand firefighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the firefighter’s outfits, SCBA or breathing air compressor indicated that actions recorded in the\nplan had not in fact taken place.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the location, purpose and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connection, and was\nthe equipment in good working order and available for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nFire hoses, nozzles and international shore connection\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAnywhere, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIACS: UI SC98 Fire hose nozzles of a plastic type material (Reg. II-2/10.2.3.3)\nIACS: UI SC146 Fire hose couplings and nozzles (Reg. II-2/10.2.3)\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n5.3.1.1 Water\nAll tankers have a firefighting system that consists of pumps permanently connected to the sea, a fire main with\nhydrant points, fire hoses with couplings and jet nozzles or preferably jet/spray nozzles. Hydrants are located to\nensure that two jets of water can reach any part of the ship.\n5.5 International shore connection\nAll tankers and terminals should be able to interconnect the fire mains on board and ashore so that an external water\nsupply can be coupled to any hydrant in the ship’s fire main. The international shore fire connection is a standardised\nway of connecting two systems that might have individual couplings or connections that do not match. This\nconnection should be ready for immediate use.\nThe flanges on the connection should have the dimensions shown in Fig. 5.1 (refer to ISGOTT). It should have a flat\nface on one side and a coupling on the other that will fit the hydrant or hose on the ship or shore.\nIf fixed on a ship, the connection should be accessible from both sides of the ship and its location clearly marked.\nTo interconnect the two fire mains, a fire hose with a shore connection led to its counterpart and its flange joints are\nbolted together.\nThe connection should be protected from the elements and located for immediate use. All appropriate staff should\nknow the location and purpose of this connection. It should be discussed during the joint completion of the ship/shore\nchecklist.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fire mains, fire pumps, hydrants, hoses and nozzles for:\n• •\n• Monthly tests and inspections.\nQuarterly tests and inspections.\nAnnual tests and inspections.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n2.1.7.1 Ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards shall be provided with at least one international shore connection\ncomplying with the Fire Safety Systems Code.\n2.1.7.2 Facilities shall be available enabling such a connection to be used on either side of the ship.\n2.3.1.1 Fire hoses shall be of non-perishable material approved by the Administration and shall be sufficient in length\nto project a jet of water to any of the spaces in which they may be required to be used. Each hose shall be provided\nwith a nozzle and the necessary couplings. Hoses specified in this chapter as \"fire hoses\" shall, together with any\nnecessary fittings and tools, be kept ready for use in conspicuous positions near the water service hydrants or\nconnections. …. Fire hoses shall have a length of at least 10 m, but not more than:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n15 m in machinery spaces.\n20 m in other spaces and open decks; and\n25 m for open decks on ships with a maximum breadth in excess of 30 m.\n2.3.1.2 Unless one hose and nozzle is provided for each hydrant in the ship, there shall be complete\ninterchangeability of hose couplings and nozzles.\nIACS: UI SC98 Fire hose nozzles of a plastic type material (Reg. II-2/10.2.3.3)\nFire hose nozzles made of plastic type material, e.g. polycarbonate, are considered acceptable provided capacity and\nserviceability are documented and the nozzles are found suitable for the marine environment.\nIACS: UI SC146 Fire hose couplings and nozzles (Reg. II-2/10.2.3)\nAluminium alloys may be used for fire hose couplings and nozzles, except in open deck areas of oil tankers and\nchemical tankers.\nIMO: FSS Code\n2.2 Materials and accessories\nInternational shore connections shall be of steel or other equivalent material and shall be designed for 1.0 N/ mm²\nservices. The flange shall have a flat face on one side, and, on the other side, it shall be permanently attached to a\ncoupling that will fit the ship's hydrant and hose. The connection shall be kept aboard the ship together with a gasket\nof any material suitable for 1.0 N/ mm² services, together with four bolts of 16 mm diameter and 50 mm in length, four\n16 mm nuts and eight washers.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the inspection, testing and maintenance of fire hoses,\nnozzles and international shore connections which defined the:\n• •\n• Frequency of inspection and testing.\nFrequency of pressure testing of fire hoses.\nReplacement criteria for damaged or worn hoses\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Inspect a random sample of the vessel’s fire hoses and nozzles from the accommodation, machinery spaces\nand main deck areas and verify that the washers, connecting spanners, connecting mechanisms and nozzle\njet/spray controls were present and/or fully functional.\n• •\n• •\n• Inspect a random sample of fire hydrants and verify that washers and connection mechanisms were present\nand functioning.\nInspect the international shore connection(s) and verify the required nuts, bolts and gasket were available\nand, in addition, two correctly sized spanners.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nIf necessary, review the fire control plan to verify the required location of fire hoses and nozzles.\nInterview a deck or engine rating to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the fire hoses,\nnozzles and international shore connections.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the fire hoses, nozzles and international\nshore connections.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nFire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections were missing from the locations shown on the fire\ncontrol plan unless laid out for cargo or bunker operations.\nFire hoses, nozzles or international shore connections were not ready for immediate use.\nFire hoses were either less than 10m in length or longer than the maximum permitted for their location.\nThe required gaskets, nuts, washers or recommended spanners were missing from the international shore\nconnection(s) storage location.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the fire hoses, nozzles and\ninternational shore connections.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the fire hoses, nozzles and\ninternational shore connections.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections or all the required inspections, tests\nand maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the fire hoses, nozzles and international shore connections indicated that actions recorded in\nthe plan had not in fact taken place.\nAn inspected fire hose, nozzle or international shore connections was found to be defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.3.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location, purpose and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s portable fire extinguishers, and were the extinguishers in good\norder and readily available for immediate use with operating instructions clearly marked?\nShort Question Text\nPortable fire extinguishers\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Anywhere\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: Resolution A.951(23) Improved Guidelines for Marine Portable fire extinguishers.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1275 Unified interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of portable fire\nextinguishers on board ships. Rev.1\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\nAll fire extinguishers should be maintained and available for immediate use. The system for managing safety should\ncontain procedures for maintenance, including that done by service agents. As a minimum, all fire extinguishers\nshould be formally checked once a year that they are in the right location, have the right charging pressure and are\nworking properly.\nIMO MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance\nare carried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\nIMO: Resolution A.951(23) Improved Guidelines for Marine Portable fire extinguishers.\nMarking of extinguishers\n8.1 Each extinguisher should be clearly marked with the following minimum information:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nname of the manufacturer.\ntypes of fire and rating for which the extinguisher is suitable.\ntype and quantity of extinguishing medium.\napproval details.\ninstructions for use and recharge (it is recommended that operating instructions be given in pictorial form, in\naddition to explanatory text in language understood by the likely user).\nyear of manufacture.\ntemperature range over which the extinguisher will operate satisfactorily: and\ntest pressure.\n9 Periodical inspections and maintenance\n9.1 Extinguishers should be subject to periodical inspections in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and\nserviced at intervals not exceeding one year.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II/2 Regulation 10\n3 Portable fire extinguishers *\n* Refer to the Improved Guidelines for Marine Portable Fire Extinguishers adopted by the Organization by resolution\nA.951(23) and Unified interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of portable fire\nextinguishers on board ships (MSC.1/Circ.1275).\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1275 Unified interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of\nportable fire extinguishers on board ships. Rev.1\n1.2 This unified interpretation should be used for ships constructed on or after 1 January 2009. For ships constructed\nbefore 1 January 2009, shipowners are encouraged to implement this unified interpretation.\n2.1 The table below should be applied for the number and arrangement of portable fire extinguishers in\naccommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations, machinery spaces of category A, other machinery spaces,\ncargo spaces, weather deck and other spaces on board ships.\nTable – Minimum numbers and distribution of portable fire extinguishers in the various types of spaces on board\nships. (Refer to Circular).\nInspection Guidance\nPortable fire extinguishers should be located around the ship as marked on the ship’s Fire Control Plan and in\naccordance with MSC.1/Circ.1275.\nThey should be clearly marked with:\n• •\n• •\nTypes of fire and rating for which the extinguisher is suitable.\nType and quantity of extinguishing medium.\nInstructions for use and recharge\nYear of manufacture.\nExtinguishers should be fully charged and readily available for immediate use. There should be evidence of regular\ninspection and servicing and sufficient spare charges (or spare extinguishers) available.\nRecords of inspection, testing and servicing should be in the Maintenance Plan for Fire Protection Systems and\nAppliances, as required by IMO MSC.1/Circ.1432. This may be integrated into the ship’s computerised planned\nmaintenance system or may stand alone.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nInspect a representative sample of each type of portable extinguisher found onboard and verify that each fire\nextinguisher was:\no Marked with the information required under A.951(23) 8.1.\no Marked with the date of the last annual service.\no Marked with the date of the last check by vessel staff.\no In the correct position as indicated by the fire control plan.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out in the maintenance plan.\nReview the inventory of spare extinguishers and spare charges and verify that there are sufficient on board\nfor the number and type of portable fire extinguishers required to be carried.\nInterview one officer or rating to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of a selected portable\nfire extinguisher.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe Fire Control Plan.\nThe maintenance plan for fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on portable fire extinguishers required by the\nmaintenance plan.\nInventory of spare fire extinguisher charges and/or spare fire extinguishers.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nFire extinguisher(s) were missing or not located as shown in the Fire Control Plan.\nThe fire control plan did not comply with MSC.1/Circ.1275 with regards to the distribution of fire\nextinguishers. (for ships constructed before 1 January 2009 make a comment only in the Hardware\nresponse tool)\nFire extinguisher(s) were not fully charged.\nFire extinguisher(s) were not readily available for immediate use.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Fire extinguisher(s) were not clearly marked with the information required by A.951(23) 8.1.\nFire Extinguisher(s) were not marked with the date of onboard inspection or annual survey.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inspection and maintenance plan for portable fire\nextinguishers.\nIn service fire extinguishers(s) were found to be defective in any respect.\nFire extinguishers were not included in the maintenance plan for fire protection systems and fire-fighting\nsystems and appliances.\nInspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on fire extinguishers were incomplete.\nInspection of an extinguisher indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken\nplace.\nThere were insufficient spare charges or extra extinguishers.\nAn interviewed officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use and/or operation of a portable fire extinguisher.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.4.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and purpose of the", "c": "Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBDs) carried on board, and were these devices\nin good order, suitably located and ready for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBDs)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Pumproom, Internal Accommodation, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO MSC/Circ.849 Guidelines for the performance\nlocation\nuse and care of emergency escape breathing devices (EEBDs)\nMSC/Circ.1081 Unified interpretations of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.3.4 and II-2/13.4.3\nObjective\nTo ensure that Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBDs) are readily available to personnel in the event\nof a fire or any other emergency on the vessel.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n10.13.3 Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nIMO: MSC/Circ.849 Guidelines for the performance, location, use and care of emergency escape breathing\ndevices (EEBDs)\n1.1 These Guidelines provide information and guidance on the location, use, and care of emergency escape\nbreathing devices (EEBDs), to provide personnel breathing protection against a hazardous atmosphere while\nescaping to an area of safety.\n2.1 An EEBD is a supplied-air or oxygen device only used for escape from a compartment that has a hazardous\natmosphere and should be of approved type.\n2.2 EEBDs are not to be used for fighting fires, entering oxygen deficient voids or tanks, or worn by fire-fighters. In\nthese events, a self-contained breathing apparatus, which is specifically suited for such situations should be used.\n3.1 \"Face piece\" means a face covering that is designed to form a complete seal around the eyes, nose and mouth\nwhich is secured in position by a suitable means.\n3.2 \"Hood\" means a head covering which completely covers the head, neck, and may cover portions of the\nshoulders.\n3.3 \"Hazardous atmosphere\" means any atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to life or health.\n4.1 The EEBD should have at least a duration of service of 10 min.\n4.2 The EEBD should include a hood or full-face piece, as appropriate, to protect the eyes, nose and mouth during\nescape. Hoods and face pieces should be constructed of flame-resistant materials and include a clear window for\nviewing.\n4.3 An unactivated EEBD should be capable of being carried hands-free.\n4.4 The EEBDs, when stored, should be suitably protected from the environment.\n4.5 Brief instructions or diagrams clearly illustrating the use should be clearly printed on the EEBD. The donning\nprocedures should be quick and easy to allow for situations where there is little time to seek safety from a hazardous\natmosphere.\n4.6 Unless personnel are individually carrying EEBDs, consideration should be given for placing such devices along\nthe escape routes within the machinery spaces or at the foot of each escape ladder within the space. In addition,\ncontrol spaces and workshops located within the machinery spaces should also be considered for the possible\nlocation of such devices.\n5.1 The EEBD should be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.\n5.2 Spare EEBDs should be kept on board.\n5.3 Maintenance requirements, manufacturer's trademark and serial number, shelf life with accompanying\nmanufacture date and name of approving authority should be printed on each EEBD.\n6.1 Training in the use of the EEBD should be considered as a part of basic safety training.\n6.2 All EEBD training units should be clearly marked.\n6.3 Personnel should be trained to immediately don an EEBD prior to exiting a space when the atmosphere becomes\nlife threatening. This is necessary due to the possibility of encountering smoke during escape. Such training should\nbe accomplished by scheduling routine escape drills for crew members working in the engineering or machinery\nspaces.\n6.4 An EEBD may also be used to escape from a machinery space due to an accidental release of a fixed CO system\nand can be carried by fire-fighters for the sole purpose of providing the device to personnel in need of emergency\nassistance.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1081 Unified interpretations of SOLAS regulations II-2/13.3.4 and II-2/13.4.3\nRegulation 13.3.4 Emergency escape breathing devices (EEBD)\nThe minimum number of EEBDs to be kept within accommodation spaces should be as follows:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nfor cargo ships: two (2) EEBDs and one (1) spare EEBD.\nfor passenger ships ...\nfor passenger ships ...\nRegulation 13.4.3 Emergency escape breathing devices (EEBD)\n1. This interpretation applies to machinery spaces where crew are normally employed or may be present on a routine\nbasis.\n2. In machinery spaces for category A containing internal combustion machinery used for main propulsion, EEBDs\nshould be positioned as follows:\n1.\n2.\n3.\none (1) EEBD in the engine control room, if located within the machinery space;\none (1) EEBD in workshop areas. If there is, however, a direct access to an escape way from the workshop,\nan EEBD is not required; and\none (1) EEBD on each deck or platform level near the escape ladder constituting the second means of\nescape from the machinery space (the other means being an enclosed escape trunk or watertight door at\nthe lower level of the space).\nAlternatively, different number or location may be determined by the Administration taking into consideration the\nlayout and dimensions or the normal manning of the space.\n3. For machinery spaces of category A other than those containing internal combustion machinery used for main\npropulsion, one (1) EEBD should, as a minimum, be provided on each deck or platform level near the escape ladder\nconstituting the second means of escape from the space (the other means being an enclosed escape trunk or\nwatertight door at the lower level of the space).\n4. For other machinery spaces, the number and location of EEBDs are to be determined by the Administration.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to non-rechargeable Emergency Escape Breathing Devices as\nfollows:\n• Weekly – “Examine all …. EEBD cylinder gauges to confirm they are in the correct pressure range.”\n• Annually – “check EEBDs according to maker's instructions”\nAnd applicable to Breathing Apparatus\n• Perform hydrostatic testing of all steel self-contained breathing apparatus cylinders. Aluminium and\ncomposite cylinders should be tested to the satisfaction of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 13\n3.4 Emergency escape breathing devices\n3.4.1 Emergency escape breathing devices shall comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code. Spare emergency\nescape breathing devices shall be kept onboard.\n3.4.2 All ships shall carry at least two emergency escape breathing devices within accommodation spaces.\n4.3 Emergency escape breathing devices\n4.3.1 On all ships, within the machinery spaces, emergency escape breathing devices shall be situated ready for use\nat easily visible places, which can be reached quickly and easily at any time in the event of fire. The location of\nemergency escape breathing devices shall take into account the layout of the machinery space and the number of\npersons normally working in the spaces.\n4.3.2 The number and location of these devices shall be indicated in the fire control plan required in regulation 15.2.4.\n4.3.3 Emergency escape breathing devices shall comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code.\nInspection Guidance\nNon-rechargeable EEBDs\n• •\n• Non-rechargeable EEBDs have a shelf life, usually 15 years, after which they should be replaced.\nMaintenance requirements, manufacturer's trademark and serial number, shelf life (expiry date) with\naccompanying manufacture date and name of approving authority should be printed on each EEBD.\nThe cylinders do not require hydrostatic testing.\nRechargeable EEBDs\n• For EEBDs that can be recharged on board using the SCBA compressor, the cylinders should be\nhydrostatically tested as for breathing apparatus i.e. five-yearly hydrostatic testing of all steel self-contained\nbreathing apparatus cylinders.\n• Aluminium and composite cylinders should be tested to the satisfaction of the Administration.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs that defined:\n• •\n• The number and location of EEBDs\nTraining and escape drill requirements for EEBDs\nInspection and maintenance requirements for EEBDs\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs\nSight, and where necessary review, the inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs in the on-board\nmaintenance plan.\nInspect sample EEBDs in the machinery spaces, the pumproom and the accommodation spaces.\n• Interview two ratings to verify their familiarity with the location and purpose of the EEBDs.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure for the use and maintenance of EEBDs\nThe inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs contained within the onboard maintenance plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the location, inspection and maintenance of the EEBDs.\nThe EEBDs were not positioned in accordance with the fire control plan.\nThere were fewer spare EEBDs onboard than indicated on the fire control plan.\nAn inspected EEBD was found defective in any respect, including:\no The cylinder pressure was outside the normal range.\no The unit was passed its expiry date.\no The donning instructions could not be read.\no The unit was not marked with its maintenance requirements, manufacturer's trademark and serial\nnumber, shelf life (expiry date) with accompanying manufacture date and name of approving\nauthority.\nEEBD(s) used for training were not clearly marked.\nEEBD(s) had not been inspected and maintained according to the company procedures and manufacturer’s\ninstructions.\nRechargeable EEBD cylinders had not been hydrostatically tested at the required interval.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location and purpose of the EEBDs.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.3.5.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and engine ratings familiar with the purpose and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s wheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers, and was the equipment in\ngood order and available for immediate use with operating instructions clearly marked?\nShort Question Text\nWheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Interview - Engine Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals Sixth Edition\nChapter 5 Fire Protection.\nAll fire extinguishers should be maintained and available for immediate use. The system for managing safety should\ncontain procedures for maintenance, including that done by service agents. As a minimum, all fire extinguishers\nshould be formally checked once a year that they are in the right location, have the right charging pressure and are\nworking properly. Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and appliances are in IMO\npublications, specifically the latest relevant Marine Safety Committee (MSC) Circular).\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to wheeled(mobile) fire extinguishers for:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly inspections.\nAnnual maintenance and inspections.\nFive-yearly inspections\nTen-yearly hydrostatic testing, including propellant cartridges.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals,\nany non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known,\nappropriate corrective action is taken, and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 10\n5.1 Machinery spaces containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units\n5.1.2.2 …. There shall be not less than one approved foam-type extinguisher of at least 135 l capacity or equivalent\nin each boiler room. These extinguishers shall be provided with hoses on reels suitable for reaching any part of the\nboiler room. In the case of domestic boilers of less than 175 kW, or boilers protected by fixed water-based local\napplication fire extinguishing systems as required by paragraph 5.6, an approved foam-type extinguisher of at least\n135 l capacity is not required\n5.2 Machinery spaces of category A containing internal combustion machinery\n5.2.2.2 There shall be in each such space approved foam-type fire extinguishers, each of at least 45 l capacity or\nequivalent, sufficient in number to enable foam or its equivalent to be directed on to any part of the fuel and\nlubricating oil pressure systems, gearing and other fire hazards.\n5.3 Machinery spaces containing steam turbines or enclosed steam engines\n5.3.2.1 There shall be approved foam fire extinguishers each of at least 45 l capacity or equivalent sufficient in\nnumber to enable foam or its equivalent to be directed on to any part of the pressure lubrication system, on to any\npart of the casings enclosing pressure lubricated parts of the turbines, engines or associated gearing, and any other\nfire hazards. However, such extinguishers shall not be required if protection, at least equivalent to that required by\nthis subparagraph, is provided in such spaces by a fixed fire-extinguishing system fitted in compliance with paragraph\n4.1.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 14\nOperational readiness and maintenance\n2.1.2 Fire-fighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate\nuse….\n2.2.3 The maintenance plan shall include at least the following fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances, where installed:\n.3 fixed fire-extinguishing systems and other fire extinguishing appliances.\nInspection Guidance\nWheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers should be located in the machinery spaces as marked on the Fire Control Plan\nand in accordance with the requirements of SOLAS.\nThey should be clearly marked with:\n• •\n• •\nTypes of fire and rating for which the extinguisher is suitable\nType and quantity of extinguishing medium\nInstructions for use and recharge\nYear of manufacture\nExtinguishers should be kept fully charged and readily available for immediate use. There should be evidence of\nregular inspection, servicing and testing and sufficient spare charges available.\nRecords of inspection and testing should be in the Maintenance Plan for Fire Protection Systems and Appliances as\nrequired by IMO: MSC. /Circ 1432. This may be integrated into the ship’s computerised planned maintenance system\nor may stand alone.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nInspect the wheeled fire extinguishers in the machinery spaces and verify each extinguisher was:\no Marked with the required information.\no Marked with the date of the last annual service.\no Marked with the date of the last check by vessel staff.\no In the correct position as indicated by the fire control plan.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out in the maintenance plan.\nReview the inventory of spare charges and verify that there were sufficient on board for the wheeled fire\nextinguishers.\nInterview one engineer officer or rating to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the\nwheeled fire extinguishers.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe fire control plan\nThe maintenance plan for fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on wheeled fire extinguishers required by the\nmaintenance plan.\nInventory of spare charges.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• A wheeled fire extinguisher(s) was not:\no Fully charged.\no Readily available for immediate use.\no Marked with the required information.\no Marked with the date of onboard inspections or servicing.\no Included in the maintenance plan for fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nA wheeled fire extinguisher(s) was:\no Missing or not located as shown in the fire control plan.\no Defective in any respect.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inspection and maintenance plan for wheeled fire\nextinguishers.\nInspection records for inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on wheeled fire extinguishers were\nincomplete.\nInspection of a wheeled fire extinguisher indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in\nfact taken place.\nThere were insufficient spare charges.\nAn interviewed engineer officer or rating was unfamiliar with the use and/or operation of a wheeled fire\nextinguisher.\nWhere the vessel is not equipped with wheeled (mobile) fire extinguishers, select “Not Answerable” in each of the\nresponse tools then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".\n5.4. Life saving appliances", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the davit-launched", "c": "lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances, and were they in good order\nwith records available to demonstrate that they had been inspected and tested as\nrequired?\nShort Question Text\nDavit-launched lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance\nthorough examination\noperational testing\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats\nlaunching appliances and release gear\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances will be ready for immediate use in an\nemergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft. A Seafarer’s Guide\nSection 2.1 Maintenance and instruction manuals\nExperience has revealed poor maintenance as a contributory factor to many incidents and near misses involving\nsurvival craft…\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing,\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n4 Qualification levels and certification\n4.1 Weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance as specified in the equipment maintenance manual(s),\nshall be conducted by authorized service providers, or by shipboard personnel under the direction of a senior ship's\nofficer in accordance with the maintenance manual(s).\n4.2 Annual thorough examinations and operational tests, as described in section 6.2, shall be conducted by certified\npersonnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance with section 7 and section 8.\nThe service provider may be the ship operator provided that it is authorized in accordance with section 3 and section\n7.\n4.3 Five-year thorough examination, any overhaul, overload operational tests, as described in section 6.3, and repair\nshall be conducted by certified personnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance\nwith section 7 and section 8.\n5 Reports and records\n5.1 All reports and checklists shall be completed and signed by the person who carries out the inspection and\nmaintenance work and countersigned by the Company's representative or the ship's master.\n5.2 Records of maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be updated and\nfiled on board the ship for the service life of the equipment.\n5.3 When thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair are completed, a statement confirming that\nthe lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose shall be promptly issued by the manufacturer or authorized service\nprovider that conducted the work. A copy of valid documents of certification and authorization as appropriate shall be\nincluded with the statement.\n6 Specific Procedures For Inspection, Maintenance, Thorough Examination, Operational Testing, Overhaul And\nRepair\n6.1 Maintenance manuals\n6.1.1 Any inspection, maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be carried\nout according to the maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation developed by the manufacturer.\n6.1.2 A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation as specified in paragraph 6.1.1 shall\nbe available on board.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: LSA Code\n4.4.3.5 All surfaces on which persons might walk shall have a non-skid finish.\n4.4.6.12 Water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine shall be provided and mounted in a\nconspicuous place near the engine starting controls.\n4.4.7.6 Every lifeboat to be launched by a fall or falls, except a free-fall lifeboat, shall be fitted with a release\nmechanism complying with the following requirements subject to subparagraph .17 below:\n.7 the mechanism shall have two release capabilities: normal (off-load) release capability and on-load release\ncapability:\n.11 clear operating instructions shall be provided with a suitably worded warning notice using colour coding,\npictograms, and/or symbols as necessary for clarity. If colour coding is used, green shall indicate a properly reset\nhook and red shall indicate danger of improper or incorrect setting.\n.12 the release control shall be clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its surroundings.\n4.4.7.11 A manually controlled interior light or source of light shall be fitted inside the lifeboat to provide illumination\nfor not less than 12 h to permit reading of survival and equipment instructions; however, oil lamps shall not be\npermitted for this purpose.\n4.4.8 Lifeboat equipment\nAll items of lifeboat equipment, whether required by this paragraph or elsewhere in section 4.4, shall be secured\nwithin the lifeboat by lashings, storage in lockers or compartments, storage in brackets or similar mounting\narrangements or other suitable means. However, in the case of a lifeboat to be launched by falls the boat-hooks shall\nbe kept free for fending off purposes. The equipment shall be secured in such a manner as not to interfere with any\nabandonment procedures.\n4.4.9.1 The number of persons for which the lifeboat is approved shall be clearly marked on it in clear permanent\ncharacters.\n4.4.9.2 The name and port of registry of the ship to which the lifeboat belongs shall be marked on each side of the\nlifeboat's bow in block capitals of the Roman alphabet.\n4.4.9.3 Means of identifying the ship to which the lifeboat belongs, and the number of the lifeboat shall be marked in\nsuch a way that they are visible from above.\n4.6.1 Totally enclosed lifeboats shall comply with the requirements of section 4.4 and in addition shall comply with the\nrequirements of this section.\n4.6.2 Enclosure\nEvery totally enclosed lifeboat shall be provided with a rigid watertight enclosure which completely encloses the\nlifeboat. The enclosure shall be so arranged that:\n.2 access to the lifeboat is provided by hatches which can be closed to make the lifeboat watertight.\n.4 access hatches are capable of being opened and closed from both inside and outside and are equipped with\nmeans to hold them securely in open positions.\n.7 it includes windows or translucent panels which admit sufficient daylight to the inside of the lifeboat with the\nhatches closed to make artificial light unnecessary.\n4.6.3.1 Except in free-fall lifeboats, a safety belt shall be fitted at each indicated seating position.\n4.8 Lifeboats with a self-contained air support system\nIn addition to complying with the requirements of section 4.6 or 4.7, as applicable, a lifeboat with a self-contained air\nsupport system shall be so arranged that, when proceeding with all entrances and openings closed, the air in the\nlifeboat remains safe and breathable and the engine runs normally for a period of not less than 10 min. During this\nperiod, the atmospheric pressure inside the lifeboat shall never fall below the outside atmospheric pressure nor shall\nit exceed it by more than 20 hPa. The system shall have visual indicators to indicate the pressure of the air supply at\nall times.\n4.9 Fire-protected lifeboats\n4.9.1 In addition to complying with the requirements of section 4.8, a fire-protected lifeboat when waterborne shall be\ncapable of protecting the number of persons it is permitted to accommodate when subjected to a continuous oil fire\nthat envelops the lifeboat for a period of not less than 8 min.\n4.9.2 Water spray system,\nA lifeboat which has a water spray fire-protection system shall comply with the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nwater for the system shall be drawn from the sea by a self-priming motor pump. It shall be possible to turn\n\"on\" and turn \"off\" the flow of water over the exterior of the lifeboat.\nthe seawater intake shall be so arranged as to prevent the intake of flammable liquids from the sea surface;\nand\nthe system shall be arranged for flushing with fresh water and allowing complete drainage.\n6.1.2.7 Where davit arms are recovered by power, safety devices shall be fitted which will automatically cut off the\npower before the davit arms reach the stops in order to prevent overstressing the falls or davits, unless the motor is\ndesigned to prevent such overstressing.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 20\n3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances complying with regulation 36 shall be provided\nand maintenance shall be carried out accordingly.\n3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned\nmaintenance programme, which includes the requirements of regulation 36.\n4 Maintenance of falls\nFalls used in launching shall be inspected periodically* with special regard for areas passing through sheaves and\nrenewed when necessary due to deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than 5 years, whichever is the\nearlier.\n* Refer to ‘Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats’ (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1).\n6 Weekly inspection\nThe following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of the inspection shall be entered in the\nlog-book:\n.1 all survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are ready\nfor use. The inspection shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment to the lifeboat and\nthe on-load release gear being properly and completely reset.\n.2 all engines in lifeboats and rescue boats shall be run for a total period of not less than 3 min, provided the ambient\ntemperature is above the minimum temperature required for starting and running the engine. During this period of\ntime, it should be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box train are engaging satisfactorily…\n.3 lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, on cargo ships shall be moved from their stowed position, without any persons\non board, to the extent necessary to demonstrate satisfactory operation of launching appliances if weather and sea\nconditions so allow.\n7 Monthly inspection\n7.1 All lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, shall be turned out from their stowed position, without any persons on\nboard if weather and sea conditions so allow.\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the inspection\nshall be entered in the log-book.\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\nRefer to ‘Symbols related to life-saving appliances and arrangements’ (resolution A.760(18), as amended) and/or\ntables 1 and 2 of ‘Escape route signs and equipment location markings’ (resolution A.1116(3)) as appropriate. Refer\nto the new symbols in tables 1 and 2 of resolution A.1116(30) where the symbols for a specific item are differently\nexpressed in resolutions A.760(18) as amended and A.1116(30)\n11 Maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats, rescue boats and fast\nrescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n11.1 Launching appliances shall be:\n.1 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable: and\n.2 upon completion of the examination referred to in paragraph 11.1.1, subjected to a dynamic test of the winch brake\nat maximum lowering speed. The load to be applied shall be the mass of the survival craft or rescue boat without\npersons on board, except that, at intervals of at least once every five years, the test shall be carried out with a proof\nload equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat and its full complement of persons and\nequipment.\n11.2 Lifeboat and rescue boat release gear, including fast rescue boat release gear and free-fall lifeboat release\nsystems, shall be:\n.1 subject to a thorough examination and operational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and\nI/8.\n.2 in case of on-load release gear, operationally tested under a load of 1.1 times the total mass of the boat when\nloaded with its full complement of persons and equipment whenever the release gear is overhauled. Such\noverhauling and operational test shall be carried out at least once every five years; *\n* Refer to Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution A.689(17)), as amended. For life-saving\nappliances installed on board on or after 1 July 1999, refer to Revised Recommendations on testing of life-saving\nappliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), as amended.\n11.4 Lifeboats and rescue boats, including fast rescue boats, shall be subject to a thorough examination and\noperational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and I/8.\n11.5 The thorough examination, operational testing and overhaul required by paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 and the\nmaintenance and repair of equipment specified in paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 shall be carried out in accordance with the\nRequirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair, and the instructions\nfor onboard maintenance as required by regulation 36.\nChapter III Regulation 31\n1.6 Chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes emitting toxic vapours or gases* shall carry, in lieu of totally\nenclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code, lifeboats with a self-contained air\nsupport system complying with the requirements of section 4.8 of the Code.\n*Refer to the products for which emergency escape respiratory protection is required in Chapter 17 of the IBC Code\n(resolution MSC.4(48) as amended) and in Chapter 19 of the IGC Code (resolution MSC.5(48), as amended\n1.7 Oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes having a flash point not exceeding 60°C(closed\ncup test) shall carry, in lieu of totally enclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code,\nfire-protected lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.9 of the Code.\nChapter III Regulation 36\nInstructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances shall be easily understood, illustrated wherever\npossible, and, as appropriate, shall include the following for each appliance:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\na checklist for use when carrying out the inspections required by regulation 20.7.\nmaintenance and repair instructions.\nschedule of periodic maintenance.\ndiagram of lubrication points with the recommended lubricants.\nlist of replaceable parts.\nlist of sources of spare parts; and\nlog for records of inspections and maintenance.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching\nappliances were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms\nand launching appliances were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an\nemergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections and tests of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching\nappliances.\nInspect the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.\nInspect the lifting hooks and their associated structure where they connect to the lifeboat keel and verify that\nthe structure was free from corrosion which might affect the strength.\nIf safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer to start a lifeboat engine and demonstrate the\npropeller moving in the ahead and astern direction.\nSelect several items from the monthly inspection check list required by SOLAS III/ 36 and verify that the\naccompanying officer was familiar with how the checks or tests were performed.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the operation, inspection and testing of the\nlifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure to ensure lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were\nperiodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nA copy of the monthly inspection checklist required by SOLAS III/36.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nRecords of periodic inspections and tests of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no procedure to ensure the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were\nperiodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and\nlaunching appliances.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the lifeboats, release\nmechanisms and launching appliances.\nRecords of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the lifeboats, release mechanisms\nand launching appliances were incomplete.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Records of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the lifeboats, release mechanisms\nand launching appliances were incomplete.\nThere were no checklists as required by SOLAS III/36 available for the inspection of the lifeboats, release\nmechanisms and launching appliances.\nRecords indicated the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five years.\nA lifeboat was not marked as required.\nThere were no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the on-load release mechanism, with a\nsuitably worded warning notice.\nThe on-load release control was not clearly marked in a colour that contrasted with its surroundings.\nItems of lifeboat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly stowed.\nA lifeboat engine would not start.\nThere were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine mounted in a conspicuous\nplace near the engine starting controls.\nWhen tested, it could not be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box train were engaging satisfactorily.\nIndicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, was not with the normal range.\nThe pressurised air hoses of the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, were in poor condition.\nNozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, were clogged by salt and/or scale.\nThe launching appliance gearcase breather vent was blocked or painted over.\nLifeboat davit limit switches were not operating freely.\nThe lifeboat falls or gripes were in poor condition.\nInspection of the lifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances indicated that actions recorded in\nthe maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe lifeboats and launching appliances and their locations were not marked with the required symbols.\nLifeboats, release mechanisms and launching appliances were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the free-fall lifeboat, its", "c": "release systems and its launching appliance, and was the equipment in satisfactory\ncondition with records available to demonstrate that it had been inspected and tested in\naccordance with company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nFree-fall lifeboat, its release systems and its launching appliance\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance\nthorough examination\noperational testing\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats\nlaunching appliances and release gear\nObjective\nTo ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release system and launching appliance will be ready for immediate use in\nan emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft. A Seafarer’s Guide\nSection 2.1 Maintenance and instruction manuals\nExperience has revealed poor maintenance as a contributory factor to many incidents and near misses involving\nsurvival craft…\nFree-fall lifeboats\nSection 5.1 Maintenance and inspection\n• •\nIf suitable access is available to the boat ramp, the condition of skid plates and the freedom of rollers should\nbe regularly checked.\nTo guard against hydraulic hose failure, consideration should be given to the routine replacement of hoses\nduring refit periods, particularly those hoses located in relatively inaccessible positions on the ramp or “A”\nframe/recovery gear.\nSection 5.5 Post recovery\n• The lifeboat should be left ready for immediate launch with safety/maintenance chains or pins removed.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing,\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n4 Qualification Levels And Certification\n4.1 Weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance as specified in the equipment maintenance manual(s),\nshall be conducted by authorized service providers, or by shipboard personnel under the direction of a senior ship's\nofficer in accordance with the maintenance manual(s).\n4.2 Annual thorough examinations and operational tests, as described in section 6.2, shall be conducted by certified\npersonnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance with section 7 and section 8.\nThe service provider may be the ship operator provided that it is authorized in accordance with section 3 and section\n7.\n4.3 Five-year thorough examination, any overhaul, overload operational tests, as described in section 6.3, and repair\nshall be conducted by certified personnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance\nwith section 7 and section 8.\n5 Reports And Records\n5.1 All reports and checklists shall be completed and signed by the person who carries out the inspection and\nmaintenance work and countersigned by the Company's representative or the ship's master.\n5.2 Records of maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be updated and\nfiled on board the ship for the service life of the equipment.\n5.3 When thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair are completed, a statement confirming that\nthe lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose shall be promptly issued by the manufacturer or authorized service\nprovider that conducted the work. A copy of valid documents of certification and authorization as appropriate shall be\nincluded with the statement.\n6 Specific Procedures For Inspection, Maintenance, Thorough Examination, Operational Testing, Overhaul And\nRepair\n6.1 Maintenance manuals\n6.1.1 Any inspection, maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be carried\nout according to the maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation developed by the manufacturer.\n6.1.2 A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation as specified in paragraph 6.1.1 shall\nbe available on board.\nIMO: LSA Code\n4.4.3.5 All surfaces on which persons might walk shall have a non-skid finish.\n4.4.6.12 Water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine shall be provided and mounted in a\nconspicuous place near the engine starting controls.\n4.4.7.11 A manually controlled interior light or source of light shall be fitted inside the lifeboat to provide illumination\nfor not less than 12 h to permit reading of survival and equipment instructions; however, oil lamps shall not be\npermitted for this purpose.\n4.4.8 Lifeboat equipment\nAll items of lifeboat equipment, whether required by this paragraph or elsewhere in section 4.4, shall be secured\nwithin the lifeboat by lashings, storage in lockers or compartments, storage in brackets or similar mounting\narrangements or other suitable means. However, in the case of a lifeboat to be launched by falls the boat-hooks shall\nbe kept free for fending off purposes. The equipment shall be secured in such a manner as not to interfere with any\nabandonment procedures.\n4.4.9.1 The number of persons for which the lifeboat is approved shall be clearly marked on it in clear permanent\ncharacters.\n4.4.9.2 The name and port of registry of the ship to which the lifeboat belongs shall be marked on each side of the\nlifeboat's bow in block capitals of the Roman alphabet.\n4.4.9.3 Means of identifying the ship to which the lifeboat belongs, and the number of the lifeboat shall be marked in\nsuch a way that they are visible from above.\n4.6.1 Totally enclosed lifeboats shall comply with the requirements of section 4.4 and in addition shall comply with the\nrequirements of this section.\n4.6.2 Enclosure\nEvery totally enclosed lifeboat shall be provided with a rigid watertight enclosure which completely encloses the\nlifeboat. The enclosure shall be so arranged that:\n.2 access to the lifeboat is provided by hatches which can be closed to make the lifeboat watertight.\n.4 access hatches are capable of being opened and closed from both inside and outside and are equipped with\nmeans to hold them securely in open positions.\n.7 it includes windows or translucent panels which admit sufficient daylight to the inside of the lifeboat with the\nhatches closed to make artificial light unnecessary.\n4.7.2.1 ... Each seat shall be provided with a suitable locking harness capable of quick release under tension to\nrestrain the body of the occupant during launching.\n4.7.6 Lifeboat fittings\nEach free-fall lifeboat shall be fitted with a release system which shall:\n.1 have two independent activation systems for the release mechanisms which may only be operated from inside the\nlifeboat and be marked in a colour that contrasts with its surroundings.\n.3 be adequately protected against accidental or premature use.\n.4 be designed to test the release system without launching the lifeboat.\n4.8 Lifeboats with a self-contained air support system\nIn addition to complying with the requirements of section 4.6 or 4.7, as applicable, a lifeboat with a self-contained air\nsupport system shall be so arranged that, when proceeding with all entrances and openings closed, the air in the\nlifeboat remains safe and breathable and the engine runs normally for a period of not less than 10 min. During this\nperiod, the atmospheric pressure inside the lifeboat shall never fall below the outside atmospheric pressure nor shall\nit exceed it by more than 20 hPa. The system shall have visual indicators to indicate the pressure of the air supply at\nall times.\n4.9 Fire-protected lifeboats\n4.9.1 In addition to complying with the requirements of section 4.8, a fire-protected lifeboat when waterborne shall be\ncapable of protecting the number of persons it is permitted to accommodate when subjected to a continuous oil fire\nthat envelops the lifeboat for a period of not less than 8 min.\n4.9.2 Water spray system,\nA lifeboat which has a water spray fire-protection system shall comply with the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nwater for the system shall be drawn from the sea by a self-priming motor pump. It shall be possible to turn\n\"on\" and turn \"off\" the flow of water over the exterior of the lifeboat.\nthe seawater intake shall be so arranged as to prevent the intake of flammable liquids from the sea surface;\nand\nthe system shall be arranged for flushing with fresh water and allowing complete drainage.\n6.1.2.7 Where davit arms are recovered by power, safety devices shall be fitted which will automatically cut off the\npower before the davit arms reach the stops in order to prevent overstressing the falls or davits, unless the motor is\ndesigned to prevent such overstressing.\n6.1.4.5 The launching appliance shall be arranged so as to preclude accidental release of the lifeboat in its\nunattended stowed position. If the means provided to secure the lifeboat cannot be released from inside the lifeboat,\nit shall be so arranged as to preclude boarding the lifeboat without first releasing it.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 20\n3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances complying with regulation 36 shall be provided\nand maintenance shall be carried out accordingly.\n3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned\nmaintenance programme, which includes the requirements of regulation 36.\n4 Maintenance of falls\nFalls used in launching shall be inspected periodically* with special regard for areas passing through sheaves and\nrenewed when necessary due to deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than 5 years, whichever is the\nearlier.\n* Refer to ‘Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats’ (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1).\n6 Weekly inspection\nThe following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of the inspection shall be entered in the\nlog-book:\n1.\n2.\nall survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are\nready for use. The inspection shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment to\nthe lifeboat and the on-load release gear being properly and completely reset.\nall engines in lifeboats and rescue boats shall be run for a total period of not less than 3 min, provided the\nambient temperature is above the minimum temperature required for starting and running the engine. During\nthis period of time, it should be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box train are engaging\nsatisfactorily…\n7 Monthly inspection\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the inspection\nshall be entered in the log-book.\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\nRefer to ‘Symbols related to life-saving appliances and arrangements’ (resolution A.760(18), as amended) and/or\ntables 1 and 2 of ‘Escape route signs and equipment location markings’ (resolution A.1116(3)) as appropriate. Refer\nto the new symbols in tables 1 and 2 of resolution A.1116(30) where the symbols for a specific item are differently\nexpressed in resolutions A.760(18) as amended and A.1116(30)\n11 Maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats, rescue boats and fast\nrescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n11.1 Launching appliances shall be:\n1.\nsubject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable: and\n11.2 Lifeboat and rescue boat release gear, including fast rescue boat release gear and free-fall lifeboat release\nsystems, shall be:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nsubject to a thorough examination and operational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7\nand I/8.\nnotwithstanding paragraph 11.2.2, the operational testing of free-fall lifeboat release systems shall be\nperformed either by free-fall launch with only the operating crew on board or by a test without launching the\nlifeboat carried out based on the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing,\noverhaul and repair.\n11.4 Lifeboats and rescue boats, including fast rescue boats, shall be subject to a thorough examination and\noperational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and I/8.\n11.5 The thorough examination, operational testing and overhaul required by paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 and the\nmaintenance and repair of equipment specified in paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 shall be carried out in accordance with the\nrequirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair, and the instructions\nfor onboard maintenance as required by regulation 36.\nChapter III Regulation 31\n1.6 Chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes emitting toxic vapours or gases* shall carry, in lieu of totally\nenclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code, lifeboats with a self-contained air\nsupport system complying with the requirements of section 4.8 of the Code.\n*Refer to the products for which emergency escape respiratory protection is required in Chapter 17 of the IBC Code\n(resolution MSC.4(48) as amended) and in Chapter 19 of the IGC Code (resolution MSC.5(48), as amended\n1.7 Oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers carrying cargoes having a flash point not exceeding 60°C(closed\ncup test) shall carry, in lieu of totally enclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code,\nfire-protected lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.9 of the Code.\nChapter III Regulation 36\nInstructions for on-board maintenance\nInstructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances shall be easily understood, illustrated wherever\npossible, and, as appropriate, shall include the following for each appliance:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\na checklist for use when carrying out the inspections required by regulation 20.7.\nmaintenance and repair instructions.\nschedule of periodic maintenance.\ndiagram of lubrication points with the recommended lubricants.\nlist of replaceable parts.\nlist of sources of spare parts; and\nlog for records of inspections and maintenance.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems,\nlaunching appliance and recovery equipment were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in\nan emergency.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release\nsystems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were periodically inspected and tested and ready for\nimmediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections and tests of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching\nappliance and recovery equipment.\nInspect the free-fall lifeboat, its equipment and release systems, considering the regulatory requirements\nand with reference to a copy of the vessel's monthly inspection checklist, and verify that the lifeboat, its\nequipment and release systems were in good order.\nInspect the free-fall lifeboat launching and recovery systems and stowage arrangements, considering the\nregulatory requirements and with reference to a copy of the vessel's monthly inspection checklist, and verify\nthat the lifeboat launching, recovery and stowage systems were in good order\nIf safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer starts the lifeboat engine and demonstrate the\npropeller moving in the ahead and astern direction.\nSelect several items from the monthly inspection check list required by SOLAS III/36 and verify that the\naccompanying officer was familiar with how the checks or tests were performed.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the operation, inspection and testing of the\nfree-fall lifeboat, its release system and launching appliance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release system and launching appliance were\nperiodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nA copy of the monthly inspection checklist required by SOLAS III/36.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nRecords of thorough examination and operational tests of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems,\nlaunching appliance and recovery equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure to ensure the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance\nand recovery equipment were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an\nemergency.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems,\nlaunching appliance and recovery equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the free-fall lifeboat, its\nrelease systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment.\nRecords of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the free-fall lifeboat, its release\nsystems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were incomplete.\nRecords of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the free-fall lifeboat, its release\nsystems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were incomplete.\nThere were no checklists as required by SOLAS III/36 available for the inspection of the free-fall lifeboat, its\nrelease systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment.\nRecords indicated the lifeboat falls had been in service for longer than five years.\nThe lifeboat was not marked as required.\nThere were no clear operating instructions provided in the lifeboat for the release system.\nThe release system was not adequately protected against accidental or premature release.\nThe release system was not clearly marked in a colour that contrasted with its surroundings.\nItems of lifeboat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly stowed.\nThe locking seat harnesses were not in good order.\nThe lifeboat engine would not start.\nThere were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine mounted in a conspicuous\nplace near the engine starting controls.\nWhen tested, it could not be demonstrated that the lifeboat gear box and gear box train were engaging\nsatisfactorily.\nIndicated pressure for the self-contained air-support system, if fitted, was not within the normal range.\nNozzles for the water spray fire-protection system, if fitted, were clogged by salt and/or scale.\nRecovery limit switches, if fitted, were not operating freely.\nThe means provided to secure the lifeboat in the stowed position were in poor condition.\nThe free-fall lifeboat was not properly secured in the stowed position.\nSafety/maintenance chains or pins were still place.\nHydraulic hoses appeared to be in poor condition\nThe rollers and/or skid ramp appeared to be in poor condition\nThe free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were not marked\nwith the required symbols.\nInspection of the free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment\nindicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe free-fall lifeboat, its release systems, launching appliance and recovery equipment were defective in any\nrespect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the dedicated rescue", "c": "boat and launching appliance, and were they in good order with records available to\ndemonstrate that they had been inspected and tested as required?\nShort Question Text\nDedicated rescue boat and launching appliance\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Survival Craft – A Seafarer’s Guide\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance\nthorough examination\noperational testing\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats\nlaunching appliances and release gear\nObjective\nTo ensure the rescue boat will be ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Survival Craft. A Seafarer’s Guide\nSection 2.1 Maintenance and instruction manuals\nExperience has revealed poor maintenance as a contributory factor to many incidents and near misses involving\nsurvival craft…\nIMO: Resolution MSC.402(96) Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing,\noverhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n4 Qualification levels and certification\n4.1 Weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance as specified in the equipment maintenance manual(s),\nshall be conducted by authorized service providers, or by shipboard personnel under the direction of a senior ship's\nofficer in accordance with the maintenance manual(s).\n4.2 Annual thorough examinations and operational tests, as described in section 6.2, shall be conducted by certified\npersonnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance with section 7 and section 8.\nThe service provider may be the ship operator provided that it is authorized in accordance with section 3 and section\n7.\n4.3 Five-year thorough examination, any overhaul, overload operational tests, as described in section 6.3, and repair\nshall be conducted by certified personnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service provider in accordance\nwith section 7 and section 8.\n5 Reports and records\n5.1 All reports and checklists shall be completed and signed by the person who carries out the inspection and\nmaintenance work and countersigned by the Company's representative or the ship's master.\n5.2 Records of maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be updated and\nfiled on board the ship for the service life of the equipment.\n5.3 When thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair are completed, a statement confirming that\nthe lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose shall be promptly issued by the manufacturer or authorized service\nprovider that conducted the work. A copy of valid documents of certification and authorization as appropriate shall be\nincluded with the statement.\n6 Specific procedures for inspection, maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair\n6.1.1 Any inspection, maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul, and repair shall be carried\nout according to the maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation developed by the manufacturer.\n6.1.2 A full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation as specified in paragraph 6.1.1 shall\nbe available on board.\nIMO: LSA Code\n5.1.1.1 Except as provided by this section, all rescue boats shall comply with the requirements of paragraphs 4.4.1 to\n4.4.7.4 inclusive, (excluding paragraph 4.4.6.8), and 4.4.7.6, 4.4.7.7, 4.4.7.9, 4.4.7.10 and 4.4.9, except that, for all\nrescue boats, an average mass of 82.5 kg shall apply to paragraph 4.4.2.2.1\n4.4.6.12 Water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine shall be provided and mounted in a\nconspicuous place near the engine starting controls.\n4.4.7.6 Every lifeboat to be launched by a fall or falls, except a free-fall lifeboat, shall be fitted with a release\nmechanism complying with the following requirements subject to paragraph .17 below:\n.17 where a single fall and hook system is used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat in combination with a suitable\npainter, the requirements of paragraphs 4.4.7.6.7, 4.4.7.6.8 and 4.4.7.6.15 need not be applicable; in such an\narrangement a single capability to release the lifeboat or rescue boat, only when it is fully waterborne, will be\nadequate.\n5.1.1.3 Rescue boats may be either of rigid or inflated construction or a combination of both....\n5.1.1.8 A rescue boat shall be fitted with an inboard engine or outboard motor. If it is fitted with an outboard motor,\nthe rudder and tiller may form part of the engine. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph 4.4.6.1, petrol-driven\noutboard engines with an approved fuel system may be fitted in rescue boats provided the fuel tanks are specially\nprotected against fire and explosion.\n5.1.2 Rescue boat equipment\n5.1.2.1 All items of rescue boat equipment, with the exception of boat-hooks which shall be kept free for fending off\npurposes, shall be secured within the rescue boat by lashings, storage in lockers or compartments, storage in\nbrackets or similar mounting arrangements, or other suitable means. The equipment shall be secured in such a\nmanner as not to interfere with any launching or recovery procedures. All items of rescue boat equipment shall be as\nsmall and of as little mass as possible and shall be packed in suitable and compact form.\n5.1.2.2 The normal equipment of every rescue boat shall consist of:\n1.\nsufficient buoyant oars or paddles to make headway in calm seas. Thole pins, crutches or equivalent\narrangements shall be provided for each oar. Thole pins or crutches shall be attached to the boat by\nlanyards or chains;\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\na buoyant bailer;\na binnacle containing an efficient compass which is luminous or provided with suitable means of illumination;\na sea-anchor and tripping line if fitted with a hawser of adequate strength not less than 10 m in length;\na painter of sufficient length and strength, attached to the release device complying with the requirements of\nparagraph 4.4.7.7 and placed at the forward end of the rescue boat;\n6. one buoyant line, not less than 50 m in length, of sufficient strength to tow a liferaft as required by paragraph\n5.1.1.7;\n7. one waterproof electric torch suitable for Morse signalling, together with one spare set of batteries and one\nspare bulb in a waterproof container;\n8. one whistle or equivalent sound signal;\n9. a first-aid outfit in a waterproof case capable of being closed tightly after use;\n10. two buoyant rescue quoits, attached to not less than 30 m of buoyant line;\n11. a searchlight with a horizontal and vertical sector of at least 6 degrees and a measured luminous intensity of\n2500 cd which can work continuously for not less than 3 h;\n12. an efficient radar reflector;\n13. thermal protective aids complying with the requirements of section 2.5 sufficient for 10% of the number of\npersons the rescue boat is permitted to accommodate or two, whichever is the greater; and\n14. portable fire-extinguishing equipment of an approved type suitable for extinguishing oil fires.\n5.1.2.3 In addition to the equipment required by paragraph 5.1.2.2, the normal equipment of every rigid rescue boat\nshall include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\na boat-hook;\na bucket; and\na knife or hatchet.\n5.1.2.4 In addition to the equipment required by paragraph 5.1.2.2, the normal equipment of every inflated rescue\nboat shall consist of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\na buoyant safety knife;\ntwo sponges;\nan efficient manually operated bellows or pump;\na repair kit in a suitable container for repairing punctures; and\na safety boat-hook.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 14\nRescue boats shall be stowed:\n.1 in a state of continuous readiness for launching in not more than 5 min, and if the inflated type, in a fully inflated\ncondition at all times.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances complying with regulation 36 shall be provided\nand maintenance shall be carried out accordingly.\n3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned\nmaintenance programme, which includes the requirements of regulation 36.\n6 Weekly inspection\nThe following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of the inspection shall be entered in the\nlog-book:\n.1 all survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are ready\nfor use. The inspection shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment to the lifeboat and\nthe on-load release gear being properly and completely reset.\n.2 all engines in lifeboats and rescue boats shall be run for a total period of not less than 3 min, provided the ambient\ntemperature is above the minimum temperature required for starting and running the engine. During this period of\ntime, it should be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box train are engaging satisfactorily. If the special\ncharacteristics of an outboard motor fitted to a rescue boat would not allow it to be run other than with its propeller\nsubmerged for a period of 3 min, a suitable water supply may be provided. In special cases, the Administration may\nwaive this requirement for ships constructed before 1 July 1986.\n7 Monthly inspection\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the inspection\nshall be entered in the log-book.\n8.4 All repairs and maintenance of inflated rescue boats shall be carried out in accordance with the manufacturer's\ninstructions. Emergency repairs may be carried out on board the ship; however, permanent repairs shall be affected\nat an approved servicing station.\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n* Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\n11 Maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats, rescue boats and fast\nrescue boats, launching appliances and release gear\n11.1 Launching appliances shall be:\n.1 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable: and\n.2 upon completion of the examination referred to in paragraph 11.1.1, subjected to a dynamic test of the winch brake\nat maximum lowering speed. The load to be applied shall be the mass of the survival craft or rescue boat without\npersons on board, except that, at intervals of at least once every five years, the test shall be carried out with a proof\nload equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat and its full complement of persons and\nequipment.\n11.2 Lifeboat and rescue boat release gear, including fast rescue boat release gear and free-fall lifeboat release\nsystems, shall be:\n.1 subject to a thorough examination and operational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and\nI/8.\n11.4 Lifeboats and rescue boats, including fast rescue boats, shall be subject to a thorough examination and\noperational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and I/8.\n11.5 The thorough examination, operational testing and overhaul required by paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 and the\nmaintenance and repair of equipment specified in paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 shall be carried out in accordance with the\nRequirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair, and the instructions\nfor onboard maintenance as required by regulation 36.\nChapter III Regulation 36\nInstructions for on-board maintenance\nInstructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances shall be easily understood, illustrated wherever\npossible, and, as appropriate, shall include the following for each appliance:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\na checklist for use when carrying out the inspections required by regulation 20.7.\nmaintenance and repair instructions.\nschedule of periodic maintenance.\ndiagram of lubrication points with the recommended lubricants.\nlist of replaceable parts.\nlist of sources of spare parts; and\nlog for records of inspections and maintenance.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the rescue boat and launching appliance were\nperiodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure the rescue boat and launching\nappliance were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections and tests of the rescue boat and launching appliance.\nInspect the rescue boat and launching appliance.\nIf safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer:\no Starts the rescue boat engine and engages the drive.\no Demonstrates that that the launching appliance can be slewed manually and/or by reserve power.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the operation, inspection and testing of the\nrescue boat and its launching appliance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure to ensure the rescue boat and launching appliance were periodically inspected and\ntested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\n• Records of periodic inspections and tests of the rescue boat and launching appliance.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the rescue boat and launching appliance.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and testing of the rescue boat and\nlaunching appliance.\nRecords of weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance of the rescue boat and launching\nappliance were incomplete.\nRecords of annual and five-yearly thorough examinations and tests of the rescue boat and launching\nappliance were incomplete.\nA full set of maintenance manuals and associated technical documentation for the rescue boat and\nlaunching appliance were not available on board.\nEmergency repairs had been made to an inflatable rescue boat on board and were pending permanent\nrepair at an approved servicing station.\nThe rescue boat was not in a state of continuous readiness, for instance, an inflatable rescue boat was not\nfully inflated.\nItems of rescue boat equipment were damaged, missing or improperly stowed.\nThe rescue boat engine would not start.\nThere were no water-resistant instructions for starting and operating the engine mounted in a conspicuous\nplace near the engine starting controls.\nWhen tested, it could not be demonstrated that the gear box and gear box train were engaging satisfactorily.\nInspection of the rescue boat and launching appliances indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance\nplan had not in fact taken place.\nThe rescue boat launching device could not be slewed manually or by reserve power in accordance with its\noperating instructions.\nThe rescue boat or its launching device were defective in any respect.\nThere was no checklist available for the inspection of the rescue boat and launching appliance.\nThe rescue boat and launching appliance and their locations were not marked with the required symbols.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.4.", "t": "Were the Master and Officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances and were they in good order,\nwith records available to demonstrate that had they had been inspected as required?\nShort Question Text\nRocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: LSA Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances will function correctly in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: LSA Code\n3.1 Rocket parachute flares\n3.1.1 The rocket parachute flare shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nbe contained in a water-resistant casing;\nhave brief instructions or diagrams clearly illustrating the use of the rocket parachute flare printed on its\ncasing;\nhave integral means of ignition; and\nbe so designed as not to cause discomfort to the person holding the casing when used in accordance with\nthe manufacturer's operating instructions.\n7.1 Line-throwing appliances\n7.1.1 Every line-throwing appliance shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nbe capable of throwing a line with reasonable accuracy.\ninclude not less than four projectiles each capable of carrying the line at least 230 m in calm weather.\ninclude not less than four lines each having a breaking strength of not less than 2 kN; and\nhave brief instructions or diagrams clearly illustrating the use of the line-throwing appliance.\n7.1.2 The rocket, in the case of a pistol-fired rocket, or the assembly, in the case of an integral rocket and line, shall\nbe contained in a water-resistant casing. In addition, in the case of a pistol-fired rocket, the line and rockets together\nwith the means of ignition shall be stowed in a container which provides protection from the weather.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 6\n3 Distress flares\nNot less than 12 rocket parachute flares, complying with the requirements of section 3.1 of the (LSA) Code, shall be\ncarried and be stowed on or near the navigation bridge.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nChapter III Regulation 18\nA line-throwing appliance complying with the requirements of section 7.1 of the (LSA) Code shall be provided.\nChapter V Regulation 29\nLife-saving signals to be used by ships, aircraft or persons in distress\nAn illustrated table describing the life-saving signals* shall be readily available to the officer of the watch of every ship\nto which this chapter applies. The signals shall be used by ships or persons in distress when communicating with lifesaving stations, maritime rescue units and aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations.\n* Such life-saving signals are described in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR)\nManual, Volume III, Mobile Facilities, and illustrated in the International Code of Signals, as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line throwing\nappliances were periodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe lines and rockets of line throwing appliances should not be stowed apart. Self-contained line throwing units are\noften disassembled for transporting to the vessel. Inspectors should check to ensure that the equipment has been\nreassembled and rockets correctly positioned ready for immediate use.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line\nthrowing appliances were periodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview records of periodic inspections of the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances.\nInspect the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances and their stowage location.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and inspection of the\nrocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances were\nperiodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nRecords of periodic inspections of the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure to ensure that rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances were\nperiodically inspected and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and operation of the rocket parachute flares and\nline throwing appliances.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection of the rocket parachute flares and line\nthrowing appliances.\nThere were insufficient rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances on board.\nThe stowage location(s) of rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances were not clearly marked\nwith the recommended symbols and the number of devices stowed there.\nRocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not stowed on or near the bridge.\nThe stowage of rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances was not water or weatherproof as\nrequired.\nRocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not clearly marked with brief operating instructions.\nAny of the following were past their expiry date:\no Rocket parachute flares.\no Line throwing rockets.\no Rocket lines.\nRocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were not ready for immediate use, e.g. rockets and lines\nwere stowed apart.\nThere was no table of lifesaving signals on the bridge.\nRecords of periodic inspections of the rocket parachute flares and line throwing appliances were incomplete.\nAny one of the rocket parachute flares or line throwing appliances were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation of the liferafts, hydrostatic", "c": "releases and liferaft launching appliances, where provided, and were they in good order\nwith records available to demonstrate that they had been serviced, inspected and tested\nas required?\nShort Question Text\nLiferafts, hydrostatic releases and liferaft launching appliances\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1490/Rev 1. Revised Unified Interpretation of SOLAS Regulation III/31.1.4 (MSC.1/Circ.1490)\nObjective\nTo ensure that liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching appliances, where fitted, will function\ncorrectly in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: LSA Code\n4.1.6 Float-free arrangements for liferafts,\n4.1.6.3 Hydrostatic release units\nIf a hydrostatic release unit is used in the float-free arrangements, it shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nbe permanently marked on its exterior with its type and serial number.\nbe permanently marked on the unit or identification plate securely attached to the unit, with the date of\nmanufacture, type, and serial number and whether the unit is suitable for use with a liferaft with a capacity of\nmore than 25 persons.\nif disposable, in lieu of the requirement in paragraph 4.1.6.3.6 be marked with a means of determining its\ndate of expiry.\n4.2.6.3 The container shall be marked with:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nmaker's name or trademark.\nserial number.\nname of approving authority and the number of persons it is permitted to carry.\ntype of emergency pack enclosed.\ndate when last serviced.\nlength of painter.\nmaximum permitted height of stowage above waterline (depending on drop-test height and length of\npainter); and\nlaunching instructions.\n6.1.6 Embarkation ladders\n6.1.6.1 Handholds shall be provided to ensure a safe passage from the deck to the head of the ladder and vice versa.\n6.1.6.2 The steps of the ladder shall be:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nmade of hardwood, free from knots or other irregularities, smoothly machined and free from sharp edges\nand splinters, or of suitable material of equivalent properties.\nprovided with an efficient nonslip surface either by longitudinal grooving or by the application of an approved\nnonslip coating.\nnot less than 480 mm long, 115 mm wide and 25 mm in depth, excluding any nonslip surface or coating; and\nequally spaced not less than 300 mm or more than 380 mm apart and secured in such a manner that they\nwill remain horizontal.\n6.1.6.3 The side ropes of the ladder shall consist of two uncovered manila ropes not less than 65 mm in\ncircumference on each side. Each rope shall be continuous with no joints below the top step. Other materials may be\nused provided the dimensions, breaking strain, weathering, stretching and gripping properties are at least equivalent\nto those of manila rope. All rope ends shall be secured to prevent unravelling.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1490/Rev 1. Revised Unified Interpretation of SOLAS Regulation III/31.1.4 (MSC.1/Circ.1490)\n1.\n2.\nLiferafts required by SOLAS regulation III/31.1.4 shall be regarded as \"remotely located survival craft\" with\nregard to SOLAS regulation III/7.2.1.4.\nThe area where these remotely located survival craft are stowed shall be provided with:\n.1 a minimum number of two lifejackets and two immersion suits;\n.2 adequate means of illumination complying with reg. III/16.7, either fixed or portable, which shall be capable of\nilluminating the liferaft stowage position as well as the area of water into which the liferaft should be launched.\nPortable lights, when used, shall have brackets to permit their positioning on both sides of the vessel;\n.3 an embarkation ladder or other means of embarkation enabling descent to the water in a controlled manner* as per\nreg. III/11.7; and\n.4 self-contained battery-powered lamps (i.e. luminaires) may be accepted as means of illumination for complying\nwith reg. III/16.7. Such lamps shall be capable of being recharged from the ship’s main and emergency source of\nelectrical power and shall be stowed under charge. When disconnected from the ship’s power, the lamp shall give a\nminimum duration of 3 hours of undiminished performance…\n* Note: Controlled manner: a knotted rope is not acceptable for this purpose.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 11\nSurvival craft muster and embarkation arrangements\n7 An embarkation ladder complying with the requirements of paragraph 6.1.6 of the Code extending, in a single\nlength, from the deck to the waterline in the lightest seagoing condition under all conditions of trim of up to 10° and a\nlist of up to 20° either way shall be provided at each embarkation station or at every two adjacent embarkation\nstations for survival craft launched down the side of the ship.\nChapter III Regulation 13\nStowage of survival craft\n1 Each survival craft shall be stowed:\n.3 in a state of continuous readiness so that two crew members can carry out preparations for embarkation and\nlaunching in less than 5 min.\n4.1 Every liferaft shall be stowed with its painter permanently attached to the ship.\n4.2 Each liferaft or group of liferafts shall be stowed with a float-free arrangement complying with the requirements of\nparagraph 4.1.6 of the Code so that each float free and, if inflatable, inflates automatically when the ship sinks.\n4.3 Liferafts shall be so stowed as to permit manual release of one raft or container at a time from their securing\narrangements.\n4.4 Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 do not apply to liferafts required by regulation 31.1.4. (\"remotely located survival craft\")\n5 Davit-launched liferafts shall be stowed within reach of the lifting hooks, unless some means of transfer is provided\nwhich is not rendered inoperable within the limits of trim and list prescribed in paragraph 1.2 or by ship motion or\npower failure.\n6 Liferafts intended for throw-overboard launching shall be so stowed as to be readily transferable for launching on\neither side of the ship unless liferafts, of the aggregate capacity required by regulation 31.1 to be capable of being\nlaunched on either side, are stowed on each side of the ship.\nChapter III Regulation 20\nOperational readiness, maintenance and inspections\n1 This regulation applies to all ships. The requirements of paragraphs 3.2, 3.3 and 6.2 shall be complied with, as far\nas is practicable, on ships constructed before 1 July 1986.\n2 Operational readiness\nBefore the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and\nready for immediate use.\n3 Maintenance\n3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances complying with regulation 36 shall be provided\nand maintenance shall be carried out accordingly.\n3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned\nmaintenance programme, which includes the requirements of regulation 36.\n6 Weekly inspection\nThe following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of the inspection shall be entered in the\nlog-book:\n.1 all survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be visually inspected to ensure that they are ready\nfor use. The inspection shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment to the lifeboat and\nthe on-load release gear being properly and completely reset.\n7 Monthly inspection\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the inspection\nshall be entered in the log-book.\n8 Servicing of inflatable liferafts, inflatable lifejackets, marine evacuation systems and maintenance and repair of\ninflated rescue boats\n8.1 Every inflatable liferaft, inflatable lifejacket, and marine evacuation system shall be serviced:\n1.\n2.\nat intervals not exceeding 12 months, provided where in any case this is impracticable, the Administration\nmay extend this period to 17 months; and\nat an approved servicing station which is competent to service them, maintains proper servicing facilities and\nused only properly trained personnel. *\n9 Periodic servicing of hydrostatic release units\nHydrostatic release units, other than disposable hydrostatic release units, shall be serviced:\n.1 at intervals not exceeding 12 months, provided where in any case this is impracticable, the Administration may\nextend this period to 17 months*; and\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n* Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\n11.3 Davit-launched liferaft automatic release hooks shall be:\n1.\n2.\nsubject to a thorough examination and operational test during the annual surveys required by regulations I/7\nand I/8: and\noperationally tested under a load of 1.1 times the total mass of the liferaft when loaded with its full\ncomplement of persons and equipment whenever the automatic release hook is overhauled. Such\noverhauling and operational test shall be carried out at least once every five years.\nChapter III Regulation 31\nSurvival craft and rescue boats\n1 Survival craft\n1.1 Cargo ships shall carry:\n.1 one or more totally enclosed lifeboats complying with the requirements of section 4.6 of the Code of such\naggregate capacity on each side of the ship as will accommodate the total number of persons on board; and\n.2 in addition, one or more inflatable or rigid liferafts, complying with the requirements of section 4.2 or 4.3 of the\nCode, of a mass of less than 185 kg and stowed in a position providing for easy side-to-side transfer at a single open\ndeck level, and of such aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons on board. If the liferaft\nor liferafts are not of a mass of less than 185 kg and stowed in a position providing for easy side-to-side transfer at a\nsingle open deck level, the total capacity available on each side shall be sufficient to accommodate the total number\nof persons on board.\n1.2 In lieu of meeting the requirements of paragraph 1.1, cargo ships may carry:\n.1 one or more free-fall lifeboats, complying with the requirements of section 4.7 of the Code, capable of being freefall launched over the stern of the ship of such aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons\non board; and\n.2 in addition, one or more inflatable or rigid liferafts complying with the requirements of section 4.2 or 4.3 of the\nCode, on each side of the ship, of such aggregate capacity as will accommodate the total number of persons on\nboard. The liferafts on at least one side of the ship shall be served by launching appliances.\n1.4 Cargo ships where the horizontal distance from the extreme end of the stem or stern of the ship to the nearest\nend of the closest survival craft is more than 100 m shall carry, in addition to the liferafts required by paragraphs 1.1.2\nand 1.2.2, a liferaft stowed as far forward of aft, or one as far forward and another as far aft, as is reasonable and\npracticable. Such liferaft or liferafts may be securely fastened so as to permit manual release and need not be of the\ntype which can be launched from an approved launching device. (\"remotely located survival craft\")\nChapter III Regulation 36\nInstructions for on-board maintenance\nInstructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances shall be easily understood, illustrated wherever\npossible, and, as appropriate, shall include the following for each appliance:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\na checklist for use when carrying out the inspections required by regulation 20.7.\nmaintenance and repair instructions.\nschedule of periodic maintenance.\ndiagram of lubrication points with the recommended lubricants.\nlist of replaceable parts.\nlist of sources of spare parts; and\nlog for records of inspections and maintenance.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft\nlaunching appliances, where provided, were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an\nemergency.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that liferafts, and launching\nappliances if fitted, were periodically inspected and tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nReview the records of periodic servicing by an authorised service station for the liferafts, hydrostatic\nreleases and, launching appliances, where provided.\nWhere necessary review the records of onboard inspections of the liferafts, hydrostatic releases and,\nlaunching appliances, where provided.\nInspect the liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching appliances, where provided, and verify that\nthey were stowed and ready for immediate release in accordance with the applicable regulations.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the operation, inspection and testing of the\nliferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching appliances, where fitted.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure to ensure liferafts, and launching appliances if fitted, were periodically inspected\nand tested and ready for immediate use in an emergency.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nRecords of periodic servicing, inspection and tests of the liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, launching\nappliances, where provided.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft\nlaunching appliances, where provided.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required servicing, inspection and testing of the liferafts,\nhydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching appliances, where provided.\nThere was insufficient liferaft capacity for the number of people on board.\nA liferaft was not in a state of continuous readiness in any respect except where the liferafts had been\nremoved for shore servicing after arrival in port and would be replaced before departure.\nA liferaft, other than a remotely located survival craft, was not capable of floating free from the ship.\nLiferafts were not stowed so as to allow manual release of one raft or container at a time.\nA liferaft painter was not permanently attached to the ship.\nThe rigging of a hydrostatic release unit was not in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.\nA non-disposable hydrostatic release unit was not marked, or had not been serviced, as required.\nA disposable hydrostatic release unit was not marked with, or was past, its expiry date.\nA liferaft was not marked, or had not been serviced, as required.\nA liferaft embarkation ladder was not provided as required or was in poor condition.\nA liferaft launching appliance, where provided, was defective in any respect.\nA remotely stowed liferaft was not provided with illumination or, an embarkation ladder or other means of\nembarkation.\nWhere a remotely stowed liferaft was provided with self-contained battery lamps as the required means of\nillumination, there was no evidence that recent tests had confirmed that the lamp would provide three hours\nof undiminished performance.\nThere were no handholds to ensure a safe passage from the deck to the head of an embarkation ladder and\nvice versa.\nServicing of liferafts, hydrostatic releases and liferaft launching appliances, where fitted, by an authorised\nservice station had not been completed at the required interval.\nRecords of weekly and monthly inspections of liferafts, hydrostatic releases and, liferaft launching\nappliances, where provided, were incomplete.\nWhere the liferafts fitted had an extended service interval due to provision of a service kit for use on board, enter a\ncomment in the Hardware response tool and provide details of:\n• •\n• The extended service interval.\nWho was trained to conduct the onboard servicing using the kit provided.\nThe evidence that the extended service interval was accepted by the Flag Administration.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.6.", "t": "Were the lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines, in good order,", "c": "clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship?\nShort Question Text\nLifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Mooring Decks, Bridge\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: Resolution A 658 (16) Use and fitting of retro-reflective materials on life-saving appliances\nObjective\nTo ensure that all life-saving appliances are in working order and ready for immediate use.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: LSA Code 2.1.1\nEvery lifebuoy shall:\n.7 If it is intended to operate the quick-release arrangement provided for the self-activated smoke signals and selfigniting lights, have a mass of not less than 4 kg.\nIMO: Resolution A.658 (16) Use and fitting of retro-reflective materials on life-saving appliances\n3 Lifebuoys\nRetro-reflective materials of a sufficient width (approximately 5 cm) should be applied around or on both sides of the\nbody of the lifebuoy at four evenly spaced points.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 7\nPersonal life-saving appliances\n1 Lifebuoys\n1.1 Lifebuoys complying with the requirements of paragraph 2.1.1 of the (LSA) Code shall be:\n.1 so distributed as to be readily available on both sides of the ship and as far as practicable on all open decks\nextending to the ship's side; at least one shall be placed in the vicinity of the stern; and\n.2 so stowed as to be capable of being rapidly cast loose, and not permanently secured in any way.\n1.2 At least one lifebuoy on each side of the ship shall be fitted with a buoyant lifeline complying with the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.1.4 of the Code equal in length to not less than twice the height at which it is stowed\nabove the waterline in the lightest seagoing condition, or 30 m, whichever is the greater.\n1.3 Not less than one half of the total number of lifebuoys shall be provided with lifebuoy self-igniting lights complying\nwith the requirements of paragraph 2.1.2 of the Code, not less than two of these shall also be provided with lifebuoy\nself-activating smoke signals complying with the requirements of paragraph 2.1.3 of the Code and be capable of\nquick release from the navigation bridge; lifebuoys with lights and those with lights and smoke signals shall be equally\ndistributed on both sides of the ship and shall not be the lifebuoys provided with lifelines in compliance with the\nrequirements of paragraph 1.2.\n1.4 Each lifebuoy shall be marked in block capitals of the Roman alphabet with the name and port of registry of the\nship on which it is carried.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n7 Monthly inspections\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order.\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nChapter III Regulation 32\n1 Lifebuoys\n1.1 Cargo ships shall carry not less than the number of lifebuoys complying with the requirements of regulation 7.1\nand section 2.1 of the Code prescribed in the following table:\nLength of ship in metres\n• •\n• •\nMinimum number of lifebuoys\nunder 100\n8\n100 and under 150 10\n150 and under 200 12\n200 and over\n14\n1.2 Self-igniting lights for lifebuoys on tankers required by regulation 7.1.3 shall be of an electric battery type.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats\nand lifelines, were in good order, clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship.\nLifebuoy self-igniting lights do not need to be intrinsically safe if located outside of the gas hazardous area. However,\nthere must be strict controls in place to avoid those non-intrinsically safe lights being misplaced into the gas\nhazardous zone. This may include highlighting or marking of those non-intrinsically safe lights or other appropriate\nmeans.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that lifebuoys, and associated lights,\nsmoke floats and lifelines, were in good order, clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship.\nInspect a selection of the ship’s lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines.\nAny matters relating to the lifebuoy and light provided for safe access will be addressed by the appropriate questions\nexcept where the lifebuoy light was found to be unsafe for use in a gas hazardous zone.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure to ensure that lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines, were in\ngood order, clearly marked and correctly distributed around the ship.\nThe checklist and log for records of monthly inspections and maintenance of the lifebuoys.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was:\no Less than the required number of lifebuoys.\no An insufficient number of lifebuoys with lights\no A lifebuoy fitted with both light and lifeline.\no No lifebuoy on either side with a buoyant lifeline of the required length.\nLifebuoys were not readily available on both sides of the ship, on each open deck or in the vicinity of the\nstern.\nLifebuoy stowage locations were not clearly marked with the approved symbols.\nLifebuoys were:\no Not marked with retro-reflective tape.\no Not clearly marked with ship’s name and port of registry.\no Secured in their brackets and not ready for immediate use.\no Fitted with defective self-igniting lights.\no Fitted with self-igniting lights not of an electric battery type.\no Fitted with a non-intrinsically safe light when located within the gas hazardous area of the vessel.\nA self-activating smoke float was past its expiry date.\nThe self-activating smoke float quick release mechanism was not operating freely.\nA lifebuoy attached to a self-activating smoke float was less than 4 kg.\nRecords of inspections and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the lifebuoys indicated that recorded inspections and maintenance had not taken place\nLifebuoys, associated lights, smoke floats or lifelines were defective in any respect.\nThe accompanying officer and/or the Safety Officer was unfamiliar with the required maintenance and\ninspection of the lifebuoys, and associated lights, smoke floats and lifelines.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.7.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the immersion suits, and were", "c": "the immersion suits in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly\nindicated?\nShort Question Text\nImmersion suits\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Forecastle, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1047 Guidelines for monthly shipboard inspection of immersion suits and anti-exposure suits by\nships’ crews\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1114 Guidelines for periodic testing of immersion suit and anti-exposure suit seams and closures\nNorwegian Maritime Authority Circular- Series 5 No 14/2017 Vacuum packed immersion suits\nObjective\nTo ensure that all life-saving appliances are in working order and ready for immediate use.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: LSA Code\n2.3 Immersion suits\n2.3.1 General requirements for immersion suits\n2.3.1.1 An immersion suit shall be constructed with waterproof materials such that:\n.1 it can be unpacked and donned without assistance within 2 min, taking into account donning of any associated\nclothing, donning of a life jacket if the immersion suit is to be worn in conjunction with a lifejacket to meet the\nrequirements of paragraph 2.3.1.2, and inflation of orally inflatable chambers if fitted.\n2.3.1.4 An immersion suit which has buoyancy and is designed to be worn without a lifejacket shall be fitted with a\nlight complying with the requirements of paragraph 2.2.3 and the whistle prescribed by 2.2.2.14.\n2.3.1.5 An immersion suit which has buoyancy and is designed to be worn without a lifejacket shall be provided with a\nreleasable buoyant line or other means to secure it to a suit worn by another person in the water.\n2.3.1.6 An immersion suit which has buoyancy and is designed to be worn without a lifejacket shall be provided with a\nsuitable means to allow a rescuer to lift the wearer from the water into a survival craft or rescue boat.\n2.3.1.7 If an immersion suit is to be worn in conjunction with a lifejacket, the lifejacket shall be worn over the\nimmersion suit. Persons wearing such an immersion suit shall be able to don a lifejacket without assistance. The\nimmersion suit shall be marked to indicate that it must be worn in conjunction with a compatible life jacket.\n2.3.2 Thermal performance requirements for immersion suits\n2.3.2.1 An immersion suit made of material which has no inherent insulation shall be:\n.1 marked with instructions that it must be worn in conjunction with warm clothing.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1047 Guidelines for monthly shipboard inspection of immersion suits and anti-exposure suits\nby ships’ crews\nWhen carrying out the inspection of immersion suits and anti-exposure suits required by SOLAS regulation III/20.7,\nthe following procedure is recommended.\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nCheck closures on storage bag as well as general condition of bag for ease of removal of suit. Ensure\ndonning instructions are legible. Confirm that suit is the type and size identified on the bag.\nLay the suit on a clean, flat surface. Make sure the suit is dry inside and out. Visually check for damage.\nRips, tears or punctures should be repaired in accordance with manufacturer‘s instructions by a suitable\nrepair station*.\nCheck the zipper by sliding it up and down to check for ease of operation. Using lubricant recommended by\nthe manufacturer, lubricate the front and back of the zipper and the slide fastener. If the zipper is not\nfunctional, the suit should be removed from service and discarded or returned to the manufacturer or a\nsuitable repair station.\nIf fitted, check inflatable head support and/or buoyancy ring for damage and ensure that it is properly\nattached. Check inflation hose(s) for deterioration. At least quarterly, the head support/buoyancy ring should\nbe inflated and tested for leaks (this test does not apply to integral inflatable lifejackets). Leaks should be\nrepaired in accordance with manufacturers' instructions by a suitable repair station.\nCheck retro reflective tape for condition and adhesion. Replace if necessary.\nIf fitted, check whistle and expiration date of light and battery.\nReplace suits in the bag with zippers fully opened.\nThe opportunity should be taken at such monthly inspections for the crew to practice donning the immersion\nsuits or anti-exposure suit.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1114 Guidelines for periodic testing of immersion suit and anti-exposure suit seams and\nclosures\n1 Research performed by several Member Governments has demonstrated that the seams and closures of\nimmersion suits and anti-exposure suits experience deterioration over time. The rate and severity of deterioration\nmay vary widely, depending upon the specific components and procedures employed in the manufacture of the suit\nand the conditions under which the suit is stored. However, even under ideal conditions, the materials and adhesives\nused have a finite service life and will inevitably experience a reduction in strength and/or loss of watertightness with\nage.\n2 The Guidelines for monthly shipboard inspection of immersion suits and anti-exposure suits (MSC/Circ.1047) are\nvery helpful in identifying obvious problems with a suit, but do not adequately address deterioration of seams and\nclosures (zippers, etc.) which may not be readily apparent by visual inspection. Such deterioration can be detected by\npressurization of the suit with air, and testing of the seams and closures for leaks with a soapy water solution.\n3 To ensure the maintenance of adequate strength and watertightness of seams and closures of immersion suits and\nanti-exposure suits with age, it is recommended that each suit be subjected to an air pressure test such as the\nfollowing, at intervals not exceeding three years, or more frequently for suits over ten years of age…\nNorwegian Maritime Authority Circular- Series 5 No 14/2017 vacuum packed immersion suits\nThe Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) is aware that approved immersion suits are being offered for sale as\nvacuum-packed units. Such vacuum-packed suits cannot be unpacked and inspected as provided by SOLAS Chapter\nIII. Nevertheless, the NMA accepts this kind of packaging, and considers such vacuum-packed suits to satisfy the\nrequirements of SOLAS regulation III/20.7 and III/36 when the following conditions are met:\n• •\nInstructions for monthly inspections of vacuum-packed units from the manufacturer or the manufacturer's\nrepresentative shall be available on board. The NMA accepts such instructions in lieu of the monthly\ninspection procedure described in MSC/Circ.1047.\nA sufficient number of immersion suits in standard packaging, of the same type as the suits that are vacuum\npacked, must be available to the ship's crew for drills.\n• •\n• The packaging of the suits must be inspected in accordance with SOLAS III/20.7 and III/36. Should the\npackaging be damaged or if there is a loss of vacuum, the suits must either be removed from the packaging\nand inspected in accordance with MSC/Circ.1047 and MSC/Circ.1114 or sent to the manufacturer or a\nservice station for service and repacking.\nMSC/Circ.1114 recommends that immersion suits undergo a pressure test every three years, but the circular\ndoes not concern vacuum-packed immersion suits. The NMA accepts that pressure testing of vacuumpacked immersion suits is carried out in accordance with intervals set out by the manufacturer. If the\nmanufacturer has not laid down test intervals, MSC/Circ.1114 shall be followed.\nImmersion suits that have been removed from its vacuum packaging must be treated as suits in standard\npackaging in respect of the inspections specified in SOLAS chapter III.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 32\n3 Immersion suits\n3.2 An immersion suit of an appropriate size, complying with the requirements of section 2.3 of the Code shall be\nprovided for every person on board the ship.\nHowever, for ships other than bulk carriers, as defined in regulation IX/1, these immersion suits need not be required\nif the ship is constantly engaged on voyages in warm climates where, in the opinion of the Administration, immersion\nsuits are unnecessary.\n3.3 If a ship has any watch or work stations which are located remotely from the place or places where immersion\nsuits are normally stowed, including remotely located survival craft carried in accordance with regulation 31.1.4\nadditional immersion suits of an appropriate size shall be provided at these locations for the number of persons\nnormally on watch or working at those locations at any time.\n3.4 Immersion suits shall be so placed as to be readily accessible, and their position shall be plainly indicated.\n3.5 The immersion suits required by this regulation may be used to comply with the requirements of regulation 7.3.\nChapter III Regulation 7\n3 Immersion suits and anti-exposure suits\nAn immersion suit, complying with the requirements of section 2.3 of the Code or an anti-exposure suit complying\nwith section 2.4 of the Code, of an appropriate size, shall be provided for every person assigned to crew the rescue\nboat or assigned to the marine evacuation system party. If the ship is constantly engaged in warm climates* where, in\nthe opinion of the Administration thermal protection is unnecessary, this protective clothing need not be carried\nChapter III Regulation 20\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that immersion suits were in good order, readily\naccessible and their location(s) clearly indicated. The procedure should include guidance on:\n• •\n• •\nThe number, type and sizes of immersion suit provided on board.\nThe location(s) and stowage of the immersion suits.\nMonthly inspections.\nPeriodic air-pressure testing both before and after an immersion suit reaches ten years in service.\nSome Administrations may accept immersion suits as vacuum-packed units, provided, for instance, that:\n• •\n• •\nManufacturer’s instructions for monthly inspections are followed.\nSufficient non vacuum-packed units are available for training.\nUnits with open or damaged packaging are treated as if they were non-vacuum-packed units.\nAir pressure testing should be to manufacturer’s instructions or, if these are not available, at intervals not\nexceeding three years, or more frequently for suits over ten years of age.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that immersion suits are in good\norder, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nInspect the ship’s immersion suits at one stowage location.\nSight the immersion suits at any other location(s).\nReview the records of monthly inspections and periodic air-pressure tests of the ship’s immersion suits.\n• Interview an officer or rating to verify their familiarity with donning an immersion suit.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures to ensure that immersion suits are in good order, readily accessible and their\nlocation(s) clearly indicated.\nRecords of monthly inspections and periodic air-pressure tests of the ship’s immersion suits.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the actions to be taken to ensure that immersion suits are\nin good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the required inspection and tests required to be carried out for\nthe immersion suits in accordance with the company procedures.\nAn interviewed officer or rating was not familiar with the instructions for donning an immersion suit.\nAn immersion suit of an appropriate size was not provided for each person on board.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe stowage location(s) of immersion suits were not clearly marked, including the number of suits in that\nlocation, with the recommended symbols.\nImmersion suits of an appropriate number were not provided at the location of the forward liferaft or any\nother required remote location.\nImmersion suits were not readily accessible.\nDonning instructions were not legible.\nImmersion suits did not match the description on their storage bags – size, type, etc.\nThere was visible damage to immersion suits, e.g. failed seams, detached zips.\nImmersion suit zippers did not slide up and down easily or were not functional.\nRetro-reflective tape was in poor condition or missing.\nWhistles, if fitted, were missing or damaged.\nLights, if fitted, were missing or past their battery expiry date.\nIf required, immersion suits were not clearly marked to show that a lifejacket must be worn.\nIf required, immersion suits were not clearly marked to show that warm clothing must be worn under the suit.\nIf suits were vacuum-packed:\no Packaging was damaged and/or vacuum lost.\no There were no loose immersion suits available for training purposes.\no Air-pressure tests had not been performed either to manufacturer’s instructions or at intervals not\nexceeding three years, or more frequently for suits over ten years of age.\nRecords of inspections and air-pressure tests carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the immersion suits indicated that recorded inspections and tests had not taken place.\nOne or more immersion suits was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.8.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the lifejackets and personal", "c": "flotation devices (PFDs) provided on board, and was the equipment in good condition,\nand properly maintained?\nShort Question Text\nLifejackets and personal flotation devices (PFDs)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Forecastle, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nIMO: LSA Code\nIMO: Resolution A 658 (16) Use and fitting of retro-reflective materials on life-saving appliances\nObjective\nTo ensure that all life-saving appliances are in working order and ready for immediate use.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: LSA Code\n2.2.1.13 Each lifejacket shall be provided with means of securing a lifejacket light…\n2.2.1.14 Each lifejacket shall be fitted with a whistle firmly secured by a lanyard.\n2.2.1.15 Lifejacket lights and whistles shall be selected and secured to the lifejacket in such a way that their\nperformance in combination is not degraded.\n2.2.1.16 A lifejacket shall be provided with a releasable buoyant line or other means to secure it to a lifejacket worn\nby another person in the water.\n2.2.1.17 A lifejacket shall be provided with a suitable means to allow a rescuer to lift the wearer from the water into a\nsurvival craft or rescue boat.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n8.12 Protection against drowning\n8.12.1 Where work is being carried out overside or in an exposed position where there is a reasonably foreseeable\nrisk of falling or being washed overboard, or where work is being carried out in or from a ship’s boat, a lifebuoy with\nsufficient line should be provided. In addition, and, as appropriate, a working lifejacket, a personal flotation device or\na buoyancy aid should be worn. Where necessary, personnel should be provided with thermal protective clothing to\nreduce the risks of cold shock.\nIMO: Resolution A.658(16) Use and fitting of retro-reflective materials on life-saving appliances\n5 Lifejackets\nLifejackets should be fitted with patches of retro-reflective materials with a total area of at least 400 cm 2 distributed\nso as to be useful for search from air and surface craft from all directions. In the case of a reversible lifejacket, the\narrangement should be complied with no matter which way the lifejacket is put on. Such material should be placed as\nhigh up on the lifejacket as possible.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the ship:\n• Include all accessible areas of the ship.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter III Regulation 7\nrequirements of paragraph 2.2.1 or 2.2.2 of the Code shall be provided for every person on board the ship….\n.4 a sufficient number of lifejackets shall be carried for persons on watch and for use at remotely located survival craft\nstations. The lifejackets carried for persons on watch should be stowed on the bridge, in the engine control room and\nat any other manned watch station….\n2.2 Lifejackets shall be so placed as to be readily accessible and their position shall be plainly indicated. Where, due\nto the particular arrangements of the ship, the lifejackets provided in compliance with the requirements of paragraph\n2.1 may become inaccessible, alternative provisions shall be made to the satisfaction of the Administration which\nmay include an increase in the number of Lifejackets to be carried.\n2.3 The lifejackets used in totally enclosed lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, shall not impede entry into the lifeboat\nor seating, including operation of the seat belts in the lifeboat.\n2.4 Lifejackets selected for free-fall lifeboats, and the manner in which they are carried or worn, shall not interfere\nwith entry into the lifeboat, occupant safety or operation of the lifeboat.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n10 Marking of stowage locations\nContainers, brackets, racks, and other similar stowage locations for life-saving equipment shall be marked with\nsymbols in accordance with the recommendations of the Organization*, indicating the devices stowed in that location\nfor that purpose. If more than one device is stowed in that location, the number of devices shall also be indicated.\n*Refer to the Symbols Related to Life-Saving Appliances and Arrangements, adopted by the Organization by\nresolution A.760(18), as amended.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n7 Monthly inspection\n7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment, shall be carried out monthly using the\nchecklist required by regulation 36.1 to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the inspection\nshall be entered in the log-book.\n8 Servicing of inflatable liferafts, inflatable lifejackets, marine evacuation systems and maintenance and repair of\ninflated rescue boats\n8.1 Every inflatable liferaft, inflatable lifejacket, and marine evacuation system shall be serviced:\n.1 at intervals not exceeding 12 months, provided where in any case this is impracticable, the Administration may\nextend this period to 17 months; and\n.2 at an approved servicing station which is competent to service them, maintains proper servicing facilities and used\nonly properly trained personnel.\nChapter III Regulation 32\n2.2 On cargo ships, each lifejacket shall be fitted with a lifejacket light complying with the requirements of paragraph\n2.2.3 of the Code.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS were in\ngood order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nProcedures should also provide guidance for the use of “working lifejackets” (also known as workvests, continuous\nuse lifejackets or PFDs), including the servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by\nSOLAS were in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures providing guidance on the use of “working\nlifejackets”, including the servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.\nInspect the lifejackets at one stowage location.\nSight the lifejackets at any other location(s).\nInspect a sample of “working lifejackets”.\nReview the records of monthly inspections of all lifejackets.\nReview the records of annual servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.\n• Interview a rating to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the use of “working lifejackets”.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS were in good order, readily\naccessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nThe company procedures providing guidance on the use of “working lifejackets”, including the servicing of\ninflatable lifejackets, if carried.\nRecords of monthly inspections of all lifejackets.\nRecords of annual servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets required by SOLAS were in good order,\nreadily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that the lifejackets\nrequired by SOLAS were in good order, readily accessible and their location(s) clearly indicated.\nThere was no company procedure providing guidance on the use of “working lifejackets”, including the\nservicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the company procedures for the use of “working lifejackets”.\nThe lifejackets required by SOLAS, as provided, were not suitable for the type of lifeboat installed.\nThe stowage locations of lifejackets were not clearly marked, including the number of lifejackets in that\nlocation, with the recommended symbols.\nLifejackets of an appropriate number were not provided on the bridge, in the engine room, at the location of\nthe forward life-raft or any other required remote location.\nLifejackets were not readily accessible.\nThe retro-reflective tape required to be fitted on lifejackets was in poor condition or missing.\nLifejacket whistles were missing or damaged.\nLifejacket lights were missing or past their battery expiry date.\nReleasable buoyant lines, if fitted, were missing or defective.\nMeans to lift the wearer of the lifejacket, if fitted, were missing or defective.\nRecords of monthly inspections carried out were incomplete.\nRecords of annual servicing of inflatable lifejackets, if carried, were incomplete.\nInspection of the lifejackets indicated that recorded inspections and servicing had not taken place.\nOne or more lifejacket was defective in any respect.\n“Working lifejackets” were not available for when crew members were carrying out work overside or in an\nexposed position where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of falling or being washed overboard, or\nwhere work is being carried out in or from a ship’s boat.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.4.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the periodic", "c": "testing and maintenance of the emergency lighting system, was there evidence of\nperiodic testing, and was the system in proper operating condition?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency lighting.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Electrician / ETO, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Pumproom, Forecastle, Mooring Decks, Lifeboat deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIACS: UI SC 213 Arrangements for remotely located survival craft\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the emergency lighting system will operate correctly in the event of a loss of primary power\nand lighting.\nIndustry Guidance\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n97.15-30 Emergency lighting and power systems.\n(a) Where fitted, it shall be the duty of the master to see that the emergency lighting and power systems are operated\nand inspected at least once in each week that the vessel is navigated to be assured that the system is in proper\noperating condition.\n(d) The date of the tests and the condition and performance of the apparatus shall be noted in the official logbook.\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of standby arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 43\n2 The electrical power available shall be sufficient to supply all those services that are essential for safety in an\nemergency, due regard being paid to such services as may have to be operated simultaneously. The emergency\nsource of electrical power shall be capable, having regard to starting currents and the transitory nature of certain\nloads, of supplying simultaneously at least the following services for the periods specified hereinafter, if they depend\nupon an electrical source for their operation:\n2.1 For a period of 3h, emergency lighting at every muster and embarkation station and over the sides as required by\nregulations III/11.4 and III/16.7.\n2.2 For a period of 18h, emergency lighting:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nin all service and accommodation alleyways, stairways and exits, personnel lift cars and personnel lift trunks;\nin the machinery spaces and main generating stations including their control positions;\nin all control stations, machinery control rooms, and at each main and emergency switchboard;\nat all stowage positions for firemen's outfits;\nat the steering gear;\nat the fire pump referred to in paragraph 2.5, at the sprinkler pump, if any, and at the emergency bilge pump,\nif any, and at the starting positions of their motors; and\nin all cargo pump-rooms of tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.10.1\n2. lighting in cargo pump-rooms, except emergency lighting, shall be interlocked with ventilation such that the\nventilation shall be in operation when switching on the lighting.\nChapter III Regulation 11\n4 Muster and embarkation stations shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of\nelectrical power required by regulation II-1/42 or II-1/43, as appropriate.\n5 Alleyways, stairways and exits giving access to the muster and embarkation stations shall be lighted. Such lighting\nshall be capable of being supplied by the emergency source of electrical power required by regulation II-1/42 or II1/43, as appropriate.\nChapter III Regulation 16\nSurvival craft launching and recovery arrangements\n7 During preparation and launching, the survival craft, its launching appliance, and the area of water into which it is to\nbe launched shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power\nrequired by regulation II-1/42 or II-1/43, as appropriate.\nChapter III Regulation 19\n3.4.9 Emergency lighting for mustering and abandonment shall be tested at each abandon ship drill.\nIACS: UI SC 213 Arrangements for remotely located survival craft\nInterpretation\n1. Liferafts required by reg. III/31.1.4 shall be regarded as \"remotely located survival craft\" with regard to reg.\nIII/7.2.1.4.\n2. The area where these remotely located survival craft are stowed shall be provided with:\n.2 adequate means of illumination complying with reg. III/16.7, either fixed or portable, which shall be capable of\nilluminating the liferaft stowage position as well as the area of water into which the liferaft should be launched.\nPortable lights, when used, shall have brackets to permit their positioning on both sides of the vessel; and\n.4 self-contained battery-powered lamps (i.e. luminaires) may be accepted as means of illumination for complying\nwith reg. III/16.7. Such lamps shall be capable of being recharged from the ship’s main and emergency source of\nelectrical power and shall be stowed under charge. When disconnected from the ship’s power, the lamp shall give a\nminimum duration of 3 hours of undiminished performance. The lamps shall comply with the requirements of the LSA\nCode section 1.2.3.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting\nsystem including:\n• •\nInstructions for inspection and testing.\nThe frequency and recording of inspection and testing.\nThese procedures may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency\nlighting system.\nCheck records to verify that inspection and testing of the emergency lighting had taken place in accordance\nwith the company procedures.\nRequest a demonstration of the emergency lighting.\nInspect a representative sample of the emergency lights and verify that they are working.\nDuring the balance of the inspection, note any defects to emergency lights.\nIn at least one location, verify that arrangements for lighting the area of water into which survival craft would\nbe launched were in satisfactory condition.\nInterview the officer responsible for electrical systems to verify their familiarity with company procedures for\nthe inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.\nRecords of inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.\nCompany procedures did not require the emergency lighting to be inspected and tested at least once per\nweek.\nThe responsible officer was not familiar with company procedures for the inspection and testing of the\nemergency lighting system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the location of the switches to turn on the emergency source\nof lighting.\nRecords indicated that emergency lighting had not been inspected and tested in compliance with company\nprocedures.\nThere were no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency lighting system.\nOne or more emergency lights were:\no Not working.\no Dirty/obscured.\no Filled with water.\n• •\nArrangements for lighting the area of water into which survival craft would be launched were not in\nsatisfactory condition.\nThe emergency lighting system was defective in any respect.\n5.5. Permits to work", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company enclosed space", "c": "entry procedures, and was evidence available to demonstrate that all enclosed space\nentries had been made in strict compliance with the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEnclosed space entry procedures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Resolution A.1050(27) Revised Recommendations for Entering Enclosed Spaces Aboard Ships.\nObjective\nTo ensure that enclosed space entry is always strictly controlled and conducted in accordance with industry\nbest practice.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 1 Basic Properties and Hazards of Petroleum\n1.4.3.2 Exposure limits\nThe toxic hazards personnel are exposed to in tanker and terminal operations arise almost entirely from liquids,\ngases or vapours of various kinds. Many of these substances have Occupational Exposure Limits (OELs). These\nlimits protect personnel against harmful exposures in the working environment.\nExposure limits are set by international organisation, national administrations or by local regulatory bodies and should\nnever be exceeded. The limits set by different organisations may differ and operators should adopt those set by their\nflag or appropriate administration. The limits should be detailed in the Safety Management System (SMS).\n1.4.5.2 Benzene\nTank entry\nBefore anybody enters a tank that has recently contained petroleum, the tank should be tested for benzene\nconcentrations. This is in addition to the requirements for entering enclosed spaces given in chapter 10.\nChapter 10 Enclosed Spaces.\n10.1 Introduction to enclosed space entry safety.\nDespite precautions that operators take to protect people entering enclosed spaces, deaths and injuries still happen.\nThis chapter recommends protections and controls that can reduce the risk from entering enclosed spaces.\n10.6 Authorisation of entry.\nNo one should open or enter an enclosed space unless:\n• •\nAuthorised by the Master or the nominated Responsible Person.\nAppropriate safety procedures have been followed.\nAn enclosed space entry permit should be issued by the Master or the nominated Responsible Person and completed\nby the personnel who are to enter the space before they enter.\n10.7.1 Control of entry into enclosed spaces.\nA Competent Person, designated by the company’s SMS, should conduct a preliminary risk assessment to identify\nthe potential hazards and appropriate safeguards. This should take into account previous cargoes carried, the\nventilation, structure, coating type and other relevant factors…\n10.7.2 Atmosphere tests before entry.\nThe atmosphere should be tested using suitable instruments for oxygen, flammable gases or vapours, carbon\nmonoxide, H2S and other toxic gases as appropriate…\nFor entry purposes, steady readings of all the following should be obtained before the enclosed space entry permit\ncan be approved and entry permitted:\n• •\n• Oxygen: any space with less than 21% oxygen by volume should NOT be entered until the reason for the\nlow level has been established and resolved. If any doubt remains about the cause of oxygen deficiency, the\nspace should be considered hazardous.\nFlammable vapour: the concentration of flammable vapour must be below 1% of the LFL before anybody\ncan enter.\nOccupational exposure limit (OEL): no more than 50% of the OEL of any toxic vapours and gases.\nIf these conditions cannot be met, apply additional ventilation to the space and re-test after a suitable interval.\n10.7.3 Enclosed space entry permit.\nOn completion of the initial gas testing the ventilation fans should be restarted and continue to operate throughout the\nperiod of entry as a condition of the entry permit which should be approved and issued before allowing personnel to\nenter an enclosed space.\nThe entry permit should have a clear period of validity that does not exceed 12 hours and remain valid only as long\nas the permit conditions are met…\n…The administrative burden can be simplified by restricting approvals, such as entry permits, so that all cargo tanks\nsafe to enter are shown on one document. This can also avoid overlapping permits and reduce any possible\nconfusion about which approval applies to which tank.\n10.12.1 Cargo pumproom entry procedures.\nBefore anyone enters a cargo pumproom, it should be thoroughly ventilated, the oxygen content of the atmosphere\nverified and the atmosphere checked for hydrocarbons or any toxic gas associated with the current or recent\ncargoes…\nWritten procedures should control pumproom entry. These procedures should:\n• •\n• Be based on risk assessment.\nEnsure that risk mitigation measures are followed.\nEnsure that entries in the space are recorded.\nNotices should be displayed at the pumproom entrance prohibiting entry without formal permission and to indicate the\npresence of people in the space.\nIMO: Resolution A.1050(27) Revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships.\n2.1 Enclosed space means a space which has any of the following characteristics:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nlimited openings for entry and exit;\ninadequate ventilation; and\nis not designed for continuous worker occupancy,\nand includes, but is not limited to, cargo spaces, double bottoms, fuel tanks, ballast tanks, cargo pump-rooms, cargo\ncompressor rooms, cofferdams, chain lockers, void spaces, duct keels, inter-barrier spaces, boilers, engine\ncrankcases, engine scavenge air receivers, sewage tanks, and adjacent connected spaces. This list is not\nexhaustive, and a list should be produced on a ship-by-ship basis to identify enclosed spaces.\n8.2 Persons entering enclosed spaces should be provided with calibrated and tested multi-gas detectors that monitor\nthe levels of oxygen, carbon monoxide and other gases as appropriate.\n11 Conclusion\nFailure to observe simple procedures can lead to persons being unexpectedly overcome when entering enclosed\nspaces. Observance of the principles and procedures outlined above will form a reliable basis for assessing risks in\nsuch spaces and for taking necessary precautions.\nTMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.\nThe permit to work is used to control the risks associated with hazardous tasks, such as enclosed space entry and\nhot work.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance:\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for enclosed space entry which:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Defined the term enclosed space entry.\nIdentified spaces onboard managed vessels which were defined as enclosed spaces.\nIdentified enclosed spaces onboard managed vessels which did not require the issue of an enclosed space\nentry permit but were subject to controlled entry procedures.\nIdentified the persons onboard who may assume the roles of Competent Person, Responsible Person and\nAttendant.\nIdentified the OEL standard that had been adopted by the company.\nProvided the following OEL values for each gas likely to be encountered:\no The Time Weighted Average (TWA)\no The Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL)\no The Ceiling Value.\nDefined the process that must be followed when an enclosed space entry must be made, including:\no Identifying potential hazards through a documented risk assessment completed by a Competent\nPerson.\no Identifying the toxic, flammable, explosive or asphyxiant gasses that may be present in an enclosed\nspace and the tests required to detect their presence.\no\n• •\n• Identifying any additional precautions required prior to entering ballast tanks as a result of the use\nof the Ballast Water Management System\no Ventilating the space before and during entry.\no Segregating the space by blanking off or isolating all connecting pipelines or valves and electrical\npower/equipment.\no Cleaning the space in accordance with documented criteria based on the previous content of the\nspace.\no Testing the atmosphere of the space before and during entry for gasses that may be present due to\nthe previous content or machinery operating within the space.\no Securing the space for entry and providing proper illumination.\no Instructing an attendant to remain at the entrance to the space while it is occupied.\no Positioning rescue and resuscitation equipment at the entrance to the space.\no Properly clothing and equipping personnel for entry and subsequent tasks.\no Issuing and authorising a permit.\nIdentified the circumstances in which more than one tank or space could be included on the same enclosed\nspace entry permit.\nProhibited the use of Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus (CABA), Emergency Life Support Apparatus\n(ELSA) or Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBD) as an alternative to properly cleaning and gas\nfreeing a space for safe entry.\nIdentified the precautions during entry:\no The atmosphere should be retested frequently while the space is occupied.\no Persons entering enclosed spaces should be provided with calibrated and tested multi-gas\ndetectors that monitor the levels of oxygen, carbon monoxide and other gases as appropriate.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company enclosed space entry procedures.\nReview the categorisation of enclosed spaces onboard which identified spaces that:\no Required the issue of an enclosed space entry permit.\no Did not require the issue of an enclosed space entry permit but where entry was controlled through\nan alternative documented process.\nIdentify through the review of the planned maintenance system or recent cargo operations where enclosed\nspace entry would have taken place and review an enclosed space entry permit for at least two of the\nfollowing types of enclosed spaces:\no Cargo spaces.\no Double bottom space.\no Fuel tank.\no Ballast tank.\no Cargo pumproom.\no Cargo compressor room.\no Cofferdam.\no Chain locker.\no Void space.\no Duct keel.\no Inter-barrier space.\no Engine crank case or scavenge air receiver.\no Sewage tank.\no Boiler.\no Nitrogen generator room.\no Inert gas plant room.\no Ballast water treatment plant room.\nReview the selected enclosed space entry permits and verify that:\no A detailed risk assessment had been developed and/or reviewed prior to each enclosed space\nentry.\no The permit period of validity was clearly indicated and did not exceed 12 hours.\no Each space had been cleaned as required, in accordance with the company procedure. Consider\ncross referencing with the oil record book or the garbage log to establish how any wash water or\nresidues were disposed of.\no The pre-entry atmosphere checks for oxygen content and flammable, toxic, explosive and/or\nasphyxiant vapours or gasses were appropriate for the space and its previous content or usage.\no\n• •\nThe permits or supplementary documentation identified the connecting pipelines, valves and/or\nelectrical power/equipment that had been blanked or isolated\no The balance of the permits had been completed as required.\no The permits had been signed by:\n The Master or nominated responsible person in accordance with the company procedure.\n The attendant.\n The person(s) entering the space.\n The responsible person supervising entry.\no The permits had not been approved by the same individual who was making the enclosed space\nentry.\nWhere company procedures did not require the issue of a permit for entry into the cargo pumproom, cargo\ncompressor room, nitrogen generator room, inert gas plant room or ballast water treatment plant room, verify\nthat the checks required by the company procedure for entry into such spaces were being adhered to with\ndocumented records of gas measurements and entry and exit times for each entry.\nInterview one rating to verify their familiarity with their role in enclosed space entry, when and how they were\nbriefed and, the process for signing a permit as either an attendant or as a person entering the space.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures which defined the enclosed space entry requirements for the identified enclosed\nspaces found onboard.\nThe enclosed space entry permits for the previous six months for:\no Spaces under the control of the engineering department.\no Spaces under the control of the deck department.\nThe cargo pumproom, cargo compressor room, nitrogen generator room, inert gas plant room and/or ballast\nwater treatment plant room entry records for the previous two months.\nThe Bridge Log Book for the previous six months\nThe planned maintenance system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company enclosed space entry procedures.\nThe company enclosed space entry procedures had not identified all spaces that were considered to be\nenclosed spaces along with corresponding precautions for entering each type of identified enclosed space.\nThere was no evidence that documented risk assessments were completed and/or reviewed before each\nenclosed space entry.\nThe company enclosed entry procedure did not give clear guidance on the requirement to clean cargo,\nbunker and ballast tanks prior to entry based on the previous content.\nCompany procedures did not require the completion of an enclosed space entry permit when entering a\nspace meeting the definition of an enclosed space. (This does not include where an alternative documented\nprocedure existed for entering the cargo pumproom, cargo compressor room, nitrogen generator room, inert\ngas plant room or ballast water treatment plant room).\nWhere company procedures did not require the completion of an enclosed space entry permit when entering\na cargo pumproom, cargo compressor room, nitrogen generator room, inert gas plant room or ballast water\ntreatment plant room, there was no alternative procedure requiring:\no Atmosphere measurements for oxygen content and toxic, flammable, explosive or asphyxiant\ngasses were taken and recorded prior to entry.\no That the entry and exit time of each individual who entered the space was recorded.\nThe company enclosed space entry procedures had not identified any additional precautions required prior\nto entering ballast tanks as a result of the use of the Ballast Water Management System.\nEvidence was available that enclosed space entry had taken place without the issue of an enclosed entry\npermit in accordance with company procedures.\nEvidence was available that a cargo pumproom, compressor room, nitrogen generator room, inert gas plant\nroom or ballast water treatment plant room had been entered without the issue of an enclosed space entry\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\npermit or, where a permit was not required, recording of atmosphere checks prior to entry and recording the\nentry and exit times for each individual.\nEvidence was available that CABA, ELSA or EEBD sets had been used for routine enclosed space entry as\na substitute for cleaning and gas freeing a space for safe entry.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company enclosed space entry procedure and/or the\nprocess of using or retaining the company enclosed space entry permits.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the enclosed space entry procedure and their role in signing the\nenclosed space entry permit as either an attendant or someone who enters the space.\nA reviewed enclosed space entry permit was found to be incomplete or missing information required to be\nentered in accordance with the company enclosed space entry procedure.\nA reviewed enclosed space entry permit indicated that not all atmosphere measurements appropriate to the\nprevious content or use of the space had been taken and recorded.\nThere was no documented evidence for segregating a space by blanking off or isolating all connecting\npipelines or valves and electrical power/equipment during a reviewed enclosed space entry, where such\nisolation would have been necessary.\nA cargo tank had been entered without being cleaned in accordance with the company enclosed space entry\nprocedure.\nAn enclosed space entry permit was completed and approved by the same individual who entered the\nspace.\nPersonal multi-gas detectors were not required to be used during enclosed space entry.\nDedicated rescue and/or resuscitation equipment was observed to be in poor condition.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and, where directly involved, ratings familiar with the", "c": "company hot work procedure, and was evidence available to demonstrate that hot work\nhad been conducted in accordance with the procedure?\nShort Question Text\nHot work procedure\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Engine Room, Main Deck, Interview - Engine Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that hot work is always carried out in a controlled manner.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 9.4 Hot work\n9.4.1 Definition of hot work\nHot work is any work that involves sources of ignition or temperature high enough to ignite a flammable gas or liquid\nor material. This includes, but is not limited to:\n• •\n• •\nWelding (electric arc or gas).\nCutting, burning, gouging (electric or gas).\nHeating (blow torch or heat gun).\nSoldering (electric or blow torch).\nUse of the following temporary/portable equipment in a hazardous area should be classed as hot work:\n• •\n• Power tools (electrical or electric power tools)\nNon-intrinsically safe electronic equipment.\nInternal combustion engines (driving air compressors, pumps, pressure washers, etc).\n9.4.2 Control of hot work\nThe SMS should include adequate guidance on the control of hot work and should be robust enough to ensure\ncompliance. An absence of guidance should be taken to mean work is prohibited rather than approved.\n9.4.3 Hot work inside a designated space\nA space where conditions are safe for hot work should be designated, such as the engine room workshop. Whenever\npossible, hot work should be carried out in that space.\nThe designated space should be assessed for possible risks, and the SMS should define the conditions for carrying\nout hot work in that space, including additional controls such as notifications., fire watches or restrictions. Hot work\nshould be prohibited during bunkering, cargo operations, crude oil washing, tank cleaning operations and whenever\ncargo tank vapours are released. If it is necessary for hot work to be done, these operations should stop until the hot\nwork is completed.\n9.4.4 Hot work outside a designated space\nHot work done outside the designated space should be controlled under the SMS by a permit to work system and\ndefined requirements…\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1084 Principles for hot work on board all types of ships.\n4. the annexed list of principles takes account of existing guidelines such as the publication “Accident Prevention on\nBoard Ship at Sea and in Port\" (ILO) as well as the “International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n(ISGOTT)” (ICS, OCIMF and IAPH).\nTMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.\nThe permit to work is used to control the risks associated with hazardous tasks such as enclosed space entry and hot\nwork\nThe system requires company management approval for higher risk activities such as hot work in defined hazardous\nareas.\nIMO: ISM Code.\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for managing hot work onboard which should include but not\nbe limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The definition of hot work.\nThe control of hot work.\nWork planning, risk assessment and the issue of hot work permits.\nHot work inside a designated space.\nHot work outside a designated space.\no Hot Work in a gas safe area.\no Hot work inside the machinery space.\no Hot work over the side.\nHot work in dangerous or hazardous areas.\no Hot work in cargo tanks.\no Hot work in ballast tanks.\no Hot work in the pumproom.\no Hot work within the cargo tank deck area.\no Hot work in the vicinity of bunker tanks.\no Hot work on pipelines.\nLevels of approval required for authorising hot work.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company hot work procedures.\nIf hot work had taken place within any hazardous area during the previous six months, select not more than\ntwo permits, and verify that:\no\n• •\n• •\nA hot work plan had been developed for the proposed hot work showing separate responsibilities\nfor work supervision and safety.\no A risk assessment had been prepared for the proposed hot work.\no A work planning meeting had been completed.\no Documented shore management approval had been obtained to complete the hot work as planned.\no A hot work permit had been issued, completed and approved on board in accordance with the hot\nwork plan and the terms of the shore management approval.\nIf hot work had not taken place in any hazardous areas during the previous six months, select not more than\ntwo permits for hot work outside the designated space, but within other parts of the non-hazardous area, and\nverify that:\no A hot work plan had been developed for the proposed hot work showing separate responsibilities\nfor work supervision and safety.\no A risk assessment had been prepared for the proposed hot work.\no A work planning meeting had been completed.\no A hot work permit had been issued, completed and approved on board in accordance with the hot\nwork plan and the company hot work procedure.\nWhile in the designated space, typically, but not necessarily, the machinery space workshop, review the\nonboard instructions for undertaking hot work in the space and verify they included instructions regarding:\no When hot work may be conducted in the designated space.\no When hot work is prohibited in the designated space.\no Who is permitted to conduct hot work in the designated space.\no The requirement to complete or review a risk assessment during a work planning meeting.\no The requirement to work in the designated space with a shield or curtain erected.\no The requirement to gain authorisation from the Master or Responsible Officer before hot work may\nbegin.\no Considerations around preventing unintended activation of the ship’s fire alarm system.\nDuring the balance of the inspection verify that no recent undocumented hot work had taken place outside of\nthe designated space, without a hot work permit.\nInterview one engine room rating to verify their understanding of the hot work instructions for the designated\nspace.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company hot work procedures.\nThe hot work permits issued onboard the vessel during the previous six months, supplemented by:\no The risk assessment relating to the specific hot work task.\no The work plan relating to the specific hot work task.\no Evidence that a work planning meeting had been held.\no Documented approval for the hot work from shore management, where required.\nThe onboard instructions for conducting hot work in the designated space.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company hot work procedures.\nThe company hot work procedures were not in alignment with the guidance provided by ISGOTT Chapter 9.\nEvidence was available that hot work had been conducted anywhere outside of the designated space\nwithout the issue of a hot work permit.\nHot work permits had been issued without:\no A risk assessment being prepared for the specific hot work task.\no A work plan being prepared for the specific hot work task.\no A work planning meeting taking place.\no Documented approval for the hot work from the shore management being provided, where required\nby the company hot work procedure.\no Approval by the Master or, a designated Responsible Officer, where the company procedure\nspecifically permitted a permit to be approved by anyone other than the Master.\n• •\n• •\n• There were no instructions for conducting hot work posted in the designated space.\nThe instructions for conducting hot work in the designated space did not define:\no When hot work may be conducted in the designated space.\no When hot work must not be conducted in the designated space.\no Who may conduct hot work in the designated space.\no The requirement to work in the designated space with a shield or curtain erected.\no The requirement to gain permission from the Master or designated Responsible Officer before\nconducting hot work in the designated space.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company hot work procedures, any aspect of the hot work\npermit process or the safety precautions referred to within the company hot work procedures or permit.\nEvidence was available that hot work had taken place in the designated space in contravention to the\nonboard instructions or the guidance provided in ISGOTT chapter 9.\nAn interviewed engine rating was unfamiliar with the designated space hot work instructions.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.3.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "working at height, and was there evidence that risk control measures such as permits to\nwork or documented risk assessments were consistently used whenever work was\nundertaken at height?\nShort Question Text\nWorking at height\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Exterior Decks, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that work at height is always conducted in a controlled manner with procedures to manage and\nmitigate risk to workers.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\nChapter 14.2 Permit to work systems\n14.2.1 There are many types of operation on board ship when the routine actions of one person may inadvertently\nendanger another, or when a series of action steps need to be taken to ensure the safety of those engaged in a\nspecific operation. In all circumstances it is necessary, before the work is done, to identify the hazards and then to\nensure they are eliminated or effectively controlled. Ultimate responsibility rests with the Company to see that this is\ndone.\n14.2.3 the safety management systems for individual ships will determine when permit to work systems should be\nused, and the form of the permit to work.\nAnnex 14.1 Permits to work\nPermits to work would normally be required for the following categories of work:\n• Working at height / over the side\nChapter 17 Work at Height\n17.1.2 Work at height should be subject to risk assessment, and suitable control measures should be taken to protect\nthose who may be put at risk. Depending on the severity of the risk, a permit to work may be required (e.g. for\nworking aloft)\nTMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.\nThe permit to work is used to control the risks associated with hazardous tasks such as enclosed space entry and hot\nwork\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed safe working procedures which included the controls required to be in\nplace whenever work at or above a defined height is planned or undertaken.\nThe procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The definition of working at height.\nThe height at or above which working at height control measures must be implemented.\nThe method of documenting the risk control measures that need to be put in place before work can be\nauthorised, either through a permit to work, risk assessment or other work management process.\nAny exclusions from the requirement for documenting the control measures when working at height in either\na permit or risk assessment.\nThe personal protective equipment (PPE) such as lifelines, harnesses, fall arresters, etc. that must be used\nwhen working at height.\nThe specialist equipment, such as bosun’s chairs, stages, portable scaffolding, safety nets, etc. that must be\nused when working at height.\nThe requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height equipment periodically and record the\ninventory and condition of the equipment.\nThe requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height equipment before each use.\nThe level of supervision that must be maintained for the duration of work at height.\nThe level of authority required to approve permits or risk assessments for working at height.\nAny additional permits that may be considered or applicable when working at height.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company safe work procedure for working at height.\nReview several recent work at height permits or risk assessments and verify that:\no The work described in the permits and/or risk assessments reflected the circumstances found\nonboard the vessel being inspected.\no The permits and/or risk assessments were approved in accordance with the company procedure.\nReview the work at height PPE and specialist equipment inventory and periodic inspection checklist and\nverify that checks had been completed in accordance with the company work at height procedure.\nInspect a selection of specialist working at height PPE and equipment provided onboard and verify that the\ncondition reflected that as reported in the most recent periodic check.\nInterview a deck or engine rating to verify their understanding of the company safe working procedure for\nworking at height and their involvement with either the permit or risk assessment review process.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company safe work procedures for working at height.\nThe working at height permits or risk assessments for the previous two months.\nRecords of the periodic checks of working at height PPE and specialist equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There was no company safe working procedure which included working at height.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no requirement to complete a permit or risk assessment when working at height unless the\ncompany procedure provided specific exclusions.\nThere was no requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height equipment periodically and record\nthe inventory and condition of the equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company working at height safe work procedures.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the requirement to conduct periodic checks on specialist\nworking at height PPE and equipment.\nThere was evidence that work at height had been undertaken that required either a work at height permit or\na documented risk assessment but where neither was available for review.\nReviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work at height described and/or circumstances\nfound onboard the inspected vessel.\nWork at height permits or risk assessments has not been approved at the appropriate level in accordance\nwith the company procedure.\nThere were no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist working at height PPE and\nequipment.\nSpecialist working at height PPE and/or equipment was found to be in apparently poor condition.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the company safe working procedures for working at height and\neither the related permit or risk assessment review process.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.4.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "working over the side, and was there evidence that risk control measures such as\nstandard work procedures, permits to work or documented risk assessments were\nconsistently used whenever work was undertaken over the side?\nShort Question Text\nWorking over the side\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that work over the side is always conducted in a controlled manner with procedures to manage\nand mitigate risk to workers.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\nChapter 14.2 Permit to work systems\n14.2.1 There are many types of operation on board ship when the routine actions of one person may inadvertently\nendanger another, or when a series of action steps need to be taken to ensure the safety of those engaged in a\nspecific operation. In all circumstances it is necessary, before the work is done, to identify the hazards and then to\nensure they are eliminated or effectively controlled. Ultimate responsibility rests with the Company to see that this is\ndone.\n14.2.3 the safety management systems for individual ships will determine when permit to work systems should be\nused, and the form of the permit to work.\nAnnex 14.1 Permits to work\nPermits to work would normally be required for the following categories of work:\n• Working at height / over the side\nChapter 17 Work at Height\n17.2.7 Other than in emergency situations, personnel should not work overside whilst the vessel is underway. If such\nwork has to be undertaken, lifeboats or rescue boats should be ready for immediate use. Any such work should be\nclosely monitored/watched by a responsible person.\nChapter 10.5 Safety for seafarers rigging accommodation and pilot ladders.\n10.5.2 The dangers associated with this work activity should be risk assessed as working overside, requiring a permit\nto work and the use of control measures such as safety line, fall prevention device, safety harness and wearing of\nlifejackets…\nTMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.\nThe permit to work is used to control the risks associated with hazardous tasks such as enclosed space entry and hot\nwork\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed safe working procedures which included the controls required to be in\nplace whenever work over the side is planned or undertaken.\nThe procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The definition of working over the side.\nThe prohibition of working over the side while the vessel is underway except in defined circumstances such\nas:\no Rigging, adjusting or recovering a combination ladder before or after boarding or disembarking a\npilot where this requires a seafarer to work outside the side rail.\no Rigging, adjusting or recovering an accommodation ladder as part of port arrival or departure\noperations where this requires a seafarer to work outside the side rail.\no Launching or recovering a lifeboat or rescue boat as part of an exercise or emergency response.\nAny exclusions from the requirement to document the control measures on each occasion when work takes\nplace over the side by utilising a standard procedure developed through risk assessment, such as:\no Rigging, adjusting or recovering a combination ladder.\no Rigging, adjusting or recovering an accommodation ladder.\no Rigging, adjusting or recovering a gangway while in port\nThe method of documenting the risk control measures that need to be put in place before work can be\nauthorised, either through a permit to work, risk assessment or other work management process.\nThe personal protective equipment (PPE) such as lifejackets, lifelines, harnesses, fall arresters, etc. that\nmust be used when working over the side.\nThe specialist equipment, such as bosun’s chairs, stages, safety nets, etc. that must be used when working\nover the side.\nThe requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height and over the side equipment periodically and\nrecord the inventory and condition of the equipment.\nThe requirement to check PPE and specialist working at height and over the side equipment before each\nuse.\nThe level of supervision that must be maintained on deck at the work location for the duration of work over\nthe side.\nThe level of supervision that must be maintained on the bridge for the duration of the work if the work over\nthe side takes place while the vessel is underway.\nThe status of the main propulsion machinery and maximum permitted speed of the vessel when work over\nthe side takes place while the vessel is underway and making way for tasks such as rigging a combination\nladder.\nThe level of authority required to approve working over the side.\nAny additional permits that may be considered or applicable when working over the side.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company safe work procedures for working over the side.\nReview any standard work procedures for working over the side while the vessel was underway such as for\nrigging a combination or accommodation ladder.\nReview several recent work over the side permits or risk assessments and verify that:\no The work described in the permits and/or risk assessments reflected the circumstances found\nonboard the vessel being inspected.\n• •\n• o The permits and/or risk assessments were approved in accordance with the company procedure.\nReview the working at height and over the side PPE and specialist equipment inventory and periodic\ninspection checklist. Verify that checks had been completed in accordance with the company work at height\nand over the side procedure.\nInspect a selection of specialist working at height and over the side PPE and equipment provided onboard\nand verify that the condition reflected that as reported in the most recent periodic check.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their understanding of the company safe working procedure for working over\nthe side with specific reference to:\no Their involvement with either the permit or risk assessment review process.\no Rigging a combination or an accommodation ladder while the ship was underway and the required\nlevel of supervision on deck and from the bridge.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company safe work procedures for working over the side.\nStandard work procedures for work over the side that did not require a permit or risk assessment to be\nprepared on each occasion.\nThe work over the side permits or risk assessments for the previous six months.\nRecords of the periodic checks of specialist working at height and over the side PPE and equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company safe working procedure which included working over the side.\nThere was no requirement to complete a permit or risk assessment when working over the side unless the\ncompany procedures provided specific exclusions.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company working over the side safe work procedure.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the requirement to conduct periodic checks on specialist\nworking at height and over the side PPE and equipment.\nThere was evidence that work over the side had been undertaken that required either a work over the side\npermit or a documented risk assessment, but where neither was available for review.\nReviewed permits or risk assessments did not reflect the work over the side described and/or circumstances\nfound onboard the inspected vessel.\nWork over the side permits or risk assessments has not been approved at the appropriate level in\naccordance with the company procedure.\nThere were no records of inventory and/or periodic checks of specialist working at height and over the side\nPPE and equipment.\nSpecialist working at height and over the side PPE and/or equipment was found to be in apparently poor\ncondition.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the company safe working procedure for working over the side and\neither the related standard procedure(s) or, the permit or risk assessment review process.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for working on", "c": "electrical equipment and systems, and was there evidence that risk control measures\nsuch as permits to work and/or documented risk assessments were consistently used\nwhenever work was undertaken on electrical equipment and systems?\nShort Question Text\nWorking on electrical equipment and systems\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nSteering Gear, Bridge, Engine Room, Forecastle, Engine Control Room, Interview - Electrician / ETO\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that work on electrical equipment and systems is always conducted in a controlled manner with\nprocedures to manage and mitigate risk to workers.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\nChapter 14.2 Permit to work systems\n14.2.1 There are many types of operation on board ship when the routine actions of one person may inadvertently\nendanger another, or when a series of action steps need to be taken to ensure the safety of those engaged in a\nspecific operation. In all circumstances it is necessary, before the work is done, to identify the hazards and then to\nensure they are eliminated or effectively controlled. Ultimate responsibility rests with the Company to see that this is\ndone.\n14.2.3 the safety management systems for individual ships will determine when permit to work systems should be\nused, and the form of the permit to work.\nAnnex 14.1 Permits to work\nPermits to work would normally be required for the following categories of work:\n• •\nGeneral electrical (under 1000 volts)\nElectrical high voltage (over 1000 volts)\nChapter 20.12 Electrical equipment\n20.12.1 The risks of electric shock are much greater on board ship than they are normally ashore because wetness,\nhigh humidity and high temperature (including sweating) reduce the contact resistance of the body. In those\nconditions, severe and even fatal shocks may be caused at voltages as low as 60V…\n20.12.2 A notice of instructions on the treatment of electric shock should be posted in every place containing electric\nequipment and switchgear. Immediate on-the-spot treatment of an unconscious patient is essential.\n20.12.3 Before any work is done on electrical equipment, fuses should be removed, or circuit breakers opened to\nensure that all related circuits are dead. If possible, switches and circuit breakers should be locked open… The work\nshould be carried out by, or under the direct supervision of, a competent person with sufficient technical knowledge\nand a permit to work system should be operated. Additional precautions are necessary to ensure safety when work is\nto be undertaken on high-voltage equipment (designed to work at a nominal system voltage in excess of 1000V).\nTMSA KPI 9.1.4 requires that a documented permit to work system is in place.\nThe permit to work is used to control the risks associated with hazardous tasks such as enclosed space entry and hot\nwork\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed safe working procedures which included the controls required to be in\nplace whenever work on electrical equipment or systems is planned or undertaken.\nThe procedure should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe definition of working on electrical equipment or systems.\nThe definitions of general electrical work and high-voltage electrical work.\nThe method of documenting the risk control measures that need to be put in place before work on electrical\nequipment or systems can be authorised, either through a permit to work, risk assessment or other work\nmanagement process.\nThe additional risk control measures that must be in place and documented when:\no Conducting work on high-voltage equipment or systems.\no Conducting work on or near live electrical equipment or systems.\no Conducting work on live electrical test benches.\no Conducting work on electrical equipment in hazardous areas\nThe personal protective equipment (PPE) such as insulating mats, insulating gloves, eye protection,\nfootwear and clothing without metal fittings, etc. that must be used when working on electrical equipment or\nsystems.\nThe dangers of wearing jewellery while working on or near electrical equipment or systems.\nThe specialist equipment that must be used when working on electrical equipment or systems.\nThe requirement to post a notice of instructions on the treatment of electric shock in spaces containing\nelectric equipment and switchgear.\nThe requirement to check PPE and specialist electrical work equipment before each use.\nThe level of supervision or direct oversight that must maintained for the duration of work on electrical\nequipment or systems.\nThe level of authority required to approve work on electrical equipment or systems.\nAny additional permits that may be considered or applicable when working on electrical equipment or\nsystems.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company safe work procedures for working on electrical equipment\nor systems.\nWhere necessary, review the planned maintenance system or daily work planning meeting records to\nidentify when work on electrical equipment or systems may have taken place.\nReview at least two recent permits and/or risk assessments for work on electrical equipment or systems and\nverify that:\no The work described in the permits and/or risk assessments reflected the circumstances found\nonboard the vessel being inspected.\n• •\no The permits and/or risk assessments were approved in accordance with the company procedure.\nDuring the general inspection of the vessel, confirm that a notice of instructions on the treatment of electric\nshock was posted in spaces containing electric equipment and switchgear.\nInterview the electrician or, where no electrician was on board, an appropriate engineer officer to verify their\nunderstanding of:\no The company safe working procedure for working on electrical equipment or systems.\no The electrical work permit and/or risk assessment development, review and approval processes.\no The additional control measures required when working on:\n High-voltage systems and equipment.\n Live electrical equipment.\n Live electrical test benches.\n Electrical equipment or systems in hazardous areas.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company safe work procedure for working on electrical equipment or systems.\nThe work on electrical equipment or systems permits and/or risk assessments for the previous two months.\nAccess to the planned maintenance system.\nAccess the daily work planning meeting records.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company safe working procedure which included working on electrical equipment or systems.\nThere was no requirement to complete a permit and/or risk assessment when working on electrical\nequipment or systems.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company safe work procedure for working on electrical\nequipment or systems.\nAn interviewed electrician or engineer officer was unfamiliar with\no The company safe working procedure for working on electrical equipment or systems and either the\nrelated permit and/or risk assessment development, review and approval process.\no The additional control measures required when working on:\n High-voltage systems and equipment.\n Live electrical equipment.\n Live electrical test benches.\n Electrical equipment or systems in hazardous areas.\nThere was evidence that work on electrical equipment or systems had been undertaken that required either\na permit and/or a documented risk assessment but the required documentation had not been completed or\nwas not available for review.\nReviewed permits and/or risk assessments did not reflect the work on electrical equipment or systems\ndescribed and/or the circumstances found onboard the inspected vessel.\nWork on electrical equipment or systems permits or risk assessments had not been approved at the\nappropriate level in accordance with the company procedure.\nThere was no documented supervision/oversight for tasks where the company procedure required such\noversight to be in place.\nNotices of instructions for the treatment of electric shock were not posted in spaces containing electric\nequipment and switchgear.\nWhere no permits and/or risk assessments for work on electrical equipment or systems had been completed or\napproved during the previous two months, make a comment in the Process response tool noting the date of the last\noccasion when work on electrical equipment or systems had been documented.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.5.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the control", "c": "of hazardous energy, and was evidence available, through documented risk assessment\nor permits, that hazardous energy sources were routinely identified and isolated before\nworking on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where hazardous energy could be\npresent?\nShort Question Text\nControl of hazardous energy\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that hazardous energy sources are always identified and effectively isolated before work starts on,\nor in, machinery, systems or spaces where hazardous energy sources could be present.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 4.4 Lock-out/Tag-out\nSpecially designed LO/TO equipment is widely available that provides a system for preventing a valve or device\nbeing operated until the lock or tag has been removed, usually under a documented system of safe management\ncontrol. Uses vary but could include the isolation of overboard sea valves and tanks during safe entry.\nHazardous energy control procedures may also include a LO/TO system that places a lock and/or tag on an energy\nisolating device, e.g. a valve or breaker. This stops the energy isolating device being operated until the lock or tag\nhas been removed.\nChapter 4.5 Control of hazardous energy\n4.5.1 Hazardous energy\nHazardous energy is any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, nuclear, thermal, gravitational,\nsound, motion, biological or other energy that can harm personnel. Examples of hazardous energy include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPressure in a cargo pipeline due to stored pressure.\nPressure in a cargo pipeline section due to temperature variations.\nGas pressure in an IG line.\nAir pressure in reservoirs.\nStored electrical energy in electrical switchboards.\nHydrostatic pressure on ship side valves.\n4.5.2 Hazardous energy controls\nA hazardous energy control procedure should be developed to identify and control hazardous energy. An example\nfive step procedure is given below:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nGather information.\nPerform SCTA. (Safety Critical Task Analysis)\nPerform risk assessment.\nImplement controls.\nCommunicate and train.\nWhen implemented these should prevent:\n• •\n• •\nInjuries by and initial uncontrolled release of hazardous energy.\nInjuries by residual energy remaining in a system after shutdown.\nRelease of a pollutant to air, the sea, the ground or on deck.\nUncontrolled sea water entering machinery or other spaces.\nProcedures should aim to establish that a zero energy state has been achieved and independently verified before\nwork starts. If this zero energy state cannot be established, work should not start until more risk assessment and\ncontrol measures are established. Procedures should identify the steps to be followed when a zero energy state\ncannot be established. Figure 4.1 provides a flowchart setting out the recommended steps to control hazardous\nenergy.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.4 requires that procedures ensure that all identified mitigation measures are completed prior to\ncommencing work\nProcedures may include:\n• •\nUse of the permit to work system for both planned and unplanned tasks.\nUse of the risk assessment form to confirm implementation.\nFinal approval for commencement of work is subject to implementation of mitigation measures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which:\n• •\nDescribed potential sources of hazardous energy, and the methods of controlling them, when planning and\nconducting work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where an uncontrolled release of energy could\ncause harm to personnel or the environment.\nProvided instructions on:\no When the process of carrying out the identification of hazardous energy sources should be\nconducted, such as;\n During the daily work planning meeting.\n As part of a standard work procedure for a defined job.\n As part of the work instructions contained within the planned maintenance system.\n Through the risk assessment process for a new or unplanned job.\no How hazardous energy sources are to be identified, such as;\n Through technical drawing review.\n Through onsite survey using hazard identification tools.\n A combination of both.\no\n• •\n• •\n• How hazardous energy sources are secured against uncontrolled release, such as through lockout/tag-out (LO/TO) or another documented work procedure.\no How the hazardous energy source isolation points are required to be documented, such as;\n The use of a dedicated LO/TO permit.\n As a subsection of another permit used to control work.\n A job specific risk assessment.\n A Safety Critical Task Assessment.\n Another documented work process.\no How to achieve and verify a zero energy state before work starts on, or in, any machinery, system\nor space with hazardous energy source(s).\no How to complete the independent verification of isolation points\no The authorisation process for work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces with hazardous energy\nsource(s).\no The process to temporarily reinstate energy sources for testing purposes.\no How to reinstate energy sources upon completion of the planned work.\no The requirement to test machinery or systems after removal of isolation to ensure full system\nfunctionality.\nDefined the type and quantity of specialist LO/TO equipment that must be available onboard.\nRequired that an inventory of specialist LO/TO equipment must be maintained.\nDefined who is authorised to:\no Undertake the LO/TO or other documented isolation process.\no Undertake the independent verification of isolation points.\no Approve the permit, risk assessment or other documented work process for the isolation of\nhazardous energy sources.\nDefined the training required for all personnel involved in the isolation of hazardous energy process.\nProhibited work on equipment or systems where a zero energy state could not be achieved except where\nspecialist procedures had been developed for working on energised systems.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company control of hazardous energy procedures.\nReview at least two recent permits, risk assessments or other work process documents which were used to\nidentify and control hazardous energy sources before work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces.\nIf necessary, review the planned maintenance system to confirm that tasks that would require the\nidentification and control of hazardous energy sources in accordance with the company procedure had an\naccompanying permit, risk assessment or other work process document available.\nInterview one deck or engineer officer to verify their understanding of:\no The company control of hazardous energy procedures and the use of permits, risk assessment or\nother documented work processes to identify and document sources of hazardous energy before\nstarting work.\no The process to verify a zero-energy state of a source of hazardous energy.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The company control of hazardous energy procedures.\nPermits, Safety Critical Task Assessments, risk assessments or other documented work processes that had\nbeen used to identify and control hazardous energy sources for the previous three months.\nThe daily work planning records.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nThe Engine Room Logbook.\nThe planned maintenance system.\nThe inventory of specialist LO/TO equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company control of hazardous energy procedures.\nThere was no specialist LO/TO equipment available onboard.\nThere was no inventory of specialist LO/TO equipment.\nWork had been completed that required either a permit, risk assessment or other documented work\nprocedure to identify and control hazardous energy sources according to the company procedure, but none\nhad been completed.\nAn interviewed deck or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company control of hazardous energy\nprocedures.\nAn interviewed deck or engineer officer was unfamiliar with the process to identify and document the\nisolation of hazardous energy sources before starting work on, or in, machinery, systems or spaces where\nhazardous energy sources were present.\nLO/TO equipment was found to be attached to machinery or systems during the inspection but there were\nno accompanying permits, risk assessment or other documented work process to document the reason for\nthe equipment being locked and/or tagged out.\nPermits, risk assessment or other documented work processes were in force for hazardous energy isolation,\nbut the isolation points identified were not locked and/or tagged out as required by the company procedure.\nMachinery or systems were found disassembled or under repair with no isolation of hazardous energy\nsources.\nWhere no records were available for the control of hazardous sources of energy for the previous three months, make\na comment in the Process response tool and note the date of the last occasion for which control measures for\nhazardous energy had been documented.\n5.6. Fixed and portable gas detecting systems", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing,", "c": "maintenance and calibration of the vessel’s portable and personal gas measurement\ninstruments, and was the equipment on board sufficient, in good working order, regularly\ntested and periodically calibrated?\nShort Question Text\nPortable and personal gas measurement instruments\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1456 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2 and the FSS and FTP codes\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1477. Guidelines to facilitate the selection of portable atmosphere testing instruments for enclosed\nspaces as required by SOLAS Regulation XI-1/7.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1561 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation XI-1/7\nObjective\nTo ensure sufficient calibrated portable and personal gas measurement instruments are always available on\nboard to enable safe enclosed space entry and cargo operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n2.4.2 Gas measurement instruments\nSome gas measurement instruments can analyse only one type of gas. Other can analyse several pre-set types of\ngases at the same time (multi-gas detectors) and have a range of capabilities based on different technologies. They\ncan be divided into personal, portable and fixed gas measurement instruments and can be further classed by their\nfunction.\n2.4.1 Provision of gas measurement instruments\nTankers should be equipped with at least two instruments capable of measuring, as a minimum, concentrations of\noxygen, flammable gases or vapours (% LFL), H2S and CO in order to carry out the tests required for enclosed\nspace entry.\nNote that enclosed spaces might have additional atmospheric hazards that may not be detected by these\ninstruments. If this is known to be the case, additional means to measure the toxic gases in the cargoes being carried\nshould be provided. An up to date inventory of the instruments should be maintained on board.\nTankers equipped with IG or nitrogen padding should ensure that the instruments are also capable of measuring\noxygen and hydrocarbon content (% Vol) in an inert atmosphere.\nEvery instrument should have a manual that describes its features, settings and alarms and explains calibration,\ntesting, operation and maintenance. The information in the manuals should be available in the working language of\nthe tanker.\n1.4.6.3 Guidance for handling cargo and bunkers containing hydrogen sulphide\n1.4.6.3.1 Vapour monitoring\nPersonal H2S gas monitoring instruments for personnel engaged in cargo operations is strongly recommended\n10.8 Precautions during entry into enclosed spaces\nThe initial entry should be carried out by one or two crew members, depending on the size nature and layout of the\nspace. Each should carry an Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD) and a personal gas monitor.\n11.1.7.2 Entry into cargo tanks\nThe safety precautions in chapter 10 should be observed, including the carrying of a personal gas detector.\n2.4.7 Testing and calibrating gas measurement instruments.\n2.4.7.1 Operational testing (self-testing) gas measurement instruments\nGas measurement instruments should be tested in line with the manufacturer’s instructions before daily use. Such\ntests are meant to ensure the instrument is in good working condition.\n2.4.7.2 Testing gas measurement instruments\nPortable and fixed gas measurement instruments should be tested at minimum recommended frequency using test\ngases as per the manufacturer’s instructions and the company’s SMS.\nIn any case, portable and fixed gas measurement instruments should be tested at least every month or after any\nfault.\n2.4.7.3 Calibrating gas measurement instruments\nCalibration, adjustment and additional maintenance should be carried out in line with the manufacturer’s\nrecommendations.\n2.4.7.4 Disposable personal gas monitors\nTo confirm they are working properly, disposable gas monitors should be tested regularly and in line with\nmanufacturer’s recommendations.\nDisposable gas detection monitors cannot be re-calibrated and should be safely discarded when they reach the\ncalibration expiry date. It is important to record the date when disposable instruments are first commissioned in order\nto establish their expiry date.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1456 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2 and the FSS and FTP codes\n1 Gas measurement and detection – portable instruments (regulation II-2/4.5.7.1)\nThe requirement of regulation II-2/4.5.7.1 for one portable instrument for measuring oxygen and one for measuring\nflammable vapour concentrations, and spares for both, should be considered as being satisfied when a minimum of\ntwo instruments, each capable of measuring both oxygen and flammable vapour concentrations are provided on\nboard. Alternatively, two portable instruments for measuring oxygen and two portable instruments for measuring\nflammable vapour concentrations could be provided on board.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1477. Guidelines to facilitate the selection of portable atmosphere testing instruments for\nenclosed spaces as required by SOLAS Regulation XI-1/7.\nIntroduction\n1. These guidelines are to facilitate the selection of a portable atmosphere testing instrument for enclosed spaces as\nrequired by SOLAS regulation XI-1/7. They are intended to be read in conjunction with this SOLAS regulation and the\nRevised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships (resolution A.1050(27)). They are not intended\nto constitute a performance standard for such equipment.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1561 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation XI-1/7\nProvision of suitable means of the calibration of portable atmosphere testing instruments.\nCompliance with the provision “suitable means shall be provided for the calibration of all such instruments” in SOLAS\nregulation XI-1/7, as adopted by resolution MSC.380(94), may be achieved by portable atmosphere testing\ninstruments being calibrated on board or ashore in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.\nFor the avoidance of any doubt, the above clarification refers to the calibration of portable atmosphere testing\ninstruments, as required by SOLAS regulation XI-1/7, and not to any pre-operational accuracy tests as recommended\nby the manufacturer.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Gas monitoring equipment.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II Regulation 4\nProbability of ignition\n5.7 Gas measurement and detection\n5.7.1 Portable instruments\nTankers shall be equipped with at least one portable instrument for measuring oxygen and one for measuring\nflammable vapour concentrations, together with a sufficient set of spares. Suitable means shall be provided for the\ncalibration of such instruments.\n5.7.2 Arrangements for gas measurement in double-hull spaces and double-bottom spaces\n5.7.2.1 Suitable portable instruments for measuring oxygen and flammable vapour concentrations in double-hull\nspaces and double-bottom spaces shall be provided. In selecting these instruments, due attention shall be given to\ntheir use in combination with the fixed gas sampling line systems referred to in paragraph 5.7.2.2.\n5.7.2.2 Where the atmosphere in double-hull spaces cannot be reliably measured using flexible gas sampling hoses,\nsuch spaces shall be fitted with permanent gas sampling lines. The configuration of gas sampling lines shall be\nadapted to the design of such spaces.\nIMO: IBC Code\n13.2 Vapour detection\n13.2.1 Ships carrying toxic or flammable products, or both shall be equipped with at least two instruments designed\nand calibrated for testing for the specific vapours in question. If such instruments are not capable of testing for both\ntoxic concentrations and flammable concentrations, then two separate sets of instruments shall be provided.\n13.2.2 Vapour-detection instruments may be portable or fixed. If a fixed system is installed, at least one portable\ninstrument shall be provided.\nIMO: IGC Code\n13.6.3 Gas detection equipment shall be designed, installed and tested in accordance with recognized standards and\nshall be suitable for the cargoes to be carried in accordance with column \"f\" in table of chapter 19. (i.e. asphyxiant or\nflammable and/or toxic)\n13.6.19 Every ship shall be provided with at least two sets of portable gas detection equipment that meet the\nrequirement of 13.6.3 or an acceptable national or international standard.\n13.6.20 A suitable instrument for the measurement of oxygen levels in inert atmospheres shall be provided.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and calibration of the\nvessel’s portable and personal gas measurement instruments which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe type and number of portable and personal gas measurement instruments to be carried on board.\nThe toxic gases or vapours for which tubes, chips or other consumables should be available.\nThe purpose(s) and function(s) of each instrument, including the sensor technology utilised and whether the\ninstrument can be used:\no in an inert atmosphere.\no at above atmospheric pressure.\nThe circumstances under which each instrument sensor may be poisoned.\nThe description and quantity of spare parts and test gases to be carried on board.\nThe method and frequency of testing and calibrating the gas measurement instruments, including a\nrequirement that all oxygen and hydrocarbon analysers are checked for correct operation before each use.\nThe records of equipment, testing and calibration to be maintained.\nThe circumstances under which personal gas measurement instruments must be worn, e.g. enclosed space,\ncargo tank, pump room entry or when handling cargo or bunkers with high H2S concentrations.\nThe procedures may refer to the manufacturer’s manuals for detailed guidance on individual instruments.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review the:\no Company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and\npersonal gas measurement instruments.\no Instruction manuals for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\n• Inspect the:\no Portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\no Associated spare parts and test gases.\no The tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic gases.\no Hoses or cables used to sample tank atmospheres and verify that they were of sufficient length to\nreach the bottom of the deepest tank.\n• Review the:\no Inventory of portable and personal gas measurement instruments, spare parts, test gases and\ntubes, chips or other consumables for measuring toxic gases.\no Test and calibration records for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\no Records of the date when each disposable personal gas monitor was first commissioned.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to assess their familiarity with the:\no Purpose and operation of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\no Testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments,\nincluding the correct use of test gases.\no Records required to be kept for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\n• Request that the accompanying officer demonstrates the pre-operational accuracy test, in accordance with\nthe manufacturer’s instructions, for a selected portable or personal gas measurement instrument.\nWhere the vessel was provided with portable gas measuring equipment and consumables from different\nmanufacturer’s the vessel staff must be able to demonstrate that the items are mutually compatible through\nmanufacturer’s instructions. (Particularly when considering gas testing tubes and hand pumps)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and calibration of the vessel’s portable and\npersonal gas measurement instruments.\nThe inventory of portable and personal gas measurement instruments, spare parts, test gases and tubes,\nchips or other consumables for measuring toxic gases.\nInstruction manuals for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\nTest and calibration records for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\nRecords of the date when each disposable personal gas monitor was first commissioned.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable\nand personal gas measurement instruments.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to explain or demonstrate:\no The type and number of portable and personal gas measurement instruments required to be\ncarried on board.\no The toxic gases or vapours for which tubes, chips or other consumables required to be carried\nonboard.\no The purpose(s) and function(s) of each instrument, including the sensor technology utilised and\nwhether the instrument can be used in an inert atmosphere and/or at above atmospheric pressure.\no The circumstances under which some sensors fitted in measurement instruments provided may be\npoisoned.\no The description and quantity of spare parts and test gases required to be carried on board.\no The method and frequency of testing and calibrating the gas measurement instruments.\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe records of equipment, testing and calibration required to be maintained.\nThe circumstances under which personal gas measurement instruments must be worn, e.g.\nenclosed space, cargo tank and pump room entry.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the purpose and/or operation of the portable and personal gas\nmeasurement instruments.\nAn item of the required portable and personal gas measurement instruments was damaged or not\noperational.\nAn item of equipment required to permit the restricted or closed sampling of a tank atmosphere was missing\nor defective.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to describe the testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable\nand personal gas measurement instruments required in accordance with the SMS and the manufacturers’\nmaintenance and operation manuals.\nThere was no evidence that the required testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and personal\ngas measurement instruments had been performed in accordance with the SMS and the manufacturers’\nmaintenance and operation manuals.\nThe vessel was not equipped with at least two instruments capable of measuring concentrations of oxygen,\nflammable gases or vapours (% LFL), H2S and CO in order to carry out the tests required for enclosed\nspace entry.\nThe vessel was not equipped with the required means to measure concentrations of toxic gases or vapours\nthat might be found in the cargoes carried.\nThere were insufficient tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for the instruments used to\nmeasure toxic gases.\nHoses or cables used to sample tank atmospheres were of insufficient length to reach the bottom of the\ndeepest tank.\nThe tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic gases were not suitable for\nthe toxic gases or vapours that might be found in the cargo being carried.\nThe tubes, chips or other consumables available on board for measuring toxic gases were past their expiry\ndate.\nA tanker equipped with inert gas or that utilised nitrogen padding did not have an instrument(s) capable of\nmeasuring oxygen and hydrocarbon content (% Vol) in an inert atmosphere.\nAn instrument was used for measuring hydrocarbon content in an inert atmosphere that was not suitable for\nthis purpose.\nThe vessel was not equipped with sufficient operational personal gas monitors to meet the requirements of\nthe SMS for enclosed space, cargo tank or pump room entry.\nThe vessel was not equipped with sufficient operational person H2S gas monitors for personnel involved in\ncargo and / or bunker operations where the cargo or bunkers were known or suspected of having a high\nH2S content.\nThere was no inventory available of the portable and personal gas measurement instruments, spare parts\nand test gases carried on board.\nRecords of the testing, maintenance and calibration of the portable and personal gas measurement\ninstruments required in accordance with the SMS and the manufacturers’ maintenance and operation\nmanuals were missing or incomplete.\nThe date when each disposable personal gas monitor was first commissioned was not recorded in order to\nestablish their expiry date.\nDisposable personal gas monitors were in use past their expiry date.\nManuals, in the working language of the ship, were not available for each item of portable and personal gas\nmeasurement instruments carried on board.\nThere were insufficient test gases available for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments.\nTest gases available on board were unsuitable for the portable and personal gas measurement instruments\ncarried.\nAn incorrect test gas had been used to test a portable instrument.\nRecords indicated the manufacturers’ recommended intervals for servicing the equipment and/or for the\nreplacement of parts such as filters had not been observed.\nDo not make a written observation where portable or personal gas detecting equipment was defective or out of\nservice, providing:\n• The vessel carried sufficient operational equipment to meet regulatory and operational requirements.\n• •\nDefective equipment was clearly marked as out of service.\nDefective equipment had been reported within the defect reporting system.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.2.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for testing", "c": "the atmosphere in double-hull and double bottom spaces for flammable gas, and were\nrecords available to confirm that appropriate measurements had been taken using the\nequipment fitted to, or provided on, the vessel?\nShort Question Text\nTesting the atmosphere in double-hull and double bottom spaces for flammable gas\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that structural failures between cargo tanks adjacent to ballast tanks and void spaces of doublehull and double-bottom spaces are promptly detected.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.3.4 Monitoring of Void and Ballast Spaces.\nVoid and ballast spaces in the cargo tank block should be regularly monitored for leaks from nearby tanks. Monitoring\nshould include regular atmosphere checks for hydrocarbon content and regular sounding/ullaging of the empty\nspaces.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.7.2.1 Suitable portable instruments for measuring oxygen and flammable vapor concentrations on double hull\nspaces and double-bottom spaces shall be provided...\n5.7.2.2 Where the atmosphere in double-hull spaces cannot be reliably measured using flexible gas sampling hoses,\nsuch spaces shall be fitted with permanent gas sampling lines...\n5.7.3.1 ... oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above, constructed after 01 January 2012, shall be provided with a fixed\nhydrocarbon gas detecting system complying with the Fire Safety System Code for measuring hydrocarbon gas\nconcentrations in all ballast tanks and void spaces of double-hull and double-bottom spaces adjacent to cargo tanks,\nincluding the forepeak tank…\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 16 – Fixed hydrocarbon gas detection systems\n2.1.2 The system shall be comprised of a central unit to gas measurement and analysis and gas sampling pipes in all\nballast tanks and void spaces of double-hull and double-bottom spaces adjacent to the cargo tanks, including the\nforepeak tank and any other tanks and spaces under the bulkhead deck adjacent to cargo tanks.\n2.2.1.3 The configuration of gas sampling lines shall be adapted to the design and size of each space. Except as\nprovided in paragraphs 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.1.5. the sampling system shall allow for a minimum of two hydrocarbon gas\nsampling points, one located on the lower and one on the upper part where sampling is required.\n2.2.3.2 means shall be provided to enable measurements with portable instruments in case the fixed system is out of\norder or for system calibration. In case the system is out of order, procedures shall be in place to continue to monitor\nthe atmosphere with portable instruments and to record the measurement results.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which described:\n• •\n• •\n• The method and frequency of detecting and monitoring flammable gas concentrations in double hull , double\nbottom and void spaces applicable to the vessel type and considering the equipment fitted on, or provided\nto, the vessel.\nThe requirement to record the measurement results obtained from monitoring the double hull, double bottom\nand void spaces required to be protected, with portable instruments.\nThe requirement to record the periods during which a fixed hydrocarbon gas detection system was\nmonitoring the double hull, double bottom and void spaces required to be protected.\nThe action to be taken when hydrocarbon/flammable gas is detected in double-hull, double-bottom or void\nspaces.\nThe action to take if the fixed hydrocarbon gas detection system is defective.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for detecting and monitoring flammable gas\nconcentrations in double-hull, double-bottom and void spaces.\nReview the records of flammable gas measurements in double-hull and double-bottom spaces and verify\nthat tests had been completed in accordance with company procedures.\nWhere a vessel is required to be fitted with a fixed hydrocarbon gas detecting system in accordance with the\nFSS Code, verify that sensors were isolated consistent with the ballast level in the individual tanks.\nWhere a vessel was fitted with a fixed flammable gas detecting system outside the requirement of the FSS\nCode, verify that manual gas measurements were made in accordance with company procedures whenever\na sensor was isolated due to ballast water content within a tank.\nReview the operation of the fixed flammable gas detecting system, where fitted, and confirm that the system\nwas fully operational with flammable gas alarm settings in accordance with the guidance provided under\n2.2.3.3 of the FSS Code. (not more than 30% of the lower flammable limit).\nReview the fixed gas detecting system sensor calibration record and verify that calibration had been\ncompleted in accordance with company procedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for detecting and monitoring flammable gas concentrations in double-hull, doublebottom and void spaces.\nRecords to demonstrate that hydrocarbon gas measurements had been undertaken in accordance with the\ncompany procedure.\nRecords to demonstrate that the fixed gas detecting system, where fitted, had been in continuous operation\nand where individual tank sensors, or groups of sensors, had been isolated, the times of isolation and\nreconnection.\nCalibration records for the fixed gas detecting system sensor(s).\nIncident investigation reports where flammable gas had been detected in ballast tanks and void spaces of\ndouble-hull and double-bottom spaces adjacent to the cargo tanks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the process and frequency for testing double-hull, doublebottom and void spaces. for hydrocarbon gas accumulation.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for monitoring double-hull,\ndouble-bottom and void spaces for hydrocarbon gas accumulation.\nRecords, or absence of records, indicated that gas measurements had not been taken and recorded in\naccordance with company procedures.\nRecords, or absence of records, indicated that fixed gas detector tank sensors had been isolated without\nappropriate manual gas measurements being taken in accordance with company procedures.\nThe fixed gas detecting system fitted to the vessel was defective in any way.\nThe fixed gas detector sensors had not been calibrated and/or the flammable gas alarm had not been set in\naccordance with company procedures.\nThere was no functioning portable flammable gas detector available to take manual gas readings.\nFlammable gasses had been detected in double-hull, double-bottom or void spaces as a result of a\nstructural defect within the previous twelve months.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fixed gas detection systems required by the IGC Code, and was the\nequipment in good working order, regularly maintained and calibrated?\nShort Question Text\nFixed gas detection systems required by the IGC Code\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel staff can detect unintentional releases or leaks from the cargo system.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.11.5 Gas detection systems\nReleases of flammable or toxic gases pose an immediate threat to both personnel and equipment. It is necessary to\ndetect accidental discharge as early as possible to avoid the possibility of confined or partially confined vapour cloud\nexplosions, flash fires and the presence of asphyxiating chemical gases…\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: IGC Code\n13.6 Gas detection\n13.6.1 Gas detection equipment shall be installed to monitor the integrity of the cargo containment, cargo handling\nand ancillary systems, in accordance with this section.\n13.6.2 A permanently installed system of gas detection and audible and visual alarms shall be fitted in:\n1.\n2.\nall enclosed cargo and cargo machinery spaces (including turrets compartments) containing gas piping, gas\nequipment or gas consumers.\nother enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces where cargo vapours may accumulate, including interbarrier\nspaces and hold spaces for independent tanks other than type C tanks.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nspaces in gas-fired internal combustion engines, referred to in 16.7.3.3.\nventilation hoods and gas ducts required by chapter 16.\ncooling/heating circuits, as required by 7.8.4.\ninert gas generator supply headers; and\nmotor rooms for cargo handling machinery.\n13.6.3 Gas detection equipment shall be designed, installed and tested in accordance with recognized standards and\nshall be suitable for the cargoes to be carried in accordance with column \"f\" in table of chapter\n19.\n13.6.4 Where indicated by an “A” in column \"f\" in the table of chapter 19 ships certified for carriage of non-flammable\nproducts, oxygen deficiency monitoring shall be fitted in cargo machinery spaces and hold spaces for independent\ntanks other than type C tanks. Furthermore, oxygen deficiency monitoring equipment shall be installed in enclosed or\nsemi-enclosed spaces containing equipment that may cause an oxygen-deficient environment such as nitrogen\ngenerators, inert gas generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant systems.\n13.6.5 In the case of toxic products or both toxic and flammable products, except when column \"i\" in the table of\nchapter 19 refers to 17.5.3, portable equipment can be used for the detection of toxic products as an alternative to a\npermanently installed system. This equipment shall be used prior to personnel entering the spaces listed in 13.6.2\nand at 30-minute intervals while they remain in the space.\n13.6.6 In the case of gases classified as toxic products, hold spaces and interbarrier spaces shall be provided with a\npermanently installed piping system for obtaining gas samples from the spaces. Gas from these spaces shall be\nsampled and analysed from each sampling head location.\n13.6.7 Permanently installed gas detection shall be of the continuous detection type, capable of immediate response.\nWhere not used to activate safety shutdown functions required by 13.6.9 and chapter 16, sampling type detection\nmay be accepted.\n13.6.8 When sampling type gas detection equipment is used, the following requirements shall be met:\n1.\nthe gas detection equipment shall be capable of sampling and analysing for each sampling head location\nsequentially at intervals not exceeding 30 min...\n13.6.9 The gas detection equipment may be located in a non-hazardous space, provided that the detection\nequipment such as sample piping, sample pumps, solenoids and analysing units are located in a fully enclosed steel\ncabinet with the door sealed by a gasket. The atmosphere within the enclosure shall be continuously monitored. At\ngas concentrations above 30% lower flammable limit (LFL) inside the enclosure, the gas detection equipment shall be\nautomatically shut down.\n13.6.13 Any alarms status within a gas detection system required by this section shall initiate an audible and visible\nalarm:\n1.\n2.\n3.\non the navigation bridge.\nat the relevant control station(s) where continuous monitoring of the gas levels is recorded; and\nat the gas detector readout location.\n13.6.14 In the case of flammable products, the gas detection equipment provided for hold spaces and interbarrier\nspaces that are required to be inerted shall be capable of measuring gas concentrations of 0% to 100% by volume.\n13.6.15 Alarms shall be activated when the vapour concentration by volume reaches the equivalent of 30% LFL in air.\n13.6.16 For membrane containment systems, the primary and secondary insulation spaces shall be able to be inerted\nand their gas content analysed individually. The alarm in the secondary insulation space shall be set in accordance\nwith 13.6.15, that in the primary space is set at a value approved by the Administration or recognized organization\nacting on its behalf.\n13.6.17 For other spaces described by 13.6.2, alarms shall be activated when the vapour concentration reaches 30%\nLFL and safety functions required by chapter 16 shall be activated before the vapour concentration reaches 60% LFL.\nThe crankcases of internal combustion engines that can run on gas shall be arranged to alarm before 100%\nLFL.\n13.6.18 Gas detection equipment shall be so designed that it may readily be tested. Testing and calibration shall be\ncarried out at regular intervals. Suitable equipment for this purpose shall be carried on board and be used in\naccordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Permanent connections for such test equipment shall be\nfitted.\n13.6.19 Every ship shall be provided with at least two sets of portable gas detection equipment that meet the\nrequirement of 13.6.3 or an acceptable national or international standard.\n13.6.20 A suitable instrument for the measurement of oxygen levels in inert atmospheres shall be provided.\n13.7 Additional requirements for containment systems requiring a secondary barrier\n13.7.1 Integrity of barriers\nWhere a secondary barrier is required, permanently installed instrumentation shall be provided to detect when the\nprimary barrier fails to be liquid-tight at any location or when liquid cargo is in contact with the secondary barrier at\nany location. This instrumentation shall consist of appropriate gas detecting devices according to 13.6. However, the\ninstrumentation need not be capable of locating the area where liquid cargo leaks through the primary barrier or\nwhere liquid cargo is in contact with the secondary barrier.\nInspection Guidance\nDepending upon the cargoes to be carried, vessels operating under the IGC Code must be fitted with fixed systems\nfor:\n• •\n• Flammable vapour detection\nToxic vapour detection\nOxygen deficiency detection (for asphyxiant cargoes including nitrogen and carbon dioxide)\nHowever, toxic vapour detection can be provided by portable instruments, except when carrying cargoes requiring a\ntype 1G ship, including sulphur dioxide, methyl bromide, ethylene oxide and chlorine.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and maintenance of the fixed gas detecting\nsystems required under the IGC Code which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The required frequency of fixed gas detector sensor calibration in accordance with the manufacturer's\ninstructions.\nThe required frequency of verification of the alarm and automated shut down activation point (where fitted)\nsettings for each sensor location.\nThe required frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms on the bridge, in the relevant control station\nand at the gas detector read out station.\nThe required frequency of testing the automated gas safety system shut down arrangements, where fitted.\nThe identification of portable gas detecting equipment supplied to meet the requirements of the IGC code.\nWhere the vessel was utilizing portable gas detecting equipment to meet the requirements of the IGC code,\nthe routine gas monitoring that was required to be undertaken and included:\no Locations subject to routine monitoring for toxic gases.\no The required frequency of routine monitoring for toxic gases.\no The method of recording the gas measurements obtained.\nThe action to take in the circumstances that the fixed gas detection system was defective in any respect.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and maintenance of the fixed\ngas detecting systems required under the IGC code.\nInspect the central control station for the fixed gas detection systems and verify that:\no The fixed gas detecting systems were monitoring all sensors provided.\no There were no fault alarms showing for either the systems or individual sensors.\no The value shown by each sensor was normal based on the location and atmosphere being\nsampled.\no The alarm set points for each sensor had been adjusted to the requirements of the IGC code and\nthe company procedure.\no Where a sensor was sampling from an inert atmosphere, the alarm set points had been adjusted to\nactivate when the vapour concentration by volume reached the equivalent of 30% LFL in air.\no Where the vessel could carry different grades of cargo, the individual alarm sensor set points had\nbeen adjusted to reflect the cargo being carried at the time.\nReview the calibration data available at the central control station and verify:\no The individual sensors had been calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and\ncompany procedure.\no The alarm set points had been confirmed as correct.\no The automatic shutdown set points, where applicable, had been confirmed as correct.\nSight the list of portable gas detecting equipment provided to comply with the IGC code and verify the\nequipment was available.\nReview the inventory of calibration gases and equipment and verify that sufficient materials were onboard to\nconduct sensor calibrations in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.\nWhere the vessel was utilising portable gas detecting equipment to comply with the monitoring of toxic\ngases, verify that routine gas measurements had been taken and recorded in accordance with the company\nprocedure.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying or responsible officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of\nthe fixed gas detecting system.\nThe maintenance and calibration of portable gas detecting equipment required under the IGC code is dealt with in a\nseparate question.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation and maintenance of the fixed gas detecting systems required\nunder the IGC code.\nInspection, calibration and maintenance records for the fixed gas detection systems.\nThe list of fixed gas detector sensors and the corresponding alarm (and where appropriate, automatic\nshutdown) set points.\nThe manufacturer's calibration instructions for the fixed gas detecting systems and sensors.\nWhere the vessel was utilising portable gas detecting equipment to comply with the IGC code, the records of\nroutine toxic gas monitoring measurements.\nThe list of portable gas detector equipment carried to comply with the IGC code.\nThe inventory of sensor calibration gases and equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the operation and maintenance of the fixed gas detecting systems\nrequired by the IGC code.\nThe fixed gas detection systems required by the IGC code were:\no Not monitoring all sensors provided by the systems.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\no\no\nIndicating a system fault.\nIndicating that one or more sensors was defective.\nThe alarm (and, where appropriate, automated shut down) set points for each fixed gas detector sensor\nwere not set as required by the IGC code or the company procedure.\nFixed gas detector sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's instructions and\ncompany procedures.\nFixed gas detector sensor alarms set points had not been adjusted to the appropriate value corresponding\nto the cargo being carried.\nThe calibration gases available onboard were either of the incorrect type or out of date.\nCalibration equipment required to conduct sensor calibration in accordance with the manufacturer's\ninstructions was not available onboard.\nThe gas detection equipment was located in a non-hazardous space, but the steel enclosure was not\ncapable of being sealed or was routinely left open.\nPortable gas detecting equipment required to be carried in accordance with the IGC code was not available.\nWhere portable gas detecting equipment had been used to comply with the requirements of the IGC code,\nthere were no records available for the routine gas monitoring required to be undertaken in accordance with\ncompany procedures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s fixed gas detection\nsystems.\nThe accompanying or responsible officer was not familiar with the calibration procedure for the fixed gas\ndetection systems.\nThe maintenance plan did not include the vessel’s fixed gas detection systems or all the required\ninspections, tests, and maintenance, including calibrations.\nRecords of inspections, tests, maintenance and calibrations carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the vessel’s fixed gas detection systems indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in\nfact taken place.\nThe fixed gas detecting systems required by the IGC code were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the vessel’s fixed gas detection system required by the IGF Code, and was the\nequipment in good working order, regularly maintained and calibrated in accordance\nwith company procedures and manufacturer’s instructions?\nShort Question Text\nFixed gas detection system required by the IGF Code\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGF Code\nIMO: A 31/Res.1140 Survey guidelines under the harmonized system of survey and certification (HSSC)\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel is protected from the consequences of unintentional releases or leaks from the gas\nor other low-flashpoint fuel system.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: A 31/Res.1140 Survey guidelines under the harmonized system of survey and certification (HSSC)\n(Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate, Annual Survey)\n2.2.5.5 confirming the availability of test and calibration records of the gas detection systems (IGF Code ch.15).\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company\nIMO: IGF Code.\n15.8 Regulations for gas detection\n15.8.1 Permanently installed gas detectors shall be fitted in:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nthe tank connection spaces.\nall ducts around fuel pipes.\nmachinery spaces containing gas piping, gas equipment or gas consumers.\ncompressor rooms and fuel preparation rooms.\nother enclosed spaces containing fuel piping or other fuel equipment without ducting.\nother enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces where fuel vapours may accumulate including interbarrier spaces\nand fuel storage hold spaces of independent tanks other than type C.\ngas heating circuit expansion tanks.\n8.\n9.\nmotor rooms associated with the fuel systems; and\nat ventilation inlets to accommodation and machinery spaces if required based on the risk assessment\nrequired in 4.2.\n15.8.6 An audible and visible alarm shall be activated at a gas vapour concentration of 20% of the lower explosion\nlimit (LEL). The safety system shall be activated at 40% of LEL at two detectors (Table 1 Footnote 1 Two\nindependent gas detectors located close to each other are required for redundancy reasons. If the gas detector is of\nself-monitoring type the installation of a single gas detector can be permitted.).\n15.8.7 For ventilated ducts around gas pipes in the machinery spaces containing gas-fuelled engines, the alarm limit\ncan be set to 30% LEL. The safety system shall be activated at 60% of LEL at two detectors (15.2.2 a gas safety\nsystem shall be arranged to close down the gas supply system automatically, upon failure in systems as described in\ntable 1 and upon other fault conditions which may develop too fast for manual intervention).\n15.8.8 Audible and visible alarms from the gas detection equipment shall be located on the navigation bridge or in the\ncontinuously manned central control station.\n15.8.9 Gas detection required by this section shall be continuous without delay.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and maintenance of the fixed gas detecting\nsystem required under the IGF Code which defined:\n• •\n• •\nThe frequency of gas sensor calibration.\nThe frequency of verification of the alarm and shut down activation point for each sensor.\nThe frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms on the bridge or in the continuously manned central\ncontrol station.\nThe frequency of testing the automated gas safety system shut down arrangements.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the operation and maintenance\nrequirements for the fixed gas detecting system required by the IGF Code.\nInspect the central control station for the gas detection system and verify that:\no The gas detecting system was fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\no The alarm activation set point for a selected sensor was in accordance with the IGF code\nrequirements.\nReview the inspection and calibration data available at the central control station and verify that:\no Sensor calibration had been completed at the defined frequency.\no Safety system shut down tests had been completed at the required frequency.\nInspect the calibration gas used to calibrate/test the gas detector sensors and verify that it met the\nspecifications as defined by the manufacturer.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and calibration of the\nfixed gas detecting system.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedure which defined the requirements for operating and testing the fixed gas detecting\nsystem required under the IGF Code.\n• •\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the fixed gas detecting system.\nThe Inspection, calibration and maintenance records for the fixed gas detection system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the requirements for operating and testing the fixed gas\ndetecting system required under the IGF Code.\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan did not include the fixed gas detecting system required under the IGF Code.\nThe maintenance plan did not define the frequency of sensor calibration and automated gas safety system\nshut down tests.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for the operation and maintenance\nof the fixed gas detection system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the maintenance plan tasks for fixed gas detector sensor\ncalibration or gas safety system shut down tests.\nThe fixed gas detecting system sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with the maintenance plan.\nThe calibration gas used for calibrating the sensors did not meet the manufacturer’s specification or was out\nof date.\nRecords of inspections, tests, maintenance and calibrations were incomplete.\nThe audible and visible alarms located on the navigation bridge or in the continuously manned central\ncontrol station had not been tested in accordance with the company procedure.\nThe fixed gas detector alarm or automatic shutdown activation set points were not in accordance with the\nrequirements of the IGF Code.\nOne or more gas detector sensors were out of service.\nOne or more gas detector sensors were inhibited or disconnected from the sampling sequence.\nThe fixed gas detecting system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation and maintenance of the", "c": "cargo pump room fixed gas detection system, and was the equipment fully operational\nwith sensors calibrated and alarm activation points set in accordance with company\nprocedures and manufacturer's instructions?\nShort Question Text\nCargo pump room fixed gas detection system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1120 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2\nThe FSS Code\nThe FTP Code and related fire test procedures.\nObjective\nTo ensure that measures specifically designed to prevent fire in the pumproom are effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.14.7\nThe safety of pump rooms can be enhanced in a number of other ways, some of which are mandatory for certain\nships:\nA fixed gas detection system capable of continuously monitoring for hydrocarbon, oxygen and toxic gases. Where\nsuch equipment is fitted, procedures should be developed to ensure it is regularly inspected and calibrated.\nProcedures should also be developed for the action to take when an alarm is triggered, especially for vacating the\nspace and stopping the cargo pumps. Whenever practicable, gas detection should monitor a number of levels within\nthe pump room, not just the lower area.\nA fixed sampling arrangement to monitor oxygen content within the pump room from the deck by a portable meter\nbefore entering the pump room. Where such an arrangement is fitted, it should ensure that remote parts of the pump\nroom can be monitored.\n2.6.1.3\nThe following onboard maintenance should be carried out monthly and after any fault condition:\n• •\n• Visual inspection\nTesting audible and visual alarms\nSpan gas checking\nAdditional maintenance should be carried out as specified by the manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe maintenance and testing described above should be included in the tanker’s maintenance plan.\nIf a fixed gas detection system should fail, manual checks should be made.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nPart IV Chapter 3 paragraph 2. Gas detection systems:\n2.1 Design requirements\n.9 sample gas should be provided with or connected to the analysing unit for regular calibration, otherwise calibration\nrecords carried out by a specialist should be kept on board.\n2.2 The setting value:\n.1 audible and visual alarms should be activated by the hydrocarbon gas with the concentration of a pre-set level\nwhich is no higher than 10% of the lower flammable limit (LFL);\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.10 Protection of cargo pump-rooms\n5.10.1 In tankers:\n.3 a system for continuous monitoring of the concentration of hydrocarbon gases shall be fitted. Sampling points or\ndetector heads shall be located in suitable positions in order that potentially dangerous leakages are readily detected.\nWhen the hydrocarbon gas concentration reaches a pre-set level which shall not be higher than 10% of the lower\nflammable limit, a continuous audible and visual alarm signal shall be automatically effected in the pump-room,\nengine control room, cargo control room and navigation bridge to alert personnel to the potential hazard.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 14\nIn addition to the fire protection systems and appliances listed in paragraph 2.2.3, tankers shall develop a\nmaintenance plan for:\n3.1 fire safety arrangements in cargo pump rooms.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1120 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2, The FSS Code, The FTP Code and related\nfire test procedures.\nSOLAS II-2/4.5.10.1.3\nMonitoring the concentration of hydrocarbon gases in cargo pump-rooms on oil tankers\n1. Sequential sampling is acceptable as long as it is dedicated for the pump room only, including exhaust ducts, and\nthe sampling time is reasonably short.\n2. Detection positions are the zones where air circulation is reduced (e.g. recessed corners).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and maintenance of the cargo pump room\ngas detection system which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The actions to be taken in the event of the activation of a pump room flammable or toxic gas alarm.\nThe actions to be taken in the event of a low oxygen alarm.\nThe frequency of the pump room hydrocarbon gas detection sensor calibration.\nThe process to verify that the hydrocarbon alarm point setting values were correct when changing cargo\ntype.\nThe frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms required on the bridge, in the cargo control room\nand/or in the pump room as appropriate.\nThe calibration interval and alarm activation values where the gas detection system was additionally fitted\nwith oxygen and/or toxic gas detectors.\nThe actions to take in the event that the pump room gas detection system fails.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for the operation and maintenance of the cargo\npump room fixed gas detection system.\nInspect the central control station for the pump room fixed gas detection system and verify that:\no The gas detection system was fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\no The alarm activation setting for a selected hydrocarbon sensor was in accordance with the SOLAS\nrequirement of not greater than 10% LFL.\no The alarm activation setting for selected oxygen and toxic gas sensors, where fitted, were in\naccordance with the company procedure.\nReview the inspection and calibration data for the gas detection system available in the cargo control room\nand verify that:\no Each gas detection sensor had been calibrated at the frequency defined by the company.\no The hydrocarbon gas alarm activation set point for each sensor had been verified as being\nappropriate to the cargo being carried.\no The audible and visual alarms in the pump room, the cargo control room and on the bridge had\nbeen tested at the frequency defined by the company.\no Calibration of each sensor had been carried out with an appropriate span gas in accordance with\nthe manufacturer’s instructions.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and calibration of the\ncargo pump room fixed gas detection system.\nFor this question the sensors fitted in the exhaust ducts should not be considered, as any gas going into the ducts is\nheavily diluted and provides a false sense of security if the gas alarm for the duct is set to a level similar to that for the\npump room sensors.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the maintenance and operation of the cargo pumproom gas detection system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the pumproom fixed gas detection system.\nThe maintenance and calibration records for the cargo pumproom gas detection system.\nWhere the fixed gas detection system was out of service, records of manual atmosphere measurements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the maintenance and operation of the pumproom gas detection\nsystem.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation and maintenance of the pumproom gas\ndetection system.\nThe alarm activation point of one or more hydrocarbon gas sensors was more than 10% LFL.\nThe gas detection sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions at the\nfrequency defined by the company.\nThe audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room, pumproom and on the bridge had not been tested\nat the frequency defined by the company.\nThe calibration gas used for calibration of the hydrocarbon, toxic gas or oxygen sensors was out of date or\nnot appropriate for use with the system.\nOne or more hydrocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxygen sensors were out of service.\nOne or more hydrocarbon gas, toxic gas or oxygen sensors were inhibited or disconnected from the\nsampling sequence.\nThe gas detection system was defective in any respect.\nWhere the pumproom gas detection system was out of service, there was no record of manual atmosphere\nmeasurements having been taken.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.6.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the operation and maintenance of the", "c": "oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert\ngas system, and was the equipment fully operational with sensors calibrated and alarm\nactivation points set in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer's\ninstructions?\nShort Question Text\nOxygen sensors in inert gas system spaces.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that entry into the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas plant is always made safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n10.4.3 Risk from inert gas including nitrogen\nIG produced from boiler flue gas, or an IG generator, may contain carbon monoxide (CO) and CO2, both of which can\ncause death.\nCO is a toxic gas that may be present in cargo tank atmospheres after gas freeing and in spaces containing\ncomponents of the IG plant.\nCO2 is not toxic but is a smothering hazard. Adequate ventilation is required to maintain a normal oxygen level in air\nof 21% by volume in the space and to eliminate any hazard.\nNitrogen is a colourless and odourless gas that will cause oxygen deficiency in confined spaces, and at exhaust\nopenings on deck, during the purging of tanks and void spaces.\nPeople exposed to nitrogen gas are not aware of any danger and may even feel a state of euphoria before they lose\nthe stimulus to breathe and are asphyxiated. Exposure to high concentrations of nitrogen is usually fatal unless\nimmediate action is taken.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.1.2 Inert gas system includes inert gas systems using flue gas, inert gas generators, and nitrogen generators and\nmeans the inert gas plant and inert gas distribution together with means for preventing backflow of cargo gases to\nmachinery spaces, fixed and portable measuring instruments and control devices.\n2.2.4.5.4 Two oxygen sensors shall be positioned at appropriate locations in the space or spaces containing the inert\ngas system. If the oxygen level falls below 19%, these sensors shall trigger alarms, which shall be both visible and\naudible inside and outside the space or spaces and shall be placed in such a position that they are immediately\nreceived by responsible members of the crew.\nTMSA 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including contractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and maintenance of the oxygen sensors\nand associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system which described:\n• •\n• •\nThe frequency of testing the audible and visual alarms.\nThe calibration interval and alarm activation values for the oxygen sensors.\nThe actions to take in the event that the oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms fitted in the space, or\nspaces, containing the inert gas system fail.\nThe actions to be taken in the event of a low oxygen alarm.\nThis question will be allocated to all oil and chemical tankers:\n• •\n• Fitted with an inert gas system, and\nConstructed on or after 1 January 2016, or\nWhere the vessel was constructed before 1 January 2016, but the oxygen sensors referred to in the FSS\ncode had been fitted.\nIn the case that the vessel was constructed before 2016 but was fitted with the oxygen sensors, the vessel operator\nshould have declared this as follows:\n• •\n• Oil Tankers: HVPQ question 9.15.5\nOil/chemical tankers: HVPQ question 9.15.5\nChemical tankers: through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that described the calibration, testing and\nmaintenance of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the\ninert gas system.\n• •\n• •\nInspect the control panel for the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces,\ncontaining the inert gas system and verify that:\no The oxygen sensors and alarms were fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\no The alarm activation setting for the oxygen sensors was in accordance with the company\nprocedure.\nReview the inspection and calibration data for the oxygen sensors and verify that:\no Each oxygen sensor had been calibrated at the frequency defined by the company.\no The calibration of each sensor had been carried out with an appropriate span gas in accordance\nwith the manufacturer’s instructions.\no The audible and visual alarms had been tested at the frequency defined by the company.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and calibration of the\noxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the maintenance and operation of the oxygen sensors and associated alarms\nfitted in the space or spaces containing the inert gas system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the oxygen sensors and associated alarms fitted in the space, or\nspaces, containing the inert gas system.\nThe maintenance and calibration records for the oxygen sensors fitted in the space, or spaces, containing\nthe inert gas system.\nWhere the fixed oxygen sensor(s) were out of service, records of manual atmosphere measurements prior\nto, and during, entry to the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system while the inert gas system was\nin operation.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure describing the maintenance and operation of the oxygen sensors and\nassociated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation and maintenance of the oxygen sensors and\nassociated alarms fitted in the space, or spaces, containing the inert gas system.\nThe oxygen sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions at the frequency\ndefined by the company.\nThe audible and visual alarms had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.\nThe calibration gas used for calibration of the oxygen sensors was out of date or not appropriate for use with\nthe system.\nOne or more oxygen sensors were out of service.\nOne or more oxygen sensors were inhibited or disconnected from the sampling sequence.\nThe oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms were defective in any respect.\nWhere the oxygen sensors and/or associated alarms fitted in the space or spaces containing the inert gas\nsystem were out of service, there was no record of manual atmosphere measurements having been taken\nprior to, and during, entry to the space, or spaces, while the inert gas system was in operation.\n5.7. Safety Management", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.1.", "t": "Had all onboard incidents been reported and investigated in accordance with", "c": "company procedures, and was an incident investigation report or a summarised lessons\nlearned bulletin available for each incident at or above a defined threshold?\nShort Question Text\nIncident investigation reports for defined incidents\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Pre-board\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents (first edition 2018)\nObjective\nTo ensure that seafarers can learn from incidents which occurred onboard their vessel to improve safety and\npollution prevention standards.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF / INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents. First Edition 2018.\nPurpose and Scope\nThe shipping industry has worked hard in recent years to eliminate personal injuries and reduce damage to the\nenvironment and assets. Though we have taken big steps towards ensuring that each day ends safely for everybody\nin our industry, we still need to do more.\nIn particular, we must make sure that we learn the lessons from incidents. Following any incident, we have\nprogrammes and procedures for investigating what happened and why. The point of this work is that we learn from\nwhat happened and do all we can to ensure that it doesn't happen again.\nThis information paper outlines the most effective ways that vessel operators can share the lessons that we learn\nfrom incident investigations.\nTMSA KPI 8.1.4 requires that procedures ensure that incidents are investigated and analysed.\nCorrective and preventative actions are identified and implemented.\nThe investigation and analysis is sufficiently detailed to accurately establish the root causes of the incident with the\nobjective of improving safety and pollution prevention.\nActions are identified to prevent reoccurrence.\nIMO: ISM Code\n9 Reports and Analysis of Non-conformities, Accidents and Hazardous Occurrences\n9.1 The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are\nreported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.\n9.2 The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action, including measures\nintended to prevent recurrence\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that all onboard incidents are reported and\nsubsequently investigated by personnel at an appropriate level of management, which may include the Flag\nAdministration, to accurately establish the root causes of the incident with the objective of improving safety and\npollution prevention.\nThe procedures should define what is considered to be an incident and should include, but not necessarily be limited\nto:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• A pollution incident that resulted in release to the environment of any substance covered by MARPOL Annex\nI, II, IV, V and VI in excess of that permitted by the applicable regulations.\nAn uncontrolled release of LNG/LPG vapour.\nA grounding incident where the vessel had:\no Been hard aground.\no Touched bottom.\no Been suspected of touching bottom.\nA collision/allision with another vessel irrespective of whether damage had been caused to either vessel.\nAn allision with a fixed or floating structure or navigation mark irrespective of whether damage had been\ncaused to the vessel or the fixed or floating structure or navigation mark.\nAn allision with a terminal during a berthing manoeuvre which resulted in damage to either the vessel or the\nterminal structure.\nA breach of the hull plating which did not result in flooding.\nTotal loss of main propulsion/blackout while navigating in open waters.\nPartial loss of main propulsion while navigating in open waters.\nTotal loss of main propulsion/blackout while navigating in territorial waters or within 12 miles of land.\nPartial loss of main propulsion while navigating in territorial waters or within 12 miles of land.\nBlackout while at a berth or at anchor.\nTotal loss, even momentarily, of steering capability at any time while the vessel was underway.\nContained hydrocarbon/chemical spill greater than 1.0m3 anywhere onboard (deck, pumproom, machinery\nspaces, mooring deck, etc.).\nLoss of one or both anchors.\nDamage to a windlass restricting the ability to recover an anchor without repairs.\nMooring tail/line (ship supplied) failure while moored at a conventional/CBM berth or while conducting STS\noperations.\nBreak out/away from a berth resulting in the vessel being out of the normal operating envelope for the\nMarine Loading Arms (MLA) or hoses.\nCargo hose crane wire failure while connecting or disconnecting hoses at a terminal.\nAccommodation ladder hoisting wire failure.\nNotification of an investigation into an alleged violation of international regulations such as MARPOL /\nCOLREGS.\nStructural or pipeline system failure causing migration of liquid within or between the cargo, ballast or bunker\nspaces.\nContamination of ballast water by hydraulic oil.\nFlooding of any space directly from the sea.\nFire or Explosion anywhere onboard.\nA work related lost time injury.\nA work related fatality.\nDefinitions for the purpose of this question:\n• Total loss of main propulsion: The main propulsion unit(s) shut down without warning, even momentarily.\n• •\nPartial loss of main propulsion: The vessel needed to slow down or stop for repairs or reset equipment to\nregain full manoeuvrability and/or propulsive power.\nTotal blackout: The main generating plant stopped providing electrical power to the main switchboard, even\nmomentarily.\nThe vessel operator should provide brief details of any of the incidents listed above which had occurred during the\neighteen months prior to the inspection through:\nThe Harmonised Vessel Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ):\n• •\n• 1.8.4 Has ship been involved in a pollution incident during the past 12 months?\n1.8.5 Has ship been involved in a grounding incident during the past 12 months?\n1.8.6 Has ship been involved in a collision during the past 12 months?\nThe Pre-inspection Questionnaire (PIQ).\nThe PIQ will prompt data entry for each incident type listed in the guidance notes as follows:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nHas an incident of this type occurred during the previous 18 months. Yes/No/multiple.\nIf multiple, how many events.\nIf yes or multiple, what was the date of the incident(s)\nHas the incident investigation been completed. Yes/No\nHas the incident investigation report been uploaded to the SIRE incident database? Yes/no.\nWhere an incident investigation is ongoing provide the date when the report is expected to be completed.\nThe data provided through the HVPQ and PIQ will be extracted and inserted in the inspection editor and final\ninspection report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the incidents reported through the HVPQ and the PIQ and verify that either an incident investigation\nreport or a lesson learned bulletin was available onboard for each reported incident where the vessel\noperator had declared that the incident investigation had been completed.\nReview the onboard system for recording and tracking incident and near-miss reports and verify that the\nincident data provided by the vessel operator through the HVPQ and PIQ included all incident information\nrequested.\nThe inspector is not required or expected to comment on the quality of the incident investigation report or\nlessons learned bulletins.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures that required incidents and near-misses were promptly reported and investigated.\nThe system for tracking incident and near-miss reports to closure.\nIncident investigation reports or lessons learned for any of the incident types listed in the guidance notes\nwhich had occurred during the 12 months prior to the inspection.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There was no incident investigation report or lessons learned bulletin available onboard for one or more of\nthe incidents reported through the HVPQ or PIQ, unless the vessel operator had declared that the incident\ninvestigation was ongoing.\n• There was evidence that the vessel had been involved in one of the incident types listed in the inspection\nguidance during the 12 months prior to the inspection but the incident had not been reported though the\nHVPQ and/or the PIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company incident and nearmiss reporting procedure and was evidence available to demonstrate that incidents and", "c": "near-misses had been investigated and closed out in accordance with the company\nprocedure?\nShort Question Text\nIncident and near-miss reporting procedure\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7 Guidance on near-miss reporting\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 Revised guidelines for the operational implementation of the international safety\nmanagement (ISM) code by companies\nOCIMF/INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents (first edition 2018)\nObjective\nTo ensure that seafarers can learn from incidents and near-misses onboard their vessel to improve safety\nand pollution prevention.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF / INTERTANKO: Sharing Lessons Learned from Incidents (First edition 2018)\n1.1 Background: why we need guidelines\nVessel operators have different ways of managing the lessons learned from incidents. Some have detailed\nprogrammes, while some use simpler procedures. In either case, an operator’s response will have evolved over time\nto suit its own organisational structure and needs.\nWhile each of these programmes has its pros and cons, we felt we needed to assemble a clear and universal set of\nguidelines that operators could follow in order to share the lessons that these programmes expose. The big\nadvantage for operators of following the guidelines is that no matter what programme you use, they will help you get\nthe full value of the resources you spend on investigating incidents.\nMost importantly, the guidelines will ensure that lessons learned are meaningful to the people who matter most – the\ncrew and other staff. This in turn will help you to prevent repeat incidents and to promote a working culture that prizes\nsafety.\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7 Guidance on near-miss reporting\n1.1 Companies should investigate near-misses as a regulatory requirement under the Hazardous Occurrences part of\nthe ISM Code.\n2.1 Near-miss: A sequence of events and/or conditions that could have resulted in loss. This loss was prevented only\nby a fortuitous break in the chain of events and/or conditions. The potential loss could be human injury, environmental\ndamage, or negative business impact (e.g., repair or replacement costs, scheduling delays, contract violations, loss\nof reputation).\n2.2 Some general examples of a near-miss help to illustrate this definition:\n.1 Any event that leads to the implementation of an emergency procedure, plan or response and thus prevents a loss.\nFor example, a collision is narrowly avoided; or a crew member double checks a valve and discovers a wrong\npressure reading on the supply side.\n.2 Any event where an unexpected condition could lead to an adverse consequence, but which does not occur. For\nexample, a person moves from a location immediately before a crane unexpectedly drops a load of cargo there; or a\nship finds itself off-course in normally shallow waters but does not ground because of an unusual high-spring tide.\n.3 Any dangerous or hazardous situation or condition that is not discovered until after the danger has passed. For\nexample, a vessel safely departs a port of call and discovers several hours into the voyage that the ships radio was\nnot tuned to the Harbour Masters radio frequency; or it is discovered that ECDIS displays scale does not match the\nscale, projection, or orientation of the chart and radar images.\nIMO: MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 Revised guidelines for the operational implementation of the international safety\nmanagement (ISM) code by companies\n6 Reporting and analysing of non-conformities, observations, accidents and hazardous occurrences\n6.1 The SMS should contain procedures to ensure that non-conformities, observations and hazardous occurrences\nare reported to the responsible person of the management. The Company should have a system in place for\nrecording, investigating, evaluating, reviewing and analysing such reports, and to take action as appropriate.\n6.2 The system should ensure such reports are reviewed and evaluated by the responsible person(s) in order to\ndetermine appropriate corrective action and to ensure that recurrences are avoided. The evaluation of reports may\nresult in:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nappropriate corrective actions.\namendments to existing procedures and instructions; and\ndevelopment of new procedures and instructions.\n6.3 The responsible person should properly monitor the follow-up and closing-out of the non-conformities/deficiency\nreports. The receipt of reports should be acknowledged to those persons who have raised the reports. This should\ninclude the status of the report and any decisions made.\n6.4 The Company should encourage the reporting of near-misses to maintain and improve safety awareness. The\nreporting and analysis of such incidents are essential for an effective risk assessment by the Company, especially\nwhere accident information is not available.\nTMSA 8.1.1 requires that procedures ensure prompt reporting and investigation of incidents and significant nearmisses. Procedures may include:\n• •\n• Clear definitions of reportable incidents and significant near-misses.\nPerson/department responsible for investigation.\nDescription of the investigation process.\nIMO: ISM Code\n9.1 The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are\nreported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.\n9.2 The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action, including measures\nintended to prevent recurrence.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that incidents and near-misses were\npromptly reported by all ranks, investigated at an appropriate level and that corrective action was taken where\nrequired.\nThe procedure should describe the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDefinitions of reportable incidents and near-misses.\nProcess of reporting and documenting incidents and near-misses onboard.\nRequired time frame for reporting incidents and near-misses to shore-based management.\nLevel of management, either onboard or ashore, responsible for conducting investigations into incidents or\nnear misses based on defined criteria.\nInvestigation process to be followed for each defined level of near-miss or incident.\nProcess to identify and implement corrective and preventative actions.\nSystem for tracking incidents and near miss reports to closure, which may be paper-based or electronic.\nProcess to communicate the outcome of an incident or near-miss investigation to the vessel’s complement.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the number of near-miss reports submitted by the vessel during the 12\nmonths preceding the inspection through the pre-inspection questionnaire. This data will be inserted in the inspection\neditor and reproduced in the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure that required incidents and near-misses were\npromptly reported and investigated.\nReview the system for recording and tracking incident and near-miss reports, select two reports and verify\nthat:\no The details of each incident or near-miss had been recorded in the format required by the company\nprocedure.\no Each incident or near-miss report had been communicated to shore-based management within the\ntime frame defined by the company procedure.\no Each incident or near-miss report had been acknowledged by shore-based management.\no Each incident or near-miss had been investigated at the required management level using the\nappropriate incident investigation process.\no Where corrective and/or preventative actions had been identified, there was evidence that these\nhad been implemented.\no Each report had been closed out and the tracking system updated.\no The outcome of each incident or near-miss investigation had been shared with the vessel’s\ncomplement.\nInterview a rating to verify their understanding of the onboard process to report a near-miss.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure that required incidents and near-misses were promptly reported by all ranks and\ninvestigated.\nThe system for tracking incident and near-miss reports to closure.\nShore-based management acknowledgement of incident and near-miss reports.\nIncident and near-miss reports generated by the vessel during the previous three months.\nIncident and near-miss investigation reports where these were a separate document from the initial report.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure that required incidents and near-misses were promptly reported by all\nranks and investigated.\nThe Master or accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process to:\no Track each incident and near-miss through to closure.\no Document onboard incidents and near-misses.\no Report incidents or near-misses to shore-based management.\no Investigate incidents and near-misses assigned to vessel staff.\no Implement and document corrective and preventative actions.\no Communicate the outcome of a completed incident or near-miss investigation to the vessel’s\ncomplement.\nIncident and near-miss reports had not been:\no Reported to shore-based management within the required time frame.\no Acknowledged by shore-based management.\no Investigated at the appropriate level of management either onboard or ashore.\no Closed out with evidence of implementation of corrective and preventative action.\nThere was no system to track incident and near-miss reports through to closure.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the process to report a near-miss.\nThere was no evidence that the outcome of completed incident and near-miss investigations had been\ncommunicated to the vessel’s complement.\nWhere there had been no near-miss reports generated during the previous three months make a comment in the\nProcess response tool and record the date of the last documented near miss.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.3.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "holding and documenting shipboard safety meetings and was evidence available that\nsafety concerns raised at the meetings were acknowledged and addressed by shore\nmanagement?\nShort Question Text\nShipboard safety meetings\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that there is an effective two-way dialogue between the vessel staff and shore-based management\nin matters relating to safety and pollution prevention at both the fleet and individual vessel level.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n1.2.2 Effective communication and workforce involvement is crucial in ensuring a safe living and working\nenvironment. Communication is a two-way process. There is a need to be able to gain information and knowledge\nthat can be acted upon and passed on to others who need it, and systems need to be in place to facilitate this at all\nlevels in the organization. Some examples include:\n• •\n• •\nensuring information posters, signs and instructions are clear and can be understood;\nensuring safety alerts, memos and newsletters are clear and can be understood;\nencouraging feedback, improvement suggestions and safety observations, and acting on the information\nreceived;\nsafety meetings should be minuted and the reports distributed and acted upon where appropriate.\n13.3.4.1 The Company is required to appoint a safety committee on every ship with five or more seafarers. The\ncommittee must be chaired by the master, and members will include, as a minimum, the safety officer and any\nelected safety representatives.\n13.7.2 The frequency of meetings will be determined by circumstances, but the committee should meet regularly,\ntaking into account the pattern of operation of the ship and the arrangement for manning and with sufficient frequency\nto ensure continuous improvement in safety. In particular, a meeting should also be held after any serious incident or\naccident on the ship, if the normal meeting is not due within a week.\n13.7.11 Relevant extracts of agreed minutes should be forwarded through the master to the Company… A record of\nresponse or action taken by the Company should be maintained.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.3 requires that onboard safety meetings are held at least monthly. In addition, extraordinary\nmeetings are held as soon as practical after any serious incident onboard or within the fleet.\nMeetings are attended by all available personnel and minutes recorded.\nSafety meetings are an open forum which encourages vessel personnel to actively participate.\nThe meeting is used to:\n• •\n• Raise safety awareness.\nVoice safety concerns and identify remedial actions.\nPromulgate lessons learnt.\nThe company reviews and responds to monthly and extraordinary safety meetings from the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n9.1 The safety management system should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and\nhazardous situations are reported to the company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety\nand pollution prevention.\n9.2 The company should establish procedures for implementation of corrective action, including measures to prevent\nrecurrence.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for shipboard safety meetings which required the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• To hold a shipboard safety meeting:\no At a defined frequency.\no After a serious incident onboard or in the fleet.\no During shore management representative visits onboard, where practical based on shipboard\noperations and hours of rest considerations.\nTo define who should attend.\nTo provide a means for those personnel not able to attend a meeting to report concerns to the safety\ncommittee through the safety representatives.\nTo follow a defined agenda for discussion items.\nTo record the minutes of each safety meeting in a defined format.\nTo submit the minutes of each safety meeting for shore management review.\nThat shore management acknowledge safety meeting minutes and address any matters requiring\nmanagement assistance or intervention.\nSafety Committee Meetings are intended to permit discussion among the vessel's officers and ratings about safety\nand pollution prevention matters. Safety meetings should not be used for the purposes of instruction or training.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the requirements for holding\nshipboard safety meetings.\nReview the safety meeting minutes held within the previous six months, select one for detailed review and\nverify that:\no A routine safety meeting had been held at approximately monthly intervals.\no An extraordinary safety meeting had been held during a shore management visit, where practical,\nor within a week of a serious incident onboard.\no The minutes of the meeting were in accordance with the defined company format and included\ndetails of who attended.\no The meeting was not held on the bridge while at sea or at anchor nor in the cargo control room\nduring cargo or tank cleaning operations.\no The minutes had been submitted for shore management review.\nReview the response from shore management for the selected safety meeting and verify that it addressed\nany matters requiring their assistance or intervention.\n• Interview one rating to understand whether they attended the most recent safety meeting and, if not, how\nthey would communicate issues of concern around safety and pollution prevention to the safety committee.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures relating to shipboard safety meetings.\nThe safety committee meeting minutes for all meetings conducted during the previous six months.\nThe shore management response to all safety committee meetings conducted during the previous six\nmonths except for minutes submitted within one week of the inspection.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures which defined the process for holding shipboard safety meetings,\nrecording the minutes and shore management review of the minutes of each meeting.\nShipboard safety meetings had not been held at the frequency defined by the company procedure or at\napproximately monthly intervals.\nExtraordinary safety meetings had not been held after a serious incident onboard or during a shore\nmanagement visit, where practical.\nThe minutes of shipboard safety meetings had not been documented in accordance with the required\ncompany format.\nThe minutes of shipboard safety meetings had not been submitted for shore management review.\nShore management had not acknowledged submitted safety meeting minutes.\nShore management had failed to address matters included in safety meeting minutes that required their\nassistance or intervention.\nThere was evidence that a safety meeting had been held on the bridge while at sea or at anchor or in the\ncargo control room while conducting cargo or tank cleaning operations.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting and recording the\nminutes of shipboard safety meetings.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the process of contributing to a safety meeting either as an\nattendee or in the circumstances that they could not attend a shipboard safety meeting.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.4.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company work planning", "c": "procedures and were records available to demonstrate that onboard work planning\nmeetings had been conducted and documented in accordance with the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nWork planning procedure\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Rating, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that all onboard work activities are planned to agree the scope of work and specific safety\nrequirements applicable to each task, and to avoid operational, departmental or rest hour conflicts.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n4.7.5 Work Planning Meetings\nWork planning meetings should be held to ensure that operations and maintenance tasks are correctly planned and\nmanaged, with the aim of completing all tasks safely and efficiently. These meetings may include discussion of:\n• •\n• •\nRisk assessments.\nWork permits.\nIsolation and tagging requirements.\nThe need for safety briefings, toolbox talks and correct procedures.\nThe format and frequency of work planning meetings should be in line with the requirements of the operator’s SMS\nand will be determined by the tanker or terminal’s activities.\nIt may be appropriate to have two levels of meeting – one for management and another for the practical issues\nrelated to specific tasks.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.4 requires that procedures require daily work planning meetings to take place.\nWork planning:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAgrees the scope of the work to be undertaken.\nIdentifies any operational or departmental conflict.\nIdentifies personnel requirements.\nIdentifies tools and equipment required.\nEstablishes appropriate PPE requirements.\nEnsures compliance with work and rest hours.\nIMO: ISM Code\n5.1 The company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regards to:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nimplementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the company;\nmotivating the crew in the observation of that policy;\nissuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner;\nverifying that specific requirements are observed….\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Work planning meetings are conducted at defined intervals, whenever possible, daily.\nMeetings are attended, as far as is possible, by those undertaking the work as well as those planning the\nwork.\nMeetings follow a defined agenda.\nThe outcome of a meeting is documented in a standard format to include, but not necessarily limited to, the\nguidance points provided by ISGOTT 4.7.5 and TMSA KPI 9A.1.4.\nMeeting records are made available to those that could not attend the meeting before they start work.\nWhere unplanned tasks arise during the period covered by a work planning meeting, the existing work\nplanning meeting record is reviewed and updated.\nThe agreed work planning record and any amendment is approved at a defined onboard management level.\nIn anticipation of periods of high workload, meetings may be held to cover several days’ activities.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the requirements for documented\nwork planning meetings.\nReview several work planning meeting records from the previous month and verify that:\no Work planning meetings had been held at the frequency defined by the company procedure.\no The outcome of the work planning meetings was documented in the format defined by the company\nprocedure.\no The work planning meeting records had been approved in accordance with the company procedure\no The scope of the planned work reflected the activities of the vessel for the dates reviewed.\no The detail of each task identified was enough to understand:\n What the job entailed.\n Whether permits, risk assessments or detailed work plans were required.\n What PPE was required to be used.\n Whether shore management approval was required.\n Who was responsible for supervising the work.\no Select a task that required either a permit, a risk assessment or a detailed work plan and verify that\nthe relevant document existed.\nInterview a rating to verify their understanding of the work planning meeting process and where they would\nfind details of the work planned for the current period.\nVerify that the daily work planning record was available in the location described by the rating.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which defined the requirements for documented work planning meetings.\nThe work planning meeting records for the previous month.\nPermits, risk assessments and detailed work plans referenced by work planning meeting records.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which defined the requirements for documented work planning meetings.\nWork planning meetings were not being held at the frequency defined by the company procedure.\nWork planning meeting records had not been approved onboard in accordance with the company\nprocedures.\nThe outcome from work planning meetings was not being recorded in the format defined by the company\nprocedure.\nThe detail included in the work planning meeting records was not enough to understand what a job entailed.\nWork planning meeting tasks required permits, risk assessments or detailed work plans to be used but these\nwere not available.\nReviewed work planning records did not reflect the actual activities of the vessel during the period of review.\nWork planning meeting tasks required shore management approval but there was no evidence that approval\nhad been provided.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company work planning procedure or the documentation\nof the outcome of work planning meetings.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location or content of the current work planning meeting\nrecord.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.5.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the purpose and implementation", "c": "of the company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure?\nShort Question Text\nStop Work Authority\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAnywhere\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that vessel staff are aware of their responsibility and authority to stop unsafe work.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\nChapter 4.2 Stop Work Authority\nIt is recommended that tanker and terminal safety management systems include a Stop Work Authority (SWA) policy\nand procedure. The SWA gives employees and contractors the responsibility and obligation to intervene and stop\nwork if they see something unsafe that may cause an accident.\nA typical SWA procedure includes five steps:\n• •\n• •\n• Stop the unsafe activity.\nTell the person in charge so the issue can be addressed.\nDiscuss the concerns with those involved and correct the issue as necessary,\nStart the activity again.\nShare what has been learned with other employees and contractors who may be affected.\nTMSA KPI 9A.2.1 requires that intervention to prevent unsafe acts and unsafe conditions occurring is actively\nencouraged. Safety intervention techniques used may include:\n• Stop work authority.\nIMO: ISM Code\n3.2 The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who\nmanage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting safety and pollution prevention.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a Stop Work Authority (SWA) policy and procedure which encourages all\ncompany staff and contractors to stop any work that is believed to present a danger to people, the environment or\nproperty. The procedure should define:\n• •\nWhat Stop Work Authority means within the company safety culture.\nHow the instruction to Stop Work should be delivered to avoid misunderstanding.\n• •\n• •\nThe expected actions of the person or persons receiving the Stop Work instruction.\nThe commitment by the vessel operator at all levels of management, both ashore and onboard, to support\nthe use of Stop Work Authority.\nThe commitment by the vessel operator that the use of Stop Work Authority will never result in disciplinary\naction or discrimination even if it later turns out that the perceived danger was not present.\nThe means by which the Stop Work Authority will be communicated across the workforce during work\nplanning to ensure full understanding and acceptance in all circumstances.\nThe company policy and procedure may use different terminology to “Stop Work Authority” but should have the same\npurpose.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nReview the company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure.\nRandomly question at least three, but not more than five, crewmembers during the inspection about the\ncompany Stop Work Authority procedure to verify their understanding.\n• Under no circumstances deliberately commit any act to test whether a crew-member is aware of the\ncompany expectations or will invoke their Stop Work Authority.\nIf Stop Work Authority is used during the inspection by a crewmember, immediately stop work and follow the\ninstructions of the onboard staff relating to the use of Stop Work.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\nThe company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure.\nAny onboard work planning tools such as tool-box talks, risk assessments, daily work planning meetings or\nsafety meetings which highlight the use of Stop Work Authority.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no company Stop Work Authority policy and procedure.\nThere was no evidence that Stop Work Authority was included and discussed in work planning processes\nsuch as tool-box talks, risk assessments, daily work planning meetings or safety meetings.\nMore than one crewmember was unfamiliar with the company Stop Work Authority policy and/or procedure.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.6.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedures for risk", "c": "assessment, as appropriate to their duties, and was there evidence of the development\nand review of risk assessments in accordance with the procedures?\nShort Question Text\nRisk assessments for new, non-routine, unplanned or specified tasks\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Rating, Interview Senior Officer\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIACS: Rec No.127. A Guide to Risk Assessment in Ship Operations\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that new, non-routine or unplanned tasks, not covered by existing procedures, are subject to risk\nassessment before work starts, and that risk assessments are reviewed before work starts on other specified\ntasks such as enclosed space entry or hot-work.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 4.2.2 Risk Assessment\nA key tool used by the industry, and a function of all SMSs for managing potential risks, is the process of a risk\nassessment. A risk assessment can identify potential hazards, i.e. anything that may cause harm, and analyse the\nlikelihood and severity of a hazard arising and the consequence of it happening. A risk assessment is, typically, a five\nstep process, the results of which may be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative fashion:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nIdentify the hazards.\nDecide who might be harmed and how.\nEvaluate the risks and decide on preventative and mitigating measures or controls.\nRecord significant findings.\nReview the assessments and update following the International Safety Management (ISM) Code or\noperator’s SMS.\nRisk assessments should provide the basis for developing policies and procedures that cover all tanker and terminal\noperations.\nAll new or non-routine activities not covered by existing procedures should be risk assessed before starting, e.g.\nemergency repairs.\nRisk assessments should consider the possibility of human error introducing a hazard or a control failure. In this\nsituation, Safety Critical Task Analysis (SCTA)(see chapter 7) may be used to help prevent, detect or respond to\nhuman error.\nTo ensure all hazards are identified, risk assessments should be completed by a team of suitably trained and\nexperienced personnel. They should, preferably, not be completed by a single person.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\n1.25 Risk awareness and risk assessment\nIf seafarers are fully informed and aware of the risks to their health, safety and welfare, they are much more likely to\nensure they avoid the risks and remain safe…\nRisk assessment\nThe risk assessment process identifies hazards present in a work undertaking, analyses the level of risk, considers\nthose in danger and evaluates whether hazards are adequately controlled, taking into account the measures already\nin place.\nEffective risk assessments:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Correctly and accurately identify all hazards;\nIdentify who may be harmed and how;\nQuantify the severity of the harm;\nIdentify and disregard inconsequential risks;\nRecord the significant findings;\nProvided the basis for implementing or improving control measures; and\nProvide a basis for regular review and updating.\nIACS: Rec No.127. A Guide to Risk Assessment in Ship Operations\nWhat the Code says about risk assessment\nParagraph 1.2.2.2 of the ISM Code states, “Safety management objectives of the company should …. establish\nsafeguards against all identified risks”. Although there is no further, explicit reference to this general requirement in\nthe remainder of the Code, risk assessment of one form or another is essential to compliance with most of its\nclauses.\nIt is important to recognize that the company is responsible for identifying the risks associated with its particular ships,\noperations and trade. It is no longer sufficient to rely on compliance with generic statutory and class requirements,\nand with general industry guidance. These should now be seen as a starting point for ensuring the safe operation of\nthe ship.\nThe ISM Code does not specify any particular approach to the management of risk, and it is for the company to\nchoose methods appropriate to its organizational structure, its ships and its trades. The methods may be more or less\nformal, but they must be systematic if assessment and response are to be complete and effective, and the entire\nexercise should be documented so as to provide evidence of the decision-making process.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.2 requires that the risk assessment process includes provisions for assessing new, non-routine and\nunplanned tasks.\n• •\nWhere no safe working procedure exists, a risk assessment is carried out, reviewed and approved at an\nappropriate level defined by the company.\nThe risk assessment process results in alternative methods of work being considered and documented\nwhere the residual risk has been determined to be unacceptable.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:\n1.\n2.\nprovide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment,\nassess all identified risks to its ships, personnel and the environment and establish appropriate safeguards;\nand\n3.\ncontinuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships, including preparing\nfor emergencies related both to safety and environmental protection.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for risk assessment that describe:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nIn what circumstances a new risk assessment is required to be developed on board, prior to commencement\nof work, which should include for any new, non-routine or unplanned task, not covered by existing\nprocedures.\nIn what circumstances an available risk assessment is required to be reviewed, prior to commencement of\nwork, which should specify tasks including:\no Hot work outside the designated space.\no Enclosed space entry.\no Working aloft.\no Working over the side.\no Launching of a lifeboat or rescue boat.\no Working on energised electrical circuits.\no Working on equipment which has the potential to move.\no Working on any system which has the potential to release stored energy.\nThe process for developing a risk assessment.\nThe process for recording the results of a risk assessment.\nWho is responsible for completing a risk assessment.\nWho should be involved in the development of a risk assessment.\nWho is responsible for approving a risk assessment.\nWho is required to review a risk assessment before work starts on a task.\nThe company should provide a standard format for recording the results of a risk assessment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for developing and / or reviewing a risk\nassessment.\nReview two sample risk assessments relating to new, non-routine, unplanned or specified tasks onboard\nduring the previous three months and verify that they:\no Contained details that were pertinent and relevant to the task that was being risk assessed.\no Referred to equipment and circumstances relevant to the ship and its equipment.\no Had been completed in the format defined by the company procedures.\no Identified appropriate preventative and mitigative measures that must be implemented before\ncommencement of a task.\no Had been approved at the appropriate management level as defined by the company procedures.\nInterview an appropriate senior officer(s) and verify their familiarity with the risk assessment procedure and\nthe work described in the selected risk assessments.\nInterview a rating to verify that they had been involved in the review of a risk assessment prior to\ncommencing work on a new, unplanned or defined task.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure describing the risk assessment development and review processes.\nThe risk assessments used onboard during the previous three months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure describing the risk assessment development and review processes.\nThe company risk assessment procedure did not define:\no The circumstances in which a risk assessment must be developed or reviewed.\no The process for developing a risk assessment.\no The process for recording the results of a risk assessment.\no The process for reviewing an available risk assessment.\no Who is responsible for completing a risk assessment.\no Who should be involved in the development of a risk assessment.\no Who is responsible for approving a risk assessment.\no Who is required to review a risk assessment before work starts on a task.\nA reviewed risk assessment was not relevant to the vessel, its circumstances or equipment.\nA reviewed risk assessment was from a generic risk assessment library, but had not been updated to reflect\nthe vessel, its circumstances or its equipment.\nA risk assessment had not been approved at the appropriate management level as defined by the company\nprocedure.\nThere was evidence that a specified task had been completed without an appropriate risk assessment being\nreviewed.\nThere was evidence that a new, non-routine or unplanned task that required a risk assessment in\naccordance with the company procedure had been completed without an appropriate risk assessment being\ndeveloped and approved.\nAn interviewed senior officer was unfamiliar with the company risk assessment procedure or any aspect of a\nrisk assessment completed, reviewed or approved by them.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with:\no The risk assessment review process prior to starting a task requiring a risk assessment.\no The existence or content of a risk assessment for a task that they had been directly involved with.\nWhere there had been no risk assessments undertaken during the previous three months, make a comment in the\nProcess response tool and record the date of the last risk assessment that had been developed or reviewed.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.7.", "t": "Were Safety Data Sheets (SDS) available on board for all cargo, bunkers,", "c": "chemicals, paints and other products being handled, and were crew members familiar\nwith their use?\nShort Question Text\nSafety Data Sheets.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Cargo Control Room, Engine Room, Steering Gear, Forecastle\nPublications\nIMO: Resolution MSC.286(86) Recommendations for material safety data sheets (MSDS) for MARPOL Annex I oil\ncargo and oil fuel\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1095 Revised minimum safety standards for ships carrying liquids in bulk containing benzene\nObjective\nTo ensure crew members are provided with clear, accurate information on the health and environmental\neffects of all hazardous and toxic substances carried on board, including guidance on their safe handling.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n1.4.4 Safety Data Sheets\nThe Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) should indicate the type and probable concentrations of hazardous or toxic\ncomponents in the cargo or bunkers to be loaded, particularly H2S and benzene. The SDS should be United Nations\nGlobally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN GHS) compliant.\nThe supplier is responsible for providing the relevant SDS to a tanker before it starts loading an oil cargo or bunker\nfuel. The tanker is responsible for providing the receiver with an SDS for the cargo to be discharged. The tanker\nshould also advise the terminal, and any tank inspectors or surveyors, whether the previous cargo contained any\ntoxic substances.\nAn SDS does not guarantee that all the hazardous or toxic components of the cargo or bunkers being loaded have\nbeen identified or documented. An SDS can be generic and may not directly reflect the specific composition of the\ncargo or fuel described. Tanker and terminal operators should have procedures and equipment to verify the actual\nlevels of toxic components present in cargoes and/or bunkers loaded or discharged.\nFor International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annex I cargoes, the term Material\nSafety Data Sheets (MSDSs) may still be used and referenced in industry documents.\n13.2.1 General\nAny chemical or hazardous material on board a ship as stores should have an SDS. If an SDS is not provided, the\nmaterial should be isolated and stored in line with the guidance on its container or packaging. Do not use until\nsatisfactory user information is available.\nAssess what PPE, first aid and eye wash equipment should be kept at each location. Ensure it is appropriate to the\nproduct stored.\nAll containers and packages should be stowed closed. Keep the storage location clean and tidy.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n1.8.1 Safety data sheet\nSOLAS requires that a safety data sheet (SDS) must be provided for each MARPOL Annex I cargo to be loaded.\nThere is not a corresponding SOLAS requirement for MARPOL Annex II cargoes. Nevertheless, the IBC Code\nrequires that ‘Information shall be on board, and available to all concerned, giving the necessary data for the safe\ncarriage of the cargo in bulk’.\nFor MARPOL Annex 1 cargoes, the term material safety data sheets (MSDS) may still be used and referenced in\nindustry documents.\nIn effect the IBC Code requires that an SDS is provided by the shipper to the ship before loading for each MARPOL\nANNEX II cargo.\nThe Master should ensure that, as far as practical and as part of the ship/shore exchange, a copy of the ‘data for the\nsafe carriage of the cargo in bulk’ provided to the ship is provided to the cargo receiver (terminal or transhipment\nship/barge) so that risk-control measures taken during loading, carriage and discharging are based on accurate\ninformation.\nIt is important that:\n• •\n• An SDS is provided for each cargo;\nThe IBC Code product name, ship type and pollution category are known; and\nOther required information on properties and emergency measures is provided in specific sections of the\nSDS.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.3.1 Information shall be on board and available to all concerned in the form of a cargo information data sheet(s)\ngiving the necessary data for the safe carriage of the cargo.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1095 Revised minimum safety standards for ships carrying liquids in bulk containing benzene\n1 Information to the master\n1.1 Prior to loading, the shipper should provide both to the master and the Company, as defined in the ISM Code, a\nMaterial Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) formatted in accordance with resolution MSC.150(77), (replaced by\nMSC.286(86)) for cargoes containing benzene.\n1.2 The cargoes that may contain benzene are, for example, the cargoes listed in Appendix I to Annex I to MARPOL\n73/78, and the following bulk liquids:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nbenzene and benzene mixtures;\nnaphtha, varnish makers and paints (75%); and\nwhite spirit.\nTMSA KPI 1A.2.3 requires that relevant reference documents are provided as a supplement to the SMS both\nonboard and ashore. Reference documents may include regulatory publications and industry guidelines. The\ncompany has a procedure for maintaining the most up-to-date editions in all locations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to\nthe SMS.\n11.2 The Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nvalid documents are available at all relevant locations;\nchanges to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and\nobsolete documents are promptly removed.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter VI Regulation 5-1\nMaterial Safety Data Sheets\nShips carrying oil or oil fuel, as defined in regulation 1 of Annex 1 of the International Convention for the Prevention of\nPollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, shall be provided with material safety\ndata sheets, based on the recommendations developed by the Organization (MSC.286(86) ), prior to the loading of\nsuch oil as cargo in bulk or bunkering of oil fuel.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.286(86) Recommendations for material safety data sheets (MSDS) for MARPOL Annex I\noil cargo and oil fuel\nAdopts:\n.1 the Recommendations for material safety data sheets (MSDS) for marine use suitable to meet the particular needs\nof the marine industry containing safety, handling, and environmental information to be supplied to a ship prior to the\nloading of MARPOL Annex I type oil as cargo in bulk and the bunkering of oil fuel, as set out in Annex 1 to the\npresent resolution; and\n.2 the Guidelines for the completion of MSDS for the MARPOL Annex I type oil as cargo in bulk and oil fuel, as set\nout in Annex 2 to the present resolution.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that up to date Safety Data Sheets (SDS) are\nreadily available for all hazardous or toxic substances carried on board and to give guidance on the handling and\nstowage of these substances, including PPE requirements. These substances include, where carried:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAll oil, chemical and/or gas cargoes.\nAll grades of bunkers.\nHydraulic oils.\nLubricating oils.\nPaints, protective coatings and thinners.\nAll chemicals used or stored onboard.\nAppropriate PPE, first aid and eye wash equipment should be available at each location where chemicals, paints,\nprotective coatings and any other hazardous or toxic materials are stored.\nAll containers and packages should be kept closed, and properly stowed to prevent uncontrolled movement. The\nstorage location should be suitable, clean and tidy. Incompatible substances should not be stowed together.\nCrew members who handle the materials in question must be aware of the purpose of the SDS and be able to\ndemonstrate familiarity with it. The SDS may be printed on the container. If it is not, then the SDS data must be\nprominently posted or readily available to the user.\nMSDS data sheets for Annex I cargoes and fuel oil are recommended to comply with the format in MSC 286 (86).\nMSDS for other products carried on board such as chemicals for use on board, paint thinners etc. should be fit for\npurpose and should be in a format broadly based on the format laid out in MSC 286(86).\n(For the purposes of this question the terms SDS and MSDS should be considered interchangeable.)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and where necessary review the company procedures to ensure that up to date Safety Data Sheets\n(SDS) are readily available for all hazardous or toxic substances carried on board and to give guidance on\nthe handling and stowage of these substances, including PPE requirements.\nSight the SDS(s) for the oil, chemical or gas cargo(es) on board at the time of the inspection.\nDuring the course of the inspection, inspect those locations where other toxic or hazardous substances are\nstored and verify that:\no Appropriate PPE is available at all storage locations.\no SDSs are available locally for all toxic or hazardous substances.\no SDSs contain the required information.\no The stowage of containers and packages is satisfactory.\no Containers and packages are correctly labelled to identify their content.\no Storage locations are suitable, clean and tidy.\nInterview an accompanying officer at any relevant location during the inspection to verify their familiarity with\nthe purpose and content of the SDSs relevant to products stored in, or handled from, the chosen location.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures to ensure that up to date Safety Data Sheets are readily available for all hazardous or\ntoxic substances carried on board and to give guidance on the handling and stowage of these substances.\nSDSs for, where carried:\no All oil, chemical and/or gas cargoes.\no All grades of bunkers.\no Hydraulic oils.\no Lubricating oils.\no Paints, protective coatings and thinners.\no All chemicals used or stored onboard.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to ensure that up to date Safety Data Sheets are readily available for all\nhazardous or toxic substances carried on board and to give guidance on the handling and stowage of these\nsubstances, including PPE requirements.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and content of the relevant SDSs.\nThere was no SDS available for a cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the inspection.\nThe (M)SDS for an Annex I cargo or fuel oil on board at the time of the inspection was not in compliance\nwith the requirements of IMO: Resolution MSC.286(86).\nThe (M)SDS for a cargo containing benzene was not in compliance with the requirements of IMO:\nResolution MSC.286(86).\nThe (M)SDS for an Annex II or gas cargo on board at the time of the inspection did not include the\ninformation for safe carriage as required by the IBC and IGC code.\nThere was no SDS available locally for a toxic or hazardous substance on board at the time of the\ninspection.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Appropriate PPE, first aid and eyewash equipment was not available at the storage location of a toxic or\nhazardous substance.\nThe stowage of containers or packages containing a toxic or hazardous substance was unsatisfactory.\nThe storage location of a toxic or hazardous substance was not clean and tidy.\nIncompatible toxic or hazardous substances were stowed together.\nToxic or hazardous substances were contained in unmarked or incorrectly marked containers.\nToxic or hazardous substances had been transferred to, and were contained in, unsuitable containers.\nToxic or hazardous substances were stored in an unsuitable location.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.7.8.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company Simultaneous", "c": "Operations (SIMOPS) procedure and was there evidence that SIMOPS were considered\nduring work planning and the required controls implemented for the duration of such\noperations?\nShort Question Text\nSimultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) procedure\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Interview - Rating, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the impact of Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) is understood and managed effectively.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 4.6 Simultaneous Operations\nSimultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) are activities that take place at the same time in the same area or that could\ndirectly or indirectly affect the safety of any other activity on the ship or at the terminal.\nSIMOPS should be established at an early stage so that the risk assessment can include the individual risks of each\noperation and the risks from their interaction. If the operations are only risk assessed individually, additional risks\nmight not be identified.\n4.6.2 Managing Simultaneous Operations\n4.6.2.1 Simultaneous Operations risk assessment\nAvoid SIMOPS whenever practicable. If this cannot be avoided, then SIMOPS should be carefully managed through\nrisk assessment, toolbox talks and work practices.\nA SIMOPS risk assessment should study the intended operations and identify any additional hazards introduced by\nundertaking the activities simultaneously…\n4.6.2.2 Simultaneous Operations plan\nThis will enable a SIMOPS plan/interface document to be prepared, which will outline planned controls to be\nconfirmed as in place to ensure the operation is managed effectively and risks reduced to an acceptable level.\nThe plan may vary in scope from a simple pre-job meeting to a detailed interface document that considers some or all\nthe following, depending on the complexity and scale of the operation, the number of different activities and the\npersonnel involved:\n• Purpose of the operation and identified SIMOPS.\n• •\n• •\nRisks and their mitigations, along with controls measures and safe operating procedures.\nReporting lines and overall control authority.\nCommunications and contingency plans.\nMOC requirements.\n4.6.2.3 Simultaneous Operations preparation\nToolbox talks should then be used to review the SIMOPS plan, and these should include discussion on the\nimplementation of the control measures and any potential conflicts or challenges.\nExamples of SIMOPS include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nBunkering or storing operations at the same time as cargo operations.\nMaintenance operations at the same time as bunkering or cargo operations.\nTesting equipment at the same time as bunkering or cargo operations.\nEnclosed space entries at the same time as bunkering or cargo operations.\nEmergency exercises at the same time as cargo operations.\nDiving operations at the same time as cargo operations.\nInspections, e.g. Port State Control, Flag State or Ship Inspection Report Programmed (SIRE), at the same\ntime as cargo operations.\nShip to Ship (STS) transfer operations. Bridge watchkeeping at the same time as cargo watchkeeping.\n4.6.3 Decision Matrix\nIt is recommended that SIMOPS procedures include a decision matrix to help identify the level at which approval is\nrequired within the organization.\n4.6.4 Matrix of permitted operations\nProcedures may include a matrix of permitted operations. This provides a visual guide to the level of risk identified in\nSIMOP. The matrix will identify activities that are:\n• •\n• Permitted to occur simultaneously without restriction.\nPermitted with restrictions.\nNot permitted at all.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.4 requires that procedures ensure that all identified mitigation measures are completed prior to\ncommencing work\nProcedures may include:\n• •\nUse of the permit to work system for both planned and unplanned tasks.\nUse of the risk assessment form to confirm implementation.\nFinal approval for the commencement of work is subject to implementation of mitigation measures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which:\n• •\n• •\n• Defined the term Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).\nProvided guidance on identifying the circumstances when SIMOPS should be considered as taking place.\nMay include tools for identifying and managing SIMOPS, such as:\no A decision matrix.\no A matrix of permitted operations.\nProvided instructions on how considerations regarding SIMOPS should be developed and documented such\nas:\no Work planning meetings and their associated records.\no The development and approval of a risk assessment.\no A SIMOPS plan/interface document developed to address activities falling under the definition of\nSIMOPS.\nProvide instruction on how the considerations regarding SIMOPS should be communicated to those involved\nin the impacted operations, such as:\no Toolbox talks.\no Risk assessment review.\no The SIMOPS plan/interface document review and approval process.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which provided guidance and instruction on\nSimultaneous Operations.\nReview the SIMOPS guidance tools, where provided:\no The decision matrix.\no The matrix of permitted operations.\nReview recent examples where the vessel staff had identified potential SIMOPS and documented the\nappropriate controls in documents such as:\no Work planning meeting records.\no Risk assessments.\no SIMOPS plan/interface documents.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their understanding of the company SIMOPS procedure and its\nimplementation and documentation during shipboard activities.\nInterview a deck or engine rating to understand how they are informed of SIMOPS and what the\nexpectations are of them in terms of remaining focused on the task to which they have been assigned while\nSIMOPS are ongoing.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure which provided guidance and instruction on Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).\nThe SIMOPS decision matrix, if provided as part of the SIMOPS procedure.\nThe SIMOPS matrix of permitted operations, if provided as part of the SIMOPS procedure.\nThe daily work planning meeting records.\nRisk assessments dealing with SIMOPS for the previous three months.\nSIMOPS plan/interface documents.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which gave guidance and instruction on Simultaneous Operations\n(SIMOPS).\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company SIMOPS procedure.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the decision matrix or the matrix of permitted operations,\nwhere these were provided and required to be used for assessing SIMOPS.\nThere were no records available to demonstrate that SIMOPS had been considered during the onboard\nwork planning process.\nRecords of SIMOPS controls had not been maintained in accordance with the company SIMOPS procedure\nthrough documents such as:\no Work planning meeting records.\no Risk assessments.\no SIMOPS plan/interface documents.\nThere was evidence of SIMOPS taking place that would have required the company SIMOPS work review\nand documentation process to be used but no records were available for review.\nThere was evidence of SIMOPS taking place which were specifically prohibited by the company SIMOPS\nprocedure.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the term SIMOPS and what their responsibilities would be with\nregards to their assigned task when SIMOPS were being undertaken.\nIf there were no records of SIMOPS having taken place during the previous three months, make a comment in the\nProcess response tool noting the date of the last documented SIMOPS.\n5.8. Area Safety Inspections", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the main deck areas, and had inspections been effective in identifying\nhazards to health, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nSafety inspection of the main deck and mooring areas.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nObjective\nTo ensure that the main deck areas are always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n2.5 Good housekeeping\n2.5.1 All ships move in a seaway and as space is very limited aboard any vessel, good housekeeping is essential for\nsafe working/access and hygiene control. Attention should be paid in particular to the:\n• •\n• safe and secure stowage of loose items;\nproper securing of doors, etc.;\nadequate illumination of all work/transit areas.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n4.8.2 Slip, trip and fall hazards\nNon-skid coatings or gratings should be provided in working areas and on walkways. These areas should be clearly\nmarked so that personnel are aware of their existence and extent. Areas for consideration include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMooring areas.\nManifold areas.\nDipping and sampling locations.\nAccess walkways.\nPipeline step-overs.\nExternal stairways.\nTrip hazards e.g. high plate edges at the top of ladders and unevenly spaced steps, should be avoided. Where the\ndesign cannot be modified, trip hazards should be clearly marked or highlighted with contrasting paint.\n4.11.7 Inspection, maintenance and testing of electrical equipment\n4.11.7.1 Inspection and checks\nTypical inspections should include checking:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCracks in metal casings or covers, cracked or broken glass, or failure of cement around glass in flame-proof\nor explosion-proof enclosures.\nCovers of flame-proof enclosures, to ensure that they are tight, that no bolts are missing and that no gaskets\nare present between mating metal surfaces.\nEach connection to ensure that it is properly connected.\nPossible slackness of joints in conduit runs and fittings.\nClamping of cable armouring.\nStresses on cables that might cause fracture.\n4.11.7.2 Maintenance\nIncorrect maintenance procedures can compromise the safety of electrical equipment. Even simple repairs and\nmaintenance can compromise safety e.g. paint covering safety features such as relief holes, passages etc. Changing\na lightbulb could damage explosion proof lights if the cover is closed incorrectly.\n13.5.7 Forecastle spaces and midships stores\nDo not carry packaged petroleum or other flammable liquids in the forecastle spaces, midship stores or any other\nspace unless they have been specifically designed and classified.\n13.5.8 Deck cargo\nProtect any drums or other receptacles carried on deck against the sea and weather. They should normally be\nstowed only one tier high.\nStow all packages well clear of deck fittings, including tank and valve controls, fire hydrants, safety equipment, steam\npipes, deck lines, tank washing openings, tank vents, hatches, doorways, emergency exits and ladders. Use\nsufficient dunnage and secure them properly to strong points on the ship’s structure.\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018.\n5.7.4 Factors influencing performance\n5.7.4.5 Abrasion – external\nRoller fairleads or other rotating deck equipment should be well maintained and kept free to rotate as originally\ndesigned.\n5.7.6 Usage and care\n5.7.6.3 Maintenance\nSynthetic lines can be susceptible to cuts and abrasion and should not be exposed to conditions that might damage\nthem. If they are used in fairleads previously used with wires, it is necessary to ensure that surfaces have not become\ngrooved or roughened by the wires.\n7.3.7 Marking of mooring and towing fittings\n7.3.7.1 For all ships\nEach fitting should be clearly marked by a weld bead outline with its SWL, in addition to any markings required by\napplicable standards. The SWL should be expressed in tonnes (t) and be located so that it is not obstructed during\noperation of the fitting. It should also be noted that the unit ‘t’ is to be used rather than the technically correct ‘kN’, as\nsome operators may not be familiar with the metric system and a fitting may be dangerously overloaded if ‘kN’ is\nconfused with ‘t’.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which requires that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the main deck areas, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety\nOfficer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nWeathertight doors to deck houses should be in a satisfactory condition and capable of being properly secured.\nFlammable liquids should not be stored in deck houses which were not specifically designed and classified.\nCare should be taken over the storage of lube oil and other oils in drums on deck. They should be well secured with\nsuitable rope or wire lashings on pallets rather than directly on the deck, and where possible within a containment\narea. The top of the drum should be covered to prevent potential water standing and subsequent ingress and\ncontamination.\nThe main deck areas should be free of leakage from cargo, cargo heating, inert gas or hydraulic systems.\nAll deck lights should be operational. The level of deck lighting should be adequate to allow:\n• •\n• •\nSufficient visibility to permit safe access to all areas of the deck.\nThe safe use of mooring equipment.\nThe monitoring of the deck area for spills and leakages.\nThe monitoring of all deck areas and the adjacent surrounding areas to prevent unauthorised access.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the\nmain deck are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and\npotential hazards to health, safety and the environment\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the main deck areas, including associated\nchecklists.\n• •\nRequest that the deck lighting is tested, even if in daylight, to ensure the system is fully operational.\nInspect the main deck areas and verify that:\no Non-skid coatings or gratings are provided in working areas and on walkways.\no Working areas and/or walkways are clearly marked.\no Trip hazards are clearly marked or highlighted with contrasting paint.\no Light fittings in gas-hazardous areas do not have:\n Cracks in metal casings or covers.\n Cracked or broken glass.\n Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.\n Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.\n Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.\n Paint covering safety features such as relief holes, passages etc.\no Deck wiring and conduit runs were in a satisfactory condition.\no There is no leakage from a cargo, cargo heating, inert gas or hydraulic system on deck.\no All deck lights are operational.\no Deck lighting is adequate to allow:\n Sufficient visibility to permit safe access to all areas of the deck.\n The safe use of mooring equipment.\n The monitoring of the deck area for spills and leakages.\n The monitoring of all deck areas and the adjacent surrounding areas to prevent\nunauthorised access.\no Roller fairleads and other items of rotating deck equipment are well maintained and free to rotate.\no Fairleads being used with synthetic lines are not grooved or roughened.\no Mooring and towing fittings are clearly marked with their SWL in tonnes (t) by weld bead outline.\no Weathertight doors to deck houses etc. are in satisfactory condition and capable of being properly\nsecured.\no Flammable liquids are not stored in a deck house which was not specifically designed and\nclassified.\no If present, lube oil, other oil drums or spare parts/stores are safely stowed and secured on deck.\no If present, drums stowed on deck were not marked to indicate their content.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which requires that safety inspections of the main deck areas are conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the main deck areas including associated checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the main deck areas were\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the main deck areas were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the main deck areas.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the main deck areas were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company main deck areas inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the main deck areas were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential\ndeficiencies listed below:\no Non-skid coatings or gratings were not provided in working areas or on walkways.\no Working areas and/or walkways were not clearly marked.\no Trip hazards were not clearly marked or highlighted with contrasting paint.\no Light fittings in gas-hazardous areas had:\n Cracks in metal casings or covers.\n Cracked or broken glass.\n Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\nFlame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.\nGaskets present between mating metal surfaces.\nPaint covering safety features such as relief holes, passages etc.\nDeck wiring and/or conduit runs were not in a satisfactory condition.\nThere was leakage from a cargo, cargo heating, inert gas or hydraulic system on deck.\nA number of deck lights were not operational.\nDeck lighting was not adequate to allow:\n Sufficient visibility to permit safe access to all areas of the deck.\n The safe use of mooring equipment.\n The monitoring of the deck area for spills and leakages.\n The monitoring of all deck areas and the adjacent surrounding areas to prevent\nunauthorised access.\nA roller fairlead or other item of rotating deck equipment was not well maintained and free to rotate.\nFairleads being used with synthetic lines were grooved or roughened.\nA mooring or towing fitting was not clearly marked with its SWL in tonnes (t) by weld bead outline.\nA weathertight door to a deck house was not in a satisfactory condition and capable of being\nproperly secured.\nFlammable liquids were stored in a deck house which was not specifically designed and classified.\nLube oil, other oil drums or spare parts/stores were not safely stowed and secured on deck.\nDrums stowed on deck were not marked with their content.\n\n\n\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the main deck, this should be\ndocumented within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question relating to the\nhardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the machinery spaces, and had inspections been effective in identifying\nhazards to health, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nSafety inspection of the machinery space.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Steering Gear, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the machinery spaces are always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n11.14 Essential Engine Room Seamanship.\nGood housekeeping is a routine matter that should not be neglected in an engine room, even during times of heavy\nworkload or in the event of reactive breakdown maintenance. Ships are huge moving objects on frequently unstable\nseas. Good housekeeping is therefore essential to ensure safety, hygiene and security. A clean and tidy workplace is\nnormally a safe workplace.\nSome routine measures to implement include…\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n5.5 Machinery spaces\n5.5.1 All personnel should be made fully aware of the precautions necessary to prevent fire in machinery spaces – in\nparticular, the maintenance of clean conditions, the prevention of oil leakage and the removal of all combustible\nmaterials from vulnerable positions.\n5.5.2 Suitable metal containers with an integral cover should be provided for the storage of cotton waste, cleaning\nrags or similar materials after use. Such containers should be emptied at frequent intervals and the contents disposed\nof safely.\n5.5.3 Wood, paints, solvents, oil and other flammable materials should not be stored in boiler rooms or machinery\nspaces including steering gear compartments.\n8.7.1 The main causes of eye injury are:\n• •\n• infra-red rays (gas welding).\nultra-violet rays (electric welding).\nexposure to chemicals; or\n• exposure to flying particles and foreign bodies.\n9.1.2 Safety signs that include hazard warnings should be used to indicate hazards and obstructions or control\nmeasures to be taken where the hazard or obstruction cannot be removed.\n9.2.1 The Company should ensure that safety signs are displayed where appropriate.\n9.8.8 Colour coding of pipelines may vary from ship to ship and seafarers moving from one ship to another should\ncheck with a competent officer what the colours mean on each particular vessel.\n11.5.4 Lighting facilities should be properly maintained. Broken or defective lights should be reported to the\nresponsible person and repaired as soon as practicable.\n11.6.1 Hatchways that are open for handling cargo or stores, through which persons may fall or on which they may\ntrip, should be closed as soon as work stops, except during short interruptions or where they cannot be closed\nwithout prejudice to safety or mechanical efficiency because of the heel or trim of the ship.\n11.6.2 The guardrails or fencing should have no sharp edges and should be properly maintained. Where necessary,\nlocking devices and suitable stops or toe-boards should be provided. Each course of rails should be kept substantially\nhorizontal and taut throughout their length.\n11.6.3 Guardrails or fencing should consist of an upper rail at a height of 1 metre and an intermediate rail at a height\nof 0.5 metres. The rails may consist of taut wire or taut chain.\n20.2.4 Safety guards on machinery or equipment should only be removed when the machinery is not operating. If\nremoval is essential for maintenance or examination of the equipment, the following precautions should be taken:\n• •\n• •\nRemoval should be authorised by a responsible person, and only a competent person should carry out the\nwork or examination.\nThere should be adequate clear space and lighting for the work to be done.\nAnyone working close to the machinery should be told what the risks are and instructed in safe systems of\nwork and precautions to take.\nA warning notice should be conspicuously posted.\n20.2.5 Whenever floor plates or handrails are removed, warning notices should be posted, the openings should be\neffectively fenced or guarded, and the area well illuminated. Floor plates and handrails should be secured in place on\ncompletion of the work being undertaken.\n20.3.1 Every dangerous part of a ship’s machinery or other equipment should have guards or protection devices to\nprevent access to danger zones or to halt movements of dangerous parts before the danger zones are reached.\n20.3.2 All steam pipes, exhaust pipes and fittings, which by their location and temperature present a hazard, should\nbe adequately lagged or otherwise shielded. The insulation of hot surfaces should be properly maintained, particularly\nin the vicinity of oil systems. This can be monitored through thermographic survey or the use of infra-red\nthermometers to ensure that surface temperatures do not exceed 220°C.\n20.3.5 The source of any oil leakage should be located and repaired as soon as practicable\n20.3.6 Waste oil should not be allowed to accumulate in the bilges or on tank tops. …. Tank tops and bilges should,\nwherever practicable, be painted a light colour and kept clean and well illuminated in the vicinity of pressure oil pipes\nso that leaks may be readily located.\n20.3.9 Engine room bilges should at all times be kept clear of rubbish and other substances so that mud-boxes are\nnot blocked, and the bilges may be readily and easily pumped.\n20.3.12 Care should be taken to ensure that spare gear is properly stowed and items of machinery under overhaul\nare safely secured so that they do not break loose and cause injury or damage even in the heaviest weather.\n20.5.7 Spare gear, tools and other equipment or material should never be left lying around, especially near to\nstabiliser or steering gear rams, switchboards and batteries.\n20.5.9 When guards or other safety devices have been removed from machinery, they should be replaced\nimmediately once the work is completed and before the machinery or equipment is tested.\n20.12.5 Flammable materials should never be left or stored near switchboards.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires procedures that require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n2.2.5.3 Oil fuel lines shall not be located immediately above or near units of high temperature including boilers, steam\npipelines, exhaust manifolds, silencers or other equipment required to be insulated by paragraph 2.2.6. As far as\npracticable, oil fuel lines shall be arranged far apart from hot surfaces, electrical installations or other sources of\nignition and shall be screened or otherwise suitably protected to avoid oil spray or oil leakage onto the sources of\nignition. The number of joints in such piping systems shall be kept to a minimum.\n2.2.6 Protection of high temperature surfaces\n2.2.6.1 Surfaces with temperatures above 220 degrees C which may be impinged as a result of a fuel system failure\nshall be properly insulated.\n2.2.6.2 Precautions shall be taken to prevent any oil that may escape under pressure from any pump, filter or heater\nfrom coming into contact with heated surfaces.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the machinery spaces, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety\nOfficer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nIn addition to the guidance stated above:\n• •\nPurifier rooms and fuel and lubricating oil handling areas should be ventilated and clean.\nGauge glass closing devices on oil tanks should be of a self-closing, fail-safe type and not inhibited.\n• •\nSelf-closing sounding devices to double bottom tanks should be in good order, closed and capped.\nAll fire doors on a ship are important, but when the high risk of machinery space fires is considered,\nmachinery space fire doors should receive special attention, particularly the fire doors between the\nmachinery space and Steering Gear Compartment, which are often found tied open.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\nmachinery spaces were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify\nhazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the machinery spaces including associated\nchecklists.\nInspect the machinery spaces, including purifier rooms, fuel and lubricating oil handling areas, workshops,\ncompressor rooms, chemical stores, spare gear stores, electrician’s store/workshop, IG rooms, boiler rooms\nand the steering gear compartment with reference to the safety officer’s checklist and verify:\no Suitable metal containers with an integral cover were provided for the storage of cotton waste,\ncleaning rags or similar materials after use, and these were emptied frequently.\no Wood, paints, solvents, oil or other flammable materials were not stored in boiler rooms or\nmachinery spaces including steering gear compartments unless specifically identified areas had\nbeen prepared and approved for storage of such items.\no Suitable eye-protection and PPE was readily available where required, for example for welding,\nhandling chemicals or operating a lathe or fixed or portable grinding wheel.\no Lagging and insulation on all high temperature surfaces such as steam pipes, exhaust pipes etc.\nwas in place, in good condition and free from oil.\no Safety notices and signs appropriate to the specific compartments were posted to indicate hazards\nand obstructions or control measures to be taken where the hazard or obstruction could not be\nremoved.\no Pipelines were colour coded or labelled to indicate their contents.\no There were no broken or defective light fittings.\no There were no unprotected open hatchways through which persons may fall or on which they may\ntrip.\no The guardrails or fencing of any protected open hatchway were in good order.\no Floor plates had not been removed and the opening left unguarded or insufficiently lit.\no Floor plates were secured, level and even.\no Safety guards were in place for all machinery, rotating shafts or equipment, as necessary.\no There were no visible oil leaks from any machinery.\no Purifier rooms and fuel and lubricating oil handling areas were ventilated and clean.\no There was no accumulation of waste oil in the bilges or in save-alls in way of machinery space fuel,\nlube and hydraulic oil service, settling and storage tanks.\no Tank tops and bilges were painted a light colour so that leaks may be readily located.\no Engine-room bilges were clear of rubbish or other substances that might prevent the bilges being\nreadily and easily pumped.\no Spare gear was properly stowed and items of machinery under overhaul were safely secured so\nthat they do not break loose and cause injury or damage even in the heaviest weather.\no Spare gear, tools and other equipment or material was not left lying around, especially near to\nsteering gear rams, switchboards or batteries.\no There were no flammable materials left or stored near switchboards.\no Gauge glass closing devices on oil tanks were of a self-closing, fail-safe type and were not\ninhibited.\no Self-closing sounding devices to double bottom tanks were in good order and closed with caps\nproperly fitted.\no No non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other arrangements\nwere used to hold any fire door open where it was required to be self-closing.\nSelect several items from the machinery space inspection checklist and request that the accompanying\nofficer describes or demonstrates what was required to be checked.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which required that safety inspections of the machinery spaces were conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the machinery spaces including associated checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the machinery spaces were\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the machinery spaces were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the machinery spaces.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the machinery spaces were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company machinery spaces inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the machinery spaces were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential\ndeficiencies listed below:\no Suitable metal containers with an integral cover were not provided for the storage of cotton waste,\ncleaning rags or similar materials after use, and/or these were not emptied frequently.\no Wood, paints, solvents, oil or other flammable materials were stored in boiler rooms or machinery\nspaces including steering gear compartments unless specifically identified areas had been\nprepared and approved for storage of such items.\no Suitable eye-protection and PPE was not readily available where required, for example for welding,\nhandling chemicals or operating a lathe or fixed or portable grinding wheel.\no Lagging and insulation on high temperature surfaces such as steam pipes, exhaust pipes etc. was\nmissing, in poor condition or impregnated with oil.\no Safety notices and signs appropriate to the specific compartments were not posted to indicate\nhazards and obstructions or control measures to be taken where the hazard or obstruction could\nnot be removed.\no Pipelines were not colour coded or labelled to indicate their contents.\no There were broken or defective light fittings in the machinery spaces.\no There were unprotected open hatchways through which persons may fall or on which they may trip.\no The guardrails or fencing of any protected open hatchway were not in good order.\no Floor plates had been removed and the opening left unguarded or insufficiently lit.\no Floor plates were unsecured, uneven, or having gaps, presenting a trip and fall hazard.\no Safety guards were not in place for all machinery, rotating shafts or equipment, as necessary.\no There were visible oil leaks from any machinery.\no Purifier rooms and fuel and lubricating oil handling areas were not ventilated and/or clean.\no There was an accumulation of waste oil in the bilges or in save-alls in way of machinery space fuel,\nlube and hydraulic oil service, settling and storage tanks.\no Tank tops and bilges were not painted a light colour so that leaks may be readily located.\no Engine-room bilges contained rubbish or other substances that might prevent the bilges being\nreadily and easily pumped.\no Spare gear was not properly stowed and/or items of machinery under overhaul were not safely\nsecured to prevent them breaking loose and causing injury or damage in heavy weather.\no Spare gear, tools and other equipment or material was left lying around, especially near to steering\ngear rams, switchboards or batteries.\no Flammable materials were left or stored near switchboards.\no Gauge glass closing devices on oil tanks were not of a self-closing, fail-safe type or were inhibited.\no Self-closing sounding devices to double bottom tanks were not in good order, closed and capped.\no Non-approved hold-open methods such as tiebacks, hooks, wedges or other arrangements were\nused to hold any fire door in the machinery spaces open where it was required to be self-closing.\nThere was a safety deficiency of any kind in the machinery spaces.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the machinery spaces, this\nshould be recorded within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question\nrelating to the hardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the cargo pumproom, and had inspections been effective in identifying\nhazards to health, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nSafety inspections of the cargo pumproom\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the cargo pump room is always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n4.11.7 Inspection, maintenance and testing of electrical equipment\n4.11.7.1 Inspection and checks\nTypical inspections should include checking:\nCracks in metal casings or covers, cracked or broken glass, or failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or\nexplosion-proof enclosures.\nCovers of flame-proof enclosures, to ensure that they are tight, that no bolts are missing and that no gaskets are\npresent between mating metal surfaces.\n10.12.2 Cargo pumproom ventilation\nGiven the potential presence of hydrocarbon gas in the pumproom, mechanical ventilation by extraction is required in\na safe atmosphere….\nThe pumproom ventilation should be interlocked with the pumproom lighting so that the ventilation operates when the\nlights are switched on. This does not apply to emergency lighting.\nDuring cargo handling, the pumproom ventilation system should be operating at the correct (lower) suction.\n12.1.15.2 Cargo and ballast line draining procedures\nOn some ships, no provision is made for effective line draining where the practice is to drain final line contents to the\npumproom bilge. It is an unsafe practice and volatile product should not be drained to the bilge.\n12.1.15.3 Routine maintenance and housekeeping issues\nIt is important that the integrity of pipelines and pumps is maintained and that any leaks are detected and rectified as\nsoon as possible.\nPumproom bilges should be kept clean and dry. Particular care should be taken to prevent hydrocarbon liquids or\nvapour escaping into the pumproom.\nValve glands and drain cocks should be regularly inspected to ensure they do not leak.\nBulkhead penetrations should be routinely checked to ensure the seals are effective….\nThe pumproom rescue harness and rope should be checked regularly to ensure it is fit for use and rigged for\nimmediate operation….\nEmergency escape routes should be regularly checked to ensure they are properly marked and clear of obstructions.\nWhere an escape trunk is fitted, check doors for ease of operation. Door seals should be effective and lighting within\nthe trunk should be operational.\n12.1.15.5 Inspecting and maintaining pumproom ventilation fans\nPumproom ventilation fans operate by drawing air out of the space. If a gas is in the pumproom and the blades of the\nfan impeller touch the casing, or the fan bearings or seals overheat, the vapours could ignite.\nPumproom extractor fans, including impellers, shafts and gas seals, should be inspected regularly.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms\nPart IV Cargo Pump-Rooms\nChapter 1 – Control Of Flammable Materials\n1.1 Requirements described below should be applied to vessels carrying oils with flashpoints not exceeding 60°C\n(closed cup test).\nEquipment and fittings on cargo piping systems\n2.2.2 Spray shields or spray protection covers should be provided on any detachable connections and around the\nglands of cargo handling pumps in order to reduce the formation of mist.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the cargo pumproom, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety\nOfficer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\ncargo pumproom were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify\nhazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the cargo pumproom including associated\nchecklists.\nInspect the cargo pumproom with reference to the safety officer’s checklist and verify:\no Entry procedures for the pumproom were clearly displayed at the entrance.\no Lights were fully operational with no damage or defects to fittings or covers.\no Ventilation was fully operational with only lower suctions open.\no The emergency ventilation dampers, where fitted, were clearly marked and fully operational.\no Pumproom fans were not running noisily or with excessive vibration.\no Bilges were clean and free of combustible material.\no Items stored in the pumproom were properly secured against movement.\no No paint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom.\no Cargo and hydraulic systems were free of oil leaks.\no Ballast systems were free of significant leaks.\no Cargo and ballast piping were free of patches or temporary repairs.\no Spray shields or spray protection covers were fitted around the glands of cargo pumps or\ndetachable connections.\no Bulkhead seals and penetrations were in apparent good order.\no A rescue harness and means of recovery was rigged ready for immediate use.\no All exposed rotating shafts were protected with guards.\no Pipe lagging, where fitted, was clean and free from oil impregnation.\no Safety chains were in place to prevent falling down open vertical ladder accesses.\no Gratings or removable deck plates were in good condition and properly fitted.\no Cargo and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were clearly marked.\no The pumproom telephone was fully operational.\nSelect several items from the cargo pumproom inspection checklist and request that the accompanying\nofficer describe or demonstrate what was required to be checked.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which required that safety inspections of the cargo pumproom were conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the cargo pumproom including associated checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the cargo pumproom be\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the cargo pumproom were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the cargo pumproom.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the cargo pumproom were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company cargo pumproom inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the cargo pumproom were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential\ndeficiencies listed below:\no Pumproom lighting was not fully operational.\no Pumproom lighting was inadequate to illuminate the space.\no Pumproom light fittings had:\n Cracks in metal casings or covers.\n Cracked or broken glass.\n Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.\n Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.\n Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.\no The pumproom ventilation was not:\n operating in extraction mode.\n interlocked with the pumproom lighting.\n operating at the correct (lower) suction.\no The pumproom fan(s) were running noisily or with excessive vibration.\no The pumproom bilges were not clean and dry.\no Cargo residue had been drained to the pumproom bilge.\no There were leaks from pumps, pipelines, valve glands or instrumentation.\no Cargo or ballast pipelines were temporarily repaired with patches or bandages.\no Spray shields or spray protection covers around the glands of cargo pumps or detachable\nconnections were missing or damaged.\no Bulkhead seals were defective in any respect.\no Exposed rotating shafts were not protected with guards.\no Pipe lagging was impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping intended to be lagged.\no Items stored in the pumproom were not properly secured against movement.\no Paint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom unless contained within an area\nspecifically designed and designated for such storage.\no The pumproom rescue harness was not fit for use and rigged for immediate operation.\no Safety chains to prevent falling through open vertical ladder accesses were missing or not\nconnected.\no Cargo and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were not clearly marked.\no The pumproom telephone was defective.\nThere was a safety deficiency of any kind in the pumproom.\nWhere the entry procedures for the pumproom posted at the entrance were not in alignment with the enclosed space\nentry procedure contained in the SMS, or cargo pumproom entry was authorised during the inspection without full\ncompliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make a negative observation under the Process response tool\nof question 5.5.1.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the cargo pumproom, this should\nbe recorded within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question relating to the\nhardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the procedure for safety inspections of", "c": "the cargo machinery rooms, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to\nhealth, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nCargo machinery rooms safety inspections\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCompressor Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo machinery rooms are always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n4.11.7 Inspection, maintenance and testing of electrical equipment\n4.11.7.1 Inspection and checks\nTypical inspections should include checking:\nCracks in metal casings or covers, cracked or broken glass, or failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or\nexplosion-proof enclosures.\nCovers of flame-proof enclosures, to ensure that they are tight, that no bolts are missing and that no gaskets are\npresent between mating metal surfaces.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n2.11 Cargo Machinery Room Precautions\nCargo vapour may be present in cargo pump or compressor rooms, and gas detection systems are installed to warn\nof its presence. In ships carrying cargoes whose vapours may be lighter than air (for example ammonia) or heavier\nthan air (for example LPG), gas detector point should be fitted at high and low levels within compartments. The\nappropriate gas detector points should be used for the cargo carried.\nVentilation systems are provided to disperse any vapour that may collect in the pump or compressor room. The\nspace should be ventilated for no less than ten minutes before cargo operations begin and throughout cargo\noperations. Ventilation systems should be used whenever a cargo liquid or vapour leakage is suspected.\nVentilation systems should be maintained in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment\nmanufacturers and should be available at all times. If the fans fitted are of non-sparking design, then these should not\nbe modified in any way.\nThe precautions given in Section 8.5.4 should be observed before personnel enter cargo machinery rooms (i.e. entry\ninto enclosed spaces).\nAll electrical equipment in cargo machinery rooms, including the lighting systems, should be certified safe for use in\nhazardous areas and maintained in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment manufacturers.\nAdditional lighting, if required, should be of a suitable safe type (see Section 5.6.2).\nGas-tight bulkhead gland seals and airlock doors to cargo machinery electric motor rooms should be carefully\nchecked and maintained to ensure the seals remain intact and effective in preventing cargo vapour entry.\n8.5.3 Cargo Control Rooms\nAny cargo control or instrument room which is not classified as gas-free should be ventilated thoroughly before entry,\nbut access doors or hatches should never be left open. Ventilation and gas detection equipment should be operated\nand checked throughout the period that the room is in use. If fixed equipment is not fitted or is not working, portable\nequipment should be used.\nIn ships designed to carry cargoes whose vapours are either lighter than air or heavier than air, alternative upper and\nlower ventilation points and gas sampling heads are normally provided. The changeover devices should be set\naccording to the relative vapour density of the cargo.\n8.5.4\nCargo Pump or Compressor Rooms, Motor Rooms and Airlocks\nIn addition to the precautions required for cargo control rooms (See Section 8.5.3), the following precautions should\nbe observed for cargo pump or compressor rooms, motor rooms and airlocks.\nVentilation fans should be running continuously for at least 10 minutes before cargo operations begin, and throughout\ntheir duration. Fans should also be run continuously when leakage of vapour or liquid into the space is suspected.\nSafety interlocks are provided to ensure that no machinery can be started until the ventilation system has been\noperating for at least 10 minutes, long enough to have dispersed any toxic or flammable vapour that may have\ncollected in cargo pump rooms or compressor rooms, and to build up sufficient pressure in motor rooms and airlocks.\nLoss of ventilation pressure can cause shutdown of equipment.\nRegular inspection should be undertaken of inlet and outlet grilles to ensure that they have not become obstructed.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n1.2.54 Turret compartments are those spaces and trunks that contain equipment and machinery for retrieval and\nrelease of the disconnectable turret mooring system, high-pressure hydraulic operating systems, fire protection\narrangements and cargo transfer valves.\n3.3 Cargo machinery spaces and turret compartments\n3.3.5 Arrangements of cargo machinery spaces and turret compartments shall ensure safe unrestricted access for\npersonnel wearing protective clothing and breathing apparatus, and in the event of injury to allow unconscious\npersonnel to be removed. At least two widely separated escape routes and doors shall be provided in cargo\nmachinery spaces, except that a single escape route may be accepted where the maximum travel distance to the\ndoor is 5 metres or less.\n3.3.6 All valves necessary for cargo handling shall be readily accessible to personnel wearing protective clothing.\nSuitable arrangements shall be made to deal with drainage of pump and compressor rooms.\n3.6 Airlocks\n3.6.1 Access between hazardous area on the open weather deck and non-hazardous spaces shall be by means of an\nair lock. This shall consist of two self-closing, substantially gastight, steel doors without any holding back\narrangements, capable of maintaining the overpressure, at least 1.5 metres but no more than 2.5 metres apart. The\nair lock space shall be artificially ventilated from a non-hazardous area and maintained at an overpressure to the\nhazardous area on the weather deck.\n3.6.3 An audible and visible alarm system to give a warning on both sides of the air lock shall be provided. The visible\nalarm shall indicate if one door is open. The audible alarm shall sound if doors on both sides of the air lock are moved\nfrom the closed positions.\n3.6.4 In ships carrying flammable products, electrical equipment that is located in spaces protected by air locks and\nnot of the certified safe type, shall be de-energised in case of loss of overpressure in the space.\n3.6.6 The air lock space shall be monitored for cargo vapours (see 13.6.2).\n12.1 Spaces required to be entered during normal cargo handling operations\n12.1.1 Electric motor rooms, cargo compressor and pump rooms, spaces containing cargo handling equipment and\nother enclosed spaces where cargo vapours may accumulate, shall be fitted with fixed artificial ventilation systems\ncapable of being controlled from outside such space. The ventilation shall be run continuously to prevent the\naccumulation of toxic and or flammable vapours, with the means of monitoring acceptable to the Administration to be\nprovided. A warning notice requiring the use of such ventilation prior to entering shall be placed outside the\ncompartment.\n12.1.4 Where a space has an opening into an adjacent more hazardous space or area, it shall be maintained at an\noverpressure. It may be made into a less hazardous space or non-hazardous space by overpressure protection in\naccordance with recognised standards.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the cargo machinery rooms, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated\nSafety Officer.\nAn appropriate checklist(s) should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nCargo machinery room air-lock audible and visual alarms and shut-down systems should be regularly tested.\nEthylene and Propylene Oxide – piping between cargo compressors and cargo containment should be blanked or\nspool pieces removed when these cargoes are carried.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\ncargo machinery rooms were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify\nhazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms including\nassociated checklists.\nWhere necessary review the records of cargo machinery room air-lock audible and visual alarms and shutdown systems tests.\nInspect the cargo machinery rooms with reference to the safety officer’s checklist and verify:\no Entry procedures and ventilation requirements for the cargo machinery rooms are clearly displayed\nat the entrance.\no Lights are fully operational with no damage or defects to fittings or covers.\no Ventilation is fully operational.\no Cargo machinery room fans are not running noisily or with excessive vibration.\no Gas sampling heads are correctly set.\no Where applicable, air-locks and associated alarms are in satisfactory condition\no Cargo machinery room electrical fittings are not damaged/modified.\no Where fitted, bulkhead seal lubricator reservoirs contain sufficient oil. (Bulkhead shaft seals on\nLNG vessels are normally provided by means of pressurised nitrogen.)\no All exposed rotating shafts are protected with guards.\no No paint or other flammable material is stored in the cargo machinery room.\no Items stored in the cargo machinery room are properly secured against movement and do not\nobstruct access.\no Drainage arrangements are satisfactory.\no Compressors are isolated whilst carrying a cargo of Ethylene Oxide or Propylene Oxide.\nSelect several items from the cargo machinery room inspection checklist and request that the accompanying\nofficer describe or demonstrate what was required to be checked.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure which required that safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms be conducted\nat appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms including associated checklists.\nRecords of regular testing of cargo machinery room air-lock audible and visual alarms and shut-down\nsystems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms be\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist(s) provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the cargo machinery rooms were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company cargo machinery rooms inspection checklist(s).\nSafety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential\ndeficiencies listed below:\no Entry requirements were not posted at the entrance to the cargo machinery rooms.\no There was no warning notice posted outside the cargo machinery rooms requiring the use of\nventilation prior to entry.\no Cargo machinery room lighting was not fully operational.\no Cargo machinery room lighting was inadequate to illuminate the space.\no Cargo machinery room light fittings had:\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\nCracks in metal casings or covers.\nCracked or broken glass.\nFailure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.\nFlame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.\nGaskets present between mating metal surfaces.\nThe compressor room ventilation system was not maintaining negative relative pressure.\nThe motor room ventilation system was not maintaining relative positive pressure.\nThe air-lock ventilation system was not maintaining relative positive pressure\nThe cargo machinery room fan(s) were running noisily or with excessive vibration.\nThere were gas leaks evident in the compressor room.\nCargo machinery room ventilation inlet or outlet grilles were obstructed.\nThe cargo machinery room gas sampling heads and/or ventilation points were incorrectly set for the\ncargo being carried.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and/or status of the gas sampling heads\nin the cargo machinery room.\nAudible and/or visual air lock alarms were not operational.\nThere were no records of tests of the air lock alarm and shut down system.\nAirlock door seals were damaged or ineffective.\nHold back arrangements were fitted to air-lock doors and/or doors were held open.\nCargo machinery room electrical fittings were found to be damaged/modified.\nA bulkhead seal between the compressor and motor rooms was not gas tight and operating\neffectively e.g. a lubricating oil reservoir was low or empty.\nAn exposed rotating shaft was not protected with a guard.\nFlammable materials were found stowed in a cargo machinery room.\nItems stored in the cargo machinery room were not properly secured against movement.\nMaterials were stowed in a cargo machinery room that obstructed safe unrestricted access to\noperate valves or rescue an injured person.\nArrangements to deal with drainage of the cargo machinery room were blocked/ineffective.\nCompressors were not isolated whilst carrying a cargo of Ethylene Oxide or Propylene Oxide.\n\n\n\n\n\nWhere the entry procedures for the compressor room posted at the entrance were not in alignment with the enclosed\nspace entry procedure contained in the SMS or, compressor room entry was authorised without full compliance with\nthe enclosed space entry procedure, make a negative observation under question 5.5.1.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the cargo machinery rooms, this\nshould be documented within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question\nrelating to the hardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the forecastle, and had inspections been effective in identifying hazards to\nhealth, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nSafety inspection of the forecastle spaces\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that the forecastle is always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n2.5 Good housekeeping\n2.5.1 All ships move in a seaway and as space is very limited aboard any vessel, good housekeeping is essential for\nsafe working/access and hygiene control. Attention should be paid in particular to the:\n• •\nsafe and secure stowage of loose items;\nadequate illumination of all work/transit areas;\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n10.3 Identifying enclosed spaces\nA list of identified enclosed spaces should be available on board every ship and these spaces should be clearly\nmarked. Examples include:\n• •\nChain lockers.\nThruster spaces.\nThe Master should ensure that all entrances to unattended enclosed spaces on the ship are kept closed or otherwise\nsecured against entry.\n13.5.7 Forecastle spaces and midships stores\nDo not carry packaged petroleum or other flammable liquids in the forecastle spaces, midship stores or any other\nspace unless they have been specifically designed and classified.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the forecastle, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nWeathertight doors to the forecastle space should be in satisfactory condition and capable of being properly secured.\nForecastle spaces should be well illuminated, free of water, and clean and tidy.\nStarter panels should be protected from leakage from SW line flanges and the watertight entrance door to the space.\nAny stores, spare parts etc. should be properly secured against movement.\nThere should be no flammable liquids stored in the forecastle unless it has been specifically designed and classified.\nAccess to bitter end securing arrangements, safety equipment and bilge wells/alarms should be clear and\nunobstructed.\nChain lockers should be clearly marked as enclosed spaces and the doors securely closed.\nAccess to interconnected spaces such as bow thruster rooms, transfer pumprooms etc. should be clearly marked\nwith the entry controls in accordance with the company enclosed spaces entry procedures.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\nforecastle were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and\npotential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the forecastle, including associated checklists.\nInspect the forecastle spaces and verify that:\no Weathertight doors to the forecastle space are in satisfactory condition and capable of being\nproperly secured.\no Forecastle spaces are well illuminated, free of water, and clean and tidy.\no Any stores, spare parts etc. are properly secured against movement.\no No flammable liquids are stored in the forecastle unless it has been specifically designed and\nclassified.\no Access to bitter end securing arrangements, safety equipment and bilge wells/alarms is clear and\nunobstructed.\no Chain lockers are clearly marked as enclosed spaces and the doors securely closed.\no Thruster rooms, transfer pump rooms or other any other interconnected spaces are clearly marked\nwith the required safe entry controls and requirements.\no Any electrical or hydraulic equipment or other machinery in the forecastle spaces is in satisfactory\ncondition.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which required that safety inspections of the forecastle were conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the forecastle including associated checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the forecastle were conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the forecastle were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the forecastle.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the forecastle were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company forecastle inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the forecastle were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential deficiencies\nlisted below:\no Weathertight doors to the forecastle space were not in satisfactory condition and capable of being\nproperly secured.\no Forecastle spaces were not well illuminated, free of water, and/or clean and tidy.\no Stores, spare parts etc. were not properly secured against movement.\no Flammable liquids were stored in the forecastle which was not specifically designed and classified.\no Access to bitter end securing arrangements, safety equipment and bilge wells/alarms was not clear\nand unobstructed.\no Chain lockers were not clearly marked as enclosed spaces and/or the doors securely closed.\no Thruster rooms, transfer pump rooms or other any other interconnected spaces were not clearly\nmarked with required safe entry controls and requirements.\no Electrical or hydraulic equipment or other machinery in the forecastle spaces was not in satisfactory\ncondition.\no Starter panels were not protected from leakage from SW line flanges and/or the watertight entrance\ndoor to the space.\no There was evidence of leakage from the anchor wash SW lines into the space.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the forecastle spaces, this should\nbe documented within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question relating to\nthe hardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the accommodation, and had inspections been effective in identifying\nhazards to health, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nSafety inspections of the accommodation spaces\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInternal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that the accommodation is always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n2.2.3 Fire aboard a vessel can be disastrous. Common causes are:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• faulty electrical appliances/circuitry;\noverloading of electrical circuitry;\ncareless disposal of cigarette ends;\ndamp storage of linen/materials;\ngalley fires due to overheating of cooking oils;\ncarelessness with hand-pressing irons; or\nincorrect methods of drying laundry.\n2.2.4 Personnel should be made aware of these risks and ensure at all times that fire risks are removed where\npossible or kept to a minimum through good housekeeping, regular inspection and maintenance of electrical circuitry\nand appliances, etc.\n2.5 Good housekeeping\n2.5.1 All ships move in a seaway and as space is very limited aboard any vessel, good housekeeping is essential for\nsafe working/access and hygiene control. Attention should be paid in particular to the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• safe and secure stowage of loose items;\nproper securing of doors, etc.;\ngood maintenance of fittings and fixtures;\nadequate illumination of all work/transit areas;\navoidance of overloading of electrical circuits;\nclear and legible signs/operational notices; and\nproper clearance and disposal of garbage/waste materials.\n23.9 Refrigerated rooms and store-rooms\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAll refrigerated room doors should be fitted with a means of opening the door from both sides. It should be\npossible to sound an alarm from inside the room.\nA routine testing of the alarm bell and checking of the door clasps and inside release should be carried out\nregularly, at least at weekly intervals.\nThose using the refrigerated room should make themselves familiar with the operation, in darkness, of the\ninside release for the door and the location of the alarm button.\nAll refrigerated room doors should be fitted with an arrangement of adequate strength to hold the door open\nin a seaway and should be secured open while stores are being handled. These doors are extremely heavy\nand can cause serious injury to a person caught between the door and the jamb.\nAnyone going into a refrigerated room should take the padlock, if any, inside with them. Another person\nshould be informed.\nCold stores or refrigerated rooms should not be entered if it is suspected that there has been a leakage of\nrefrigerant. A warning notice to this effect should be posted outside the doors.\nAll stores and crates should be stowed securely so that they do not shift or move in a seaway.\nWhen wooden boxes or crates are opened, protruding fastenings should be removed or made safe.\nMetal meat hooks not in use should be stowed in a special container provided for the purpose. Where hooks\ncannot be removed easily, they should be kept away from passageways or areas where people are working.\nFor entry into meat and fish storage rooms, appropriate thermal personal protective equipment should be\nreadily available.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the accommodation, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety\nOfficer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nIn addition to the guidance stated above:\n• •\nWeathertight doors, windows and portholes should be in good order and capable of being properly secured.\nThe ship's hospital, where provided, should be ready for immediate use. The ship's hospital should not be\nused as an additional cabin or used as a storeroom.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\naccommodation were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards\nand potential hazards to health, safety and the environment\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the accommodation, including associated\nchecklists.\n• •\nWhere necessary review the records of testing the refrigerated room alarm.\nInspect the accommodation spaces, including public spaces, sanitary areas, laundries, food store handling\nspaces, refrigerated spaces, galley, pantries and the hospital with reference to the safety officer’s checklist\nand verify that:\no Accommodation spaces are well illuminated, clean, tidy, in a hygienic condition and obstruction\nfree.\no There are no overloaded electrical sockets.\no The condition of electrical equipment is satisfactory.\no Smoking regulations are being observed.\no Laundries are free of accumulations of clothing that could constitute a fire hazard.\no Laundry driers and vents are free of accumulations of lint and fluff that could constitute a fire\nhazard.\no Weathertight doors, windows and portholes are in good order and capable of being properly\nsecured.\no The ship's hospital, where provided, is ready for immediate use and not being used as an additional\ncabin or storeroom.\no The refrigerated room alarm is operational and regularly tested.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedure which required that safety inspections of the accommodation were conducted at\nappropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards to health,\nsafety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the accommodation including associated checklists.\nRecords of regular testing of the refrigerated room alarm.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the accommodation were\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the accommodation were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the accommodation.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the accommodation were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company accommodation inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the accommodation were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the potential\ndeficiencies listed below:\no Accommodation spaces were not well illuminated, clean, tidy, in a hygienic condition and/or\nobstruction free.\no There were overloaded electrical sockets.\no The condition of electrical equipment was not satisfactory (give details).\no Smoking regulations were not being observed.\no Laundries contained accumulations of clothing that could constitute a fire hazard.\no Laundry driers and/or vents contained accumulations of lint and fluff that could constitute a fire\nhazard.\no A weathertight door, window or porthole was not in good order and capable of being properly\nsecured.\no The ship's hospital was not ready for immediate use but was being used as an additional cabin or\nstoreroom.\no The refrigerated room alarm was not operational.\no The refrigerated room alarm had not been regularly tested.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the accommodation spaces, this\nshould be documented within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific question\nrelating to the hardware included in the CVIQ.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.8.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for safety", "c": "inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom, and had inspections been effective\nin identifying hazards to health, safety and the environment?\nShort Question Text\nBallast and/or bunker pumproom safety inspection\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the ballast and/or bunker pump room is always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n4.11.7 Inspection, maintenance and testing of electrical equipment\n4.11.7.1 Inspection and checks\nTypical inspections should include checking:\nCracks in metal casings or covers, cracked or broken glass, or failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or\nexplosion-proof enclosures.\nCovers of flame-proof enclosures, to ensure that they are tight, that no bolts are missing and that no gaskets are\npresent between mating metal surfaces.\n12.1.15.3 Routine maintenance and housekeeping issues\nIt is important that the integrity of pipelines and pumps is maintained and that any leaks are detected and rectified as\nsoon as possible.\nPumproom bilges should be kept clean and dry. Particular care should be taken to prevent hydrocarbon liquids or\nvapour escaping into the pumproom.\nValve glands and drain cocks should be regularly inspected to ensure they do not leak.\nBulkhead penetrations should be routinely checked to ensure the seals are effective….\nThe pumproom rescue harness and rope should be checked regularly to ensure it is fit for use and rigged for\nimmediate operation….\nEmergency escape routes should be regularly checked to ensure they are properly marked and clear of obstructions.\nWhere an escape trunk is fitted, check doors for ease of operation. Door seals should be effective and lighting within\nthe trunk should be operational.\n12.1.15.5 Inspecting and maintaining pumproom ventilation fans\nPumproom ventilation fans operate by drawing air out of the space. If a gas is in the pumproom and the blades of the\nfan impeller touch the casing, or the fan bearings or seals overheat, the vapours could ignite.\nPumproom extractor fans, including impellers, shafts and gas seals, should be inspected regularly.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required that safety inspections of all the accessible\nareas of the ship, including the ballast and/or bunker pumproom, are conducted at appropriate intervals by the\ndesignated Safety Officer.\nAn appropriate checklist should have been developed to facilitate these inspections.\nPumproom fans must be operating in the extraction mode. On some vessels with ballast or fuel oil transfer\npumprooms only one extraction fan is fitted. In the event of failure, alternative temporary arrangements combined\nwith a risk assessment/enclosed space entry permit must be made prior to entry.\nBallast and bunker pumprooms do not have to comply with the requirements of SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation\n4.5.10 for temperature sensing devices, interlocked lighting, gas detection or bilge level monitoring.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that safety inspections of the\nballast and/or bunker pumproom were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to\nidentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment\nWhere necessary review the records of safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom including\nassociated checklists.\nInspect the ballast and/or bunker pumproom with reference to the Safety Officer’s checklist and verify:\no Entry procedures for the pumproom were clearly displayed at the entrance.\no Lights were fully operational with no damage or defects to fittings or covers.\no Ventilation was fully operational with only lower suctions, (if higher suctions are fitted), open.\no The emergency ventilation dampers, (if fitted), were clearly marked and fully operational.\no Pumproom fan(s) were not running noisily or with excessive vibration.\no Bilges were clean and free of combustible material.\no Items stored in the pumproom were properly secured against movement.\no No paint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom.\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\n• Bunker and hydraulic systems were free of oil leaks.\nBallast systems, including ballast water treatment plant, were free of significant leaks.\nBunker and ballast piping were free of patches or temporary repairs.\nBulkhead seals and penetrations were in apparent good order, and, if fitted with oil/grease cups,\nthese were filled above the minimum level.\nA rescue harness and means of recovery was rigged ready for immediate use.\nAll exposed rotating shafts were protected with guards.\nPipe lagging, where fitted, was clean and free from oil impregnation.\nSafety chains were in place to prevent falling down open vertical ladder accesses.\nGratings or removable deck plates were in good condition and properly fitted.\nBunker and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were clearly marked.\nThe pumproom telephone, if fitted, was fully operational.\nSelect several items from the ballast and/or bunker pumproom inspection checklist and request that the\naccompanying officer describe or demonstrate what was required to be checked.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which required that safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were\nconducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and potential hazards\nto health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom including associated checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker\npumproom be conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety Officer to identify hazards and\npotential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nRecords of safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were missing or incomplete.\nThere was no checklist provided to facilitate the safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required that safety inspections\nof the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were conducted at appropriate intervals by the designated Safety\nOfficer.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted in accordance\nwith the company ballast and/or bunker pumproom inspection checklist.\nSafety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker pumproom were ineffective as demonstrated by any of the\npotential deficiencies listed below:\no Pumproom lighting was not fully operational.\no Pumproom lighting was inadequate to illuminate the space.\no Pumproom light fittings had:\n Cracks in metal casings or covers.\n Cracked or broken glass.\n Failure of cement around glass in flame-proof or explosion-proof enclosures.\n Flame-proof enclosures that were not tight or had missing bolts.\n Gaskets present between mating metal surfaces.\no The pumproom ventilation was not:\n Operating in extraction mode.\n Operating at the correct (lower) suction.\n Operational due to the failure of the single fan fitted. (Give details of alternative temporary\narrangements in place.)\no The pumproom fan(s) was running noisily or with excessive vibration.\no The pumproom bilges were not clean and dry.\no There were leaks from pumps, pipelines, valve glands or instrumentation.\no Bunker or ballast pipelines were temporarily repaired with patches or bandages.\no Bulkhead seals were defective in any respect including grease/oil cups that were\ncracked/broken/missing or below the minimum level.\no\no\no\no\n• Exposed rotating shafts were not protected with guards.\nPipe lagging was impregnated with oil or missing from sections of hot piping intended to be lagged.\nItems stored in the pumproom were not properly secured against movement.\nPaint or other flammable material was stored in the pumproom unless contained within an area\nspecifically designed and designated for such storage.\no The pumproom rescue harness was not fit for use and rigged for immediate operation.\no Safety chains to prevent falling through open vertical ladder accesses were missing or not\nconnected.\no Bunker and ballast pump emergency stop buttons were not clearly marked.\no The pumproom telephone was defective.\nThere was a safety deficiency of any kind in the pumproom.\nWhere the entry procedures for the pumproom posted at the entrance were not in alignment with the enclosed space\nentry procedure contained in the SMS or, ballast and/or bunker pumproom entry was authorised during the inspection\nwithout full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make a negative observation in the Process\nresponse tool of question 5.5.1.\nWhere a hardware defect was noted as evidence of ineffective safety inspections of the ballast and/or bunker\npumproom, this should be recorded within the Hardware response tool for this question unless identified by a specific\nquestion relating to the hardware included in the CVIQ.\n5.9. Lifting and Rigging", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.9.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company lifting and rigging", "c": "procedures, and was evidence available to demonstrate that each item of lifting and\nrigging equipment had been maintained, inspected and tested in accordance with the\nprocedure?\nShort Question Text\nLifting and rigging equipment procedures, maintenance and inspection\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Room, Main Deck, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nOCIMF: Recommendations for the Tagging/Labelling\nTesting and Maintenance\nDocumentation/Certification for Ships' Lifting Equipment May 2005\nObjective\nTo ensure that all lifting and rigging equipment has been thoroughly inspected at least annually and is\nalways fit for purpose when used.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Recommendations for the Tagging/Labelling, Testing and Maintenance, Documentation/Certification\nfor Ships' Lifting Equipment May 2005\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\nChapter 19 Lifting Equipment and Operations\n19.1.2 ‘Lifting equipment’ means work equipment used for lifting or lowering loads and includes the attachments used\nfor anchoring, fixing or supporting it.\n19.1.3 ‘Loose gear’ means any gear by means of which a load can be attached to lifting equipment but which does\nnot form an integral part of either the lifting equipment or the load.\n19.2.1 A valid certificate of testing and thorough examination by a competent person should be in force for every item\nof lifting equipment, accessory for lifting and loose gear…\nA certificate for ship’s lifting equipment is valid for no more than five years.\n19.3.2 When there is any suspicion that any lifting equipment or any part of that equipment may have been subjected\nto excessive loads, exceeding the SWL, or subject to treatment likely to cause damage, it should be taken out of\nservice until it can be subjected to a thorough examination by a competent person.\n19.4.2 Any lifting equipment or accessory for lifting that is, or has been, exposed to conditions that could cause\ndeterioration in its condition should be:\n• Thoroughly examined;\no\n• In the case of lifting equipment for lifting persons or an accessory or lifting, at least every six\nmonths;\no In the case of other lifting equipment, at least every 12 months; or\no In either case, in accordance with an examination scheme; and\no Whenever exceptional circumstances that are liable to jeopardize the safety of the lifting equipment\nhave occurred; and\nWhere appropriate, inspected by a competent person at suitable intervals.\n19.7.1 All vessels are required to maintain records of manufacture, examination, inspection and testing of lifting\nequipment. Records and service history should be kept of equipment, of dates when and where it is brought into use,\nits safe working load, plus any repairs, modifications, tests and examinations carried out.\n19.9.5 No person should be lifted except where the equipment is designed or specially adapted and equipped for that\npurpose, or for rescue in emergencies.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 procedures require that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated\nSafety Officer.\nSafety inspections of the vessel:\n• •\nIdentify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nInclude all accessible areas of the vessel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nLifting equipment with a safe working load (SWL) of 1000kg or greater and its associated loose gear will generally be\ninspected and certified by the vessel’s Classification Society in accordance with Flag Administration rules.\nRigging equipment is considered to be any equipment used for lifting, pulling, dragging or moving objects that is not\ndefined as either lifting equipment or loose gear.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the management of lifting and rigging equipment in the\nfollowing categories:\n• •\nLifting equipment and loose gear inspected and certified by the vessel’s Classification Society. The\nprocedure should provide guidance on:\no The maintenance of the required certification in accordance with the Flag Administration rules.\no The routine maintenance and onboard inspection by a competent person.\no The requirement to retain certificates for each fall wire or topping lift wire.\no The company mandatory retirement criteria for fall wires and topping lift wires\nLifting equipment, loose gear and rigging equipment not inspected or certified by the vessel’s Classification\nSociety, which remains the sole responsibility of vessel staff to verify as fit for purpose. The procedure\nshould provide guidance on:\no The definition of all equipment considered to fall under this classification.\no The retention of certificates, or equivalent, for each item of lifting or rigging equipment, including fall\nwires.\no The inspection of each item of equipment by a competent person at a defined interval.\no The marking of each item of equipment with a unique identifier.\no The marking of each item of equipment with its SWL.\no The marking of each item of equipment with a ready means to identify that the equipment remains\nfit for continued use.\no\n• The development and maintenance of an inventory of all such equipment which includes:\n The normal storage location of each item of equipment.\n The date each item of equipment was brought into service.\n The safe working load (SWL) of each item of equipment.\n The date of the last inspection by a competent person of each item of equipment.\n The date of the last proof load test, where required.\no The retirement criteria for the rigging equipment.\no The retirement criteria for fall wires of davits and hoists.\no The age at which mandatory retirement of specific items of rigging equipment must take place.\nThe requirement that each item of lifting and rigging equipment is inspected by the work supervisor prior to\neach use to verify that it remained fit for continued use.\nColour coding may be considered as a convenient method to identify the inspection status of each item of lifting or\nrigging equipment.\nItems of lifting equipment, loose gear and rigging equipment that should be considered under this question.\n• •\nCranes, derricks, davits, beam chain blocks, lifting beams and pad eyes (which form part of the vessel’s\noutfitting)\nChain blocks, wire hoists, snatch blocks, webbing slings, hose slings, wire rope slings, multi-leg bridles,\nshackles, hooks, tripods, shear legs, mucking winches and tank rescue hoists. (which do not form part of the\nvessel’s outfitting)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for the management of lifting and rigging\nequipment.\nVerify the validity of the certificates for lifting equipment and loose gear required to be inspected and\ncertified under the vessel’s Classification Society and/or Flag administration rules.\nReview the inventory of lifting and rigging equipment not covered by a Classification Society inspection and\ncertification process and verify that:\no The inventory listed all items of equipment defined by the company lifting and rigging procedure\nand included for each item:\n The normal storage location.\n The date brought into service.\n The SWL.\n The date of the last inspection by a competent person.\no Manufacturer’s certificates or equivalent were available for each item.\no Proof load test certificates were available, where required by the company procedure.\no Inspections had been completed and documented in accordance with the company procedure.\n• During the general inspection, inspect a selection of lifting and rigging equipment and verify:\no That each item was marked with a unique identifier, its SWL and an indicator that it had been\ninspected in accordance with the company procedure.\no That each item was in apparently satisfactory condition and fit for continued use.\n• Interview a rating to verify their understanding of the markings on a selected item of lifting or rigging\nequipment and the checks they would undertake before using it during routine work.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedure for the management of lifting and rigging equipment.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe certificates for each item of lifting equipment covered by a Classification Society programme.\nThe records of periodic inspections by a competent person required to be maintained for each item of lifting\nequipment and loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme.\nThe inventory of lifting and rigging equipment not covered by a Classification Society programme.\nThe manufacturer’s certificates for all lifting equipment wire falls and topping lift wires.\nThe manufacturer’s test certificates or equivalent for all items of lifting or rigging equipment not covered by a\nClassification Society programme.\nThe proof load test certificates for items not covered by a Classification Society programme where such\ntests were required by the company lifting and rigging procedure.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the management of lifting and rigging equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for the management of lifting and\nrigging equipment.\nCertification for lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme had not\nbeen maintained in accordance with the Classification Society requirements:\nAn item of lifting equipment and loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme was out of\nservice.\nAn item of lifting equipment or loose gear covered by a Classification Society programme was found to be\ndefective in any respect.\nThere was no inventory of lifting and rigging equipment for all equipment that was not covered by a\nClassification Society programme.\nThe inventory of lifting or rigging equipment had not been maintained in accordance with company rigging\nand lifting procedure:\nManufacturer’s test certificates were not available for each item of rigging equipment and, lifting equipment\nfall and topping lift wires.\nItems of rigging equipment or, fall or topping lift wires, had not been removed from service in accordance\nwith the company retirement criteria.\nItems of lifting or rigging equipment were not marked in accordance with the company lifting and rigging\nprocedure.\nItems of lifting or rigging equipment had not been periodically inspected by a competent person in\naccordance with the company procedure.\nItems of lifting or rigging gear which had not been removed from service were found to be in an apparently\nunsatisfactory condition.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the inventory of lifting and rigging equipment.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the markings required on each item of lifting or rigging equipment\nand/or the checks required to be undertaken before using the item during routine work.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.9.2.", "t": "Where the vessel was fitted with a single cargo hose handling crane, was a risk", "c": "assessment available which identified the minimum spare parts that must be carried\nonboard to ensure continued operation in the event of a single component failure, and\nwere the identified spare parts available onboard?\nShort Question Text\nSpare parts for a single cargo hose handling crane.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that a hose crane is always available to connect and disconnect cargo hoses.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s strategy.\nThe company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system, for\nexample:\n• •\nDeck machinery.\nCargo handling machinery/equipment.\nThe spare parts inventory may be standalone or integrated into the planned maintenance system.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nTo ensure that cargo hoses can be safely disconnected in the event of a single component failure of the cargo hose\ncrane, there should be the capability to replace a defective hydraulic hose or other essential mechanical component\nwith an available spare.\nWhere a vessel is fitted with two identical hose handling cranes, hydraulic hoses and other critical mechanical\ncomponents can be exchanged between cranes as a temporary measure.\nWhere a vessel is fitted with a single hose handling crane, the vessel operator should have conducted a risk\nassessment to identify those crane components that may fail during operation and then to have made provision for an\nappropriate stock of spare parts to be carried. Items to be considered by the risk assessment should include but not\nbe limited to:\n• •\nHydraulic hoses.\nComplete winch motors or a comprehensive set of manufacturers recommended spare parts.\n• •\nComplete hydraulic pumps or a comprehensive set of manufacturers recommended spare parts.\nLifting and luffing wires as appropriate to the design of the crane.\nIt is an OCIMF expectation that at least one hydraulic hose of each size and length fitted to the hose handling crane\nshould be carried as a spare.\nWhere a vessel is fitted with a special purpose crane for lightering or offshore hose handling in addition to two\nstandard hose handling cranes, the special purpose crane should be treated as if it were a single crane unless it\nshared the same components as the standard hose handling cranes.\nThis question will only be allocated where a vessel is fitted with a single hose handling crane. (HVPQ question\n10.9.2.1 or 10.9.3.1 answered as 1)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nReview the risk assessment for the continued operation of a single hose crane.\nReview the inventory of spare hydraulic hoses for the cargo hose handling crane and verify that at least one\nspare hose with the same specification and rating was available for each diameter and length of hydraulic\nhose fitted to the crane.\nReview the inventory of any other items or spare parts identified by the risk assessment.\nSight the spare hydraulic hoses and any other spare parts required to be carried by the risk assessment.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The risk assessment for the continued operation of a single hose crane.\nThe inventory of spare parts for the hose crane including hydraulic hoses, with details of length, diameter\nand hose end fittings.\nThe hose crane operations and maintenance manual which included the full list of hydraulic hoses, including\ndiameter and length, fitted to the hose handling crane.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no risk assessment available which identified the minimum spare parts that must be carried for a\nsingle hose handling crane.\nThere was not at least one spare hydraulic hose suitable to replace any hydraulic hose fitted to the hose\nhandling crane.\nAny other spare parts identified by the risk assessment as being essential for the continued use of the hose\nhandling crane were not available onboard.\n5.10. Safe Access", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.1.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for rigging the pilot boarding arrangements, and was the equipment provided\nin satisfactory condition and used in accordance with industry best practice?\nShort Question Text\nPilot boarding arrangements\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Rating, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: Resolution A.1045(27) Recommendation on pilot transfer arrangements\nIMO: Resolution A.1108(29) Amendments to the Recommendation on pilot transfer arrangements\nObjective\nTo ensure pilot boarding arrangements are always correctly rigged under the supervision of a responsible\nofficer.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\n5.3.2 Embarking the Pilot\nThe Master should ensure the availability of a properly maintained means of pilot embarkation and disembarkation\nthat is positioned, rigged, checked and manned in accordance with IMO recommendations (see Checklist A4) and,\nwhere applicable, local requirements…\nThe Pilot should:\n• •\nUse appropriate personal protective equipment; and\nLiaise with the Master so that the ship is positioned and manoeuvred to permit safe boarding.\nThe Pilot may be expected to check that boarding equipment appears properly rigged and manned.\nChecklist A4 Required Boarding Arrangements for Pilots\nIMO: Resolution A.1045(27) Recommendation on pilot transfer arrangements\nBasis for ICS Bridge Procedures Guide Checklist A4\nIMO: Resolution A.1108(29) Amendments to the Recommendation on pilot transfer arrangements\nThe existing paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 are amended to read as follows:\n.1 a gateway in the rails or bulwark, adequate handholds should be provided at the point of embarking on or\ndisembarking from the ship on each side which should be not less than 0.7 m or more than 0.8 m apart. Each\nhandhold should be rigidly secured to the ship's structure at or near its base and also at a higher point, should be not\nless than 32 mm in diameter and should extend not less than 1.2 m above the deck to which it is fitted; and\n.2 a bulwark ladder, two separate handhold stanchions should be fitted at the point of embarking on or disembarking\nfrom the ship on each side which should be not less than 0.7 m or more than 0.8 m apart. The bulwark ladder should\nbe securely attached to the ship to prevent overturning. Each stanchion should be rigidly secured to the ship's\nstructure at or near its base and also at a higher point, should be not less than 32 mm in diameter and should extend\nnot less than 1.2 m above the top of the bulwarks. Stanchions or handrails should not be attached to the bulwark\nladder.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nReference sources from industry organisations, the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers and\nInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines are referred to when compiling a risk assessment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the environment. The various tasks should be\ndefined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 23\n2.2 The rigging of the pilot transfer arrangements and the embarkation of the pilot shall be supervised by a\nresponsible officer having means of communication with the navigation bridge and who shall also arrange for the\nescort of the pilot by a safe route to and from the navigation bridge. Personnel engaged in rigging and operating any\nmechanical equipment shall be instructed in the safe procedures to be adopted and equipment shall be tested prior to\nuse.\n2.3 A Pilot ladder shall be certified by the manufacturer as complying with this regulation or with an international\nstandard acceptable to the organization.\n2.4 All pilot ladders used for pilot transfer shall be clearly identified with tags or other permanent marking so as to\nenable identification of each appliance for the purposes of survey, inspection and record keeping. A record shall be\nkept on the ship as to the date the identified ladder is placed into service and any repairs effected.\n3.2 In all ships, where the distance from sea level to the point of access to, or egress from, the ship exceeds 9m, and\nwhen it is intended to embark pilots by means of the accommodation ladder, or other equally safe and convenient\nmeans in conjunction with a pilot ladder, the ship shall carry such equipment on either side, unless the equipment is\ncapable of being transferred for use on either side.\n7.1 The following associated equipment shall be kept at hand ready for immediate use when persons are being\ntransferred:\n1.\n2.\n3.\ntwo manropes of not less than 28mm and not more than 32mm in diameter properly secured to the ship if\nrequired by the pilot…\na lifebuoy equipped with a self-igniting light\na heaving line\n7.2 When required by paragraph 4 above, stanchions and bulwark ladders shall be provided.\n8 Lighting\nAdequate lighting shall be provided to illuminate the transfer arrangements overside and the position on deck where a\nperson embarks or disembarks.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the safe rigging of the pilot boarding arrangements,\nwhich included :\n• •\n• •\nThe inspection of the pilot boarding equipment before each use.\nThe required rigging process for pilot boarding arrangements.\nThe required level of supervision during the rigging and recovery of the pilot boarding arrangement.\nThe required level of supervision during pilot transfer.\nThe procedure may refer to, or incorporate, industry best practice and/or ship pilot boarding arrangement drawings.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which described the requirements for the\nrigging and recovery of the pilot boarding arrangements.\nWhere necessary review the certification and maintenance records for the pilot ladders.\nInspect at least one pilot ladder and verify that:\no The ladder was clearly identified with tags or other permanent marking to allow connection to\ncertification and maintenance records.\no The side ropes were continuous with no shackles, splices or knots.\no The steps were equally spaced.\no The steps were horizontal and tightly secured.\no Each spreader was integral to a step was not a separate item lashed between steps.\no The side ropes were equally spaced.\no The steps were not painted, varnished, dirty or slippery.\no The steps were free of cracks or crush damage.\no There were no loops or tripping lines to present a tripping hazard or that could foul the pilot launch.\no The ladder was apparently constructed in accordance with the guidance provided in the Bridge\nProcedures Guide (BPG) checklist A4.\no Where the ladder had been repaired with replacement steps, the number of replacement steps and\nthe means of inserting them was in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidance.\nInspect the pilot ladder securing arrangements and verify that the weight of the ladder was taken by the side\nropes and not by a step.\nInspect the access to deck and verify that deck securing points, handhold stanchions and a bulwark ladder\nwere provided as appropriate to the pilot boarding arrangement provided.\nInspect the deck at the pilot boarding position and verify that the deck was provided with an anti-slip finish.\nInspect the gateway in the rails or bulwark, where provided, and verify that it opened inwards, was provided\nwith holdback arrangements and that it did not impede the safe passage of the pilot when boarding or\ndisembarking.\nVerify that the pilot boarding position was within the parallel body length of the vessel for all normal\noperating draughts.\nInspect the lifebuoy and self-igniting light and verify that the heaving line was not connected to the lifebuoy.\n(as required by ICS BPG5 Checklist A4)\nRequest that the pilot boarding illumination is switched on and demonstrated as functioning.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\n• The required level of supervision for the rigging and recovery of the pilot boarding arrangements.\n• •\nThe method of securing the pilot ladder and accommodation ladder to the ship’s side when rigging a\ncombination ladder.\nThe safety precautions required when working over the side while rigging or recovering a pilot ladder or\ncombination ladder.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their understanding of the process to rig and recover the pilot boarding arrangement\nespecially as it related to working over the side.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for the safe rigging of the pilot boarding arrangements.\nThe manufacturer’s certificates for each pilot ladder.\nThe manufacturer’s repair instructions, where provided.\nThe maintenance records for each pilot ladder which included the date the ladder was put in service.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for the safe rigging of the pilot boarding arrangements.\nAn inspected pilot ladder was found:\no Without any identification to connect it to its manufacturer’s certificate or maintenance records.\no With defects or arrangements which were specifically identified as unacceptable on BPG Checklist\nA4.\no Constructed with materials or in a manner that did not comply with BPG Checklist A4.\no Without manufacturer’s certificates or maintenance records.\no To have been repaired in a manner which did not conform to the manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe pilot access arrangements did not conform to the requirements of BPG Checklist A4.\nThe pilot boarding position was not within the parallel body length of the vessel for all normal operating\ndraughts.\nWhere a combination ladder was required due to the vessel’s freeboard, the means to secure the pilot\nladder and the accommodation ladder to the ship’s side was missing or broken.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for rigging and recovering the pilot\nboarding arrangements.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the pilot boarding arrangements provided.\nAn interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover the pilot boarding\narrangements.\nAn item of equipment related to the pilot boarding arrangement was found to be missing or defective.\nThe pilot boarding illumination was defective.\nThe pilot ladder securing arrangement did not ensure that the weight of the pilot ladder was supported by\nthe side ropes.\nThe gateway in the rails or bulwark opened outwards, did not have a means to hold it open or impeded the\nsafe passage of the pilot when embarking or disembarking.\nThe deck area in the vicinity of the pilot boarding area did not have a non-slip finish.\nWhere a pilot boarding arrangement was in the rigged condition during the inspection it was observed to be\nrigged in a manner that did not conform to ICS BPG5 Checklist A4 or the vessel’s pilot boarding\narrangement rigging drawings.\nA damaged or retired pilot ladder was retained onboard but was not clearly marked to prevent its use for\neither pilot transfer or any other purpose", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.2.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for rigging the accommodation ladders, and were the accommodation\nladders in good order and used in accordance with the company procedure and\nmanufacturer’s instructions?\nShort Question Text\nAccommodation ladders\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Deck Rating, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1331 Guidelines for Construction\nInstallation\nMaintenance and Inspection/Survey of Means of Embarkation and Disembarkation.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure accommodation ladders are always correctly rigged under the supervision of a responsible\nperson or officer.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1331 Guidelines for Construction, Installation, Maintenance and Inspection/Survey of Means\nof Embarkation and Disembarkation.\n3.3 Lifebuoy\nA lifebuoy equipped with a self-igniting light and a buoyant lifeline should be available for immediate use in the vicinity\nof the embarkation and disembarkation arrangement when in use.\n3.5 Marking\nEach accommodation ladder or gangway should be clearly marked at each end with a plate showing the restrictions\non the safe operation and loading, including the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination,\ndesign load, maximum load on bottom end plate, etc. Where the maximum operational load is less than the design\nload, it should also be shown on the marking plate.\n3.7 Positioning\n3.7.1 …accommodation ladders should not be used at an angle greater than 55° from the horizontal, unless designed\nand constructed for use at angles greater than these and marked as such, as required by paragraph 3.5.\n3.7.3 Adequate lighting for means of embarkation and disembarkation and the immediate approaches should be\nensured from the ship and/or the shore in hours of darkness.\n3.8 Rigging (safety net)\nA safety net should be mounted in way of the accommodation ladders and gangways where it is possible that a\nperson may fall from the means of embarkation and disembarkation or between the ship and quayside.\n4.1 Accommodation ladders and gangways, including associate winch and fittings, should be properly maintained and\ninspected at appropriate intervals as required by SOLAS regulation III/20.7.2, in accordance with manufacturers’\ninstructions. Additional checks should be made each time the accommodation ladder and gangway is rigged, looking\nout for signs of distortion, cracks and corrosion. Close examination for possible corrosion should be carried out,\nespecially when an aluminium accommodation ladder/gangway has fittings made of mild steel.\n4.2 Bent stanchions should be replaced or repaired, and guard ropes should be inspected for wear and renewed\nwhere necessary.\n4.3 Moving parts should be free to turn and should be greased as appropriate.\n4.4 The lifting equipment should be inspected, tested and maintained paying careful attention to the condition of the\nhoist wire. The wires used to support the means of embarkation and disembarkation should be renewed, when\nnecessary, as required by SOLAS regulation II-1/3-9.\n4.5 Arrangements should also be made to examine the underside of gangways and accommodation ladders at\nregular intervals.\n4.6 All inspections, maintenance work and repairs of accommodation ladders and gangways should be recorded in\norder to provide an accurate history for each appliance. The information to be recorded appropriately on board should\ninclude the date of the most recent inspection, the name of the person or body who carried out that inspection, the\ndue date for the next inspection and the dates of renewal of wires used to support the embarkation and\ndisembarkation arrangement.\n5.1.1 Accommodation ladder\n5.1.1.1 The following items should be thoroughly examined during annual surveys required by SOLAS regulations I/7\nand I/8 and checked for satisfactory condition of the accommodation ladder:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nsteps;\nplatforms;\nall support points such as pivots, rollers, etc.;\nall suspension points such as lugs, brackets, etc.;\nstanchions, rigid handrails, hand ropes and turntables;\ndavit structure, wire and sheaves, etc.; and\nany other relevant provisions stated in these Guidelines.\n5.1.1.2 At every five-yearly survey, upon completion of the examination required by paragraph 5.1.1.1, the\naccommodation ladder should be operationally tested with the specified maximum operational load of the ladder.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nReference sources from industry organisations, the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers and\nInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines are referred to when compiling a risk assessment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-9\nMeans of embarkation on and disembarkation from ships\n1.\n2.\n3.\nShips constructed on or after 1 January 2010 shall be provided with means of embarkation on and\ndisembarkation from ships for use in port and in port-related operations, such as gangways and\naccommodation ladders, in accordance with paragraph 2, unless the Administration deems compliance with\na particular provision is unreasonable or impractical\nThe means of embarkation and disembarkation required in paragraph 1 shall be constructed and installed\nbased on the guidelines developed by the Organization.\nFor all ships the means of embarkation and disembarkation shall be inspected and maintained in suitable\ncondition for their intended purpose, taking into account any restrictions related to safe loading. All wires\nused to support the means of embarkation and disembarkation shall be maintained as specified in regulation\nIII/20.4.\nChapter III Regulation 20\n4 Maintenance of falls\nFalls used in launching shall be inspected periodically with special regard for areas passing through sheaves, and\nrenewed when necessary due to deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than 5 years, whichever is earlier.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for the safe rigging of the accommodation ladder, which\nincluded but was not limited to:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The inspection of the accommodation ladder before each use.\nThe rigging process for the accommodation ladder.\nThe required level of supervision during the rigging and recovery of the accommodation ladder.\nThe provision of a lifebuoy, light and line in the vicinity of the accommodation ladder when in use.\nThe circumstances in which a safety net is required to be rigged\nAny restrictions imposed on the use of the accommodation ladder for personnel transfer while the vessel is\nunderway.\nThe required level of supervision during personnel transfer.\nThe procedure may refer to, or incorporate, industry best practice and/or accommodation ladder arrangement\ndrawings.\nThe line should be attached to the lifebuoy and light and marked with the symbol described by IMO Res. A.1116(30)\nLSS008\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which described the requirements for the\nrigging and recovery of the accommodation ladders.\nWhere necessary, review the manufacturer’s instructions and/or drawings for the accommodation ladders.\nWhere necessary review the maintenance and load test records for the accommodation ladders, including\nthe date of the fall wires installation.\nInspect one accommodation ladder and its hoisting arrangement and verify that:\no The accommodation ladder was clearly marked at each end with a plate or other markings showing\nthe restrictions on the safe operation and loading, including the maximum and minimum permitted\ndesign angles of inclination, design load, maximum load on bottom end plate.\no The fall wire(s) were in apparent good order.\no\no\n• There was sufficient wire remaining on the winch storage drum when the accommodation ladder\nwas deployed at the maximum freeboard (It is not expected that the inspector requests that this is\ndemonstrated)\nThe visible parts of the accommodation ladder and its hoisting arrangement were in apparent good\norder and free from:\n Cracks or fractures.\n Excessive corrosion especially in areas where dissimilar metals are used.\n Bucking or deformation of the individual steps or main structure.\n Missing, broken or deformed stanchions or handrails.\n Seized turntables, rollers or pivots.\n Damage to lifting and support points.\n Missing locking or securing pins for adjusting the lower platform angle.\nRequest that the accommodation ladder illumination is switched on and demonstrated as functioning.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\n• •\n• •\nThe required level of supervision for the rigging and recovery of the accommodation ladder.\nThe safety precautions required when working over the side or outside the ship’s rail while rigging or\nrecovering an accommodation ladder, where this was required.\nAny restriction, or additional precautions, for the use of the accommodation ladder while the vessel was\nunderway.\nThe circumstances where a safety net was required to be rigged when using an accommodation ladder.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their understanding of the process to rig and recover the accommodation ladder\narrangement especially as it related to working over the side or outside the ship’s rails, where this was required.\nWhere the information plate for a portable gangway was missing and the vessel had marked the required information\non the accommodation ladder in some other manner, the vessel must be able to demonstrate that the information\nwas an exact representation of the information shown on the original plate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for the safe rigging of the accommodation ladders.\nThe manufacturer’s instructions and/or design drawings for the accommodation ladders.\nThe maintenance records for each accommodation ladder.\nThe certificate and date of installation for each accommodation ladder fall wire.\nThe certificate for the five-yearly load test for each accommodation ladder.\nEvidence of thorough examination of the portable gangway during annual surveys.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure that described the safe rigging of an accommodation ladder.\nThe maintenance records for the accommodation ladders were missing or incomplete.\nThe certificate(s) for the five-yearly load test of an accommodation ladder was not available or the test had\nnot been completed within the required time frame.\nThere was no evidence that the accommodation ladder fall wires had been replaced within the previous five\nyears or, the manufacturer’s certificate was not available for a fall wire in service.\nThe fall wire was not long enough to permit the accommodation ladder to be deployed at the maximum\nfreeboard whilst leaving sufficient turns on the winch drum.\nAn inspected accommodation ladder was found:\no Without plates or markings showing the restrictions on the safe operation and loading, including the\nmaximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination, design load, maximum load on\nbottom end plate.\no With defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of the ladder, steps,\nhandrails, stanchions, turntables, rollers, pivots or lifting arrangements.\no\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• With defects to its hoisting arrangements.\nWith defective fall wire(s).\nTo have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the ladder or its hoisting\nsystem.\no Any other defect that compromised its safe use.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for rigging and recovering an\naccommodation ladder.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation or rigging of the accommodation ladder\nprovided.\nAn interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover an accommodation\nladder.\nThe accommodation ladder illumination was defective.\nWhere an accommodation ladder was rigged during the inspection:\no It was observed to be rigged or used in a manner that did not conform to the accommodation\nladder design limitations.\no The bottom platform had not been adjusted to keep it level when deployed at the boarding level.\no A safety net had not been rigged when required by the company procedure.\no There was no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area. (The line should be\nconnected to the lifebuoy and light)", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.3.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "providing safe access to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth, and was safe\naccess provided by the ship’s portable gangway, the vessel’s accommodation ladder or a\nshore gangway?\nShort Question Text\nSafe access to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1331 Guidelines for Construction\nInstallation\nMaintenance and Inspection/Survey of Means of Embarkation and Disembarkation.\nObjective\nTo ensure safe access is always provided between the ship and a berth, whether by a ship’s portable\ngangway, accommodation ladder or a gangway provided by the terminal.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 16.4 Tanker/terminal access\n16.4.2 Provision of tanker/terminal access\nResponsibility for the provision of safe tanker/terminal access is jointly shared between tanker and terminal\npersonnel. Requirements for provision of safe access should be detailed in the pre-arrival communications. The\npreferred means of access between a tanker and a terminal is a shore based gangway.\nIrrespective of whether safe access in provided by the terminal or tanker, the gangway should be subject to part of\nthe ship/shore safety checks that are carried out at regular intervals throughout the ship’s stay at the berth.\n16.4.3 Access Equipment\nAll means of access should meet the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Clear walkway.\nContinuous handrails on both sides.\nElectrically insulated to eliminate continuity between tanker and terminal.\nAdequate lighting.\nFor gangways without self-levelling treads or steps, the maximum safe operating angle should be marked.\nLifebuoys should be available with light and line on both tanker and terminal.\nMarked with SWL or maximum number of persons.\nMeans of access should be placed as close as possible to the accommodations.\nMeans of access also provide a means of escape. The location of any portable gangway should be carefully\nconsidered to ensure that it provides a safe access to any escape route from the jetty.\n• The jetty area for landing a tanker’s gangway should be open, clearly identified and unobstructed with\naccess to the area maintained clear.\n16.4.3.2 Portable gangways (tanker or terminal)\nA portable gangway consists of a straight, lightweight bridging structure with side stanchions and handrails. The\nwalking surface has a non-slip surface or transverse bars to provide foot grips for when it is at an incline. It is rigged\nperpendicular to the tanker’s side and the working deck of the berth.\nPortable gangways should not be landed on tanker’s handrails unless the handrails are designed for this purpose.\nWhen gangways are mounted over the tanker’s handrails, access steps with handrails (bulwark ladders) should be\nprovided to enable safe access to and from the deck.\nWhere practical, the gangway should be deployed at a gate in the tanker’s handrails.\nPortable gangways provided should be of adequate minimum length to safely operate throughout all states of tide,\nchanges in freeboard and motions of the tanker.\n16.4.3.4 Safety nets\nSafety nets are not required if the gangway is fixed to the shore and provided with a permanent system of handrails.\nFor other types of gangways and those fitted with rope or chain handrails or removable posts, correctly rigged safety\nnets should be provided.\nThe safety net should be rigged to prevent any person from falling into the water or directly onto the jetty/ground. It\nshould extend from the ship’s side at the boarding point to the bottom landing platform and suitability should be\nchecked by the responsible person.\n23.10.1 Notices on the tanker\nOn arriving at a terminal, a tanker should display notices at the gangway in appropriate languages stating:\nWARNING\n• •\n• •\nNo Naked Lights\nNo Smoking\nNo Unauthorised Persons\nNo Use of Mobile Phones without Master’s Permission\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1331 Guidelines for Construction, Installation, Maintenance and Inspection/Survey of Means\nof Embarkation and Disembarkation.\n3.5 Marking\nEach accommodation ladder or gangway should be clearly marked at each end with a plate showing the restrictions\non the safe operation and loading, including the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination,\ndesign load, maximum load on bottom end plate, etc. Where the maximum operational load is less than the design\nload, it should also be shown on the marking plate.\n3.7 Positioning\n3.7.1 Gangways should not be used at an angle of inclination greater than 30° from the horizontal… unless designed\nand constructed for use at angles greater than these and marked as such, as required by paragraph 3.5.\n3.7.2 Gangways should never be secured to a ship’s guardrails unless they have been designed for that purpose. If\npositioned through an open section of bulwark or railings, any remaining gaps should be adequately fenced.\n3.7.3 Adequate lighting for means of embarkation and disembarkation and the immediate approaches should be\nensured from the ship and/or the shore in hours of darkness.\n3.8 Rigging (safety net)\nA safety net should be mounted in way of the accommodation ladders and gangways where it is possible that a\nperson may fall from the means of embarkation and disembarkation or between the ship and quayside.\n4.1 Accommodation ladders and gangways, including associate winch and fittings, should be properly maintained and\ninspected at appropriate intervals as required by SOLAS regulation III/20.7.2, in accordance with manufacturers’\ninstructions. Additional checks should be made each time the accommodation ladder and gangway is rigged, looking\nout for signs of distortion, cracks and corrosion. Close examination for possible corrosion should be carried out,\nespecially when an aluminium accommodation ladder/gangway has fittings made of mild steel.\n4.2 Bent stanchions should be replaced or repaired and guard ropes should be inspected for wear and renewed\nwhere necessary.\n4.3 Moving parts should be free to turn and should be greased as appropriate.\n4.5 Arrangements should also be made to examine the underside of gangways and accommodation ladders at\nregular intervals.\n4.6 All inspections, maintenance work and repairs of accommodation ladders and gangways should be recorded in\norder to provide an accurate history for each appliance. The information to be recorded appropriately on board should\ninclude the date of the most recent inspection, the name of the person or body who carried out that inspection, the\ndue date for the next inspection and the dates of renewal of wires used to support the embarkation and\ndisembarkation arrangement.\n5.1.2 Gangway\n5.1.2.1 The following items should be thoroughly examined during annual surveys required by\nSOLAS regulations I/7 and I/8 and checked for satisfactory condition of the gangway:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\ntreads;\nside stringers, cross-members, decking, deck plates, etc.;\nall support points such as wheel, roller, etc.;\nstanchions, rigid handrails, hand ropes; and\nany other relevant provisions stated in these Guidelines.\n5.1.2.2 At every five-yearly survey, upon completion of the examination required by paragraph 5.1.2.1, the gangway\nshould be operationally tested with the specified maximum operational load of the gangway.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nReference sources from industry organisations, the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers and\nInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines are referred to when compiling a risk assessment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the environment. The various tasks should be\ndefined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-9\nMeans of embarkation on and disembarkation from ships\n1.\n2.\n3.\nShips constructed on or after 1 January 2010 shall be provided with means of embarkation on and\ndisembarkation from ships for use in port and in port-related operations, such as gangways and\naccommodation ladders, in accordance with paragraph 2, unless the Administration deems compliance with\na particular provision is unreasonable or impractical\nThe means of embarkation and disembarkation required in paragraph 1 shall be constructed and installed\nbased on the guidelines developed by the Organization.\nFor all ships the means of embarkation and disembarkation shall be inspected and maintained in suitable\ncondition for their intended purpose, taking into account any restrictions related to safe loading…\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure safe access to the vessel when alongside a\nterminal/berth, which included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe inspection of the ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder before each use.\nThe rigging process for the ship’s portable gangway including the use of strengthened rails and bulwark\nladders, where applicable.\nThe required level of supervision during the rigging and recovery of the ship’s portable gangway or\naccommodation ladder.\nThe use of a safety net when using a ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder.\nThe circumstances where a safety net must be used when using a terminal provided gangway.\nThe required level of supervision during personnel transfer.\nThe provision of a lifebuoy, light and line at the head of the gangway.\nThe provision of warning signs which include:\no Guidance in alignment with ISGOTT6 23.10.1.\no Specific warnings relating to the cargo being handled, such as high H2S content.\no Specific warnings relating to onboard processes such as generating and using nitrogen.\nThe procedure may refer to, or incorporate, industry best practice and/or safe access arrangement drawings.\nThe line should be attached to the lifebuoy and light and marked with the symbol described by IMO Res. A.1116(30)\nLSS008\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which described the requirements for providing\nsafe access to the vessel while alongside a terminal/berth.\nWhere necessary, review the manufacturer’s instructions and/or drawings for the ship’s portable gangway,\nwhere provided.\nWhere necessary review the maintenance and load test records for the ship’s portable gangway, where\nprovided.\nInspect the portable gangway, where provided, and verify that:\no It was clearly marked at each end with a plate showing the restrictions on the safe operation and\nloading, including the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination, design load…\no The visible parts of the portable gangway were in apparent good order and free from:\n Cracks or fractures.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n• •\nExcessive corrosion especially in areas where dissimilar metals are used.\nBucking or deformation of the individual steps or main structure.\nMissing, broken or deformed stanchions or handrails.\nSeized rollers or wheels.\nDamage to lifting and support points.\nMissing or damaged locking or securing arrangements for portable stanchions.\n• Request that the gangway illumination is switched on and demonstrated as functioning.\nWhere the ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder was deployed verify that:\no It was rigged in accordance with its design limitations.\nWhere the ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder, or shore gangway was deployed verify that:\no Where it was resting on handrails, the handrails were designed to take the load.\no A safety net had been rigged when required.\no It was rigged in accordance with the guidance provided in ISGOTT6.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no\no\no\n• The required level of supervision for the rigging and recovery of the portable gangway, where\nprovided.\nThe safety precautions required when working over the side or outside the ship’s rail while rigging\nor recovering the portable gangway, where provided.\nThe provision of a safety net when using the ship’s portable gangway, accommodation ladder or\nwhere a shore gangway without fixed railings was provided.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their understanding of the process to rig and recover the portable gangway\narrangement, especially as it related to working over the side or outside the ship’s rails prior to the rigging of\nthe safety net.\nThis question relates to portable gangways and safe access at a terminal. If an accommodation ladder is in use as a\nmeans of access focus on the means of access rather than the technical details of the accommodation ladder.\nWhere the information plate for a portable gangway was missing and the vessel had marked the required information\non the gangway in some other manner, the vessel must be able to demonstrate that the information was an exact\nrepresentation of the information shown on the original plate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which described the requirements for providing safe access to the vessel while\nalongside a terminal/berth.\nWhere a portable gangway was provided:\no The manufacturer’s instructions and/or design drawings for the portable gangway.\no The maintenance records for the portable gangway.\no The certificate for the five-yearly load test for the portable gangway.\no Evidence of thorough examination of the portable gangway during annual surveys.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which described the requirements for providing safe access to the vessel\nwhile alongside a terminal/berth.\nThe maintenance records for the portable gangway, where provided, were missing or incomplete.\nWhere a portable gangway was provided:\no The certificate for the five-yearly load test of the portable gangway was not available or the test had\nnot been completed within the required time frame.\no The portable gangway was found:\n Without plates or markings showing the restrictions on the safe operation and loading,\nincluding the maximum and minimum permitted design angles of inclination and design\nload.\nWith defects such as fractures, corrosion or deformation, to the structure of the ladder,\nsteps, handrails, stanchions, rollers, or lifting arrangements.\n With deteriorated tread/non-skid provision on each step surface.\n To have temporary repairs to the main structure or strength members of the gangway.\n Any other defect that compromised its safe use.\nThe embarkation and disembarkation area illumination provided by the vessel was defective.\nWhere a ship’s portable gangway or accommodation ladder was rigged during the inspection as a means of\nembarkation or disembarkation to the terminal, it was observed to be rigged or used in a manner that did not\nconform to the design limitations of the equipment.\nA safety net had not been rigged where required by the company procedure and/or the guidance provided\nby ISGOTT6 16.4.3.4.\nA portable gangway was resting on handrails not designed to take the load.\nWhere a gangway was resting on the ship’s handrails or bulwark, there was no bulwark ladder provided to\ngive safe access between the deck and the head of the gangway.\nThere was no lifebuoy, light and line available at the gangway landing area. (The line should be connected\nto the lifebuoy and light)\nThere was no warning sign displayed at the gangway required by the company procedure and/or ISGOTT6\n23.10.1.\nThere was no sign displayed at the gangway warning of the specific dangers of the cargo being handled\n(e.g. High H2S) or operations being undertaken (i.e. nitrogen purging).\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for providing safe access to the\nvessel while alongside a terminal/berth.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the safe rigging of a portable gangway or accommodation\nladder while at a terminal/berth.\nAn interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the process to safely rig and recover the portable gangway,\nwhere provided.\n\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n•", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company personnel transfer by", "c": "crane procedure, and where a personnel transfer basket (PTB) and accessories were\nprovided, were these in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with company\nprocedures and manufacturer’s recommendations?\nShort Question Text\nPersonnel transfer by crane\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF: Transfer of Personnel by Crane between Vessels. First Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure personnel transfer by crane is always conducted in accordance with industry best practice\nguidance.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Transfer of Personnel by Crane between Vessels. First Edition\n1 Introduction\n…Crane transfers are typically completed using a Personnel Transfer Basket (PTB). In this paper, the term PTB is\nused to describe the piece of equipment in which personnel are transferred and includes collapsible basket and rigid\ncapsule types.\nIt is recommended that the transfer of personnel between vessels should be kept to an absolute minimum. If a\ntransfer is being considered, the means of transfer should be evaluated by risk assessment, bearing in mind the\nresidual risks may still be unacceptable and the decision not to transfer should always be considered as an option.\n3.2 Personnel Transfer Basket\nPTBs should be certified and meet Flag State and Classification Society requirements.\nThe PTB should be clearly marked with the SWL or capacity.\nThe following features are recommended for PTBs:\n• •\n• •\n• The SWL should be based on appropriate testing and application of safety factors, which should be\ndocumented.\nAssociated hooks/slings/shackles shall have equivalent testing/certification and markings.\nThe empty weight of the PTB should be clearly stated.\nAll PTBs should float, and rigid capsule types should be self-righting.\nA crane hook pennant that is long enough to keep the crane block well clear of the personnel being\ntransferred should be used, but not too long to prevent the PTB from being lifted safely over the rail.\nIt is recommended that two tag lines are secured to each PTB. Tag lines should be appropriate for the specific\noperation, should never be wrapped around or secured to a strong point, and should:\n• •\n• •\nHave a diameter between 16mm and 19mm (5/8” – 3/4”).\nBe secured at opposing ends of the base ring of the PTB or at the lowest point reasonably accessible. This\nensures best control of the PTB, particularly when the crane is slewed.\nBe long enough to reach the water at the lightship draught of the active vessel with sufficient handling\nallowance.\nHave ends that are seized. Knots or back-splices should not be used as they may get snagged, causing the\nPTB to tip.\nA policy should be in place requiring the inspection, maintenance and replacement of PTBs at specified intervals\nwhich should, as a minimum, conform to any published guidance by the manufacturer (see section 4).\nThe personnel transfer procedure should follow the policy and should include the method of maintenance and\nstorage, together with instruction to inspect the PTB shortly before the transfer begins to confirm it is safe to use (see\nsection 7).\n4 Maintenance, inspection and testing of equipment\nA rigorous maintenance and inspection programme should be in place for personnel transfer equipment in\naccordance with the Classification Society requirements, the manufacturer’s recommendation and the vessel’s SMS.\n4.1 Documentation\nDocumentation showing that equipment has been properly tested, inspected and maintained should be available.\nThis documentation could include:\n• •\n• •\n• Valid certificates for the cranes, PTBs and accessories.\nA record of any outstanding or pending operational or maintenance issues.\nA record of any issues that have been resolved.\nPast maintenance and service records.\nRecommendations from manufacturers of required maintenance intervals and equipment to be checked.\n4.2 Inspection\nA structured inspection programme should be in place in accordance with, as a minimum, the manufacturer’s\nrecommendations. All inspections should be completed before the transfer, in accordance with the guidance in\nsection 3.\n4.3 Testing\nThe scope and frequency of tests should be in accordance with, as a minimum, the manufacturer’s recommendations\nand, where applicable, with the certifying authority.\nAll tests should be carried out before the transfer, in accordance with the guidance in section 7.\nTMSA KPI 9.2.1 requires that risk assessments for routine tasks are used to develop safe working procedures.\nThe risk assessment identifies all hazards associated with a task and any personnel at risk. All risk mitigation\nmeasures to address identified hazards are incorporated into the safe working procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the environment. The various tasks should be\ndefined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nWhere transfer of personnel by crane is permitted and/or a personnel transfer basket (PTB) is provided, the vessel\noperator should have developed a procedure in alignment with the OCIMF information paper ‘Transfer of Personnel\nby Crane between Vessels’. First Edition\nThis question will be included in the inspection question pool when the following HVPQ question is answered in the\naffirmative:\n• 13.1.6 Does the Operator's SMS provide instructions regarding the transfer of personnel using derricks or\ncranes?\nand/or the vessel operator had declared the vessel carries a PTB through the pre-inspection questionnaire (PIQ).\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure describing the requirements for personnel\ntransfer by crane.\nSight the manufacturer’s test certificates for the PTB and any accessories.\nWhere the vessel declared that the crane(s) were certified for personnel transfer through HVPQ 13.1.7, sight\nthe appropriate crane certification.\nSight the training records for the personnel designated for personnel transfer by crane operations.\nWhere necessary review the onboard maintenance and inspection records for the crane, PTB and\naccessories.\nWhere personnel transfer by crane had taken place within the previous three months, review the risk\nassessment and personnel transfer by crane plan for one transfer or group of transfers.\nInspect the PTB and accessories and verify that:\no Each item of equipment was in apparent good order.\no Each item of equipment was marked with its SWL or capacity.\no The PTB was marked with its empty weight.\no A crane hook pennant was available to keep the main crane hook clear of the PTB.\no Two tag lines were available which met the specifications provided in the OCIMF information paper.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedure which described the transfer of personnel by crane.\no The risk assessment and personnel transfer by crane plan development process.\no The contingency plan for crane failure during a personnel transfer by crane.\no The use of the PTB and accessories provided.\nWhere no PTB or accessories were provided on board, focus on the procedural and familiarity aspects of the\nquestion and guidance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure describing personnel transfer by crane.\nThe manufacturer’s test certificates for the PTB and accessories.\nThe crane certification for personnel transfer use, where HVPQ question 13.1.7 had been declared as\naffirmative.\nThe training records for the personnel designated for personnel transfer by crane operations.\nThe onboard maintenance and inspection records for the crane, PTB and accessories.\nWhere personnel transfer by crane had taken place within the previous three months, the risk assessment\nand personnel transfer by crane plan for one transfer or group of transfers.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of personnel by crane.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedure describing the requirements for transfer of personnel by crane.\no The use of the PTB or accessories for personnel transfer by crane.\no The checks on the PTB and accessories required to be carried out before personnel transfer by\ncrane is undertaken.\no The risk assessment and personnel transfer by crane plan development process.\no The contingency plan for crane failure during personnel transfer by crane.\nThere were no manufacturer’s test certificates available for the PTB or lifting accessories.\nThe crane(s) used for personnel transfer were not certified for personnel transfer contrary to the response to\nHVPQ question 13.1.7.\nThere was no contingency plan for the failure of the crane during personnel transfer.\nThere were no training records available for the personnel designated for personnel transfer by crane\noperations.\nMaintenance, inspection or testing of the crane, PTB or accessories had not been conducted in accordance\nwith the company procedure or the manufacturer’s recommendations.\nRecords of maintenance, inspection or testing for the crane, PTB or accessories were incomplete or\nmissing.\nThe PTB or lifting accessories were not marked with:\no The SWL or capacity.\no The empty weight.\nTaglines meeting the recommendations of the OCIMF information paper were not provided.\nTaglines were terminated with knots or back-splices.\nThe PTB had not been replaced in accordance with the company PTB retirement policy or manufacturer’s\nrecommendations.\nPersonnel transfers by crane had taken place without a risk assessment and/or personnel transfer by crane\nplan being developed to address the circumstances at the time of transfer.\nThere was evidence that personnel transfer by crane had taken place using a device or arrangement other\nthan an approved PTB provided by either the passive or active vessel.\nWhere no PTB or accessories were provided on board, select “Not Answerable” in the Hardware response tool then\nselect \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "helicopter/ship operations, and had these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nHelicopter operations\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nICS: Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations 5th Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure helicopter/ship operations are performed safely and in a controlled manner.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n7.4 - Helicopter transfer\n7.4.1 Conventional tankers\nConventional tankers do not usually have specialised offshore helicopter facilities. Any helicopter transfer operations\nshould follow the guidance and practices in the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) publication Guide to\nHelicopter/Ship Operations.\nThe helicopter operating company will need to be consulted before deciding on this method of transfer, because the\ntype of helicopter available and the experience of their pilots will determine whether the proposed transfer operation\nis possible. The helicopter operating company will need to know whether the helicopter is required to land on the\nofftake tanker, or hover and transfer personnel by winch or sling. Confirming the tanker’s structural layout and\ncapabilities are an equally important part of the decision-making process.\nFor safe transfer of personnel, it is normally better to have the helicopter landed on the deck of the offtake tanker. For\nsuch an operation to be undertaken safely, there must be an appropriately marked landing and winching area on the\ndeck, with no high deck structures and deck edge handrails capable of being folded down to deck level. Very High\nFrequency (VHF) radio communications will normally be used between the tanker and the helicopter, and all\npersonnel should be familiar with the procedures and expectations in the Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nICS: Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations 5th Edition\n2.2.2 Helicopter operations risk assessment\nA ship planning to undertake helicopter operations should produce a risk assessment that identifies the hazards and\nevaluates the risk in terms of probability and severity of consequences. The helicopter operations risk assessment\nshould be reviewed on a regular basis in line with company requirements.\nThis guidance cannot provide an exhaustive list for individual risk assessments and mitigations, but examples\ninclude: (headings only here)\n• Weather conditions.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Ship movement (pitch, heave and roll).\nCrash on deck/ditching.\nNoise.\nDowndraught/loose articles/flying objects.\nRotating blades.\nCommunication.\nStatic electricity.\n2.2.4 Master\nThe ship’s Master is also responsible for:\n• •\n• •\nAppointing the RO (Responsible Officer), deck crew and administrator from among the officers and crew\nmembers. These functions, which in this instance are specifically related to helicopter operations, are\nadditional to their other shipboard functions.\nEnsuring that ship’s crew members involved in helicopter/ship operations are trained and understand the\nstandards and procedures necessary to maintain the safety of the ship, its crew and the helicopter air crew.\nMaking sure that the RO and the deck crew are fully familiar with equipment for winching and landing\noperations and are trained and regularly drilled in the tasks required of them in both routine operations and\nemergencies; and\nConfirming the radio frequency being monitored to give landing clearance, when appropriate, and for\nwarning the helicopter pilot if an unsafe situation develops.\n4.7 Firefighting appliances and rescue equipment\nSummary of required firefighting and rescue equipment\nEmergency tools/equipment\nAs a minimum, the following equipment, ready for immediate use and stored to protect it from the elements:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRed emergency signalling lamp (intrinsically safe if located on the deck area of tankers)\nLarge axe\nCrowbar\nAdjustable wrench\nFire resistant blanket\n60cm bolt/wire cutters\nGrab or salving hook (insulated handle)\nHeavy duty hacksaw, complete with six spare blades\nLadder\nLifeline, 5mm diameter x 15m in length\nSide cutting pliers\nSet of assorted screwdrivers\nHarness knife complete with sheath\nFirst aid kit\n6.1.3 Pre-arrival checks on the ship\nThe RO should check all operational requirements on deck shortly before the arrival of the helicopter (see also\nsection 4.5). Some ships may require special checks (See Chapter 8). A checklist which may be used is set out in\nAppendix C.\nAppendix C Shipboard safety checklist for helicopter operations\nAppendix E Helicopter landing/operating area plan\nThe ship should expect the shipyard to have supplied a diagram of the helicopter landing/operating area plan, at the\ntime the ship was built. The scale of the diagram should be clearly highlighted.\nIf no helicopter landing/operating area plan has been provided by the shipyard, one should be made.\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Helicopter operations risk assessment.\nTraining and emergency drill requirements.\nPreparation of a Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan.\nUse of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nResponsible Officer and deck crew assignment.\nEmergency tools and equipment requirements.\nRestrictions on cargo / crane operations during helicopter/ship operations.\nThis question will only be allocated to vessels where HVPQ 5.2.1.1 is answered as yes.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship\noperations.\nReview the helicopter operations risk assessment and evidence of last review.\nSight the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nReview completed ICS Shipboard Safety Checklists for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nReview records of training and emergency drills for helicopter/ship operations.\nDuring the course of the inspection, inspect the emergency tools and equipment required by the ICS Guide\nto Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations.\nHelicopter operations risk assessment and evidence of last review.\nICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nRecords of training and emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.\nCompleted ICS Shipboard Safety Checklists for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nInventory of helicopter tools and equipment required for routine and emergency operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations including:\no Helicopter operations risk assessment.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• o\no\no\no\no\no\nTraining and emergency drill requirements.\nPreparation of a Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan.\nUse of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nDeck Party Officer and Deck Party Crew assignment.\nEmergency tools and equipment requirements.\nRestrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship\noperations or the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nThere was no helicopter operations risk assessment available.\nThere was no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had been reviewed in accordance\nwith the company procedures.\nThere was no record of the required training and emergency drills taking place.\nThere was no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.\nThere was no Helicopter Landing/Operating Area Plan available.\nThe ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent) had not been completed prior\nto performing helicopter/ship operations.\nThe emergency tools and equipment required by the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations were not\nreadily available.\nRestrictions on cargo / crane operations during helicopter/ship operations had not been complied with.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "helicopter/ship operations, and had the crew involved received appropriate training?\nShort Question Text\nHelicopter facilities\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nICS: Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations 5th Edition\nCivil Aviation Authority: CAP437 Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas (2018)\nObjective\nTo ensure helicopter/ship operations on vessels equipped with helicopter facilities are performed safely and\nin a controlled manner.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n7.4 - Helicopter transfer\n7.4.2 DP bow loading tankers with helidecks\nDP bow loading tankers are normally fitted with offshore standard helicopter decks. These decks are normally\nconstructed and equipped to comply with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) publication CAP437: Standards for\nOffshore Helicopter Landing Areas. Although this is a UK publication it is used in many parts of the world as the\ndefinitive guide for offshore standard helicopter decks and operational expectations. Where some countries have\nsimilar rules, CAP437 equivalence is normally agreed, even where slight differences exist (e.g. the orientation of the\n‘H’ marking can be 90 degrees different from CAP437). The latest version of CAP437 incorporates the International\nCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), covering relevant issues such\nas lighting, markings, etc.\nOn DP bow loading tankers, the crews are normally trained in helicopter operations and emergency procedures to the\nsame standard as on most offshore terminals, and the equipment and facilities are also equivalent. Personnel\ntransferring from the offtake tanker will have a pre-departure briefing on helicopter safety before being allowed to\nboard the helicopter. In most locations, there is also a requirement that transit suits are worn.\nSome operational safety factors are specific to the offtake tankers (and not included in CAP437) but should be part of\nthe tanker technical operator’s SMS and the field operations manual. Tanker-specific operational safety factors\ninclude:\n• •\n• Cargo operations should be suspended during helicopter flights to the offtake tanker.\nCargo tank inert gas pressure should be minimised, and all vents closed. Pressure should be continually\nmonitored when the helicopter is close to or on the tanker and helicopter operations should be aborted if the\ninert gas pressure rises towards release valve settings.\nCommunications are normally conducted on air band frequencies, and in the case of isolated terminals, the\nofftake tanker may have to take on the flight-watch duties until the helicopter is able to communicate with\nanother radio station. This should be factored into the watchkeeping arrangements.\n• During times of absolute calm, vented hydrocarbons may form a cloud around the offtake tanker and\nterminal. This may force the cancellation of helicopter movements until the area is confirmed gas free.\nAdditionally, if the helideck is sheltered behind a high structure, some helicopters may have difficulty lifting\noff the offtake tanker helideck because of insufficient air movement. The tanker may be required to\ndisconnect from the terminal and move clear.\nCivil Aviation Authority: CAP437 Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas (2018)\nVessels supporting offshore mineral workings and specific standards for landing areas on merchant vessels\n9.1 Helidecks on vessels used in support of the offshore oil and gas industry should be designed to comply with the\nrequirements of the preceding chapters of this publication.\n9.2 The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has published a ‘Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations’, updated in\n2008, which comprehensively describes physical criteria and procedures on ships having shipboard heliport landing\nor winching area arrangements. Other than to address the basic design criteria and marking and lighting schemes\nrelated to shipboard heliport landing area arrangements, it is not intended to reproduce detail from the ICS document\nhere in CAP 437. However, it is recommended that the 2008 4th edition of the ICS ‘Guide to Helicopter/Ship\nOperations’ should be referenced in addition to this chapter and, where necessary, in conjunction with Chapter 10\nwhich includes information relating to shipboard heliport winching area arrangements.\nICS: Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations 5th Edition\n2.2.2 Helicopter operations risk assessment\nA ship planning to undertake helicopter operations should produce a risk assessment that identifies the hazards and\nevaluates the risk in terms of probability and severity of consequences. The helicopter operations risk assessment\nshould be reviewed on a regular basis in line with company requirements.\nThis guidance cannot provide an exhaustive list for individual risk assessments and mitigations, but examples\ninclude: (headings only here)\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWeather conditions.\nShip movement (pitch, heave and roll).\nCrash on deck/ditching.\nNoise.\nDowndraught/loose articles/flying objects.\nRotating blades.\nCommunication.\nStatic electricity.\n2.2.4 Master\nThe ship’s Master is also responsible for:\n• •\n• •\nAppointing the RO (Responsible Officer), deck crew and administrator from among the officers and crew\nmembers. These functions, which in this instance are specifically related to helicopter operations, are\nadditional to their other shipboard functions.\nEnsuring that ship’s crew members involved in helicopter/ship operations are trained and understand the\nstandards and procedures necessary to maintain the safety of the ship, its crew and the helicopter air crew.\nMaking sure that the RO and the deck crew are fully familiar with equipment for winching and landing\noperations and are trained and regularly drilled in the tasks required of them in both routine operations and\nemergencies; and\nConfirming the radio frequency being monitored to give landing clearance, when appropriate, and for\nwarning the helicopter pilot if an unsafe situation develops.\n4.7 Firefighting appliances and rescue equipment\nSummary of required firefighting and rescue equipment\nEmergency tools/equipment\nAs a minimum, the following equipment, ready for immediate use and stored to protect it from the elements:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRed emergency signalling lamp (intrinsically safe if located on the deck area of tankers)\nLarge axe\nCrowbar\nAdjustable wrench\nFire resistant blanket\n60cm bolt/wire cutters\nGrab or salving hook (insulated handle)\nHeavy duty hacksaw, complete with six spare blades\nLadder\nLifeline, 5mm diameter x 15m in length\nSide cutting pliers\nSet of assorted screwdrivers\nHarness knife complete with sheath\nFirst aid kit\n6.1.3 Pre-arrival checks on the ship\nThe RO should check all operational requirements on deck shortly before the arrival of the helicopter (see also\nsection 4.5). Some ships may require special checks (See Chapter 8). A checklist which may be used is set out in\nAppendix C.\nAppendix C Shipboard safety checklist for helicopter operations\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 3\nDefinitions\n27 “Helicopter facility” is a helideck including any refuelling and hangar facilities\nChapter II-2 Regulation 18\nHelicopter facilities\nThe purpose of this regulation is to provide additional measures in order to address the fire safety objectives of this\nchapter for ships fitted with special facilities for helicopters. For this purpose, the following functional requirements\nshall be met:\n4 operation manuals and training shall be provided.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures in the form of an operations manual providing guidance on\nroutine and emergency helicopter/ship operations including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nHelicopter operations risk assessment.\nIdentification of job roles and responsibilities for all personnel involved.\nTraining requirements of all personnel involved.\nEmergency drill requirements.\nUse of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nEmergency tools and equipment requirements.\nRestrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.\nReasons for, and extent of, any operational limitations.\nThe training of personnel involved in helicopter/ship operations should include appropriate formal accredited courses\nsuch as Offshore Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HDA) followed by ship-specific\nfamiliarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations.\nThe vessel may have been issued with a Helicopter Landing Area Certificate (HLAC) issued by one of the Aviation\nInspection Bodies (AIBs) recognised by the flag Administration. An HLAC can be taken as evidence of suitable\ntraining of personnel involved in helicopter/ship operations.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight and where necessary, review the company procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship\noperations.\nReview the helicopter operations risk assessment and evidence of last review.\nSight the Helicopter Landing Area Certificate (HLAC) if available.\nIf no HLAC is available, review records of appropriate formal accredited training courses such as Offshore\nHelicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HDA) followed by ship-specific\nfamiliarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations.\nReview records of emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.\nSight the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nReview completed ICS Shipboard Safety Checklists for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nDuring the course of the inspection, inspect the required emergency tools and equipment as set out in the\nICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations.\nHelicopter operations risk assessment and evidence of last review.\nHelicopter Landing Area Certificate (HLAC) if available.\nIf no HLAC is available, records of appropriate formal accredited training courses such as Offshore\nHelicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HDA) followed by ship-specific\nfamiliarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations.\nRecords of emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.\n• •\nICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nCompleted ICS Shipboard Safety Checklists for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship operations including:\no Helicopter operations risk assessment.\no Identification of job roles and responsibilities for all personnel involved.\no Training requirements of all personnel involved.\no Emergency drill requirements.\no Use of the ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent).\no Emergency tools and equipment requirements.\no Restrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations.\no Reasons for, and extent of, any operational limitations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures providing guidance on helicopter/ship\noperations or the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations.\nThere was no helicopter operations risk assessment available.\nThere was no evidence that the helicopter operations risk assessment had been reviewed in accordance\nwith the company procedures.\nNo HLAC was available, and there were no/incomplete records of appropriate formal accredited training\ncourses such as Offshore Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and Offshore Helideck Assistant (HDA) followed\nby ship-specific familiarisation of the helicopter facilities and operations for all personnel involved.\nThere were no records of emergency drills in helicopter/ship operations.\nThere was no copy of the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations on board.\nThe ICS Shipboard Safety Checklist for Helicopter Operations (or equivalent) had not been completed prior\nto performing helicopter/ship operations.\nThe required emergency tools and equipment as set out in the ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations\nwere not readily available.\nRestrictions on cargo operations during helicopter/ship operations had not been complied with.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.10.7.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and crew familiar with the escape routes from the", "c": "machinery spaces, pump rooms, compressor rooms, accommodation spaces and, when\nin port, from the vessel, and were these routes clearly marked, unobstructed and well\nilluminated?\nShort Question Text\nEscape routes\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck, Internal Accommodation, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO Resolution A.1116(30) Escape route signs and equipment location markings\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1120 Unified interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2\nThe FSS Code\nThe FTP Code and related fire test procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nOCIMF: Guidelines to Harden Vessels. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that there are marked escape routes available to ship and shore personnel in the event of an\nemergency on the vessel.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.15 Pumproom operational procedures\n12.1.15.3 Routine maintenance and housekeeping issues\nEmergency escape routes should be regularly checked to ensure they are properly marked and clear of obstructions.\nWhen an escape trunk is fitted, check doors for ease of operation. Door seals should be effective and lighting within\nthe trunk should be operational\n16.4 Tanker/terminal access\n16.4.3 Access equipment\nAll means of access should meet the following criteria:\n• Means of access also provide means of escape. The location of any portable gangway should be carefully\nconsidered to ensure it provides a safe access to any escape route from the jetty.\n23 Tanker and terminal precautions for cargo operations\n23.1 External openings in superstructures\nDoors should not normally be locked in port. However, if there are security concerns, the measures to prevent\nunauthorised access should also ensure that personnel have an escape route.\n23.9.1 Notices on the tanker\nOn arriving at a terminal ….\nPhoto luminescent notices stating “emergency escape route” should be displayed at appropriate locations, together\nwith directional signs.\n20.5.4 Tanker evacuation\nThere should be an agreement between tankers and terminals in any evacuation plan, and it is important that\nmasters of all tankers using a terminal are aware of emergency evacuation plans. These agreements should be\ndiscussed at the pre-transfer conference and identified when the ship/shore safety checklist is finished.\nPre-transfer SSSCL Ref. 40. Means of emergency escape from both tanker and terminal are established\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n9.4 Signs and notices\n9.4.1 The international standards for safety signs are explained in the following paragraphs. Colours and symbols,\nwhen used appropriately, can provide information and warnings of hazards that can be understood by anyone,\nregardless of what language they speak.\n9.4.9 Green signs mean emergency escape or a first-aid sign. The sign is a green square or rectangle, with safety\ninformation shown by words or a symbol in white. For example, a white arrow on a green background points to an\nemergency exit.\nOCIMF: Guidelines to Harden Vessels. First Edition.\n4.2.2.3 Restricted areas\nRestricted areas are covered in the vessel’s SSP and should be monitored. The control of access to restricted areas\nmay be enhanced by using key or combination locks, padlocks, key code pads or door sensor locks. While it may be\npossible to breach locked doors and get access, this may alert vessel staff and raise the alarm.\nIn an emergency, shipboard personnel should be able to access and exit the accommodation block and machinery\nspaces. When berthed alongside, contingency plans should consider how access is granted to firefighting crews and\nemergency services. This may include identifying key access doors and staff responsible for ensuring they are\nunlocked.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 13\n1 Purpose\nThe purpose of this regulation is to provide means of escape so that persons on board can safely and swiftly escape\nto the lifeboat and liferaft embarkation deck. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nsafe escape routes shall be provided;\nescape routes shall be maintained in a safe condition, clear of obstacles; and\naddition aids for escape shall be provided as necessary to ensure accessibility, clear marking, and adequate\ndesign for emergency situations.\n3.3 Means of escape in cargo ships.\n3.3.1 General\nAt all levels of accommodation there shall be at least two widely separated means of escape from each restricted\nspace or group of spaces.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.1120 Unified Interpretations of SOLAS Chapter II-2, the FSS Code, the FTP Code and Related\nFire Test Procedures.\nSOLAS Chapter II-2 Reg 13.3.3 Interpretation or reference\nLocking arrangements and accessibility to embarkation decks\n1.\n2.\nThe escape routes are routes for escape and also for access. Accordingly, the locking arrangement should\nbe such that it does not obstruct these two objectives (escape and access). Doors along any designated\nescape routes which require keys to unlock them when moving in the direction of escape should not be\npermitted.\nThe embarkation deck should be accessible from the open decks to which escapes routes\nIMO: Resolution A.1116(30) Escape route signs and equipment location markings.\n4. INVITES Contracting Governments to note that these escape route signs and equipment location markings should\ntake effect on ships constructed on or after 1 January 2019 or ships which undergo repairs, alterations, modifications\nand outfitting within the scope of SOLAS chapters II-2 and/or III, as applicable, on or after 1 January 2019, and that\nthey should be used, as appropriate, in combination with resolution A.952(23) for the preparation of the shipboard fire\ncontrol plans required by SOLAS regulation II-2/15.2.4.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure that ensured:\n• •\n• •\nThe identification and marking of escape routes from:\no Accommodation spaces.\no Machinery spaces.\no Compressor rooms.\no Thruster rooms.\no Any other space where the means of escape may not be obvious when disorientated.\nMeans of escape were unobstructed but, where external doors were locked for security reasons, a rapid\nmeans of opening the door from the inside was provided.\nWhere company security procedures did not explicitly require exterior doors to be locked and secured to\nprevent access from the outside, the doors either remained unlocked or secured in a manner that would\npermit access from the outside to a properly equipped firefighting party.\nWhilst the vessel was in port, the escape route to the terminal means of access was marked.\nEscape routes should be marked by signs that are a green square or rectangle, with safety information shown by\nwords or a symbol in white.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure defining the requirements for identifying and\nmarking escape routes.\nInspect the designated escape routes from the accommodation spaces, machinery spaces, pump room, etc.\nand verify that:\no The escape routes were clearly identified by signs in accordance with IMO guidance.\no Where an escape route terminated at a door, the door was either unlocked or, where the door was\nlocked for security reasons, there was a rapid means of opening the door from the inside.\no Where an escape route was provided with a self-closing fire door, the door was able to close and\nlatch properly without external assistance.\no Where the escape route was an enclosed trunk, the emergency lighting was fully maintained with\nfunctioning bulbs in every lamp.\no The escape routes, or doors forming part of an emergency escape route, were not obstructed.\nInspect the escape route from the accommodation to the means of shore access and verify that it was\nclearly marked with signs and, so far as possible, routed around mooring lines under tension and/or the\ncargo manifolds in use.\nWhere an external door forming part of an escape route was locked for security reasons:\no Request that an officer or rating demonstrate the opening of the door from the inside without the\nneed for a key or tools.\no Request that an officer or rating describes how a properly equipped firefighting party would open\nthe door from the outside in an emergency.\nUnless documented security procedures override access in an emergency, then a means of access through a door\nforming part of an emergency escape route should be possible from both directions.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedure defining the requirements for identifying and marking emergency escape routes.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which defined the requirements for identifying and marking escape\nroutes.\nThe escape routes from within the accommodation spaces, machinery spaces, pump rooms, compressor\nrooms, thruster rooms or any other spaces where a person could become disorientated in an emergency\nwere not marked with signs in accordance with IMO guidance.\nThe accompanying officer could not direct the inspector to the escape route from any location within the\nvessel where there was potential to take a route to a dead end or space with no exit to an outside deck.\nExternal doors forming part of an escape route were locked or bolted with no means of rapid opening from\nthe inside.\nAn officer or rating was unable to demonstrate the opening of an external door which formed part of an\nescape route from the inside.\nExcept in circumstances where security procedures required external doors to be secured to make entry\nfrom the outside impossible, the accompanying officer was unable to explain how a properly equipped\nfirefighting team would be able to access through an external door forming part of an emergency escape\nroute.\nA means of escape was blocked or obstructed.\nSelf-closing doors forming part of an escape route would not close and latch without intervention when\nreleased.\nMore than one bulb was unlit in any enclosed escape trunk.\n• •\nThe escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access was not marked.\nThe escape route from the accommodation to the shore means of access was routed over moorings lines\nunder tension or passed across the outboard side the cargo manifold in use unless there was no alternative\nto such routing.\n5.11. Sample Management", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.11.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures addressing", "c": "the management of samples of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II cargoes as\napplicable, and were samples being properly stored and eventually disposed of?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and bunker sample management.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: MEPC/Circ.864/Rev.1 2019 Guidelines for on board sampling for the verification of the sulphur content of the\nfuel used on board ships.\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.96(47) Guidelines for the sampling of fuel oil for determination of compliance with Annex VI of\nMARPOL 73/78\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo and bunker samples are safely stored on board and properly disposed of in a timely\nmanner.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n13.3 Cargo and bunker samples\nThe operator’s SMS should include guidance on managing and storing cargo and bunker samples. The quantity of\nsamples kept on board should be carefully managed and reduced to a minimum number required. When they are no\nlonger required, they should be disposed of in an appropriate cargo or slop tank on board or landed ashore.\n13.3.1 Sample disposal\nAfter the cargo has been discharged, unless the company or charterer says otherwise, it is suggested that cargo\nsamples are kept for no longer than three months. MARPOL requires that bunker samples are kept on board for at\nleast 12 months from the time of delivery.\n13.3.2 Sample storage\nAll cargo and bunker samples should be stored securely in lockers that cannot be accessed from the\naccommodation. Consider storing samples in an area protected by a fire detection and fixed firefighting system, such\nas a paint locker or midship storeroom. If no fixed firefighting system is fitted, portable firefighting equipment should\nbe provided nearby. Keep samples away from high temperatures and do not expose them to direct sunlight. Before\nentering any storage space, make sure it is properly ventilated.\nIn some cases, oil tankers may be equipped to carry certain MARPOL Annex II cargoes and have a relevant\ncertificate of fitness. In such cases, follow the guidance in the IBC Code section 16.5, Stowage of Cargo Samples.\n(see below)\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n6.7.12 Sample Management\nAfter completion of loading or before discharge starts, samples of the cargo should be obtained under supervision of\nthe duty officer, the shipper’s surveyor and a representative from the shore installation. The sample should be stored\nin the sample locker (see Section 6.7.14).\nMarking of samples\nSample bottles should be clearly marked with;\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Date and time of sampling;\nPort;\nType of sample e.g. manifold, final from tank after loading, tank before discharge;\nGrade;\nTank number;\nManifold number;\nName/rank of person taking the sample;\nUSCG Compatibility Number (if appropriate); and\nMARPOL Category (X, Y, Z or OS).\nA log should be kept with the seal reference number and date of all samples, as well as the date of final disposal.\nRetention of samples\nAll samples should be kept in the sample locker for a time to be determined by the company\nDisposal of samples\nCargo samples should be disposed of as required by the SMS. When cargo samples are disposed of ashore, a\nrecord should be kept. This record should include: date, place, number of samples, quantity per bottle and a\nreference to the delivery receipt.\nInhibited samples\nInhibited samples should be checked regularly for signs of polymerisation. These samples should only be retained for\nas long as the inhibitor remains active, as stated on the inhibitor certificate.\n6.7.14 Sample Storage\nChemical tankers are required to store a wide range of cargo samples. The IBC Code requires that the storage of\nsamples must be within a purpose built storage.\nThe sample locker must be designed and built to ensure that sample bottles are securely stored and protected from\ndamage and excessive vibration, and that the space is adequately ventilated and fitted with flame arresters. Firefighting equipment should be readily available. The sample store should be a dedicated locker, resistant to the\ndifferent liquids that will be stowed in it and sited within the cargo area.\nThe sample locker should separate chemicals that react dangerously with each other and should only be used for the\nstorage of cargo samples.\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.96(47) Guidelines for the sampling of fuel oil for determination of compliance with\nAnnex VI of MARPOL 73/78\n8 Sealing of the retained sample\n8.1 Immediately following collection of the retained sample, a tamper proof security seal with a unique means of\nidentification should be installed by the supplier’s representative in the presence of the ship's representative. A label\ncontaining the following information should be secured to the retained sample container:\n* The phrase “be drawn continuously throughout the bunker delivery period” in paragraph 6 of the Guidelines should\nbe taken to mean continuous collection of drip sample throughout the delivery of bunker fuel covering each bunker\ndelivery note. In case of receiving an amount of bunker fuel necessitating two or more delivery notes, the sampling\nwork may be temporarily stopped to change sample bags and bottles and then resumed as necessary.\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nlocation at which, and the method by which, the sample was drawn;\ndate of commencement of delivery;\nname of bunker tanker/bunker installation;\nname and IMO number of the receiving ship;\nsignatures and names of the supplier’s representative and the ship's representative;\ndetails of seal identification; and\nbunker grade.\n8.2 To facilitate cross-reference details of the seal, identification may also be recorded on the bunker delivery note.\n9 Retained sample storage\n9.1 The retained sample should be kept in a safe storage location, outside the ship’s accommodation, where\npersonnel would not be exposed to vapours which may be released from the sample. Care should be exercised\nwhen entering a sample storage location.\n9.2 The retained sample should be stored in a sheltered location where it will not be subject to elevated\ntemperatures, preferably at a cool/ambient temperature, and where it will not be exposed to direct sunlight.\n9.3 Pursuant to regulation 18(6) of Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78, the retained sample should be retained under the\nship’s control until the fuel oil is substantially consumed, but in any case, for a period of not less than 12 months from\nthe time of delivery.\n9.4 The ship’s master should develop and maintain a system to keep track of the retained samples\nIMO: MEPC/Circ.864/Rev.1 2019 Guidelines for on board sampling for the verification of the sulphur content\nof the fuel used on board ships.\nAnnex\n3 Sample handling\n…The ship should be given the option of retaining a sample. The label should include the following information:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nsampling point location where the sample was drawn;\ndate and port of sampling;\nname and IMO number of the ship;\ndetails of seal identification; and\nsignatures and names of the inspector and the ship's representative.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n16.5 Stowage of cargo samples\n16.5.1 Samples which have to be kept on board should be stowed in a designated space situated in the cargo area\nor, exceptionally, elsewhere, subject to the approval of the Administration.\n16.5.2 The stowage space should be:\n• •\n• cell-divided in order to avoid shifting of the bottles at sea;\nmade of material fully resistant to the different liquids intended to be stowed; and\nequipped with adequate ventilation arrangements.\n16.5.3 Samples which react with each other dangerously should not be stowed close to each other.\n16.5.4 Samples should not be retained on board longer than necessary.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures addressing the management of samples of bunker fuel oil and\nAnnex I and/or Annex II cargoes as applicable, including:\n• •\n• Marking/labelling of samples.\nStorage arrangements.\nRecords to be kept.\nA sample locker should be equipped with adequate ventilation arrangements but does not have to be mechanically\nventilated.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, company procedures addressing the management of samples of bunker\nfuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II cargoes as applicable.\nReview the records of bunker fuel oil and cargo samples and Oil Record Book Part II or Cargo Record Book\nas applicable.\nInspect the designated space(s) for storing samples.\nDuring the course of the inspection, note any samples stored outside the designated space(s) for storing\nsamples.\nInterview the responsible officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures addressing the\nmanagement of samples of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II cargoes as applicable.\nThe responsible officer can be any officer nominated by the Master to review the onboard sample management\nduring an inspection.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures addressing the management of samples of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or Annex II\ncargoes as applicable.\nRecords of bunker fuel oil and cargo samples.\nOil Record Book Part II or Cargo Record Book as applicable.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures addressing the management of bunker fuel oil and Annex I and/or\nAnnex II cargo samples as applicable, including:\no Marking/labelling of samples.\no Storage arrangements.\no Records to be kept.\nThe responsible officer was not familiar with the company procedures addressing the management of\nbunker fuel oil or Annex I and/or Annex II cargo samples, as appropriate.\nThe designated storage space(s) for samples was:\no Insufficient for the quantity of samples being retained.\no Accessible from the accommodation.\no Not within the cargo area for MARPOL Annex II samples.\no Subject to high temperatures.\no Inadequately ventilated.\no Not protected by a fixed firefighting system or readily available portable firefighting equipment.\nSamples were:\no Stored outside the designated storage space(s).\no Retained beyond the period indicated in the company procedures.\no Not disposed of as required by the company procedures.\nBunker fuel oil samples were not marked as required by MEPC.96(47) or MEPC.1/Circ.864/rev.1 as\nappropriate.\nAnnex I cargo samples were not marked as required by company procedures.\nAnnex II cargo samples were not marked as recommended in the ICS Tanker Safety Guide.\nA log was not kept of all:\no bunker fuel oil samples.\no cargo samples.\nThe disposal of cargo samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record Book Part II or Cargo Record Book\nas applicable.\nThe disposal of bunker samples had not been recorded in the Oil Record Book Part 1.\nThe design of a sample locker did not ensure that sample bottles were securely stored and protected from\ndamage.\nAnnex II cargo samples that might react dangerously with one another were not separated in the sample\nlocker.\nInhibited Annex II cargo samples had been retained on board beyond the period that the inhibitor remained\nactive, as stated on the inhibitor certificate.\n5.12. Safety Equipment", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.12.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedures that", "c": "addressed the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations, and did\nthe procedures prohibit the use of filter type respirators for this purpose?\nShort Question Text\nRespiratory protective equipment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the correct respiratory protective equipment is worn during cargo operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n10.13 Respiratory Protective Equipment\nCartridge or canister face masks will not protect the user against concentrations of hydrocarbon or toxic vapours or\nagainst oxygen deficiency. They should never be used in place of breathing apparatus.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n3.11.11 Respiratory Protection\nRespiratory protection in the form of breathing apparatus (self-contained or air-line) is designed to provide the user\nwith an adequate supply of fresh air when working in an area where toxic vapours could be present. It usually\nconsists of a sealed facepiece connected to either a self-contained air source or to a fresh air line.\n3.11.15 Canister or filter type respirators\nCanister or filter type respirators/filter masks are designed to absorb specific toxic or poisonous elements, dust and\ndebris but do not protect the wearer from an oxygen deficient atmosphere.\nFilter masks may be ineffective in protecting the wearer from cargo vapours and do not protect the wearer from an\noxygen deficient atmosphere. They should not be used during cargo or tank cleaning operations.\nFilter masks should never be used in enclosed spaces or areas on board where the oxygen content of the\natmosphere may be insufficient to sustain life.\nFilter masks should only be used to protect wearers from dust and other debris in the air when carrying out\nmaintenance tasks such as chipping paintwork or when using grinding tools.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Aromatic hydrocarbons.\nToxic cargoes.\nIncompatible cargoes.\nHigh vapour pressure cargoes.\nCargoes containing mercaptans and/or H2S.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that addressed the use of respiratory protective equipment\nduring cargo operations including prohibiting the use of filter type respirators for this purpose.\nFilter masks should not be used during cargo operations.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment\nduring cargo operations.\nDuring the course of the inspection, observe any respiratory protective equipment in use during cargo\noperations.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures for the use of\nrespiratory protective equipment during cargo operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• Company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations.\nThe company procedures for the use of respiratory protective equipment during cargo operations did not\nprohibit the use of filter type respirators during cargo operations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the use of respiratory protective\nequipment during cargo operations.\nFilter type respirators were observed being used by crew members involved in cargo operations.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "5.12.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the location and operation of", "c": "the decontamination showers and eyewash stations on deck, and were these facilities\nsuitably marked, easily accessible and ready for use?\nShort Question Text\nDecontamination showers and eyewash stations.\nVessel Types\nChemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the decontamination showers and eyewash stations provided on deck are always ready to use in\nan emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n2.7.3 Cold Weather\nSpecial attention should be paid to emergency showers and eye wash stations to ensure they continue to function.\nWater pipes supplying these should be insulated and provided with heat tracing to prevent freezing.\n8.3.4 Preparations\nBefore commencing tank cleaning or gas freeing operations, the responsible officer should confirm that all the\nnecessary equipment is available and in working condition.\nChecks, including the following, should be made before operations start:\n• Decontamination showers and eye-wash arrangements are ready for use.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IBC Code\n14.3.4 Suitably marked decontamination showers and an eyewash shall be available on deck in convenient locations.\nThe showers and eyewash shall be operable in all ambient conditions.\nIMO: IGC Code\n14.4.1 Requirements of this section shall apply to ships carrying products for which those paragraphs are listed on\ncolumn “I” in the table of Chapter 19.\n14.4.3 One or more suitably marked decontamination showers and eyewash stations shall be available on deck,\ntaking into account the size and layout of the ship. The showers and eyewashes shall be operable in all ambient\nconditions.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that decontamination showers and eye wash stations on\ndeck are ready for use, and:\n• •\n• Suitably marked.\nEasily accessible.\nRegularly inspected and tested.\nThis procedure may form part of the planned maintenance system.\nTo be operable in any ambient condition, a recirculation system, or fully heat-traced line must be provided.\nUninsulated sections of freshwater supply lines may lead to water being heated by direct sunlight such that a person\nwould not be able to use a shower or eyewash station for the intended purpose.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which ensures that decontamination showers\nand eye wash stations on deck are ready for use.\nInspect the decontamination showers and eye wash stations, select one and,\no If the temperature is at or below freezing, verify that the selected shower or eye wash was not\nfrozen.\no If the temperature was high with strong sunlight, verify that the selected shower or eye wash was\nnot scalding hot.\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspection and testing of the decontamination showers and eye\nwash stations.\nInterview a rating to verify their familiarity with the location and operation of the decontamination showers\nand eyewash stations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedure which ensures that decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck were\nready for use.\nRecords of inspection and testing of the decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There was no company procedure which ensures that decontamination showers and eye wash stations on\ndeck were ready for use.\n• •\n• •\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the location and operation of the decontamination showers and\neyewash stations on deck.\nThe decontamination showers and eye wash stations on deck were not\no Ready for use.\no Suitably marked.\no Easily accessible.\no Regularly inspected and tested as required by company procedures.\no Provided with insulation and a recirculation system or a fully heat-traced line.\nSections of freshwater piping supplying the showers or eye wash stations required to be heat traced and/or\ninsulated were found with the insulation and/or heat tracing removed.\nThe fresh water supply to a shower or eyewash station was found to be either frozen or scalding hot.\n6. Pollution Prevention\n6.1. Pollution Prevention - Record Books", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for maintaining", "c": "the Cargo Record Book, and did the entries contained in the Cargo Record Book\naccurately record the cargo related operations required to be documented by MARPOL\nAnnex II?\nShort Question Text\nCargo Record Book\nVessel Types\nChemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that all cargo operations are conducted in compliance with the Procedures and Arrangements\nManual and recorded in accordance with MARPOL Annex II.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) Fifth edition\n4.3.2 MARPOL Annex II Prevention of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances.\nAll liquid cargoes carried in bulk are defined by MARPOL as either oil (Annex I) or as NLS (Annex II)\nThe MARPOL Annex II regulations assign pollution criteria for all regulated NLS…\nCargo record book\nAll operations involving the loading, discharging and cleaning of cargo tanks after the carriage of NLS products\nshould be recorded in the ship’s cargo record book.\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):\n.2 Cargo Record Book (MARPOL Annex II, regulation 15.1);\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex II\nRegulation 15 Cargo Record Book\n1 Every ship to which this Annex applies shall be provided with a Cargo Record Book, whether as part of the ship’s\nofficial logbook or otherwise, in the form specified in the appendix II to this Annex.\n2 After completion of any operation specified in appendix II to this Annex, the operation shall be promptly recorded in\nthe Cargo Record Book.\n3 In the event of an accidental discharge of a noxious liquid substance or a mixture containing such a substance or a\ndischarge under the provision of regulation 3 of this Annex, an entry shall be made in the Cargo Record Book stating\nthe circumstances of, and reason for, the discharge.\n4 Each entry shall be signed by the officer or officers in charge of the operation concerned and each page shall be\nsigned by the master of the ship. The entries in the Cargo Record Book, for ships holding an International Pollution\nPrevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk or a certificate referred to in regulation 7\nof this Annex, shall be at least in English, French or Spanish. Where entries in an official national language of the\nState whose flag the ship is entitled to fly are also used, this shall prevail in the case of dispute or discrepancy.\n5 The Cargo Record Book shall be kept in such a place as to be readily available for inspection and, except in the\ncase of unmanned ships under tow, shall be kept onboard the ship. It shall be retained for three years after the last\nentry has been made.\nAppendix II Form of Cargo Record Book for ships carrying noxious liquid substances in bulk.\nList of Items to be recorded\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Loading of cargo\nInternal transfer of cargo\nUnloading of cargo\nMandatory prewash in accordance with the ship’s Procedures and Arrangements Manual\nCleaning of cargo tanks except mandatory prewash (other prewash operations, final wash, ventilation, etc.)\nDischarge into the sea of tank washings\nBallasting of cargo tanks\nDischarge of ballast water from cargo tanks\nAccidental or other exceptional discharge\nControl by authorized surveyors\nAdditional operational procedures and remarks\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for maintaining the Cargo Record Book, either in paper or\nelectronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration guidance. The procedures\nshould include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• What cargo related operations are required to be entered in the Cargo Record Book.\nWho is required to enter the details of a cargo related operation into the Cargo Record Book.\nWhen entries are required to be entered in the Cargo Record Book.\nThe use of the correct official name in accordance with the Certificate of Fitness for each entry requiring the\ncargo to be identified. The entries may also include the popular trading name or abbreviation.\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the Cargo Record Book entries and sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering cargo related operations which had been overlooked and not entered in the\nCargo Record Book in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for operations required to be entered under Section K, Additional operational procedures and\nremarks.\nInstructions for retention of completed Cargo Record Books.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Cargo Record Book,\ninstructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including automatic backing up of data to\noffline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the\nship’s network. The use of the electronic record book should be authorised by a Declaration from flag/class.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that for maintaining the Cargo Record Book\n(CRB) in accordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions.\nReview the entries in the CRB for a recent series of cargo operations relating to a single cargo and verify\nthat:\no Each operation had been entered in the CRB in the correct chronological sequence from the time\nthe cargo was initially loaded until the completion of cargo tank cleaning and disposal of any\ngenerated tank washings.\no Each entry included the information required by the instructions in the CRB.\no Each entry was signed by the officer in charge of the operation.\no Each page was counter-signed by the Master.\no\n• Each reference to a named cargo used the correct official name in accordance with the Certificate\nof Fitness.\no Where prewash operations had been carried out in accordance with MARPOL requirements, the\nCRB entry was endorsed by the local port authority inspector or equivalent.\no Discharge of tank washings was in accordance with the company procedure and MARPOL Annex\nII.\no Where wash water had been discharged to a reception facility, a receipt or certificate specifying the\nquantity of tank washings transferred, together with the time and date of the transfer, was kept\ntogether with the CRB.\no Where tank washings had been transferred to the sea, the entries in the CRB were consistent with\nthe vessel’s operations at the time of the operation by comparison with the deck logbook.\no Where an error or omission had been made, the method of correcting or inserting an updated entry\nhad been made in accordance with the company procedure.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Cargo Record\nBook, verify that data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and that there is an appropriate\nmethod of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. Sight the\nDeclaration from flag/class.\nThe review of CRB entries should be limited to the previous six months.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for maintaining the Cargo Record Book, either in paper or electronic format, in\naccordance with MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions.\nCargo Record Books for the previous six months.\nCargo records for the previous six months.\nThe Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Cargo Record Book in accordance with MARPOL\nAnnex II and any Flag Administration instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedures for maintaining the CRB in accordance\nwith MARPOL Annex II and any Flag Administration instructions.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be made in the CRB\nThe entries in the CRB:\no Were not an accurate record of cargo operations.\no Did not correctly identify cargoes by their correct technical name according to the Certificate of\nFitness.\no Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex II.\no Did not record all cargo related operations required to be recorded by MARPOL Annex II.\no Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.\no Were not verified and signed by the Master on completion of each page.\no Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when tank washings were disposed to a reception\nfacility.\nWhere a prewash operation had been carried out in accordance with MARPOL Annex II requirements, the\nrequired entry in the CRB had not been endorsed by the local port authority inspector or equivalent.\nTank washings disposal to the sea had not been made in compliance with MARPOL Annex II.\nA pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded in the CRB.\nWhere a vessel was an oil/chemical carrier MARPOL Annex I cargo operations had been entered in the\nCargo Record Book rather than the Oil Record Book Part II.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for maintaining", "c": "the Oil Record Book Part II, and did the entries contained in the Oil Record Book Part II\naccurately record the cargo related operations required to be documented by MARPOL\nAnnex I?\nShort Question Text\nOil Record Book Part II\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nINTERTANKO: A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part II – Cargo/Ballast Operations). Second\nEdition.\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.872 Unified Interpretations of Regulations 1.23 and 36.2.10 of MARPOL Annex I\nObjective\nTo ensure that all cargo operations are conducted and recorded in compliance with MARPOL Annex I.\nIndustry Guidance\nINTERTANKO: A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part II – Cargo/Ballast Operations).\nSecond Edition.\n2.2 Objective of the Guide\nThe objective of this Guide is to provide simple and clear advice and guidance for making entries in the ORB Part II\nwith the aim of:\n• •\n• Ensuring compliance with the relevant MARPOL Annex I requirements;\nFacilitating and simplifying the onboard work of the responsible officers and the Master; and,\nEnsuring uniform and consistent ORB Part II record-keeping that is aligned with and compatible with, other\nshipboard log books and records.\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.872 Unified Interpretations of Regulations 1.23 and 36.2.10 of MARPOL Annex I\nTerminal hose flush water\nInterpretation of regulation 36.2.10\nWhen the master of an oil tanker agrees to accept terminal hose flush water from a Single Point Mooring (SPM) or a\nConventional Buoy Mooring (CBM), that flush water should be categorized as the disposal of residues under\nregulation 36.2.10…\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):\n.1 Oil Record Book, parts I and II (MARPOL Annex I, regulations 17.1 and 36.1);\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 36 Oil Record Book Part II – Cargo/ballast operations\n1 Every oil tanker of 150 gross tonnage and above shall be provided with an Oil Record Book Part II (Cargo/Ballast\nOperations). The Oil Record Book Part II, whether as part of the ship’s official logbook or otherwise, shall be in the\nform specified in the appendix III to this Annex.\n2 The Oil Record Book Part II shall be completed on each occasion, on a tank-to-tank basis if appropriate, whenever\nany of the following cargo/ballast operations take place on the ship:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nloading of oil cargo\ninternal transfer of oil cargo during voyage;\nunloading of oil cargo;\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\n9.\nballasting of cargo tanks and dedicated clean ballast tanks;\ncleaning of cargo tanks including crude oil washing;\ndischarge of ballast except from segregated ballast tanks;\ndischarge of water from slop tanks;\nclosing of all applicable valves or similar devices after slop tank discharge operations;\nclosing of valves necessary for isolation of dedicated clean ballast tanks from cargo and stripping lines after\nslop tank discharge operations; and,\n10. disposal of residues.\n4 In the event of such discharge of oil or oily mixture as referred to in regulation 4 of this Annex or in the event of\naccidental or other exceptional discharge of oil not excepted by that regulation, a statement shall be made in the Oil\nRecord Book Part II of the circumstances of, and reasons for, the discharge.\n5 Each operation described in paragraph 2 of this regulation shall be fully recorded without delay in the Oil Record\nBook Part II so that all entries in the book appropriate to that operation are completed. Each completed operation\nshall be signed by the officer or officers in charge of the operation concerned and each completed page shall be\nsigned by the master of the ship. The entries in the Oil Record Book Part II shall be at least in English, French or\nSpanish. Where entries in an official language of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly are also used, this\nshall prevail in the case of dispute or discrepancy.\n6 Any failure of the oil discharge monitoring and control system shall be noted in the Oil Record Book Part II.\n7 The Oil Record Book shall be kept in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all reasonable times\nand, except in the case of unmanned ships under tow, shall be kept onboard the ship. It shall be preserved for a\nperiod of three years after the last entry has been made.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II (ORB II), either in\npaper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration guidance. The\nprocedure should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhat cargo related operations are required to be entered in the ORB II.\nWho is required to enter the details of a cargo related operation into the ORB II.\nWhen entries are required to be entered in the ORB II.\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the ORB II entries and sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering cargo related operations which had been overlooked and not entered in the ORB\nII in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for operations required to be entered under Section O, Additional operational procedures and\ngeneral remarks.\nInstructions for retention of completed ORB II.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in ORB II, instructions for the\nuse of the electronic record book system should be provided, including automatic backing up of data to offline storage\nand an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. The\nuse of the electronic record book should be authorised by a Declaration from flag/class.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II in\naccordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nReview the entries in the ORB II for a recent series of cargo operations relating to a single cargo and verify\nthat:\no Each operation had been entered in the ORB II in the correct chronological sequence from the time\nthe cargo was initially loaded until the completion of cargo tank cleaning and disposal of any\ngenerated tank washing water.\no\no\no\no\n• •\nEach entry included the information required by the instructions in the ORB II.\nEach entry was signed by the officer in charge of the operation.\nEach page was counter-signed by the Master.\nDischarge of tank washings was in accordance with the company procedure and MARPOL Annex\nI.\no Where wash water had been discharged to a reception facility, a receipt or certificate specifying the\nquantity of tank washings transferred, together with the time and date of the transfer, was kept\ntogether with ORB II.\no Where water from a slop tank had been discharged into the sea, the entries in the ORB II were\nconsistent with the vessel’s operations at the time of the operation by comparison with the deck\nlogbook.\no Where an error or omission had been made, the method of correcting or inserting an updated entry\nhad been made in accordance with the company procedure.\no Where a transfer of bilge water or sludge from the machinery space had taken place that a\ncorresponding entry was recorded in ORB I.\nWhere an error or omission had been made verify that the method of correcting or inserting an updated\nentry had been made in accordance with the company procedure.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the ORB II, verify\nthat data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and that there is an appropriate method of data\nrecovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. Sight the Declaration from\nflag/class.\nThe review of ORB II entries should be limited to the previous six months of records.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II in accordance with MARPOL Annex I\nand any Flag Administration instructions.\nOil Record Book Part II for the previous six months.\nCargo records for the previous six months.\nThe Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part II (ORB II) in accordance with\nMARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for maintaining the ORB II in\naccordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be made in the ORB II.\nThe entries in ORB II:\no Were not an accurate record of cargo operations.\no Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex I.\no Did not record all cargo related operations required to be recorded by MARPOL Annex I.\no Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.\no Were not verified and signed by the Master on completion of each page.\no Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when wash water was disposed to a reception facility.\no Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company procedure.\nDischarge of water from the slop tanks into the sea had not been made in compliance with MARPOL Annex\nI.\nBallast water had been loaded into a cargo tank or cargo tanks after the carriage of crude oil, but the cargo\ntank(s) had not been crude oil washed.\n• •\n• The oil discharge monitoring equipment was, or had been, out of service but there was no entry in ORB II for\nwhen the equipment was taken out of service and, if applicable, returned to service.\nA pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded in the ORB II.\nWhere a vessel was an oil/chemical carrier, MARPOL Annex II cargo operations had been entered in the\nORB II rather than the Cargo Record Book.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.3.", "t": "Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I, and did the entries contained in the Oil Record\nBook Part I accurately record the machinery space operations required to be\ndocumented by MARPOL Annex I?\nShort Question Text\nOil Record Book Part I\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Documentation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nINTERTANKO: A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part I – Machinery Space Operations). Fourth\nEdition.\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.736/Rev.2 Guidance for the Recording of Operations in the Oil Record Book Part I – Machinery\nSpace Operations (All Ships)\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\nObjective\nTo ensure that all machinery space operations are conducted and recorded in compliance with MARPOL\nAnnex I.\nIndustry Guidance\nINTERTANKO: A Guide for Correct Entries in the Oil Record Book (Part I – Machinery Space Operations).\nFourth Edition.\n2.2 Objectives of the Guide\nAssist ship operators in defining the controls and activities necessary to ensure that:\n• •\n• All operations referred to in regulation 17 of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 consolidated edition as amended,\nare recorded in the ORB.\nAll records are in accordance with the format stipulated by Appendix III of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78\nconsolidated edition 2011 as amended.\nThe records in the ORB are compatible with the records in the other log books.\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.736/Rev.2 Guidance for the Recording of Operations in the Oil Record Book Part I –\nMachinery Space Operations (All Ships)\n2 This Guidance is intended to facilitate compliance with MARPOL requirements on board ships by providing advice\nto crews on how to record the various operations in the Oil Record Book by using the correct codes and item\nnumbers in order to ensure a more uniform port State control procedure.\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):\n.1 Oil Record Book, parts I and II (MARPOL Annex I, regulations 17.1 and 36.1);\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 17 Oil Record Book Part I – Machinery space operations\n1 Every oil tanker of 150 gross tonnage and above and every ship of 400 gross tonnage and above other than an oil\ntanker shall be provided with an Oil Record Book Part I (Machinery space operations). The Oil Record Book, whether\nas part of the ship’s official logbook or otherwise, shall be in the form specified in appendix III to this Annex.\n2 The Oil Record Book Part I shall be completed on each occasion, on a tank-to-tank basis if appropriate, whenever\nany of the following machinery space operations takes place in the ship:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nballasting or cleaning of fuel tanks;\ndischarge of dirty ballast or cleaning water from oil fuel tanks;\ncollection and disposal of oil residues (sludge);\n4.\n5.\ndischarge overboard or disposal otherwise of bilge water which has accumulated in machinery spaces; and\nbunkering of fuel or bulk lubricating oil.\n3 In the event of such discharge of oil or oily mixture as referred to in regulation 4 of this Annex or in the event of\naccidental or other exceptional discharge of oil not excepted by that regulation, a statement shall be made in the Oil\nRecord Book Part I of the circumstances of, and reasons for, the discharge.\n4 Each operation described in paragraph 2 of this regulation shall be fully recorded without delay in the Oil Record\nBook Part I so that all entries in the book appropriate to that operation are completed. Each completed operation shall\nbe signed by the officer or officers in charge of the operation concerned and each completed page shall be signed by\nthe master of the ship. The entries in the Oil Record Book Part I, for ships holding an International Oil Pollution\nPrevention Certificate, shall be at least in English, French or Spanish. Where entries in an official language of the\nState whose flag the ship is entitled to fly are also used, this shall prevail in the case of dispute or discrepancy.\n5 Any failure of the oil filtering equipment shall be recorded in the Oil Record Book Part I.\n6 The Oil Record Book Part I shall be kept in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all reasonable\ntimes and, except in the case of unmanned ships under tow, shall be kept onboard the ship. It shall be preserved for\na period of three years after the last entry has been made.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I (ORB I), either in\npaper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration guidance. The\nprocedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhat machinery space operations are required to be entered in the ORB I.\nWho is required to enter the details of a machinery space operation into the ORB I.\nWhen entries are required to be made in the ORB I.\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the ORB I entries and sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering machinery space operations which had been overlooked and not entered in the\nORB I in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for operations required to be entered under Section I, Additional operational procedures and\ngeneral remarks.\nInstructions for retention of completed Oil Record Book Part I.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in ORB I, instructions for the\nuse of the electronic record book system should be provided, including automatic backing up of data to offline storage\nand an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. The\nuse of the electronic record book should be authorised by a Declaration from flag/class.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I\n(ORB I) in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nReview the entries in the ORB I for a randomly selected period of approximately 10 uninterrupted days and\nverify that:\no The collection and transfer or disposal of oil residues (sludge) were consistent with the weekly\ninventory of oil residues retained on board. (Code C)\no The disposal of sludge using the incinerator was consistent with the capacity of the incinerator\nwhen in sludge burning mode. (Code 12.3)\no The disposal of bilge water through the 15 ppm equipment was consistent with the capacity of the\n15 ppm equipment. (Code D15.1).\no The voluntary declaration of quantities retained on board in oily bilge water holding tanks (Code I)\nwas consistent with the disposals made (Code D15.1)\no\n• •\n• •\n• The capacities of the oil residue tanks corresponded with the capacities listed in the IOPP\nsupplement.\nReview the entries in ORB I more generally, and verify that:\no Each operation had been entered in the ORB I in the correct chronological sequence.\no Each entry included the information required by the instructions in the ORB I.\no Each entry was signed by the officer in charge of the operation.\no Each page was counter-signed by the Master.\no Where an error or omission had been made verify that the method of correcting or inserting an\nupdated entry had been made in accordance with the company procedure.\nWhere sludge (C12.2) or bilge water (D15.3) had been transferred to a cargo area slop tank verify that there\nwas a reciprocal entry in Oil Record Book Part II.\nWhere sludge (C12.1) or bilge water (D15.2) had been disposed of to a reception facility, verify that a receipt\nor certificate detailing the quantity of residues or oily mixture transferred along with the date and time of the\ntransfer was available with the ORB I.\nWhere bunkering of fuel oil (H26.3) had taken place verify that the entries in the ORB I were consistent with\nthe bunker delivery note (BDN) provided by the bunker supplier\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the ORB I, verify\nthat data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and that there is an appropriate method of data\nrecovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. Sight the Declaration from\nflag/class.\nThe review of ORB I entries should be limited to the previous six months.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I in accordance with MARPOL Annex I\nand any Flag Administration instructions.\nOil Record Book Part I for the previous six months.\nThe Engine Room Log Book for the previous six months.\nA copy of the supplement to the IOPP certificate (Form B)\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book Part I in accordance with MARPOL\nAnnex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for maintaining the Oil Record Book\nPart I in accordance with MARPOL Annex I and any Flag Administration instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be made in the Oil Record Book Part\nI.\nThe entries in the Oil Record Book Part I:\no Were not an accurate record of machinery space operations.\no Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex I.\no Did not record all machinery space operations required by MARPOL Annex I.\no Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.\no Were not verified and signed by the Master upon completion of each page.\no Were not supported by a receipt or certificate when sludge or bilge water was disposed to a\nreception facility.\no Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company procedure.\nThe oil filtering equipment, its alarm or automatic stopping device was, or had been, out of service but there\nwas no entry in the ORB I for when the equipment failed and, if applicable, was returned to service.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nBilge water had been discharged in a Special Area, but the oil filtering equipment was not fitted with an\nalarm and an automatic stopping device (IOPP Certificate Supplement 2.2.1) or this equipment was out of\nservice.\nA pollution incident (accidental or other exceptional discharge) was recorded in the ORB I.\nWhere sludge or bilge water had been transferred to a cargo area slop tank there was no reciprocal entry in\nOil Record Book Part II.\nWhere sludge or bilge water had been disposed of to a reception facility, there was no receipt or certificate\ndetailing the quantity of residues or oily mixture transferred, available with the ORB I.\nWhere sludge had been incinerated, the volume of sludge disposed of was inconsistent with the capacity of\nthe incinerator in sludge burning mode.\nWhere bilge water had been discharged through the oil filtering equipment, the volume of bilge water\ndisposed of was inconsistent with the capacity of the oil filtering equipment.\nThe disposal of accumulated sludge or bilge water could not be accounted for through the entries provided\nin the ORB I\nThe capacity of one or more oil residue tanks referred to in an ORB I entry did not correspond with the\ncapacities listed on the supplement to the IOPP certificate.\nIf the oil filtering equipment was defective in any respect enter a negative observation in the Hardware response\ntool of question 6.6.1.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for maintaining", "c": "the Garbage Record Book in accordance with the Garbage Management Plan, and did the\nentries contained in the Garbage Record Book accurately record the garbage\nmanagement activities required to be documented by MARPOL Annex V?\nShort Question Text\nGarbage Record Book\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Engine Room, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Guidelines for the Implementation of MARPOL Annex V. 2017 Edition.\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.834/Rev.1 Consolidated Guidance for Port Reception Facility Providers and Users.\nObjective\nTo ensure that all garbage management activities are conducted and recorded in compliance with MARPOL\nAnnex V.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Guidelines for the Implementation of MARPOL Annex V. 2017 Edition.\nPreface\nThe main objectives of these Guidelines are to assist:\n.2 shipowners, ship operators, ship’s crew, cargo owners and equipment manufacturers in complying with the\nrequirements set forth in MARPOL Annex V and relevant domestic laws;\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.834/Rev.1 Consolidated Guidance for Port Reception Facility Providers and Users.\nConsiderations during MARPOL waste/residues delivery\n37 Following delivery, the master should request a Waste Delivery Receipt to document the type and quantity of\nMARPOL wastes/residues actually received by the facility. IMO has standardized the format of this document to\nfacilitate its use and application and in order to provide uniformity of records throughout the world…\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):\n.3 Garbage Record Book, parts I and II (MARPOL Annex V, regulation 10.3);\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex V\nRegulation 10 Placards, garbage management plans and garbage record-keeping\n1.1 Every ship of 12m or more in length overall and fixed or floating platforms shall display placards which notify the\ncrew and passengers of the discharge requirements of regulations 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Annex and section 5.2 of part\nII-A of the Polar Code, as applicable.\n1.2 The placards shall be written in the working language of the ship’s crew and, for ships engaged in voyages to\nports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of other Parties to the Convention, shall also be in English, French or\nSpanish.\n2 Every ship of 100 gross tonnage and above, and every ship which is certified to carry 15 or more persons and fixed\nor floating platforms shall carry a garbage management plan which the crew shall follow. This plan shall provide\nwritten procedures for minimizing, collecting, storing, processing and disposing of garbage, including the use of\nequipment onboard. It shall also designate the person or persons in charge of carrying out the plan. Such a plan shall\nbe based on the guidelines developed by the Organization and written in the working language of the crew.\n3 Every ship of 400 gross tonnage and above and every ship which is certified to carry 15 or more persons engaged\nin voyages to ports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of another Party to the Convention and every fixed or\nfloating platform shall be provided with a Garbage Record Book. The Garbage Record Book, whether as part of the\nship’s official logbook, or as an electronic record book which shall be approved by the Administration taking into\naccount the Guidelines developed by the Organization, or otherwise, shall be in the form specified in appendix II to\nthis Annex:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nEach discharge into the sea or to a reception facility, or a completed incineration, shall be promptly recorded\nin the Garbage Record Book and signed for on the date of discharge or incineration by the officer in charge.\nEach completed page of the Garbage Record Book shall be signed by the master of the ship. The entries in\nthe Garbage Record Book shall be at least in English, French or Spanish. Where the entries are also made\nin an official language of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly, the entries in that language shall\nprevail in case of a dispute or discrepancy.\nThe entry for each discharge into the sea under regulations 4, 5, 6 or section 5.2 of chapter 5 of part II-A of\nthe Polar Code shall include date and time, position of the ship (latitude and longitude), category of the\ngarbage and the estimated amount (in cubic metres) discharged. For discharge of cargo residues the\ndischarge start and stop positions shall be recorded in addition to the foregoing;\nThe entry for each completed incineration shall include date and time and position of the ship (latitude and\nlongitude) at the start and stop of incineration, categories of garbage incinerated, and the estimated amount\nincinerated for each category in cubic metres;\nThe entry for each discharge to a port reception facility or another ship shall include date and time of\ndischarge, port or facility or name of ship, categories of garbage discharged, and the estimated amount\ndischarged for each category in cubic metres;\nThe Garbage Record Book along with receipts obtained from reception facilities shall be kept on board the\nship or the fixed or floating platform, and in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all\nreasonable times. This document shall be preserved for a period of at least two years from the date of the\nlast entry made in it.\nIn the event of any discharge or accidental loss referred to in regulation 7 of this Annex an entry shall be\nmade in the Garbage Record Book, or in the case of any ship of less than 400 gross tonnage, an entry shall\nbe made in the ship's official log-book of the date and time of occurrence, port or position of the ship at time\nof occurrence (latitude, longitude and water depth if known), the reason for the discharge or loss, details of\nthe items discharged or lost, categories of garbage discharged or lost, estimated amount for each category\nin cubic metres, reasonable precautions taken to prevent or minimize such discharge or accidental loss and\ngeneral remarks.\nAppendix II to Annex V\nForm of Garbage Record Book\n3 Description of the Garbage\nGarbage is to be grouped into categories for the purposes of recording in parts I and II of the Garbage Record Book\n(or ship’s official logbook) as follows:\nPart I\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• A Plastics\nB Food Wastes\nC Domestic Wastes\nD Cooking Oil\nE Incinerator Ashes\nF Operational Wastes\nG Animal carcasses\nH Fishing gear\nI E-waste\nPart II\n• •\nJ Cargo residues (non-HME)\nK Cargo residues (HME)\n4.2 Amount of garbage\nThe amount of garbage on board should be estimated in cubic metres, if possible separately according to category.\nThe Garbage Record Book contains many references to estimated amount of garbage. It is recognized that the\naccuracy of estimating amounts of garbage is left to interpretation. Volume estimates will differ before and after\nprocessing. Some processing procedures may not allow for a usable estimate of volume, e.g. the continuous\nprocessing of food waste. Such factors should be taken into consideration when making and interpreting entries\nmade in a record.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for developing a Garbage Management Plan and\nmaintaining the Garbage Record Book (GRB), either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL\nAnnex V and any Flag Administration guidance. The procedure and/or Garbage Management Plan should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• What garbage related activities are required to be entered in the GRB.\nWho is required to enter the details of garbage related activities into the GRB.\nWhen entries are required to be made in the GRB.\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the GRB entries and sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering garbage related activities which had been overlooked and not entered in the\nGRB in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for retention of completed GRB.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Garbage Record Book,\ninstructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including automatic backing up of data to\noffline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the\nship’s network. The use of the electronic record book should be authorised by a Declaration from flag/class.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for maintaining the Garbage Record Book\n(GRB) in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag Administration instructions.\nReview the entries in the GRB for a selected period of 10 consecutive days which included a port visit and\nverify that:\no Special areas.\no Distance from coastline.\no Whether the waste had been comminuted or ground.\no Food wastes had been disposed of overboard in accordance with restrictions based on:\no Each operation had been entered in the GRB in the correct chronological sequence\no Each entry included the information required by the instructions in the GRB.\no Each entry was signed by the officer in charge of the operation.\no Each page was counter-signed by the Master.\no Where an error or omission had been made, the method of correcting or inserting an updated entry\nhad been made in accordance with the company procedure.\nWhere garbage had been disposed of to a reception facility, verify that a receipt or certificate detailing the\nquantity of garbage by category transferred along with the date and time of the transfer was available with\nthe GRB.\nWhere an error or omission had been made verify that the method of correcting or inserting an updated\nentry had been made in accordance with the company procedure.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Garbage\nRecord Book, verify that data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and that there is an\nappropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s\nnetwork. Sight the Declaration from flag/class.\nWhere necessary review the Garbage Management Plan.\nThe review of GRB entries should be limited to the previous six months.\n• Inspect the garbage collection areas, including the incinerator space and verify:\no Garbage was being stored and segregated in a safe and hygienic manner in accordance with the\ngarbage management plan.\no Dangerous or toxic waste items, such as aerosols and batteries, were being properly collected and\nsegregated to prevent them from being incinerated or disposed of ashore with general waste.\n• Interview a rating to verify their understanding of onboard garbage management including:\no Garbage segregation onboard.\no Disposal of aerosols and batteries.\no Permitted disposals of garbage to the sea.\no Garbage management practices within their operational department.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for developing a Garbage Management Plan and maintaining the Garbage Record\nBook (GRB), either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag\nAdministration guidance.\nThe Garbage Management Plan.\nGarbage Record Book for the previous six months.\nThe Bridge Log Book for the previous six months.\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for maintaining the Garbage Record Book, either in paper or electronic\nformat, in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag Administration instructions.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\nThe was no Garbage Management Plan available onboard.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with company procedure for maintaining the Garbage Record\nBook in accordance with MARPOL Annex V and any Flag Administration instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the Garbage Management Plan.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the entries required to be made in the Garbage Record\nBook.\nThe entries in the Garbage Record Book:\nWhere garbage had been disposed of to a reception facility, there was no receipt or certificate detailing the\nquantity and categories of garbage disposed of.\nThere was no evidence that food waste disposed of overboard through a waste disposal unit (comminuter or\ngrinder) had been recorded on the GRB.\nGarbage was stored onboard in an unhygienic manner.\nGarbage was not being segregated into the required categories in preparation for final disposal either by\nincineration or to a reception facility.\nDangerous or toxic garbage was found to be mixed with general garbage.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the garbage management practices onboard.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.5.", "t": "Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, and did the entries contained\nin the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book accurately record the operations and\nemissions required to be documented by MARPOL Annex VI?\nShort Question Text\nOzone Depleting Substances Record Book\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\nObjective\nTo ensure all operations involving ozone-depleting substances, including any deliberate and non-deliberate\nemissions, are recorded in compliance with MARPOL Annex VI.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOX Technical Code):\n.4 Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book (MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 12.6)\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nRegulation 6\nIssue or endorsement of Certificates\nInternational Air Pollution Prevention Certificate\n1 An International Air Pollution Certificate shall be issued, after an initial or renewal survey in accordance with the\nprovisions of Regulation 5 of this annex to:\n.1 any ship of 400 gross tonnage and above engaged in voyages to ports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction\nof other Parties;\nRegulation 12\nOzone depleting substances\n5 Each ship subject to regulation 6.1 shall maintain a list of equipment containing ozone-depleting substances*\n*See appendix 1, Supplement to International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate (IAPP Certificate), section 2.1\n6 Each ship subject to regulation 6.1 that has rechargeable systems that contain ozone depleting substances shall\nmaintain an ozone-depleting substances record book. This record book may form part of an existing logbook or\nelectronic record book as approved by the Administration.\n7 Entries in the ozone-depleting substances record book shall be recorded in terms of mass(kg) of substance and\nshall be completed without delay on each occasion, in respect of the following:\n• •\n• .1 recharge, full or partial, of equipment containing ozone-depleting substances;\n.2 repair or maintenance of equipment containing ozone-depleting substances;\n.3 discharge of ozone-depleting substances to the atmosphere:\n• •\no\no\n.3.1 deliberate, and\n.3.2 non-deliberate;\n.4 discharge of ozone-depleting substances to land-based reception facilities; and\n.5 supply of ozone-depleting substances to the ship.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record\nBook, either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag Administration\nguidance. The procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The operations and emissions required to be entered in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, i.e.:\no recharge, full or partial, of equipment containing ozone-depleting substances.\no repair or maintenance of equipment containing ozone-depleting substances.\no discharge of ozone-depleting substances to the atmosphere, both deliberate and non-deliberate.\no discharge of ozone-depleting substances to land-based reception facilities.\no supply of ozone-depleting substances to the ship.\nWho is required to enter the details of an operation or emission into the Ozone-depleting Substances\nRecord Book.\nWhen entries are required to be made in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book.\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book entries\nand sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering operations or emissions which had been overlooked and not entered in the\nOzone-depleting Substances Record Book in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for retention of completed Ozone-depleting Substances Record Books.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Ozone-depleting\nSubstances Record Book, instructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including\nautomatic backing up of data to offline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail\nor not be available from the ship’s network. The use of the electronic record book should be authorised by a\nDeclaration from flag/class.\nThe Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book may form part of an existing logbook or electronic record book.\nA list of equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances is included in the Supplement to the International\nAir Pollution Prevention Certificate (IAPP Certificate), section 2.1\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that described the requirements for\nmaintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, either in paper or electronic format, in\naccordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag Administration guidance.\nReview the list of equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances included in the Supplement to\nthe IAPP Certificate, section 2.1.\nSelect an item of equipment listed and review the relevant maintenance records.\nReview the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book and verify that:\no Any equipment recharge, repair or maintenance noted had been correctly recorded in the Ozonedepleting Substances Record Book.\no The supply of ozone-depleting substances to the ship, or discharge of ozone-depleting substances\nto land-based reception facilities, had been recorded in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record\nBook, as appropriate.\nReview the entries in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book more generally, and verify that:\no Each operation had been entered in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book in the correct\nchronological sequence.\no Each entry included the information required by the company procedures.\no Each entry was signed by the officer in charge of the operation.\no\no\n• Each page was counter-signed by the Master.\nWhere an error or omission had been made verify that the method of correcting or inserting an\nupdated entry was in accordance with the company procedures.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Ozonedepleting Substances Record Book, verify that data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and\nthat there is an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the\nship’s network. Sight the Declaration from flag/class.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures that described the requirements for maintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances\nRecord Book, either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag\nAdministration guidance.\nThe Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book for the previous six months.\nThe maintenance records for the equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances for the\nprevious six months.\nA copy of the Supplement to the IAPP Certificate.\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure that described the requirements for maintaining the Ozone-depleting\nSubstances Record Book, either in paper or electronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI and\nany Flag Administration guidance.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that described the requirements for\nmaintaining the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, either in paper or electronic format, in\naccordance with MARPOL Annex VI and any Flag Administration guidance.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\nAn item of equipment on board containing ozone-depleting substances was not included in the Supplement\nto the International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate (IAPP Certificate), section 2.1.\nThe entries in the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book:\no Were not an accurate record of operations and/or emissions involving ozone-depleting substances.\no Recorded operations that were in violation of MARPOL Annex VI.\no Did not record all operations and/or emissions required by MARPOL Annex VI.\no Were not signed by the officer in charge of each operation.\no Were not verified and signed by the Master upon completion of each page.\no Were not supported by a receipt or certificate for the discharge of ozone-depleting substances to\nland-based reception facilities.\no Were corrected in a manner which was not in compliance with the company procedures.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.1.6.", "t": "Were the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 for", "c": "the control of NOx and associated emissions in good order?\nShort Question Text\nMARPOL Annex VI NOx Compliance and Record Keeping.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nChief Engineer's Office, Documentation, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\nIMO: NOx Technical Code (2008)\nTechnical Code on Control of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines\nIMO: Resolution MEPC 307(73) 2018 Guidelines for the discharge of exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) bleed-off water\nObjective\nTo ensure the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI for the control of NOx and associated\nemissions are maintained as required.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: NOx Technical Code (2008) Technical Code on Control of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine\nDiesel Engines\n1.3.15 A Technical File is a record containing all details of parameters, including components and settings of an\nengine, which may influence the NOx emission of the engine, in accordance with 2.4 of this Code.\n1.3.16 A Record Book of Engine Parameters is the document used in connection with the Engine Parameter Check\nmethod for recording all parameter changes, including components and engine settings, which may influence NOx\nemission of the engine.\n2.3.4 Every marine diesel engine installed on board a ship shall be provided with a Technical File. The Technical File\nshall be prepared by the applicant for engine certification and approved by the Administration and is required to\naccompany an engine throughout its life on board ships. The Technical File shall contain the information as specified\nin 2.4.1.\n2.4.1 To enable an Administration to perform the engine surveys described in 2.1, the Technical File required by 2.3.4\nshall, at a minimum, contain the following information:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\nidentification of those components, settings and operating values of the engine which influences its NOx\nemissions including any NOx reducing device or system;\nidentification of the full range of allowable adjustments or alternatives for the components of the engine;\nfull record of the relevant engine’s performance, including the engine’s rated speed and rated power;\na system of onboard NOx verification procedures to verify compliance with the NOx emission limits during\nonboard verification surveys in accordance with chapter 6;\na copy of the relevant Parent Engine test data, as given in section 2 of appendix 5 of this Code;\nif applicable, the designation and restrictions for an engine which is an engine within an Engine Family or\nEngine Group;\nspecifications of those spare parts/components which, when used in the engine, according to those\nspecifications, will result in continued compliance of the engine with the applicable NOx emission limit; and\nthe EIAPP Certificate, as applicable\n2.3.7 Where the Engine Parameter Check method in accordance with 6.2 is used to verify compliance, if any\nadjustments or modifications are made to an engine after its pre-certification, a full record of such adjustments or\nmodifications shall be recorded in the engine’s Record Book of Engine Parameters.\n6.2.2.7 The shipowner or person responsible for a ship equipped with a marine diesel engine required to undergo an\nEngine Parameter Check method shall maintain on board the following documentation in relation to the onboard NOx\nverification procedures:\n1.\n2.\n3.\na Record Book of Engine Parameters for recording all changes, including like for like replacements, and\nadjustments within the approved ranges made relative to an engine’s components and settings;\nan engine parameter list of an engine’s designated components and settings and/or the documentation of an\nengine’s load-dependent operating values submitted by an applicant for engine certification and approved by\nthe Administration; and\ntechnical documentation of an engine component modification when such a modification is made to any of\nthe engine’s designated engine components.\n6.2.2.8 Descriptions of any changes affecting the designated engine parameters, including adjustments, parts\nreplacements and modifications to engine parts, shall be recorded chronologically in the Record Book of Engine\nParameters. These descriptions shall be supplemented with any other applicable data used for the assessment of the\nengine’s NOx emissions.\nIMO: Resolution MEPC 307(73) 2018 Guidelines for the discharge of exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) bleedoff water\n2.3.1 \"Bleed-off water\" means water to be discharged directly, or via a holding tank, to the sea from an EGR water\ntreatment system.\n4.1 Residues from EGR water treatment systems should be delivered ashore to adequate reception facilities. Such\nresidues should not be discharged to the sea or incinerated on board.\n4.2 Each ship fitted with an EGR unit should record the storage and disposal of bleed-off water residues in an EGR\nrecord book, including the date, time and location of such storage and disposal.\nIMO: MEPC.312(74) Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Record Books under MARPOL\n2.1 These Guidelines are only applicable to the use of electronic record books on board to meet the requirements of\nthe following record books and recording requirements under the MARPOL Annexes and the Technical Code on\nControl of Emission of Nitrogen Oxides from Marine Diesel Engines (NOx Technical Code):\n.5 recording of the tier and on/off status of marine diesel engines (MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 13.5.3);\n.7 Record Book of Engine Parameters (NOx Technical Code, paragraph 6.2.2.7).\n2.2 The use of an electronic record book to record operational logs is an alternative method to a hard copy record\nbook. The electronic record book may allow ships to utilize their technology to reduce administrative burdens and\ncontribute to on board environmental initiatives, e.g. reduction of paper use.\n4.4.2 The electronic record book should have the capability to allow automatic backup of data in the system to offline\nstorage. Backups should ensure the offline record is updated automatically every time changes are made to entries to\nensure the backing up process is not forgotten by the user.\n5 Declaration\n5.1 Any electronic system deemed to meet the above criteria should be provided with written confirmation by the\nAdministration and carried on board the ship for the purpose of regulatory surveys or inspections. An example of a\ndeclaration can be seen in the appendix.\n5.2 Delegating the assessment of the electronic record book against these Guidelines and the issuing of a declaration\non behalf of the Administration by recognized organizations (ROs) is at the discretion of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nRegulation 13\nNitrogen oxides (NOx)\nApplication\n1.1 This regulation shall apply to:\n.1 each marine diesel engine with a power output of more than 130 kW installed on a ship; and\n.2 each marine diesel engine with a power output of more than 130 kW that undergoes a major conversion on or after\n1 January 2000 except when demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administration that such engine is an identical\nreplacement to the engine that is replacing and is otherwise not covered under paragraph 1.1.1. of this regulation.\n1.2 This regulation does not apply to\n.1 a marine diesel engine intended to be used solely in emergencies, or solely to power any device or equipment\nintended to be used solely for emergencies on the ship on which it is installed, or a marine diesel engine installed in\nlifeboats intended to be used solely for emergencies; …\n5.3 The tier and on/off status of marine diesel engines installed on board a ship to which paragraph 5.1 of this\nregulation applies which are certified to both Tier II and Tier III or which are certified to Tier II only shall be recorded in\nsuch a logbook as prescribed by the Administration at entry into and exit from an emission control area designated\nunder paragraph 6 of this regulation, or when the on/off status changes within such an area, together with the date,\ntime and position of the ship.\nInspection Guidance\nThe details of each marine diesel engine installed on board to which MARPOL Annex VI regulation 13 applies can be\nfound in paragraph 2.2.1 of the vessel’s International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.\nThe level of NOx emissions for each engine is described by Tier designation. Tier I and Tier II status is usually\nachieved via engine design. Tier III status is achieved by the use of additional equipment such as Selective Catalytic\nReduction (SCR) or Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) systems. Such equipment is not run continuously and must be\noperating to achieve Tier III status. Thus engines may be run at Tier II or Tier III depending upon local requirements.\nEngines must be operating in Tier III mode in a NOx Emission Control Area that applies to the vessel.\nNOx Emission Control Areas apply as follows:\n• •\n• •\nBaltic Sea for vessels constructed after 1 Jan 2021.\nNorth Sea for vessels constructed after 1 Jan 2021.\nNorth American for vessels constructed after 1 Jan 2016.\nUnited States Caribbean Sea for vessels constructed after 1 Jan 2016.\nMARPOL Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code require Technical Files for each of these diesel engines to be\nmaintained on board, together with the following records in relation to NOx emissions:\n• •\n• A Record Book of Engine Parameters for those engines required to undergo Engine Parameter Checks at\ninitial and subsequent surveys.\nA record that shows only engines operating at Tier III are in use in a NOx Tier III emission control area\n(NECA)\nShips fitted with Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) are required to record the discharge of solid residues and\nbleed-off water in an EGR Record Book.\nWhere diesel engines are fitted with a Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) System there should be a strategy for\nmonitoring the catalyst condition/degradation set out in the engine’s technical file. This may involve continuous\nmonitoring of NOx levels or a prediction of the life of the catalyst under operating conditions together with annual spot\nchecks of NOx levels. Vessel staff should be familiar with the strategy, its implementation and associated equipment.\nRecords should be available on board of measured NOx levels.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for maintaining these Records Books, either in paper or\nelectronic format, in accordance with MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13, the NOx Technical Code and any Flag\nAdministration guidance. The procedure should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The information required to be entered in the Record Books.\nWho is required to enter the details in the Record Books.\nWhen entries are required to be made in the Record Books.\nGuidance on any additional record keeping requirements of local or national legislation such as the U.S.\nVessel General Permit (VGP).\nWhen the Master is required to verify the accuracy of the Record Book entries and sign each page.\nThe procedure for correcting entries made in error.\nThe procedure for entering operations or emissions which had been overlooked and not entered in a Record\nBook in the correct chronological order.\nInstructions for retention of completed Record Books.\nThe actions to take if any NOx abatement system fitted suffers a failure that cannot be rectified within one\nhour.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Record Books,\ninstructions for the use of the electronic record book should be provided, including automatic backing up of data to\noffline storage and an appropriate method of data recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the\nship’s network. . The use of the electronic record book should be authorised by a Declaration from flag/class.\nThe Record Books may form part of an existing logbook or electronic record book.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight and where necessary, review, the company procedures for maintaining the documents and records\nrequired by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.\nReview the IAPP Certificate.\nSight the Technical Files for diesel engines listed in paragraph 2.2.1 of the vessel’s International Air\nPollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.\nReview the Record Books of Engine Parameters where applicable.\nReview the records of diesel engine Tier and on/off status on entering/leaving an NECA where applicable.\nReview the EGR Record Book where applicable.\nWhere the vessel is using an electronic record book for recording the entries required in the Record Books,\nverify that data is being automatically backed up to offline storage and that there is an appropriate method of\ndata recovery if the system were to fail or not be available from the ship’s network. Sight the Declaration\nfrom flag/class.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for maintaining the documents and records required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation\n13 and the NOx Technical Code.\nInternational Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.\nTechnical Files for diesel engines listed in paragraph 2.2.1 of the vessel’s International Air Pollution\nPrevention (IAPP) Certificate.\nRecord Books of Engine Parameters for those engines required to undergo Engine Parameter Checks at\ninitial and subsequent surveys.\nRecords of diesel engine Tier and on/off status on entering/leaving an NECA where applicable.\nRecords of the discharge of solid residues and bleed-off water from the EGR equipment where fitted.\nWhere an electronic record book is in use, the Declaration from flag/class.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for maintaining the documents and records required by MARPOL\nAnnex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for maintaining the documents and\nrecords required by MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13 and the NOx Technical Code.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the NOx abatement system installed on board, or its\noperation.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the event that a NOx abatement\nsystem fitted suffered a failure that could not be rectified within one hour.\nTechnical Files were not available for all diesel engines listed in paragraph 2.2.1 of the vessel’s International\nAir Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate.\nRecord Books of Engine Parameters were not available for all those engines required to undergo Engine\nParameter Checks at initial and subsequent surveys.\nRecord Books of Engine Parameters had not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.\nOn a vessel constructed after the applicable date, there were no records of diesel engine Tier and on/off\nstatus on entering/leaving an NECA.\nThere was evidence that Tier II engines had been operated in an applicable NECA.\nOn a vessel with Exhaust Gas Recirculation equipment, records of the discharge of solid residues and\nbleed-off water had not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the strategy for monitoring the catalyst\ncondition/degradation in an SCR system installed on board, and/or its implementation and associated\nequipment.\nThere were no records available, paper or electronic, of continuous or spot-checked NOx levels associated\nwith an SCR system fitted on board.\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there were no instructions available for the use of the\nelectronic record book system.\n• •\nWhere the vessel was using an electronic record book, there was no Declaration from flag/class authorising\nits use.\nThere was no facility for automatic backup and recovery of data if the electronic record book system were to\nfail or not be available from the ship’s network.\n6.2. Cargo and Bunker Operations", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the arrangements to drain the cargo", "c": "pumproom bilges in the event of flooding or accidental leakage, and were these\narrangements in good order?\nShort Question Text\nFlooding or accidental leakage of cargo pumproom bilges\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the cargo pumproom bilge pump could be operated when the pumproom was flooded.\nIndustry Guidance\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n• 32.52-5 Bilge piping for pump rooms and adjacent cofferdams on tank vessels constructed or converted on\nor after November 19, 1952—TB/ALL.\n(a) Provisions shall be made for removing drainage from the pumproom bilges and adjacent cofferdams. A separate\nbilge pump, ejector, or bilge suction from a cargo pump or cargo stripping pump may be provided for this purpose.\nThe bilge pump shall not be located in nor shall the piping pass through spaces containing machinery where sources\nof vapor ignition are normally present.\n(b) Where a bilge suction is provided from a cargo or stripping pump, a stop check valve shall be fitted in the suction\nbranch, and an additional stop valve shall be fitted also if the bilge suction branch can be subjected to a head of oil\nfrom the filling line.\n(c) Means shall be provided for controlling the cargo or pump room bilge pumps and their suctions or discharges in\norder that a flooded pump room may be pumped out. Suitable portable or manually operated pumps may be\naccepted as complying with this provision, or alternatively, the pump controls shall be arranged so that they are\noperable from inside the pump room and either from an accessible position outside the pump room, or from the pump\nroom casing above the freeboard deck.\nTMSA 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are always\nwithin permitted levels. These sources could include:\n• Environmentally responsible disposal methods.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 15\n1. Subject to the provisions of regulation 4 of this Annex and paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 of this regulation, any discharge\ninto the sea of oil or oily mixtures shall be prohibited.\nRegulation 34\n1. Subject to the provisions of regulation 4 of this Annex and paragraph 2 of this regulation, any discharge of oil or\noily mixtures from the cargo area of an oil tanker shall be prohibited except when all the following conditions are\nmet:…\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for draining the pumproom bilges. These procedures should\ninclude:\n• •\n• Transferring bilge contents to cargo/slop tanks or other containment tanks without risk of pollution.\nPumping out the pumproom in the event of flooding, including controlling the bilge pump and suction and\ndischarge valves remotely from the upper deck.\nPeriodic testing of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for draining the pumproom bilges.\nInspect the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges, including the controls on platforms above the\nfreeboard deck or the upper deck and verify that:\no Valves required to remain open were correctly set.\no Valves or controls were marked with their purpose.\nWhere necessary, review Oil Record Book Part II for records of the disposal of pumproom bilge\naccumulations.\nWhere necessary, review records of tests of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify that they were familiar with the pipeline set up to pump the pumproom\nbilges to a slop or cargo tank when the pumproom was flooded.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for draining the pumproom bilges.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for pumproom flooding.\nThe Oil Record Book Part II.\nRecords of tests of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for draining the pumproom bilges.\nThere was no shipboard emergency response plan for pumproom flooding.\nThe company procedures did not provide guidance on:\no Transferring bilge contents to cargo/slop tanks or other containment tanks without risk of pollution.\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPumping out the pumproom in the event of flooding, including controlling the bilge pump and\nsuction and discharge valves remotely from the upper deck.\no Periodic testing of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for draining the pumproom bilges.\nThere was evidence that the disposal of the content of the pumproom bilges or bilge wells had not been\ndocumented within the Oil Record Book part II.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and purpose of the remote controls for the bilge\npump and suction and discharge valves.\nThere were no means available to operate the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves remotely.\nValves, including steam delivery and condensate return valves, required to remain in the open position to\npermit emergency bilge pumping were shut with no means to open them remotely.\nThe means available to operate the bilge pump and suction and discharge valves remotely were defective in\nany respect.\nThere was no evidence of periodic testing of the arrangements for draining the pumproom bilges.\nThe bilge pump was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.2.2.", "t": "Were cargo system overboard and sea suction valves checked and verified as", "c": "closed and secured prior to commencement of cargo transfer, and where provided, were\nsea valve-testing arrangements in order and regularly monitored for leakage?\nShort Question Text\nCargo system overboard and sea suction valves\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: Prevention of Oil Spillages through Cargo Pumproom Sea Valves. Second Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure all precautions are taken to prevent cargo spillages through cargo system overboard and sea\nsuction valves.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n12.1.14.2 Line displacement with water\nOn ships with a segregated ballast system, avoid the practice of using cargo pumps on a sea suction. However, at\nthe end of cargo operations, some terminals require ships to displace the contents of the hoses or MLAs, and\nperhaps the shorelines, with water. This practice risks pollution, so it should be done only if essential and should be\ncarefully planned and executed. Before starting the displacement, the ship and terminal should agree the procedures\nto be used, particularly the amount to be pumped and the pumping rate.\nPay particular attention to venting the cargo pumps and ensuring there is no outflow of oil when opening the sea\nvalve.\nRefer to OCIMF/ICS: Prevention of Oil Spillages through Cargo Pumproom Sea Valves.\n12.6.2 Loading cargo tank ballast\n12.6.2.1 Operation of cargo pumps\nWhen starting to ballast, operate the cargo pumps so that no oil is allowed to escape overboard when the sea suction\nvalve is opened (see OCIMF/ICS: Prevention of Oil Spillages through Cargo Pumproom Sea Valves).\n23.7.3 Sea and overboard discharge valves\nDuring cargo, tank cleaning/de-ballasting operations, keep a watch to ensure that no oil is escaping through sea\nvalves.\nSea and overboard discharge valves connected to the cargo and ballast systems should be closed and secured using\na Lock-out/Tag-out system (LO/TO) and may be sealed when not in use. In-line blanks should be inserted where\nprovided. When a LO/TO system is not practical as with hydraulic valves, use some suitable marking to indicate\nclearly that the valves are to remain closed.\nOCIMF/ICS: Prevention of Oil Spillages through Cargo Pumproom Sea Valves. Second Edition\n4. Sea valve monitoring\nIt is recommended that a device be installed to monitor pressure build-up and determine liquid make-up in the section\nof the pipeline which lies between the inboard and the out-board valves. Such a device would both provide an early\nindication of leakage through either valve during cargo handling operations, and enable the leaking valve to be\nidentified.\nDevices should be positioned so that both readings and samples can be taken from a point far enough above the\npumproom lower platform level that there is no possibility of human exposure to gas concentrations which may\naccumulate below the floor plates.\nThe use of a pressure/vacuum gauge rather than a pressure only gauge, is preferable in that it will provide a reliable\nindication of a vacuum in the line prior to opening the sea-valve for ballasting.\n5.2 Display of notice\nA notice reading “START PUMP BEFORE OPENING SEA SUCTION” should be prominently displayed next to each\ncargo system suction valve in the pumproom(s). A similar notice should be displayed in the cargo control room or\npump operating location.\n5.3 Testing of Sea Valves\nNote: Care must be taken that the pipe system is not over-pressurised during the test. This can be done by utilising a\npressure limiting device on the air inlet set for no more than 3.5 kg/cm2.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are in\nplace for all vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to prevent cargo spillages through cargo system overboard\nand sea suction valves that included detailed guidance on:\n• •\nTaking ballast into cargo tanks via sea-valves.\nLine displacement with sea water.\nAnd precautionary measures including:\n• •\n• •\n• Checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and secured prior to commencement\nof cargo transfer.\nChecking cargo system overboard valves and sea suction valves for leakage, where arrangements are\nfitted.\nTesting cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between dry-docks, where\narrangements are fitted.\nThe maximum test pressure to which sea valve arrangements should be subjected.\nRecording these checks and tests.\n• Posting suitable anti-pollution notices next to overboard valves and cargo system sea valves and at the\npump operating position.\nThe HVPQ responses to questions 6.1.6, 6.1.10, 6.1.11 and 6.1.12 will be inserted in the inspection editor and the\nfinal inspection report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures to prevent cargo spillages through cargo\nsystem overboard and sea suction valves.\nReview records of:\no Checks that cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and secured prior to\ncommencement of cargo transfer in the bridge or cargo logbook.\no Checks of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage.\no Tests of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between dry-docks.\nInspect cargo system overboard valves, cargo system sea valves and testing arrangements where fitted.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures to prevent cargo spillages through cargo system overboard and sea suction valves.\nRecords of\no Checks that cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and secured prior to\ncommencement of cargo transfer in the bridge or cargo logbook.\no Checks of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage.\no Tests of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between dry-docks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to prevent cargo spillages through cargo system overboard and sea\nsuction valves that included detailed guidance on:\no Taking ballast into cargo tanks via sea-valves.\no Line displacement with sea water.\nAnd precautionary measures including:\no Checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves are closed and secured prior to\ncommencement of cargo transfer.\no Checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage, where arrangements are\nfitted.\no Testing cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between dry-docks, where\narrangements are fitted.\no The maximum test pressure to which sea valve arrangements should be submitted.\no Recording these checks and tests.\no Posting suitable anti-pollution notices next to cargo system overboard and sea suction valves and\nat the pump operating position.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to prevent cargo spillages through\ncargo system overboard and sea suction valves.\nCargo system overboard valves and/or cargo system sea suction valves had not been fully closed prior to\ncommencement of cargo transfer.\nCargo system overboard valves and/or cargo system sea valves had not been secured using a Lockout/Tag-out system prior to commencement of cargo transfer.\nWhere provided, in-line blanks had not been inserted.\nWhere a Lock-out/Tag-out system was not practical as with hydraulic valves, suitable marking to indicate\nclearly that the valves were to remain closed had not been used.\nThere were no records of cargo system overboard and sea suction valves being checked as closed and\nsecured prior to commencement of cargo transfer.\nWhere arrangements for monitoring and testing cargo system overboard and sea suction valves were fitted:\no There were no records of checking cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for leakage.\no\n• •\n• •\n• The pressure/vacuum gauge indicated that there was leakage past one of the cargo system\noverboard and/or sea suction valves.\nThere were no records of testing cargo system overboard and sea suction valves for integrity between drydocks.\nThe leak detecting arrangement for the direct sea suction valves was not fitted with a pressure/vacuum\ngauge.\nThe pressure/vacuum gauge fitted was damaged/defective.\nThe arrangements were not positioned so that both readings and samples could be taken from a point far\nenough above the pumproom lower platform level that there was no possibility of human exposure to gas\nconcentrations which may accumulate below the floor plates.\nSuitable anti-pollution notices were not posted next to overboard valves and/or cargo system sea valves\nand/or at the pump operating position.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.2.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for inspections", "c": "and pressure tests of the bunker oil (HFO and MDO) pipeline system, and had the tests\nbeen performed and the results suitably recorded?\nShort Question Text\nBunker pipeline system pressure testing\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Main Deck, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nUSCG: Marine Safety Manual\nVol. II: Materiel Inspection\nObjective\nTo ensure the bunker pipeline system is regularly inspected and tested.\nIndustry Guidance\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n156.170 Equipment tests and inspections.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may use any equipment listed in paragraph (c) of\nthis section for transfer operations unless the vessel or facility operator, as appropriate, tests and inspects the\nequipment in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) of this section and the equipment is in the condition\nspecified in paragraph (c) of this section.\n(c) For the purpose of paragraph (a) of this section:\n• •\n• •\n(2) Each transfer system relief valve must open at or below the pressure at which it is set to open;\n(3) Each pressure gauge must show pressure within 10 percent of the actual pressure;\n(4) Each loading arm and each transfer pipe system, including each metallic hose, must not leak under static\nliquid pressure at least 1 1/2 times the maximum allowable working pressure; and\n(5) Each item of remote operating or indicating equipment, such as a remotely operated valve, tank level\nalarm, or emergency shutdown device, must perform its intended function.\n(e) The test fluid used for the testing required by this section is limited to liquids that are compatible with the hose\ntube as recommended by the hose manufacturer.\n(f) The frequency of the tests and inspections required by this section must be:\n• (3) For vessels, annually or as part of the biennial and mid-period inspections.\nUSCG: Marine Safety Manual, Vol. II: Materiel Inspection\nSECTION B: DOMESTIC INSPECTION PROGRAMS\nCHAPTER 6: POLLUTION PREVENTION\n8. Equipment Tests and Inspections\na. Introduction. The high pressure test required by 33 CFR 156.170 is intended to expose a weakness or leak under\ncontrolled conditions, so that corrective action can be taken before a spill.\n• •\n(1) Testing to 1.5 MAWP is standard engineering practice and does not damage or destroy a hose in good\nworking condition.\n(2) On the other hand, testing only to MAWP is not a conclusive indicator of hose condition and is not\nsuitable to determine that a hose is safe for transfer operations.\nb. Transfer piping systems.\n• (1) A vessel's oil transfer pipe system includes the discharge pump and piping or hose between the pump\nand the vessel's deck manifold (which connects to the facility or other vessel's transfer system). The portions\nof the vessel's oil transfer pipe system, not including non-metallic hose(s), must be tested annually to a\nminimum of 1.5 times the MAWP of the pipe system.\no (a) In this instance, the MAWP can be assumed to be either the pressure at which the transfer\npiping relief valve is set or, where no relief valve(s) are fitted, the maximum discharge pressure\nincluding hydraulic shock that can be developed by the vessel's pump.\no (b) For centrifugal pumps, this is the pressure developed by the pump at zero flow conditions, i.e.,\npump shutoff head.\no (c) All non-metallic cargo hose(s) used on a vessel as part of its oil transfer system must also be\ntested to 1.5 times its MAWP, which will be a minimum of 1,552 kPa per 33 CFR 155.800 and\n156.170(c)(1).\nc. Acceptance of alternative cargo piping test pressures for vessels. Achieving test pressures of 150% MAWP for\nannual cargo piping tests on tank vessels is often impractical while vessels are in service, where transfers are\nconducted by vacuum or suction method, or outside the shipyard where special equipment is not available.\nTherefore, as provided by 33 CFR 156.107, alternative test pressures of not less than 100% MAWP may be used for\nin-service annual cargo piping tests, provided that a 150% MAWP test of the cargo piping is conducted at least twice\nin any 5-year period.\n• •\n• (1) The Coast Guard envisions that the 150% MAWP tests will be conducted during drydock periods at the\ndiscretion of the vessel owners or operators. Those vessels with longer drydock intervals must make\narrangements to conduct the 150% MAWP tests at least twice in any 5-year period.\n(2) All alternative test pressures must provide an equivalent level of safety and protection from pollution.\nAccurate records of the required tests must be maintained aboard the vessel. These records must be made\navailable to the OCMI or COTP upon request.\n(3) An alternative to the 150% MAWP test of hoses should not normally be granted. Sections of piping that\ncannot be tested without pressurizing cargo tanks, must not be pressure tested due to the possibility of\ncausing structural damage aboard the vessel. These sections of piping must be visually examined during\nperiods of availability.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet.\nTests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Cargo/bunker line pressure testing\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and pressure testing of the bunker pipeline\nsystem, including guidance on the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nEquipment to be inspected/tested.\nInspection and test frequency.\nTesting method(s).\nTest pressure.\nDisposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.\nRecords to be kept.\nBunker pipelines are defined as any pipeline used for taking on, discharging, or internally transferring any fuel for\nconsumption on board. Inspections should include any pressure relief valves, pressure gauges, valves, ullage\ngauges, level alarms and emergency shutdown arrangements that form part of the system.\nWhere ship’s drawings do not define the MAWP for the bunker pipeline system, the MAWP may be assumed to be\neither:\n• •\nThe pressure at which the transfer piping relief valve is set; or,\nWhere no relief valve(s) are fitted, the maximum discharge pressure including hydraulic shock that can be\ndeveloped by the vessel's pump.\nPipelines should be marked with the date of test and the test pressure.\nRecords should include the date of test, the test pressure and the method and testing medium used. Pressure\ntesting should be a hydrostatic test, pressure testing using compressed air or inert gas is not acceptable.\nProcedures and records may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nThe responses to HVPQ questions 6.1.14.1 and 6.1.14.2 will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary, review the company procedures for the inspection and pressure testing of the\nbunker pipeline system.\nReview the records of inspection and testing of the bunker pipeline system.\nReview records of the disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.\nDuring the inspection, observe the condition of the bunker pipeline system and associated equipment.\nVerify pipelines had been marked with the date and pressure of the last test.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for the inspection and pressure testing of the bunker pipeline system.\nRecords of inspection and testing of the bunker pipeline system.\nRecords of testing the bunker system relief valve, where fitted.\nRecords of testing tank level alarms, where fitted.\nRecords of the disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the inspection and pressure testing of the bunker pipeline system\nincluding guidance on the:\no Equipment to be inspected/tested.\no Inspection and test frequency.\no Testing method(s).\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• o\no\no\nThe test pressure.\nDisposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.\nRecords to be kept.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and pressure\ntesting of the bunker pipeline system including the testing method.\nThere were no records of inspection and testing of the bunker pipeline system.\nThere were no records of the disposal of the liquid used to test the pipeline system.\nThere were no records of the testing of the bunker system relief valve, where fitted.\nThe bunker pipeline system was not marked with the date of the last test and the test pressure.\nThe bunker pipeline system had not been tested:\no To 100% of MAWP within the last 12 months.\no To 150% of MAWP twice in the last 5 years.\no With a suitable liquid but tested with air or inert gas instead.\nA section of pipeline, pressure gauge, valve, remotely operated valve, tank level alarm or emergency\nshutdown device that formed part of the bunker pipeline system was defective in any respect.\n6.3. Ballast Operations", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe", "c": "operation of the ballast water management system (BWMS), and was the equipment in\nsatisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company procedures and\nmanufacturer’s instructions?\nShort Question Text\nBallast water management system (BWMS)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Pumproom, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Ballast Water Management Convention and BWMS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that ballast is always handled safely in accordance with company procedures and manufacturer’s\ninstructions.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n10.3 Identifying enclosed spaces\nSome spaces that do not meet the criteria for an enclosed space may have an unsafe atmosphere and should be\nsubject to the enclosed space procedures. A list should identify these spaces on every tanker. Examples include:\nBallast water treatment room.\n10.4 The hazards of enclosed space atmospheres\n10.4.2 Presence of toxic and/or flammable gases\nWhen preparing to enter a ballast tank or void space, the space should be tested for hydrocarbon vapour and H2S.\nTechnologies such as ballast water treatment systems introduce an additional risk of gases to enclosed spaces that\nwould not normally be expected on tankers. For this reason, where ballast water treatment systems are fitted, the\nprecautions noted in section 10.3 should be followed.\nSome examples of ballast water treatment systems are:\n• •\n• Electrolysis based systems that may generate hydrogen gas.\nChemical injection systems that inject different chemicals.\nOzone based systems.\n12.4.7 Ventilating double hull ballast tanks\nThe use of a ballast water treatment system may call for extra measures to ensure that the space is properly\nventilated. Toxic gases in the tank atmosphere, or chemicals in the remaining ballast water, may mean precautions\nneed to be taken before entering a tank.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.3 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of ballast handling operations which\nincludes ballast water exchange and ballast water treatment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Ballast Water Management Convention and BWMS Code\nRegulation D-3 Approval requirements for ballast management systems\n2. Ballast water management systems which make use of Active Substances or preparations containing one or more\nActive Substances to comply with this Convention shall be approved by the Organisation. This procedure shall\ndescribe the approval and withdrawal of approval of Active Substances and their proposed manner of application. At\nwithdrawal of approval, the use of the relevant Active Substance or Substances shall be prohibited within one year\nafter the date of such withdrawal.\n3. Ballast water management systems used to comply with this Convention must be safe in terms of the ship, its\nequipment and the crew.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the ballast\nwater management system (BWMS), including guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the BWMS.\nWho is permitted to use the BWMS.\nIdentification of hazards to the crew presented by the operation of the BWMS.\nMitigation measures for hazards presented by the operation of the BWMS.\nUse, handling and storage of any active substances, such as chemicals, used by the system for disinfection\nor neutralisation.\nSafe disposal of any by-products of the process.\nThe possible effect of water density, water temperature and suspended solids on the operation of the\nBWMS.\nActions in the event of a failure of the BWMS.\nRecords to be kept of the operation of the BWMS.\nThese procedures may refer to the manufacturer’s operation and safety manual for the BWMS and the vessel’s\nmaintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight and where necessary, review the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance\nof the ballast water management system (BWMS).\nInspect the BWMS control panel and verify that the system is operational with no apparent faults or alarms.\nReview available self-monitoring data to verify satisfactory operation.\nInspect the visible parts of the BWMS and verify that it is intact and not modified in any respect.\nWhere necessary, review the maintenance and inspection records of the BWMS.\nWhere necessary, review the records of the operation of the BWMS.\n• Interview the accompanying officer and verify their familiarity with:\no Company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BWMS.\no The hazards from the operation of the equipment and the handling and storage of any chemicals\nused.\no The actions in the event of the failure of the BWMS.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the ballast water management\nsystem (BWMS).\nThe operation and safety manual for the BWMS.\nInspection and maintenance records of the BWMS.\nRecords of the operation of the BWMS.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the ballast water\nmanagement system (BWMS), including guidance on:\no Who is responsible for supervising the use of the BWMS.\no Who is permitted to use the BWMS.\no Identification of hazards to the crew presented by the operation of the BWMS.\no Mitigation measures for hazards presented by the operation of the BWMS.\no Use, handling and storage of any active substances, such as chemicals, used by the system for\ndisinfection or neutralisation.\no Safe disposal of any by-products of the process.\no The possible effect of water density, water temperature and suspended solids on the operation of\nthe BWMS.\no Actions in the event of the failure of the BWMS.\no Records to be kept of the operation of the BWMS.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection and\nmaintenance of the BWMS, particularly the hazards from the operation of the equipment and the handling\nand storage of any chemicals used.\nThere were no records of the required inspection and maintenance of the BWMS in the vessel's\nmaintenance plan.\nThere were no records of the operation of the BWMS.\nThe BWMS was not fully operational, including pumps, filters and back-flush arrangements.\nBWMS self-monitoring data indicated that the equipment had not operated correctly at the last ballast/deballast operation.\nThe BWMS had been modified and/or by-passed.\nThe BWMS was defective in any respect.\nThere was insufficient stock of the required chemicals for injection.\nStorage and/or handling arrangements for the required chemicals were not satisfactory.\nWhere the entry procedures for the space containing the BWMS posted at the entrance were not in alignment with\nthe enclosed space entry procedure contained in the SMS for such a space or, entry into the space containing the\nBWMS was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make\na negative observation in the Process response tool of question 5.5.1.\n6.4. Deck Area Pollution Prevention", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "removal of small quantities of oil or chemical spilled and contained on deck, and was\nsuitable response equipment available, in satisfactory condition and effectively\ndeployed?\nShort Question Text\nMain deck oil or chemical spill clean up equipment.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nIMO: Guidelines for the development of Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans. 2010 edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure any oil or chemical spills contained on deck are promptly and safely cleaned up.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n23.7.5 Spill containment\nA permanently fitted spill tank, with suitable means of draining, should be fitted under all tanker/terminal manifold\nconnections. If no permanent spill tank is fitted, portable drip trays should be placed under each connection to catch\nany leaks. Avoid plastic and other non-metallic containers unless bonding is possible.\nSSSCL. Part 5A Tanker and terminal: Pre-transfer conference.\nItem 42: Oil spill clean-up material is available (20.4)\nBunker Checklist. Part F: Ship technical checks before bunkering.\nItem 32: Oil spill clean-up material is available (20.4, 24.2)\nIMO: Guidelines for the development of Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plans. 2010 edition.\n2.5.2.1 Operational spills: The Plan should outline the procedures for safe removal of oil or NLS spilled and contained\non deck. This may be through the use of on-board resources or by hiring a clean-up company. In either case the Plan\nshould provide guidance to ensure proper disposal of removed oil, NLS and clean-up materials.\n3.3 Response equipment: Some ships may carry on board equipment to assist in pollution response. The type and\nquantity of this equipment may vary widely. The Plan should indicate an inventory of such equipment, if carried. It\nshould also provide directions for safe use and guidelines to assist the master in determining when such use is\nwarranted. Care should be exercised to ensure that the use of such equipment by the crew is practical and consistent\nwith safety considerations. When such equipment is carried, the Plan should establish personnel responsibilities for\nits deployment, oversight, and maintenance. In order to ensure safe and effective use of such equipment, the Plan\nshould also provide for crew training in the use of it. The Plan should include a provision that no chemical agent\nshould be used for response to pollution on the sea without authorization of the appropriate coastal State and that\nsuch authorization should also be requested, when required, for use of containment or recovery equipment.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n155.205 Discharge removal equipment for vessels 400 feet or greater in length.\n(a) Oil tankers and offshore oil barges with an overall length of 400 feet or more must carry appropriate equipment\nand supplies for the containment and removal of on-deck oil cargo spills of at least 12 barrels.\n155.210 Discharge removal equipment for vessels less than 400 feet in length.\n(a) Oil tankers and offshore oil barges with an overall length of less than 400 feet must carry appropriate equipment\nand supplies for the containment and removal of on-deck oil spills of at least 7 barrels.\nIn both cases\n(b) The equipment and supplies must include—\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\nSorbents.\nNon-sparking hand scoops, shovels, and buckets.\nContainers suitable for holding recovered waste.\nEmulsifiers for deck cleaning.\nProtective clothing.\nA minimum of one non-sparking portable pump with hoses; and\nScupper plugs.\n(c) During cargo transfer operations, the equipment and supplies must remain ready for immediate use.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\n• •\nVessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact\ndetails, vessel equipment and changes in company procedures.\nThey are additionally reviewed following any incident or drill where the emergency response plans have\nbeen used.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The Company should establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential emergency shipboard\nsituations.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex II\nRegulation 17\nShipboard marine pollution emergency plan for noxious liquid substances\n1.\n2.\nEvery ship of 150 gross tonnage and above certified to carry noxious liquid substances in bulk shall carry on\nboard a shipboard marine pollution emergency plan for noxious liquid substances approved by the\nAdministration.\nSuch a plan shall be based on the Guidelines* developed by the Organization and written in a working\nlanguage or languages understood by the master and officers. The plan shall consist at least of:\n.3 a detailed description of the action to be taken immediately by persons on board to reduce or control the discharge\nof noxious liquid substances following the incident; and\n1.\nIn the case of ships to which regulation 37 of Annex I of the Convention also applies, such a plan may be\ncombined with the shipboard oil pollution emergency plan required under regulation 37 of Annex I of the\nConvention. In this case, the title of such a plan shall be ‘‘Shipboard marine pollution emergency plan’’.\n* Refer to ‘‘Guidelines for the development of shipboard marine pollution emergency plans for oil and/or noxious liquid\nsubstances’’ adopted by the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the Organization by resolution\nMEPC.85(44), as amended by resolution MEPC.137(53).\n(See also IMO: MARPOL Annex I Regulation 37 Shipboard oil pollution emergency plan)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and contained on\ndeck. These procedures may be partly or wholly contained in the SOPEP or SMPEP and should ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Suitable equipment is readily available at the manifold and there is an adequate method (non-sparking\nportable pumps, dump valves to a cargo/slop tank or other equally effective means) for the rapid disposal of\nspills at the aft end of the main deck on both sides of the vessel.\nIf transferring to a cargo/slop tank is not a viable option, an enclosed container with a capacity of at least 2\nm3 is available for the disposal of spills and water from the deck.\nPortable pumps are:\no Bonded to the vessel's structure to prevent electrical discharge to earth. Bonding may be made by\nexternal means, or by the discharge hose, if this is attached by means of a flanged connection to\nthe vessel's structure.\no Mounted to prevent movement and subsequent damage during operation.\nIf portable pumps are arranged to discharge to a cargo/slop tank, this is via a suitable fixed connection, not\nvia the insertion of the spill pump discharge hose through a tank opening such as a sighting port.\nIf effective draining of a spill cannot be achieved or if pressure release is required, an alternative method of\nimmediately disposing of a spill should be provided.\nThe arrangement and positioning of the equipment take into account the following:\no The effectiveness of dump-valves to a cargo/slop tank will be impacted by:\n Cargo/slop tank pressure.\n The liquid level in any U-bends fitted in the drain pipework.\n The ullage in the receiving tank and the vessel’s trim, particularly when the tank is full, and\nthe vessel is trimmed by the stern.\no The location on deck where any spill will accumulate will be impacted by\n Trim\n Hogging/sagging\nAn inventory of the spill clean-up equipment is maintained by a designated officer and periodic inspections\ncarried out.\nCrew members receive suitable training in the use of the spill clean-up equipment.\nInstructions are available for the safe use of the spill clean-up equipment, including PPE requirements.\nNo chemical agent is used in response to pollution on the sea without authorization of the appropriate\ncoastal State\nRemoved spilled oil or chemical and clean-up materials are properly disposed of.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the SOPEP or SMPEP.\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and\ncontained on deck.\nReview the inventory of spill clean-up equipment provided on board and the records of periodic inspections.\nDuring the main deck inspection:\no Review the arrangement, positioning and condition of the spill clean-up equipment.\no Inspect the stored spill clean-up equipment and confirm actual quantities broadly agree with the\ninventory.\no Review the means for the rapid disposal of oil or chemical at the aft end of the main deck on both\nsides of the vessel.\no Where dump valves were installed at the after end of the main deck verify that:\n The valve operating controls would remain above the surface of an accumulation of spilled\nliquid.\n The valve operating controls could be accessed without the need to wade into an\naccumulation of spilled liquid.\n The opening of the dump valves would result in the draining of accumulated liquid at any\nstate of list and trim or vapour pressure within the tank and, if not, the limitations that\napplied were clearly posted.\n• Where safe to do so, request that at least one portable pump is demonstrated and that it could create and\nmaintain suction.\n• Interview a rating to verify they were familiar with the location, purpose and safe use of the spill clean-up\nequipment and PPE provided for dealing with small spills.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The SOPEP or SMPEP\nCompany procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and contained on deck.\nThe inventory of spill clean-up equipment and records of periodic inspections.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and contained on deck.\nThere was no inventory of spill clean-up equipment on board.\nThe records of periodic inspections of the inventory of spill clean-up equipment were missing or incomplete.\nThere were no instructions available for the safe use of the spill clean-up equipment, including PPE\nrequirements.\nCompany procedures did not contain:\no A provision that no chemical agent should be used in response to pollution on the sea without\nauthorization of the appropriate coastal State and that such authorization should also be requested,\nwhen required, for use of containment or recovery equipment.\no Guidance on the proper disposal of removed oil or chemical and clean-up materials.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:\no Company procedures for the removal of oil or chemical spilled and contained on deck.\no Location, purpose or safe use of the spill clean-up equipment on board, including PPE\nrequirements.\nActual quantities of spill clean-up equipment on board were significantly different to the latest inventory.\nThere were inadequate quantities of spill clean-up equipment on board.\nSuitable spill clean-up equipment was not available at the manifold.\nThere was no adequate means for the rapid disposal of oil or chemical at the aft end of the main deck on\nboth sides of the vessel.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhere the transfer of spilled oil or chemical to a cargo/slop tank was not an option, there was no alternative\nmeans to collect spills and water from the deck into an enclosed container with a capacity of at least 2 m3.\nHand scoops, shovels, or buckets provided were not of the non-sparking type.\nPortable pumps were:\no Not bonded(earthed) to the vessel’s structure.\no Not mounted to prevent movement and subsequent damage during operation.\no Not ready for immediate use e.g. no air available.\no Arranged to discharge to a cargo/slop tank via the insertion of the spill pump discharge hose\nthrough a tank opening such as a sighting port.\nFor non inerted vessels, the portable pumps were not provided with a connection to a full depth sounding\npipe or other connection which avoided the free fall of liquid in the receiving tank.\nFor any reason, it appeared that the dump valves would not be effective in draining spilled oil or chemical\nfrom the deck.\nWhere there were restrictions for the use of dump valves, these were not clearly posted at or near the\nlocation of the dump valves.\nSpill clean-up equipment was defective or deficient in any respect.\nThere was no permanently fitted spill tank, with suitable means of draining, or a portable drip tray, fitted\nunder each tanker/terminal manifold connection.\nA plastic or other non-metallic portable drip tray had been placed under a tanker/terminal manifold\nconnection without bonding.\nAn interviewed rating was unfamiliar with the location and use of the oil/chemical spill clean-up material and\nPPE provided, including the specific PPE required for the cargoes being carried.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.4.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the disposal", "c": "of accumulations of water contaminated with oil and/or marine pollutants in the\nforecastle and other internal spaces, and had the procedures been implemented?\nShort Question Text\nDisposal of oily water in the forecastle and other internal spaces\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nPumproom, Forecastle, Steering Gear\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.759 Guidelines for a shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan\nObjective\nTo ensure any water contaminated with oil or marine pollutants generated in the forecastle and other internal\nspaces is disposed of properly.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.759 Guidelines for a shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan\n1.2 Key elements of the shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan should include documented ship-specific\ncompany procedures as laid out in these guidelines.\n3 Shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan\nThe shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan should contain measures, including as provided for in paragraphs\n4 to 14, in order to ensure proper oily waste disposal in accordance with relevant Flag State and Port State\nregulations. The measures could be directly incorporated in a shipboard oily waste pollution prevention plan or in the\nSafety Management System (SMS).\n7 Identification of waste streams\nProcedures for determining and documenting waste streams, by volume and types.\n8 Minimizing wastes\nProcedures to minimize oily waste generation, bilge contaminants and segregation of clean water, including:\n.1 maintenance, procedures and operational controls; and\n.2 minimizing waste and contaminant generation directly associated with the maintenance, cleaning, and operation of\nequipment and systems within a machinery space.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• Methods of minimising emissions.\n• •\n• Identification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administration,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily waste or other marine\npollutants accumulating in internal space bilge wells, including:\n• •\n• •\n• Identification of relevant spaces.\nMeasures to minimise oily waste generation.\nMonitoring of bilge levels, by inspection or sensor/alarm.\nArrangements for proper disposal of any liquid oily waste and marine pollutant waste generated.\nRecord keeping.\nWhere pumps or ejectors are fitted, pollution prevention notices should be posted and the overboard valves should\nbe secured against accidental opening. Testing and maintenance of such equipment should be included in the\nvessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily waste or\nother marine pollutants accumulating in internal space bilge wells.\nReview the records of the disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space\nbilge wells.\nInspect bilge-wells in the forecastle and other internal spaces and note the arrangements for monitoring and\ndisposal of the contents and arrangements to prevent unauthorised discharge.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in\ninternal space bilge wells.\nRecords of the disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space bilge wells.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants\naccumulated in internal space bilge wells including:\no Identification of relevant spaces.\no Measures to minimise oily waste generation.\no Monitoring of bilge levels, by inspection or sensor/alarm.\no Arrangements for proper disposal of any oily and/or marine pollutant waste generated.\no Record keeping.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure proper disposal of oily\nwaste or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space bilge wells.\n• •\n• •\nThere was evidence that a disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutant had taken place, for example after\na hydraulic leak in the forecastle, but there was no record of how the oily waste or marine pollutant had been\ndisposed of.\nArrangements for the proper disposal of oily waste or other marine pollutants accumulated in internal space\nbilge wells were inadequate.\nArrangements to prevent unauthorised discharge of oily waste and/or marine pollutant were inadequate.\nThe bilge well of an internal space contained a significant quantity of oily waste or marine pollutant.\n6.5. Machinery Space Pollution Prevention", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the emergency arrangements to pump", "c": "out the machinery space bilges in the event of flooding, and were these arrangements\nprominently marked and in good order?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency arrangements to pump out the machinery space bilges\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1424 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/48.3 Controls of emergency bilge suction valve\nin periodically unattended machinery spaces\nObjective\nTo ensure that the machinery space bilges could be pumped out promptly in the event of a flooding\nsituation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n5.4 Flooding\n5.4.2 Prevention, Preparedness and Response\nThough the engineering team cannot predict or prevent flooding caused by allision, collision and grounding, it can\navoid flooding caused by inefficient bilge management. Best practices to follow include: (abbreviated)\n• •\n• •\nMaintain and operate bilge and ballast systems properly. Repair any corrosion or leaks in the lines or pumps\nstraight away.\nTest and verify the emergency bilge suction valve regularly, and any other valves for emergency bilge\noperation.\nTake extra care when working on sea chests and seawater mainlines…\nNever wedge sounding pipes open.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1424 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/48.3 Controls of emergency bilge\nsuction valve in periodically unattended machinery spaces\nSOLAS Regulation II-1/48.3 reads:\nRegulation 48 Protection against flooding\n3 The location of the controls of any valve serving a sea inlet, a discharge below the waterline or a bilge injection\nsystem shall be so sited as to allow adequate time for operation in case of influx of water to the space, having regard\nto the time likely to be required in order to reach and operate such controls. If the level to which the space could\nbecome flooded with the ship in the fully loaded condition so requires, arrangements shall be made to operate the\ncontrols from a position above such level.\nInterpretation\n(A) ‘Bilge injection system’ is same as ‘direct suction’ referred in SOLAS Reg.II-1/35-1 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 and is\nunderstood to mean ‘Emergency bilge suction’, which is used to discharge overboard large quantities of sea water\naccumulated in engine room bilges using the main circulating pump or another suitable pump as permitted by 35-1", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "3.7.2.", "t": "(B) The requirements for the controls of the “valves serving a sea inlet, a discharge below the waterline or a bilge", "c": "injection system” are not applicable to valves serving an emergency bilge system provided:\n(1) The emergency bilge valve is normally maintained in a closed position,\n(2) A non-return device is installed in the emergency bilge piping, and\n(Note: A normally closed non-return valve with positive means of closing is considered to satisfy both (1) and (2)\nabove.)\n(3) The emergency bilge suction piping is located inboard of a shell valve that is fitted with the control arrangements\nrequired by SOLAS Reg. II-1/48.3.\nNote:\n1.\nThis UI is to be uniformly implemented by IACS Societies on ships contracted for construction on or after 1\nJanuary 2013.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 35-1\nBilge pumping arrangements\n1 This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2009.\n2 Passenger ships and cargo ships\n2.1 An efficient bilge pumping system shall be provided, capable of pumping from and draining any watertight\ncompartment other than a space permanently appropriated for the carriage of fresh water, water ballast, oil fuel or\nliquid cargo and for which other efficient means of pumping are provided, under all practical conditions. Efficient\nmeans shall be provided for draining water from insulated holds.\n2.2 Sanitary, ballast and general service pumps may be accepted as independent power bilge pumps if fitted with the\nnecessary connections to the bilge pumping system.\n3 Passenger ships\n3.7.1 In addition to the direct bilge suction or suctions required by paragraph 3.6, a direct suction from the main\ncirculating pump leading to the drainage level of the machinery space and fitted with a non-return valve shall be\nprovided in the machinery space. The diameter of this direct suction pipe shall be at least two thirds of the diameter of\nthe pump inlet in the case of steamships, and of the same diameter as the pump inlet in the case of motorships.\n3.7.2 Where in the opinion of the Administration the main circulating pump is not suitable for this purpose, a direct\nemergency bilge suction shall be led from the largest available independent power driven pump to the drainage level\nof the machinery space; the suction shall be of the same diameter as the main inlet of the pump used. The capacity\nof the pump so connected shall exceed that of a required bilge pump by an amount deemed satisfactory by the\nAdministration.\n3.7.3 The spindles of the sea inlet and direct suction valves shall extend well above the engine room platform.\n4 Cargo ships\nAt least two power pumps connected to the main bilge system shall be provided, one of which may be driven by the\npropulsion machinery.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex 1\nRegulation 4\nExceptions\nRegulations 15 and 34 of this Annex and paragraph 1.1.1. of part II-A of the Polar Code shall not apply to:\n1.\n2.\nThe discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or\nsaving life at sea; or\nThe discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment:\n1. provided that all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage or\ndiscovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or minimising the discharge: and\n2. except if the owner or the Master acted either with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with\nknowledge that damage would probably result; or\nThe discharge into the sea of substances containing oil, approved by the Administration, when being used for the\npurpose of combating specific pollution incidents in order to minimise the damage from pollution. Any such\ndischarges shall be subject to the approval of any government in whose jurisdiction it is contemplated the discharge\nwill occur\nInspection Guidance\nAlthough paragraph 3 of SOLAS II-1/reg 35-1 applies to passenger ships, arrangements such as described may be\nrequired in tankers by flag and/or class rules.\nThe purpose of the “bilge injection system”, “direct suction” or ‘‘emergency bilge suction” is to discharge overboard\nlarge quantities of sea water from engine room bilges in an emergency using the main circulating pump or another\nsuitable large pump.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the use of the emergency bilge pumping arrangements in\nthe machinery spaces. These should include guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• The use of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct suctions and overboard valves.\nThe use of the emergency bilge suction. The emergency bilge suction valve should be readily accessible\nand clearly marked as to its purpose.\nMARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures necessary for the\npurpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving life at sea or resulting from damage to a ship or its\nequipment. The emergency bilge discharge arrangements must not be used for the disposal of daily\nmachinery space bilge accumulations.\nShip specific requirements to seal emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves, depending on the\nship’s equipment and design, to prevent unauthorised discharge of oil or oily mixtures.\nThe marking of system valves and controls to ensure correct operation and avoid accidental opening.\nPositive evidence that a valve has not been opened can be provided by use of a numbered seal, the number of which\nshould be recorded in an official document such as the Engine Room Log Book or the Oil Record Book Part I. Such a\nmethod of sealing must be easily breakable to allow the valve to be opened in an emergency.\nThe vessel-specific instructions for pumping of the machinery space bilges in an emergency may be included as part\nof the vessel emergency response plan for machinery space flooding.\nEmergency overboard discharge valve(s) should be provided with a notice warning against accidental opening.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use of the emergency bilge pumping\narrangements in the machinery spaces.\nInspect the emergency bilge pumping arrangements in the machinery spaces, including the associated bilge\ndirect suction valves, overboard valves and the emergency bilge suction valve and verify that:\no Each suction and/or discharge valve required to be opened and/or closed to permit the emergency\npumping of the engine room bilges was marked.\no Where an emergency bilge suction could be served by multiple pumps there was a clear indication\nof which pump should be started to take suction.\no Warning signs to prevent accidental opening of the emergency overboard discharge valve(s) were\nposted at appropriate locations.\nConsider reviewing the records of numbered seals in the relevant logbook.\nInterview the accompanying officer or any other available engineer officer to verify their understanding of\nhow the machinery space bilges would be pumped out in an emergency utilising the various systems\nprovided onboard. This should include the sequence of opening and closing valves and starting the\nappropriate pump based on the scenarios where:\no There had been a failure of the main seawater circulating system pipework.\no There had been flooding from any source other than a failure in the main seawater circulating\nsystem pipework.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for the use of the emergency bilge pumping arrangements in the machinery\nspaces.\nThe shipboard emergency response plan for machinery space flooding.\nThe Oil Record Book Part I.\nThe Engine Room Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the use of the emergency bilge pumping arrangements in the\nmachinery spaces.\nThere was no shipboard emergency response plan for machinery space flooding.\nThe company procedures did not include guidance on:\no The use of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct suctions and overboard\nvalves.\no The use of the emergency bilge suction.\no MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures necessary for\nthe purpose of securing the safety of the ship or saving life at sea or resulting from damage to a\nship or its equipment.\no Ship specific requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves, depending on the ship’s\nequipment and design, to prevent unauthorised discharge of oil or oily mixtures.\nThe accompanying or interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with\no The location and purpose of the various pumps connected to the bilge system, their direct suctions\nand overboard valves.\no The location and purpose of the emergency bilge suction.\no The sequence of opening and closing valves and starting the appropriate pump to effectively\ncommence pumping out the bilges in an emergency.\no MARPOL requirements concerning the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures in an\nemergency flooding situation.\no Company requirements to seal suction and/or overboard valves to prevent unauthorised discharge\nof oil or oily mixtures.\nThe emergency bilge suction valve was not readily accessible.\nThe emergency bilge suction valve was not clearly marked as to its purpose.\nThe emergency overboard discharge valve(s) were not provided with a notice warning against accidental\nopening.\nEmergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves had not been sealed in accordance with company\nprocedures.\nSeals on emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves were not easily breakable.\nThe condition of the emergency bilge suction and/or overboard valves was unsatisfactory in any respect\nwhich may make the operation of the valve difficult or impossible in an emergency.\nThe emergency bilge pumping system or lines were defective in any respect.\nThere was evidence that the emergency bilge discharge arrangements had been used for the disposal of\ndaily machinery space bilge accumulations.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.5.2.", "t": "Were the engineer officers familiar with the company procedure for the safe use of", "c": "the incinerator, and was the incinerator in satisfactory condition and used in accordance\nwith the company procedure and in compliance with MARPOL?\nShort Question Text\nIncinerator operation.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Interview - Engineer Officer\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: MEPC.244(66) 2014 Standard specification for shipboard incinerators.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the disposal of garbage and sludge using the incinerator is always carried out safely and in\naccordance with the requirements of MARPOL.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n9.3.2 Incinerators\n• •\n• •\n• Incinerators are a potential fire hazard, therefore it is essential that their operation is closely monitored,\nincluding what is being incinerated.\nWaste should not be allowed to accumulate around incinerator spaces other than in the correct storage\nfacilities. Accumulated waste around incinerator spaces is a fire and occupational health hazard;\nWaste oil or sludge should not be incinerated when in ports, harbours or estuaries;\nSludge from EGCS should not be incinerated; and\nPlastics and PVC should only be incinerated in IMO-approved incinerators.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarer’s. 2015 Edition.\n2.6.4 Incinerators and compactors should always be operated by competent personnel, and operating instructions\nshould be strictly followed.\nIMO: MEPC.244(66) 2014 Standard specification for shipboard incinerators.\n3. Materials and manufacture\n3.10 The incinerator furnace may be charged with solid waste either by hand or automatically. In every case, fire\ndangers should be avoided, and charging should be possible without danger to the operating personnel.\nFor instance, where charging is carried out by hand, a charging lock may be provided which ensures that the\ncharging space is isolated from the fire box as long as the filling hatch is open.\nWhere charging is not effected through a charging lock, an interlock should be installed to prevent the charging door\nfrom opening while the incinerator is in operation with burning of garbage is in progress or while the furnace\ntemperature is above 220C.\n3.12 Interlocks should be installed to prevent ash removal doors from opening while burning is in progress or while\nthe furnace temperature is above 220C\n4. Operating requirements\n4.5 The incinerator should have warning plates attached in a prominent location on the unit, warning against the\nunauthorized opening of doors to combustion chamber(s) during operation and against overloading the incinerator\nwith garbage.\n4.6 The incinerator should have instruction plate(s) attached in a prominent location of the unit that clearly addresses\nthe following:\n4.6.1 Cleaning ashes and slag from the combustion chamber(s) and cleaning of combustion air openings before\nstarting the incinerator (where applicable).\n4.6.2 Operating procedures and instructions. These should include proper start up procedures, normal shut-down\nprocedures, emergency shut-down procedures, and procedures for loading garbage (where applicable).\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nRegulation 16 Shipboard Incineration\n1 Except as provided on paragraph 4 of this regulation, shipboard incineration shall be allowed only in a shipboard\nincinerator.\n2 Shipboard incineration of the following substances shall be prohibited:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nresidues of cargoes subject to Annex I, II or III or related contaminated packing materials;\npolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs);\ngarbage, as defined by Annex V, containing more than traces of heavy metals;\nrefined petroleum products containing halogen compounds;\n5.\n6.\nsewage sludge and sludge oil either of which is not generated on board the ship; and\nexhaust gas system cleaning system residues.\n3 Shipboard incineration of polyvinyl chlorides (PVCs) shall be prohibited, except in shipboard incinerators for which\nIMO Type Approval Certificates have been issued.\n4 Shipboard incineration of sewage sludge and sludge oil generated during normal operation of a ship may also take\nplace in the main or auxiliary power plant of boilers, but in those cases, shall not take place inside ports, harbours\nand estuaries.\n6.1 Except as provided in paragraph 6.2 of this regulation, each incinerator on a ship constructed on or after 1\nJanuary 2000 or incinerator that is installed on board a ship on or after 1 January 2000 shall meet the requirements\ncontained in appendix IV to this Annex…\n6.2 The Administration may allow exclusion from the application of paragraph 6.1 of this regulation to any incinerator\ninstalled on board a ship before 19 May 2005, provided that the ship is solely engaged in voyages within waters\nsubject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State of which the ship is entitled to fly.\n7 Incinerators installed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 6.1 of this regulation shall be provided with\na manufacturer’s operating manual, which is to be retained with the unit and which shall specify how to operate the\nincinerator within the limits described in paragraph 2 of the appendix IV of this Annex.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which described the safe use of the shipboard incinerator.\nThe procedure should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the incinerator.\nWho is permitted to use the incinerator.\nWhen and where incinerator use is prohibited for either garbage or sludge disposal considering:\no The geographical position of the ship and proximity to land.\no Any local regulations relating to the use of the incinerator.\no Onboard operations.\no The status of the machinery space.\nWhat is permitted to be incinerated onboard considering the design of the incinerator and the restrictions\nimposed by MARPOL Annex VI.\nThe checks that must be conducted before the incinerator is used on each occasion.\nThe PPE that must be used when loading garbage into the incinerator.\nThe actions that must be taken if the incinerator fails or develops a fault.\nThe requirement to review a risk assessment for the safe use of the incinerator paying attention to the\neffectiveness of the safety interlocks fitted to garbage loading chutes.\nThe requirement to post clear and simple operating instructions at the incinerator controls.\nThe requirement to post a list of items that are not to be incinerated from a safety and/or regulatory\nperspective in the incinerator space.\nHow to dispose of incinerator ashes.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the safe use of the\nincinerator.\nSight, and where necessary review, the risk assessment for the safe operation of the incinerator.\nInspect the incinerator and the garbage sorting area and verify that:\no The incinerator appeared fully functional and operational.\no Clear and simple operating instructions were posted at the incinerator controls.\no A list of items that were prohibited from being incinerated was posted in the incinerator space.\no\no\no\no\n• There was evidence that prohibited items were being separated and stored for disposal ashore.\nThe safety interlocks on the garbage loading chutes were properly connected and functioning. (as\nfar as possible with the incinerator stopped)\nThere was no evidence of localised overheating or leaking of exhaust fumes on the exterior of\neither the combustion chambers or the exhaust trunk.\nThere was no evidence of oil dripping around the incinerator casing and/or cooling space.\nInterview an engineer officer who was responsible for the supervision of the incinerator to verify their\nunderstanding and knowledge of:\no Who is permitted to use the incinerator for garbage disposal and what level of supervision must be\nmaintained\no The safe operating procedure for the incinerator.\no The PPE that must be used when loading the incinerator with garbage.\no The correct garbage loading process.\no The safety interlocks that prevent the garbage loading chutes from being opened in the incorrect\nsequence or while the furnace is in operation.\no The location of the incinerator emergency stop controls.\no The items that were prohibited from being incinerated.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures which described the safe use of the incinerator.\nThe risk assessment for the safe operation of the incinerator.\nThe incinerator operation and maintenance manual.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which described the safe use of the incinerator.\nThere was no risk assessment available for the safe operation of the incinerator.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure or risk assessment for the safe\noperation of the incinerator.\nAn interviewed engineer officer was unfamiliar with:\no The company procedures or risk assessment for the safe operation of the incinerator.\no The PPE that must be worn when loading garbage into the incinerator.\no The process to safely load garbage into the incinerator.\no The items that were prohibited from being incinerated.\no The actions to take if the incinerator fails or develops a fault.\nThe incinerator was out of service or defective in any respect.\nA list of items prohibited from being incinerated was not posted in the incinerator space.\nOperating instructions were not posted by the incinerator controls.\nThere was evidence of localised overheating or exhaust gas leakage from the combustion chamber or\nexhaust trunk.\nThere was evidence that the safety interlocks on the garbage loading chutes were defective or being\nbypassed.\nThere was evidence of oil dripping around the incinerator casing and/or cooling space.\nThere was evidence that prohibited items were being incinerated.\nThere was evidence that the incinerator had been used to incinerate garbage or sludge at times or places\nwhere MARPOL, local regulations or company procedure prohibited the use of the incinerator.\nThere was evidence that the main or auxiliary power plant of boilers had been used to incinerate sewage\nsludge and/or sludge oil at times or places where MARPOL, local regulations or company procedure\nprohibited this practice.\nWaste had been allowed to accumulate around incinerator spaces other than in the correct storage facilities.\n6.6. Oil Discharge Monitors", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master and engineer officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "the use of the oil filtering equipment, and was the oil filtering equipment in satisfactory\ncondition and used in accordance with the company procedure, manufacturer’s\ninstructions and MARPOL Annex I?\nShort Question Text\nOil filtering equipment.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Engine Room, Interview - Engineer Officer\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Polar Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that bilge discharges from machinery spaces are always within the limits permitted by MARPOL\nAnnex I.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nChapter 9- Pollution Control\n9.3 Equipment Operational Guidelines\n9.3.1 Oily Water Separators (OWS)\n• •\nKeep the OWS overboard discharge manual valve lock closed when not in use. The Chief Engineer and\nMaster should hold the keys;\nPost a sign next to the OWS overboard discharge valve to identify the function of the valve and warn that it\nmust be locked at all times when not in use. Some legal jurisdictions require notices to inform crews of the\nconsequences (such as fines) should they illegally discharge anything to sea.\nIMO: MEPC.107(49) Revised Guidelines and Specifications for Pollution Prevention Equipment for Machinery\nSpace Bilges of Ships.\n3.1 Pollution prevention equipment\nFor the purpose of these Guidelines and Specifications pollution prevention equipment installed in a ship in\ncompliance with regulation 16 (amended by MEPC.285(70) to 14.7) comprises:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n15 ppm Bilge Separator;\n15 ppm Bilge Alarm; and\nautomatic stopping device\n3.2 15 ppm Bilge Separator\n“15 ppm Bilge Separator” may include any combinations of a separator, filter, coalescer or other means, and also a\nsingle unit designed to produce an effluent with oil content not exceeding 15 ppm.\n3.3 15 ppm Bilge Alarm\nThe alarm arrangements specified in regulation 16(5) (amended by MEPC.285(70) to 14.7) are referred to in these\nGuidelines and Specifications as a “15 ppm Bilge Alarm”.\n3.6 Automatic Stopping Device\nThe automatic stopping device is a device used, where applicable, to automatically stop any discharge overboard of\noily mixture when the oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 ppm. The automatic stopping device should consist of a\nvalve arrangement installed in the effluent outlet line of the 15 ppm Bilge Separator which automatically diverts the\neffluent mixture from being discharged overboard back to the ships bilges or bilge tank when the oil content of the\neffluent exceeds 15 ppm.\n4.2.9 The 15 ppm Bilge Alarm should record date, time and alarm status, and operating status of the 15 ppm Bilge\nSeparator. The recording device should also store data for at least eighteen months and should be able to display or\nprint a protocol for official inspections as required. In the event the 15 ppm Bilge Alarm is replaced, means should be\nprovided to ensure the data recorded remains available on board for 18 months.\n4.2.11 (amended by MEPC.285(70) as follows) The validity of calibration certificates should be checked at IOPP\nannual/intermediate/renewal surveys. The accuracy of 15 ppm bilge alarms is to be checked by calibration and\ntesting of the equipment conducted by a manufacturer or persons authorized by the manufacturer and should be\ndone at intervals not exceeding five years after its commissioning, or within the term specified in the manufacturer's\ninstructions, whichever is shorter. Alternatively the unit may be replaced by a calibrated 15 ppm bilge alarm. The\ncalibration certificate for the 15 ppm bilge alarm, certifying the date of the last calibration check, should be retained on\nboard for inspection purposes.\n6 Installation Requirements\n6.1 15 ppm Bilge Separator\n6.1.1 For future inspection purposes on board ship, a sampling point should be provided in a vertical section of the\nwater effluent piping as close as is practicable to the 15 ppm Bilge Separator outlet. Re-circulating facilities should\nbe provided, after and adjacent to the overboard outlet of the stopping device to enable the 15 ppm Bilge Separator\nsystem, including the 15 ppm Bilge Alarm and the automatic stopping device, to be tested with the overboard\ndischarge closed (see figure 1).\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\n2.\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: Polar Code\nPart II-A – Pollution prevention measures\n1.1 Operational requirements\n1.1.1 In Arctic waters any discharge into the sea of oily mixtures from any ship shall be prohibited.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 14. Oil filtering equipment\n1. Except as specified in paragraph 3 of this regulation, any ship of 400 gross tonnage and above but less than\n10,000 gross tonnage shall be fitted with oil filtering equipment complying with paragraph 6 of this regulation. Any\nsuch ship which may discharge into the sea ballast water retained in oil fuel tanks in accordance with regulation 16.2\nshall comply with paragraph 2 of this regulation.\n2. Except as specified in paragraph 3 of this regulation, any ship of 10,000 gross tonnage and above shall be fitted\nwith oil filtering equipment complying with paragraph 7 of this regulation.\n5. The Administration may waive the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this regulation for:\n.1 any ship engaged exclusively on voyages within special areas or Arctic waters.\n6. Oil filtering equipment referred to in paragraph 1 of this regulation shall be of a design approved by the\nAdministration and shall be such as will ensure that any oily mixture discharged into the sea after passing through the\nsystem has an oil content not exceeding 15 parts per million. In considering the design of such equipment, the\nAdministration shall have regard to the specification recommended by the Organization.\n7. Oil filtering equipment referred to in paragraph 2 of this regulation shall comply with paragraph 6 of this regulation.\nIn addition, it shall be provided with alarm arrangements to indicate when this level cannot be maintained. The\nsystem shall also be provided with arrangements to ensure that any discharge of oily mixtures is automatically\nstopped when the oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 parts per million. In considering the design of such equipment\nand approvals, the Administration shall have regard to the specification recommended by the Organization.\nInspection Guidance\nThe terms “oily water separator”, “15ppm bilge separator” and “oil filtering equipment” are considered to\ninterchangeable for the purpose of this question.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which described the use of the oil filtering equipment\nprovided.\nThe procedure should include:\n• •\n• Who is responsible for supervising the use of the oil filtering equipment.\nWho is permitted to use of the oil filtering equipment.\nWhen the oil filtering equipment may be used for overboard discharge of bilge water, considering amongst\nother things:\no\n• •\n• •\n• Whether the equipment was fitted with an automatic stopping device or not. (IOPP Form B section\n2.2.2)\no Operation in a special area, Arctic waters or any other area with potential restrictions and/or\nprohibitions.\no The company environmental protection policy.\nThe authorisation that must be obtained before the overboard discharge of bilge water may be conducted.\nThe required checks to be conducted on the oil filtering equipment and system pipework before an\noverboard discharge of bilge water may take place.\nThe required checks to be conducted on the oil filtering equipment and system pipework upon completion of\nan overboard discharge of bilge water.\nThe actions that must be taken if the oil filtering equipment fails or develops a fault.\nThe document retention instructions for the 15 ppm bilge alarm data.\nThe required frequency of the 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor calibration.\n• •\n• The control measures to prevent the unauthorised opening of the oil filtering equipment overboard valve.\nThe control of anti-tampering devices or seals on flanges or pipe connection on the oil filtering equipment\nand the connected pipework.\nThe actions to take if the oil filtering equipment, its associated system pipework or machinery space\npipework in general was suspected as having been used for the illegal discharge of bilge water or sludge.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the use of the oil filtering\nequipment provided.\nWhere necessary, review the manufacturer’s instructions for the 15 ppm bilge alarm.\nSight the calibration certificate for the 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor fitted to the oil filtering equipment.\nInspect the oil filtering equipment and its associated pipework and verify that:\no The overboard valve was secured and sealed against accidental opening.\no A warning sign had been posted at the overboard valve indicating that opening the valve was\nprohibited without the authority of the Chief Engineer or the Master.\no There were no signs or indicators that the flanges and pipe connections on the oil filtering\nequipment and associated piping had been tampered with.\no That each flange or connection that could permit inappropriate use of the oil filtering system or its\noverboard had been sealed to prevent tampering.\nWhere the oil filtering equipment was, or had recently been, defective verify that an entry had been made in\nthe Oil Record Book Part I to record the time the equipment was taken out of service and, where applicable,\nreturned to service.\n• Request that an engineer officer demonstrates the operation the oil filtering equipment using the mandatory\ntesting facility (MEPC 107(49) 6.1.1) to verify the proper functioning of:\no The 15 ppm bilge alarm.\no The automatic stopping device.\no The 15 ppm bilge alarm recorder.\n• Interview the accompanying engineer officer and verify their familiarity with:\no The restrictions on the use of the oil filtering equipment for overboard discharge of bilge water,\nparticularly as it related to a vessel without an automatic stopping device.\no The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment became defective.\no The actions to take if any part of the oil filtering equipment or its associated pipework was found to\nhave been tampered with.\no The actions to take if any piping system in the machinery space was suspected as being used to\nillegally dispose of bilge water or sludge overboard.\n• Where the vessel was exempt from being fitted with an oil filtering device verify that:\no The vessel was trading within the limitations identified by MARPOL Annex I 14.5.1.\no The IOPP Certificate was endorsed appropriately (14.5.3.4).\no There was no evidence that the machinery space piping was being used inappropriately for bilge\nwater or sludge disposal\no The engineer officers were familiar with the machinery space bilge water and sludge management\nprocedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures which described the use of the oil filtering equipment provided.\nThe calibration certificate for the 15 ppm bilge alarm fitted to the oil filtering equipment.\nThe manufacturer’s maintenance and operation manuals for the oil filtering equipment.\nRecords of inspection and maintenance of the oil filtering equipment in the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nThe Oil Record Book Part I.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which described the use of the oil filtering equipment provided.\nThe 15 ppm bilge alarm sensor had not been calibrated within the previous five years or within the time\nframe specified by the manufacturer’s operation and maintenance manual, where this was less than five\nyears.\nThe oil filtering equipment overboard valve was not closed and/or was not secured and sealed to prevent\naccidental opening.\nThere was no warning sign posted at the overboard valve indicating that the valve was only to be operated\nwith the authority of the Chief Engineer or the Master.\nThere was evidence that the oil filtering equipment or its system pipework had been tampered with.\nThe oil filtering equipment or its system pipework flanges and connections were not sealed as per the\nmanufacturer's or shipowner's approved drawing and/or instructions to prevent tampering.\nThe oil filtering equipment was defective in any respect.\nThere were no records of inspection and maintenance of the oil filtering equipment in the vessel’s\nmaintenance plan.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which described the use of\nthe oil filtering equipment provided.\nAn engineer officer was unable to demonstrate the operation and proper functioning of the oil filtering\nequipment, automatic stopping device, 15 ppm bilge alarm and/or 15 ppm bilge alarm recorder.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with:\no The restrictions on use of the oil filtering equipment in accordance with the company procedure and\nthe design of the equipment.\no The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment was defective.\no The actions to take if the oil filtering equipment or its associated pipework was found to have been\ntampered with.\no The actions to take if any piping system in the machinery space was suspected as being used to\nillegally pump bilge water or sludge overboard.\nWhere the oil filtering equipment was, or had been, out of service but where no entry had been made in the Oil\nRecord Book part I, make a negative observation under question 6.1.3 in addition to the observations that may be\nrelevant under this question relating to Hardware, Process and Human element as appropriate.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "6.6.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of", "c": "the oil discharge monitoring and control system, and was the oil discharge monitoring\nand control system in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the company\nprocedures, manufacturer’s instructions and MARPOL Annex I?\nShort Question Text\nOil discharge monitoring and control system (ODME)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nPumproom, Main Deck, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.108(49). Revised Guidelines and Specifications for Oil Discharge Monitoring and Control\nSystem for Oil Tankers.\nObjective\nTo ensure that discharges from cargo and ballast spaces are always within the limits permitted by MARPOL\nAnnex I.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.108(49). Revised Guidelines and Specifications for Oil Discharge Monitoring and\nControl System for Oil Tankers.\n(Amended by resolution MEPC.240(65) but no text below affected)\n3.1 Oil discharge monitoring and control system\nAn oil discharge monitoring and control system, referred to in these Guidelines and Specifications as a monitoring\nsystem, is a system which monitors the discharge into the sea of oily ballast or other oil-contaminated water from the\ncargo tank areas and comprises the items specified in paragraph 6.1.4.\n3.2 Control section\nA control section of a monitoring system is a unit composed of the items specified in paragraph 6.1.4.8.\n3.3 Overboard discharge control\nAn overboard discharge control is a device which automatically initiates the sequence to stop the overboard\ndischarge of the effluent in alarm conditions and prevents the discharge throughout the period the alarm condition\nprevails. The device may be arranged to close the overboard valves or to stop the relevant pumps, as appropriate.\n3.4 Starting interlock\nA starting interlock is a facility which prevents the initiation of the opening of the discharge valve or the operation of\nother equivalent arrangements before the monitoring system is fully operational when use of the monitoring system is\nrequired by the Convention.\n3.5 Control unit\n3.5.1 A control unit is a device which receives automatic signals of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\noil content of the effluent ppm;\nflow rate of discharge m3/hour;\nships speed in knots;\nship’s position - latitude and longitude;\ndate and time (GMT); and\nstatus of the overboard discharge control.\n3.5.2 The unit shall make automatic recordings of data as specified in paragraph 6.9.2.\n6.2 Oil content meter\n6.2.4 It is desirable that the reading should not be affected by the type of oil. If it is, it should not be necessary to\ncalibrate the meter on board ship, but pre-set alterations in the calibration may be made in accordance with the\nmanufacturer's instructions. In the latter case, means should be available to check that the correct calibration has\nbeen selected for the oil in question. The accuracy of the readings should at all times remain within the limit specified\nin 6.2.2.\n6.2.7 The meter should have simple means to enable the ship's crew to check the functioning of the electrical and\nelectronic circuitry of the meter by introduction of a simulated signal corresponding approximately to half the full-scale\nreading of the meter. It should also be possible for qualified personnel to recalibrate the meter on board the oil tanker.\n6.5 Ships speed indicating system\n6.5.1 The automatic speed signal required for a monitoring system should be obtained from the ships speed\nindicating device by means of a repeater signal. The speed information used may be either speed over the ground or\nspeed through the water, depending upon the speed measuring equipment installed on board.\n6.6 Ship position indicating device\n6.6.1 The ship position indicating device shall consist of a receiver for a global navigation satellite system or a\nterrestrial radio navigation system, or other means, suitable for use at all times throughout the intended voyage to\nestablish and update the ships position by automatic means.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels.\nProcedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMethods of minimising emissions.\nIdentification of applicable regulations.\nEnvironmentally responsible disposal methods.\nEmissions monitoring.\nFuel analysis.\nVOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:\n1.\n2.\ncompliance with mandatory rules and regulations, and\nthat applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations,\nclassification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 31 Oil discharge monitoring and control system\n1 Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of regulation 3 of this Annex, oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and\nabove shall be equipped with an oil discharge monitoring and control system approved by the Administration.\n1.\n2.\n3.\nIn considering the design of the oil content meter to be incorporated into the system the Administration shall\nhave regard to the specification recommended by the organization. The system shall be fitted with a\nrecording device to provide a continuous record of the discharge in litres per nautical mile and total quantity\ndischarged, or the oil content and rate of discharge, this record shall be identifiable as to time and date and\nshall be kept for at least three years. The oil discharge monitoring and control system shall come into\noperation when there is any of effluent into the sea and shall be such as will ensure that any discharge of\noily mixture is automatically stopped when the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil exceeds that permitted\nby regulation 34 of his Annex. Any failure of this monitoring and control system shall stop the discharge. In\nthe event of failure of the oil discharge monitoring and control system a manually operated alternative\nmethod may be used, but the defective unit shall be made operable as soon as possible. Subject to\nallowance by the port State authority, a tanker with a defective oil discharge monitoring and control system\nmay undertake one ballast voyage before proceeding to a repair port.\nThe oil discharge monitoring and control system shall be designed and installed in compliance with the\nguidelines and specifications for oil discharge monitoring and control systems for oil tankers developed by\nthe Organization. Administrations may accept such specific arrangements as detailed in the Guidelines and\nSpecifications.\nInstructions as to the operation of the system shall be in accordance with an operation manual approved by\nthe Administration. They shall cover manual as well as automatic operations and shall be intended to ensure\nthat at no time shall oil be discharged except in compliance with the conditions specified in regulation 34 of\nthis Annex.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which described the use of the oil discharge monitoring and\ncontrol system provided. The procedure should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWho is responsible for supervising the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\nWho is permitted to use the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\nWhen the oil discharge monitoring and control system may be used for overboard discharge of oily mixtures,\nconsidering amongst other things:\no Whether the vessel was in a special area.\no The proximity to land.\no The vessel’s route.\no The operational status of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\no The company environmental protection policy.\nThe authorisation that must be obtained before the overboard discharge of oily mixtures may be conducted.\nThe required checks to be conducted on the oil discharge monitoring and control system before an\noverboard discharge of oily mixtures may take place.\nThe level of supervision and lookout required during an overboard discharge of an oily mixture:\no In the cargo control room.\no On deck.\no On the bridge.\nThe additional permissions that must be obtained before using the oil discharge monitoring and control\nsystem with any of the automatic inputs and control functions in manual mode.\nThe required checks to be conducted on the oil discharge monitoring and control system upon completion of\nan overboard discharge of oily mixtures.\nThe actions that must be taken if the oil discharge monitoring and control system fails or develops a fault.\nThe print-out or electronic data retention instructions for the oil discharge monitoring and control system\nrecorder data.\nThe required frequency of the oil content meter sensor calibration.\nThe required frequency of the oil discharge monitoring and control system test functions.\n• The control measures to prevent the unauthorised opening of the oil discharge monitoring and control\nsystem overboard valve(s).\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the use of the oil discharge\nmonitoring and control system provided.\nInspect the oil discharge monitoring and control system control panel and verify that:\no The system is operational with no apparent faults or alarms.\no The recording device was printing the data legibly, or\no it is possible to store and subsequently download the data from memory.\no The sensor input for speed and position is accurate.\no The time and date is synchronised to GMT.\nDuring the deck inspection inspect the visible parts of the oil discharge monitoring and control system and\nverify that it is intact and not modified in any respect.\nWhere the vessel had conducted an overboard discharge of oily mixtures during the previous six months,\ninspect the recorder print out/memory and verify that a selected discharge had been undertaken with the\nsystem in automatic mode with all sensors providing an automatic input.\nWhere a discharge of oily mixtures had taken place with the oil discharge monitoring and control system or\nany of its required data feeds in manual mode:\no Inspect the Oil Record Book Part II and verify that an entry had been made to record that the oil\ndischarge monitoring and control system was defective.\no Request documented confirmation that shore-based management had been advised of the failure\nof the system and that approval for continuing the discharge in manual mode had been provided.\no Request evidence that the oil discharge monitoring and control system had been repaired and\ndemonstrated as fully operational as soon as possible after failure.\nWhere the oil discharge monitoring and control system was, or had recently been, defective verify that an\nentry had been made in the Oil Record Book Part II to record the time the equipment was taken out of\nservice and, where applicable, returned to service.\nWhere necessary, review the maintenance and inspection records.\nInterview the accompanying officer and verify their familiarity with:\no The test run and calibration function of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\no The actions to take if the oil discharge monitoring and control system became defective.\no The company procedure for using the oil discharge monitoring and control system in manual mode.\no The actions to take if during overboard discharge the dedicated overboard lookout reported sighting\nan excessive discharge of oil or an oil slick astern of the vessel.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures which described the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system\nprovided.\nThe manufacturer’s maintenance and operation manuals for the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\nThe maintenance and inspection records for the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\nPrint-outs of ODME data or data displayed from memory.\nThe Oil Record Book Part II.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which described the use of the oil discharge monitoring and control\nsystem provided.\nThe oil discharge monitoring and control system was defective in any respect.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The oil discharge monitoring and control system was apparently modified or fitted with connections which\nwere not part of the original design.\nMaintenance and testing of the oil discharge monitoring and control system had not been conducted in\naccordance with the company procedures and the manufacturer's operation and maintenance manual.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which described the use of the oil\ndischarge monitoring and control system provided.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:\no The restrictions on use of the oil discharge monitoring and control system in accordance with the\ncompany procedure and the design of the equipment, if any.\no The actions to take if the oil discharge monitoring and control system was defective.\no The test run and calibration function of the oil discharge monitoring and control system.\nThe oil discharge monitoring and control system had been used to discharge oil mixtures overboard while in\nmanual mode or with any of the data feeds in manual mode, without authorisation from shore based\nmanagement.\nThe oil discharge monitoring and control system had been used to discharge oil mixtures overboard which\nwere not compatible with the sensors fitted.\nThe printed data from the recording device was illegible.\nThe stored data from the recording device was unavailable for review or download.\nWhere the oil discharge monitoring and control system was, or had been, out of service but where no entry\nhad been made in the Oil Record Book part II, make a negative observation under question 6.1.2 in\naddition to the observations that will be relevant under this question relating to Hardware, Process and\nHuman element as appropriate.\n7. Maritime Security\n7.1. Ship Routing", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.1.1.", "t": "Was security threat and risk assessment an integral part of voyage planning, and", "c": "did the passage plan contain security related information for each leg of the voyage?\nShort Question Text\nSecurity threat and risk assessment during passage planning.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge\nPublications\nIndustry: Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies\nMasters and Seafarers\nIndustry : BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea\nGulf of Aden\nIndian Ocean and Arabian Sea\nIndustry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast\nof West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.\nReCAAP: Regional Guide to Counter Piracy & Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2021).\nObjective\nTo ensure voyage planning always addresses security considerations.\nIndustry Guidance\nIndustry: Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies, Masters and Seafarers\nFundamentals\nThe fundamental requirements of best practices to avoid attack by pirates and armed robbers are:\n1.\n2.\nConduct thorough, ship-specific pre-voyage threat and risk assessments to identify appropriate Ship\nProtection Measures (SPMs).\nImplement SPMs as identified in the pre-voyage risk assessment.\nSection 4 Company Threat and Risk Assessment\nRisk Assessment\nRisk assessment is an integral part of voyage planning within a safety management system. All voyages require\nthorough advanced planning and risk assessment using all available information. The risk being evaluated should\ninclude likelihood of harm to the crew or ship from attack by pirates and armed robbers. The risk assessment must\nreflect the prevailing characteristics of the specific voyage, ship and operations and not just be a repetition of advice\ne.g. relating to different geographical regions and different pirate modus operandi. Detailed guidance on preparing\nrisk assessments can be found from a variety of sources including the ISPS code.\nSection 5 Company planning\n5.1 Company planning prior to entering an area of increased risk\nThis section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the company prior to a ship entering an area of\nincreased risk identified through the risk assessment in order to mitigate against the risk of attack. It should be noted\nthat pirate and armed robbery risk will vary across regions.\n5.1.6 Offer guidance to the Master as to recommended route\nOffer the Master guidance regarding recommended routeing through areas of increased risk identified through the\nrisk assessment. Guidance should be provided on using recommended transit corridors or other supported routes\n(e.g. a Group Transit or National Convoys where these exist). If anchoring, consideration should be given to the use\nof protected anchorages where available recognising that standards of protection vary widely. The company should\nappreciate that the voyage routeing may need to be reviewed and amended at short notice in light of updated\ninformation.\nIndustry: BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea,\nGulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea\nand\nIndustry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off\nthe Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.\nAnnex B - Maritime security charts (similar advice and guidance is provided in both publications)\nMaritime security charts contain safety-critical information to assist bridge crews in the planning of safe passages\nthrough high risk areas. All information has been gathered by the UKHO through work with NATO and other\ngovernment organisations, ensuring each chart has the most accurate, up-to-date and verified information available.\nEach maritime security chart includes:\n• •\nInformation about dangers to the security of navigation including piracy, terrorism, embargoes, mine warfare,\nexclusion zones, blockades and illegal fishing. This information, when used alongside official navigational\ncharts, can help to ensure the safety of ships, crew and cargo.\nGeneral security advice, self-protective measures, security procedures and regional contacts, as well as\nrouteing and reporting requirements implemented by military or security forces.\nReCAAP: Regional Guide to Counter Piracy & Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2021).\nTMSA KPI 13.2.1 requires that formal risk assessments of company activities are undertaken to identify and mitigate\npotential security threats.\nShip specific security risk assessments are reviewed prior to entry into areas identified as having increased risk.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe passage plan and voyage charts should contain security related information for each leg of the voyage.\nIn order to plan a voyage or transit through a security risk area, the Master should have available current threat\ninformation and a security risk assessment based on that information. The information available should include:\n• •\n• •\nRelevant UKHO or equivalent security charts.\nIndustry best management practice guidance (BMP) publications.\nRegional guidance where available.\nCompany specific guidance regarding recommended routeing, speed, waiting areas and anchorages.\nA detailed threat and risk assessment should be completed for each voyage and activity within a security risk area.\nThis should be reviewed and updated prior to entering an area which requires an increased state of readiness and\nvigilance and the passage plan amended if necessary.\nThe passage plan should identify points where there will be, for example:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nChanges to security levels.\nPoints at which maritime reports should be made (e.g., entering a VRA/VCR)\nEnhanced bridge manning levels (e.g., extra lookouts).\nVessel speed requirements.\nRestricted access controls.\nVoyage day/night transit considerations.\nHardening of the vessel.\nNo planned maintenance on voyage critical equipment.\nThe vessel operator should have provided bridge security cards and/or checklists to ensure that all security related\nconsiderations were included within the passage plan.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.\nInspectors should note that a company may instruct its vessel not to participate in a VRA based on their own internal\nsecurity assessment. In these circumstances the voyage planning records should identify the VRA reporting points\nand indicate that reports must not be made to comply with company instructions.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight UKHO or equivalent security charts and industry best management practice guidance (BMP)\npublications and/or regional guidance.\nReview the passage plan for a recently completed voyage including security related notations on voyage\ncharts.\nReview the security risk assessment for the same voyage.\nReview if necessary, the records of the same voyage in the Bridge Log Book.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nUKHO or equivalent security charts.\nIndustry best management practice guidance (BMP) publications.\nRegional Security Guidance (e.g., ReCAAP Guidance)\nCompany passage plan appraisal form checklist for a recently completed voyage.\nPassage plan for the same recently completed voyage.\nSecurity risk assessment for the same recently completed voyage.\n• •\nBridge Log Book.\nBridge security cards and/or checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel did not have the appropriate security information available such as:\no Relevant security charts.\no Industry best management practice guidance (BMP) publications.\no Regional Security Guidance (e.g., ReCAAP Guidance)\no Company specific guidance.\nNo security risk assessment had been performed for a recent voyage.\nCompleted voyage security risk assessments did not identify ship protection measures where required.\nNo company specific guidance regarding recommended routeing had been provided for a recent voyage\nthrough a high-risk area.\nThere was no evidence that the voyage security risk assessment had been reviewed and updated prior to\nentering an area which required an increased state of readiness and vigilance, and the passage plan\namended if necessary.\nThe passage plan did not contain appropriate security related information for each leg of the voyage.\nBridge security cards or checklists were not available.\n7.2. Ship Hardening and access control", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for hardening", "c": "the vessel when entering areas of increased security risk, and was there a Vessel\nHardening Plan (VHP) available?\nShort Question Text\nVessel hardening.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Exterior Decks, Main Deck, Interview - Security Officer\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF: Guidelines to Harden Vessels. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel can be hardened effectively if scheduled to enter an area of increased security risk.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines to Harden Vessels. First Edition.\n1.1 Assessing risks, detecting threats and defending the vessel\nVessel hardening is the physical measures taken to improve a vessel's security integrity. Any vessel hardening\nmeasures adopted should not compromise the vessel’s compliance with the International Convention for the Safety of\nLife at Sea (SOLAS) regulations. Escape routes should be kept clear and nothing should interfere with the crew’s\nability to respond to non-security related emergencies.\n2 Risk assessment\nIt is recommended a Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) is created, based on the company risk assessment. The VHP\nshould outline what mitigation measures are needed to reduce the risk to As Low as Reasonably Practicable\n(ALARP). It could be a stand-alone document, be incorporated into company procedures or be contained within the\nShip Security Plan (SSP). An example of a VHP is given in appendix C.\nAppendix C\nVessel Hardening Plan\nA Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) can ensure vessels are prepared for operations in areas of increased security. A\nVHP ought to be considered as part of any voyage preparation and more so when the vessel will cross known areas\nof maritime crime or piracy. The requirement for a VHP should be defined within the company management\nprocedures for security. The Company Security Officer should be responsible for the VHP ensuring process is in\nplace for hardening the vessel. The Master and the Ship's Security Officer are responsible for reviewing the VHP\nbefore transit or operation within known security risk areas. It is recommended that vessel owners and managers\nshould develop and use a VHP.\nTMSA KPI 13.1.3 requires that measures have been developed to mitigate and respond to all identified threats to\nvessels and shore-based locations.\nMitigating measures may include:\n• Physical security measures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for hardening the vessel when entering areas of increased\nsecurity risk that included:\n• •\n• •\n• A ship-specific Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP), including a list of materials needed to implement the VHP and\nthe required quantities.\nGuidance on when the required quantities of hardening material should be available on board, i.e. always or\nonly as needed.\nA requirement to maintain an inventory of the materials needed to implement the VHP currently on board.\nInspection and maintenance requirements for security equipment such as water cannons, CCTV etc.\nSafety guidance to crew when rigging security equipment, e.g., working with razor wire or near the ships\nside.\nThe VHP should not conflict with lifesaving appliance operation, e.g., life rafts should not be obstructed.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.\nThis question will only be allocated to vessels where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire that:\n• The vessel’s usual trading area included entering or transiting areas of increased security risk.\nIn which case, the vessel operator will have declared whether the vessel always carried materials to implement its\nhardening plan. The response will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight and where necessary, review the company procedures for hardening the vessel when entering areas\nof increased security risk.\nReview:\no Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP).\no Records of implementation of the VHP such as logbooks, work planning records, reports,\nphotographs etc.\no Inventory of hardening materials.\no Inspection and maintenance records for security equipment such as water cannons, CCTV, infrared\ndetection cameras, etc.\n• •\nDuring the inspection, inspect the hardening materials currently stored on board.\nIf the vessel is hardened in accordance with the VHP at the time of the inspection, verify that LSA and FFA\nis accessible and unobstructed.\n• Interview the Ship Security Officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for hardening the\nvessel when entering areas of increased security risk, particularly the VHP.\nWhere the VHP was reported to be an integral part of the ship security plan and confidential, the date of the last\nreview/major changes to the plan should be sighted to verify that a VHP plan existed.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for hardening the vessel.\nVessel Hardening plan (VHP).\nInventory of hardening materials.\nInspection and maintenance records for security equipment such as water cannons, CCTV, infrared\ndetection cameras, etc.\nBridge Log Book.\nWork planning records.\nAny other records of hardening being implemented, e.g., reports, photographs.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for hardening the vessel when entering areas of increased security risk.\nThe Ship Security Officer was not familiar with the company procedures for hardening the vessel when\nentering areas of increased security risk.\nThere was no Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP) available.\nThe Vessel Hardening Plan was not ship-specific.\nThe VHP did not include a list of materials needed to implement the VHP and the required quantities.\nThere was no inventory of the hardening materials currently on board.\nThere were no records of inspection and maintenance of security equipment such as water cannons, CCTV,\ninfrared cameras, etc.\nThe inventory of hardening materials clearly did not reflect actual quantities on board.\nThere was no record of the VHP being properly implemented prior to sailing into or through an area of\nincreased security risk.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.2.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the company procedures to", "c": "control access to the vessel in port and to ensure the safety of visitors, and were these\nprocedures effectively implemented?\nShort Question Text\nControlling access to the vessel\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nApproaching Vessel, Forecastle, Main Deck, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure access to the vessel is controlled at all times, and that all visitors are provided with an overview of\nthe hazards present and the safety precautions to observe while they are on board.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n21.2.1 Security information\nIn addition to International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) requirements, the tanker should provide the terminal with a\nlist of approved visitors, including Agents, Surveyors and Loading Masters.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n2.5.3 Unauthorised access\nAll access to the ship and the control and monitoring of visitors should be in accordance with the ship’s own Ship\nSecurity Plan (SSP) which is required by the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n2.5.2 On arrival at a terminal, a notice board displaying appropriate warnings should be posted at the access point to\nthe ship. The warnings can be translated into other languages as appropriate.\n• •\n• •\n• WARNING\nNo Naked Lights\nNo Smoking\nNo Unauthorised Persons\nNo Use of Mobile Phones without Master’s Permission.\nFigure 2.1: Sample visitor warning notice\nWhen toxic or hazardous cargoes are being handled, further notices in appropriate languages should be prominently\ndisplayed stating the particular risks of the operations being conducted.\nLocal, national or port regulations may require additional notices to be posted.\nAppendix A\nVisitor Information Card\nPurpose\nIt is essential that every person, including contractors and sub-contractors, who boards the ship, is provided with an\noverview of the hazards present and the safety precautions to observe while on board.\nIt is also recommended that similar advice is provided to people who are working close to the ship, e.g. the crews of\nbarges (bunkers, stores). This is especially relevant if cargo operations or gas freeing operations are taking place,\nwhich can spread cargo vapours over a large area.\nThe visitor information card is an example of the information that should be provided to visitors. Information cards\nshould be designed to account for the plans, procedures and operations specific of the company and ship.\nInformation cards should always be assessed and may be modified for each port arrival, taking into account\noperations, cargoes, anticipated visitors and any other special arrangements.\nTMSA KPI 13.1.3 requires that measures have been developed to mitigate and respond to all identified threats to\nvessels and shore-based locations.\nMitigating measures may include:\n• •\nAccess control.\nSecurity patrols.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, in accordance with the Ship Security Plan (SSP), to control\naccess to the vessel in port and to ensure the safety of visitors. These procedures should include:\nAccess control\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Pre-approval of visitors for terminal security purposes.\nA continuous gangway watch.\nRegular patrols of the deck to monitor potential unauthorised access points e.g. hawse pipes, mooring ropes\netc.\nRemote monitoring by CCTV where available.\nVisitor photo identification, visitor passes and record keeping.\nBaggage searches.\nEscorting visitors.\nVisitor induction and familiarisation.\n• •\nWarning notices.\nVisitor information cards.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• PPE requirements.\nSmoking regulations.\nRestrictions on movement around the vessel.\nRestrictions on mobile phones and portable electronic equipment.\nBriefing on the hazards of the cargo and any operations taking place e.g. loading, tank-cleaning or gasfreeing.\nEmergency signals and actions in the case of an emergency.\nDrug and alcohol policy.\nProvision of basic PPE for the period of a visit for those visitors who do not have it.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nWhen boarding the vessel, observe the security arrangements and induction and familiarisation procedures\nfor visitors.\nDuring the course of the inspection, observe the arrangements for regular patrols of the deck to monitor\npotential unauthorised access points.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures to control access to the vessel in port, and to ensure the safety of visitors, if available\noutside of the Ship Security Plan.\nVisitor Log.\nVisitor Information Card, if provided.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to control access to the vessel in port and to ensure the safety of\nvisitors.\nThe gangway watchman was unfamiliar with the company procedures to control access to the vessel in port\nand to ensure the safety of visitors.\nThe Master had not provided the terminal with a list of approved visitors, including Agents, Surveyors,\nLoading Masters and the SIRE inspector.\nA continuous gangway watch was not maintained.\nThere were no regular patrols of the deck to monitor potential unauthorised access points e.g. hawse pipes,\nmooring ropes etc.\nCCTV coverage of the vessel access points was not monitored, where CCTV systems were provided.\nVisitors to the vessel were not required to provide photo identification.\nVisitors were not provided with visitor passes.\nNo records were maintained of visitors boarding and leaving the vessel.\nVisitor baggage was not searched in accordance with the company procedures for the appropriate security\nlevel.\nVisitors were not escorted from the gangway to the accommodation.\nThere was no notice board at the access point to the vessel displaying the appropriate warnings to visitors,\nincluding the particular risks from toxic or hazardous cargoes being handled and the operations taking place.\nVisitors to the vessel were not provided with an overview of the hazards present and the safety precautions\nto observe while they are on board, (which may be via a Visitor Information Card), including:\no Smoking regulations.\no Restrictions on movement around the vessel.\no Restrictions on mobile phones and portable electronic equipment.\no Briefing on the hazards of the cargo and any operations taking place e.g. loading, tank-cleaning or\ngas-freeing.\no The use of appropriate PPE while onboard.\no Emergency signals and actions in the case of an emergency.\no Drug and alcohol policy.\n7.3. Communications and Monitoring", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with regional maritime security reporting", "c": "requirements and operation of the ship security alert system (SSAS) and had this\nequipment been regularly tested?\nShort Question Text\nShip security reporting and communications\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Internal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2012 edition\nIndustry: Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies\nMasters and Seafarers\nIndustry : BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea\nGulf of Aden\nIndian Ocean and Arabian Sea\nIndustry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off the Coast\nof West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.\nReCAAP: Regional Guide to Counter Piracy & Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2021).\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel staff have knowledge of regional maritime security reporting and that the SSAS\nworks.\nIndustry Guidance\nIndustry: Global Counter Piracy Guidance for Companies, Masters and Seafarers\nSection 3 Voluntary Reporting\nA major lesson learnt from operations against piracy and armed robbery to date is the importance of liaison with the\nmilitary and law enforcement. This is an essential part of self-protection that applies to all ships. To ensure these\nforces are aware of the intended sea passage and to understand the ships’ vulnerability to an attack, ships are\nencouraged to report to the centres overseeing the Voluntary Reporting Areas (VRAs). This information is essential to\nenable the centres to best use any assets available to them and to assist in an emergency. Once ships have entered\na VRA it is important that they continue to report while transiting within the area. This will allow the reporting centres\nto update the ship of any maritime security related incidents or threats in that region.\nShips are strongly encouraged to register and report with the respective reporting centres as appropriate and, then\nsend regular reports.\nSee also\nIndustry: BMP5 Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea,\nGulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea\nIndustry: BMP West Africa. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security off\nthe Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea. 1st Edition.\nReCAAP: Regional Guide to Counter Piracy & Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (2021).\nTMSA KPI 13.1.5 requires that procedures include the reporting of potential security threats and actual security\nincidents. The reporting procedures may include:\n• •\nVessel to the company.\nVessel to external authorities.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.3 The SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the Company’s organization can respond at any time to\nhazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships.\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2012 edition\nPart A\n9. Ship Security Plan\n9.4 The plan should address at least the following:\n.14 identification of the company security officer, including 24-hour contact details\n10 Records\n10.1 Records of the following activities addressed in the ship security plan shall be kept on board for at least the\nminimum period specified by the Administration, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3\n.10 maintenance, calibration and testing of any security equipment provided on board, including testing the ship\nsecurity alert system.\n2.12 Ship security communications\nRequirement for alert and identification systems\n2.12.1 Under the Maritime Security Measures, all SOLAS ships have to have a ship security alert system (SSAS).\n2.12.3 Also under provision elsewhere in the SOLAS Convention, the following SOLAS ships engaged on\ninternational voyages have to be fitted with a long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) system:\n2 cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards.\nInspection Guidance\nThe Master and officers should be aware of the name and 24-hour contact details of the Company Security Officer\n(CSO), and these details should be posted appropriately.\nThe Master and Ship Security Officer (SSO) should be familiar with the company procedures for voluntary security\nreporting in VRAs.\nSecurity communication equipment provided on board, including the ship security alert system (SSAS), long-range\nidentification and tracking (LRIT) equipment and dedicated standalone security communications equipment, if fitted,\nshould be regularly tested and in satisfactory condition.\nThe Master and officers should be familiar with the procedures for the use of this equipment, including the location of\nthe SSAS activation buttons.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.\nInspectors should note that a company may instruct its vessel not to participate in a VRA based on their own internal\nsecurity assessment. In these circumstances the voyage planning records should identify the VRA reporting points\nand indicate that reports must not be made to comply with company instructions.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight the 24-hour contact details for the CSO.\nVerify with the Master or SSO that:\no They were familiar with the company procedures for voluntary security reporting in VRAs.\no SSAS, LRIT and dedicated standalone security communications equipment, if fitted, is in\nsatisfactory condition, regularly tested and records maintained.\nVerify that participation in operational VRAs had been considered during each passage planning phase,\nand;\no Where security reporting to VRAs was required by company procedures, there was evidence that\nreports had been made as required, or\no Where security reporting to VRAs was not to be made in accordance with company procedures the\npassage plan was annotated with the actions to take, if any, when passing reporting points.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their awareness of the:\n• o\no\nPurpose and operation of the SSAS, LRIT and dedicated standalone security communications\nequipment, if fitted.\n24-hour contact details of the CSO.\n(Inspectors should not request details of communications equipment or to sight test and maintenance records.)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nContact details of the CSO.\nRecords of participation in voluntary security reporting.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the 24-hour contact details of the company security officer\n(CSO).\nThe 24-hour contact details of the CSO were not posted appropriately.\nThe Master and/or SSO were not familiar with the company procedures for voluntary security reporting in\nVRAs.\n• •\n• •\n• There was no evidence that participation in an operational VRA had been considered during the passage\nplanning phase.\nWhere the company procedure required participation in a VRA, there was no evidence that reporting to a\nVRA had been undertaken in accordance with the scheme\nIt was reported that there were no records of the regular testing of:\no The SSAS and/or the LRIT.\no Dedicated standalone security communications equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was not aware of the purpose and operation of the SSAS, LRIT and/or dedicated\nstandalone security communications equipment.\nIt was reported that an item of security communication equipment was defective in any respect.\n7.4. Ship Security Officer", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.4.1.", "t": "Did the Ship Security Officer (SSO) have a valid Certificate of Proficiency and a full", "c": "understanding of their role, and were ship security records of port calls being maintained\nas required by SOLAS?\nShort Question Text\nShip Security Officer (SSO).\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Interview - Security Officer, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2012 edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the SSO is trained and qualified and required security records are maintained.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n6.6 Responsibilities under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code\nFor tankers at a terminal, while the PFSO is responsible for the port security plan, the Master has overriding authority\nto make decisions about the safety and security of the tanker. A Ship Security Officer (SSO) should be appointed who\nis trained and capable of implementing the ship security plan and security measures on board. The SSO could be the\nMaster but is often one of the senior officers.\nIMO: Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2012 edition\n1.8 Definitions\nShip security officer means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master, designated by the company as\nresponsible for the security of the ship including implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and liaison\nwith the company security officer and port facility security officers.\n4.5.16\nAn SSO must be designated for every SOLAS ship. To allow for crew changes, a number of SSOs may be\ndesignated to serve on each ship. The duties of an SSO include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nUndertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security measures are\nmaintained;\nMaintaining and supervising the implementation of the SSP, including any amendments;\nCo-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with other shipboard personnel\nand relevant PFSOs;\nProposing modifications to the SSP;\nReporting any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security\ninspections and verifications of compliance to the CSO;\n6.\n7.\n8.\nImplementing any corrective actions;\nEnhancing security awareness and vigilance on board the ship;\nEnsuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, including security-related\nfamiliarization training;\n9. Reporting all security incidents;\n10. Co-ordinating implementation of the SSP with the CSO and relevant PFSOs;\n11. Ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained; and\n12. Ensuring the effective implementation of the SSP by organizing drills at appropriate intervals.\n4.5.17 Effective 1 January 2012, SSOs are required to hold a certificate of proficiency confirming they:\n1.\n2.\nhave approved seagoing service of not less than 12 months (or appropriate seagoing service and\nknowledge of ship operations) and:\nmeet the minimum standards of competency specified in the STCW Code, which are listed in appendix 4.3 –\nCompetency matrix for ship security officers.\nTMSA KPI 13.2.2 requires that the personnel responsible for security receive training appropriate to their role and the\ncompany’s activities.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:\n1.\n2.\nmanned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements; and\nappropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter XI-2 Regulation 9\n2.1 For the purpose of this chapter, a Contracting Government may require that ships intending to enter its ports\nprovide the following information to officers duly authorized by that Government to ensure compliance with this\nchapter prior to entry into port with the aim of avoiding the need to impose control measures or steps:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nThat the ship possesses a valid Certificate and the name of the issuing authority;\nThe security level at which the ship is currently operating;\nThe security level at which the ship operated in any previous port where it has conducted a ship/port\ninterface within the time frame specified in paragraph 2.3;\nAny special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in any previous port where it has\nconducted a ship/port interface within the time frame specified in paragraph 2.3;\nThat the appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during any ship-to-ship activity within the\ntime frame specified in paragraph 2.3;\nOther practical security-related information (but not the details of the ship security plan), taking into account\nthe guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.\nIf requested by the Contracting Government, the ship or the Company shall provide confirmation, acceptable to that\nContracting Government, of the information required above.\n2.2 Every ship to which this chapter applies intending to enter the port of another Contracting Government shall\nprovide the information described in paragraph 2.1 on the request of the officers duly authorized by that Government.\nThe master may decline to provide such information on the understanding that failure to do so may result in denial of\nentry into port.\n2.3 The ship shall keep records of the information referred to in paragraph 2.1 for the last 10 calls at port facilities.\nInspection Guidance\n• •\n• •\nA Ship Security Officer (SSO) must be appointed on each ship, and they must be in possession of a\nCertificate of Proficiency acceptable to the flag administration.\nThe SMS should clearly designate who is the SSO and should contain a description of the role and a list of\ntheir duties.\nThe SSO must be a member of the crew and cannot be an external security consultant, for example.\nShip security records as required by SOLAS must be maintained for the last 10 port calls.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and verify the SSO’s Certificate of Proficiency.\nSight and where necessary review, the sections of the SMS relating to ship security.\nSight evidence of regular security inspections of the vessel by the SSO.\nSight the ship security records for the last 10 port calls.\n• •\nInterview the SSO to verify their familiarity with their role, responsibilities, and duties.\nInterview a rating to verify their knowledge of vessel specific security procedures.\n(Inspectors do not need to review the details of the information maintained in the records but should note whether\nrecords are maintained or not.)\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nSSO’s Certificate of Proficiency.\nSections of the SMS relating to ship security.\nEvidence of regular security inspections of the vessel by the SSO.\nShip security records as required by SOLAS.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The SMS did not clearly designate who should be SSO.\nThe SMS did not contain a description of the role of the SSO, and a list of their duties.\nThe SSO did not have a valid Certificate of Proficiency.\nThe designated SSO was not a member of the crew.\nThe SSO did not have a full understanding of their role, responsibilities, and duties. For example, they were\nnot familiar with one or more of the following:\no Purpose of the Ship Security Plan (SSP).\no Operation, testing and maintenance of security equipment on board\no Vessel Hardening Plan (VHP).\no Identity, role and contact details of the CSO\no Role of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)\n• •\n• An interviewed rating had no knowledge of security procedures or response to security alarms\nThere was no evidence of regular security inspections of the vessel by the SSO.\nShip security records were not being maintained as required by SOLAS.\n7.5. Cyber Security", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "7.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for cyber", "c": "security risk management, and had these procedures been fully implemented?\nShort Question Text\nCyber security risk management.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management\nIndustry: The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships Version 4\nIMO: Resolution MSC.428(98) Maritime cyber risk management in safety management systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel has in place effective technical and procedural measures to protect against a cyber\nincident and ensure continuity of operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n6.4 Cyber safety and security\nCyber security is concerned with the protection of Information Technology (IT), Operational Technology (OT),\ninformation and data from unauthorised access, manipulation and disruption. Cyber safety covers the risks from the\nloss of availability or integrity of safety critical data and OT.\nIMO: MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management\n2.1.2 The distinction between information technology and operational technology systems should be considered.\nInformation technology systems may be thought of as focusing on the use of data as information. Operational\ntechnology systems may be thought of as focusing on the use of data to control or monitor physical processes.\nFurthermore, the protection of information and data exchange within these systems should also be considered.\nIndustry: The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships Version 4\n1.1 Cyber security characteristics of the maritime industry\n...Cyber risk management should:\n• •\n• •\nIdentify the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and on board.\nIdentify the systems, assets, data and capabilities, that if disrupted, could pose risks to the ship’s operations\nand safety.\nImplement technical and procedural measures to protect against a cyber incident, timely detection of\nincidents and ensure continuity of operations.\nA contingency plan which is regularly exercised.\nTMSA KPI 13.1.2 requires that the company has documented procedures in place to identify security threats\napplicable to vessels trading areas and shore-based locations. Security threats may include:\n• Cyber threat\nThe identified threats are reviewed as required by changes in circumstance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The Company should establish procedures to identify describe and respond to potential emergency shipboard\nsituations.\nIMO: Resolution MSC.428(98) Maritime cyber risk management in safety management systems\nThe Maritime Safety Committee,\n1 Affirms that an approved safety management system should take into account cyber risk management in\naccordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code;\n2 Encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems\nno later than the first annual verification of the company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021;\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for cyber risk management that:\n• •\n• •\nIdentified the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and on board,\nincluding:\no The officer with responsibility for cyber risk management on board.\no The person responsible for managing user profiles and passwords in the vessel network.\nIdentified the IT(information technology) and OT(operational technology) systems at risk on board such as:\no Cargo management systems.\no Bridge systems.\no Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems.\no Access control systems.\no Administrative and crew welfare systems.\no Communication systems.\nDescribed technical protection measures to protect against a cyber incident such as\no Physical security of network components.\no Anti-virus software.\no Application software management.\no Back-up facilities.\no Control of crew internet access.\no Control of administrator profiles, user profiles and passwords.\nDescribed procedural protection measures to protect against a cyber incident such as:\no Cyber security training and awareness raising for crew members.\no Control of local and remote access to the IT and OT systems.\no Control of the use of personal devices on board.\no Equipment disposal including data destruction.\no Contingency plans for possible cyber incidents.\nSpaces containing sensitive IT or OT control equipment should be securely locked.\nPhysical access to sensitive user equipment (such as exposed USB ports on bridge systems and wi-fi hub ports)\nshould be secured or disabled.\nAll on-board computers should be protected by anti-virus software, and this should be kept updated.\nOnly senior officers should have administrator profiles and the responsibility for maintaining user profiles should be\nclearly set out. User profiles should only allow workstations etc. to be used for their intended purpose. User profiles\nshould be carefully managed, and redundant profiles deleted.\nGeneric user profiles and passwords should not be passed on as part of crew changes. Passwords should be\nchanged regularly.\nBack-up facilities should be available and used to assist recovery following a cyber incident.\nOT systems critical to navigation and propulsion should have backup systems enabling quick and safe recovery after\na cyber incident.\nApplication software should be regularly updated with security patches and upgrades.\nCrew members should receive cyber security training as appropriate to their responsibilities and duties.\nCyber security awareness should be actively promoted on board using for example, posters, CBT or online courses.\nComputer access for visitors such as surveyors, technicians etc. should be restricted. Unauthorised access to\nsensitive OT computers should be prohibited. There should be procedures for the approval of access to sensitive\nnetworks, including remote access.\nProcedures should strictly restrict the use of portable media. Where use is unavoidable, such media should be\nchecked for malware etc. in a computer not connected to the ship’s control network.\nThe following is a sample non-exhaustive list of cyber incidents, which should be addressed in plans for onboard\ncontingencies. These incidents may be addressed in the company’s procedures for dealing with shipboard\nemergencies as required by the ISM Code’s Chapter 8 (Emergency preparedness).\n• •\n• •\n• Loss of availability of electronic navigational equipment or loss of integrity of navigation related data.\nLoss of availability or integrity of external data sources, including but not limited to GNSS.\nLoss of essential connectivity with the shore, including but not limited to the availability of Global Maritime\nDistress and Safety System (GMDSS) communications.\nLoss of availability of industrial control systems, including propulsion, auxiliary systems, and other critical\nsystems, as well as loss of integrity of data management and control.\nThe event of a ransomware or denial of service incident.\nContingency plans and related information should include communications and escalation management to ensure\nthat the correct shore based support can be accessed and should be available in a non-electronic form as some\ntypes of cyber incidents can include the deletion of data and shutdown of communication links.\nContact details should be readily available for technical support from the operator’s IT department or external IT\ncontractors as appropriate.\nThe ships security plan is confidential and approved by flag state. Where the master advises that the ship security\nplan and any other plans relating to security are confidential, the inspector should only confirm their existence by\ninspection of the front cover.\nThe inspector should address the question based on those documents and records that are not considered\nconfidential in conjunction with the explanations of the accompanying officer.\nWhere a comment is required to support an observation, it must not provide any detail relating to the content of plans\nor risk assessments that are reported as confidential.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Interview the officer with responsibility for cyber risk management on board to confirm the existence of\no The company procedures for cyber risk management.\no The inventory/register of sensitive IT/OT systems fitted on board.\no Records of approval for external local or remote access to sensitive IT/OT systems.\no Contact details for technical support from the operator’s IT department or external IT contractors.\no Records of cyber security training.\no Cyber contingency plans in hard copy.\n• During the tour of the vessel, inspect equipment to verify physical cyber security measures were in place.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for cyber risk management.\nThe inventory/register of sensitive IT/OT systems fitted onboard.\nRecords of approval for external local or remote access to sensitive IT/OT systems.\nCyber contingency plans in hard copy.\nContact details for technical support from the operator’s IT department or external IT contractors.\nRecords of cyber security training.\nThe inspector should not request to review any of the documents and records above considered to be confidential.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for cyber risk management that:\no Identified the roles and responsibilities of users, key personnel, and management both ashore and\non board.\no Identified the IT and OT systems at risk on board.\no Described technical protection measures to protect against a cyber incident.\no Described procedural protection measures to protect against a cyber incident.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for cyber risk management.\nA space containing sensitive IT or OT control equipment was not securely locked.\nThere was no inventory/register of sensitive IT/OT systems fitted on board.\nPhysical access to sensitive user equipment (such as exposed USB ports on bridge systems) was not\nsecured or disabled.\nCompany procedures did not designate who on board should have an administrator profile and/or who\nshould manage user profiles.\nBack-up facilities were not available or not used.\nOfficers were not familiar with the back-up arrangements for OT systems critical to navigation and\npropulsion.\nThere was no evidence of formal approval for a technician observed on board to access sensitive equipment\nsuch as ECDIS etc.\nThere was no evidence that portable media observed in use had been checked for malware etc. in a\ncomputer not connected to the ship’s control network.\nIt was reported that:\no On-board computers were not protected by anti-virus software.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• o\no\no\no\no\no\nAnti-virus software had not been regularly updated.\nApplication software had not been regularly updated with upgrades and security patches.\nA crew member other than a senior officer had an administrator profile.\nUser profiles allowed computer workstations to be used for other than their intended purpose.\nUser profiles were not actively managed.\nGeneric user profiles and passwords were passed on at crew changes.\nThe accompanying officer had not received cyber security training as appropriate to their responsibilities and\nduties.\nUser names and passwords were posted at workstations.\nIt was observed that passwords were not required to access workstations.\nThere was no evidence that cyber security awareness was actively promoted on board.\nThere were no cyber contingency plans addressing the loss of:\no Function or reliability of navigational equipment e.g., ECDIS.\no Availability or integrity of external data sources such as GNSS.\no Connectivity with the shore including GMDSS communications.\no Control systems for critical systems such as propulsion, steering etc.\nThere were no hard copies of cyber contingency plans.\nContact details were not readily available for technical support from the operator’s IT department or external\nIT contractors as appropriate.", "s": "Part 1 (Ch.1-7)" }, { "id": "8.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of", "c": "the inert gas system, and had the inert gas system been used in accordance with ISGOTT\nguidance, with cargo tanks maintained in an inert condition at all times, except when it\nwas necessary to be gas-free for entry?\nShort Question Text\nInert gas system usage on oil tankers.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nOCIMF: Inert Gas Systems. The use of inert gas for the carriage of flammable oil cargoes\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas system is used in accordance with ISGOTT guidance, and cargo tanks are always\nmaintained in an inert condition, except when it is necessary to be gas-free for entry.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Inert Gas Systems. The use of inert gas for the carriage of flammable oil cargoes\n4. Guidance for the use of inert gas systems on oil tankers\nAll vessels fitted with an inert gas system should maintain it fully functional, use it in accordance with ISGOTT\nguidance, and maintain cargo tanks in an inert condition at all times, except when it is necessary to be gas-free for\nentry.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.3 Composition and quality of inert gas\nSOLAS requires IG systems to deliver IG with an oxygen content in the IG main of not more than 5% by volume at\nany required rate of flow\nSOLAS also requires that IG systems keep positive pressure in the cargo tanks and that they have an oxygen content\nof not more than 8% (except when it is necessary for the tank to be gas free).\n11.1.5.1 Inert gas operations\nTankers using an IG system should maintain their cargo tanks in a non-flammable condition at all times:\n• •\n• Tanks should be kept in an inert condition at all times, except when it is necessary for them to be gas free\nfor inspection work, i.e. the oxygen content should be not more than 8% by volume and the atmosphere\nshould be maintained at positive pressure.\nThe atmosphere within the tank should transition from an inert condition to a gas free condition without\npassing through the flammable condition. In practice, this means that before any tank is gas freed it should\nbe purged with IG until the hydrocarbon content of the tank atmosphere is below the critical dilution line.\nWhen an oil tanker is in a gas free condition before arrival at a loading port, the tanks should be inerted\nbefore loading.\n11.1.6.1 Inerting empty tanks\nWhen all tanks have been inerted, they should be kept common with the IG main and the system pressurised with a\nminimum positive pressure of at least 100mm Water Gauge (WG). If individual tanks have to be separated from a\ncommon line, e.g. for product integrity, the tanks should have an alternative means of maintaining an IG blanket.\n11.1.9.2 Carrying products with a flashpoint above 60 degrees C\nTankers may carry petroleum products that have a flashpoint above 60 degrees C, e.g. lubricating oils, heavy fuel\noils, diesel fuels, etc., without needing an IG system fitted or, if fitted, without having to keep the tanks inerted.\nHowever, when cargoes with a flashpoint above 60 degrees C are carried at a cargo temperature higher than their\nflashpoint less 10 degrees C, e.g. some residual fuel oils, the tanks should be inert because they could become\nflammable.\nIf IG systems are fitted the cargo tanks should be inerted where there is a possibility that the ullage space\natmosphere may become flammable.\nWhen a non-volatile cargo is carried in a tank that has not been gas freed, the tank should be inert.\nISGOTT Checks pre-arrival Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 1B. Tanker: checks pre-arrival if using an inert gas system\nISGOTT Checks pre-transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 7A. Tanker: general checks pre-transfer (item 86)\nISGOTT Checks during transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 8. Tanker: repetitive checks during and after transfer (Items 8, 9, 11, and 86)\n11.1.11 Inert Gas system failure\nSOLAS requires that each ship fitted with an IG system has detailed instruction manuals covering operations, safety\nand maintenance requirements and occupational health hazards, The International Code for Fire Safety Systems\n(FSS Code) states, ‘The manual shall include guidance on procedures to be followed in the event of a fault or failure\nof the IG system’.\n11.1.11.1 Action to be taken should the Inert Gas system fail\nIf the IG system fails to deliver the required quality and quantity of IG, or to maintain a positive pressure in the cargo\ntanks and slop tanks, action must be taken immediately to prevent any air going into the tanks. All cargo and/or\nballast discharge from inerted tanks must be stopped, the IG deck isolating valve closed, the vent valve between it\nand the gas pressure regulating valve opened and immediate action taken to repair the IG system.\nNational and local regulations may require the failure of an IG system to be reported to the harbour authority, terminal\noperator and to the port and flag state administrations.\nSection 12.8.3.1 gives guidance on special precautions to take if the IG system fails when loading static accumulator\noils into inerted tanks.\n11.1.11.2 Follow-up action on crude oil tankers\nPyrophoric iron sulphide deposits (pyrophors, see section 1.5.3) may be present in the cargo tanks of crude oil\ntankers. If a tanker is carrying crude oil, the failed IG system must be repaired and restarted, or another source of IG\nprovided before discharge from inerted tanks is resumed.\n11.1.11.3 Follow-up action on product tankers\nTank coatings usually inhibit the formation of pyrophors in the cargo tanks of product tankers. If it is impracticable to\nrepair the IG system, discharge may be resumed with the written agreement of all interested parties, as long as an\nexternal source of IG is provided, or detailed procedures are established to ensure the safety. The following\nprecautions should be taken:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nConsult the manual referred to in section 11.1.11.\nEnsure that devices to prevent the passage of flame, or flame screens (as appropriate), are in place and\ncheck they are in a satisfactory condition.\nOpen the valves on the vent mast riser.\nPermit no free fall of water or slops.\nIntroduce no dipping, ullaging, sampling or other equipment into the tank unless essential for the safety of\nthe operation. If it necessary for such equipment to be introduced into the tank, it should be done after at\nleast 30 minutes after the injection of IG has stopped. See action 11.1.6.8 for static electricity precautions\nrelating to IG, and section 12.8 for static electricity precautions when dipping, ullaging and sampling.\nEnsure that all metal components of any equipment to be introduced into the tank are securely electrically\nearthed. This restriction should be applied for at least five hours after the injection of IG has stopped.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Maintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system which\nincluded:\n• •\n• •\n• Inerting empty cargo tanks.\nOperation during discharge, de-ballasting, COW and tank cleaning.\nPurging tanks before gas freeing.\nTopping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation of the inert gas system.\nVerify the oxygen content of inert gas being supplied to the cargo tanks was not more than 5% by volume.\nVerify that the inert gas pressure in the cargo tanks/inert gas main had been maintained within the range of\nvalues identified within the cargo and ballast transfer plan throughout the discharge operation.\nWhere permitted, request the accompanying officer to measure the oxygen content in a randomly chosen\ncargo tank to verify that the oxygen content was less than 8% by volume.\nReview a sample of records for cargo, tank cleaning or gas-freeing operations from the previous three\nmonths and verify that the inert gas system had been used in accordance with the company procedures\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the procedures for the operation of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included:\no Inerting empty cargo tanks.\no Operation during discharge, de-ballasting, COW and tank cleaning.\no Purging tanks before gas freeing.\no Topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system.\nThe detailed instruction manuals for the inert gas system.\nCargo and inert gas records for the previous three months or three voyages whichever was greater.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system which included:\no Inerting empty cargo tanks.\no Operation during discharge, de-ballasting, COW and tank cleaning.\nPurging tanks before gas freeing.\nTopping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s\ninert gas system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert\ngas system.\nThe inert gas system was not in use at the time of the inspection, although its use was required by company\nprocedures and/or ISGOTT guidance.\nInerted cargo tanks were not being maintained at positive pressure of at least 100mm Water Gauge (WG).\nThe inert gas pressure in the cargo tanks/inert gas main had not been maintained within the range of values\nidentified within the cargo and ballast transfer plan throughout the discharge operation.\nInert gas was being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in the IG main of more than 5% by\nvolume.\nThe oxygen content of a randomly sampled cargo tank was more than 8% by volume.\nPeriodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo tanks.\nSampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records showed that the inert gas system had not been\nused in accordance with company procedures and/or ISGOTT guidance.\nRecords of the operation of the inert gas system were missing or incomplete.\no\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.1.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures and", "c": "international regulations for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of\ncrude oil washing operations (COW), and was the COW system in satisfactory condition\nand used in accordance with the company procedures for each COW operation?\nShort Question Text\nCrude Oil Washing operations (COW)\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO: Crude Oil Washing Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure crude oil washing operations are always planned, prepared, conducted and documented in\naccordance with international regulation and industry best practice.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.5 Crude Oil Washing (COW)\n12.5.4 Control of tank atmosphere\nThe oxygen content of the tank must not exceed 8% by volume, as described in section 11.1.6.9\n12.5.5 Precautions against leaks from the washing system\nBefore arriving in a port where it is intended to COW, the tank washing system should be pressure tested to normal\nworking pressure and examined for leaks.\nDuring COW, the system should be kept under constant observation so that any leak can be detected immediately,\nand action taken to deal with it.\n12.5.6 Avoiding oil and water mixtures\nMixtures of crude oil and water can produce an electrically charged mist during washing. The electrical potential of\nthese mixtures is higher than dry crude oil. The use of dry crude oil is therefore important. Before washing begins,\nany tank to be used as a source of crude oil for washing should be partly discharged at least by one metre of ullage\nto remove any water that has settled out during the voyage.\nFor the same reason, if the slop tank is to be used as a source of oil for washing, it should first be completely\ndischarged ashore and refilled with dry crude oil.\n12.5.7 Isolating the tank cleaning heater\nIf the tank washing water heater is fitted outside the engine room, it should be blanked off during COW to prevent any\ningress of oil.\n12.5.8 Supervision\nThe PIC (person in charge) of COW operations should be suitable qualified in accordance with the requirements laid\ndown by the tanker’s flag administration and any local port regulations.\nISGOTT Checks pre-transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 5A. Tanker and terminal: pre-transfer conference\nPart 7B. Tanker: checks pre-transfer if crude oil washing is planned\nIMO Crude Oil Washing Systems\nAppendix 1 List of changes when applying the Specifications to new crude oil tankers of 20,000 tons deadweight and\nabove (i.e. delivered after 1 June 1982).\n6.1 Tankage to be crude oil washed\n6.1.1 before departure on a ballast voyage:\n(a) approximately one quarter of the cargo tanks shall be crude oil washed for sludge control purpose on a rotational\nbasis in accordance with the procedures specified in the Operations and Equipment Manual. However, for these\npurposes, no tank need be crude oil washed more than once in every four months; and\n(b) if it is considered that additional ballast in a cargo tank or tanks may be required during the ballast voyage under\nthe conditions and provisions specified in regulation 18(3) of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, the tank or tanks which may\nbe used for this ballast shall be crude oil washed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Operations and\nEquipment Manual.\n6.6 Use and control of inert gas\nBefore each tank is crude oil washed, the oxygen level shall be determined at a point 1 m from the deck and at the\nmiddle region of the ullage space and neither of these determinations shall exceed 8% by volume.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• •\n• Roles and responsibilities.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nTank cleaning.\nRecord keeping.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nRegulation 33 - Crude oil washing requirements\n1 Every crude oil tanker of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and above delivered after 1 June 1982, as defined in regulation\n1.28.4, shall be fitted with a cargo tank cleaning system using crude oil washing. The Administration shall ensure that\nthe system fully complies with the requirements of this regulation within one year after the tanker was first engaged in\nthe trade of carrying crude oil or by the end of the third voyage carrying crude oil suitable for crude oil washing,\nwhichever occurs later.\nRegulation 35 - Crude oil washing operations\n1 Every oil tanker operating with crude oil washing systems shall be provided with an Operations and Equipment\nManual detailing the system and equipment and specifying operational procedures. Such a Manual shall be to the\nsatisfaction of the Administration and shall contain all the information set out in the specifications referred to in\nparagraph 2 of regulation 33 of this Annex. If an alteration affecting the crude oil washing system is made, the\nOperations and Equipment Manual shall be revised accordingly.\n3 Unless an oil tanker carries crude oil which is not suitable for crude oil washing, the oil tanker shall operate the\ncrude oil washing system in accordance with the Operations and Equipment Manual.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of\ncrude oil washing (COW) which included the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Roles, responsibilities and qualifications of those involved in COW operations.\nRequirement for crude oil washing of cargo tanks for:\no Sludge control purposes.\no Preparation for the carriage of ballast in a cargo tank or tanks.\nSuitability of crude oils for crude oil washing.\nUse of dry crude oil for washing.\nInspection and testing of COW equipment.\nPlanning of COW operations.\nTesting of cargo tank oxygen content prior to commencing COW in each tank.\nProvision and completion of COW checklists.\nMaintaining records of COW operations.\nThese procedures may refer to the Crude Oil Washing Operations and Equipment (COW) Manual.\nA record should be maintained of all COW operations, including the tanks washed, the number of machines used, the\ntime washing started and was completed, the washing pattern employed, the washing line pressure and the method\nemployed to ensure that the tanks were dry.\nThe oxygen content of each cargo tank to be crude oil washed should be tested with portable equipment not more\nthan 30 minutes prior to commencing COW in that tank and the results recorded in the appropriate COW records.\nThis question will be allocated to vessels where HVPQ question 9.15.20.1 is answered in the affirmative.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the:\no Company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil\nwashing.\no COW manual.\no Records and checklists for previous COW operations.\nWhere COW operations were planned or underway, review the:\no COW plan for the current operation.\no Completed COW checklists.\no Ship Shore Safety Check Lists (SSSCL).\no Records of the current COW operation.\no Bridge and/or Cargo Log Book\nInspect the crude oil washing system including the:\no Remote and local pressure gauges for the tank cleaning line.\no Tank cleaning line, including expansion joints and hydrant connections.\no Tank cleaning machines.\no Tank washing water heater, if fitted outside the engine room.\nWhere COW operations were planned or underway, interview the person in charge of crude oil washing\noperations to verify their familiarity with company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and\ndocumentation of COW operations.\nWhere no COW operations were planned or underway, interview the accompanying officer to verify their\nfamiliarity with company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of COW\noperations.\nWhere the vessel was not undertaking COW operations at the port of inspection, the inspector should:\n• •\nReview the records from the most recent COW operation.\nConduct the interview(s) based on the potential for an upcoming COW operation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing.\nThe COW manual.\nThe records and checklists for the current and previous COW operations.\nShip Shore Safety Check Lists (SSSCL).\nThe COW plan for the current operation.\nThe Bridge and/or Cargo Log Book.\nThe Oil Record Book Part II\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil\nwashing which included the:\no Roles, responsibilities and qualifications of those involved in COW operations.\no Requirement for crude oil washing of cargo tanks for:\n Sludge control purposes.\n Preparation for the carriage of ballast in a cargo tank or tanks.\no Suitability of crude oils for crude oil washing.\no Use of dry crude oil for washing.\no Inspection and testing of COW equipment.\no Planning of COW operations.\no Testing of cargo tank oxygen content prior to COW.\nCompletion of COW checklists.\nMaintaining records of COW operations.\nThe person in charge of crude oil washing operations at the time of inspection was not familiar with the\ncompany procedures for the planning, preparation, conduct and documentation of crude oil washing or the\ncontents of the COW manual.\nThe person in charge of crude oil washing operations at the time of inspection was not suitably qualified in\naccordance with company procedures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the planning, preparation,\nconduct and documentation of crude oil washing or the contents of the COW manual.\nThe vessel did not have an approved COW manual.\nAlterations had been made to the COW system, but the COW Manual had not been updated to reflect these\nchanges.\nThe oxygen content of a tank being crude oil washed was more than 8% by volume.\nThe oxygen content of each cargo tank being crude oil washed had not been tested with portable equipment\nwithin 30 minutes prior to commencement of COW and the result recorded in the appropriate COW records.\nRecords had not been maintained of all COW operations.\nCargo tanks had not been crude oil washed at the required frequency for sludge control purposes.\nThe crude oil washing cycles and washing durations used for COW operations were not in accordance with\nthe instructions in the COW manual.\nOne or more of the operational checklists in the COW manual had not been completed as required.\nThere was no evidence that, prior to arrival in port, the tank washing system had been pressure tested to\nnormal working pressure, examined for leaks and any leaks rectified.\nThere was a leak from the COW pipeline system during operation.\nA pressure gauge(s) on the tank cleaning line was missing, defective or inaccurate.\nThe pressure in the tank cleaning line was not as required by the COW manual.\nCOW machines were turning in tanks not being crude oil washed, indicating leaking valves to fixed tank\ncleaning machines.\nA cargo tank(s) had not been de-bottomed by at least one metre prior to being used as a source of crude oil\nfor washing.\nA slop tank had not been completely discharged ashore prior to being used as a source of crude oil for\nwashing. (A slop tank may be considered as a cargo tank if it had not contained slops since the previous\noccasion when it had been loaded with crude oil.)\nThe tank washing water heater had not been blanked off before crude oil washing.\nHydrants fitted to the crude oil washing line were not fitted with blanks or caps.\nThere was significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary repairs on the pipework or\ncomponents of the COW system.\nThe crude oil washing system was defective in any respect.\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhere the vessel had not conducted or was not planning to conduct COW operations during the inspection the\nquestion should be addressed based on the records from the previous COW operation.\nWhere no COW operations had taken place during the previous six months, a comment should be made in the\nprocess drop down indicating the last time COW operations were recorded as having taken place.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.1.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the isolation", "c": "of individual cargo tanks from the common venting system in accordance with SOLAS,\nand were these procedures being followed?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank isolation from venting system.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure there are no incidences of cargo tank over or under pressurisation as a result of the mishandling\nor failure of vapour or inert gas isolating valves.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.2.2.2 Causes of tank over pressurisation\nOver pressurisation usually occurs during ballasting, loading or internal transfer of cargo or ballast. It can be caused\nby one of the following:\n• •\nIncorrect setting of the tank’s vapour or IG isolating valve to the vapour line or IG line.\nFailure of an isolating valve to the vapour line or IG line.\n11.2.2.3 Tank over pressurisation – precautions and corrective actions\nThe best way to protect against over pressurisation is by following effective procedures:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA procedure to control the setting of the isolating valves on the vent lines. The procedure should include a\nmethod of recording the current position of the isolating valves and a method for preventing them from being\nincorrectly or casually operated.\nWhere isolating valves are fitted to the branch line of each tank, they should be provided with locking\narrangements that are under the control of the ship’s Responsible Officer.\nA method of recording the status of all valves in the cargo system and preventing them from being\nincorrectly or casually operated.\nSetting the valves in the correct position and making sure that they remain correctly set.\nRestricting the operation of the valves to authorised personnel only.\nRegular maintenance, pre-operational testing and operator awareness of isolating valves, P/V valves or\nhigh-velocity vents can guard against failure during operation.\n11.2.2.4 Tank under pressurisation – causes\nThe causes of under pressurisation are similar to those of over pressurisation.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Line and valve setting\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.3.2 Venting arrangements\n5.3.2.1 The venting arrangements in each cargo tank may be independent or combined with other cargo tanks and\nmay be incorporated into the inert gas piping.\n5.3.2.2 Where the arrangements are combined with other cargo tanks, either stop valves or other acceptable means\nshall be provided to isolate each cargo tank. Where stop valves are fitted, they shall be provided with locking\narrangements which shall be under the control of the responsible ship's officer. There shall be a clear visual indication\nof the operational status of the valves or other acceptable means. Where tanks have been isolated, it shall be\nensured that relevant isolating valves are opened before cargo loading or ballasting or discharging of those tanks is\ncommenced. Any isolation must continue to permit the flow caused by thermal variations in a cargo tank in\naccordance with regulation 11.6.1.1. For tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2017, any isolation shall also\ncontinue to permit the passage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo loading and\nballasting, or during discharging in accordance with regulation 11.6.1.2.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common\nventing system which included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMaintenance and pre-operational testing of isolating valves.\nChecking the operational status of isolating valves prior to commencing operations.\nLocking arrangements for isolating valves, under the control of the responsible officer.\nGuidance on personnel authorised to operate the isolating valves.\nProvision of clear visual indication of the operational status of the valves or other acceptable means of\nisolation.\nA method of recording the current position of the valves/means at the cargo control room/position.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo tanks from\nthe common venting system.\nSight the record or display of the current operational status of the isolating valves.\nDuring the course of the inspection, inspect the isolating valves and verify their operational status and\ncondition, including locking arrangements.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the isolation of\nindividual cargo tanks from the common venting system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common venting system.\nThe record or display of the current operational status of the isolating valves\nCargo operation logbooks\nRecords of checks, tests and maintenance of the isolating valves.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo tanks from the common venting\nsystem which included:\no Maintenance and pre-operational testing of isolating valves.\no Checking the operational status of isolating valves prior to commencing operations.\no Locking arrangements for isolating valves, under the control of the responsible officer.\no Guidance on personnel authorised to operate the isolating valves.\no Provision of clear visual indication of the operational status of the valves or other acceptable means\nof isolation.\no A method of recording the current position of the valves/means of isolation at the cargo control\nroom/position.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the isolation of individual cargo\ntanks from the common venting system.\nAn isolating valve was incorrectly set.\nThe operational status of an isolating valve was not in accordance with the record or display of current\nstatus.\nThere was no record or display of the current status of the isolating valves.\nThere was no locking arrangement for an isolating valve or valves.\nAn isolating valve was not locked in position.\nLocking arrangements for the isolating valves were not under the control of the responsible officer.\nThere were no records of maintenance or testing of isolating valves.\nThere were no records of pre-operational checks of isolating valves.\nThere was no clear visual indication of the operational status of an isolating valve or valves.\nOperation of isolating valves was not restricted to authorised personnel.\nAn isolating valve was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.1.4.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile\nproducts, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nOil cargo tank cleaning procedures.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nEI: HM50 Guidelines for the cleaning of tanks and lines for marine tank vessels carrying petroleum and refined\nproducts 5th edition\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that tank cleaning and gas freeing operations after the carriage of volatile products are always\ncarefully planned, conducted and documented.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n12.3.2 Tank washing risk management\nAll tank washing operations should be carefully planned and documented. The potential hazards of planned tank\nwashing operations should be systematically identified, and risk assessed. Appropriate preventative measures should\nbe put in place to reduce the risk to ALARP.\n12.3.3 Supervision and preparation\nSupervision\nA Responsible Officer should supervise all tank washing operations.\nBefore starting the operation, all the crew involved should be fully briefed by the Responsible Officer on the tank\nwashing plans and their roles and responsibilities.\n12.3.4 Tank atmospheres\n12.3.4.1 Inert\nThis is a condition where the tank atmosphere is known to be at its lowest risk of explosion by virtue of the\natmosphere being maintained at all times as non-flammable through the introduction of IG and the resultant reduction\nof the overall oxygen content in any part of any cargo tank to a level not exceeding 8% by volume while under a\npositive pressure.\nThe lowest risk comes from washing the tank in an inert atmosphere.\n12.3.4.2 Non-inert\nNon-inert cargo tanks should only be washed when a combination of measures control the flammability of the tank\natmosphere and sources of ignition.\n12.3.6.8 Special tank cleaning procedures\nSteaming\nSteaming may only be carried out in tanks that have either been inerted or water washed, and gas freed. Before\nsteaming, the concentration of flammable gas should not exceed 10% of the LFL. Precautions should be taken to\navoid the build-up of steam pressure within the tank.\nThe static electricity precautions in Chapter 3 should be strictly observed.\nUsing chemicals in wash water\nCertain tank cleaning chemicals may introduce a toxic or flammable hazard. Personnel should be made aware of the\nOEL of the product. Detector tubes are particularly useful for detecting the presence of specific gases and vapours in\ntanks. Tank cleaning chemicals that can produce a flammable atmosphere should only be used when the tank is\ninerted.\nUsing chemicals for local cleaning\nSome tank cleaning chemicals may be used to hand wipe bulkheads and blind spots, provided only a small amount is\nused and the personnel entering the tank observe all the requirements for entering an enclosed space.\nAn SDS for tank cleaning chemicals should be on board the ship before they are used. Its advice and precautions\nshould be followed.\n12.4 Gas freeing\n12.4.1 General\nGas freeing is generally one of the most hazardous tanker operation, whether for entry, hot work or cargo quality\ncontrol. The cargo vapours displaced during gas freeing are highly flammable so good planning and firm overall\ncontrol are essential. The extra risk from toxic petroleum gas cannot be overemphasised and should be impressed on\nall personnel concerned. All operations connected with gas freeing demand the greatest possible care. Regional and\nlocal regulations may prohibit the release of cargo vapours when in coastal or port areas.\n12.4.3 Procedures and precautions\nThe following recommendations apply generally to gas freeing:\n• •\n• A Responsible Officer should supervise all gas freeing operations.\nCheck all local, regional and national regulations on emissions of VOC or other limits.\nNotify all personnel on board that gas freeing is about to begin.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Tank cleaning\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning\noperations after the carriage of volatile products that address:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Tank washing and gas freeing plans.\nRisk assessment.\nRecord keeping requirements.\nTank washing procedures and arrangements.\nThe required atmosphere for tank washing.\nSpecial tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:\no Using chemicals in wash water.\no Using chemicals for local cleaning.\nManaging slops retained onboard after completion of tank washing.\nTank washing a slop tank on completion of slop discharge.\nPurging and gas freeing.\nFor all tank cleaning operations, the precautions set out in ISGOTT 12.3 Tank Cleaning must be strictly observed.\nProcedures may refer to industry guidance such as:\nEI: HM50 Guidelines for the cleaning of tanks and lines for marine tank vessels carrying petroleum and\nrefined products 5th edition\nThis question will be allocated to oil tankers with an inert gas system which will be determined by HVPQ 9.15.1\nanswered in the affirmative.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank\ncleaning operations after the carriage of volatile products.\nReview available tank cleaning plans, risk assessments, log books and records to verify compliance with\ncompany procedures.\nInterview the officer responsible for tank cleaning operations to verify their familiarity with company\nprocedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning after the carriage of volatile products.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning and gas freeing operations after\nthe carriage of volatile products.\nCompleted plans, risk assessments, log books and records for previous tank cleaning operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the\ncarriage of volatile products that addressed:\no Tank washing and gas freeing plans.\nRecord keeping requirements.\nRisk assessment.\nSupervision.\nPreparation.\nThe required atmosphere for tank washing.\nSpecial tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:\n Using chemicals in wash water.\n Using chemicals for local cleaning.\n Steaming.\no Purging and gas freeing.\nThe officer responsible for tank cleaning operations was not familiar with the company procedures for\nplanning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile products.\nTank washing and gas freeing plans and supporting records were not available for recent tank cleaning\noperations.\nRecords and interviews indicated that:\no Tank cleaning operations had not been carefully planned.\no A tank cleaning plan had not been followed.\no Tank cleaning, including after discharge of a slop tank, had been conducted without the use of inert\ngas.\no The potential hazards of planned tank washing operations had not been systematically identified\nand risk assessed, including the risks from any tank cleaning additives used.\no Appropriate preventative measures had not been put in place to reduce the identified risks to\nALARP.\no Tank cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with company procedures.\no Tank cleaning operations had not been supervised by a Responsible Officer.\no Officers and ratings involved in tank washing operations had not been briefed by the Responsible\nOfficer on their roles and responsibilities.\no Steam had been introduced into a tank that may have had a flammable atmosphere.\no\no\no\no\no\no\n• •\n• 8.2. Chemicals", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation of the inert gas system, and had the inert gas system been used in accordance\nwith these procedures, industry guidance, and SOLAS and IBC regulations?\nShort Question Text\nChemical tanker inert gas system usage.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1501 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/16.3.3 for products requiring oxygendependent inhibitors\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas system is always used in accordance with industry guidance, SOLAS and IBC\nregulations and company procedures to prevent fire and explosion.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n4.5 Inert gas requirements for chemical carriers\nThe provision and use of an inert gas system is specified by the SOLAS Convention. To meet the SOLAS\nrequirements for non-flammability, an inert gas system must be capable of delivering inert gas with an oxygen content\nof not more than 5% by volume in the inert gas main at any required flow rate. The system must also be able to\nmaintain a positive pressure in the cargo tanks at all times, such that the tank atmosphere has an oxygen content of\nnot more than 8% by volume.\n5.13 Inert gas systems\n5.13.1 Introduction\nInert gas systems on board chemical tankers can be used to:\n• •\n• Prevent fire and explosion by maintaining the atmosphere in the tank below the LEL;\nPrevent a chemical reaction. The IBC Code specifies that certain products must be transported under an\ninert atmosphere; and\nMaintain cargo quality.\n5.13.2 Oxygen content\nSOLAS regulations require an inert atmosphere to be maintained with a maximum oxygen content of 8%, although\nsome chemical cargoes will need a lower oxygen content to be maintained.\n6.8.5 Maintaining an inert atmosphere during the voyage\nA positive pressure of inert gas should be maintained in the ullage space of an inerted cargo tank at all times in order\nto prevent air from entering. If the pressure falls below the set level of the low-pressure alarm, action should be taken\nto repressurise the tank with inert gas. Pressure loss is normally associated with falling air and sea temperatures. The\noxygen level in the ullage space should also be monitored regularly to ensure that it remains below 8%.\n7.4.1 Inerting definitions\nInerting\nInerting is the displacement of air from a previously clean and gas free tank to create an inert atmosphere within the\ntank. Inerting ensures the tank atmosphere is incapable of supporting combustion by reducing the oxygen content.\nInerting with nitrogen is also carried out to reduce the moisture content of the tank atmosphere for cargo compatibility\nand quality control reasons.\nPadding\nPadding means filling and maintaining the cargo tank and associated piping system with an inert gas, or other gas,\nvapour or liquid, in order to separate the cargo from air.\nPurging\nIMO defines purging as the introduction of inert gas into a tank which is already in an inert condition with the object of\nfurther reducing the oxygen content; and/or reducing the existing hydrocarbon or other flammable vapour content to a\nlevel below which combustion cannot be supported if air is subsequently introduced into the tank.\nPurging utilises inert gas to reduce the concentration of hydrocarbon or other flammable vapours in the cargo tanks to\nless than 2% by volume.\nThe term purging is also used in the chemical tanker industry to describe the process of replacing the tank\natmosphere in order to reduce oxygen content or dewpoint.\n7.4.3 Inerting tanks containing cargo\nWhen SOLAS requirements require tanks containing cargo to be inerted before discharge (see section 4.5), inert gas\nshould be introduced into the tank through the distribution system while venting vapours in the tank to atmosphere.\nThis operation should continue until the oxygen content is at or below 8% by volume.\nIt should be noted that the vapours vented during the inerting process may be both flammable and toxic.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.9.2 Carrying products with a flashpoint above 60 degrees C\nTankers may carry petroleum products that have a flashpoint above 60 degrees C, e.g. lubricating oils, heavy fuel\noils, diesel fuels, etc., without needing an IG system fitted or, if fitted, without having to keep the tanks inerted.\nHowever, when cargoes with a flashpoint above 60 degrees C are carried at a cargo temperature higher than their\nflashpoint less 10 degrees C, e.g. some residual fuel oils, the tanks should be inert because they could become\nflammable.\n11.1.11 Inert Gas system failure\nSOLAS requires that each ship fitted with an IG system has detailed instruction manuals covering operations, safety\nand maintenance requirements and occupational health hazards. The International Code for Fire Safety Systems\n(FSS Code) states, ‘The manual shall include guidance on procedures to be followed in the event of a fault or failure\nof the IG system’.\n11.1.11.1 Action to be taken should the Inert Gas system fail\nIf the IG system fails to deliver the required quality and quantity of IG, or to maintain a positive pressure in the cargo\ntanks and slop tanks, action must be taken immediately to prevent any air going into the tanks. All cargo and/or\nballast discharge from inerted tanks must be stopped, the IG deck isolating valve closed, the vent valve between it\nand the gas pressure regulating valve opened and immediate action taken to repair the IG system.\nNational and local regulations may require the failure of an IG system to be reported to the harbour authority, terminal\noperator and to the port and flag state administrations.\nSection 12.8.3.1 gives guidance on special precautions to take if the IG system fails when loading static accumulator\noils into inerted tanks.\n11.1.11.3 Follow-up action on product tankers\nTank coatings usually inhibit the formation of pyrophors in the cargo tanks of product tankers. If it is impracticable to\nrepair the IG system, discharge may be resumed with the written agreement of all interested parties, as long as an\nexternal source of IG is provided, or detailed procedures are established to ensure the safety. The following\nprecautions should be taken:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nConsult the manual referred to in section 11.1.11.\nEnsure that devices to prevent the passage of flame, or flame screens (as appropriate), are in place and\ncheck they are in a satisfactory condition.\nOpen the valves on the vent mast riser.\nPermit no free fall of water or slops.\nIntroduce no dipping, ullaging, sampling or other equipment into the tank unless essential for the safety of\nthe operation. If it necessary for such equipment to be introduced into the tank, it should be done after at\nleast 30 minutes after the injection of IG has stopped. See action 11.1.6.8 for static electricity precautions\nrelating to IG, and section 12.8 for static electricity precautions when dipping, ullaging and sampling.\nEnsure that all metal components of any equipment to be introduced into the tank are securely electrically\nearthed. This restriction should be applied for at least five hours after the injection of IG has stopped.\nISGOTT Checks pre-arrival Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 1B. Tanker: checks pre-arrival if using an inert gas system\nISGOTT Checks pre-transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 7A. Tanker: general checks pre-transfer\nISGOTT Checks during transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 8. Tanker: repetitive checks during and after transfer\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Maintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 16\n3.3.1 The inert gas system for tankers required in accordance with regulation 4.5.5.1 shall be operated as to render\nand maintain the atmosphere of the cargo tanks non-flammable, except when such tanks are required to be gas free.\n3.3.2 Notwithstanding the above, for chemical tankers, the application of inert gas may take place after the cargo tank\nhas been loaded, but before commencement of unloading and shall continue to be applied until that cargo tank has\nbeen purged of all flammable vapours before gas-freeing. Only nitrogen is acceptable as inert gas under this\nprovision.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1501 Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/16.3.3 for products requiring oxygendependent inhibitors\nWhen a product containing an oxygen-dependent inhibitor is carried on a ship for which inerting is required under\nSOLAS chapter II-2, the inert gas system shall be operated as required to maintain the oxygen level in the vapour\nspace of the tank at or above the minimum level of oxygen required under paragraph 15.13 of the IBC Code and as\nspecified in the Certificate of Protection.\nIMO: IBC Code\n15.13.5 When a product containing an oxygen-dependent inhibitor is to be carried:\n1. in a ship for which inerting is required under SOLAS regulation II 2/4.5.5, as amended, the application of inert gas\nshall not take place before loading or during the voyage but shall be applied before commencement of unloading.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system which\nincluded:\n• •\n• Inerting empty cargo tanks.\nPadding\nInerting tanks before commencement of unloading.\n• •\n• •\nOperation during discharge and tank cleaning.\nPurging tanks before gas freeing.\nTopping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nChemical tankers built after 1 Jan 2016 and over 8000 dwt must be fitted with an inert gas system in compliance with\nthe current FSS Code and must use it in any tank when carrying a flammable cargo, chemical or petroleum.\nHowever, a flammable cargo may be loaded into a gas free tank and then inerted before commencement of\nunloading. In such cases, only nitrogen systems are acceptable.\nAlso, when carrying a product containing an oxygen-dependent inhibitor, the oxygen level in the vapour space should\nbe maintained at or above the minimum level required by the IBC and the cargo specification and the inert gas should\nnot be applied before the commencement of unloading.\nChemical tankers built before 1 Jan 2016 and over 20,000 dwt, and carrying flammable petroleum cargo, must be\nfitted with and utilise an inert gas system approved by their flag administration.\nThis inert gas system need not be used in any tank carrying flammable chemical cargoes provided the capacity of the\ntank is not more than 3000 m3, the individual nozzle capacity of the tank washing machines does not exceed 17.5\nm3/hr, and the total combined throughput of the machines in use at any one time does not exceed 110 m3/hr.\nThe means of providing inert gas as declared though HVPQ question 9.31.1 will be inserted in the inspection editor\nand the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation of the inert gas system.\nVerify the oxygen content of inert gas being supplied to the cargo tank(s) is not more than 5% by volume.\nVerify that the inert gas pressure in the cargo tanks/inert gas main had been maintained at the value\nidentified within the cargo and ballast transfer plan throughout the discharge operation.\nWhere permitted, request the accompanying officer to measure the oxygen content in a randomly chosen\ninerted cargo tank to verify that the oxygen content was less than 8% by volume.\nReview a sample of records for cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing operations from the previous three\nmonths and verify that the inert gas system has been used in accordance with the company procedures.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the procedures for the operation of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included:\no How to identify when the inert gas system must be used with each potential cargo and operation.\no Inerting empty cargo tanks.\no Inerting tanks before commencement of unloading.\no Operation during discharge and tank cleaning.\no Purging tanks before gas freeing.\no Topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system.\nThe detailed instruction manuals for the inert gas system.\nCargo and inert gas records for the previous three months or three voyages whichever was greater.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s inert gas system which included:\no Inerting empty cargo tanks.\no Inerting tanks before commencement of unloading.\no Operation during discharge and tank cleaning.\no Purging tanks before gas freeing.\no Topping up the pressure in the cargo tanks when necessary during other stages of the voyage.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert gas system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the vessel’s\ninert gas system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the inert\ngas system.\nThe inert gas system was not in use at the time of the inspection, although its use was required by industry\nguidance, SOLAS and IBC regulations and/or company procedures.\nInerted cargo tanks were not being maintained at positive pressure.\nInert gas was being delivered to the cargo tanks with an oxygen content in the IG main of more than 5% by\nvolume.\nThe oxygen content of a randomly chosen inerted cargo tank was more than 8% by volume.\nPeriodic checks had not been performed on the oxygen content of cargo tanks.\nSampling of cargo, tank cleaning and gas freeing records showed that:\no The inert gas system had not been used in accordance with industry guidance, SOLAS and IBC\nregulations and/or company procedures.\no When inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, inert gas had not been\nintroduced into the tank through the distribution system while venting vapours in the tank to\natmosphere.\no When inerting a loaded tank before commencement of unloading, the inerting operation had not\ncontinued until the oxygen content in the ullage space was at or below 8% by volume.\nRecords of the operation of the inert gas system and/or inerting of cargo tanks were missing or incomplete.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures that addressed", "c": "the carriage of inhibited cargoes, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nCarriage of inhibited chemical cargoes.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that inhibited cargoes are carried safely and in compliance with company procedures and the IBC\nCode.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n1.6.2 Unstable chemicals\nReaction characteristics\nUnstable chemicals can self-react without the need for another substance to trigger a reaction. Decomposition or\npolymerisation are the most typical reactions that can occur within unstable chemicals carried on board chemical\ntankers.\nChemicals that polymerise, such as styrene monomer and vinyl acetate monomer, have a unique property that allows\nindividual molecules to combine with each other to form long chain polymers. Most polymerisation reactions are\nexothermic and are characterised by an accelerating reaction rate until all the monomer molecules are consumed.\nPolymerisation is often initiated by high temperatures or by reaction with small amounts of impurities that act as a\ncatalyst. The most common impurities that create polymerisation are acid, alkalis and metals.\nPolymerisation of a monomer cargo presents the following dangers:\n• •\n• •\nThe generation of heat that accelerates the speed of the chemical reaction;\nThe rapid expansion of the product that causes over pressurisation of the cargo tank with a consequent\ndanger of rupture;\nThe rupture of the tank may lead to chemical reactions with other cargoes in adjacent tanks;\nWhile a monomer cargo may often be a light and volatile liquid in its stable form, the polymerisation process\nproduces heavier and more viscous liquids, or even solids, which may block the tank vents so that the\npressure inside the tank increases even further.\nInhibited cargoes\nUnder the IBC Code a certificate of protection must be provided for cargoes that are required to be inhibited during\nthe voyage. It is also a requirement of the Code that for such cargoes, unless a certificate of protection is supplied,\nthe cargo must be rejected and not loaded. An example of an appropriate certificate of protection is included in\nAppendix D.\nCargoes that have the potential to polymerise or otherwise be self-reactive will be provided with an inhibitor that stops\nthe reaction. These inhibitors are designed to be effective for a set duration at a specified temperature. It is therefore\nessential that the quantity of the inhibitor is sufficient for the expected temperature and duration of the planned\nvoyage and that there is an appropriate safety margin. If additional inhibitor is left on board for use during the voyage\nthe shipper or charterer should provide instructions on:\n• •\n• The quantity to add;\nHow to add it to the cargo, and\nHow it should be mixed with the cargo.\nAn elevated temperature can reduce the effectiveness of the inhibitor or reduce its effective life. It is therefore\nessential that heat sources are kept away, and that the temperature of the cargo is closely monitored on at least a\ndaily basis, or more frequently if recommended by the cargo manufacturer or shipper.\nAn increase in cargo temperature that is not related to ambient weather conditions or adjacent cargo temperatures\nmay be an early indication that polymerisation has started. In such instances appropriate counter measures as\nrecommended by the shipper or manufacturer are essential. Such measures may include the application of more\ninhibitor to the cargo or the cooling of adjacent structures. Should the increase in temperature be rapid then jettison of\nthe cargo may be the only option to avoid a serious incident.\nEffect of inert gas on inhibited chemicals\nInhibitors may require the presence of oxygen to be effective. This is usually obtained from oxygen dissolved within\nthe product itself. If the inhibitor is oxygen dependent, the minimum level of oxygen in the tank atmosphere must be\nstated on the certificate of protection.\nIf nitrogen is bubbled through an inhibited cargo (such as when compressed nitrogen is used to clear the cargo hose\nafter loading) the nitrogen introduced will deplete the oxygen dissolved in the liquid. Bubbling nitrogen through\ninhibited chemicals should therefore be avoided (see section 6.7.8). Should there be any doubt, additional advice\nshould be sought from the shipper.\nIBC Code requirements\nThe IBC Code requires the shipper to provide the ship with a number of critical safety instructions concerning\ninhibited cargoes. (See IBC Code extract below)\n6.7.8 Tank atmosphere control\nOxygen levels must be maintained at or above the minimum level required by oxygen-dependent inhibitors used with\ncertain self-reactive chemical cargoes (e.g. styrene and acrylonitrile). In such cases, the application of inert gas\nshould not start before loading or during the voyage but should be applied before the start of discharging in\ncompliance with the IBC Code. Using nitrogen during discharging and tank cleaning operations should also be strictly\ncontrolled to ensure the oxygen level is maintained within the appropriate limits. Similarly, bubbling nitrogen through\nthese products should be avoided, as this could drive oxygen out of the product; and\nMonitoring of the ullage space should be carried out at regular intervals during the voyage to ensure that the correct\natmosphere is being maintained.\n6.8.4 Inhibited cargoes\nSome cargoes are liable to self-react under certain conditions (see section 1.6 and Appendix D). The temperature of\ncargoes that may self-react should be monitored daily and recorded. Unexpected changes of temperature are an\nearly indicator of a possible self-reaction.\nThe following should be observed for these cargoes:\n• •\n• Daily temperature monitoring;\nIf the inhibitor is oxygen dependent, monitoring the vapour space for the correct level of oxygen; and\nMonitoring of adjacent temperatures.\nShould the temperature rise be higher than expected, taking into account the ambient conditions and the temperature\nof adjacent cargoes, this should be treated as an emergency with appropriate action being taken (see Chapter 10).\nA polymerising cargo will generate a lot of heat with a rapid rise in temperature and increase in pressure so the\nvessel should always have a contingency plan ready to jettison the cargo.\nWith inhibited cargoes, the precautions and limitations described in the certificate of protection should be carefully\nobserved. If control of the tank atmosphere is required, ullage spaces should be monitored regularly to ensure that\nthe correct atmosphere is being maintained.\nMost inhibitors are not volatile, so they do not vaporise with the cargo and are unlikely to be present in cargo vapours.\nPolymerisation may therefore occur where cargo vapours condense. Places where this can occur, such as inside\nvent valves and flame arresters, should be regularly inspected and any blockage by solid polymers promptly cleared.\nA cargo that contains an oxygen-dependent inhibitor should not be inerted below the minimum oxygen level required.\nThe certificate of protection should be consulted regarding the minimum content of oxygen.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 25 The Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 5b. Tanker and terminal: bulk liquid chemicals. Checks pre-transfer\nItem 61 Inhibition certificate received (if required) from manufacturer? Yes/No\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n15.13 Cargoes protected by additives\n15.13.1 Certain cargoes with a reference in column \"o\" in the table of chapter 17 by the nature of their chemical\nmake-up, tend, under certain conditions of temperature, exposure to air or contact with a catalyst, to undergo\npolymerization, decomposition, oxidation or other chemical changes. Mitigation of this tendency is carried out by\nintroducing small amounts of chemical additives into the liquid cargo or by controlling the cargo tank environment.\n15.13.2 Ships carrying these cargoes should be so designed as to eliminate from the cargo tanks and cargo handling\nsystem any material of construction or contaminants which could act as a catalyst or destroy the inhibitor.\n15.13.3 Care should be taken to ensure that these cargoes are sufficiently protected to prevent deleterious chemical\nchange at all times during the voyage. Ships carrying such cargoes should be provided with a certificate of protection\nfrom the manufacturer and kept during the voyage specifying:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nthe name and amount of additive present;\nwhether the additive is oxygen dependent and if so, the minimum level of oxygen required in the vapour\nspace of the tank for the inhibitor to be effective must be specified;\ndate additive was put in the product and duration of effectiveness;\nany temperature limitations qualifying the additives effective lifetime; and\nthe action to be taken should the length of voyage exceed the effective lifetime of the additives.\n15.13.4 Ships using the exclusion of air as the method of preventing oxidation of the cargo should comply with 9.1.3.\n15.13.5 When a product containing an oxygen-dependent inhibitor is carried:\n1.\n2.\nIn a ship for which inerting is required under SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.5, as amended, the application of\ninert gas shall not take place before loading or during the voyage but shall be applied before\ncommencement of unloading.\nIn a ship to which SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.5, as amended, does not apply, the product may be carried\nwithout inertion (in tanks of a size not greater than 3000 m3). If inertion is to be applied on such a ship, then\nthe application of inert gas shall not take place before loading or during the voyage, but shall be applied\nbefore commencement of unloading\n15.13.6 Venting systems should be of a design that eliminates blockage from polymer build-up. Venting equipment\nshould be of a type that can be checked periodically for adequacy of operation.\n15.13.7 Crystallization or solidification of cargoes normally carried in the molten state can lead to depletion of inhibitor\nin parts of the tank contents. Subsequent remelting can thus yield pockets of uninhibited liquid with the accompanying\nrisk of dangerous polymerization. To prevent this, care should be taken to ensure that at no time are such cargoes\nallowed to crystallize or solidify, either wholly or partially, in any part of the tank. Any required heating arrangements\nshould be such as to ensure that in no part of the tank does cargo become overheated to such an extent that any\ndangerous polymerization can be initiated. If the temperature from steam coils would induce overheating, an indirect\nlow-temperature heating system should be used.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes and include guidance\non:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Inhibited cargo certificates of protection.\nTemperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes and adjacent spaces.\nInerting of inhibited cargoes and monitoring of the oxygen level in the vapour space.\nPreventing a build-up of solid polymers in the venting system.\nThe use of compressed nitrogen to clear arms/hoses after loading.\nThe addition of extra inhibitor when provided on board.\nContingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, company procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nReview cargo operation log books and records, inhibited cargo certificates of protection and contingency\nplans in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation.\nDuring the course of the inspection, note if any parts of the venting system are blocked by solid polymers.\nInterview the responsible officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures that address the carriage\nof inhibited cargoes\nWhere the vessel had not carried any inhibited cargoes during the previous six months, make a comment in the\nProcess response tool noting the last occasion an inhibited cargo was carried. Focus on the balance of the human\nand procedural aspects of the guidance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nInhibited cargo certificates of protection.\nInert gas logs relevant to the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nBridge and Cargo Log Books.\nCargo tank temperature records relevant to the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nCargo load and discharge plans relevant to the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nContingency plans in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation of an inhibited cargo.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures that addressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes and included guidance\non:\no Inhibited cargo certificates of protection.\no Temperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes and adjacent spaces.\no Inerting of inhibited cargoes and monitoring of the oxygen level in the vapour space.\no Preventing a build-up of solid polymers in the venting system.\no The use of compressed nitrogen to clear arms/hoses after loading.\no The addition of extra inhibitor when provided on board.\no Contingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.\nThe responsible officer was not familiar with the company procedures that addressed the carriage of\ninhibited cargoes.\nThere was no certificate of protection on board for an inhibited cargo, in accordance with IBC 15.13.3.\nThe stated duration of effectiveness of the inhibitor had expired prior to discharge.\nTemperatures of an inhibited cargo had not been monitored during the voyage on at least a daily basis or as\nrecommended by the cargo manufacturer.\nTemperatures of spaces adjacent to inhibited cargoes had not been monitored on at least a daily basis.\nThe oxygen level in the vapour space of a cargo protected by an oxygen dependent inhibitor had not been\nmonitored.\nA cargo protected by an oxygen dependent inhibitor had been inerted before loading or during carriage.\nThere was no evidence that venting systems had been regularly inspected for the build-up of solid polymers,\ne.g. log book entries or standing orders.\nParts of the venting system were blocked by solid polymers.\nCompressed nitrogen had been used to clear the arms/hoses after loading a cargo with an oxygen\ndependent inhibitor.\nThere was no contingency plan in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation and a rapid rise in temperature of\nan inhibited cargo.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the information contained in the", "c": "Procedures and Arrangements Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Noxious\nLiquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code and the latest MEPC.2/Circular, and was this\ninformation readily available to the officers engaged in cargo planning and operations?\nShort Question Text\nProcedures and Arrangements Manual.\nVessel Types\nChemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: MEPC.2/Circ.25 Provisional categorization of liquid substances in accordance with MARPOL Annex II and the\nIBC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and officers have the necessary information readily available to them to plan and\nperform safe cargo operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n4.3.2 MARPOL Annex II – Prevention of pollution by noxious liquid substances\nDischarging cargoes and the disposal of residues after cleaning should be carried out in accordance with the ship’s\nProcedures and Arrangements (P&A) Manual. The P&A Manual describes how the ship’s pumping and stripping\nsystem is to be operated in order to ensure that tanks are effectively stripped in order to comply with MARPOL Annex\nII regulations.\nPermitted cargoes\nThe ship may only load cargoes that are included on the COF or an addendum to the COF. The shipper of the\nproduct is required to provide the ship with a full description of the cargo including its IBC Code shipping name. The\nship should refuse to accept a cargo if the full shipping name and description of the product are not provided.\nIMO: IBC Code\n16.2\nCargo information\n16.2.1 A copy of this Code or national regulations incorporating the provisions of the Code, shall be on board every\nship covered by this Code.\n16.2.2 Any cargo offered for bulk shipment shall be indicated in the shipping documents by the product name under\nwhich it is listed in chapter 17 or 18 of the Code or the latest edition of MEPC.2/Circ. or under which it has been\nprovisionally assessed. Where a cargo is a mixture, an analysis indicating the dangerous components contributing\nsignificantly to the total hazard of the product shall be provided, or a complete analysis if this is available. Such an\nanalysis shall be certified by the manufacturer or by an independent expert acceptable to the Administration.\nIMO: MEPC.2/Circ.25 Provisional categorization of liquid substances in accordance with MARPOL Annex II\nand the IBC Code\n(for example only, this Circular is reissued and renumbered on 1st December each year)\n3.2 The present circular incorporates the following amendments to the information set out in the previous circular (i.e.\nMEPC.2/Circ.24):\n1.\n2.\n3.\nany new products, trade-named mixtures, and cleaning additives that have been assessed by the ESPH\nWorking Group during the year;\namendments to existing product entries included in the product lists; and\nnew product entries covered by any new tripartite agreements communicated to the Organization since\nMEPC.2/Circ.24.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex II\nRegulation 14 Procedures and Arrangements Manual\n1.\n2.\nEvery ship certified to carry substances of category X, Y or Z shall have on board a Manual approved by the\nAdministration. The Manual shall have a standard format in compliance with appendix IV to this Annex. In\nthe case of a ship engaged in international voyages on which the language used is not English, French or\nSpanish, the text shall include a translation into one of these languages.\nThe main purpose of the Manual is to identify for the ship's officers the physical arrangements and all the\noperational procedures with respect to cargo handling, tank cleaning, slops handling and cargo tank\nballasting and deballasting which must be followed in order to comply with the requirements of this Annex.\nAppendix III\nForm of International Pollution Prevention certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk.\nThis is to certify:\n4. That the ship complies with the requirements of Annex II to MARPOL for the carriage in bulk of the following\nnoxious liquid substances, provided that all relevant provisions of Annex II are observed.\nNoxious liquid substances/Conditions of carriage (tank numbers etc.)/Pollution category\nList follows\nAppendix V\nAssessment of residue quantities in cargo tanks, pumps and associated piping\n1.2.1 The ability of the pumping system of a tank to comply with regulation 12.1, 12.2 or 12.3 is determined by\nperforming a test in accordance with the procedure set out in section 3 of this appendix. The quantity measured is\ntermed the “stripping quantity”. The stripping quantity of each tank shall be recorded in the ship’s (P&A) Manual.\nInspection Guidance\nThe information contained in the documents listed should be readily available to the officers engaged in cargo\nplanning and operations. The Master and officers should be familiar with the information they need to safely perform\ntheir duties, including:\nP&A Manual\n• The physical arrangements and all the operational procedures with respect to cargo handling, tank cleaning,\nslops handling and cargo tank ballasting and deballasting which must be followed in order to comply with the\nrequirements of MARPOL Annex II.\nCertificate of Fitness\n• List of permitted cargoes attached to the Certificate of Fitness. (It is not a requirement for the list of cargoes\nto be attached to the P & A Manual.)\nIBC Code\n• •\nChapter 17, Summary of minimum requirements.\nChapter 18, List of products to which the Code does not apply\nMEPC.2/Circular\n• Any new products, trade-named mixtures, and cleaning additives. (The Circular is issued on 1st December\neach year)\nThis question will be allocated to LPG carriers which have been issued with a Noxious Liquid Substances (NLS)\ncertificate\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, in either hard copy or digital format, the P&A Manual, the list of permitted cargoes, the IBC Code and\nthe latest edition available of the MEPC.2/Circular.\n• Interview the officer responsible for cargo planning and operations to verify their familiarity with the\ninformation contained in the Procedures and Arrangements Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of\nNoxious Liquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code and the latest MEPC.2/Circular.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the information contained in the P&A\nManual that relates to their duties.\n• Expected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nProcedures and Arrangements Manual.\nList of permitted cargoes.\nIBC Code.\nLatest edition available of the MEPC.2/Circular.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The officer responsible for cargo planning and operations was not familiar with the information contained in\nthe P&A Manual, Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk, the IBC Code\nand/or the latest MEPC.2/Circular.\nThe officer responsible for cargo planning and operations was not familiar with the “stripping quantities” for\neach cargo tank.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the information contained in the P&A Manual, as it related to\ntheir duties.\nThe P&A Manual was not readily available.\nOn a ship engaged in international voyages, the P&A Manual was not available in either English, French or\nSpanish.\nThe information contained in the IBC Code was not readily available.\nA copy of the list of permitted cargoes was not readily available.\nA copy of the MEPC.2/Circular was not readily available.\nThe MEPC.2/Circular available was not the latest edition.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.4.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile\nand/or toxic products, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nChemical tank cleaning procedures.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that tank cleaning and gas freeing operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products\nare always carefully planned, conducted and documented.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n12.3.2 Tank washing risk management\nAll tank washing operations should be carefully planned and documented. The potential hazards of planned tank\nwashing operations should be systematically identified, and risk assessed. Appropriate preventative measures should\nbe put in place to reduce the risk to ALARP.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n4.3.2 MARPOL Annex II – Prevention of pollution by noxious liquid substances\nIMO MEPC.2/Circular\nIMO publishes a list of current tripartite agreements on an annual basis in a document titled MEPC.2/Circular. The\ncircular also lists the tank cleaning agents that have been approved for use on board chemical tankers.\nThe latest version of this document should be kept on board the ship.\n8 Tank cleaning and gas freeing\n8.1 Introduction\nThe Master should ensure that the operation is supervised by a responsible officer and that all personnel involved\nfollow the correct procedures.\nThe tank cleaning process should ensure, whenever possible, that cargo, vapours or inert gas are not released onto\nthe deck area. It is critically important that every possible care is exercised during all operations connected with tank\ncleaning and gas freeing, and that the operations are carried out using the approved procedures and arrangements\nfor the ship.\n8.2 Procedures and Arrangements Manual\nAll ships certified to carry NLS in bulk must be provided with a P&A Manual, approved by the flag State. The P&A\nManual addresses the marine environmental aspects of removal and disposal of residues from cargo tanks and\ndescribes how to perform these operations.\nThe P&A Manual should be adhered to in all respects, including the performance of mandatory prewash requirements\nin accordance with MARPOL Annex II.\n8.3 Supervision and preparation\n8.3.1 Responsibility\nThe Master should ensure that all tank cleaning and gas freeing operations are appropriately planned, supervised\nand communicated to all involved.\n8.3.2 Tank cleaning plan\nA written tank cleaning plan should be prepared and made available to all personnel participating in the operation.\nAny significant deviation from the plan should be approved in writing by the Master or the responsible officer.\nThe written plan must be followed at all times and should cover:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe type of cargo to be cleaned from each tank, and its characteristics. The SDS should be available so that\npersonnel involved are familiar with the hazards.\nIf applicable, the type of cleaning additives and their hazards.\nThe major risks during cleaning including toxicity, flammability, corrosiveness, reactivity, and temperature as\nwell as the safety precautions to be taken.\nThe safety equipment and PPE to be available and ready for use throughout the operation and during\nconnecting and disconnecting of hoses at the cargo manifold.\nThe tanks to be cleaned, cleaning method, cleaning sequence and gas freeing arrangements.\nMonitoring the pumping of tank washings to ensure correct discharge/transfer.\nMARPOL requirements for the disposal of cargo residues and cleaning water (slops).\nSegregation of slops to avoid mixing different categories of product.\nNecessary actions required to keep the cargo deck area free from cargo vapours during tank washing and\ngas freeing operations, and\nThe management of hazards with the use of nitrogen.\n8.3.3 Pre-cleaning meeting\nBefore starting tank cleaning operations, the responsible officer should lead a review of the tank cleaning plan with all\ncrew members involved, especially those who will supervise operations. Crew members should be actively\nencouraged to contribute to the review of the plan, especially with regard to their role and any safety concerns they\nmay have.\n8.4 Cargo tank washing and cleaning\n8.4.3 Prevention of toxic exposure during tank cleaning\nCrew members should be protected from exposure to toxic vapours by ensuring that:\n• •\n• Where possible, tank cleaning is carried out under fully closed conditions.\nGas freeing operations comply with the IBC Code.\nAccess to cargo areas is restricted.\n• •\nThe ship’s ventilation is correctly set, and precautions are taken to monitor and prevent exposure in\nmachinery spaces, and\nAppropriate PPE is provided and worn.\n8.4.5 Tank washing in an inert atmosphere\nWashing with portable machines\nWhen using portable machines, it is not possible to ensure that an overpressure of inert gas is maintained in the tank.\nAir may be drawn into the tank increasing the oxygen content. The tank atmosphere should be considered to be noninert.\n8.5 Special cleaning methods\n8.5.3 Manual cleaning\nIt may be necessary for personnel to enter a tank to clean residues from a tank by manual cleaning. For particularly\ndifficult residues a chemical solvent or other cleaning agent may be required. This process may create additional\nrisks, such as increasing the toxicity or flammability of the tank atmosphere. The amount of chemical solvent or other\nagent used should therefore be the minimum required.\nThe operation should only proceed once all control measures are in place to ensure the safety and health of the crew\ninvolved.\n8.5.4 Use of tank cleaning additives\nTank cleaning additives used on a chemical tanker may be toxic and/or corrosive and/or flammable and/or static\naccumulating. When heated they may emit dangerous fumes. The precautions listed in 8.4.4 should be followed.\nPersonnel handling cleaning additives should wear PPE as recommended by the manufacturers.\nWhen a washing medium other than water is used to wash a tank, such as mineral oil or chlorinated solvent, its\ndischarge is controlled under the same provisions of MARPOL Annex I or Annex II applicable to the medium had it\nbeen carried as cargo. Tank washing procedures involving the use of such a medium must be set out in the P&A\nManual and be approved by the flag State.\nTank cleaning additives used on board have to be approved by IMO and an SDS must be provided. Annex 10 of the\nlatest MEPC.2/Circ contains a list of approved cleaning additives.\nCleaning additives that are not cargo should be carried and stored according to the requirements of the IMDG Code.\n8.5.5 Steaming\nSteam should never be introduced into a tank with an atmosphere which may be flammable.\nThe standard method for removing chlorides used deionised water. If steaming is required, the tank must be gas free.\n8.11 Gas freeing\n8.11.1 Safe procedures for gas freeing after tank cleaning and cleaning by ventilation\nGas freeing operations need to be carefully planned, taking into account expected vapours that may be flammable, or\ntoxic or corrosive.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Tank cleaning\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning\noperations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products that addressed:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.\nWritten tank washing and gas freeing plans.\nRecord keeping.\nRisk assessment.\nTank washing procedures and arrangements.\nThe required atmosphere for tank washing.\nManufacturer’s coating guidelines.\nSpecial tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:\no The use of washing media other than water.\no Recirculation washing.\no Using chemical additives in wash water.\no Using chemical solvents or other agents for local cleaning.\nGas freeing.\nThe vessel’s P&A Manual will form part of these procedures. Tank cleaning guidelines may be the operators own\nguidelines or a recognised professionally produced industry publication. Manufacturers' tank coating guidelines\nshould be available and consulted to ensure any temperature and other coating restrictions are not exceeded.\nFor all tank cleaning operations, the precautions set out in the ICS Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals), Chapter 8,\nTank Cleaning and Gas Freeing, must be strictly observed.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank\ncleaning operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products.\nReview available tank cleaning plans, risk assessments, log books and records to verify compliance with\ncompany procedures.\nObserve any tank cleaning operations taking place during the course of the inspection, including the\nperformance of mandatory prewash requirements in accordance with MARPOL Annex II.\nInterview the officer responsible for tank cleaning operations to verify their familiarity with company\nprocedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic\nproducts.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of\nvolatile and/or toxic products.\nP&A Manual\nCompleted written tank cleaning plans, risk assessments, log books and records for previous tank cleaning\noperations.\nTank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.\nManufacturers tank coating guidelines.\nCargo Record Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for planning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the\ncarriage of volatile and/or toxic products that addressed:\no Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.\no Written tank washing and gas freeing plans.\no Risk assessment.\no Tank washing procedures and arrangements.\no The required atmosphere for tank washing.\no Manufacturer’s coating guidelines.\no Special tank cleaning procedures including, where applicable:\n The use of washing media other than water.\n Recirculation washing.\n Using chemical additives in wash water.\n Using chemical solvents or other agents for local cleaning.\no Gas freeing.\nThe officer responsible for tank cleaning operations was not familiar with the company procedures for\nplanning and documenting cargo tank cleaning operations after the carriage of volatile and/or toxic products\nincluding:\no The relevant sections of the P&A Manual.\no Tank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes.\no Manufacturers' tank coating guidelines.\nTank cleaning guidelines for all expected cargoes were not available on board.\nManufacturers' tank coating guidelines were not available on board.\nThe latest version of MEPC.2/Circular listing approved tank cleaning agents was not available on board.\nRecords of written tank washing and gas freeing plans were not available for recent tank cleaning\noperations.\nWritten tank cleaning plans did not include:\no The type of cargo to be cleaned from each tank, and its characteristics. SDS should be available so\nthat personnel involved are familiar with the hazards.\no The major risks during cleaning including toxicity, flammability, corrosiveness, reactivity, and\ntemperature as well as the safety precautions to be taken.\no The safety equipment and PPE to be available and ready for use throughout the operation and\nduring connecting and disconnecting of hoses at the cargo manifold.\no The tanks to be cleaned, cleaning method, cleaning sequence and gas freeing arrangements.\no Monitoring the pumping of tank washings to ensure correct discharge/transfer.\no MARPOL requirements for the disposal of cargo residues and cleaning water (slops).\no Segregation of slops to avoid mixing different categories of product, and\no Necessary actions required to keep the cargo deck area free from cargo vapours during tank\nwashing and gas freeing operations.\nRecords and interviews indicated that:\no Tank cleaning plans had not been developed in accordance with the procedures and/or the P & A\nManual.\no Tank cleaning operations had not been documented in accordance with company procedures.\no Tank cleaning operations had not been conducted in accordance with the tank cleaning plan.\no Tank cleaning operations had not been supervised by a responsible officer.\no Officers and ratings involved in tank washing operations had not been briefed by the responsible\nofficer on their roles and responsibilities.\no When washing with portable machines, the tank atmosphere had not been treated as non-inert.\no Steam had been introduced into a tank that may have had a flammable atmosphere.\n• •\n• •\no Tank cleaning plans did not address the risks from tank cleaning additives used.\nCleaning additives that were not cargo were not stored according to the requirements of the IMDG Code.\nTank cleaning operations were taking place that were not in accordance with the written tank cleaning plan.\nTank cleaning operations were taking place that were not in accordance with company procedures and/or\nthe P&A Manual.\nA washing medium other than water had been used to wash a tank, such as mineral oil or chlorinated\nsolvent, but tank washing procedures involving the use of such a medium were not available in the P&A\nManual.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.5.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes during cargo stowage planning, and\nhad these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nChemical cargo compatibility charts.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo stowage is carefully planned to avoid the possibility of co-mingling of incompatible cargoes\nor their vapours.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n1.6.6 Incompatible Chemicals\nReaction characteristics\nCertain groups of chemicals react with those of other groups if they come in contact with each other. Such reactions\ncan be hazardous and result in the generation of toxic gases, heat, fire and explosion. A violent reaction can lead to\nan overflow and the possible rupture of a cargo tank.\nIBC Code requirements (see below)\nThe USCG Compatibility Chart\nSeveral authoritative bodies have divided chemical cargoes into groups, defining criteria for incompatibility between\nthem, and have published lists of incompatible cargoes. The most familiar is published by the United States Coast\nGuard (USCG) (CFR 46 part 150, Compatibility of Cargoes). The USCG considers a mixture of two chemicals to be\nhazardous (and the chemicals in question declared incompatible) when, under specified test conditions, the\ntemperature rise in the mixture exceeds 25°C or a gas is produced as a result of the reaction.\nWhether cargoes within a pair of groups are incompatible is indicated in a table known as the USCG compatibility\nchart.\nThe USCG compatibility chart assigns each bulk chemical cargo to one of 22 reactive groups and 14 cargo groups.\nReactive groups contain those chemicals which are most reactive, so that dangerous reactions can be identified\nbetween members of different reactive groups and between members of reactive groups and cargo groups.\nChemicals assigned to cargo groups are much less reactive and do not react dangerously together.\nTwo incompatible cargoes are not allowed to be stowed adjacent to each other. Caution must be exercised regarding\noverlapping tanks.\nWhile the USCG table gives general indications, the footnotes and data sheets for any two particular cargoes should\nalways be consulted because there are exceptions to the compatibility chart.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Cargo and ballast handling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n3.1 Cargo segregation\n3.1.3 Cargoes, residues of cargoes or mixtures containing cargoes, which react in a hazardous manner with other\ncargoes, residues or mixtures, shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nbe segregated from such other cargoes by means of a cofferdam, void space, cargo pump-room, pumproom, empty tank, or tank containing a mutually compatible cargo;\nhave separate pumping and piping systems which shall not pass through other cargo tanks containing such\ncargoes, unless encased in a tunnel; and\nhave separate tank venting systems.\n3.1.4 If cargo piping systems or cargo ventilation systems are to be separated, this separation may be achieved by\nthe use of design or operational methods. Operational methods shall not be used within a cargo tank and shall\nconsist of one of the following types:\n1.\n2.\nremoving spool-pieces or valves and blanking the pipe ends;\narrangement of two spectacle flanges in series, with provisions for detecting leakage into the pipe between\nthe two spectacle flanges.\nUSCG: 46 CFR Part 150 – Compatibility of Cargoes\n• •\nFigure 1 to Part 150 – Compatibility chart\nAppendix I to Part 150 – Exceptions to the chart\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for cargo stowage planning that included:\n• •\nIdentification of incompatible cargoes using recognised compatibility charts.\nMeans of segregation of incompatible cargoes.\nThese procedures may refer to:\n• •\n• Compatibility charts and appendices.\nP&A Manual.\nRelevant ship’s drawings showing acceptable segregation arrangements.\nThe cargo stowage plan should identify when care should be taken to avoid the co-mingling of non-compatible\ncargoes, which cargoes are involved, and the means of segregation. All areas where comingling is possible should\nbe considered, i.e. cargo tanks, slop tanks, common pipelines, drip trays, tank venting systems etc.\nIf the USCG compatibility chart is used, then reference to Appendix 1 (b) 'dangerously reactive exceptions to the\ncompatibility chart' must be made during preparation of the stowage plan and the latest updated information must be\non board.\nIf compatibility charts and supporting exception lists from commercial industry publications are used, care must be\ntaken to ensure that they provide the latest information.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible\ncargoes during cargo stowage planning.\nSight, and where necessary review, the compatibility chart in use and verify it contains the latest information.\nReview current and previous cargo stowage plans to verify compliance with company procedures.\nDuring the course of the inspection, sight any operational means of segregation identified in the cargo\nstowage plan such as spool pieces or spectacle flanges.\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo stowage planning to verify their familiarity with company\nprocedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes, and the contents and use of the\ncompatibility charts provided on board.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes during cargo stowage planning.\nCurrent and previous cargo stowage plans.\nCompatibility charts and appendices.\nP&A Manual.\nRelevant ship’s drawings showing acceptable segregation arrangements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for cargo stowage planning that included:\no Identification of incompatible cargoes using recognised compatibility charts.\no Means of segregation of incompatible cargoes, including ship specific arrangements.\nThe officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with company procedures for identifying\nand segregating incompatible cargoes.\nThe officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with the contents and use of the\ncompatibility charts provided on board.\nThere were no compatibility charts issued by a recognised authority available on board.\nThe compatibility charts provided on board did not contain the latest information available.\nThe chart table footnotes and the data sheets for two particular cargoes had not been consulted during\nstowage planning.\nTwo incompatible cargoes had been stowed adjacent to each other or in a configuration that did not provide\ndouble barrier separation.\nIncompatible cargoes had been stowed in tanks that shared a common venting system.\nTank cleaning had been carried out after carriage of two incompatible cargoes without identifying mitigations\nin the tank cleaning plan.\nOperational means of segregation were observed to be not as indicated in the cargo stowage plan.\nThe cargo stowage plan did not identify when care should be taken to avoid the co-mingling of noncompatible cargoes, which cargoes were involved, and the means of segregation.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.6.", "t": "Were there sufficient escape sets as required by the IBC Code for everyone on", "c": "board, and did the sets provide suitable respiratory and eye protection?\nShort Question Text\nEscape sets required by IBC Code.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Internal Accommodation, Interview - Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that everyone on board is provided with a suitable emergency escape set to exit a hazardous\natmosphere in case of an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n3.11.14 Emergency Escape Respiratory Protection\nShips certified for the carriage of certain cargoes listed in the IBC Code are required to be provided with respiratory\nand eye protection sufficient for every person on board for emergency escape.\nEscape sets, known as emergency escape breathing devices (EEBDs), provide a supply of air for at least 15 minutes.\nThis equipment is for emergency escape only and should not be used for any other purpose.\n3.11.17 Training\nPractical demonstrations and training in the use of all types of breathing apparatus on board should be carried out\nregularly to ensure that all personnel gain experience in their use. Familiarity gained through regular practice will lead\nto confidence in the use of the equipment. Only trained personnel who are confident and capable in the use of\nbreathing apparatus should use the equipment.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n10.13.3 Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nEEBDs are for emergency escape and should not be used as the primary means for entering spaces or\ncompartments with unsafe atmospheres.\nThe device can be of two types:\nCompressed Air Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nThis consists of an air cylinder, reducing valve, air hose, face mask or hood and a flame-retardant high visibility bag\nor jacket. It is normally a constant flow device, providing compressed air at a rate of approximately 40 litres per\nminute, giving a 10-15 minute duration, depending on the capacity of the cylinder. Compressed air EEBDs can\nnormally be recharged on board with a conventional SCBA compressor. The pressure gauge, supply valve and hood\nshould be checked before use.\nRe-breathing Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nThis normally consists of a robust watertight carrying case, compressed oxygen cylinder, breathing bag, mouthpiece\nand a flame-retardant hood. It is designed for single use. When the hood is placed over the user’s head and the set\nactivated, exhaled air is mixed with compressed oxygen inside the breathing bag to allow the wearer to breath\nnormally when escaping from a hazardous atmosphere.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Aromatic hydrocarbons.\nToxic cargoes.\nIncompatible cargoes.\nHigh vapour pressure cargoes.\nCargoes containing mercaptans and/or H2S.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n14.3 Emergency equipment\n14.3.1 Ships carrying cargoes for which ‘Yes’ is indicated in column ‘n’ of chapter 17, shall be provided with suitable\nrespiratory and eye protection sufficient for every person on board for emergency escape purposes, subject to the\nfollowing:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nfilter-type respiratory protection is unacceptable.\nself-contained breathing apparatus shall have at least a duration of service of 15 min.\nemergency escape respiratory protection shall not be used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes and\nshall be marked to that effect.\nInspection Guidance\nEscape Set in this context can be considered synonymous with Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD).\nThe vessel operator should have provided the emergency escape sets required by the IBC Code that:\n• •\n• Provide suitable respiratory and eye protection.\nHave a duration of at least 15 minutes.\nDo not use filter-type respiratory protection.\nAnd are:\n• •\n• •\nAvailable for every person on board.\nIn addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and machinery spaces.\nSuitably marked as not to be used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\nIncluded in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the onboard maintenance\nplan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs contained within the onboard maintenance\nplan.\nInspect two escape sets at random.\nInterview a rating to verify their familiarity with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape sets\nprovided.\nExpected Evidence\n• The inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs contained within the onboard maintenance plan\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThe escape sets provided:\no Did not have a design duration of at least 15 minutes.\no Were not included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the\nonboard maintenance plan.\no Used filter-type respiratory protection.\no Did not provide suitable eye protection.\no Were not suitably marked as not to be used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\no Were not in addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and\nmachinery spaces.\nAn escape set:\no Was not fully charged.\no Had not been inspected and maintained in accordance with the onboard maintenance plan.\no Had been used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\no Had been used as the primary means for entering spaces or compartments with unsafe\natmospheres.\nThere were insufficient escape sets for everyone on board at the time of the inspection, including any\ncontractors, supernumeraries, visitors etc.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape sets provided.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures relating to the", "c": "safety equipment required by the IBC Code, including SCBAs, and was the equipment in\nsatisfactory condition ready for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nSafety equipment required by the IBC Code.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the safety equipment required by the IBC Code is always ready for immediate use in the event of\nan emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n3.11.12 Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)\nSCBA should be stowed outside hazardous areas in places that are easily accessible and should be maintained\nready for immediate use. Air cylinders, including spares, should be kept fully charged and the adjusting straps kept\nslack so as to enable the SCBA to be quickly donned in an emergency.\nThe IBC Code specifies the number of SCBA sets that have to be provided on board each ship. Guidance may be\navailable from the administration on the use of SCBA including routine maximum personal daily use and required rest\nperiods.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Aromatic hydrocarbons.\nToxic cargoes.\nIncompatible cargoes.\nHigh vapour pressure cargoes.\nCargoes containing mercaptans and/or H2S.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n14.2 Safety equipment\n14.2.1 Ships carrying cargoes for which 15.12, 15.12.1 or 15.12.3 is listed in column ‘o’ in the table of chapter 17\nshall have on board sufficient but not less than three complete sets of safety equipment, each permitting personnel to\nenter a gas-filled compartment and perform work there for at least 20 min. Such equipment shall be in addition to that\nrequired by SOLAS regulation II-2/10.10.\n14.2.2 One complete set of safety equipment shall consist of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\none self-contained air-breathing apparatus (not using stored oxygen);\nprotective clothing, boots, gloves and tight-fitting goggles;\nfireproof lifeline with belt resistant to the cargoes carried; and\nexplosion-proof lamp.\n14.2.3 For the safety equipment required in 14.2.1, all ships shall carry either:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\none set of fully charged spare air bottles for each breathing apparatus;\na special air compressor suitable for the supply of high-pressure air of the required purity;\na charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare air bottles for the breathing apparatus; or\nfully charged spare air bottles with a total free air capacity of at least 6,000 l for each breathing apparatus on\nboard in excess of the requirements of SOLAS regulation II-2/10.10.\n14.2.4 A cargo pump-room on ships carrying cargoes which are subject to the requirements of 15.18 or cargoes for\nwhich in column ‘k’ in the table of chapter 17 toxic-vapour-detection equipment is required but is not available shall\nhave either:\n1.\n2.\na low-pressure line system with hose connections suitable for use with the breathing apparatus required by\n14.2.1. This system shall provide sufficient high-pressure air capacity to supply, through pressure-reduction\ndevices, enough low-pressure air to enable two men to work in a gas-dangerous space for at least 1 h\nwithout using the air bottles of the breathing apparatus. Means shall be provided for recharging the fixed air\nbottles and the breathing apparatus air bottles from a special air compressor suitable for the supply of highpressure air of the required purity; or\nan equivalent quantity of spare bottled air in lieu of the low-pressure airline.\n14.2.5 At least one set of safety equipment as required by 14.2.2 shall be kept in a suitable clearly marked locker in a\nreadily accessible place near the cargo pump-room. The other sets of safety equipment shall also be kept in suitable,\nclearly marked, easily accessible places.\n14.2.6 The breathing apparatus shall be inspected at least once a month by a responsible officer, and the inspection\nrecorded in the ship’s log-book. The equipment shall be inspected and tested by an expert at least once a year.\nInspection Guidance\nAn 'expert' in the context of this question may be a member of the crew provided that:\n• •\n• The crew member who conducted the annual maintenance had attended a manufacturer's training course\nfor the specific type of SCBA carried on board within the five years prior to the last service.\nThe specialist testing equipment required to complete the annual service in accordance with the\nmanufacturer's instructions was available on board at the time of the annual service.\nA copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the member of the crew who conducted the\nannual service was retained with the maintenance records.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required\nby the IBC Code, giving guidance on:\n• •\n• Stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment.\nInspection and testing of the SCBAs.\nNon-emergency use of the SCBAs, including routine maximum personal daily use and required rest periods.\nFor vessels carrying toxic cargoes, the safety equipment referred to above should provide full protection. The\nprotective suits themselves shall be capable of providing adequate protection against the product as indicated in the\nappropriate resistance table that is provided by the manufacturer, and fitted with integral gloves and boots. The\nresponsible officer should be aware of these limitations as they relate to the cargoes being carried. Such protective\nsuits are not required if the vessel does not carry toxic cargoes.\nIf required to be carried, the protective suits must be suitable for:\n• •\nAll chemicals listed on the certificate of fitness identified under column ‘o’ in the table of chapter 17 of the\nIBC code.\nUse in a flammable atmosphere.\nSome of these procedures may form part of the onboard maintenance plan.\nThis question will only be allocated where HVPQ question 9.33.3 has been answered as yes.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the use of the safety equipment, including\nSCBAs, required by the IBC Code.\nReview the records of inspection and testing of the SCBAs forming part of the safety equipment required by\nthe IBC.\nWhere the annual testing of the SCBA’s had been completed by an ‘expert’ member of the crew, review:\no The records of the last annual service and verify that a copy of the manufacturer's training course\ncertificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board was retained for the crewmember who\nperformed the service.\no The specialist equipment required by the manufacturer to conduct the annual servicing.\nInspect at least one set of safety equipment required by the IBC Code.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures for the use of the\nsafety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IBC Code.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the use of the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IBC Code.\nRecords of inspection and testing of the SCBAs forming part of the safety equipment required by the IBC.\nEvidence that the protective suits were suitable for:\no All chemicals listed on the certificate of fitness identified under column ‘o’ in the table of chapter 17\nof the IBC code.\no Use in a flammable atmosphere.\nWhere annual testing of the SCBAs had been conducted by an 'expert' member of the crew, a copy of the\nmanufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board for the crewmember\nwho performed the service.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IBC\nCode, giving guidance on:\no Stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment.\no Inspection and testing of the SCBAs.\no Non-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use and required rest\nperiods.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures relating to the safety equipment,\nincluding SCBAs, required by the IBC Code.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were less than three complete sets of safety equipment on board, in addition to those required by\nSOLAS regulation II-2/10.10 for fire-fighting purposes.\nA set of safety equipment did not contain:\no one self-contained air-breathing apparatus (not using stored oxygen).\no protective clothing, boots, gloves and tight-fitting goggles.\no fireproof lifeline with belt resistant to the cargoes carried.\no explosion-proof lamp.\nThe protective suits where not suitable for:\no All chemicals listed on the certificate of fitness identified under column ‘o’ in the table of chapter 17\nof the IBC code.\no Use in a flammable atmosphere.\nFor the safety equipment required by the IBC, the vessel was not equipped with either:\no One set of fully charged spare air bottles for each breathing apparatus,\no A special air compressor suitable for the supply of high-pressure air of the required purity,\no A charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare air bottles for the breathing apparatus;\nor\no fully charged spare air bottles with a total free air capacity of at least 6,000 l for each breathing\napparatus on board in excess of the requirements of SOLAS regulation II-2/10.10.\nThe sets of safety equipment were not stowed:\no Outside hazardous areas.\no In a suitable, clearly marked, easily accessible place.\nThe sets of safety equipment were not ready for immediate use because:\no Air cylinders, including spares, were not fully charged.\no Adjusting straps were not kept slack so as to enable the SCBAs to be donned quickly.\no Protective clothing, boots and gloves were not ready to be donned quickly.\nThe SCBA required by the IBC had not been:\no Inspected at least once a month by a responsible officer, and the inspection recorded in the ship’s\nlogbook.\no Inspected and tested by an expert within the last 12 months.\nWhere the SCBA required by the IBC code had been tested onboard by an ‘expert’ member of the crew:\no A copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on\nboard for the crewmember who performed the service was not available with the maintenance\nrecords.\no The specialist equipment required by the manufacturer to conduct the annual servicing was not\navailable onboard", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.2.8.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures addressing the", "c": "protective equipment required by the IBC Code, and was this equipment in satisfactory\ncondition and suitable for the products being handled?\nShort Question Text\nProtective equipment required by the IBC Code.\nVessel Types\nChemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Internal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure crew members are protected from exposure to hazardous conditions when engaged in cargo\noperations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n3.11 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)\n3.11.1 General\nPPE protects the wearer from exposure to hazardous working conditions by providing a barrier between the wearer\nand a hazardous environment. The effectiveness of that barrier will be lost if the PPE is incorrectly used or is the\nwrong type. It is therefore essential that the selection of PPE is based on a thorough assessment of the risks\ninvolved. To ensure consistency across their fleets and that crew members are adequately protected, companies\nshould identify and harmonise cargo-specific PPE for all products on board their ships.\n3.11.4 Toxic or corrosive substance protection\nThe crew should always wear adequate protective clothing when opening equipment that may contain toxic or\ncorrosive substances, e.g. when ullaging and sampling, connecting and disconnecting hoses, opening sighting ports,\nworking within the manifold area, entering pumprooms and tanks, investigating leaks and dealing with spillages on\ndeck.\n3.11.5 Chemical resistant clothing (protective suits)\nA protective suit should always be used when working in environments where there is a risk of accidental exposure to\nproducts or their vapours. There is a risk of exposure during operations at the ship’s manifold when connecting and\ndisconnecting hoses, during tank and line sampling, and tank cleaning.\nIf a protective suit has been contaminated with a hazardous product, it should first be washed or hosed down\nthoroughly before removal from the wearer. The protective suit should then be properly cleaned in accordance with\nthe manufacturer’s guidelines and dried prior to being stored in a ventilated space designed for the purpose.\n3.11.6 Types of chemical resistant clothing\nSDS and the company’s PPE matrix (see Appendix F) should provide advice on the correct type of protective suits\nand other associated PPE to use when exposure to a product is possible. Ideally, the protective suit should combine\nthe maximum level of protection with the greatest degree of comfort.\nVarious materials are used to manufacture chemical protective suits. Each material has different chemical resistant\nproperties. The manufacturer of a protective suit must provide a chemical resistance list to indicate for which\nchemicals a suit may be used for and which restrictions might apply. This list should be referred to prior to use.\nProtective clothing is referenced under European/ISO and US standards respectively. Up to date standards should be\nconsulted.\nProtection will only be as good as the weakest link and it is therefore important that gloves, boots and head gear,\nincluding face protection, offer the same degree of chemical resistance as the remainder of the clothing. Proper sizing\nof the clothing is essential since an incorrectly fitting suit can mean the expected level of protection will not be met\nand may be uncomfortable.\nPersonnel using the protective suits should be properly trained for the type of suit they are using. Before moving into\nthe working area with type 1/level A and type 3/level B suits it is essential that a second properly trained person\ninspects the suit and confirms it is being properly worn.\nUse of a higher level of protection will generally also involve a higher level of exertion, especially in adverse climatic\nconditions. An assessment of the user’s fitness to wear a particular suit type should therefore be conducted. It is\nrecommended that companies issue guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a type 1/level A\nand type 3/level B protective suit.\nAt all times protective suits should be maintained as per the manufacturer’s instructions. Any defects must be\nrepaired, or the suits removed from service.\nWhen selecting appropriate chemical resistant clothing, the manufacturer’s instructions should be consulted to ensure\nthat the clothing provides the degree of protection specified as required in the product’s SDS.\n3.11.7 Eye protection\n• •\n• Chemical splash goggles give complete chemical and mechanical eye protection and can generally be worn\ncomfortably over most spectacles.\nChemical spray hoods, usually combined with a safety helmet, provide eye and face protection from\nsplashes of liquid and mechanical hazards, but not against vapour hazards. They should be worn when\ndisconnecting hoses at the manifold or during any other operation where there is a risk of being splashed or\nsprayed with product under pressure. Face shields are not suitable for this task as they do not offer full\ncoverage from liquid or vapour releases from below the level of the bottom of the shield; and\nSafety spectacles, with or without lateral protection (side shields), are available with different lens materials.\nSafety spectacles are not designed to be worn over normal spectacles. These are designed to protect the\neyes from dust and debris while chipping or carrying out similar tasks. These are not suitable eye protection\nin chemical environments.\n3.11.8 Hand protection\nThe cargo’s SDS should be consulted. The choice of glove will be dependent on the resistance of the glove’s material\nto the chemicals handled and whether the working conditions are continuous or intermittent. Gloves with long cuffs\nthat can extend over the sleeves of normal clothing are preferable.\n3.11.9 Foot protection\nRubber or PVC boots need to be worn when there is a risk of coming into contact with corrosive or toxic chemicals.\nBoots should have reinforced toe caps in order to provide protection against physical injuries.\n3.11.10 Cargo-specific PPE\nCompanies should ensure that product handling hazards are identified and managed. As such, companies should\nidentify cargo-specific PPE for all products or groups of products that are loaded on board its ships. The use of SDS\nand other available information must be part of the process. The selection of cargo-specific PPE should be based on\na risk assessment.\nPPE terminology should be standardised across all company documents.\nIf the cargo specific PPE matrix refers to general categorisation of products, such as corrosive, toxic, very toxic, etc.\nthe company should identify which products belong to each category.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Aromatic hydrocarbons.\nToxic cargoes.\nIncompatible cargoes.\nHigh vapour pressure cargoes.\nCargoes containing mercaptans and/or H2S.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n14.1 Protective equipment\n14.1.1 For the protection of crew members who are engaged in loading and discharging operations, the ship should\nhave on board suitable protective equipment consisting of large aprons, special gloves with long sleeves, suitable\nfootwear, coveralls of chemical-resistant material, and tight-fitting goggles or face shields or both. The protective\nclothing and equipment should cover all skin so that no part of the body is unprotected.\n14.1.2 Work clothes and protective equipment should be kept in easily accessible places and in special lockers. Such\nequipment should not be kept within accommodation spaces, with the exception of new, unused equipment and\nequipment which has not been used since undergoing a thorough cleaning process. The Administration may,\nhowever, approve storage rooms for such equipment within accommodation spaces if adequately segregated from\nliving spaces such as cabins, passageways, dining rooms, bathrooms, etc.\n14.1.3 Protective equipment should be used in any operation which may entail danger to personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC that\nincluded:\n• •\n• •\n• A list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and considering the\nproducts to be carried.\nWhat protective equipment is required to be worn for the different types of operations on board, and\nproducts handled, preferably in the form of a cargo-specific PPE matrix.\nCrew training in the correct use of the protective equipment.\nChecks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working area.\nAssessment of a user’s fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions.\n• •\n• •\nGuidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a Type 1/level A and Type 3/level B suit\nprotective suit, if applicable.\nHow protective equipment should be cleaned and stored.\nActions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment.\nFrequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, company procedures, including the cargo-specific PPE matrix where\nprovided, addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC Code.\nReview the records of inspections of the protective equipment.\nInspect a representative sample of the protective equipment in the storage location(s).\nObserve, where possible, protective equipment in use on deck.\nInterview the officer in charge of cargo operations to verify their familiarity with company procedures,\nincluding the cargo-specific PPE matrix where provided, addressing the protective equipment required by\nthe IBC Code.\nRequest a deck officer or rating to demonstrate or describe the selection and donning of a full set of\nprotective equipment including a protective suit.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures, including the cargo-specific PPE matrix where provided, addressing the protective\nequipment required by the IBC Code.\nRecords of inspections of the protective equipment.\nAn inventory or the protective equipment available onboard required by the IBC Code\nSDS for the products being handled.\nChemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.\nEvidence that protective suits were suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IBC that included:\no A list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and\nconsidering the products to be carried.\no What protective equipment was required to be worn for the different types of operations on board,\nand products handled, preferably in the form of a cargo-specific PPE matrix.\no Crew training in the correct use of the protective equipment.\no Checks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working\narea.\no Assessment of a user’s fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions.\no Guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a Type 1/level A and Type 3/level\nB suit protective suit, if applicable.\no How protective equipment should be cleaned and stored.\no Actions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment.\no Frequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.\nThe officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures addressing the\nprotective equipment required by the IBC Code.\nThe PPE matrix, where provided, was not cargo-specific.\nPPE terminology was not standardised across all company documents.\nA crew member was observed not wearing adequate protective clothing where there was a risk of accidental\nexposure to toxic or corrosive products or their vapours.\nA crew member was observed wearing protective clothing incorrectly where there was a risk of accidental\nexposure to toxic or corrosive products or their vapours.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nProtective equipment in use did not provide the degree of protection specified as being required in the SDS\nof a cargo being handled.\nFace shields were being worn when disconnecting hoses at the manifold or during any other operation\nwhere there was a risk of being splashed or sprayed with product under pressure.\nSafety spectacles were being used as eye protection in a chemical environment.\nProtective equipment was not stored in an easily accessible, ventilated space, designed for the purpose.\nProtective equipment in use was stored within the accommodation in an unauthorised space or spaces.\nItems of the protective equipment required by company procedures were not available on board.\nThere was no chemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.\nThere was no evidence that chemical suits were suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.\nAn item of protective equipment in use was in poor condition.\nGloves, boots and/or head gear were of inferior chemical resistance than the protective suits provided.\nProtective equipment was not available in a suitable quantity and range of sizes to fit the crew on board.\nA deck officer or rating was unfamiliar with the selection and donning of a full set of protective equipment\nincluding a protective suit.\n8.3. Oil and Chemical", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the", "c": "inert gas generator, and had the system been operated and maintained in accordance\nwith the manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nInert gas generator\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas generator always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design criteria.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.5.2 Inert Gas system maintenance\nThe deck and engine departments should cooperate closely to ensure the IG system is maintained and operated\nproperly.\nTo demonstrate that the IG plant is fully operational and in good working order, a record of inspection of the plant,\nincluding defects and their rectification, should be maintained on board.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n1.3.3 'Inert gas plant' means all equipment specially fitted to supply, cool, clean, pressurize, monitor and control\ndelivery of inert gas to cargo tank systems.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.3.1 System requirements\n2.3.1.1 Inert gas generators\n2.3.1.1.1 Two fuel oil pumps shall be fitted to the inert gas generator. Suitable fuel in sufficient quantity shall be\nprovided for the inert gas generators.\n2.3.1.1.2 The inert gas generators shall be located outside the cargo tank area. Spaces containing inert gas\ngenerators shall have no direct access to accommodation service or control station spaces but may be located in\nmachinery spaces. If they are not located in machinery spaces, such a compartment shall be separated by a gastight\nsteel bulkhead and/or deck from accommodation, service and control station spaces. Adequate positive-pressuretype mechanical ventilation shall be provided for such a compartment.\n2.3.1.2 Gas regulating valves\n2.3.1.2.1 A gas regulating valve shall be fitted in the inert gas main. This valve shall be automatically controlled to\nclose, as required in paragraph 2.2.2.2. It shall also be capable of automatically regulating the flow of inert gas to the\ncargo tanks unless means are provided to automatically control the inert gas flow rate.\n2.3.1.2.2 The gas regulating valve shall be located at the forward bulkhead of the forward most gas-safe space\nthrough which the inert gas main passes.\n2.3.1.3 Cooling and scrubbing arrangement\n2.3.1.3.1 Means shall be fitted which will effectively cool the volume of gas specified in paragraph 2.2.1.2 and remove\nsolids and sulphur combustion products. The cooling water arrangements shall be such that an adequate supply of\nwater will always be available without interfering with any essential services on the ship. Provision shall also be made\nfor an alternative supply of cooling water.\n2.3.1.3.2 Filters or equivalent devices shall be fitted to minimize the amount of water carried over to the inert gas\nblowers.\n2.3.1.4 Blowers\n2.3.1.4.1 At least two inert gas blowers shall be fitted and be capable of delivering to the cargo tanks at least the\nvolume of gas required by paragraph 2.2.1.2. For systems fitted with inert gas generators the Administration may\npermit only one blower if that system is capable of delivering the total volume of gas required by paragraph 2.2.1.2 to\nthe cargo tanks, provided that sufficient spares for the blower and its prime mover are carried on board to enable any\nfailure of the blower and its prime mover to be rectified by the ship's crew.\n2.3.1.4.2 Where inert gas generators are served by positive displacement blowers, a pressure relief device shall be\nprovided to prevent excess pressure being developed on the discharge side of the blower.\n2.3.1.4.3 When two blowers are provided, the total required capacity of the inert gas system shall be divided evenly\nbetween the two and in no case is one blower to have a capacity less than 1/3 of the total required.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included the:\n• •\nInert gas generator.\nGas regulating valve.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nThis question will only be allocated to a vessel fitted with an inert gas generator as its main inert gas system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the:\no Inert gas generator\no Gas regulating valve.\nInspect the inert gas plant and verify that:\no Where the inert gas systems and generator was contained in an enclosed room or space, safe\nentry procedures were posted at each entrance to the room.\no Each component of the inert gas system and generator was in good order and free of gas or liquid\nleaks.\no The inert gas pipelines and scrubber seawater lines were free of pinholes or temporary repairs.\no Blowers were free of excessive vibration.\no If only one blower was provided, there were sufficient spare parts available for the blower and\nprime mover.\no The actuators for the gas regulating valve and remote operated isolation valves were operating\nautomatically/remotely.\no Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were connected and indicating\nreasonable values.\no If the inert gas system and generator was not located in the machinery spaces, the compartment\nwas provided with adequate positive-pressure-type mechanical ventilation.\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas generator and\nsystem and verify that scheduled inspections and maintenance on the equipment had taken place.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing\nand maintenance of the inert gas system including the:\no Inert gas generator\no Gas regulating valve\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the inert gas system and\ninert gas generator.\nThe manufacturer's instruction and maintenance manual for the inert gas generator and inert gas system.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas generator and inert gas system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the:\no Inert gas generator\no Gas regulating valve\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance\nand testing of the vessel’s inert gas system.\nWhere the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, there were no safe entry procedures\nposted at each entrance to the room.\nThe records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant were missing or incomplete.\nThe gas regulating valve or remote controlled isolation valves were being operated on local control.\nLocal or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were disconnected or defective.\nThere were significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.\nBlower(s) were suffering excessive vibration.\nWhere only one blower was provided, there were insufficient spare parts available for the blower and prime\nmover.\nWhere the inert gas generator was not located in the machinery spaces the compartment was not provided\nwith adequate positive-pressure-type mechanical ventilation.\nThe inert gas plant was defective in any respect.\nWhere the entry procedures posted at the entrance(s) to the space or spaces containing the inert gas system were\nnot in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure in the SMS or, entry into a space containing the inert gas\nsystem was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make\nan observation under question 5.5.1.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the", "c": "nitrogen generator inert gas system, and had the system been operated and maintained\nin accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nNitrogen generator inert gas system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nEuropean Industrial Gases Association: Safe Installation And Operation Of PSA and Membrane Oxygen And\nNitrogen Generators\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the nitrogen generator inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design\ncriteria.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.5.2 Inert Gas system maintenance\nThe deck and engine departments should cooperate closely to ensure the IG system is maintained and operated\nproperly.\nTo demonstrate that the IG plant is fully operational and in good working order, a record of inspection of the plant,\nincluding defects and their rectification, should be maintained on board.\nEuropean Industrial Gases Association: Safe Installation and Operation of PSA and Membrane Oxygen and\nNitrogen Generators\n4.4 Oxygen hazards\nOxygen concentrations greater than 23.5% create greater fire hazards than normal air. Although it is not flammable,\noxygen vigorously accelerates combustion of flammable materials. Materials that do not burn in air, including fireresistant materials, can burn vigorously in an oxygen-enriched atmosphere. Although a source of ignition energy is\nalways necessary in combination with flammable materials and oxygen, control or elimination of flammables is a\nprecautionary step. Lubricating oils and other hydrocarbon materials can react violently with higher concentrations of\noxygen, and the combination shall be avoided.\nIt is important to note that the waste gas from nitrogen generators contains significantly greater than 23.5% oxygen\nand without appropriate venting can create an oxygen-enriched atmosphere.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.4 Requirements for nitrogen generator systems\nIn addition to the provisions in paragraph 2.2, for inert gas systems using nitrogen generators, the provisions of this\nsection shall apply.\n2.4.1 System requirements\n2.4.1.1 The system shall be provided with one or more compressors to generate enough positive pressure to be\ncapable of delivering the total volume of gas required by paragraph 2.2.1.2.\n2.4.1.2 A feed air treatment system shall be fitted to remove free water, particles and traces of oil from the\ncompressed air.\n2.4.1.3 The air compressor and nitrogen generator may be installed in the engine-room or in a separate\ncompartment. A separate compartment and any installed equipment shall be treated as an \"Other machinery space\"\nwith respect to fire protection. Where a separate compartment is provided for the nitrogen generator, the\ncompartment shall be fitted with an independent mechanical extraction ventilation system providing six air changes\nper hour. The compartment is to have no direct access to accommodation spaces, service spaces and control\nstations.\n2.4.1.4 Where a nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank is installed, it may be installed in a dedicated compartment, in a\nseparate compartment containing the air compressor and the generator, in the engine room, or in the cargo area.\nWhere the nitrogen receiver or a buffer tank is installed in an enclosed space, the access shall be arranged only from\nthe open deck and the access door shall open outwards. Adequate, independent mechanical ventilation, of the\nextraction type, shall be provided for such a compartment.\n2.4.2 Indicators and alarms\n2.4.2.1 In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.2.4.2, instrumentation is to be provided for continuously\nindicating the temperature and pressure of air at the suction side of the nitrogen generator.\n2.4.2.2 In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.2.4.5, audible and visual alarms shall be provided to include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nfailure of the electric heater, if fitted.\nlow feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor.\nhigh-air temperature; and\nhigh condensate level at automatic drain of water separator.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included the nitrogen generator and its associated equipment.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nIt is recommended a warning sign is posted at an appropriate place to warn of the dangers of the oxygen-enriched\nwaste gases from the nitrogen generator.\nIt is recommended that a warning sign is posted at each entrance to the space(s) containing the air compressor,\nnitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or buffer tank warning of the dangers of asphyxiation in a nitrogen enriched\natmosphere.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the nitrogen generator and its associated\nequipment.\nInspect the nitrogen generator and its associated equipment including, where fitted:\no Air and nitrogen compressor.\no Feed air treatment system.\no PSA or membrane nitrogen. generating units.\no Nitrogen receiver or buffer tank.\nVerify the following visual and audible alarms are in good order:\no Failure of the electric heater, if fitted.\no Low feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor.\no High-air temperature.\no High condensate level at the automatic drain of the water separator.\nWhere the air compressor and nitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or buffer tank are installed in a\ndedicated compartment, verify:\no That the independent mechanical extraction ventilation system is operating correctly.\no Safe entry procedures are posted at each entrance to the compartment.\no Warning signs are posted at each entrance to the space warning of the dangers of asphyxiation in\na nitrogen enriched atmosphere.\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system and\nverify that scheduled inspections and maintenance on the equipment had taken place.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing\nand maintenance of the inert gas system including the nitrogen generator and its associated equipment and\nthe dangers of:\no An oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage.\no An oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the inert gas system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction and maintenance manual for the nitrogen generator inert gas system.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the nitrogen generator and its associated equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance\nand testing of the vessel’s inert gas system including the nitrogen generator.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the dangers from:\no An oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage.\no The oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.\nThe record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, was\nmissing or incomplete.\nAny of the following visual and audible alarms was inoperative:\no Failure of the electric heater, if fitted.\no Low feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor.\no High-air temperature.\no High condensate level at the automatic drain of the water separator.\nThe independent mechanical extraction ventilation system serving a dedicated space containing the air\ncompressor and nitrogen generator or the nitrogen receiver or buffer tank was not operating correctly.\nWhere the air compressor and nitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or buffer tank were installed in a\ndedicated compartment, there were no safe entry procedures posted at each entrance to the compartment.\nThe nitrogen generator and its associated equipment was defective in any respect.\nWhere:\n• •\nThe entry procedures posted at the entrance of the space, or spaces, containing the air compressor,\nnitrogen generator and nitrogen receiver or buffer tank, were not in alignment with the enclosed space entry\nprocedure in the SMS or,\nEntry into a space or spaces containing the air compressor, nitrogen generator and nitrogen receiver or\nbuffer tank was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space entry\nprocedure.\nMake an appropriate observation under question 5.5.1.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the", "c": "flue gas inert gas system, and had the system been operated and maintained in\naccordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nFlue gas inert gas system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the flue gas inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design criteria.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.5.2 Inert Gas system maintenance\nThe deck and engine departments should cooperate closely to ensure the IG system is maintained and operated\nproperly.\nTo demonstrate that the IG plant is fully operational and in good working order, a record of inspection of the plant,\nincluding defects and their rectification, should be maintained on board.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n1.3.3 'Inert gas plant' means all equipment specially fitted to supply, cool, clean, pressurize, monitor and control\ndelivery of inert gas to cargo tank systems.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.3.1 System requirements\n2.3.1.2 Gas regulating valves\n2.3.1.2.1 A gas regulating valve shall be fitted in the inert gas main. This valve shall be automatically controlled to\nclose, as required in paragraph 2.2.2.2. It shall also be capable of automatically regulating the flow of inert gas to the\ncargo tanks unless means are provided to automatically control the inert gas flow rate.\n2.3.1.2.2 The gas regulating valve shall be located at the forward bulkhead of the forward most gas-safe space\nthrough which the inert gas main passes.\n2.3.1.3 Cooling and scrubbing arrangement\n2.3.1.3.1 Means shall be fitted which will effectively cool the volume of gas specified in paragraph 2.2.1.2 and remove\nsolids and sulphur combustion products. The cooling water arrangements shall be such that an adequate supply of\nwater will always be available without interfering with any essential services on the ship. Provision shall also be made\nfor an alternative supply of cooling water.\n2.3.1.3.2 Filters or equivalent devices shall be fitted to minimize the amount of water carried over to the inert gas\nblowers.\n2.3.1.4 Blowers\n2.3.1.4.1 At least two inert gas blowers shall be fitted and be capable of delivering to the cargo tanks at least the\nvolume of gas required by paragraph 2.2.1.2.\n2.3.1.4.3 When two blowers are provided, the total required capacity of the inert gas system shall be divided evenly\nbetween the two and in no case is one blower to have a capacity less than 1/3 of the total required.\n2.3.1.5 Inert gas isolating valves\nFor systems using flue gas, flue gas isolating valves shall be fitted in the inert gas mains between the boiler uptakes\nand the flue gas scrubber. These valves shall be provided with indicators to show whether they are open or shut, and\nprecautions shall be taken to maintain them gastight and keep the seatings clear of soot. Arrangements shall be\nmade to ensure that boiler soot blowers cannot be operated when the corresponding flue gas valve is open.\n2.3.1.6 Prevention of flue gas leakage\n2.3.1.6.1 Special consideration shall be given to the design and location of scrubber and blowers with relevant piping\nand fittings in order to prevent flue gas leakages into enclosed spaces.\n2.3.1.6.2 To permit safe maintenance, an additional water seal or other effective means of preventing flue gas\nleakage shall be fitted between the flue gas isolating valves and scrubber or incorporated in the gas entry to the\nscrubber.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included the:\n• •\n• •\n• Boiler uptake valves.\nScrubber.\nDemister.\nBlowers.\nGas regulating valve.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nThis question will only be allocated to a vessel with a flue gas system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the:\no Boiler uptake valves.\no Scrubber.\no Demister.\no Blowers.\no Gas regulating valve.\nInspect the inert gas plant located in the machinery spaces and verify that:\no Where the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, safe entry procedures were\nposted at each entrance to the room.\no Each component of the inert gas system was in good order and free of inert gas or liquid leaks.\no The inert gas pipelines and scrubber seawater lines were free of pinholes or temporary repairs.\no Blowers were free of excessive vibration.\no The actuators for the gas regulating valve and remote operated isolation valves were operating\nautomatically/remotely.\no Local or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were connected and indicating\nreasonable values\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system and\nverify that scheduled inspections and maintenance on the equipment had taken place.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing\nand maintenance of the inert gas system including the:\no Boiler uptake valves.\no Scrubber.\no Demister.\no\no\nBlowers.\nGas regulating valve.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the inert gas system.\nThe manufacturer's instruction and maintenance manual for the flue gas inert gas system.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the:\no Boiler uptake valves.\no Scrubber.\no Demister.\no Blowers.\no Gas regulating valve.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance\nand testing of the vessel’s inert gas system.\nWhere the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, there were no safe entry procedures\nposted at each entrance to the room.\nThe records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant was missing or incomplete.\nThe gas regulating valve or remote controlled isolation valves were being operated on local control.\nLocal or remote temperature or pressure sensing devices were disconnected or defective.\nThere were significant gas or liquid leaks from the inert gas plant.\nBlower(s) were suffering excessive vibration.\nThe inert gas plant was defective in any respect.\nWhere the entry procedures posted at the entrance(s) to the space or spaces containing the inert gas system were\nnot in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure in the SMS or, entry into a space containing the inert gas\nsystem was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make\nan observation under question 5.5.1.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarms,\nand were these alarm systems fully operational and properly set?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank high level and overfill alarms.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: IBC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarms are always fully operational, properly set and\nused during all cargo loading, discharging and transfer operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n46 CFR § 39.2007 - Tankship liquid overfill protection - T/ALL.\n(a) Each cargo tank of a tankship must be equipped with an intrinsically safe high-level alarm and a tank overfill\nalarm.\n(b) If installed after July 23, 1990, the high-level alarm and tank overfill alarm required by paragraph (a) of this section\nmust -\n• •\n• •\nBe independent of each other.\nActivate an alarm in the event of loss of power to the alarm system.\nActivate an alarm during the failure of electrical circuitry to the tank level sensor; and\nBe able to be verified at the tank for proper operation prior to each transfer. This procedure may be achieved\nwith the use of an electronic self-testing feature that monitors the condition of the alarm circuitry and sensor.\n(c) The high-level alarm required by paragraph (a) of this section must -\n• •\n• Activate an alarm once the cargo level reaches 95 percent of the tank capacity or higher, but before the tank\noverfill alarm.\nBe identified with the legend “High-level Alarm” in black letters at least 50.8 millimetres (2 inches) high on a\nwhite background; and\nActivate a visible and audible alarm so that it can be seen and heard on the vessel where cargo transfer is\ncontrolled.\n(d) The tank overfill alarm required by paragraph (a) of this section must -\n• Be independent of the cargo gauging system.\n• •\n• Be identified with the legend “TANK OVERFILL ALARM” in black letters at least 50.8 millimetres (2 inches)\nhigh on a white background.\nActivate a visible and audible alarm so that it can be seen and heard on the vessel where cargo transfer is\ncontrolled and in the cargo deck area; and\nActivate an alarm early enough to allow the person in charge of transfer operations to stop the cargo transfer\nbefore the tank overflows.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n5.3.5 Overfill detection systems\nHigh level alarms\nCarriage requirements for certain cargoes require tanks to be fitted with high level alarms that are independent of any\nalarms fitted to the closed gauging system. The alarm may be activated by either a float-operated switch, a capacitive\npressure transmitter, or an ultrasonic device. The activation point should be set to when the cargo is approaching the\nnormal full condition. Typically this limit will be set at 95%.\nTank overflow control systems (overflow alarms)\nTank overflow control systems should be set to alarm when the level in the tank reaches 98% of capacity.\nTesting Alarms\nAll high level and overflow alarms should be tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions to ensure\ncorrect operation prior to cargo operations. This will confirm that the alarms are working correctly and can be relied\nupon.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• •\nAlarms and trips.\nTank gauging equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n15.19 Overflow control\n15.19.1 The provisions of this section are applicable where specific reference is made in column “o” in the table of\nchapter 17 and are in addition to the requirements for gauging devices.\n15.19.2 In the event of a power failure on any system essential for safe loading, an alarm shall be given to the\noperators concerned.\n15.19.3 Loading operations shall be terminated at once in the event of any system essential for safe loading\nbecoming inoperative.\n15.19.4 Level alarms shall be capable of being tested prior to loading.\n15.19.5 The high-level alarm system required under 15.19.6 shall be independent of the overflow-control system\nrequired by 15.19.7 and shall be independent of the equipment required by 13.1 (gauging devices).\n15.19.6 Cargo tanks shall be fitted with a visual and audible high-level alarm which complies with 15.19.1 to 15.19.5\nand which indicates when the liquid level in the cargo tank approaches the normal full condition.\n15.19.7 A tank overflow-control system required by this section shall:\n• •\n• come into operation when the normal tank loading procedures fail to stop the tank liquid level exceeding the\nnormal full condition.\ngive a visual and audible tank-overflow alarm to the ship’s operator; and\nprovide an agreed signal for sequential shutdown of onshore pumps or valves or both and of the ship’s\nvalves. The signal, as well as the pump and valve shutdown, may be dependent on operator’s intervention.\nThe use of shipboard automatic closing valves shall be permitted only when specific approval has been\nobtained from the Administration and the Port State authority concerned.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 11\n6.3.1 Preventive measures against liquid rising in the venting system\nProvisions shall be made to guard against liquid rising in the venting system to a height which would exceed the\ndesign head of cargo tanks. This shall be accomplished by high-level alarms or overflow control systems or other\nequivalent means, together with independent gauging devices and cargo tank filling procedures. For the purposes of\nthis regulation, spill valves are not considered equivalent to an overflow system.\nInspection Guidance\nFor the purposes of this question, the term “high-high-level alarms” includes:\n• •\n• Overfill alarms\nOverflow alarms\nOverflow control systems\nIn oil ships, high-level alarms may be integral to the fixed gauging system, but not high-high alarms.\nIn chemical ships, both high-level and high-high-level alarms must be independent of the fixed gauging system, and\neach other.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank\nhigh-level and high-high-level alarm systems, including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe mandatory use of the alarms during all cargo tank loading, discharging and transfer operations.\nSet points for all alarms.\nTesting procedures and frequency.\nRecords of testing and maintenance to be kept.\nGuidance on the use of shipboard automatic closing valves, if fitted.\nProcedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer operations\nin the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or high-high-level alarm system or a single alarm for an\nindividual cargo tank.\nThe instruction within the planned maintenance system may form part of the procedures.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the\ncargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems.\nReview the records of testing and maintenance of the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm\nsystems.\nInspect the alarm indicator panels in the cargo control room or position and verify:\no The panel was switched on with all cargo tanks being monitored.\no The audible and visible alarms were operational.\nInspect the alarm equipment on deck including the audible and visible alarm fittings.\nIf safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer demonstrates the operation of the audible and visible\nalarms on the deck area by the test activation of a high-high-level alarm on a randomly selected cargo tank.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank high-level and\nhigh-high-level alarm systems.\no The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems or\nindividual tanks alarms may be isolated and the safeguards to ensure they were always in\noperation during cargo transfer operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank high-level and highhigh-level alarm systems.\nRecords of the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm\nsystems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level\nand high-high-level alarm systems.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and\nhigh-high-level alarm systems.\no The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and high-high-level alarm systems or\nindividual cargo tank alarms may be isolated and the safeguards to ensure they were always in\noperation during cargo transfer operations.\nThe company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and highhigh-level alarm systems did not include:\no The mandatory use of the alarms during all loading, discharging and transfer operations.\no Set points for all alarms.\no Testing procedures and frequency.\no Records of testing and maintenance to be kept.\no Guidance on the use of shipboard automatic closing valves, if fitted.\no Procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer\noperations in the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or high-high-level alarm system or a\nsingle alarm for an individual cargo tank.\nHigh-level and/or high-high-level alarms were not in operation at the time of inspection, during loading,\ndischarging or transfer operations.\nHigh-level alarms were not fitted.\nHigh-high-level alarms were not fitted.\nHigh-level and high-high-level alarms were not independent of each other.\nHigh-high-level alarms were not independent of the fixed tank gauging system.\nHigh-level alarms were set at or above the high-high-level alarm activation point.\nHigh-level and high-high-level alarm indicator panels etc. were not clearly identified as such.\nHigh-level and/or high-high-level alarm audible and/or visible alarms were not operational in the cargo\ncontrol room or on deck.\n• •\n• •\n• High-high-level alarms were not set at a level to allow the person in charge of transfer operations to stop the\ncargo transfer before the tank overflows (typically 98% of the tank capacity).\nHigh-level and/or high-high-level alarms had not been regularly tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s\ninstructions.\nIn a chemical ship, the:\no High-level alarms were not independent of the fixed gauging system.\no High-high-level alarms did not provide an agreed signal for sequential shutdown of onshore pumps\nand/or valves and ship’s valves. (the signal may be dependent on operator intervention)\no Shipboard automatic closing valves were in use without the specific approval of the flag sate and or\nport state authority.\nThe high-level and/or high-high-level alarms were permanently silenced or inhibited\nThe high-level and/or high-high-level alarms were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.5.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in\nnon-inerted tanks, and were these procedures being followed?\nShort Question Text\nGauging and sampling static accumulator cargo in non-inerted tanks.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the required additional precautions are taken when dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable\nstatic accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n3.2 General precautions against electrostatic hazards\n3.2.1 Overview\nThe safest way to protect from electrostatic risks is to conduct operations with tanks protected by IG.\nHowever, if a flammable atmosphere might be present, the following measures should be taken to prevent\nelectrostatic hazards:\n• •\nBond metal objects to the metal structure of the tanker to eliminate risk of spark discharges between metal\nobjects that might be electrically insulated. This includes the metallic components of any equipment used for\ndipping, ullaging and sampling.\nRemove any loose conductive objects that cannot be bonded.\n…\nThe following additional precautions should be taken against static electricity during ullaging, dipping, gauging, or\nsampling of static accumulator oils:\n• •\nProhibit the use of conductive (metal) ullaging, dipping, gauging or sampling equipment during product\ntransfers into a tank and for 30 minutes after completion of operations to allow the settling of gas bubbles,\nwater or particulate matter in the liquid and the relaxation of any electrical charge. After the 30 minutes\nsettling time, metal ullaging, dipping, gauging or sampling equipment may be used but it must be effectively\nbonded and securely earthed to the structure of the ship before it is introduced into the tank and must\nremain earthed until after removal.\nProhibit the use of all non-conductive (non-metal) containers of more than one litre capacity for dipping,\nullaging and sampling during loading and for 30 minutes after completion of product transfer into a tank.\nNon-conductive (non-metal containers) of less than one litre capacity may be used for sampling in tanks at any time if\nthey have no conducting components and if they are not rubbed prior to sampling. Cleaning, with a high conductivity\nproprietary cleaner or soapy water, is recommended to reduce charge generation. To prevent charging, the container\nshould not be rubbed dry after washing.\nOperations can be carried out at any time through a correctly designed and installed full depth sounding pipe. A\nsignificant charge cannot accumulate on the surface of the liquid within the sounding pipe and so waiting time is not\nrequired. Precautions to prevent the introduction of charged objects into a tank still apply and if metal equipment is\nused it should be bonded before being inserted into the sounding pipe.\nDetailed guidance on precautions to be taken during ullaging, dipping and sampling of static accumulator oils is given\nin section 12.8.2. These precautions should be closely followed to avoid the hazards associated with the\naccumulation of an electrical charge on the cargo.\n12.8.2 Measuring and sampling non-inerted tanks\n12.8.2.2 Introducing equipment to a tank\nMeasures to avoid charged objects.\nNon-conducting and intermediate conducting materials may be acceptable in some circumstances, e.g. plastic\nsample bottle holders can be lowered safely with natural fibre (intermediate conductivity) rope. Natural fibre rope\nshould be used because synthetic rope generates significant static charge when sliding rapidly through an operator’s\ngloved hand. This type of apparatus needs no special bonding or earthing.\n12.8.2.3 Sounding pipes\nA sounding pipe is a conducting pipe that extends the full depth of the tank and is effectively bonded and earthed to\nthe tank structure.\nA sounding pipe can be used at any time because, as long as it is designed and installed properly, it is not possible\nfor any significant charge to accumulate on the surface of the liquid within it. The pipe should be slotted to prevent\nany pressure differential between the pipe and the tank and to ensure that true levels are indicated.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Cargo and ballast handling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static\naccumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks that described the additional precautions to be taken against static\nelectricity including:\n• •\n• •\n• A description of the dipping, ullaging and sampling equipment to be used.\nBonding/earthing/cleaning procedures for this equipment.\nSettling time after completion of operations.\nAdditional precautions if the vessel is not fitted with properly designed and installed full length sounding\npipes.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed tank gauging system, if fitted.\nInformation on the type of sounding pipes fitted should be clearly displayed at the cargo control position.\nRopes or tapes made of synthetic materials should not be used for lowering equipment into cargo tanks at any time.\nThis question will be allocated as follows:\n• •\n• Oil tankers: not fitted with an inert gas system. Determined by HVPQ 9.15.1 answered in the negative.\nOil / Chemical tankers: All.\nChemical tankers: All.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable\nstatic accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\nIf the vessel is fitted with a fixed tank level gauging system but is not fitted with IG and not fitted with full\ndepth sounding pipes, the operator's procedure to be followed in the event of failure of the fixed gauging\nsystem must be reviewed.\nObserve dipping, ullaging and sampling taking place, if possible.\nReview cargo log books and records to verify compliance with company procedures.\nInterview the officer in charge of cargo operations to verify their familiarity with company procedures for\ndipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their familiarity with company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling\nflammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in noninerted tanks.\nCargo log books and records.\nDrawings/plans relating to cargo tank sounding pipes.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable static accumulator\ncargoes in non-inerted tanks that described the additional precautions to be taken against static electricity\nincluding:\no A description of the dipping, ullaging and sampling equipment to be used.\no Bonding/earthing/cleaning procedures for this equipment.\no Settling time after completion of operations.\no Additional precautions if the vessel is not fitted with properly designed and installed full length\nsounding pipes.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed tank gauging system, if fitted.\nThe officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures for dipping, ullaging\nand sampling flammable static accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\nA deck rating was not familiar with the company procedures for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable\nstatic accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks as they related to their duties.\nThere was no information available on the type of sounding pipes fitted in the cargo tanks.\nIn a vessel fitted with a fixed tank level gauging system but not fitted with IG and not fitted with full depth\nsounding pipes, the operator's procedure to be followed in the event of failure of the fixed gauging system\ndid not adequately address the additional precautions required for dipping, ullaging and sampling flammable\nstatic accumulator cargoes in non-inerted tanks.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMetallic components of any equipment used for dipping, ullaging and sampling were not bonded to the metal\nstructure of the vessel.\nMetal ullaging, dipping, gauging or sampling equipment was introduced into a cargo tank during product\ntransfer or within 30 minutes of completion without the use of a full-length sounding pipe.\nA non- metal sampling container of more than one litre capacity was introduced into a cargo tank during\nproduct transfer or within 30 minutes of completion without the use of a full-length sounding pipe.\nRopes or tapes made of synthetic materials had been used for lowering ullaging and/or sampling equipment\ninto cargo tanks.\nA non-metal sampling container was rubbed dry prior to being introduced to a cargo tank.\nSounding pipes used for dipping, ullaging and sampling cargo tanks were not metallic and/or did not extend\nthe full depth of the tank and/or were not effectively bonded and earthed to the tank structure.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.6.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks, and were these\nprocedures being followed?\nShort Question Text\nLoading static accumulator cargo into non-inerted tanks.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure suitable precautions are always taken when flammable static accumulator cargoes are loaded into\nnon-inerted tanks.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n3.1.4.3 Conductivity\nLiquid non-conductors have conductivities of less than 50 pS/m (picoSiemens/metre). Such liquids are often referred\nto as static accumulators.\nPetroleum products, e.g. clean oils (distillates) including some low sulphur bunker fuels, frequently fall into this\ncategory with typical conductivities being below 10 pS/m (relaxation time > 2s). Chemical solvents and highly refined\nfuels can have conductivities less than 1 pS/m (relaxation time > 20s)\n3.2 General precautions against electrostatic hazards\n3.2.1 Overview\nThe safest way to protect from electrostatic risks is to conduct operations with tanks protected by IG.\nHowever, if a flammable atmosphere might be present, the following measures should be taken to prevent\nelectrostatic hazards:\n• •\n• •\n• Restrict the product flow to a maximum of 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets, irrespective of design, during\nthe initial stages of product transfer into a tank, until:\no The filling pipe and any other structure on the base of the tank has been submerged to twice the\nfilling pipe diameter and all splashing and surface turbulence has ceased, and\no Any water collected in the pipeline has been cleared.\nIt is necessary to load at this restricted rate for a period of 30 minutes or until two pipeline volumes (i.e. from\ndelivery tank to ship’s tank) have been loaded into the receiving tank, whichever is the lesser.\nContinue to restrict the product flow to a maximum of 1 m/sec at the tank inlet for the whole of the operation\nunless the product is clean. A clean product, in this context, contains less than 0.5% by volume of free water\nor other immiscible liquid and less than 10 mg/l of suspended solids.\nAvoid splash filling by employing bottom entry using a fill pipe terminating close to the bottom of the tank.\nNot blowing lines using compressed air\nSee also\n• •\n3.2.4 Filters\n3.2.6 Free fall into tanks\n12.1.7 Loading static accumulator oils\n12.1.71 General\nPetroleum distillates often have electrical conductivities of less than 50 picoSiemens per metre (pS/m) and so fall into\nthe category of static accumulators.\nSince the conductivities of distillates are not normally known and may not be included in an SDS or other common\ndocuments, they should all be treated as static accumulators unless they contain an anti-static additive that raises the\nconductivity above 50 pS/m (for cautions on the effectiveness of anti-static additives, see section 12.1.7.9). A static\naccumulator may carry enough charge to be an incendive ignition hazard during loading and for up to 30 minutes\nafter loading.\nSee also\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• 12.1.7.3 During the initial filling of a tank\n12.1.7.4 Minimising hazards from water\n12.1.7.7 Spread loading\n12.1.7.8 Limitation of product velocity (loading rates) after the initial filling period (bulk loading)\n12.1.7.9 Anti-static additives\n12.1.7.10 Loading different grades of a product into unclean tanks (switch loading)\n12.1.14.7 Gas release in the bottom of tanks\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Cargo and ballast handling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into noninerted tanks that described the:\n• •\nIdentification of flammable static accumulator cargoes.\nPrecautions to be taken against hazards from static electricity when loading these cargoes including:\no Minimising hazards from water.\no Initial loading rates.\no Bulk loading rates.\no Spread loading.\no Switch loading.\no Use of anti-static additives.\no Effect of filters in the pipeline.\no Avoiding:\n Free fall into tanks.\n\n\nSplash loading.\nBlowing lines with compressed air.\nISGOTT6 table 3.1 identifies the following examples:\nStatic accumulators:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Benzene\nXylene\nGasoline (straight-run)\nDiesel (ultra-low sulphur)\nLube oil (base)\nCommercial jet fuel\nToluene\nKerosene\nDiesel\nCyclohexane\nMotor gasoline\nNon accumulators\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Fuel with anti-static additive\nHeavy black fuel oils\nSemi-conductive crude oil\nBitumen\nConductive crude oil\nAlcohols\nKetones\nProvided that:\n• •\n• The tank is maintained in an inert condition, or\nThe cargo is not a static accumulator, or\nIt can be guaranteed that the tank atmosphere is non-flammable,\nThen no anti-static precautions are necessary. However, in case of doubt it should be assumed that a product is a\nstatic accumulator, and the appropriate precautions should be taken.\nThis question will be assigned as follows:\n• •\nOil tankers that are not fitted with an inert gas system. (HVPQ 9.15.1)\nChemical tankers which are not fitted with a nitrogen generator. (HVPQ 9.31.1)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for loading flammable static accumulator\ncargoes into non-inerted tanks.\nObserve loading taking place, if possible.\nReview cargo log books and records to verify compliance with company procedures.\n• Interview the officer in charge of cargo operations to verify their familiarity with company procedures for\nloading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks.\nCargo log books and records.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for loading flammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks\nwhich described:\no The identification of flammable static accumulator cargoes.\no The precautions to be taken against hazards from static electricity when loading these cargoes.\nThe officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures for loading\nflammable static accumulator cargoes into non-inerted tanks.\nA flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank with:\no An initial rate of more than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets.\no An initial rate of less than 1 m/sec at the individual tank inlets, but for shorter than the required\nperiod:\n 30minutes or the time taken to load twice the content of the shore pipeline content\nwhichever is the lesser.\n But which must include the time to fill the tank to a depth equal to twice the diameter of the\nfilling pipe.\no A bulk rate of more than 1 m/sec when the cargo was not “clean”.\nA flammable static accumulator cargo was loaded into a non-inert tank:\no Over the top.\no In such a way to produce splash filling.\nUpon completion of loading a flammable static accumulator, cargo lines were blown using compressed air.\nA low volatility static accumulator cargo was loaded into an uncleaned non-inerted tank that had previously\ncontained a high volatility cargo, without following the precautions to be taken against hazards from static\nelectricity.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and calibration of", "c": "the inert gas system fixed oxygen analyser, and had the equipment been operated,\nmaintained and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nIGS oxygen analyser\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Cargo Control Room, Engine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas with an oxygen content of not more than 5% by\nvolume to the cargo tanks at any rate of flow.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.6 Use during cargo tank operations\nBefore the IG system is operated the tests required by the operations manual or the manufacturer’s instructions\nshould be carried out. The fixed oxygen analyser and recorder should be tested and proved to be in good order.\nPortable oxygen and hydrocarbon meters should also be prepared and tested.\nISGOTT Checks pre-arrival Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 1B. Tanker: checks pre-arrival if using an inert gas system\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.2.1.2 The system shall be capable of:\n.5 delivering inert gas with an oxygen content of not more than 5% by volume to the cargo tanks at any required rate\nof flow.\n2.2.4.2 Instrumentation shall be fitted for continuously indicating and permanently recording, when inert gas is being\nsupplied:\n.2 the oxygen content of the inert gas.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n3.14.2 Clear instructions should be provided for operating, calibrating and testing all instruments and alarms. Suitable\ncalibration facilities should be provided.\n3.14.7 The arrangement for oxygen analyser, recorder and indicating equipment should be as follows:\n.9 Dependent on the principle of measurement, fixed zero and/or span calibration arrangements should be provided\nin the vicinity of the oxygen analyser fitted with suitable connections for portable analysers.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included the fixed oxygen analyser and gave guidance on:\n• •\nThe method and frequency of calibration.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed analyser.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system and may refer to the\nmanufacturer’s instruction and maintenance manual for the fixed oxygen analyser.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nThe fixed oxygen analyser must have been calibrated not more than 24 hours prior to starting of the inert gas system.\nClear instructions should be provided for operating, calibrating and testing the fixed oxygen analyser in the vicinity of\nthe equipment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the fixed oxygen analyser.\nInspect the fixed oxygen analyser including the fixed zero and/or span calibration arrangements.\nVerify that the local reading at the fixed oxygen analyser agrees with the remote indications of the oxygen\ncontent in the cargo control room or station and the machinery space control room.\nReview the calibration records of the fixed oxygen analyser and verify that it had been calibrated not more\nthan 24 hours before being used for each cargo, purging or inerting operation.\nWhere necessary review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system and\nverify that scheduled inspections and maintenance on the equipment had taken place.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and testing of the\nfixed oxygen analyser including the:\no Method and frequency of calibration.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed oxygen analyser.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the inert gas system.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction and maintenance manual for the fixed oxygen analyser\nThe calibration records for the fixed oxygen analyser.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the fixed oxygen analyser.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the fixed oxygen analyser including the:\no Method and frequency of calibration.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of the fixed analyser.\nThe records of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant were missing or incomplete.\nThe fixed oxygen analyser had not been:\no Operated, maintained and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and\ncompany procedures.\no Calibrated within 24 hours prior to starting the inert gas system for each cargo, purging or inerting\noperation.\nThe zero and/or span gas used to calibrate the fixed oxygen analyser was unsuitable, out of date or not\navailable.\nThere were no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and testing the fixed oxygen analyser in\nthe vicinity of the equipment.\nThe fixed oxygen analyser was defective in any respect.\nIf the local reading at the fixed oxygen analyser did not agree with the remote indications of the oxygen content in the\ncargo control room or station and the machinery space control room, an observation should be made under question", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.19.", "t": "Indicators and alarms for the inert gas system.", "c": "", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.8.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar with the cargo system Emergency", "c": "Shutdown (ESD) system, where fitted, and/or the cargo pump emergency stop controls,\nand was there evidence that the systems and equipment had been tested in accordance\nwith company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nOil and Chemical Tanker ESD and/or cargo pump emergency stop controls.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Rating, Cargo Control Room, Pumproom, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the cargo handling system or individual cargo pumps will be brought to a safe, static\ncondition, either automatically or manually, in abnormal circumstances.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.6.3 Emergency Shutdown Plan\nThe ship and the terminal should have agreed an Emergency Shutdown (ESD) procedure and alarm and recorded it\non an appropriate form. This agreement sets out those circumstances when operations should stop immediately. It\nalso accounts for the possible dangers of a pressure surge caused by an ESD procedure.\n12.1.6.4 Supervision\nThe following safeguards should be maintained throughout loading:\n• All personnel concerned should fully understand the agreed standby notice period for the normally stopping\nof cargo pumps on completion of loading and the emergency stop system for both the ship and terminal.\n18.5 Emergency Shutdown systems\nESD systems for cargo transfers are used to stop the flow of cargo liquid and vapour in an emergency and bring the\ncargo handling system to a safe, static condition.\nIt is recommended that tankers and terminals are provided with the necessary equipment to enable interconnections\nof ESD systems.\nAs a minimum, ESD systems should:\n• •\nStop all cargo transfer pumps when an ESD is activated on the tanker or terminal.\nStop the tanker’s cargo transfer pumps when a terminal high level alarm is activated.\nISGOTT Checks pre-transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist:\nPart 5A. Tanker and terminal: pre-transfer conference (item 51)\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet.\nTests and checks of equipment may include:\n• •\n• Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System operation.\nAlarms and trips.\nCargo and ballast pump tests.\nRecords of the tests and checks are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33 Section 155.780\nEmergency shutdown.\n(a) A tank vessel with a capacity of 250 or more barrels that is carrying oil or hazardous material as cargo must have\non board an emergency means to enable the person in charge of a transfer operation to a facility, to another vessel,\nor within the vessel to stop the flow of oil or hazardous material.\n(b) The means to stop the flow may be a pump control, a quick-acting, power actuated valve, or an operating\nprocedure. If an emergency pump control is used, it must stop the flow of oil or hazardous material if the oil or\nhazardous material could siphon through the stopped pump.\n(c) The means to stop the flow must be operable from the cargo deck, cargo control room, or the usual operating\nstation of the person in charge of the transfer operation.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed cargo operation procedures for all vessel types within the fleet which\nincluded:\n• •\n• •\n• The testing of Emergency Shutdown (ESD) systems, if fitted to the vessel.\nThe periodic testing of automatic cargo pump shut down systems and associated sensors, if fitted to the\nvessel.\nThe periodic testing of manual cargo pump shut down controls from all locations.\nThe testing of each cargo pump shut down system prior to each cargo operation.\nThe familiarisation of the vessel crew with the cargo system shut down controls and the circumstances in\nwhich they should be activated.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the procedures which described the operation and testing of ESD\nsystems and/or cargo pump emergency stop controls.\nReview the most recent records for the testing of:\no The ESD system, where fitted.\no The automated cargo pump shut down systems and associated sensors, where fitted.\no The individual cargo pump emergency stop controls from each location provided.\no\nThe cargo pump shutdown system for each pump prior to use.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their familiarity with:\n• •\n• •\nThe circumstances in which the cargo pump emergency stop control should be activated.\nThe locations of the cargo pump emergency stop controls.\nThe actions that should be taken once the cargo pump emergency stop control had been activated.\nThe danger of shutting a manifold valve against the flow while loading/discharging.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures which described the operation and testing of the ESD, where fitted, the cargo\npump automated shutdown, the cargo pump emergency stop controls and the cargo pump emergency stop\nsystem.\nThe testing records for the ESD, where fitted, the cargo pump automated shutdown, the cargo pump\nemergency stop controls and the cargo pump emergency stop system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which described the testing and operation of cargo system:\no Emergency shutdown systems.\no Automated cargo pump shutdown systems and associated sensors.\no Cargo pump emergency stop controls.\nThe testing of the ESD, automated shutdown or cargo pump emergency stop controls and systems had not\nbeen tested in accordance with the company procedure.\nThe ESD system, automated cargo pump shutdown or cargo pump emergency stop controls or systems\nwere defective in any respect.\nThe manual ESD system control or the cargo pump emergency stop controls were not clearly marked and\nready for immediate use.\nAccess to a manual ESD system control or cargo pump emergency stop control was obstructed.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the ESD system, where fitted.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with what abnormal or alarm conditions could cause a cargo pump\nto shut down automatically.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for the testing of the ESD, automated\ncargo pump shutdown and/or the testing of the cargo pump emergency stop controls.\nAn interviewed deck rating was unfamiliar with the location and operation of the cargo pump emergency stop\ncontrols, the circumstances in which they should be activated or the actions to take after the emergency stop\ncontrol had been activated.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines, and were records\navailable for these activities?\nShort Question Text\nPressure testing and inspection of cargo, inert gas and vapour pipelines.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nPumproom, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nUSCG: Marine Safety Manual\nVol. II: Materiel Inspection\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines are regularly examined, and pressure tested when required,\nto verify their condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.3.2 Cargo and ballast system integrity\nAny latent defect in the cargo system will usually reveal itself when the system is pressurised during the discharge\noperation. It is good practice to pressure test cargo lines on a periodic basis, depending on the trade of the ship.\nAlthough these pressure tests may provide an indication of the system’s condition at the time of the test, they should\nnot be considered a substitute for regular external inspection of the pipeline system and periodic internal inspections,\nparticularly at known failure points such as pump discharge bends and stub pipe connections.\n12.1.15.3 Routine maintenance and housekeeping issues\nPipelines should be visually examined and routinely pressure tested to verify their condition. Other non-destructive\ntesting or examination, such as ultrasonic wall thickness measurement, may be appropriate but should always be\nsupplemented by a visual examination.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Cargo/bunker line pressure testing\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n35.35-70 Maintenance of cargo handling equipment - TB/ALL.\n(d) The cargo discharge piping of all tank vessels shall be tested at least once each year for tightness, at the\nmaximum working pressure.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n156.170 - Equipment tests and inspections\n(c)(4) Each loading arm and each transfer pipe system, including each metallic hose, must not leak under static liquid\npressure at least 1 1/2 times the maximum allowable working pressure; and\n(f) The frequency of the tests and inspections required by this section must be:\n(3) For vessels, annually or as part of the biennial and mid-period inspections.\nUSCG: Marine Safety Manual, Vol. II: Materiel Inspection\nB6-29 Acceptance of Alternative Cargo Piping Test Pressures for Vessels.\nAchieving test pressures of 150% MAWP for annual cargo piping tests on tank vessels is often impractical while\nvessels are in service, where transfers are conducted by vacuum or suction method, or outside the shipyard where\nspecial equipment is not available. Therefore, as provided by 33 CFR 156.107, alternative test pressures of not less\nthan 100% MAWP may be used for in-service annual cargo piping tests, provided that a 150% MAWP test of the\ncargo piping is conducted at least twice in any five-year period. It is envisioned that the 150% MAWP tests will be\nconducted during drydock periods at the discretion of the vessel owners or operators. Those vessels with longer\ndrydock intervals must make arrangements to conduct the 150% MAWP tests at least twice in any five-year period.\nAll alternatives must provide an equivalent level of safety and protection from pollution. Accurate records of the\nrequired tests must be maintained aboard the vessel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo transfer system,\nvapour and inert gas pipelines which should include the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Frequency of visual external examinations of each type of pipeline.\nDetermination of the MAWP of the cargo transfer system.\nFrequency of periodic hydrostatic pressure testing of cargo system pipelines.\nRequirement for hydrostatic pressure testing of cargo system pipelines after repairs, sectional replacements\nor modifications.\nMarking of cargo system pipelines with the date and pressure of the last hydrostatic pressure test.\nDetails of the records required to be maintained of inspections and tests.\nAnd may include:\no Periodic internal visual examinations of sections of each type of pipeline.\no Non-destructive testing, such as ultrasonic wall thickness measurement of sections of each type of\npipeline.\nThe instructions in the planned maintenance system may form part of the procedures.\nExternal visual examination of pipelines should cover all components including:\n• •\n• •\nFlanges and their bolts.\nExpansion couplings.\nLocal and/or remote pressure gauge and thermometer inserts or connections\nThe condition and adjustment of U bolts and any rubbing inserts.\nThe cargo transfer system should be hydrostatically pressure tested to the 100% maximum allowable working\npressure (MAWP) at least annually.\nThe cargo transfer system, which includes the crude oil washing line, should be hydrostatically pressure tested to at\nleast 150% MAWP at least twice within any five-year period.\nThe cargo transfer system includes the discharge pump and piping between the pump and the vessel's manifold,\nexcluding any non-metallic, i.e. flexible, hoses.\nIn this context, the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) can be assumed to be either the pressure at which\nthe cargo transfer system relief valve is set or, where no relief valve is fitted, the maximum discharge pressure that\ncan be developed by the vessel's pump. For centrifugal pumps this is the pressure developed by the pump at zero\nflow conditions.\nCargo transfer system pressure testing should be a hydrostatic test. Pressure testing using compressed air or inert\ngas is not acceptable.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour\nand inert gas pipelines.\nReview the records of the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines and verify that:\no The MAWP of the cargo transfer system had been determined and documented.\no Each pipeline had been visually inspected in accordance with the company procedure.\no Each cargo system pipeline had been hydrostatically pressure tested to 100% of MAWP annually.\no Each cargo system pipeline had been hydrostatically pressure tested to 150% of MAWP at least\ntwice in the previous five years.\nDuring the inspection, observe the visual condition of the cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition of the pipelines with the records of the inspection and\ntesting of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The items to pay attention to when conducting a visual inspection of the cargo, vapour or inert gas\npipelines.\no How and when the previous hydrostatic pressure test of the cargo system pipelines had been\nconducted.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.\nThe determination of the MAWP of the cargo pipeline system.\nRecords of the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines\nthat included:\no The frequency of visual external examinations\no The frequency of hydrostatic pressure testing of cargo transfer systems.\no The requirement to hydrostatically pressure test a cargo transfer system after repairs, modifications\nor sectional replacement.\no Records to be maintained of inspections and tests.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and testing of\ncargo, vapour and inert gas pipelines.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The MAWP of the cargo transfer system had not been determined and documented.\nThe determination of the MAWP of the cargo transfer system was inconsistent with the ship's drawings or\ncargo pump performance curves.\nThe cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to 100% MAWP within the last 12\nmonths.\nThere was evidence that cargo system piping had undergone repairs, modifications or sectional replacement\nthat would potentially affect its integrity since the last hydrostatic test without being retested upon completion\nof the work.\nThe cargo transfer system had not been hydrostatically pressure tested to at least 150% MAWP at least\ntwice within any five-year period.\nThe cargo transfer system pressure testing was performed using compressed air or inert gas.\nCargo system pipelines were not marked with the date and pressure of the last test.\nCargo, vapour or inert gas pipelines had not been inspected and/or tested as required by company\nprocedures.\nThere were no records of the inspection and testing of cargo, vapour and/or inert gas lines as required by\ncompany procedures.\nInspection of the cargo, vapour and/or inert gas pipelines indicated that the required inspections and tests\nhad either not been performed or were ineffective.\nThe visual inspection of the cargo system, vapour or inert gas pipelines determined that the pipelines or any\nof their components were in an unsatisfactory condition.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.10.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection system, and was this\nequipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nVapour collection system.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: MARPOL\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: MSC/Circ.585 Standards for vapour emission control systems\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vapour collection system is in satisfactory condition and operated correctly when\nrequired.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n11.5 Vapour recovery systems\nVapour recovery systems fall into two categories:\n• •\nThose systems conforming to IMO guidelines that provide a system for returning cargo vapours to the shore\nfor reclaiming or incinerating. These are known as VECS (see section 23.7.7)\nProprietary systems for recovering petroleum liquid or vapour that would otherwise be vented during the\nloading operation or during the loaded passage. These are known as vapour recovery systems.\nPersonnel who operate VECS and vapour recovery systems should be fully trained to use them.\n23.7.7 Loading at terminals with Vapour Emission Control Systems\n23.7.7.1 General\n…The IMO has developed international standards for the design, construction and operation of vapour collection\nsystems on tankers and VECs at terminals…\nNote that VECs can serve tankers fitted with IG systems as well as non-inerted tankers.\nISGOTT Checks pre-transfer Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 5A. Tanker and terminal: pre-transfer conference\nItem 56 Vapour return line operational parameters are agreed. (11.5, 18.3, 23.7.7)\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n5.9 Vapour Return Systems\nThe purpose of vapour return systems is to ensure that cargo vapours are not released to the atmosphere. Vapour\nreturn lines on chemical tankers are either connected to the ship’s P/V line or, if the ship is fitted with an inert gas\nsystem, to an extension of that system.\nThe IBC Code requires the ship to be able to return vapours of most toxic chemicals to shore.\nIMO: MSC/Circ.585 Standards for vapour emission control systems\n1.1 These standards have been developed for the design, construction and operation of vapour collection systems on\ntankers and vapour emission control systems at terminals.\n1.2.10 “Vapour collection system” means an arrangement of piping and hoses used to collect vapour emitted from a\ntanker’s cargo tanks and transport the vapour to a vapour processing unit.\n2.2.1 Each chemical, product or crude carrier should have vapour collection piping which is permanently installed with\na tanker vapour connection located as a close as practical to the loading manifold. In lieu of permanent piping,\nAdministrations may permit chemical tankers to have a permanent vapour connection at each cargo tank for\nconnection to a vapour hose which should be kept as short as practicable.\n2.6.4 Each tanker equipped with a vapour collection system that is common to two or more tanks should be fitted with\na pressure sensing device that senses the pressure in the main vapour collection line for those tanks, and which:\n1.\n2.\nhas a high-pressure alarm that alarms at a pressure of not more than the lowest pressure relief valve setting\nin the cargo tank venting system; and\nhas a low-pressure alarm that alarms at a pressure of not less than atmospheric pressure for an inerted\ntanker, or the lowest vacuum relief valve setting (i.e. that setting nearest to atmospheric pressure) in the\ncargo tank venting system for a non-inerted tank vessel.\n2.8.1 Each person in charge of a transfer operation utilizing a vapour emission control system should have completed\na training programme covering the particular system installed on the tanker. The training should encompass the\npurpose and principles of operation of the vapour emission control system and provide an understanding of the\nequipment involved and associated hazards. In addition, the training should provide an understanding of operating\nprocedures including testing and inspection of equipment, pre-transfer procedures, piping connection sequence,\nstart-up procedures, normal operations and emergency procedures. Training should also include an understanding of\nthe shoreside terminal equipment and operating procedures.\n2.9.1 Tanker transfer procedures should contain information on the tanker’s vapour collection system including:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nA line diagram of the tanker’s vapour collection piping indicating the locations and purpose of all control and\nsafety devices.\nThe maximum allowable transfer rate as limited by the venting capacity of the pressure or vacuum relief\nvalves, or any other factor which would limit the transfer rate.\nThe maximum pressure drop in the vessel’s vapour collection system for various transfer rates.\nThe relief settings of each pressure and vacuum valve.\nPre-transfer procedures, and\nProcedures to be followed in the event of a fault during vapour collection operations.\nTMSA KPI 10.1.3 requires that procedures minimise marine and atmospheric emissions and ensure that they are\nalways within permitted levels. Procedures may include:\n• Methods of minimising emissions.\n• VOC management.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nChapter 3 Regulation 15\n1 If the emissions of VOCs from a tanker are to be regulated in a port or ports or a terminal or terminals under the\njurisdiction of a Party, they shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of this regulation.\n5 A tanker to which paragraph 1 of this regulation applies shall be provided with a vapour emission collection system\napproved by the Administration taking into account the safety standards for such systems developed by the\nOrganization* and shall use the system during the loading of relevant cargoes.\n*Refer to Standards for vapour emission control systems (MSC/Circ.585)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vapour collection systems on board oil and chemical tankers are also variously described as:\n• •\n• Vapour Control Systems (VCS)\nVapour Emission Control Systems (VECS)\nVapour Return Systems\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour\ncollection system which included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA line diagram of the vessel’s vapour collection piping indicating the locations and purpose of all control and\nsafety devices.\nThe initial transfer rate.\nThe maximum allowable transfer rate as limited by the venting capacity of the pressure or vacuum relief\nvalves, or any other factor which would limit the transfer rate.\nThe maximum pressure drop in the vessel’s vapour collection system for various transfer rates.\nThe relief settings of each pressure and vacuum valve.\nPre-transfer procedures, including tests of P/V valves, tank level gauges and alarms, and high- and lowpressure alarms.\nProcedures to be followed in the event of a fault during vapour collection operations.\nTraining and familiarisation requirements.\nThese procedures may be in the form of a dedicated system manual approved by the Flag State or recognised\norganisation (such as a class society).\nThe pressure sensing device in the system should have an indicator and visible and audible high- and low-pressure\nalarms at the cargo control room or position.\nThis question will only be allocated to:\n• •\nOil vessels when HVPQ 9.9.1 “Is a vapour return system fitted?” is answered in the affirmative.\nChemical vessels when the vessel operator had declared through the Pre-inspection questionnaire that the\nvessel is fitted with a vapour collection system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection, testing and operation of the\nvapour collection system.\nReview, if available, the records of cargo operations, including tank pressures, where the vapour control\nsystem had been used.\nReview, where necessary, vapour collection system training/familiarisation records.\nDuring the deck inspection:\no Observe the operation, condition and configuration of the vapour collection system.\no Where provided on chemical tankers, inspect any vapour hoses used for direct connection at the\ncargo tank.\nVerify the satisfactory operation of the visible and audible high- and low-pressure alarms at the cargo control\nroom or position.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the inspection,\ntesting and operation of the vapour collection system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection system.\nThe vapour collection system manual.\nCargo operations records and checklists relating to the last occasion the vapour collection system was used.\nThe maintenance and testing records for any vapour hoses provided on chemical tankers in accordance with\nIMO MSC/Circ.585 2.2.1.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the inspection, testing and operation of the vapour collection system\nwhich included:\no A line diagram of the tanker’s vapour collection piping indicating the locations and purpose of all\ncontrol and safety devices.\no The initial transfer rate\no The maximum allowable transfer rate as limited by the venting capacity of the pressure or vacuum\nrelief valves, or any other factor which would limit the transfer rate.\no The maximum pressure drop in the vessel’s vapour collection system for various transfer rates.\no The relief settings of each pressure and vacuum valve.\no Pre-transfer procedures, including tests of P/V valves, tank level gauges and alarms, and high- and\nlow-pressure alarms.\no Procedures to be followed in the event of a fault during vapour collection operations.\no Training and familiarisation requirements.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and\noperation of the vapour collection system.\nThe pressure sensing device in the main vapour collection line was inoperative.\nThe visible and audible high- and low-pressure alarms at the cargo control room or position were defective\nin any respect.\nThe high- and low-pressure alarms were not set as required by company procedures.\nThere was no evidence that the person(s) in charge of transfer operations had received suitable\ntraining/familiarisation covering the particular system installed on the tanker.\n• •\n• The vapour collection system was not approved by the Flag State or recognised organisation (such as a\nclass society).\nWhere vapour hoses were provided onboard chemical tankers in accordance with IMO MSC/Circ.585 2.2.1,\nthere was no evidence of proper maintenance and testing\nThe vapour collection system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.11.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert\natmosphere, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nOil and chemical tank cleaning in non-inert tanks.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Rating, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that tank washing operations after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert atmosphere are\nalways conducted safely, and in accordance with the recommendations of ISGOTT6.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nReference should always be made to the full text of ISGOTT6 Section 12.3 Tank Cleaning. Edited extracts below are\nfor reference only and are not exhaustive.\n12.3.5.2 Washing in a non-inert atmosphere\nNon-inert cargo tank washing should only be done when both the source of ignition and the flammability of the tank\natmosphere are controlled. To do this, the following precautions should be taken.\nTo control the fuel in the tank atmosphere\nBefore washing\n• •\n• Flush the tank bottom with water, so that all parts are covered, then strip.\nFlush the piping system with water (including cargo pumps, crossovers and discharge lines).\nVentilate the tank to reduce the gas concentration of the atmosphere to 10% or less of the LFL\nDuring washing\n• •\n• Monitor the change in LFL percentage by testing the atmosphere frequently and at various levels in the tank.\nMaintain the tank atmosphere at not more than 35% LFL. If the gas level reaches 35% at any measured\nlocation within a tank, immediately stop the washing in that tank.\nOnly resume washing when continued ventilation has reduced the gas concentration to 10% or less of the\nLFL and is able to maintain it.\nTo control the sources of ignition in the tank\n• •\nRestrict the throughput of individual tank washing machines to no greater than 60 m3/hr.\nKeep the total water throughput per cargo tank as low as practicable. Do not let it exceed 180 m3/hr.\n• •\n• •\nDifferent washing methods create different risks, so follow these precautions when tank washing in non-inert\nconditions:\no Never use recirculated wash water\no Never inject steam into a tank that may contain hydrocarbon vapours and that is in a non-inert\ncondition.\nMake up and test the electrical continuity of all hose connections before introducing any portable washing\nmachines to the tank.\nIntroduce sounding rods and other equipment into the tank using a full depth sounding pipe. If a full depth\nsounding pipe is not fitted, ensure that any metallic components of the sounding rod or other equipment are\nbonded and securely earthed to the ship before introducing them to the tank and that they remain earthed\nuntil removed.\nObserve this precaution during washing and for five hours afterwards to allow enough time for any mist\ncarrying a static charge to dissipate. If the tank is continuously mechanically ventilated after washing, this\ncan be reduced to one hour. During this time:\no A metal interface detector can be used if earthed to the ship by a clamp or bolted metal connection.\no A metal rod on the end of a metal tape can be used if earthed to the ship by a clamp or a bolted\nmetal connection.\no Do not use a metal sounding rod suspended on a fibre rope, even if the end at deck level is\nfastened to the ship. The rope cannot be relied on to provide an earthing path.\no Entirely non-metallic equipment may be used, e.g. a wooden sounding rod suspended on a natural\nfibre rope, without earthing.\no Do not use ropes made of synthetic polymers to lower equipment into cargo tanks.\n12.3.6.2 Portable hoses for fixed and portable tank washing machines\nBonding wires should be incorporated within all portable tank washing hoses to ensure electrical continuity. Couplings\nshould be connected to the hose in a way that ensures effective bonding.\nHoses should be indelibly marked for identification. A record should be kept showing the date and the result of\nelectrical continuity testing.\n12.3.6.3 Testing tank cleaning hoses\nAll hoses supplied for tank washing machines should be tested for electrical continuity in a dry condition before use.\nIn no case should the resistance exceed six ohms per metre length.\n12.3.6.5 Free fall\nIt is essential to avoid the free fall of water or slops into a tank. The liquid level should always cover the discharge\ninlets in the slop tank to a depth of at least one metre to avoid splashing. This is not necessary when the slop and\ncargo tanks are fully inerted.\n12.3.6.8 Special tank cleaning procedures\nSteaming\nSteaming may only be carried out in tanks that have been either inerted or water washed, and gas freed. Before\nsteaming, the concentration of flammable gas should not exceed 10% of the LFL.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Tank cleaning\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products\nin a non-inert atmosphere that included:\n• •\n• •\n• Precautions to:\no Control the fuel in the tank atmosphere.\no Control the sources of ignition in the tank.\nBonding of portable tank washing machines and hoses.\nTesting tank cleaning hoses.\nAvoiding the free-fall or spraying of water into a tank.\nProhibition of steaming.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of\nvolatile products in a non-inert atmosphere.\nReview available tank cleaning plans, risk assessments, log books and records to verify compliance with\ncompany procedures.\nReview records of electrical continuity testing of portable tank cleaning hoses and portable\nhydrant/hose/machine connections, where applicable.\nDuring the course of the inspection, inspect fixed and portable tank cleaning equipment to verify its condition\nand marking for identification.\nInterview the officer responsible for tank washing operations to verify their familiarity with company\nprocedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert atmosphere.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their familiarity with company procedures relating to introducing sounding\nrods and other equipment into a tank during tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a noninert atmosphere.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert\natmosphere.\nCompleted plans, risk assessments, log books and records for previous tank cleaning operations.\nRecords of electrical continuity testing of portable tank cleaning hoses and portable hydrant/hose/machine\nconnections, where applicable.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for cargo tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a noninert atmosphere that included,\no Precautions to:\n Control the fuel in the tank atmosphere.\n Control the sources of ignition in the tank.\no Bonding of portable tank washing machines and hoses.\no Testing tank cleaning hoses.\no Avoiding the free-fall or spraying of water into a tank.\no Prohibition of steaming.\n• •\n• •\n• The officer responsible for tank washing operations was not familiar with the company procedures for cargo\ntank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert atmosphere.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the company procedures relating to introducing sounding rods\nand other equipment into a tank during tank washing after the carriage of volatile products in a non-inert\natmosphere.\nRecords and interviews indicated that before tank washing in a non-inert atmosphere:\no The tank bottom and/or the pipeline system had not been flushed and stripped.\no The tank atmosphere had not been ventilated to less than 10% LFL.\no The electrical continuity of portable hoses had not been tested or tested resistance exceeded 6\nohms per metre length.\no The portable tank washing hoses were not indelibly marked for identification purposes.\no The electrical continuity of portable hydrant/hose/machine connections had not been tested.\nRecords and interviews indicated that during tank washing in a non-inert atmosphere:\no The tank atmospheres had not been tested frequently\no The tank atmosphere had exceeded 35% LFL, but washing had continued.\no The tank washing had recommenced with a tank atmosphere above 10% LFL.\no Wash water throughput was above the recommended levels.\no Recirculated water was used for washing.\no Steam had been injected into a tank that was not verified as being gas free.\no Steam had continued to be injected while the atmosphere exceeded 10% LFL.\no The recommended methods/equipment had not been used for dipping tanks.\no The liquid level in the slop tank was not maintained at least one metre above the discharge inlets.\nTank cleaning equipment was defective or deficient in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.12.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use of", "c": "portable cargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and sampling equipment,\nand was the equipment in satisfactory condition and used in accordance with the\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nPortable ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and sampling equipment.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that portable UTI and sampling equipment is always used in accordance with international\nregulations and industry best practice.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals.\nChapter 3 Static Electricity\nThe main precaution for ships against electrostatic risks is to conduct operations with the tanks protected by IG. For\ntanks that are not protected by IG, section 3.2 describes, in general terms, precautions against electrostatic hazards\nduring operations...\n3.2.2 Bonding\nThe most important countermeasure to prevent and electrical hazard is to bond all metallic objects together to\neliminate the risk of discharges between two objects that might be charged to different voltages if they were\nelectrically insulated…\nSome examples of objects that might be electrically insulated in hazardous situations and which should be bonded\nare:\n• Manual ullaging and sampling equipment with conducting components.\nAny earthing or bonding links used as a safeguard against the hazards of static electricity associated with portable\nequipment should be connected whenever the equipment is set up and not disconnected until after the equipment is\nno longer in use.\n12.8 Cargo measurement, ullaging, dipping and sampling\n12.8.1 General\nCargo measurement and sampling is undertaken using a variety of methods that should conform to the requirements\nfor safe handling of the intended cargoes. Which system is used will be determined by the type of tanker, the toxicity\nand/or volatility of the particular cargo and associated regulatory requirements.\nIn general, there are three main methods of gauging – closed, open and restricted:\n• •\n• Closed: a gauging device that penetrates the cargo tank, but which is part of a closed system maintaining\nthe complete integrity of cargo containment. This device is designed and installed so as not to release cargo\nliquid or vapour in any amount to the atmosphere, e.g. automatic float, continuous tape (magnetic coupled),\nsight glass (protected), electronic probe, magnetic, differential pressure cell.\nOpen: a gauging method that uses an opening in the cargo tank, such as a gauge hatch or ullage port. This\nmethod may expose the user to the cargo and its vapours.\nRestricted: a gauging device that penetrates the cargo tank and which, during operation, can allow the\nrelease of small quantities of cargo vapour or liquid. The amount of release is controlled by a small diameter\ntank penetration opening and by a locally operated valve (sometimes known as a vapour lock) or similar\nclosure device in that opening. When not in use, this type of gauging device is closed to maintain the\ncomplete integrity of cargo containment, e.g. rotary tube, fixed tube, slip tube and sounding tube.\nAs a closed gauging system offers complete integrity and flexibility for varying cargo types and trades, its use is\npreferred at all times. Open gauging and restricted gauging should only be allowed where:\n• •\nOpen venting is allowed by the relevant regulations, e.g. the IMO’s International Code for the Construction\nand Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code).\nMeans are provided for relieving tank pressure before the gauge is operated.\nCargo compartments may be pressurised, so only authorised personnel should open vapour lock valves, ullage ports\nor covers to control the release of pressure.\nAvoid escaping vapour and wear proper PPE if risk of gas exposure exists (see sections 23.3.1 and/or 23.3.2 and\n24.2.1). Stand at right angles to the direction of the wind. Standing immediately upwind of the ullage port might create\na back eddy of vapour towards the operator. Depending on the cargo, consider using appropriate RPE (see sections\n10.8 and 12.8.4)\nWhen open gauging, the tank opening should be uncovered only as long as it takes to complete the operation.\nTMSA 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are in\nplace for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Tank gauging equipment\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures describing the use, operation, testing, calibration and\nservicing of the portable cargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and sampling equipment which\nincluded:\n• •\n• •\n• The definitions of closed, restricted and open cargo measurement and sampling.\nThe circumstances in which:\no Closed cargo measurement and sampling equipment must be used.\no Restricted cargo measurement and sampling equipment may be used.\no Open cargo measurement and sampling may take place.\nThe bonding requirement for using the portable measurement equipment in both inerted and non-inerted\ntank atmospheres.\nThe restrictions on introducing portable measurement and sampling equipment into non-inerted cargo tanks\nwhen handling static accumulator cargo.\nThe required service and calibration interval for the portable UTI equipment.\n• •\n• •\nThe required pre-operational checks for the portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment.\nThe procedures for safe use of the portable measurement and sampling equipment including personal\nprotective equipment (PPE) and respiratory protective equipment (RPE) requirements.\nThe total number of portable UTI measurement units required to be carried onboard.\nThe total number of cargo sampling units required to be carried onboard.\nThese procedures may refer to the equipment manufacturer’s manuals and instructions.\nPortable UTI equipment may be rated for open, restricted or closed service and will be certificated accordingly. The\nappropriately rated equipment should always be used as required for volatile and/or toxic cargoes e.g. equipment\ncertificated for restricted service must not be used when handling a cargo specified for closed gauging in IBC chapter\n17, column ‘j’.\nPortable UTI equipment should be serviced and calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations and\nvalid certificates of calibration should be provided for each instrument.\nThe following information provided by the vessel operator through the HVPQ will be inserted in the inspection editor\nand reproduced in the final report:\n• 9.8.12.3 (Portable gauging equipment) How many units are supplied?\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures describing the use, operation, testing,\ncalibration and servicing of the of portable cargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and\nsampling equipment\nReview the service and calibration records for each portable cargo UTI measurement unit carried.\nWhere necessary review the:\no Manufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the portable cargo UTI measurement and sampling\nequipment.\no Records of pre-operational checks of the portable cargo UTI measurement and sampling\nequipment.\nInspect two portable cargo UTI measurement units and verify that:\no The units were appropriately rated as closed, restricted or open for the operations being\nundertaken.\no The grounding wire and clip was properly fixed to the device and in use where required.\no When the sensors were placed in a bucket of water:\n The ullage/interface function sounded.\n The temperature reading was accurate compared to a manual thermometer.\nInterview a deck rating to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for safe use of the portable UTI\nmeasurement and sampling equipment including grounding requirements and PPE and RPE requirements.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures describing the use, operation, testing, calibration and servicing of the of portable\ncargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and sampling equipment.\nThe manufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the portable cargo UTI measurement and sampling\nequipment provided.\nThe records of pre-operational checks of the portable cargo UTI measurement and sampling equipment.\nThe service and calibration records for the portable cargo UTI measurement units.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures describing the use, operation, testing, calibration and servicing of the of\nportable cargo ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) measurement and sampling equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures describing the use, operation,\ntesting and maintenance of the UTI measurement and sampling equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The service rating of the portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment provided onboard.\no The service and calibration requirements.\no The pre-operational checks of portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment.\no The procedures for safe use of the equipment including PPE and RPE requirements.\no The bonding requirements for using the UTI measurement and sampling equipment.\nAn interviewed deck rating was not familiar with the company procedures for safe use of the portable UTI\nmeasurement and sampling equipment including PPE and RPE requirements.\nThe portable UTI measurement and sampling equipment in use was not of the correct rating for the cargo\nbeing handled, e.g. equipment rated as ‘restricted’ was being used in tanks where the cargo being handled\nrequired a ‘closed’ device.\nPortable UTI measurement and sampling equipment was not being used in accordance with the company\nprocedures for safe use including PPE and RPE requirements.\nThere was no control of the opening of vapour locks and/or ullage ports by unauthorised personnel e.g.\ncargo inspectors.\nWhere open cargo measurement and sampling was permitted, cargo tank openings had been left open after\ngauging had been completed.\nPortable UTI measurement or sampling equipment was being used without being bonded in a non-inert\natmosphere or where the company procedure required bonding to be in use.\nOne or more vapour locks were noted to be leaking during use or when closed with the cap on.\nOne or more vapour lock was observed to be damaged or missing.\nInappropriate measurement or sampling equipment was observed being used through the vapour locks (e.g.\nsounding rods which did not fit on the vapour locks provided).\nPortable UTI measurement and sampling equipment had not been serviced or calibrated according to\nmanufacturer’s instructions or did not have the associated certificates.\nNo fixed ullage system was fitted but there were insufficient portable UTI units provided to simultaneously\ngauge each tank being worked, plus two spares.\nMore than two portable UTI measurement units were out of service on a vessel with no fixed cargo level\nmeasurement system.\nThere were less than two operational UTI measurement units on a vessel fitted with an operational fixed\ncargo level measurement system.\nWhere a vessel was fitted with a fixed cargo level measurement system which was out of service, make a comment\nin the Hardware response tool to record the number of functioning UTI measurement units that were available.\nAddress the defective fixed cargo level measurement system through question 8.99.5\nAddress any issues relating to measurement or sampling of static accumulator cargoes in non-inert tanks through\nquestion 8.3.5", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.13.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting systems in accordance with\nSOLAS, and were these systems correctly set?\nShort Question Text\nSecondary venting systems.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo tanks are always protected from over or under pressurisation in the event of inappropriate\nuse of the ventilation system or a failure of a primary protection device.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.8.3 Full flow Pressure/Vacuum venting arrangements\nProtection from over or under pressurisation of the cargo tanks may be provided by installing, on each tank, full flow\nP/V valves rated at 125% of the maximum loading/discharge rate. Where the mast riser is the primary vent, the P/V\nvalve may act as the secondary protection.\n11.1.8.4 Individual tank pressure monitoring and alarm systems\nA tank pressure monitoring and alarm system may be used as an alternative to P/V valves for the secondary P/V\nrelief. These systems use individual tank pressure sensors connected to an alarm system that is monitored in the\ncargo control room or a location where cargo operations are normally carried out.\n12.8.6 Cargo tank monitoring systems\nTank monitoring systems often have multiple functions, such as radar or other types of remote gauging, temperature\nmeasurement, tank pressure sensors and level alarms. It may be integrated with other cargo monitoring or control\nequipment or with loading computers or control systems. Manufacturers may refer to these multi-function systems as\ncargo tank monitoring systems.\nWhether provided as a complete system or as separate elements, planned maintenance procedures should be\nestablished to ensure maintenance, test and calibration of this equipment per the manufacturer’s instructions.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n5.8 Venting Systems and P/V Valves\nChemical carriers are provided with an independent P/V valve for each tank. These valves are designed to handle\nvapour flow based on the maximum loading or discharge rate of the tank.\nIMO regulations require a secondary means of protecting cargo tanks against over or under-pressure in case the\nprimary means of venting fails. This can be complied with by fitting an extra P/V valve on a separate vent line or by\nfitting a pressure sensor in the tank.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Cargo and ballast handling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.3.2 Venting arrangements\n5.3.2.1 The venting arrangements in each cargo tank may be independent or combined with other cargo tanks and\nmay be incorporated into the inert gas piping.\n5.3.2.2 Where the arrangements are combined with other cargo tanks, either stop valves or other acceptable means\nshall be provided to isolate each cargo tank. Where stop valves are fitted, they shall be provided with locking\narrangements which shall be under the control of the responsible ship's officer. There shall be a clear visual indication\nof the operational status of the valves or other acceptable means. Where tanks have been isolated, it shall be\nensured that relevant isolating valves are opened before cargo loading or ballasting or discharging of those tanks is\ncommenced. For tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2017, any isolation shall also continue to permit the\npassage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo loading and ballasting, or during\ndischarging in accordance with regulation 11.6.1.2\nChapter II-2 Regulation 11\n6.1 General\nThe venting arrangements shall be so designed and operated as to ensure that neither pressure nor vacuum in cargo\ntanks shall exceed design parameters and be such as to provide for:\n1.\n2.\nthe flow of the small volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures caused by thermal variations in a cargo\ntank in all cases through pressure/vacuum valves; and\nthe passage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo loading and ballasting, or\nduring discharging.\n6.3.2 Secondary means for pressure/vacuum relief\nA secondary means of allowing full flow relief of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures shall be provided to prevent overpressure or under-pressure in the event of failure of the arrangements in paragraph 6.1.2. In addition, for tankers\nconstructed on or after 1 January 2017, the secondary means shall be capable of preventing over-pressure or underpressure in the event of damage to, or inadvertent closing of, the means of isolation required in regulation 4.5.3.2.2.\nAlternatively, pressure sensors may be fitted in each tank protected by the arrangement required in paragraph 6.1.2,\nwith a monitoring system in the ship's cargo control room or the position from which cargo operations are normally\ncarried out. Such monitoring equipment shall also provide an alarm facility which is activated by detection of\noverpressure or under-pressure conditions within a tank.\nIMO: IBC Code\n8.3.3 Controlled tank venting systems shall consist of a primary and a secondary means of allowing full flow relief of\nvapour to prevent over-pressure or under-pressure in the event of failure of one means. Alternatively, the secondary\nmeans may consist of pressure sensors fitted in each tank with a monitoring system in the ship’s cargo control room\nor position from which cargo operations are normally carried out. Such monitoring equipment shall also provide an\nalarm facility which is activated by detection of over-pressure or under-pressure conditions within a tank.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank\nventing systems in accordance with SOLAS which described:\n• •\n• The primary and secondary system for each anticipated cargo tank/group configuration.\nThe associated settings of the pressure/vacuum sensor alarms, where fitted.\nMaintenance, test and calibration procedures for the cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system per the\nmanufacturer’s instructions.\nThese procedures may be contained in the vessel’s cargo handling manual(s) and/or the planned maintenance\nsystem.\nIn the case of inerted vessels, if pressure sensors are provided as the means of secondary protection, the alarm\nsettings for the pressure sensors must be set to actuate when the tank pressure reaches 10% greater than the\nnormal actuation settings of the pressure valves themselves. In the case of the low-pressure settings, the pressure in\na tank should never be permitted to fall below zero and the pressure sensors should be set to alarm above zero.\nIn the case of non-inerted vessels if pressure sensors are provided, the over-pressure setting should be set to alarm\nat either 10% greater than the normal actuation settings of the pressure valves or slightly higher than the pressure at\nwhich the pressure valve meets the maximum load rate for the tank as measured from the pressure flow diagram.\nThe vacuum setting should be either 10% greater than the normal actuation settings of the vacuum valves or slightly\nhigher than the vacuum at which the vacuum valve meets the maximum discharge rate for the tank as measured from\nthe vacuum flow diagram.\nAt no time should the alarm settings for the pressure sensors exceed the safe design pressures of the cargo tank.\nClass societies may accept a system that may not comply with the SOLAS requirements for 'secondary means of\nallowing full flow relief'. In such cases an observation should still be made.\nIf the vessel is described in the IOPPC Form B 1.11.4 as a Crude oil/Product carrier and carries crude and products\nsimultaneously, the cargo tank vapour isolating valve will be intentionally closed to prevent vapour carryover. In such\ncases, both primary and secondary protection must be provided on the cargo tank side of the cargo tank vapour\nisolating valve.\nThe vessel operator will have described the secondary venting arrangements fitted to the vessel though the preinspection questionnaire. The description provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.\nThe response to HVPQ questions 9.10.6 and 9.10.7 (where applicable) will be inserted in the inspection editor for the\ninformation of the inspector.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary\ncargo tank venting systems.\n• •\n• Review the primary and secondary venting arrangements and verify they comply with SOLAS (and the\nHVPQ).\nWhere an electronic pressure/vacuum monitoring system is provided:\no Verify the satisfactory operation of the system.\no Verify that the alarms are set to operate at the correct value.\no Review records of tests and calibration of the pressure sensors.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting\nsystems.\no The required settings for pressure alarms, where fitted.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting systems.\nShip’s drawings of the cargo tank venting arrangements.\nCargo handling manual(s).\nRecords of tests and calibration of the pressure sensors, where fitted.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation of the primary and secondary cargo tank venting\nsystems in accordance with SOLAS which described:\no The primary and secondary system for each anticipated cargo tank/group configuration.\no The associated settings of the pressure/vacuum sensor alarms, where fitted.\no Maintenance, test and calibration procedures for the cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring\nsystem per the manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the primary and\nsecondary cargo tank venting systems in accordance with SOLAS.\nThe primary and secondary venting arrangements were not as described in the HVPQ and/or PIQ.\nThe means of providing ‘secondary means of allowing full flow relief’ did not comply with the SOLAS\nrequirements.\nCargo tanks were fitted with vapour isolating valves which might be damaged or inadvertently closed but\nwere not fitted with either full-flow P/V valves or a pressure/vacuum monitoring system.\nCargo tanks were fitted with vapour isolating valves which would be intentionally closed for vapour\nsegregation purposes but were not fitted with either two full flow P/V valves or a P/V valve and a\npressure/vacuum monitoring system on the cargo tank side of the cargo tank vapour isolating valve.\nOn a chemical carrier, cargo tanks were fitted with an independent P/V valve but there was no secondary\nprotection in the form of a second full flow P/V valve or a pressure/vacuum monitoring system.\nThe cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system alarms were not set to operate at the correct value.\nOne or more cargo tank pressure sensors were not operational.\nOne or more cargo tank pressure sensors appeared to be inaccurate.\nThe cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system was defective in any respect.\nThere were no records of tests and/or calibration of the cargo tank pressure/vacuum monitoring system per\nthe manufacturer’s instructions.\nIn the circumstances that the ‘secondary means of allowing full flow relief’ did not comply with the requirements of\nSOLAS, the supporting comment should describe why the requirements were not met.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.14.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems, and\nwere the systems in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank venting systems.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo tank venting systems are maintained in satisfactory condition and operated correctly.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.8 Cargo tank protection against over/under pressure.\nSerious accidents have occurred on oil tankers as a result of cargo tanks being severely over or under pressure.\nAlthough SOLAS regulations have been modified to require tanks to be fitted with pressure monitors and safety\ndevices, it is still essential that venting systems are thoroughly checked to ensure that they are correctly set for the\nintended operation.\n11.2.2.3 Tank over pressurisation – precautions and corrective actions\nRegular maintenance, pre-operational testing and operator awareness of isolating valves, P/V valves or high velocity\nvents can guard against failure during operation.\nShip Shore Safety Check List – Part 1A. Tanker checks pre-arrival\nitem 6. Pressure/vacuum valves and or high velocity vents are operational (11.1.8)\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n3.9.12 All pressure and vacuum relief openings should be fitted with flame screens with easy access for cleaning and\nrenewal. The flame screens should be at the inlets and outlets of any relief device and be of robust construction\nsufficient to withstand the pressure of gas generated at maximum loading and during ballasting operations while\npresenting minimum resistance.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• IGS and venting system\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.3.2.1 The venting arrangements in each cargo tank may be independent or combined with other cargo tanks and\nmay be incorporated into the inert gas piping.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 11\n6.1 General\nThe venting arrangements shall be so designed and operated as to ensure that neither pressure nor vacuum in cargo\ntanks shall exceed design parameters and be such as to provide for:\n1.\n2.\nthe flow of the small volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures caused by thermal variations in a cargo\ntank in all cases through pressure/vacuum valves; and\nthe passage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo loading and ballasting, or\nduring discharging.\n6.4 Size of vent outlets\nVent outlets for cargo loading, discharging and ballasting required by paragraph 6.1.2 shall be designed on the basis\nof the maximum designed loading rate multiplied by a factor of at least 1.25 to take account of gas evolution, in order\nto prevent the pressure in any cargo tank from exceeding the design pressure. The master shall be provided with\ninformation regarding the maximum permissible loading rate for each cargo tank and in the case of combined venting\nsystems, for each group of cargo tanks.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\ncargo tank venting systems including, where fitted:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• P/V valves.\nHigh velocity vents\nMast risers\nVent stacks.\nVacuum valves.\nFlame screens.\nVapour lines.\nP/V valves and/or high velocity vents should be checked for free movement prior to the commencement of each\ncargo operation as required by the Ship Shore Safety Check List – Part 1A. Tanker checks pre-arrival, item 6.\nHigh velocity vents should not be jacked open, particularly when loading. Their correct operation relies on a pressure\nbuild-up within the compartment, which opens the valve at a predetermined level, and which then results in a gas exit\nvelocity of a minimum of 30 metres/sec. The high velocity flow means no flame screen is needed at the vapour outlet\non this type of valve.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and pre-operational tests of P/V valves and/or high velocity\nvents.\nReview the information provided regarding the maximum permissible loading rate for each cargo tank and in\nthe case of combined venting systems, for each group of cargo tanks.\nAssess the condition of, where fitted:\no P/V valves.\no High velocity vents\no Mast risers.\no Vent stacks.\no Vacuum valves.\no Flame screens.\no Vapour lines.\nVerify that high velocity vents were being operated correctly.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting\nsystems.\nRecords of inspection and maintenance of P/V valves and/or high velocity vents, which may be contained in\nthe planned maintenance system.\nShip Shore Safety Check Lists\nInformation regarding the maximum permissible loading rate for each cargo tank and in the case of\ncombined venting systems, for each group of cargo tanks.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.\nThere were no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo tank venting systems.\nP/V valves and/or high velocity vents had not been checked for free movement prior to the commencement\nof each cargo operation as required by the Ship Shore Safety Check List – Part 1A. Tanker checks prearrival, item 6.\nNo information was available regarding the maximum permissible loading rate for each cargo tank and in the\ncase of combined venting systems, for each group of cargo tanks.\nThe flame screen for a P/V valve or mast riser was damaged, clogged or missing.\nA P/V valve and/or high velocity vent was passing vapour or drawing air inside its design pressure or\nvacuum setting.\nHigh velocity vents had been jacked open during cargo operations.\nA vapour line was in unsatisfactory condition, for example, heavily corroded or with soft patches.\nA P/V valve or high velocity vent was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.15.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for monitoring", "c": "leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps, and had regular purging of the\ncofferdams taken place to identify any excessive leakage?\nShort Question Text\nDeepwell pump cofferdam purging.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel’s deep well pumps are always in full operational condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) Fifth Edition\n5.5.2 Deepwell pumps\n…The pump’s cofferdam should be purged regularly to allow checking for any signs of leakage past the shaft seals\nthat protect the cofferdam.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell\npumps which included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPurging procedures.\nSafety precautions to be followed when purging cofferdams.\nPrecautions with regards to purging medium and purging medium pressure.\nFrequency of purging.\nRecords to be maintained.\nGuidance on acceptable levels of leakage from both the cargo and hydraulic oil sides.\nActions to be taken when unacceptable levels of leakage are encountered.\nPrecautions to be taken when handling specialist cargo types.\n• •\nActions, if any, to be taken to prevent cofferdam blockage when carrying heated or solidifying cargo.\nActions to be taken when a cofferdam is blocked by solidified cargo.\nThese procedures may refer to the manufacturer’s instruction manual and form part of the vessel’s planned\nmaintenance system.\nIn line with manufacturer’s instructions, the cofferdams of deepwell pumps should be purged regularly, with air or an\ninert gas, to monitor the condition of the seals and detect any leakage of cargo, hydraulic or lubricating oil into the\ncofferdams.\nWhen purging deepwell pump cofferdams, the exhaust gas and any entrained liquid are likely to be hazardous and\nsuitable safety precautions should be taken, including wearing suitable PPE.\nDetailed records of purging routines should be maintained, the results analysed, and suitable action taken when\nabnormal leakage is detected.\nIn some cases, small leakage rates during pump operation are normal, rates may vary with the properties of different\ncargoes. The manufacturer’s instruction manuals should provide guidance on acceptable limits.\nWhen handling heated or solidifying cargoes, the cofferdams may be filled with, for example, diesel oil or a light\nlubricating oil to keep any leakage into the cofferdam in liquid form.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of\ndeepwell pumps.\nReview the records of purging of the deepwell pump cofferdams.\n• While inspecting a deepwell pump, interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.\no The connections, controls and indicators used during the purging process.\no The maximum pressure permitted for the purging medium.\no The purging medium required for the types of cargo recently carried.\no The manufacturer’s and company guidance on the use of liquid to fill the cofferdams for speciality\nproducts, where this practice was utilised.\n• Interview a selected rating, for example the pumpman, to verify their familiarity with the safety precautions to\nbe taken when purging deepwell pump cofferdams.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.\nManufacturer’s instruction manual(s) for the deepwell pumps.\nRecords of purging of the deepwell pump cofferdams.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedure for monitoring leakage into the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.\no The connections, controls and indicators used during the purging process.\nThe maximum pressure permitted for the purging medium.\nThe purging medium required for the types of cargo recently carried.\nThe manufacturer’s and company guidance on the use of liquid to fill the cofferdams for specialty\nproducts, where this practice was utilised.\nPurging had not been carried out as required by the company procedure for monitoring leakage into the\ncofferdams of deepwell pumps.\nThere were no detailed records of purging as required by the company procedure for monitoring leakage\ninto the cofferdams of deepwell pumps.\nRecords of purging indicated leakage levels above the manufacturer’s set limits for cargo, hydraulic oil or\nlubricating oil for one or more pump, but no defect report(s) had been created to resolve the situation at the\nnext suitable opportunity.\nRecords of purging indicated that the cofferdam of one or more pump was apparently blocked, but no defect\nreport(s) had been created to resolve the situation at the next suitable opportunity.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the safety precautions to be taken when purging the deepwell\npump cofferdams.\no\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• Where purging records indicated that one or more pumps had leakage levels above the manufacturer’s set limits or\nthat the cofferdams were blocked, but a defect report had been created to correct the situation at the next suitable\nopportunity, enter a comment in Hardware response tool and provide brief details of the defects recorded.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.16.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing and", "c": "maintenance of the non-return devices installed in the inert gas system, and were these\ndevices in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nInert gas system non-return devices\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the devices installed in the inert gas system to prevent the return of vapour and liquid to the inert\ngas plant, or to any gas-safe spaces, function correctly.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.5.2 Inert gas system maintenance\nThe deck and engine departments should cooperate closely to ensure the IG system is maintained and operated\nproperly. It is important to make sure that non-return barriers function correctly, especially the deck water seal or\nblock and bleed valves, so that there is no possibility of petroleum gas or liquid petroleum passing back to the\nmachinery spaces.\nTo demonstrate that the IG plant is fully operational and in good working order, a record of inspection of the plant,\nincluding defects and their rectification, should be maintained on board.\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.2.2.6 Where a double block and bleed valve is installed, the system shall ensure upon of loss of power, the block\nvalves are automatically closed, and the bleed valve is automatically open.\n2.2.3.1 Non-return devices\n2.2.3.1.1 At least two non-return devices shall be fitted in order to prevent the return of vapour and liquid to the inert\ngas plant, or to any gas-safe spaces.\n2.2.3.1.2 The first non-return device shall be a deck seal of the wet, semi-wet, or dry type or a double block and bleed\narrangement. Two shut-off valves in series with a venting valve in between, may be accepted provided:\n1.\nthe operation of the valve is automatically executed. Signal(s) for opening/closing is (are) to be taken from\nthe process directly, e.g. inert gas flow or differential pressure; and\n2.\nalarm for faulty operation of the valves is provided, e.g. the operation status of \"blower stop\" and \"supply\nvalve(s) open\" is an alarm condition.\n2.2.3.1.3 The second non-return device shall be a non-return valve or equivalent capable of preventing the return of\nvapours and liquids and fitted between the deck water seal (or equivalent device) and the first connection from the\ninert gas main to a cargo tank. It shall be provided with positive means of closure. As an alternative to positive means\nof closure, an additional valve having such means of closure may be provided between the non-return valve and the\nfirst connection to the cargo tanks to isolate the deck water seal, or equivalent device, from the inert gas main to the\ncargo tanks.\n2.2.3.1.4 A water seal, if fitted, shall be capable of being supplied by two separate pumps, each of which shall be\ncapable of maintaining an adequate supply at all times. The audible and visual alarm on the low level of water in the\nwater seal shall operate at all times.\n2.2.3.1.5 The arrangement of the water seal, or equivalent devices, and its associated fittings shall be such that it will\nprevent backflow of vapours and liquids and will ensure the proper functioning of the seal under operating conditions.\n2.2.3.1.6 Provision shall be made to ensure that the water seal is protected against freezing, in such a way that the\nintegrity of seal is not impaired by overheating.\n2.2.3.1.7 A water loop or other approved arrangement shall also be fitted to each associated water supply and\ndrainpipe and each venting or pressure-sensing pipe leading to gas-safe spaces. Means shall be provided to prevent\nsuch loops from being emptied by vacuum.\n2.2.3.1.8 Any water seal, or equivalent device, and loop arrangements shall be capable of preventing return of\nvapours and liquids to an inert gas plant at a pressure equal to the test pressure of the cargo tanks.\n2.2.3.1.9 The non-return devices shall be located in the cargo area on deck.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n9.4 Deck water seal\n9.4.1 This unit performs an important function and must be maintained in good condition. Corroded inlet pipes and\ndamage to float-controlled valves are not uncommon. The overboard drain line and connection are also possible\nsources of trouble.\n9.5 The non-return valve should be opened for inspection to check for corrosion and also to check the condition of the\nvalve seat.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code…\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\ninert gas system which included the:\n• •\nDeck seal or double block and bleed arrangement.\nNon-return valve.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board. This may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nThe type of deck seal fitted to the vessel will be extracted from the HVPQ and inserted in the inspection editor and\nthe final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the inert gas system which included the:\no deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement\no non-return valve\nInspect the IG main non-return valve and verify it had been opened and inspected as required by company\nprocedures.\nInspect the deck seal, if fitted, and verify that the:\no Water level gauge is clear and readable.\no Water level is as required.\no Overall fabric condition of the deck seal is satisfactory, including pipework.\no Deck seal had been opened and inspected as required by company procedures, including\npipework.\nInspect the double block and bleed arrangement, if fitted, and verify that:\no All valves are operating automatically.\no There was evidence that the valves had been tested/inspected for automatic operation and\ntightness.\nWhere necessary, review the records for the inspection, testing and maintenance of the non-return devices\ninstalled in the inert gas system.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, testing and\nmaintenance of the non-return devices installed in the inert gas system\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas\nsystem.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the non-return devices installed in the inert gas\nsystem.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas\nsystem that included the:\no deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement\no non-return valve\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the inert gas system that included the:\no deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement\no non-return valve\nThere was no evidence that the IG main non-return valve had been opened and inspected as required by\ncompany procedures.\nThere was no evidence that the block and bleed valve arrangement, where fitted, had been tested/inspected\nfor automatic operation and tightness.\nThe deck seal level gauge was not clear and readable.\nThe deck seal water level was not as required.\nThe fabric condition of the deck seal, including pipework, was not satisfactory.\nThere was no evidence to show the deck seal had been opened and inspected, including pipework, as\nrequired by company procedures.\nThe valves of the double block and bleed arrangement were not operating automatically as required.\nThe non-return devices installed in the inert gas system were defective in any respect.\nWhere a dry-type deck seal is fitted record as a comment in the Hardware response tool.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.17.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use,", "c": "inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework,\nand were these items in satisfactory condition and properly fitted when in use?\nShort Question Text\nManifold reducers and spool pieces.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework meet the required pressure\nrating for the cargo transfer system and will not leak at the flange face when used.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n23.6.3 Reducers and spool pieces\nReducers and spool pieces should be made of steel and be fitted with flanges that conform to the American Society\nof Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard B16.5, Class 150 or equivalent (see OCIMF/CDI’s Recommendation for\nOil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment).\nAll spool pieces and reducers should have lifting lugs fitted close to the centre of balance so that they can be handled\nmore easily. The handles should not interfere with quick acting coupling devices or the bolting of flanges. When in\nstorage, flange faces should be suitably protected.\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment. First\nEdition.\n4.3 Distance pieces\nDistance pieces should be fitted outboard of the manifold valves and immediately inboard of the reducer or spool\npiece.\n4.4 Spool pieces and reducers\nTo protect the fixed manifold flange, a spool piece or reducer that in turn connects to the loading arm or hose should\nbe used.\nNo more than one spool piece or reducer should be fitted between the manifold flange and the flange presented for\nconnection.\nLifting lugs\nAll spool pieces and reducers should be fitted with a lifting lug. This lug should be placed as near to the centre of\ngravity as possible and at a location that should not interfere with either the operation of quick acting couplers or with\nthe bolting up of flanges.\nPresentation flanges, material and design\nThe number of reducers carried, and the size of presentation flanges, should be in accordance with tables 4.1 and\n4.2. Typically, the principal reducers may be kept bolted in place. On the occasions when a smaller presentation\nflange is required, the principal reducers should be removed and replaced by the required size reducer.\nThe presentation flanges should be kept vertical and have flat faces. Gasket contact surfaces should be machined\nand finished with a continuous spiral groove, in accordance with ASME B16.5.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n6.7.2 Manifold connections\nReducers and spool pieces should be made of material that is compatible with the cargo and complies with relevant\nindustry standards. Where long reducers or spool pieces are used the resulting lengths should be properly supported\nto prevent undue stress.\nUSCG: CFR 33 Part 156.170 Equipment tests and inspections.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may use any equipment listed in paragraph (c) of\nthis section for transfer operations unless the vessel or facility operator, as appropriate, tests and inspects the\nequipment in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) of this section and the equipment is in the condition\nspecified in paragraph (c) of this section.\n(b) During any test or inspection required by this section, the entire external surface of the hose must be accessible.\n(c) For the purpose of paragraph (a) of this section:\n(4) Each loading arm and each transfer pipe system, including each metallic hose, must not leak under static liquid\npressure at least 1 1/2 times the maximum allowable working pressure;\n(e) The test fluid used for the testing required by this section is limited to liquids that are compatible with the hose\ntube as recommended by the hose manufacturer.\n(f) The frequency of the tests and inspections required by this section must be:\n(3) For vessels, annually or as part of the biennial and mid-period inspections.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Cargo/bunker line pressure testing\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers,\nspool pieces and other portable pipework that included guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nProvision of test certification.\nSuitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces.\nRegular inspection.\nPressure testing at least annually.\nRecords to be maintained of inspections and tests.\nAll manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework should be provided with pressure test certificates.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework should have the same or greater certified rating as\nthe fixed manifold piping to which it is connected.\nManifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework should be marked with the date and pressure of the last\ntest.\nOther portable pipework may include cargo Y pieces, spiders or other hard configurations.\nThis question will apply to all manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework carried onboard\nfor use for cargo or bunker operations unless they are clearly marked as out of service for refurbishment.\nWhere reducers or spool pieces are provided by the terminal this question will apply in respect of:\n• •\nPhysical condition and pressure rating.\nThe number of reducers fitted between the manifold flange and the flange presented for connection.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold\nreducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nReview the inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nReview the records of inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable\npipework.\nDuring the inspection, observe the disposition and visual condition of the manifold reducers, spool pieces\nand other portable pipework.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection and testing of manifold\nreducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nRequest that the blanks or covers are removed from at least one stored reducer or spool piece and verify\nthat the presentation flanges were undamaged and free from pitting or scoring.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other\nportable pipework.\nThe inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nRecords of the inspection and pressure testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable\npipework.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces\nand other portable pipework that included guidance on:\no The correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\no Provision of test certification.\no Suitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces.\no Regular inspection.\no Pressure testing at least annually.\no Records to be maintained of inspections and tests.\nThere was no inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the use, inspection and testing\nof manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nTest certification was not available for a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework.\nThere were no records available for the inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other\nportable pipework as required by company procedures.\nInspection of the manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework indicated that the required\ninspections and tests had either not been performed or were ineffective.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework:\no Had not been pressure tested to 100% MAWP within the last 12 months.\no Was not marked with the date and pressure of the last test.\no Did not have the same certified rating (MAWP) as the fixed manifold piping to which it was\nconnected.\nThe position of handles or lugs on reducers in use during cargo transfer operations interfered with quick\nacting coupling devices or the bolting of flanges.\nMore than one spool piece or reducer was fitted between the fixed manifold flange and the flange presented\nfor connection.\nThe flange face of a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework was visibly damaged,\ncorroded or in an unsatisfactory condition.\nWhere a long reducer or spool piece was in use, it was not properly supported to prevent undue stress.\n(applicable to chemical tankers only)\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time of the\ninspection was defective in any respect.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time of the\ninspection had been repaired but there was no evidence that it had been pressure tested on completion of\nthe repairs.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.18.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation, testing and", "c": "maintenance of the pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device(s) installed in the inert gas\nmain, and was this device(s) in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nInert gas system pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device(s)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo tanks are not subject to excessive pressure or vacuum should the inert gas system fail or\nwhere the venting system is used inappropriately.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.1.8.1 Pressure/Vacuum breakers\nP/V breakers are usually liquid filled and it is important that the correct density liquid is used, and the appropriate\nlevel maintained. The P/V breakers should be marked with their High Pressure (HP) and vacuum opening pressures,\nthe date of the last inspection, the type of anti-freeze and the lowest operating temperature.\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\n3.9.12 All pressure and vacuum relief openings should be fitted with flame screens with easy access for cleaning and\nrenewal. The flame screens should be at the inlets and outlets of any relief device and be of robust construction\nsufficient to withstand the pressure of gas generated at maximum loading and during ballasting operations while\npresenting minimum resistance.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code…\nChapter II-2 regulation 11 Para 6\n6.3.4 Pressure/vacuum-breaking devices\nOne or more pressure/vacuum-breaking devices shall be provided to prevent the cargo tanks from being subject to:\n.1 a positive pressure, in excess of the test pressure of the cargo tank, if the cargo were to be loaded at the maximum\nrated capacity and all other outlets are left shut; and\n.2 a negative pressure in excess of 700 mm water gauge if cargo were to be discharged at the maximum rated\ncapacity of the cargo pumps and the inert gas blowers were to fail.\nSuch devices shall be installed on the inert gas main unless they are installed in the venting system required by\nregulation 4.5.3.1 or on individual cargo tanks. The location and design of the devices shall be in accordance with\nregulation 4.5.3 and paragraph 6.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\ninert gas system which included the pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) devices.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board. This may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nThe P/V breaker should not be set to operate at a lower pressure than that of the secondary venting system fitted to\nthe individual cargo tanks.\nIn all cases, the P/V breaker should be set within the safe parameters of the tank structure.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the inert gas system which included the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices.\nInspect the P/V breaker(s) and verify that it is marked with the:\no Design pressure and vacuum opening settings.\no Date of the last inspection.\no Type/quantity of anti-freeze and the lowest allowable ambient temperature.\nAssess the fabric condition of the P/V breaker(s), including flame screens.\nWhere possible, verify the liquid level in the P/V breaker(s).\nWhere necessary, review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the pressure/vacuum\nbreaking device(s) installed in the inert gas system.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The purpose of the pressure/vacuum breaking device(s) installed in the inert gas system.\no The method of verifying the correct liquid level in the P/V breaker, especially where the level could\nonly be verified at atmospheric pressure.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas\nsystem.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the pressure/vacuum breaking device(s) installed in\nthe inert gas system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas\nsystem that included the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the inert gas system that included the pressure/vacuum-breaking devices.\nThe fabric condition of a P/V breaker was unsatisfactory.\nP/V breaker flame screens were damaged, missing, fitted with gaps, or had been repaired with mesh which\ndid not conform to the required mesh gauge specification.\nThe liquid level in a P/V breaker indicated that the device was not filled to the design settings.\nThe P/V breaker liquid level gauge was not clear and readable.\nA P/V breaker was not marked with the:\no Design pressure and vacuum opening settings.\no Date of the last inspection.\no Type/quantity of anti-freeze and the lowest allowable temperature.\nA P/V breaker was\no Set to operate at a lower pressure than that of the secondary venting system\no Not set within the safe parameters of the tank structure.\no Defective in any respect.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The purpose of a liquid P/V breaker.\no The process to verify the liquid level in a liquid P/V breaker.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.19.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of", "c": "the indicators and alarms in the inert gas system, and had the equipment been operated,\nmaintained and calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and\ncompany procedures?\nShort Question Text\nIndicators and alarms for the inert gas system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: FSS Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with its design criteria.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\nISGOTT Checks pre-arrival Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 1B. Tanker: checks pre-arrival if using an inert gas system\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.2.4 Indicators and alarms\n2.2.4.1 The operation status of the inert gas system shall be indicated in a control panel.\n2.2.4.2 Instrumentation shall be fitted for continuously indicating and permanently recording, when inert gas is being\nsupplied:\n1.\n2.\nthe pressure of the inert gas mains forward of the non-return devices; and\nthe oxygen content of the inert gas.\n2.2.4.3 The indicating and recording devices shall be placed in the cargo control room where provided. But where no\ncargo control room is provided, they shall be placed in a position easily accessible to the officer in charge of cargo\noperations.\n2.2.4.4 In addition, meters shall be fitted:\n1.\nin the navigating bridge to indicate at all times the pressure referred to in paragraph 2.2.4.2.1 and the\npressure in the slop tanks of combination carriers, whenever those tanks are isolated from the inert gas\nmain; and\n2.\nin the machinery control room or in the machinery space to indicate the oxygen content referred to in\nparagraph 2.2.4.2.2.\n2.2.4.5 Audible and visual alarms\n2.2.4.5.1 Audible and visual alarms shall be provided, based on the system designed, to indicate:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\noxygen content in excess of 5% by volume.\nfailure of the power supply to the indicating devices as referred to in paragraph 2.2.4.2.\ngas pressure less than 100 mm water gauge. The alarm arrangement shall be such as to ensure that the\npressure in slop tanks in combination carriers can be monitored at all times.\nhigh-gas pressure; and\nfailure of the power supply to the automatic control system.\n2.2.4.5.2 The alarms required in paragraphs 2.2.4.5.1.1, 2.2.4.5.1.3 and 2.2.4.5.1.5 shall be fitted in the machinery\nspace and cargo control room, where provided, but in each case in such a position that they are immediately received\nby responsible members of the crew.\n2.2.4.5.3 An audible alarm system independent of that required in paragraph 2.2.4.5.1.3 or automatic shutdown of\ncargo pumps shall be provided to operate on predetermined limits of low pressure in the inert gas main being\nreached.\n2.2.4.5.4 Two oxygen sensors shall be positioned at appropriate locations in the space or spaces containing the inert\ngas system. If the oxygen level falls below 19%, these sensors shall trigger alarms, which shall be both visible and\naudible inside and outside the space or spaces and shall be placed in such a position that they are immediately\nreceived by responsible members of the crew.\n2.3 Requirements for flue gas and inert gas generator systems\n2.3.2 Indicators and alarms\n2.3.2.1 In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.2.4.2, means shall be provided for continuously indicating the\ntemperature of the inert gas at the discharge side of the system, whenever it is operating.\n2.3.2.2 In addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.2.4.5, audible and visual alarms shall be provided to indicate:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\ninsufficient fuel oil supply to the oil-fired inert gas generator.\nfailure of the power supply to the generator.\nlow water pressure or low water flow rate to the cooling and scrubbing arrangement.\nhigh water level in the cooling and scrubbing arrangement.\nhigh gas temperature.\nfailure of the inert gas blowers; and\nlow water level in the water seal.\n2.4 Requirements for nitrogen generator systems\n2.4.2 Indicators and alarms\n2.4.2.1 In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.2.4.2, instrumentation is to be provided for continuously\nindicating the temperature and pressure of air at the suction side of the nitrogen generator.\n2.4.2.2 In addition to the requirements in paragraph 2.2.4.5, audible and visual alarms shall be provided to include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nfailure of the electric heater, if fitted.\nlow feed-air pressure or flow from the compressor.\nhigh-air temperature; and\n4.\nhigh condensate level at automatic drain of water separator.\nIMO Inert Gas Systems\n3.14 Instrumentation and alarms\n3.14.1 Certain fixed and portable instruments are required for the safe and effective operation of an inert gas system.\nIt is desirable that all instruments should be graduated to a consistent system of units.\n3.14.2 Clear instructions should be provided for operating, calibrating and testing all instruments and alarms. Suitable\ncalibration facilities should be provided.\n3.14.4 The arrangement of scrubber instrumentation and alarm should be as follows:\n.1 The water flow to the scrubber should be monitored either by a flow meter or by pressure gauges. An alarm should\nbe initiated when the water flow drops below the designed flow requirements by a predetermined amount and the\ninert gas blowers should be stopped automatically in the event of a further reduction in the flow. The precise setting of\nthe alarm and shut-down limits should be related to individual scrubber designs and materials.\n.2 The water level in the scrubber shall be monitored by a high-water level alarm. This alarm should be given when\npre-determined limits are reached, and the scrubber pump shut down when the level rises above set limits. These\nlimits should be set having regard to the scrubber design and flooding of the scrubber inlet piping from the boiler\nuptakes.\n.3 The inert gas temperature at the discharge side of the gas blowers shall be monitored. An alarm should be given\nwhen the temperature reaches 65 ° C and automatic shut-down of the inert gas blowers should be arranged if the\ntemperature reaches 75 ° C.\n.4 If a precooler is necessary at the scrubber inlet to protect coating materials in the scrubber, the arrangements for\ngiving an alarm in .3 above should apply to the outlet temperature from the precooler.\n.5 To monitor the scrubber efficiency, it is recommended that the cooler water inlet and outlet temperatures, and the\nscrubber differential pressures are indicated.\n.6 All sensing probes, floats and sensors required to be in contact with the water and gas in the scrubber should be\nmade from materials resistant to acidic attack.\n3.14.5 For the deck water seal, an alarm should be given when the water level falls by a pre-determined amount but\nbefore the seal is rendered ineffective. For certain types of deck water seals, such as the dry type, the water level\nalarm may require to be suppressed when inert gas is being supplied to the inert gas distribution system.\n3.14.6 The pressure of the inert gas in the inert gas main shall be monitored. An alarm should be given when the\npressure reaches the set limit. The set limit should be set having regard to the design of cargo tanks, mechanical\nnon-return valve and deck water seal.\n3.14.8 A sampling point should be provided between the automatic gas pressure regulating valve and the deck water\nseal for use with portable instruments.\n3.14.9 The inert gas pressure sensor and recorder should obtain the signal from a point in the inert gas main between\nthe deck isolating/non-return valve and the cargo tanks.\n3.14.10 When the pressure in the inert gas main forward of the non-return devices falls below 50 millimetres water\ngauge means shall be provided to give an audible alarm or to shut down the main cargo pumps automatically.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1\nJanuary 2016, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system in accordance with the\nrequirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73), except that the Administration\nmay accept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.2 For tankers of 8,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed on or after 1 January 2016 when carrying\ncargoes described in regulation 1.6.1 or 1.6.2, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas\nsystem in accordance with the requirements of the Fire Safety Systems Code, except that the Administration may\naccept other equivalent systems or arrangements, as described in paragraph 5.5.4.\n5.5.1.3 Tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted with an inert\ngas system complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code and with fixed tank washing machines. However, inert gas\nsystems fitted on tankers constructed on or after 1 July 2002 but before 1 January 2016 shall comply with the Fire\nSafety Systems Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.98(73).\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system which included the indicators and alarms and gave guidance on the:\n• •\nMethod and frequency of testing and calibration of the indicators and alarms.\nActions to be taken in the event of a failure of any of the indicators and alarms.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system and may refer to the\nmanufacturer’s instruction and maintenance manual for the indicators and alarms.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nClear instructions should be provided for operating, calibrating and testing all instruments and alarms. Suitable\ncalibration facilities should be provided.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system which included the indicators and alarms.\nInspect the inert gas system fixed instrumentation, controls, indicators and alarms and verify:\no The oxygen and pressure recording devices were accurately recording the inert gas oxygen\ncontent and main IG line pressure against the date and time.\no Lamps and indicators were functioning by requesting that the lamp and alarm test feature is\noperated.\nVerify that the local and remote indicators for oxygen content, inert gas pressure, temperature etc. were\nconsistent.\n• •\nReview the test and calibration records for the inert gas system instruments and alarms.\nWhere necessary review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system and\nverify that scheduled inspections and maintenance on the equipment had taken place.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, and testing of the\ninert gas system indicators and alarms including the:\no Method and frequency of testing and calibration of the indicators and alarms.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of any of the indicators and alarms.\no Actions to be taken in the event of the activation of any of the alarms.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the inert gas system.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manuals for the operation, calibration and testing of all inert gas system\ninstruments and alarms.\nThe test and calibration records for the inert gas system instruments and alarms.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the indicators and alarms.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation, inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the inert gas system indicators and alarms including the:\no Method and frequency of testing and calibration of the indicators and alarms.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a failure of any of the indicators and alarms.\nThe record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, was\nmissing or incomplete.\nThe inert gas control panel pressure indicator and/or recorder was:\no Defective in any respect.\no Not consistent with local pressure indicator(s) on deck.\nThe inert gas control panel oxygen content indicator and/or recorder was\no Defective in any respect.\no Not consistent with the local indicator at the fixed oxygen analyser.\nThe inert gas pressure indicator fitted in the navigating bridge was inoperative or not consistent with the inert\ngas control panel pressure indicator.\nThe machinery space control room/machinery space inert gas oxygen content indicator was inoperative or\nnot consistent with the local indicator at the fixed oxygen analyser.\nAny of the required audible and visual alarms in the inert gas control panel or in the engine control\nroom/machinery space were inoperative.\nThe independent audible alarm or automatic shutdown of cargo pumps at low-low inert gas pressure in the\ninert gas main was inoperative.\nThere were no clear instructions provided for operating, calibrating and testing all instruments and alarms.\nThere were no suitable calibration facilities provided for the inert gas instrumentation.\nThere were no records of calibration for the inert gas instrumentation.\nInert gas instruments were not graduated to a consistent system of units, for example, inert gas pressure\nindicators.\nInert gas system indicators and alarms were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.20.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose and operation of the", "c": "connections and interconnections to the inert gas system for routine and emergency\ninert gas operations, and were these arrangements in satisfactory condition and clearly\nidentified as to their purpose?\nShort Question Text\nConnections and interconnections to/with the inert gas system piping\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: FSS Code\nIMO: Inert Gas Systems\nIACS UI SC 272 Inert gas supply to double-hull spaces (SOLAS II-2/4.5.5.1)\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and officers are familiar with the location and use of connections to, and\ninterconnections with, the inert gas system, which may include:\n• •\n• •\nConnections for the emergency supply of inert gas from an external source.\nConnections for portable arrangements to introduce inert gas to the double hull spaces.\nFixed interconnections with the ballast system piping to introduce inert gas to the double hull\nspaces.\nFixed interconnections with the cargo system piping to introduce inert gas to the cargo tanks.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: FSS Code\nChapter 15\n2.2.3.2.6 Arrangements shall be provided to enable the inert gas main to be connected to an external supply of inert\ngas. The arrangements shall consist of a 250 mm nominal pipe size bolted flange, isolated from the inert gas main by\na valve and located forward of the non-return valve referred to in paragraph 2.3.1.4.3. The design of the flange should\nconform to the appropriate class in the standards adopted for the design of other external connections in the ship's\ncargo piping system.\n2.2.3.2.7 If a connection is fitted between the inert gas supply main and the cargo piping system, arrangements shall\nbe made to ensure an effective isolation having regard to the large pressure difference which may exist between the\nsystems. This shall consist of two shutoff valves with an arrangement to vent the space between the valves in a safe\nmanner or an arrangement consisting of a spool-piece with associated blanks.\n2.2.3.2.8 The valve separating the inert gas supply main from the cargo main, and which is on the cargo main side\nshall be a non-return valve with a positive means of closure\nIMO Inert Gas Systems\n3.11 Arrangements for inerting, purging and gas-freeing\n3.11.4 Arrangement II.\nGas is introduced at the bottom of the tank and vented from the top. Gas replacement is by the dilution method. This\narrangement introduces the gas through a connection between the inert gas deck main (just forward of the\nmechanical non-return valve) and the bottom cargo lines.\n8 Emergency procedures\n8.1 In the event of total failure of the inert gas system to deliver the required quality and quantity of inert gas and\nmaintain a positive pressure in the cargo tanks and slop tanks, action must be taken immediately to prevent any air\nbeing drawn into the tank. All cargo tank operations should be stopped, the deck isolating valve should be closed,\nand the vent valve between it and the gas pressure regulating valve should be opened and immediate action should\nbe taken to repair the inert gas system.\n8.2 In the case of tankers engaged in the carriage of crude oil it is essential that the cargo tanks be maintained in the\ninerted condition to avoid the hazard of pyrophoric iron sulphide ignition. If it is assessed that the tanks cannot be\nmaintained in an inerted condition before the inert gas system can be repaired, an external supply of inert gas should\nbe connected to the system through the arrangements required by Reg. 62.11.5 as soon as practicable, to avoid air\nbeing drawn into the cargo tanks.\nIACS UI SC 272 Inert gas supply to double-hull spaces (SOLAS II-2/4.5.5.1)\nDouble-hull spaces required to be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of inert gas as per SOLAS II2/4.5.5.1.4.1 are all ballast tanks and void spaces of double-hull and double-bottom spaces adjacent to the cargo\ntanks, including the forepeak tank and any other tanks and spaces under the bulkhead deck adjacent to cargo tanks,\nexcept cargo pump-rooms and ballast pump-rooms.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• Maintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.1.4 Tankers required to be fitted with inert gas systems shall comply with the following provisions:\n1.\n2.\n3.\ndouble-hull spaces shall be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of inert gas.\nwhere hull spaces are connected to a permanently fitted inert gas distribution system, means shall be\nprovided to prevent hydrocarbon gases from the cargo tanks entering the double hull spaces through the\nsystem; and\nwhere such spaces are not permanently connected to an inert gas distribution system, appropriate means\nshall be provided to allow connection to the inert gas main.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the vessel’s\ninert gas system which included the arrangements for the:\n• •\nSupply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency.\nExternal supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas system.\n• Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gas-freeing,\nwhere such an arrangement was provided.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board. This may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance\nof the vessel’s inert gas system. which included the arrangements for the:\no Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency.\no External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas system.\no Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.\nInspect the\no Arrangements for the supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces, including portable hoses if they\nform part of the arrangements.\no Where hull spaces were connected to a permanently fitted inert gas distribution system, inspect the\nmeans to prevent hydrocarbon gases from the cargo tanks entering the double hull spaces through\nthe system.\no Connection for an external supply of inert gas.\no Arrangements for the connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for\ninerting, purging and gas-freeing, if fitted.\nWhere necessary review the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the arrangements for\nconnection to the inert gas system.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the arrangements for the:\no Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency, including the forepeak where this\nwas adjacent to a cargo space or spaces.\no External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas system.\no Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system.\nThe detailed instruction manuals for the inert gas system.\nCargo and inert gas operation log books.\nThe records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the arrangements for connection to the inert gas\nsystem.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas\nsystem which included the arrangements for the:\no Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency.\no External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas system.\no Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the arrangements for the:\no Supply of inert gas to the double-hull spaces in an emergency, including the forepeak.\no External supply of inert gas in the event of a failure of the vessel’s inert gas system.\no Connection of the inert gas supply main to the cargo piping system for inerting, purging and gasfreeing, if fitted.\nThe connection for the external supply of inert gas was not clearly marked with its purpose.\n• •\n• •\nThe spool piece to isolate the inert gas supply main from the cargo piping system had been left in place.\nThere was no evidence of inspection and maintenance of the non-return valve between the inert gas supply\nmain and the cargo piping system.\nPortable hoses required to connect the inert gas supply main to the double-hull spaces were damaged or\nmissing.\nOne or more of the connections to the inert gas supply main were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.21.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedure for cargo", "c": "heating, and was the cargo heating system in satisfactory condition and tested and used\nin accordance with the company procedure?\nShort Question Text\nCargo heating system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo heating is always conducted in accordance with international regulations, industry\nguidance and within the design criteria of the vessel and its fittings.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.11.1 Loading heated products\nUnless the ship is specially designed to carry very hot cargoes, such as bitumen, high temperature cargoes can\ndamage a tanker’s structure, the cargo tank coatings and equipment such as valves, pumps and gaskets.\nSome Classification Societies have rules on the maximum loading temperature for cargoes. Master should consult\nthe ship operator whenever the temperature of the cargo is more than 60° C.\nPrecautions that may help to ease the effect of a hot cargo are:\nSpreading the cargo throughout the ship as evenly as possible to dissipate the heat and avoid local heat stress.\nEnsuring that tanks and pipelines are completely free of water before receiving any cargo with a temperature above\nthe boiling point of water.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals). Fifth Edition.\n5.10 Heating and Cooling Systems\nMost chemical tankers are provided with systems to heat or cool the cargo. There are two main methods employed to\ncontrol the temperature of the cargo: heating coils and heat exchangers.\n6.4.5 Preparing the cargo system prior to arrival.\nHeating and cooling systems\nIf the cargo to be loaded requires heating or cooling during the voyage, the integrity of the system should be\ninspected and tested for tightness before loading starts.\nIf no heating or cooling is required, it is recommended the heating coils are blown through and blanked.\nIf the heating or cooling medium is incompatible with the cargo to be loaded the system must be blown through and\nthe coils blanked prior to loading.\nTMSA 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for all\nvessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n7.1.1 When provided, any cargo heating or cooling systems shall be constructed, fitted and tested to the satisfaction\nof the Administration. Materials used in the construction of temperature-control systems shall be suitable for use with\nthe product intended to be carried.\n7.1.2 Heating or cooling media shall be of a type approved for use with the specific cargo. Consideration shall be\ngiven to the surface temperature of heating coils or ducts to avoid dangerous reactions from localized overheating or\novercooling of cargo. (See also 15.13.7)\n7.1.3 Heating or cooling systems shall be provided with valves to isolate the system for each tank and to allow\nmanual regulation of flow.\n7.1.4 In any heating or cooling system, means shall be provided to ensure that, when in any condition other than\nempty, a higher pressure can be maintained within the system than the maximum pressure head that could be\nexerted by the cargo tank contents on the system.\n7.1.5 Means shall be provided for measuring the cargo temperature.\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nThe means for measuring the cargo temperature shall be of restricted or closed type, respectively, when a\nrestricted or closed gauging device is required for individual substances, as shown in column j in the table of\nchapter 17.\nA restricted temperature-measuring device is subject to the definition for a restricted gauging device in\n13.1.1.2 (e.g. a portable thermometer lowered inside a gauge tube of the restricted type).\nA closed temperature-measuring device is subject to the definition for a closed gauging device in 13.1.1.3\n(e.g. a remote-reading thermometer of which the sensor is installed in the tank).\nWhen overheating or overcooling could result in a dangerous condition, an alarm system which monitors the\ncargo temperature shall be provided. (See also operational requirements in 16.6.)\n7.1.6 When (toxic) products for which 15.12, 15.12.1 or 15.12.3 are listed in column o in the table of chapter 17 are\nbeing heated or cooled, the heating or cooling medium shall operate in a circuit:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nwhich is independent of other ship’s services, except for another cargo heating or cooling system, and which\ndoes not enter the machinery space; or\nwhich is external to the tank carrying toxic products; or\nwhere the medium is sampled to check for the presence of cargo before it is recirculated to other services of\nthe ship or into the machinery space. The sampling equipment shall be located within the cargo area and be\ncapable of detecting the presence of any toxic cargo being heated or cooled. Where this method is used, the\ncoil return shall be tested not only at the commencement of heating or cooling of a toxic product, but also on\nthe first occasion the coil is used subsequent to having carried an unheated or uncooled toxic cargo.\n16.6 Cargoes not to be exposed to excessive heat\n16.6.2 Heating coils in tanks carrying this product shall be blanked off or secured by equivalent means.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures describing the operation, testing and maintenance of the\ncargo heating system. These procedures should be ship and cargo specific and include, as applicable to the ship\ntype:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nTesting of the heating equipment.\nMonitoring the system return for leaks via an observation tank or other means, including special\narrangements when heating toxic cargoes.\nMaintaining the required pressure in the heating system.\nBlanking of heating coils when carrying cargoes not to be exposed to excessive heat.\nBlanking of coils when the heating or cooling medium is incompatible with the cargo to be loaded.\nThe precautions that may be required when considering the contents of tanks adjacent to heated cargo,\nsuch as allowances for expansion, or the dangers of polymerisation.\nThe means of checking cargo temperatures, including the use of restricted or closed type devices where\nrequired.\nThe means of controlling the heating applied to each cargo tank.\nAvoiding localised overheating of sensitive cargoes.\nThe use of high temperature alarms.\nAny cargo temperature limits set by the operator, class or the coating manufacturer.\nThe records to be maintained of cargo heating and system testing.\nThese procedures may refer to the vessel’s operation manuals, international regulations, industry guidance\npublications, the heating equipment manufacturer’s instructions and/or the coating manufacturer’s instructions.\nVessels may be fitted with heating coils in the cargo tanks or deck mounted heat exchangers, using steam, hot water\nor thermal fluid as a heating medium.\nWhere steam cargo heating systems are fitted and when a heated cargo is being carried at the time of the inspection,\nan indication of the condition of the heating coils can be provided by inspection of the hot well or observation tank. A\nvery small amount of oil on the surface of hot wells or observation tanks can be considered normal, but a layer of oil\nover the surface indicates that there is a problem of some significance.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures describing the operation, testing and\nmaintenance of the cargo heating system.\nInspect the cargo heating system including the:\no Heating coil manifolds and associated pipework, where fitted.\no Deck mounted heat exchangers and associated pipe work, where fitted.\no Observation tank or other means for monitoring the system return.\no Remote temperature indication and alarm system, if fitted.\nSight, and where necessary review, the cargo heating records.\nWhere necessary review the records of the inspection and testing of the cargo heating system.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures describing the\noperation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heating system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures describing the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heating system.\nThe vessel’s operation manuals, where provided.\nThe records of cargo heating system usage.\nThe daily temperature records for heated cargo.\nRecords of the inspection and testing of the cargo heating system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures describing the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heating\nsystem.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures describing the operation, testing\nand maintenance of the cargo heating system including any cargo temperature limits.\nThe cargo heating system had not been operated and/or tested in compliance with company procedures.\nThere were no records of the cargo heating system testing.\nThere were no records of cargo heating operations.\nThe cargo heating system had not been isolated where required in compliance with company procedures.\nThere were no records of the regular monitoring of the cargo heating system return to detect leakage.\nInspection of the observation tank or hot well indicated there was significant leakage in the cargo heating\nsystem.\nThere were leaks of heating medium from the associated pipework on deck or in the engine room.\nOne or more temperature sensors in the remote temperature indicating system were defective.\nCargo heating records indicated cargo temperature limits had been exceeded.\nThere was significant corrosion, pitting, soft patches and/or other temporary repairs on the pipework or\ncomponents of the heating system.\nThe cargo heating system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.22.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for managing", "c": "on-board doping operations, and had these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nCargo doping and additives.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure on-board doping operations are properly planned, risk assessed and performed safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\n12.1.6.16 Doping and additives: anti-static, inhibitors, dyes, hydrogen sulphide knockdown\nDoping is when cargoes are treated with small quantities of specialised additives and fluids, such as dyes, liquid\nmarkers, anti-static agents and lubricants, during loading or before leaving port.\nAs far as possible, doping should be carried out ashore or in closed-line condition. When the additives are flammable\nor toxic, a closed doping operation is recommended. However, some terminals do not have a closed in-line additive\ninjection system, so the additives have to be added manually. Any manual doping activity should be risk assessed.\nAppropriate procedures should be in place to control the associated hazards. Manual doping operations should be\ncarefully planned to minmise the health, safety and environmental impact.\nThe associated risk assessment should include a review of the Safety Data Sheets (SDS) of the cargo and the\nadditive, supplier’s instructions, PPE, physical and operational hazards, supervision, weather, equipment, resources\nand contingency measures. Any free fall of additives into non-inerted cargo tanks should be avoided.\nThe supplier/contractor should draw up a doping plan and communicate this to the ship’s Master before any doping.\nOn receiving the plan, the Master should carry out their own onboard risk assessment and check that all relevant\nitems have been addressed, and the risks reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).\nThe doping plan should be discussed by all personnel involved on the ship and in the terminal. As a minimum, the\nplan should include the method of doping, PPE to be used and the contingency measures.\nThe SDS for any additives should be reviewed as part of the risk assessment process regarding hazard identification\nand risk mitigation measures. A copy of the SDS should be kept in the vicinity of the doping operation.\nIf additives are to be stowed on board, they should be well secured; see section 13.5 for further guidance.\n13.5.2.2 Additives (anti-static, inhibitors, dyes, hydrogen sulphide knockdown)\nThese cargo additives are often loaded on tankers in small containers and delivered with the cargo. So that they can\nbe stowed correctly, they should be accompanied by the appropriate SDS.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals). Fifth Edition.\n1.6.2 Unstable chemicals\nInhibited cargoes\nIf additional inhibitor is left on board for use during the voyage the shipper or charterer should provide instructions on:\n• •\n• The quantity to add;\nHow to add it to the cargo; and\nHow it should be mixed with the cargo.\n6.3.5 Specific cargo handling requirements\nInhibited cargoes\nAdding substances such as powdered inhibitors and other similar material may generate a static charge if introduced\nto the tank by free-fall or pouring the substance from an opening on the cargo deck. Consequently, at the pre-transfer\nconference a safe method of adding inhibitors should be agreed.\nTMSA KPI 6.3.3 requires that the SMS includes procedures for non-routine or specialised cargo and ballast\noperations undertaken in the fleet.\nThese operations may include:\n• Cargo dosing (dyes, additives)\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for managing on-board doping operations that included:\n• •\n• Reviewing the supplier’s/contractor’s doping plan.\nPerforming a risk assessment of the proposed operation.\nSupervising the doping operation.\nPreference is for additive injection at a shore location, or via an in-line injection system, e.g. via a spool piece at the\nship’s manifold. In this case, pressure test records for the injection system should be verified prior to commencing\ncargo operations. Injection may also be carried out via the cargo tank vapour locks.\nDoping via an open tank lid should only take place in exceptional circumstances.\nThe doping plan and associated risk assessment should identify:\n• •\n• •\n• Any flammability or toxicity hazards associated with the additive.\nThe method of doping to be used and any operational restrictions.\nArrangements for supervision by ship’s crew.\nPPE and handling equipment requirements.\nContingency measures including the method of clean-up of any spillages.\n• •\nStorage requirements for any additive to be carried on board.\nAppropriate anti-static precautions if tanks are not inerted.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing on-board doping operations.\nReview records of current and/or past doping operations.\nIf doping operations are taking place during the inspection, observe the operation including the method of\ndoping used, supervision by ship’s crew, use of PPE and anti-static precautions.\nInspect stowage arrangements of any additives stored on board.\nVerify that safety data sheets for any additives stored onboard were available.\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo operations to verify their familiarity with the company procedures\nfor managing on-board doping operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for managing on-board doping operations.\nDoping plans.\nAssociated risk assessments.\nSafety Data Sheets for additives used.\nCargo operation log books.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for managing on-board doping operations that included:\no Reviewing the supplier’s/contractor’s doping plan.\no Performing a risk assessment of the proposed operation.\no Supervising the doping operation.\nThe officer responsible for cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures for managing onboard doping operations.\nThe vessel had not been provided with the supplier’s/contractor’s plan for an on-board doping operation.\nA risk assessment had not been performed based upon the supplier’s/contractor’s plan for an on-board\ndoping operation.\nThe doping plan and/or risk assessment did not include:\no Any flammability or toxicity hazards associated with the additive.\no The method of doping to be used and any operational restrictions.\no Arrangements for supervision by ship’s crew.\no PPE and handling equipment requirements.\no Contingency measures including the method of clean-up of any spillages.\no Storage arrangements of any additives to be carried on board.\no Appropriate anti-static precautions if tanks were not inerted.\nThere was no evidence that the doping plan and/or risk assessment had been discussed by all personnel\ninvolved on the ship and in the terminal, including contractors.\nThere was no Safety Data Sheet:\no Available for the additive(s) used for doping.\no Kept in the vicinity of the doping operation.\nDoping had taken place via an open tank lid when alternative methods were available.\nThe doping method utilised involved free fall of additives into non-inerted cargo tanks.\nAdditives were stored on board in a manner that did not reflect the flammability or toxicity hazards indicated\nin the associated Safety Data Sheet.\nPressure test records were not available for the injection system used for doping.\nPPE as required by the doping plan and/or risk assessment was not being utilised.\n• Contractors were not being supervised by ship’s crew as required by the doping plan and/or risk\nassessment.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.23.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment,\nand was the equipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank temperature monitoring systems.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the cargo temperature monitoring equipment is maintained in full operational condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals.\n12.8.5 Closed gauging for custody transfer\nTemperatures can be taken using electronic thermometers inserted through the tank’s vapour locks. The\nthermometers should also be calibrated and have the appropriate approval certificates\n12.8.6 Cargo tank monitoring systems\nTank monitoring systems often have multiple functions, such as radar or other types of remote gauging, temperature\nmeasurement, tank pressure sensors and level alarms. It may be integrated with other cargo monitoring or control\nequipment or with loading computers or control systems. Manufacturers may refer to these multi-function systems as\ncargo tank monitoring systems.\nWhether provided as a complete system or as separate elements, planned maintenance procedures should be\nestablished to ensure maintenance, test and calibration of this equipment per the manufacturer’s instructions.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n5.3.7 Temperature monitoring equipment\nSensors are fitted so that the temperature of the cargo can be monitored in order to:\n• •\n• Ensure that cargo heating requirements are complied with.\nEnsure that any tank structure and tank coating temperature limitations are not exceeded, and\nCalculate the weight of the cargo on board. (The specific gravity of a product varies according to\ntemperature).\nSensors may also be fitted to monitor the temperatures of the structure around the cargo system.\nTMSA 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are in\nplace for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Tank gauging equipment\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IBC Code\n7.1.5 Means shall be provided for measuring the cargo temperature.\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nThe means for measuring the cargo temperature shall be of restricted or closed type, respectively, when a\nrestricted or closed gauging device is required for individual substances, as shown in column j in the table of\nchapter 17.\nA restricted temperature-measuring device is subject to the definition for a restricted gauging device in\n13.1.1.2 (e.g. a portable thermometer lowered inside a gauge tube of the restricted type).\nA closed temperature-measuring device is subject to the definition for a closed gauging device in 13.1.1.3\n(e.g. a remote-reading thermometer of which the sensor is installed in the tank).\nWhen overheating or overcooling could result in a dangerous condition, an alarm system which monitors the\ncargo temperature shall be provided. (See also operational requirements in 16.6.)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo\ntemperature monitoring equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.\nThese procedures may refer to the equipment manufacturer’s manuals and instructions and in part be contained in\nthe planned maintenance system.\nThe cargo temperature monitoring equipment may be portable ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) instruments or a\nfixed system with sensors fitted in the cargo tanks and remote readouts in the cargo control room, which may be\nintegrated into a cargo tank monitoring system. Visible and audible cargo temperature alarms may be installed in the\ncargo control room and on the bridge.\nPortable UTI equipment should be serviced and calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations and\nvalid certificates of calibration should be provided for each instrument.\n(The safe operation and condition of UTI instruments is addressed by question 8.3.12.)\nFixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment should also be serviced and calibrated in accordance with\nmanufacturer's recommendations. Calibration should be carried out preferably at intervals not exceeding 30 months.\nCalibration of instrumentation is often difficult whilst the vessel is in service, and it is usually carried out during repair\nperiods\nHowever, comparisons between portable and fixed equipment readings provide a practical cross-reference.\nRecords should be maintained of all checks, tests and calibrations.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for the maintenance, testing and calibration of\nthe cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\n• •\nRequest a demonstration of fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment, including alarms, if fitted.\nReview where necessary the:\no Manufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\no Records of checks, tests and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures for the maintenance,\ntesting and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures for the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring\nequipment.\nManufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\nRecords of checks, tests and calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and calibration of the cargo temperature\nmonitoring equipment in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the maintenance, testing and\ncalibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate the operation of the fixed cargo temperature\nmonitoring equipment, including alarms.\nThere were no records of checks, tests or calibration of the cargo temperature monitoring equipment.\nThe fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and calibrated in accordance with\nmanufacturer’s instructions.\nThe fixed cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been calibrated within the last 30 months.\nPortable cargo temperature monitoring equipment had not been tested and calibrated in accordance with\nmanufacturer’s instructions.\nOne or more temperature sensor in the fixed cargo temperature monitoring system was defective.\nThe visible and/or audible alarm in the fixed temperature monitoring system was defective.\nThe cargo temperature monitoring equipment was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.24.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for managing", "c": "cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds, and were the manifold\narrangements in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo manifold arrangements.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Manifold\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IBC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo and vapour manifolds are always properly connected and monitored throughout cargo\ntransfer operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n9.9.1 Manifold platform\nSometimes this platform is higher than two metres and may not have edge protection. Where fitted, edge protection\nmay be temporarily removed to allow hose connection. The risk of falling from height means adequate safety\nprecautions are needed.\n18.1.8 Precautions when connecting and disconnecting Marine Loading Arms\nWhere an elevated manifold platform is fitted, without fixed or movable protections, the area should be properly\nidentified and marked by warning signs to prevent falls.\n11.7 Stern loading and discharging arrangements\nUsing a stern manifold for cargo transfer operations introduces additional hazards and operational concerns.\nProcedures should address the following:\n• •\nThe dangerous area extending at least three metres from the manifold valve should be clearly marked. No\nunauthorised personnel should be allowed in this area during the entire cargo operation.\nElimination of potential sources of ignition from accommodation openings and electrical fittings. Air inlets\nand doors to enclosed spaces should be kept closed.\n12.1.14.3 Line draining\n…Draining any product from the MLAs or hoses into open drip-trays should be avoided. The contents of portable or\nfixed drip-trays should be transferred to a slop tank or other safe container.\n18.1.2 Forces on manifolds\nWhere supports or jacks are used, they should be fitted in such a way that they stand directly onto the deck or some\nother substantial support. They should never be placed onto fixtures or fittings that are not capable of, or suitable for,\nsupporting the load.\n18.2 Cargo hoses\n18.2.10 Handling. Lifting and suspending\nLifting bridles and saddles should be provided. The use of steel wires in direct contact with the hose cover should not\nbe permitted. Certified lifting straps should be used. They should be positioned so that the hose does not fold over on\nitself (sharp kinks in the hoses should be avoided). Lifting equipment should be appropriately sized to accommodate\nthe weight of the hose when full of product.\nStraps should be placed strategically to allow the flange to align horizontally. This will improve hose connection\nefficiency.\nExcessive weight on the ship’s manifold should be avoided… Adequate support for the hose, when connected to the\nmanifold should be provided. Where this support is via a single lifting point, such as a hose crane, the hose string\nshould be supported by bridles or webbing straps. Some hoses are specifically designed to be unsupported.\nFigure 18.4: Hose handling arrangement\n23.6.2 Removing blank flanges\nEach tanker and terminal manifold flange should have a removable blank flange made of steel or other approved\nmaterial, preferably fitted with handles.\nBlank flanges should be capable of withstanding the working pressure of the line or system they are connected to.\nThey should also be as thick as the end flange they are fitted to.\n23.6.3 Reducers and spool pieces\nManifold pressure gauges should be fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve to the spool piece or reducer.\n23.7 Spills and leaks\n23.7.1 General\nThe cargo transfer system should be checked at the start of cargo transfer and at agreed intervals. This should\ninclude tanker outboard manifolds, pipelines, MLAs, cargo hoses, unused connections, blanks, valves and waterside\nchecks.\n23.7.5 Spill containment\nA permanently fitted spill tank, with suitable means of draining, should be fitted under all tanker/terminal manifold\nconnections. If no permanent spill tank is fitted, portable drip-trays should be placed under each connection to catch\nany leaks. Avoid plastic and other non-metallic containers unless bonding is possible.\n23.7.6 Tanker and terminal cargo and bunker pipelines not in use\nValve tightness should not be relied on to stop the escape or seepage of oil.\nAll the tanker’s cargo and bunker pipelines not in use should be securely blanked at the manifold. Where fitted, cargo\npipelines to stern or bow manifolds should be drained of cargo and isolated from the tanker’s main pipeline system.\nFor stern manifolds this will require physical blanking or removal of a spool piece to fully isolate the line forward of the\naccommodation.\n23.7.7.2 Misconnection of liquid and vapour lines\nTo prevent the possible misconnection of the vapour manifold to a liquid loading line, a mechanical keying\narrangement should be provided for vapor manifold presentation flanges as follows:\n1.\n2.\nThe bolt locations should be arranged so that two bolts straddle the 12 o’clock position at the top of the\nflange face.\nOne cylindrical stud should be permanently attached to each of the presentation flange faces at the 12\no’clock position on the flange bolt circles.\n23.9.4 Tugs and other craft alongside\nThe midships cargo handling crane should not be used while cargo operations are underway because of a risk of a\nsuspended load falling onto the pressurised manifold pipelines.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n6.7.2 Manifold connections\nA bolt should be fitted in every hole, then tightened correctly and evenly. Nuts and bolts should be of the correct size\nand material. Damaged bolts should not be used. Improvised arrangements using G-clamps or similar devices are\nnot permitted under any circumstances.\nThe IBC Code requires that flanges at the manifold are provided with shields to guard against spray from acid\ncargoes. It is recommended to use such shields to protect against spray from other cargoes that are toxic or\ncorrosive.\n6.7.18 Disconnection of cargo hoses\nCare should always be taken to avoid incompatible cargoes being mixed in cargo and stripping lines, slop tanks,\ndrain tanks and manifold drip-trays.\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment\n1.5.2 Identification of cargo vapour manifolds\nThe first inboard metre of each cargo vapour manifold connection should have its exterior surfaces painted, with the\nexception of the flange faces. The painted area should be divided into three bands, with the outboard and inboard\nbands being red in colour and 100mm wide and the centre and being yellow in colour. In addition, the word VAPOUR\nshould be painted in black letters, at least 50mm high, on both the forward and aft sides of all reducers, both principal\nand reserve, in approximately the 2 o’clock and 10 o’clock positions.\nIMO: IBC Code\n15.11 Acids\n15.11.4 Flanges of the loading and discharging manifold connections shall be provided with shields, which may be\nportable, to guard against the danger of cargo being sprayed: and in addition, drip trays shall also be provided to\nguard against leakage onto the deck.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Line and valve setting\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which provided guidance for managing cargo and vapour\nconnections at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages. These procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nManifold connection via hose or marine loading arm.\nThe fitting and monitoring of pressure gauges at each manifold connection outboard of the manifold valve.\nThe fitting of blanks to all unused manifold connections.\nThe fitting of blanks or caps to all drains and sample points, except while in use.\nThe use of fixed and portable drip-trays and the management of drained or spilled cargo.\nThe management of vapour manifolds and connections.\nSafe work on elevated manifold platforms, if fitted.\nThe supporting of cargo hoses during cargo transfer.\nRestrictions on the use of the mid-ships hose-handling crane(s) during cargo operations.\nThe management of bow and stern manifolds, if fitted.\nManifold drip trays should be clean and free from cargo residues.\nSuitable means of draining the drip trays to a cargo tank or drain tank should be provided. On chemical tankers, driptrays should be drained to appropriate tanks with due regard to toxicity and compatibility requirements.\nManifold drip-tray drains to deck should be fitted with valves and either capped or plugged.\nPressure gauge stems should be fitted with valves and capped whenever gauges are not fitted.\nIt is generally accepted that steel blanks should be of the same thickness as the flanges to which they are attached,\nbut this will not necessarily result in the pressure capability being the same as that of the associated pipework. It is\nthe pressure rating of the blank which is important, and blanks made of materials such as titanium have a superior\nstrength and may therefore be significantly thinner for the same pressure rating as a mild steel blank. If such blanks\nare fitted, documentation should be on board to prove that the pressure rating is adequate for the service.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the management of cargo\nand vapour connections at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.\nInspect cargo and vapour manifolds, including bow and stern manifolds where fitted, and verify that the\narrangements were in alignment with industry best practice and, where applicable, regulation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures which described the management of cargo and vapour connections at the cargo\nmanifolds to prevent and detect leakages.\nDocumentation supporting the pressure rating of manifold blanks, where appropriate.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures which described the management of cargo and vapour connections at\nthe cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures which described the management\nof cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.\nA manifold connection was:\no Secured with damaged bolts or bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.\no Not fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.\no Made using improvised arrangements such as a G-clamp or similar device.\nWhere a hose or marine loading arm was secured by camlocks, one or more cams had not properly\nengaged with the manifold flange.\nA marine loading arm was improperly supported by jacks or similar arrangements.\nThe jacks for a marine loading arm were supported by items not designed to support the load, such as\nempty oil drums.\nCargo hoses were not properly supported during cargo transfer.\nOn a chemical tanker, manifold flanges in use were not fitted with spray guards whilst handling acids, or\nanother cargo that was toxic or corrosive.\nA manifold pressure gauge was:\no Not fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve.\no Missing from an unused manifold connection.\no Indicating an increased pressure and possible manifold valve leakage.\nA manifold pressure gauge stem was not fitted with a valve or cock and/or was not capped when not in use\nA manifold blank flange was not:\no As thick as the end flange it was bolted to and there was no supporting documentation to show it\nwas of the same working pressure rating as the line or system it was connected to.\no Made of steel or other approved material.\no Secured with bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.\no Fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.\nThere was a cargo or bunker leak from an unused manifold.\nAn unused manifold was not blanked.\nA manifold sample point or drain was not blanked or capped when not in use.\nA manifold sample point or drain was positioned to drain directly onto the deck.\nThe manifold(s) had been drained into the open drip-trays.\nFixed and/or portable drip-trays had not been drained and cleaned of cargo residues.\nThere was no permanent or portable drip-tray underneath a manifold connection.\nPlywood or canvas sheeting had been placed across the manifold drip tray gratings to prevent minor\nspillages entering the drip tray freely.\nA portable drip-tray was made of plastic or another non-metallic material but was not bonded to the ship’s\nstructure.\nManifold drip-tray drains to deck were not fitted with valves and capped.\nOn a chemical tanker, there were no suitable means to ensure incompatible cargoes were not mixed in\nmanifold drip trays and/or drain tanks.\nVapour manifold presentation flanges were not fitted with the required stud at the 12 o’clock position.\nVapour manifold connections, including reducers, were not painted/marked as required.\nAn elevated manifold working platform did not have effective edge protection and was not properly identified\nand marked by warning signs to prevent falls.\nThe midships hose-handling crane was being used to handle stores etc. whilst cargo operations were taking\nplace.\nAn unused stern manifold was not isolated from the main cargo pipeline system by a blank or the removal of\na spool piece.\nThe dangerous area extending at least three metres from the stern manifold valve in use was not clearly\nmarked to prevent access by unauthorised personnel.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.3.25.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "receiving nitrogen from shore for operations such as inerting, purging or padding cargo\ntank, or for clearing cargo lines?\nShort Question Text\nReceiving nitrogen from shore\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nCDI: Best Practice Recommendations Regarding the use of Nitrogen. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo tanks are not over pressurised, possibly resulting in serious deformation or catastrophic\nfailure of the tank structure.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n12.1.14.5 Clearing hoses and marine loading arms to the ship\nDo not clear hoses and loading arms to the ship using compressed air because of the risks of:\n• •\n• •\nStatic charge generation.\nCompromising IG quality.\nOver pressurisation of tanks or pipelines.\nOil mists coming from tank vents.\n12.1.14.8 Receiving nitrogen from shore\nIf shore supplied nitrogen is used, e.g. to purge tanks, for padding cargo or to clear lines, be aware that this may be\nat high pressure (up to ten bar) and at a high flow rate, making it potentially hazardous because of the risk of over\npressurising the cargo tanks. Carry out a risk assessment: the operation should only proceed if appropriate risk\nmitigations are in place. As a minimum, follow the precautions for over pressurisation in section 11.2.2.\nOne way to reduce the risk is to ensure the tank has vents with a greater flow capacity than the inlet, so that the tank\ncannot be over pressurised. If vapour control and emission regulations require closed operation, the incoming flow of\nnitrogen should be restricted to a rate equal to or less than the maximum flow of vapour possible through the vapour\nreturn line (VRL). Measures to ensure this should be agreed. A small hose or reducer before the manifold can be\nused to restrict the flow rate, but the terminal should control the pressure. A gauge will allow the ship to monitor the\npressure.\nAttempting to throttle a gas flow with a ship’s manifold valve designed to control liquid flow is inappropriate. However,\nthe manifold may be used as a rapid safety stop in an emergency. Note the effect of a pressure surge in a gas is not\nas violent as in a liquid.\nSensitive cargoes, e.g. highly specialised lubricating oils, may have to be carried under a pad or blanket of nitrogen\nsupplied from the shore. In this case, it is better to purge the entire cargo tank before loading. After purging, loading\nthe cargo in a closed condition will create the pad within the tank. This significantly reduces the risk of over\npressurisation when padding with shore supplied nitrogen.\nSSSCL Part 5A. Tanker and terminal pre-transfer conference\nItem 60 Procedure for receiving nitrogen from terminal to cargo tanks are agreed (12.1.14.8).\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) Fifth Edition\n4.4.3 Vapour space environment control\nFor cargoes that react with air or moisture in the air, the IBC Code requires the atmosphere in the vapour space to be\ncontrolled. This is usually achieved using an inert gas such as nitrogen which is either applied as a pad (applied after\nloading the tank) or before loading by fully inerting the vapour space. Inerting or padding may also be required for\nquality control purposes.\n7.4.9 Nitrogen Supplied from Shore\nGeneral\nShould it be necessary to obtain nitrogen from the terminal, it is essential that agreement is reached at the pretransfer conference concerning the flow rate and the pressure of the nitrogen being supplied.\n…it should be noted that a high uncontrolled flow rate of nitrogen can cause cargo tank overpressurisation with very\nlittle warning. Although a slight overpressure is required (usually no more than 0.2 bar), it is usual for the shore\nnitrogen supply pressure to be far in excess of this figure.\nIt is possible to overpressurise and damage a cargo tank if the flow rate of nitrogen supplied from the shore exceeds\nthe maximum design-rated capacity of the P/V valve.\nCDI: Best Practice Recommendations Regarding the use of Nitrogen. First Edition.\n4.1 Safety Precautions when Handling Nitrogen\nDue to the hazards described in this document, nitrogen should be used with the following safety precautions in\nplace…\n4.4 Padding Operations\nVessels may receive nitrogen after loading in order to reduce the oxygen content in the ullage space of the cargo\ntank or to apply a positive pressure to prevent the ingress of moisture or oxygen during the voyage. Numerous tank\nover-pressurisation incidents have occurred during padding operations. Often the nitrogen is supplied by shore\nthrough the cargo line resulting in a large volume of nitrogen being released into the bottom of an already loaded\ncargo tank. The pressure in the tank may increase rapidly above the venting capacity of the P/V valve or the liquid\nlevel in the tank forced to rise blocking the vent line. This can result in extensive structural damage to the tank as well\nas a loss of containment. The following precautions should be considered…\nTMSA 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type of\nvessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may\ninclude:\n• •\n• Gas and chemical specific operational procedures.\nTank pressure and atmosphere monitoring.\nDraining/blowing lines and disconnection of hoses.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 11\n6 Protection of cargo tank structure against pressure or vacuum in tankers\n6.1 General\nThe venting arrangements shall be so designed and operated as to ensure that neither pressure nor vacuum in cargo\ntanks shall exceed design parameters and be such as to provide for:\n.2 the passage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo loading and ballasting, or during\ndischarging.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that described the actions to be taken to avoid over\npressurisation of cargo tanks when nitrogen is received from shore. These procedures should include the:\n• •\n• Requirement to carry out a risk assessment prior to operations.\nChoice of connection and piping system for receiving the nitrogen.\nMethods of controlling the incoming flow of nitrogen.\nIf possible, padding operations should be conducted through the vessel’s vapour system rather than through the\ncargo system and the liquid in the cargo line and tank.\nShore line clearing to the ship involving flammable cargoes should only be conducted using nitrogen and not\ncompressed air.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which described the procedure for receiving\nnitrogen from the shore for operations such as inerting or purging tanks, for padding cargo tanks or to clear\nlines.\nReview the records and completed risk assessments for at least one operation where nitrogen had been\nreceived from shore within the last six months.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the procedures for receiving nitrogen from\nshore.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure which described the procedure for receiving nitrogen from the shore for operations\nsuch as inerting or purging tanks, for padding cargo tanks or to clear lines.\nRecords and completed risk assessments for operations where nitrogen had been received from shore\nwithin the last six months.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which described the processes for receiving nitrogen from the shore for\noperations such as for operations such as, inerting, purging or padding cargo tanks or for clearing cargo\nlines.\nCompany procedures did not describe the actions to be taken to avoid over pressurisation of cargo tanks\nwhen nitrogen is received from shore, including the:\no Requirement to carry out a risk assessment prior to operations.\no Choice of connection and piping system for receiving the nitrogen.\no Methods of controlling the incoming flow of nitrogen.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures which described the procedure for\nreceiving nitrogen from the shore for operations such as inerting or purging tanks, for padding cargo tanks or\nto clear lines.\nRisk assessments were not available for operations where the vessel received nitrogen from ashore.\nShip shore safety checklists for cargo operations that included receiving nitrogen from shore had not been\ncompleted to document the agreed procedures to receive nitrogen, the maximum pressure and the flow rate.\nRecords showed that hoses or loading arms containing flammable cargo had been cleared to the ship using\ncompressed air.\n8.4. LPG", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures that addressed", "c": "the carriage of inhibited cargoes, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nCarriage of inhibited cargoes.\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that inhibited cargoes are carried safely and in compliance with company procedures and the IGC\nCode.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n1.4.1 Self-reaction\nSome liquefied gas cargoes may react with themselves and may form solids. The most common form of self-reaction\nis polymerisation which may be initiated by the presence of small quantities of other cargoes or by certain metals.\nPolymerisation normally produces heat which may then accelerate self-reaction and contamination of the cargo.\nPolymerisation may also result in the formation of explosive peroxides.\nThe IGC Code requires cargoes which may self-react either to be carried under an inert gas blanket, or to be inhibited\nbefore shipment.\n1.4.1.1 Use of Inhibitors\nNormally there should be no need to add any inhibitor to the cargo during the voyage. If it should become necessary,\nfor example if the effective lifetime is exceeded, any additions should be made in accordance with the shipper’s\ninstructions.\nThe inhibitor may not boil-off with the cargo and it is possible for reliquefaction systems to contain uninhibited cargo.\nThe reliquefaction system should therefore be drained or purged with inhibited cargo when shut down to prevent selfreaction within the system.\nMany inhibitors are much more soluble in water than in the cargo. In order to avoid a reduction in inhibitor\nconcentration, care should be taken to exclude water from the cargo system. Similarly, the inhibitor may be very\nsoluble in anti-freeze additives. The cargo shipper’s instructions on the use of anti-freeze should be observed.\nIf the ship is in still conditions the cargo should be circulated daily to ensure a uniform concentration of inhibitor.\nParticular provisions concerning the avoidance of uninhibited stagnant liquid pockets can be found in Section 17.4.2\nof the IGC Code.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n2.4.2 Formation of polymers or dimers\nThe difference between the vapour pressures (see Section 2.8.4) of the cargo and its inhibitor has an important\nimplication on the behaviour of the inhibitor. Inhibitors usually have a vapour pressure much lower than the cargo in\nwhich they are dissolved, which means that the inhibitor will remain in the liquid and provide the greatest protection.\nThe gases in the vapour space are, therefore, relatively unprotected, as is any condensate from the reliquefaction\nplant\nInhibitors can be toxic. The inhibitors used most commonly are tertrahydroquinone (THQ) for VCM and tertiarybutyl\ncatechol (TBC) for butadiene. Particular care should be taken when handling inhibitors and cargoes with inhibitor\nadded. The SDS for the particular inhibitor should be provided in addition to the inhibitor information form.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals\nChapter 25 The Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 5c. Tanker and terminal: liquefied gas. Checks pre-transfer\nItem 71 Inhibition certificate received (if required) from manufacturer? Yes/No\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n17.8 Inhibition\nCare shall be taken to ensure that the cargo is sufficiently inhibited to prevent self-reaction (e.g. polymerization or\ndimerization) at all times during the voyage. Ships shall be provided with a certificate from the manufacturer stating:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nname and amount of inhibitor added;\ndate inhibitor was added and the normally expected duration of its effectiveness;\nany temperature limitations affecting the inhibitor; and\nthe action to be taken should the length of the voyage exceed the effective lifetime of the inhibitors.\n17.19 Vinyl chloride\nIn cases where polymerization of vinyl chloride is prevented by addition of an inhibitor, 17.8 is applicable. In cases\nwhere no inhibitor has been added, or the inhibitor concentration is insufficient, any inert gas used for the purposes of\n17.6 (Exclusion of air from vapour spaces) shall contain no more oxygen than 0.1% by volume. Before loading is\nstarted, inert gas samples from the tanks and piping shall be analysed. When vinyl chloride is carried, a positive\npressure shall always be maintained in the tanks and during ballast voyages between successive carriages.\n17.20 Mixed C4 cargoes\n17.20.2 If the mixed C4 cargo shipped under the terms of this section contains more than 50% (mole) of butadiene,\nthe inhibitor precautions in 17.8 shall apply.\n18.4 Suitability for carriage\n18.4.3 Where products are required to be inhibited, the certificate required by 17.8 shall be supplied before departure,\notherwise the cargo shall not be transported.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that addressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes and\nincluded guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nInhibited cargo certificates.\nTemperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes.\nInerting of inhibited cargoes.\nDraining/purging of the reliquefaction system after shut-down.\nThe use of anti-freeze with inhibited cargoes.\nThe exclusion of water from the cargo system.\nRecirculation of cargo to ensure a uniform concentration of inhibitor.\nAdding inhibitor to a cargo in transit.\nThe possible toxicity of inhibitors.\nContingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.\nThe products which are required to be inhibited are identified in column ‘l’ of Chapter 19 of the IGC. They are\nbutadiene, isoprene, vinyl ethyl ether and vinylidene chloride. Products required to be inhibited should be refused if\nan inhibitor certificate is not available or did not contain the minimum information required.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that addressed the carriage of inhibited\ncargoes.\nReview cargo operation logbooks and records, inhibited cargo certificates and contingency plans in the\nevent of uncontrolled polymerisation.\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo planning to verify their familiarity with company procedures that\naddressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nWhere the vessel had not carried any inhibited cargoes during the previous six months, make a comment in the\nProcess response tool noting the last occasion an inhibited cargo was carried. Focus on the balance of the human\nand procedural aspects of the guidance.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures that address the carriage of inhibited cargoes.\nInhibited cargo certificates.\nInert gas logs.\nBridge and cargo log books.\nCargo tank temperature records relating to inhibited cargoes.\nCargo load and discharge plans relating to inhibited cargoes.\n• Contingency plans in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation of an inhibited cargo.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures that addressed the carriage of inhibited cargoes and included guidance\non:\no Inhibited cargo certificates.\no Temperature monitoring of inhibited cargoes.\no Inerting of inhibited cargoes.\no Draining/purging of the reliquefaction system after shut-down.\no The use of anti-freeze with inhibited cargoes.\no The exclusion of water from the cargo system.\no Recirculation of cargo to ensure a uniform concentration of inhibitor.\no Adding inhibitor to a cargo in transit.\no The possible toxicity of inhibitors\no Contingency planning for uncontrolled polymerisation.\nThe officer responsible for cargo planning was not familiar with the company procedures that addressed the\ncarriage of inhibited cargoes.\nThere was no certificate on board for an inhibited cargo or the certificate did not contain the minimum\ninformation required.\nThe stated duration of effectiveness of the inhibitor had expired prior to discharge.\nTemperatures of an inhibited cargo had not been monitored during the voyage on at least a daily basis, or\nas recommended by the cargo manufacturer.\nThere was no contingency plan in the event of uncontrolled polymerisation and a rapid rise in temperature of\nan inhibited cargo.\nThere were no records available to confirm that the oxygen in the inert gas supply into the tanks was less\nthan 0.1% by volume where polymerization of vinyl chloride had been prevented by inert gas when no\ninhibitor has been added or inhibitor concentration was insufficient.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for carrying out", "c": "cargo sampling operations?\nShort Question Text\nCargo sampling\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1625 Unified Interpretation of the IGC Code.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nSIGTTO: Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sampling Procedures First Edition 2010\nObjective\nTo ensure LPG cargo sampling operations are performed safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas) 3rd Edition\n6.19.2 Liquid Samples\nThe following precaution should be taken when sampling cargo liquid or vapour. Reference should also be made to\nthe guidance contained in SIGTTO: Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sampling Procedures First Edition 2010.\nThe responsible officer should be present when any cargo sampling is carried out. The officer should be familiar with\nall aspects of the ship’s sampling system, including the operational characteristics of all valves. It should be\nunderstood that whoever is performing the actual sampling, the responsibility rests entirely with the responsible\nofficer for ensuring that sampling is conducted in a safe and efficient manner. This includes preventing any escape of\ncargo liquid or vapours to the atmosphere beyond that required by the sampling process. During sampling it is\nimportant that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe responsible officer should be satisfied that the sampling equipment is compatible with the ship’s\nsampling points before starting any sampling operation. If the two are incompatible for any reason it should\nbe ensured that any action taken to rectify the situation does not impair the gastight integrity of any part of\nthe ship's system or endanger life or property;\nSample containers should be completely clean and compatible with the cargo to be sampled. They should\nbe of a recognised standard and able to withstand the extremes of temperature and pressure anticipated;\nSample containers should be purged with nitrogen before use;\nIt is imperative that sufficient ullage or vapour space is left in the sample container to allow the liquid to\nexpand when the temperature increases to ambient. To this end a container should be used which is\nsuitably designed for the product being sampled, with a built-in ullage tube and bursting disc. The safe\nullage space is created by holding the sample container vertically, with the ullage tube end at the top. The\ncontainer is then filled from the bottom connection and thus cannot be overfilled above the level set by the\nullage tube;\nUnless the sample container is free from cargo vapour, it should not be stored in an unventilated space;\nGloves, goggles and necessary protective clothing should be worn when sampling cold cargoes;\nIf the cargo is toxic, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) should be worn. If sampling takes place in\nan enclosed space, a respirator is insufficient because lack of oxygen may lead to asphyxiation; and\nAny electrical equipment used when taking samples should be of the certified safe type.\n6.19.3 Vapour Samples\nThe precautions in Section 6.19.2 should be observed when sampling cargo vapour or inert gas. When plastic\nsample bags are used for collecting vapour samples they should be handled carefully and purged after use. Plastic\nsample bags should never be used for liquid samples.\nSIGTTO: Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sampling Procedures First Edition 2010\n2. Sampling Systems – ‘Open Loop’ or ‘Closed Loop’ Systems\nShips’ cargo tanks are normally fitted with several sample connections so that samples may be taken at several\ndifferent levels. ‘Top’, ‘middle’ and ‘bottom’ samples are common, and these are of great assistance when checking\nvapour displacement operations, such as inerting or ‘gassing up’ for example.\nThe lower connections can also be used to take liquid samples if there is a suitable pressure in the cargo tanks. This\nis not possible with fully refrigerated cargoes, where it is necessary to take samples using the cargo pump, usually\nrecirculating product back to the same tank.\nLiquid sampling connections should be fitted with two valves to ensure isolation should one be blocked by ice or\nhydrates, etc., and terminate in a standard connection.\nDuring sampling, venting to atmosphere should always be minimised, although it is recognised that a small,\ncontrolled amount of cargo vapour may be released during purging of sample points and when creating an ullage in\nsample containers. Any such purging, venting or ullaging of sample containers must be carried out in a safe location,\ntaking into account the properties of the product, wind and weather conditions, and proximity of sources of ignition\nand ventilation intakes, etc.\nIf the sample system has only an inlet connection to the sample container, it will always be necessary to vent small\nquantities of cargo to atmosphere. This is known as an ‘open loop’ system.\nIf a second connection is provided so that product can be returned to the cargo tanks, this arrangement is known as a\n‘closed loop’ system and, if used with the sample container with inlet and outlet connections, minimises the amount of\nproduct vented to atmosphere.\nIf the main hazard from the product to be sampled is its flammability, open sampling may be used provided that due\ncare is taken to reduce the amount of product release to an absolute minimum. However, if the cargo has toxic risks,\ne.g. VCM or butadiene, then SIGTTO recommends the use of ‘closed loop’ sampling to avoid release of the material\nto atmosphere.\nThe return path of this closed loop should also be fitted with double shut-off valves. These return valves should be\noperated full open or closed and should not be used for throttling/flow control during the sampling process.\n4. Standard for Sampling Connection Fittings\nIn fully refrigerated ships, where it is necessary to use a cargo pump to obtain a sample, a standard connection point\nshould be fitted on the pump discharge line.\nThe sampling connection should be isolated either by two needle valves or by one needle valve and one ball valve.\nThe two valves should be fitted at least 500 mm apart. The double shut-off is to isolate the sampling system in the\nevent of uncontrolled leakage, such as may be caused by hydrate formation in the valve body. Therefore, access to\nthe primary shut off valve should not require personnel to reach over or round the second valve.\nIf a ‘closed loop’ return connection is fitted, this should have the same valve requirements as detailed in this section.\nWhen not in use, the stub piece should be fitted with a screwed plug incorporating a soft washer to protect the sealing\nface.\n5. The Procedures Involved in Taking Samples\nWhenever sampling is undertaken, the safety guidance given in the ICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas)\n3rdEdition and ISO 4257 (ISO 4257:2001/COR 1:2007) should be observed, particularly regarding the use of\nprotective clothing, gloves, goggles, breathing apparatus and ‘certified safe’ electrical equipment. Sampling of toxic\ncargoes may require additional specialised equipment. Written procedures for sampling all cargoes included on the\nvessel’s Certificate of Fitness should be part of the vessel’s cargo operations manual.\nIt is imperative that everyone involved in sampling operations is properly informed of the nature of the cargo being\nhandled and the precautions to be observed. This information should include a full description of the physical and\nchemical properties of the cargo, counter measures against accidental personal contact, firefighting and other\nemergency procedures. The Data Sheets from the ‘ICS Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas)’ should be consulted for\nthis information, and any other sources, such as ‘HAZCHEM’ or ‘TREM’ cards (Transport Emergency Cards) from\nterminal and the IGC Code.\nA responsible officer should be present at all times when any sample is drawn from a ship’s tanks by a terminal\nrepresentative or third-party inspector. The officer should be fully conversant with all aspects of the ships sampling\nsystem, including the operational characteristics of all valves. They should clearly recognise that their duty is to\nensure sampling is authorised and carried out in a safe manner, regardless of who is actually performing the\nsampling operation.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may\ninclude:\n• Cargo survey and sampling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n1.2.15 Closed loop sampling is a cargo sampling system that minimizes the escape of cargo vapour to the\natmosphere by returning product to the cargo tank during sampling\n5.6.5 Cargo sampling connections\n5.6.5.1 Connections to cargo piping systems for taking cargo liquid samples shall be clearly marked and shall be\ndesigned to minimize the release of cargo vapours. For vessels permitted to carry toxic products, the sampling\nsystem shall be of a closed loop design to ensure that cargo liquid and vapour are not vented to atmosphere.\n5.6.5.2 Liquid sampling systems shall be provided with two valves on the sample inlet. One of these valves shall be\nof the multi-turn type to avoid accidental opening and shall be spaced far enough apart to ensure that they can isolate\nthe line if there is blockage, by ice or hydrates for example.\n5.6.5.3 On closed loop systems, the valves on the return pipe shall also comply with 5.6.5.2.\n5.6.5.4 The connection to the sample container shall comply with recognized standards and be supported so as to be\nable to support the weight of a sample container. Threaded connections shall be tack-welded, or otherwise locked, to\nprevent them being unscrewed during the normal connection and disconnection of sample containers. The sample\nconnection shall be fitted with a closure plug or flange to prevent any leakage when the connection is not in use.\n5.6.5.5 Sample connections used only for vapour samples may be fitted with a single valve in accordance with 5.5,\n5.8 and 5.13, and shall also be fitted with a closure plug or flange.\n5.6.5.6 Sampling operations shall be undertaken as prescribed in 18.9.\n18.9 Cargo sampling\n18.9.1 Any cargo sampling shall be conducted under the supervision of an officer who shall ensure that protective\nclothing appropriate to the hazards of the cargo is used by everyone involved in the operation.\n18.9.2 When taking liquid cargo samples, the officer shall ensure that the sampling equipment is suitable for the\ntemperatures and pressures involved, including cargo pump discharge pressure, if relevant.\n18.9.3 The officer shall ensure that any cargo sample equipment used is connected properly to avoid any cargo\nleakage.\n18.9.4 If the cargo to be sampled is a toxic product, the officer shall ensure that a \"closed loop\" sampling system as\ndefined in 1.2.15 is used to minimize any cargo release to atmosphere.\n18.9.5 After sampling operations are completed, the officer shall ensure that any sample valves used are closed\nproperly and the connections used are correctly blanked.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1625 Unified Interpretation of the IGC Code.\n4 Cargo sampling (paragraphs 5.6.5 and 18.9)\n4.1 These requirements should only be applicable if such a sampling system is fitted on board. Connections used for\ncontrol of atmosphere in cargo tanks during inerting or gassing up should not be considered as cargo sampling\nconnections.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for performing cargo sampling operations for all cargoes\nincluded on the vessel’s Certificate of Fitness which required that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sampling must be authorised and directly supervised by a responsible officer and carried out in a safe\nmanner, regardless of who is actually performing the sampling operation.\nOnly fully compatible sampling equipment, connected properly, is used for the task.\nVenting to atmosphere is minimised during sampling.\nPurging, venting or ullaging of sample containers must be carried out in a safe location.\nOnly ‘closed loop’ equipment is used when toxic products are being sampled.\nThe correct PPE is available and used.\nEveryone involved in sampling operations is properly informed of the nature of the cargo being handled and\nthe precautions to be observed.\nSampling connections are clearly marked.\nSampling connections are capped or blanked when not in use.\nThese procedures may be contained in the vessel’s Cargo System Operation Manual.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for performing cargo sampling operations.\nObserve any sampling operations taking place during the course of the inspection.\nInspect sampling equipment provided onboard and sampling connections to verify compatibility.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for performing cargo sampling operations.\no The PPE and safety precautions for taking liquid and/or gas samples.\no The sampling equipment carried onboard the vessel.\no The sampling connections and locations for taking liquid and/or gas samples.\nExpected Evidence\n• Company procedures for performing cargo sampling operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for performing cargo sampling operations for all cargoes included on\nthe vessel’s Certificate of Fitness which required that:\no Sampling must be authorised and directly supervised by a responsible officer and carried out in a\nsafe manner, regardless of who is actually performing the sampling operation.\no Only fully compatible sampling equipment, connected properly, is used for the task.\no Venting to atmosphere is minimised during sampling.\no Purging, venting or ullaging of sample containers must be carried out in a safe location.\no Only ‘closed loop’ equipment is used when toxic products are being sampled.\no The correct PPE is available and used.\no Everyone involved in sampling operations is properly informed of the nature of the cargo being\nhandled and the precautions to be observed.\no Sampling connections are clearly marked.\no Sampling connections are capped or blanked when not in use.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for performing cargo sampling\noperations.\nSampling was taking place without the presence of a responsible officer.\nConnections to cargo piping systems for taking cargo liquid samples were not clearly marked.\nThere was evidence that connections used for control of atmosphere in cargo tanks during inerting or\ngassing up were being used as cargo sampling connections.\nA liquid sampling arrangement was not provided with a double valve arrangement.\nNeither of the valves on a liquid sampling arrangement were of the ‘multi turn’ type.\nSampling equipment in use was not fully compatible with the sampling connections.\nSampling equipment was not properly connected, allowing release of cargo vapour.\nAn ‘open loop’ sampling system was being used to sample a toxic cargo.\nPurging, venting or ullaging of sample containers was being carried out in an unsafe location.\nPersonnel involved in sampling operations were not wearing the required PPE.\nPersonnel sampling a toxic cargo were not wearing SCBA.\nElectrical equipment used when taking samples was not of the certified safe type.\nPlastic vapour sample bags were being used for liquid samples.\nPersonnel involved in sampling operations had not been properly informed of the nature of the cargo being\nhandled and the precautions to be observed.\nSample connection valves used during sampling operations were inadequately secured on completion.\nA sample connection was not capped or blanked to prevent any leakage when the connection was not in\nuse.\nSample containers that were not free of cargo vapour were stored in an unventilated space.\nA sampling arrangement was defective in any respect.\nSampling equipment and sampling connections were incompatible.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for identifying", "c": "and segregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants during cargo stowage planning,\nand had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nSegregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Compressor Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo stowage is carefully planned to avoid the co-mingling of incompatible cargoes and\nrefrigerants.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas) 3rd Edition\n6.13 Separation of Cargoes\nWhen common pipeline systems are provided for various cargo-related operations, risk of contamination exists when\ndifferent grades of cargo are carried simultaneously. If separation is needed to avoid cargo contamination, shipper’s\ninstructions and regulatory requirements should be observed. If a common piping system has to be used for different\ncargoes, care should be taken to ensure complete drainage and drying of the piping system before purging with new\ncargo.\nDiffering levels of cargo separation are used. These include two-valve separation, segregation and isolation.\nWhere two cargoes are compatible and an apparent negligible mix is permitted, the adjacent systems carrying the\ndifferent cargoes should be isolated by at least two valves at each connection, or by one positive visible blank.\nWhere shipper’s instructions or regulatory requirements require segregation, the position of the valves, blanks,\nportable bends, spectacle blanks and spool pieces associated with such segregation should be carefully arranged\nand identified. These arrangements for segregation should be followed as part of the approved system.\nIf the cargoes to be carried are not compatible, the responsible officer should ensure that the pipeline systems for\neach cargo are completely isolated from each other. This entails checking that all necessary blanks are fitted or that\npipe spool pieces have been removed. A cargo log book entry should be made of the action taken.\nWherever possible, separate reliquefaction systems should be used for each cargo. However, if there is a danger of\nchemical reaction, it is necessary to use completely segregated systems. This is known as positive segregation and\nis characterised by using removable spool pieces or pipe sections at all times. This restriction should apply equally to\nliquid, vapour and vent lines as appropriate. Whilst positive segregation may be acceptable for most cargoes, some\nsubstances may require totally independent piping systems. Special treatment of certain cargoes is specified in the\nIGC Code.\nIf there is any doubt about the reactivity or compatibility of two cargoes, the data sheets for each cargo and a cargo\ncompatibility chart should be checked and advice sought from shippers or other authority. If this advice seems\ninconclusive, the cargoes should be treated as incompatible and positive segregation provided.\nThe following precautions should be observed:\n• •\n• Before opening any cargo line, for example, to remove a blank flange or swing a spectacle blank, attention\nshould be given to ensuring that the line is properly inerted and fully de-pressurised. Flanges should not be\nfully unbolted until the condition of the line is verified;\nCommon pipelines and associated equipment should be drained, inerted and checked before being used for\nanother cargo; and\nAll temporary pipework should be gas-freed, disconnected and properly stored when not in use.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n2.3.2 Reactivity with other cargoes\nTable 2.4 summaries the chemical reactivity between the main cargoes. Confirmation should always be sought from\nshippers when changing from one grade to another.\n(See Table 2.4 Chemical incompatibilities of liquefied gases)\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nPart 150 Compatibility of cargoes\nFig.1 Compatibility Chart\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\nPlanning\nCargo and ballast handling.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n7.3.2 Compatibility\nRefrigerants used for reliquefaction shall be compatible with the cargo they may come into contact with. In addition,\nwhen several refrigerants are used and may come into contact, they shall be compatible with each other.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for cargo stowage planning that included the:\n• •\n• Identification of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants using all available data.\nMeans of identifying and documenting locations and processes where segregation is necessary.\nMeans of segregation of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.\nThese procedures may refer to:\n• •\n• •\nCharterer’s instructions.\nRecognised compatibility charts, safety data sheets and information provided by shippers.\nCargo System Operation Manual.\nRelevant ship’s drawings showing acceptable segregation arrangements.\nWhere such cargoes are carried, charterers instructions for cargo compatibility issues should be followed. Special\nattention must be given to the ship’s reliquefaction system. There may also be a need, when changing cargoes, to\nreplace the lubricating oil in compressors for certain cargoes.\nThe cargo stowage plan should identify when care should be taken to avoid the co-mingling of non-compatible\ncargoes, which cargoes are involved, and the means of segregation. All areas where co-mingling is possible should\nbe considered.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight and where necessary, review the company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible\ncargoes and refrigerants during cargo stowage planning.\nSight and where necessary, review the compatibility chart in use and any other available data.\nReview current and previous cargo stowage plans and supporting documents to verify compliance with\ncompany procedures.\nDuring the course of the inspection, sight any operational means of segregation identified in the cargo\nstowage plan such as spool pieces or spectacle flanges.\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo stowage planning to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.\no The use of the compatibility chart and any other data provided on board.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for identifying and segregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants during cargo\nstowage planning.\nCurrent and previous cargo stowage plans.\nCargo log book.\nRisk assessments or checklists that identify systems and processes that require segregation.\nCompatibility charts.\nCargo System Operation Manual.\nRelevant ship’s drawings showing acceptable segregation arrangements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for cargo stowage planning that included the:\no Identification of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants using all available data.\no Means of identifying and documenting locations and processes where segregation is necessary.\no Means of segregation of incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.\nThe officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with company procedures for identifying\nand segregating incompatible cargoes and refrigerants.\nThe officer responsible for cargo stowage planning was not familiar with the use of the compatibility chart\nprovided on board.\nThere was no compatibility chart issued by a recognised body available on board.\nTwo incompatible cargoes had been stowed adjacent to each other or in a configuration that did not provide\npositive segregation.\n• •\n• Operational means of segregation were observed to be not as indicated in the cargo stowage plan.\nThe cargo stowage plan did not identify when care should be taken to avoid the co-mingling of noncompatible cargoes, which cargoes are involved, and the means of segregation.\nA cargo log book entry was not made of the action taken to isolate the pipeline systems prior to the loading\nof incompatible cargoes.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe", "c": "carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures?\nShort Question Text\nCarriage of propylene oxide (PO) and/or ethylene oxide (EO)\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Compressor Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n2.2 The Chemical Gases\nSome non-hydrocarbon cargoes are carried on gas carriers, usually referred to as chemical gases, and their\nproperties vary considerably. As these cargoes can be toxic, appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) will be\nused when handling them and information on what PPE is required will commonly be found on the safety data sheet\n(SDS) for that specific cargo.\nEthylene oxide (EO) C2H4O and propylene oxide (PO) C3H6O\nThese are highly reactive, colourless liquids with an ether-like odour that are used to make common industrial\nchemicals such as glycols. EO is more sensitive than PO and is rarely carried in bulk as this cargo requires a Type\n1G ship. Cargoes of PO and cargo mixtures of EO and PO containing less than 30% EO are more common; these\ncargoes can generally be carried on Type 2C chemical tankers or Type 2G gas carriers.\nEO and PO cargoes are self-reactive, particularly in the presence of air or materials that can catalyse the reaction.\nFor this reason, the IGC code specifies that cargoes of PO and EO/PO mixtures are required to be acetylene-free for\nshipment.\nBoth cargoes are flammable and toxic. The flammability hazard is increased because these products contain oxygen\nthat can assist the combustion process. Furthermore, if the products decompose at ambient conditions, that process\ncreates two gases, and the sudden volume expansion may be explosive.\nThe detailed requirements for carrying these cargoes are set out in the IGC Code.\n8.2.2 Sampling systems – ‘open loop or ‘closed loop’ systems\nCertain cargoes, such as propylene oxide, are required by the IGC Code to be carried under a nitrogen blanket.\nProduct samples are, therefore, only drawn from the liquid phase. The vapour space is sampled to ensure adequate\nnitrogen content. Further advice is available from the IGC Code, and the safety data sheets (SDS) for the cargo\nconcerned.\n9.4.14 Chemical burns\nAs shown in table 9.4, chemical burns can be caused by ammonia, chlorine, ethylene oxide and propylene oxide.\nDeck showers and eye baths are provided for water rinsing on gas carriers certified to carry these products. Their\nlocations will usually be clearly indicated so that treatment can be administered as quickly as possible in the event of\nan accident.\n9.24.2 Protective clothing\nIn addition to breathing apparatus, full protective clothing will be worn when entering an area where contact with a\nliquefied gas cargo is a possibility. Types of protective clothing vary from those providing protection against liquid\nsplashes to a full positive pressure gas tight suit that will normally incorporate a helmet, gloves and boots. Such\nclothing will usually also be resistant to low temperatures and solvents. It is particularly important to wear full\nprotective clothing when entering an enclosed space that has contained toxic gas such as ammonia, chlorine,\nethylene oxide, propylene oxide, vinyl chloride monomer or butadiene.\nFor certain cargoes the IGC Code requires the use of suitable eye protection and clothing that is gas tight.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n1.4.1.2 Use of Inert Gas\nCertain cargoes which can self-react, including ethylene oxide and propylene oxide, cannot be inhibited. Such\ncargoes have to be carried under inert gas. Care should be taken to ensure that a positive pressure is maintained in\nthe inerted atmosphere at all times and that the oxygen concentration does not exceed 0.2% by volume.\n1.8 Pressure\nParticularly hazardous cargoes, including ethylene oxide and propylene oxide, may be carried below their boiling\npoints to reduce boil-off and enhance safety. In such cases the cargo tank pressure should be maintained above\natmospheric pressure with nitrogen padding.\n4.6 Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances\nA number of gas tankers are certified to carry particular chemical products which have a vapour pressure not\nexceeding 2.8 bar at a temperature of 37.8oC. These products are called noxious liquid substances (NLS). The ten\nNLS that may be carried on a gas tanker identified by an asterisk in Chapter 19 of the IGC code. NLS commonly\ncarried on gas tankers include:\n• •\n• Isoprene;\nPentanes and pentene; and\nPropylene oxide.\nA gas tanker should have a Certificate of Fitness which should identify all the liquefied gas cargoes and NLS cargoes\nthat the ship is certified to carry. In addition, gas tankers carrying NLS in bulk are required to have the following\ndocumentation on board:\n• •\n• •\nThe International Pollution Prevention Certificate (IPPC) identifying the particular product with their pollution\ncategories that the ship is certified to carry;\nThe Procedures and Arrangements Manual describing the operational procedures to be followed in order to\ncomply with MARPOL Annex II;\nThe Cargo Record Book required by MARPOL Annex II; and\nThe Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plan (SMPEP) describing the on-board response to the spill or\nrelease of noxious liquid substances.\nThe requirement for a P&A Manual applies only when a gas tanker is carrying NLS cargoes. When NLS cargoes are\nnot carried, a P&A Manual is not required on board.\n5.4 Atmosphere Control\n5.4.2 Cargo Tanks and Piping systems\nSome liquefied gas cargoes react easily with oxygen and require the oxygen content in the vapour space to be kept\nextremely low (in some cases less than 0.1%) to prevent a chemical reaction occurring. As examples, ethylene\noxide/propylene oxide mixtures can decompose spontaneously unless special precautions are taken to control the\natmosphere, and butadiene can react with oxygen to form unstable peroxide compounds.\nPrior to loading such reactive cargoes, the oxygen content in the cargo tank should be reduced to the level\nappropriate for the cargo to be loaded. While such cargoes remain on board, oxygen should be excluded in\naccordance with shippers’ requirements by keeping the vapour space full of inert gas or cargo vapour at a positive\npressure. In the particular case of butadiene, the cargo vapour should be kept above atmospheric pressure.\n6.9.2 Reliquefaction and Boil-Off Control\nThe vapour of certain cargoes, including ethylene oxide and propylene oxide, cannot be compressed. Such cargoes\ncan only be refrigerated by indirect cooling and cargo compressors usually have to be isolated or blanked off.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n17.14 Ethylene oxide\n17.14.1 For the carriage of ethylene oxide, the requirements of 17.18 shall apply, with the additions and modifications\nas given in this section.\n17.14.2 Deck tanks shall not be used for the carriage of ethylene oxide.\n17.4.3 Stainless steels types 416 and 442, as well as cast iron, shall not be used in ethylene oxide cargo containment\nand piping systems.\n17.14.4 Before loading, tank shall be thoroughly and effectively cleaned to remove all traces of previous cargoes from\ntanks and associated pipe work, except where the immediate prior cargo has been ethylene oxide, propylene oxide,\nor mixtures of these products. Particular care shall be taken in the case of ammonia in tanks made of steel other than\nstainless steel.\n17.14.5 Ethylene oxide shall be discharged only by deep well pumps or inert gas displacement. The arrangement of\npumps shall comply with 17.18.15.\n17.14.6 Ethylene oxide shall be carried refrigerated only and maintained at temperatures of less than 30oC.\n17.14.7 PRVs shall be set at a pressure of not less than 0.55 MPa gauge. The maximum set pressure shall be\nspecially approved by the administration.\n17.14.8 The protective padding of nitrogen gas, as required by 17.18.27, should be such that the nitrogen\nconcentration in the vapour space of the cargo tank will, at no time, be less than 45% by volume.\n17.14.9 Before loading, and at all times when the cargo tank contains ethylene oxide liquid or vapour, the cargo tank\nshall be inerted with nitrogen.\n17.14.10 The water-spray system required by 17.18.29 and that required by 11.3 shall operate automatically in a fire\ninvolving the cargo containment system.\n17.14.11 A jettisoning arrangement shall be provided to allow the emergency discharge of ethylene oxide in the event\nof uncontrollable self-reaction.\n17.18 Propylene oxide and mixtures of ethylene oxide-propylene oxide with ethylene oxide content of not more than\n30% by weight\n17.18.1 Products transported under the provisions of this section shall be acetylene-free.\n17.18.2 Unless cargo tanks are properly cleaned, these products should not be carried in tanks that have contained\nas one of the three previous cargos any product known to catalyse polymerization, such as:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nanhydrous ammonia and ammonia solutions;\namines and amine solutions; and\noxidizing substance (e.g., chlorine)\n17.18.3 Before loading, tank shall be thoroughly and effectively cleaned to remove all traces of previous cargoes from\ntanks and associated pipe work, except where the immediate prior cargo has been propylene oxide or ethylene oxide\npropylene oxide mixtures. Particular care shall be taken in the case of ammonia in tanks made of steel other than\nstainless steel.\n17.18.4 In all cases, the effectiveness of cleaning procedures for tanks and associated pipe work shall be checked,\nby suitably testing or inspection, to ascertain that no traces of acidic or alkaline materials remain that might create a\nhazardous situation in the presence of these products.\n17.18.5 Tanks shall be entered and inspected prior to each initial loading of these products to ensure freedom from\ncontamination, heavy rust deposits and any visible structural defects. When cargo tanks are in continuous service for\nthese products, such inspections shall be performed at intervals of not more than two years.\n17.18.6 Tanks for the carriage of these projects shall be of steel or stainless-steel construction.\n17.18.7 Tanks that have contained these products may be used for other cargoes after thorough cleaning of tanks\nand associated pipework systems by washing or purging.\n17.18.8 All valves, flanges, fittings and accessory equipment shall be of a type suitable for use with these products\nand shall be constructed of steel or stainless steel in accordance with recognised standards. Disc or disc faces, seats\nand other wearing parts of the valves shall be made of stainless steel containing not less than 11% chromium.\n17.18.9 Gaskets shall be constructed of materials which do not react with, dissolve in, or lower the auto ignition\ntemperature of, these products and which are fire resistant and possess adequate mechanical behaviour. The\nsurface presented to the cargo shall be polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) materials giving a similar degree of safety by\ntheir inertness. Spirally wound stainless steel with a filler of PTFE or similar fluorinated polymer may be accepted, if\napproved by the Administration or recognised organisation acting on its behalf.\n17.18.10 Insulation and packing, if used, shall be of a material which does not react with, dissolve in, or lower the\nauto ignition temperature of, these products.\n17.18.11 The following materials are generally found unsatisfactory for use in gaskets, packing and similar uses in\ncontainment systems for these products and would require testing before being approved:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nNeoprene or natural rubber if it comes into contact with the products;\nAsbestos or binders used with asbestos; and\nMaterials containing oxides of magnesium, such as mineral wools.\n17.18.12 Filling and discharge piping shall extend to within 100 mm of the bottom of the tank or any sump.\n17.18.13 The product shall be loaded and discharged in such a manner that venting of the tanks to atmosphere does\nnot occur. If vapour returned to shore is used during tank loading, the vapour return system connected to a\ncontainment system for the product shall be independent of all other containment systems.\n17.18.14 During discharging operations, the pressure in the cargo tank shall be maintained above 0.007 MPa gauge.\n17.18.15 The cargo shall be discharged only by deep well pumps, hydraulically operated submerged pumps or inert\ngas displacement. Each cargo pump shall be arranged to ensure that the product does not heat significantly if the\ndischarge line from the pump is shut off or otherwise blocked.\n17.18.16 Tanks carrying these products shall be vented independently of tanks carrying other products. Facilities\nshall be provided for sampling the tank contents without opening the tank to atmosphere.\n17.18.17 Cargo hoses used for transfer of these products shall be marked “FOR ALKYLENE OXIDE TRANSFER\nONLY”.\n17.18.18 Hold spaces shall be monitored for these products. Hold spaces surrounding type A and type B independent\ntanks shall also be inerted and monitored for oxygen. The oxygen content of these spaces shall be maintained below\n2% by volume. Portable sampling equipment is satisfactory.\n17.18.19 Prior to disconnecting shorelines, the pressure in liquid and vapour lines shall be relieved through suitable\nvalves installed at the loading header. Liquid and vapour from these lines shall not be discharged to atmosphere.\n17.18.20 Tanks shall be designed for the maximum pressure expected to be encountered during loading, carriage or\nunloading of cargo.\n17.18.21 Tanks for the carriage of propylene oxide with a design vapour pressure of less than 0.06 MPa, and tanks\nfor the carriage of ethylene oxide-propylene oxide mixtures with a design vapour pressure of less than 0.12 MPa,\nshall have a cooling system to maintain the cargo below the reference temperature. The reference temperatures are\nreferred to in 15.1.3.\n17.18.22 Pressure relief valve settings shall not be less than 0.02 MPa gauge; and for type C independent tanks not\ngreater than 0.7 MPa gauge for the carriage of propylene oxide and not greater than 0.53 MPa gauge for the carriage\nof ethylene oxide-propylene oxide mixtures.\n17.18.23 The piping system for tanks to be loaded with these products shall be completely separate from the piping\nsystems for all other tanks, including empty tanks, and from all cargo compressors. If the piping system for the tanks\nto be loaded with these products is not independent, as defined in 1.2.28, the required piping separation shall be\naccomplished by the removal of spool pieces, valves, or other pipe sections and the installation of blank flanges at\nthese locations. The required separation applies to all liquid and vapour piping, liquid and vapour vent lines and any\nother possible connection such as common inert gas supply lines.\n17.18.24 The product shall be transported only in accordance with cargo handling plans approved by the\nAdministration. Each intended loading arrangement shall be shown on a separate cargo handling plan. Cargo\nhandling plans shall show the entire cargo piping system and the locations for installation of the blank flanges needed\nto meet the above piping separation requirements. A copy of each approved cargo handling plan shall be kept on\nboard the ship. The International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk shall be endorsed\nto include references to the approved cargo handling plans.\n17.18.25 Before each initial loading of these products, and before every subsequent return to such service,\ncertification verifying that the required piping separation has been achieved shall be obtained from a responsible\nperson acceptable to the port Administration and carried on board the ship. Each connection between a blank flange\nand pipeline flange shall be fitted with a wire and seal by the responsible person to ensure that inadvertent removal of\nthe blank flange is impossible.\n17.18.26 The maximum allowable loading limits for each tank shall be indicated for each loading temperature that\nmay be applied, in accordance with 15.5.\n17.18.27 The cargo shall be carried under a suitable protective padding of nitrogen gas. An automatic nitrogen\nmakeup system shall be installed to prevent the tank pressure falling below 0.007 MPa gauge in the event of product\ntemperature fall due to ambient conditions or malfunctioning of refrigeration system. Sufficient nitrogen shall be\navailable on board to satisfy the demand of the automatic pressure control. Nitrogen of commercially pure quality\n(99.9% by volume) shall be used for padding. A battery of nitrogen bottles, connected to the cargo tanks through a\npressure reduction valve, satisfies the intention of the expression “automatic” in this context.\n17.18.28 The cargo tank vapour space shall be tested prior to and after loading to ensure that the oxygen content is\n2% by volume or less.\n17.18.29 A water-spray system of sufficient capacity shall be provided to blanket effectively the area surrounding the\nloading manifold, the exposed deck piping associated with product handling and the tank domes. The arrangement of\npiping and nozzles shall be such as to give a uniform distribution rate of 10 L/m2/min. The arrangement shall ensure\nthat any spilled cargo is washed away.\n17.18.30 The water-spray system shall be capable of local and remote manual operation in case of a fire involving\nthe cargo containment system. Remote manual operation shall be arranged such that the remote starting of pumps\nsupplying the water-spray system and remote operation of any normally closed valves in the system can be carried\nout from a suitable location outside the cargo area, adjacent to the accommodation spaces and readily accessible\nand operable in the event of fire in the areas protected.\n17.18.31 When ambient temperatures permit, a pressurised water hose ready for immediate use shall be available\nduring loading and unloading operations, in addition to the above water spray requirements.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide\n(EO) and PO-EO mixtures which gave guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nTank preparation and inspection, including compatibility with previous cargoes.\nSeparation of pipeline systems and compressors, including sealing and certification.\nPressure relief valve (PRV) settings.\nNitrogen purging and padding requirements.\nCargo discharge methods.\nVapour return requirements.\nCargo temperature control.\nMonitoring/inerting of hold spaces.\nSampling arrangements.\nEmergency procedures, including jettisoning ethylene oxide.\nThese procedures may refer to or form part of the Procedures and Arrangements (P&A) Manual, the Cargo System\nOperation Manual and/or the approved cargo handling plans.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO),\nethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures.\n• •\n• •\nReview the approved cargo handling plans and the P&A Manual.\nIf the vessel has loaded propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) or PO-EO mixtures within the last 12\nmonths, review:\no Segregation certification issued by the appropriate shore authority prior to loading.\no Records of the last 3 cargoes carried prior to the PO/EO.\no Cargo tank inspection records for tanks used for PO/EO.\no Records of tank cleaning prior to loading PO/EO.\no Records of monitoring cargo tank pressure and oxygen content.\no Records of monitoring hold spaces for PO/EO leakage and oxygen during the voyage.\nIf the vessel is carrying propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) or PO-EO mixtures at the time of the\ninspection:\no Inspect the seals on the blanks in the pipeline system.\no Verify the water-spray system is fully operational and ready for immediate use.\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo operations to verify their familiarity with the company procedures\nfor the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO\nmixtures.\nApproved cargo handling plans.\nP&A Manual.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual, where provided.\nSegregation certification issued by the appropriate shore authority prior to loading.\nRecords of the last 3 cargoes carried prior to the PO/EO.\nCargo tank inspection records for tanks used for PO/EO.\nRecords of tank cleaning prior to loading PO/EO.\nRecords of monitoring cargo tank pressure and oxygen content.\nRecords of monitoring hold spaces for PO/EO leakage and oxygen during the voyage.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the safe carriage of propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and\nPO-EO mixtures.\nThe officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures for the safe carriage\nof propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) and PO-EO mixtures including:\no Tank preparation and inspection, including compatibility with previous cargoes.\no Separation of pipeline systems and compressors, including sealing and certification.\no Pressure relief valve (PRV) settings.\no Nitrogen purging and padding requirements.\no Cargo discharge methods.\no Vapour return requirements.\no Cargo temperature control.\no Monitoring/inerting of hold spaces.\no Sampling arrangements.\no Emergency procedures, including jettisoning ethylene oxide.\nThe vessel was handling PO/EO cargoes but:\no These cargoes were not included on the Certificate of Fitness or NLS certificate, and/or\no There was no approved cargo handling plan available.\no There was no P&A Manual on board.\nThere was no segregation certification on board issued by the appropriate shore authority prior to loading\npropylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) or PO-EO mixtures.\nEthylene oxide was being carried in deck tanks.\nWhile the vessel was handling PO/EO cargo, blanks were not sealed as required.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• During discharge of PO/EO the tank pressure was not maintained above 0.007 MPa gauge.\nThe vessel’s cargo hoses used for PO/EO transfer were not correctly marked with “FOR ALKYLENE OXIDE\nTRANSFER ONLY”.\nThere were no records to show that the hold spaces were being monitored for PO/EO leakage and/or\noxygen content.\nWhere hold spaces were required to be inerted, oxygen content was more than 2%.\nWhere required to be fitted, the cargo tanks were not fitted with a cooling system to maintain the cargo\ntemperature below the reference temperature.\nThe cargo loading plan did not document the maximum allowable loading limits for each tank corresponding\nto the loading temperature.\nThe water spray system was not operational or defective in any respect.\nThere was no evidence that the gaskets in use were constructed of materials which were resistant to the\ncargo.\nThere was no jettison equipment available on board.\nIf propylene oxide (PO), ethylene oxide (EO) or PO-EO mixtures are not included on the vessel’s Certificate of\nFitness, select “Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question\nguidance\".", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.5.", "t": "Were there sufficient escape sets as required by the IGC Code for everyone on", "c": "board, and did the sets provide suitable respiratory and eye protection?\nShort Question Text\nEscape sets as required by the IGC Code\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Interview - Rating, Internal Accommodation\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that everyone on board is provided with a suitable emergency escape set to exit a hazardous\natmosphere in case of an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n3.11.5 Breathing Apparatus\nShips carrying toxic cargoes are provided with sets of small breathing apparatus supplying air for approximately 15\nminutes. This equipment is for emergency escape only and should not be used for other purposes.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n10.13.3 Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nEEBDs are for emergency escape and should not be used as the primary means for entering spaces or\ncompartments with unsafe atmospheres.\nThe device can be of two types:\nCompressed Air Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nThis consists of an air cylinder, reducing valve, air hose, face mask or hood and a flame-retardant high visibility bag\nor jacket. It is normally a constant flow device, providing compressed air at a rate of approximately 40 litres per\nminute, giving a 10–15-minute duration, depending on the capacity of the cylinder. Compressed air EEBDs can\nnormally be recharged on board with a conventional SCBA compressor. The pressure gauge, supply valve and hood\nshould be checked before use.\nRe-breathing Emergency Escape Breathing Device\nThis normally consists of a robust watertight carrying case, compressed oxygen cylinder, breathing bag, mouthpiece\nand a flame-retardant hood. It is designed for single use. When the hood is placed over the user’s head and the set\nactivated, exhaled air is mixed with compressed oxygen inside the breathing bag to allow the wearer to breath\nnormally when escaping from a hazardous atmosphere.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• Toxic cargoes.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n14.4 Personal protection requirements for individual products\n14.4.1 Requirements of this section shall apply to ships carrying products for which those paragraphs are listed in\ncolumn \"i\" in the table of chapter 19.\n14.4.2 Suitable respiratory and eye protection for emergency escape purposes shall be provided for every person on\nboard, subject to the following:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nfilter-type respiratory protection is unacceptable;\nself-contained breathing apparatus shall have at least a duration of service of 15 min; and\nemergency escape respiratory protection shall not be used for firefighting or cargo-handling purposes and\nshall be marked to that effect.\nInspection Guidance\nEscape Set in this context can be considered synonymous with Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD).\nThe vessel operator should have provided the vessel with the emergency escape sets required by the IGC Code that:\n• •\n• •\nProvide suitable respiratory and eye protection.\nHave a duration of at least 15 minutes.\nDo not use filter-type respiratory protection.\nAnd are:\no Available for every person on board while the vessel is underway.\no In addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and machinery\nspaces.\no Suitably marked as not to be used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\no Included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the onboard\nmaintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs contained within the onboard maintenance\nplan.\nInspect two escape sets at random.\nInterview a rating at random to verify their familiarity with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape\nsets provided.\nExpected Evidence\n• The inspection and maintenance records for the EEBDs contained within the onboard maintenance plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThe escape sets provided:\no Did not have a design duration of at least 15 minutes.\no Were not included in the company procedures for the use and maintenance of EEBDs and the\nonboard maintenance plan.\no Used filter-type respiratory protection.\no Did not provide suitable eye protection.\no Were not suitably marked as not to be used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\no Were not in addition to the EEBDs required by SOLAS to be located in the accommodation and\nmachinery spaces.\nAn escape set:\no Was not fully charged.\no Had not been inspected and maintained in accordance with the onboard maintenance plan.\no Had been used for fire-fighting or cargo-handling purposes.\no Had been used as the primary means for entering spaces or compartments with unsafe\natmospheres.\nThere were insufficient escape sets for everyone on board, including any contractors, supernumeraries,\nvisitors etc. while underway.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the locations, purpose and operation of the escape sets provided.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection and maintenance of the cargo tank insulation, and was the insulation reported\nto be in good condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank insulation\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nIACS: Requirements Concerning Gas Tankers\nSIGTTO: Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management. First Edition 2004.\nObjective\nTo ensure the cargo tank insulation is properly inspected and maintained.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS: Requirements Concerning Gas Tankers\nG1.8 Insulation\nG1.8.1 When liquified gas is carried at a temperature below –10°C, suitable insulation is to be provided to ensure that\nthe minimum temperature of the hull structure does not fall below the minimum allowable service temperature given\nfor the concerned grade of steel in W1 when the cargo tanks are at their design temperature and the ambient\ntemperatures are 5°C for air and 0°C for sea water.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n3.7.2 Tank insulation\nThermal insulation is fitted to refrigerated cargo tanks for the following reasons:\n• •\nTo minimise heat flow into cargo tanks and reduce boil off.\nTo protect the ship structure around the cargo tanks from the effects of low temperature.\nInsulation materials for use on gas carriers will usually possess the following main characteristics:\n• •\n• •\n• Low thermal conductivity.\nAbility to bear loads.\nAbility to with stand mechanical damage.\nLight weight.\nUnaffected by cargo liquid or vapour.\nThe vapour sealing property of the insulation system is important to prevent the ingress of water or water vapour.\nIngress of moisture can cause a loss of insulation efficiency and progressive condensation and freezing can cause\nextensive mechanical damage to the insulation. Humidity conditions will, therefore, be kept as low as possible in hold\nspaces. One method used to protect the insulation is to provide a foil skin that acts as a vapour barrier to surround\nthe system.\nThermal insulation may be applied to various surfaces, depending on the design of the containment system. For Type\nB and Type C containment systems, insulation is applied directly to the cargo tank’s outer surfaces. For Type A cargo\ntanks, insulation can be applied either directly to the cargo tank or to the inner hull (if fitted) although, for maximum\neffectiveness, it is more common for the insulation to be applied directly to the cargo tank surface.\nSIGTTO: Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management. First Edition 2004.\n5.4 Prevention of Fires in Liquefied Gas Carrier Cargo Containment Systems.\nThe precautions that should be considered when undertaking repair and construction work on ship and terminal\nstorage tanks can be itemised as follows:\n• •\nWhen hot work is to be carried out near the tank insulation, a suitable area is to be checked for gas in the\ninsulation. If working on the tank surface, a sufficient area of insulation is to be removed to ensure that\nignition of possible entrapped gas pockets or the insulation material cannot occur.\nAll exposed insulation in the vicinity of hot work should be covered with a non-flammable material. Care\nshould also be taken that any tape or sealing materials are also non- flammable.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nThe frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of class, flag state and national authorities.\nIn addition, industry recommendations are taken into account. Guidance for inspection of compartments is provided,\nwhich may include industry/class publications. Records are compartment specific and made to a standard format that\nmay include photographs as evidence of the compartment’s condition.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10. Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n• •\n• •\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals;\nany non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;\nappropriate corrective action is taken; and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: IGC Code\n4.10 Thermal insulation\n4.10.1 Thermal insulation shall be provided, as required, to protect the hull from temperatures below those allowable\n(see 4.19.1) and limit the heat flux into the tank to the levels that can be maintained by the pressure and temperature\ncontrol systems applied in Chapter 7.\n4.10.2 In determining the insulation performance, due regard shall be given to the amount of the acceptable boil-off in\nassociation with the reliquefaction plant on board, main propulsion machinery or other temperature control system.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the cargo tank\ninsulation which included guidance on:\n• •\n• •\nScope and frequency of inspections.\nMaintenance procedures.\nRecords to be kept of inspections and maintenance.\nFire safety precautions to be taken when undertaking maintenance or repair work in the vicinity of cargo tank\ninsulation.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the ship’s maintenance plan. Inspection of cargo tank insulation may\nform part of general inspection of hold spaces.\nTypical Insulation materials are:\n• •\n• •\n• Balsa wood.\nMineral wool.\nExtruded polystyrene.\nExpanded polystyrene.\nPolyurethane foam.\nInsulation materials may be combustible.\nIf loose-fill perlite insulation is used, levels should be regularly checked and topped up as required.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the\ncargo tank insulation.\nReview the:\no Records of inspection of the cargo tank insulation.\no Records of maintenance and repair of the cargo tank insulation.\nWhere defects to the cargo tank insulation had been noted within an inspection report, verify that a defect\nreport had been generated to follow up with the required corrective actions.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the inspection\nand maintenance of the cargo tank insulation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the cargo tank insulation.\nRecords of inspection of the cargo tank insulation.\nRecords of maintenance and repair of the cargo tank insulation.\nOpen defect reports for any defects to the cargo tank insulation.\nThe enclosed space entry records and permits for recent cargo tank insulation inspections.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the cargo tank insulation which\nincluded guidance on:\no Scope and frequency of inspections.\no Maintenance procedures.\no Records to be kept of inspections and maintenance.\nFire safety precautions to be taken when undertaking maintenance or repair work in the vicinity of\ncargo tank insulation.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance\nof the cargo tank insulation.\nThere were no records of the inspection, maintenance, or repair of the cargo tank insulation.\nInspections of cargo tank insulation had not taken place as required by company procedures.\nWhere a defect to the cargo tank insulation had been noted within an inspection report, no defect report had\nbeen generated to follow up with the required corrective actions (give details of defect).\no\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.4.7.", "t": "Were the vent outlets from the cargo containment system fitted with the correct", "c": "protection screen or flame screen required for the cargo being carried, and were the\nscreens in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nVent outlet protection screens or flame screens\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that the correct protection or flame screens are fitted to vent outlets in accordance with the cargo\nbeing carried, and that these screens are in satisfactory condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n5.9.2 Vent Mast Protection Screens and Flame Screens\nThe IGC Code requires specific vent mast protection screens and flame screens to be used when carrying particular\ncargoes:\nWhen carrying cargoes other than MARPOL Annex II Noxious Liquid Substances (NLS), cargo vent mast outlets are\nrequired to be fitted with a coarse protection screen (up to 13mm square mesh) to prevent the ingress of foreign\nobjects without adversely affecting the vent flow: and\nWhen carrying a low vapour pressure MARPOL Annex II NLS, cargo vent mast outlets are required to be fitted with\nflame screens (typically 2mm square mesh) for fire protection. Flame screens are required to be removed and\nreplaced by the coarse protection screens when gas tankers are not carrying MARPOL Annex II NLS cargoes.\n5.9.2.1 Flame Screens\nThe main purpose of a flame screen is to remove heat from a vent mast fire, and to prevent flame passing down the\nvent riser into the cargo tank.\nFlame arresters and flame screens should be maintained in good condition and replaced if they become defective.\nFlame screens should never be painted. Particular devices should only be fitted to the vent mast when the ship is\ncarrying cargoes that require them to be fitted.\nThe passage of cold vapour through a damp screen can cause freezing and blockage. If a flame screen becomes\nblocked, the passage of gas or vapour may be restricted dangerously. This may increase the pressure in the vent\nmast.\nIn some ship designs, the protection screen is permanently fixed in place at the vent mast outlet and the flame screen\nis bolted on top of it when carrying MARPOL Annex II NLS cargoes. When removed from the vent mast, flame\nscreens should be stored properly in order to prevent damage and marked clearly so that they can be located readily\nwhen required.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n2.6.2 Flammability/flammable range\nFlammability within vapour clouds\nChemical cargoes have very low vapour pressures so, if a relief valve lifted, there is a potential risk of flammable\nmixtures existing in the vent mast for some time. Therefore, there is a serious risk of a flame entering the cargo tank\nin the event of a mast being struck by lightning, if flame screens are not fitted for certain chemical cargoes listed in\nthe IGC Code.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• IGS and venting system\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n8.2.15 Suitable protection screens of not more than 13 mm square mesh shall be fitted on vent outlets to prevent the\ningress of extraneous objects without adversely affecting the flow. Other requirements for protection screens apply\nwhen carrying specific cargoes (see 17.9 and 17.21).\n17.1 General\nThe requirements of this chapter are applicable where reference thereto is made in column \"i\" in the table of chapter\n19. These requirements are additional to the general requirements of the Code.\n17.9 Flame screens on vent outlets\nWhen carrying a cargo referenced to this section, cargo tank vent outlets shall be provided with readily renewable\nand effective flame screens or safety heads of an approved type. Due attention shall be paid in the design of flame\nscreens and vent heads, to the possibility of the blockage of these devices by the freezing of cargo vapour or by icing\nup in adverse weather conditions. Flame screens shall be removed and replaced by protection screens, in\naccordance with 8.2.15, when carrying cargoes not referenced to this section.\n17.21 Carbon dioxide: high purity\n17.21.2 There is a potential for the cargo to solidify in the event that a cargo tank relief valve, fitted in accordance with\n8.2, fails in the open position. To avoid this, a means of isolating the cargo tank safety valves shall be provided and\nthe requirements of 8.2.9.2 do not apply when carrying this carbon dioxide. Discharge piping from safety relief valves\nshall be designed so they remain free from obstructions that could cause clogging. Protective screens shall not be\nfitted to the outlets of relief valve discharge piping, so the requirements of 8.2.15 do not apply.\nInspection Guidance\nWhen carrying MARPOL Annex II NLS cargoes, vent outlets connected to the cargo containment system should be\nfitted with readily renewable and effective flame screens or safety heads of an approved type. These cargoes include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Chlorine\nDiethyl ether\nEthylene oxide/propylene oxide mixtures\nIsoprene\nIsopropylamine\nMonoethylamine\nPentane\nPentene\nPropylene oxide\nVinyl ethyl ether\nVinylidene chloride\nWhen carrying carbon dioxide cargoes, vent outlets connected to the cargo containment system should NOT be fitted\nwith either flame screens or protection screens.\nFor all other gas cargoes, vent outlets connected to the cargo containment system should be fitted with suitable\nprotection screens of not more than 13 mm square mesh to prevent the ingress of extraneous objects without\nadversely affecting the flow.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nVerify from cargo records and/or maintenance plans that vent outlets from the cargo containment system are\nfitted with the correct flame screen or protection screen for the cargo being carried, and that these are in\nsatisfactory condition.\nIf flame screens or protection screens are available on board but not currently fitted, inspect the storage\nlocation to verify that they are stored properly in order to prevent damage and marked clearly so that they\ncan be located readily when required.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCargo plans and/or maintenance records that demonstrated vent outlets from the cargo containment system\nwere fitted with the correct flame screen or protection screen for the cargo being carried.\nMaintenance plans that demonstrated flame screens or protection screens had been inspected and\nmaintained in a satisfactory condition.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• A vent outlet connected to the cargo containment system was not fitted with the required flame screen (or\nsafety head) or protection screen for the cargo being carried.\nA flame screen or protection screen fitted to a vent outlet connected to the cargo containment system was\nnot in satisfactory condition e.g., blocked or clogged, painted over or damaged.\nFlame screens not currently in use were not stored properly in order to prevent damage and/or marked\nclearly so that they could be located readily when required.\nA vessel issued with an International Pollution Prevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid\nSubstances in Bulk (NLS) did not have the required flame screens (or safety heads) available on board to fit\nto the vent outlets connected to the cargo containment system.\nOn a vessel carrying a carbon dioxide cargo, flame screens or protection screens were fitted to the vent\noutlets connected to the cargo containment system.\n8.5. LNG", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, testing and calibration of the custody transfer measurement system (CTMS),\nand was the system in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCustody transfer measurement system (CTMS)\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nGIIGNL: LNG Custody transfer handbook 6th edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel is able to measure the quantity of energy loaded from production facilities, unloaded to\na receiving terminal, or transferred to another LNG carrier during ship-to-ship operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.20 Custody Transfer Measurement Systems\nCargo measurement is generally handled by the custody transfer measurement system (CTMS). The CTMS takes\nreadings from the cargo level gauging system, together with measurements of cargo temperature, pressure and\nvessel trim and list, and calculates the volume of cargo on board, together with average cargo liquid and vapour\ntemperatures at the time of the measurement. These data are taken as the official record of cargo quantity at the start\nor completion of loading or discharging operations and are used to calculate the amount of cargo transferred.\nThe accuracy of the CTMS is certified at the time of delivery of the ship and periodically once in service. It has\nbecome common practice to fully calibrate the system at each drydocking. At such time, the cargo tanks are entered\nand the level gauging system and associated pressure, temperature, trim and list measuring instruments are checked\nfor proper operation and are fully calibrated.\nWith gas tanker drydocking cycles of up to 5 years, it is usual to undertake an in-service verification of the system's\naccuracy at the midpoint of a drydocking cycle. This verification can be undertaken without gas-freeing the ship or\nentering the cargo tanks.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.11.6 LNG custody transfer measurement systems (CTMS)\nFor LNG carriers to meet the requirements for custody transfer, the cargo tanks are commonly calibrated by an\nindependent measurer, and high accuracy level, temperature and vapour pressure measuring equipment is installed.\nThis is often supported by data logging and cargo calculation facilities referred to as custody transfer measurement\nsystems (CTMS) (see Section 8.8). Such systems are usually approved by local customs authorities.\nThe need for this equipment has developed from the LNG trade practice of relying on shipboard measurement of\ncargo to determine the quantity of product transferred between seller and buyer.\nAccuracy is important in these circumstances since the quantities determined are also used as the basis for import\nduties and fiscal accounting. The GIIGNL publication, ‘LNG Custody Transfer Handbook’ (Reference 2.22), contains\nfurther details on LNG custody transfer.\nSuch a system normally includes:\n• •\n• •\nLevel gauges\ntemperature sensors\ntrim and list indicator\npressure gauges or sensors.\nSome LNG ships are fitted with a means of determining cargo density. However, its value is more usually derived\nfrom the analysis of samples carried out in the terminal.\nGIIGNL: LNG Custody transfer handbook Fifth edition – version 5.0\n2.2. General scheme of the measurement operations\nThe objective is to measure the quantity of energy loaded from production facilities into an LNG carrier or unloaded\nfrom an LNG carrier to a receiving terminal. For ship-to-ship operations, the objective is to measure the quantity of\nenergy transferred from one LNG carrier to another LNG carrier.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "2.3.5.", "t": "Periodic instruments recalibration", "c": "It is recommended that, unless it is specified by the fiscal authorities or by the Classification Society, Buyer and Seller\nagree on the periodicity of recalibration intervals, e.g. at each dry-docking.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may\ninclude:\n• •\n• Pre-arrival checks.\nCargo survey and sampling.\nGas and chemical specific operational procedures.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing and calibration of the custody\ntransfer measurement system (CTMS), including requirements for:\n• •\nPre-arrival checks\nServicing and periodic calibration\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review the company procedures for the operation, testing and calibration of the\ncustody transfer measurement system (CTMS).\nReview where necessary the:\no\no\no\n• Manufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the CTMS.\nRecords of pre-operational tests of the CTMS.\nService and calibration records for the CTMS.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ntesting and calibration of the CTMS.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation, testing and calibration of the CTMS.\nManufacturer’s manuals and instructions for the CTMS.\nRecords of pre-operational tests of the CTMS.\nService and calibration records for the CTMS\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, testing and calibration of the custody transfer\nmeasurement system (CTMS).\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, testing and\ncalibration of the custody transfer measurement system (CTMS).\nThe CTMS had not been calibrated as required by company procedures.\nThere was no current certificate of calibration for the CTMS available on board.\nThere were no records of pre-operational tests of the CTMS.\nThe CTMS had not been tested prior to the current loading/discharging operations.\nThe CTMS was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.5.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the Gas Combustion Unit (GCU)?\nShort Question Text\nGas Combustion Unit (GCU)\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the Gas Combustion Unit is properly operated, inspected, maintained, and tested.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.8.3 Gas combustion units (GCU)\nGCUs have been specifically developed for the controlled and safe oxidation of BOG from LNG carriers. The GCU\nsystem is required to safely oxidise excess BOG from the cargo tanks while maintaining exhaust gas temperatures at\nthe stack outlet below 535 °C. Although this is 50°C below the auto-ignition temperature of methane in air, an industry\nstandard of 450°C has been adopted.\nA combination inert gas generator (IGG)/GCU is fitted on some newer LNG carriers, where the exhaust gas from the\nGCU is used to generate inert gas.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nDefinitions.\nGCU\nGas Combustion Unit: Equipment used to dispose of excess cargo vapour by thermal oxidation.\n1.8 Pressure\nCargo tank pressure on LNG carriers is commonly controlled by:\n• •\n• Burning the boil-off in the ship’s propulsion machinery;\nBurning the boil-off in the gas combustion unit (GCU); or\nReliquefaction of boil-off.\nAppendix 3\nCargo Handling Plant and Equipment\nA3.6 Gas Combustion Units\nMethane, while an efficient and environmentally friendly fuel, is recognised as being a greenhouse gas if released\nunburned into the atmosphere. For this and various safety reasons, venting of methane boil off gas (BOG) is not\nallowed in ports and should be restricted at sea to emergency situations only, or for the very limited cases of cargo\nsystem gas-freeing operations.\nA gas combustion unit (GCU) is typically fitted on board LNG carriers that have diesel propulsion. It provides a means\nfor the safe and controlled combustion of BOG. On steam propelled LNG carriers, the main boilers provide this\nfunction.\nThe GCU is sized to handle 100% of the daily BOG volume of the fully laden LNG vessel. This is so that the GCU can\nhandle all the BOG in case where it is not:\n• •\nBurned as fuel, for example when the vessel is idle; or\nReliquefied because the vessel does not have a reliquefaction plant or because it is undergoing\nmaintenance.\nThe GCU is typically located in the ship's funnel and is basically a large vertical tube inside which the BOG is burned.\nIt utilises large fans to both cool the walls of the GCU combustion chamber and to provide air for proper combustion.\nIt is designed so that the temperature of the exhaust gas leaving the top of the combustion chamber is 535o C or less.\nAt this temperature it will not initiate combustion should cargo vapour be released and drift past the GCU exhaust.\nThe GCU has been designed to operate over a wide range of gas flow, including low gas flow during gas freeing\noperations. In such cases the gas flow is a combination of methane and inert gas. Methods of maintaining the flame\nto burn the methane in such a mixed flow are available from the original equipment manufacturer and include the use\nof igniters or maintaining a pilot flame using diesel oil.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n1.2.52 Thermal oxidation method means a system where the boil-off vapours are utilized as fuel for shipboard use or\nas a waste heat system subject to the provisions of chapter 16 or a system not using the gas as fuel complying with\nthis Code.\nChapter 7 – Cargo Pressure/Temperature Control\n7.4 Thermal oxidation of vapours\n7.4.1 General\nMaintaining the cargo tank pressure and temperature by means of thermal oxidation of cargo vapours, as defined by\n1.2.52 and 16.2 shall be permitted only for LNG cargoes. In general:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nthermal oxidation systems shall exhibit no externally visible flame and shall maintain the uptake exhaust\ntemperature below 535oC;\narrangement of spaces where oxidation systems are located shall comply with 16.3 and supply systems\nshall comply with 16.4; and\nif waste gases coming from any other system are to be burnt, the oxidation system shall be designed to\naccommodate all anticipated feed gas compositions.\n7.4.4 Safety\n7.4.4.1 Suitable devices shall be installed and arranged to ensure that gas flow to the burner is cut off unless\nsatisfactory ignition has been established and maintained.\n7.4.4.2 Each oxidation system shall have provision to manually isolate its gas fuel supply from a safely accessible\nposition.\n7.4.4.3 Provision shall be made for automatic purging the gas supply piping to the burners by means of an inert gas,\nafter the extinguishing of these burners.\n7.4.4.4 In the case of flame failure of all operating burners for gas and oil or for a combination thereof, the combustion\nchambers of the oxidation system shall be automatically purged before relighting.\n7.4.4.5 Arrangements shall be made to enable the combustion chamber to be manually purged.\nChapter 16 – Use of cargo as fuel.\n16.1 General\nExcept as provided for in 16.9, methane (LNG) is the only cargo whose vapour or boil-off gas may be utilized in\nmachinery spaces of category A, and, in these spaces, it may be utilized only in systems such as boilers, inert gas\ngenerators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\n16.2 Use of cargo vapour as fuel\nThis section addresses the use of cargo vapour as fuel in systems such as boilers, inert gas generators, internal\ncombustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\n16.2.1 For vaporized LNG, the fuel supply system shall comply with the requirements of 16.4.1, 16.4.2 and 16.4.3.\n16.2.2 For vaporized LNG, gas consumers shall exhibit no visible flame and shall maintain the uptake exhaust\ntemperature below 535oC.\n16.3 Arrangement of spaces containing gas consumers.\n16.3.1 Spaces in which gas consumers are located shall be fitted with a mechanical ventilation system that is\narranged to avoid areas where gas may accumulate, taking into account the density of the vapour and potential\nignition sources. The ventilation system shall be separated from those serving other spaces.\n16.3.2 Gas detectors shall be fitted in these spaces, particularly where air circulation is reduced. The gas detection\nsystem shall comply with the requirements of chapter 13.\n16.3.3 Electrical equipment located in the double wall pipe or duct specified in 16.4.3 shall comply with the\nrequirements of chapter 10.\n16.3.4 All vents and bleed lines that may contain or be contaminated by gas fuel shall be routed to a safe location\nexternal to the machinery space and be fitted with a flame screen.\nInspection Guidance\nThe Gas Combustion Unit (GCU) should be operated in automatic mode to allow for failure of the reliquefaction unit\nor the loss of gas combustion in the machinery.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nGCU, including guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• Who is responsible for supervising the operation of the GCU.\nIdentification of hazards presented by the operation of the GCU.\nMitigation measures for hazards presented by the operation of the GCU.\nThe actions to be taken in the event of the failure of the GCU in automatic mode, and procedures for manual\noperation if required.\nAn inspection, maintenance and testing programme, which may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan,\nincluding the testing of alarms which may include:\no Flame failure.\no Loss of combustion air supply.\no Loss of cooling air/dilution air supply.\no BOG inlet temperature.\no Combustion gas exit temperature (HH at 535oC).\no Methane gas concentration in gas pipe duct.\no Loss of ventilation in gas pipe duct, alternatively loss of N2 pressure.\nSome or all of these procedures may be contained in the Cargo System Operation Manual.\n(Gas Combustion Units may also be called Thermal Oxidation Vapour Systems.)\nThis question will only be assigned where HVPQ 9.111 indicates that a GCU is provided.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and\ntesting of the GCU.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and testing of the GCU and associated alarms.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the GCU and its associated equipment.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, maintenance, testing of\nthe Gas Combustion Unit.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, testing and maintenance of the GCU.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the GCU.\nRecords of inspection, maintenance and testing of the GCU.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the GCU.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no Actions to be taken in the event of the failure of the GCU in automatic mode and procedures for\nmanual operation if required.\no Provision to manually isolate the gas fuel supply to the GCU from a safely accessible position.\no Company procedures for testing GCU alarms which may include:\n Flame failure.\n Loss of combustion air supply.\n Loss of cooling air/dilution air supply.\n BOG inlet temperature.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n\n\n\nCombustion gas exit temperature (HH at 535oC).\nMethane gas concentration in gas pipe duct.\nLoss of ventilation in gas pipe duct, alternatively loss of N2 pressure.\nInspections, tests and maintenance of the GCU had not been carried out in accordance with the company\nrequirements.\nThe GCU was defective in any respect.\nThe GCU space mechanical ventilation system was defective in any respect.\nGas detection fitted in the GCU space was defective in any respect.\nFire detection fitted in the GCU space was defective in any respect.\nVents or bleed lines that may contain or be contaminated by gas fuel from the GCU were not fitted with\nflame screens.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.5.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection, maintenance and testing of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel\nsupply system, and were these arrangements in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nLNG gas fuel supply system\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the safe supply of boil-off gas (BOG) to consumers in the engine-room such as boilers, inert gas\ngenerators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.8.1 LNG boil-off and vapour handling systems\nBoil-off vapours are produced during cool-down, loading and during the loaded and ballast voyages. Typically, the\nlow duty (LD) compressor handles the boil-off while on passage and the high-duty (HD) compressor handles cargo\nvapours produced during cool-down and loading, returning these vapours to shore.\nWhen a ship is at sea the LD compressor collects the BOG from a header connected to each cargo tank, passing it\nthrough a heat exchanger and into the engine room. The pipeline is jacketed from the point at which it enters the\nengine-room or accommodation, up to either the boiler front or dual fuel engine, depending upon the propulsion\nsystem. The annular space (between the gas pipeline and its jacket) may be either pressurised with nitrogen or\nexhaust ventilated with air, giving at least 30 changes per hour. The gas pipeline will, ordinarily, be purged with\nnitrogen before and after gas burning operations.\nThere are a number of automatic protective devices built into the system to ensure safe operation and these will need\nto be regularly inspected and maintained. Protective systems include continuous monitoring for leakage and\nautomatic shutdown in the event of system malfunction or leak detection. These systems are described in some detail\nin the IGC Code, and the provisions of the IGC Code should always be complied with in deference to anything in this\npublication.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• •\nEngine machinery\nCargo handling machinery/equipment\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 16 Use of cargo as fuel.\n16.2 Use of cargo vapour as fuel\nThis section addresses the use of cargo vapour as fuel in systems such as boilers, inert gas generators, internal\ncombustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\n16.2.1 For vapourised LNG, the fuel supply system shall comply with the requirements of 16.4.1, 16.4.2 and 16.4.3.\n16.2.2 For vapourised LNG, gas consumers shall exhibit no visible flame and shall maintain the uptake exhaust\ntemperature below 535oC.\n16.3 Arrangement of spaces containing gas consumers.\n16.3.1 Spaces in which gas consumers are located shall be fitted with a mechanical ventilation system that is\narranged to avoid areas where gas may accumulate, taking into account the density of the vapour and potential\nignition sources. The ventilation system shall be separated from those serving other spaces.\n16.3.2 Gas detectors shall be fitted in these spaces, particularly where air circulation is reduced. The gas detection\nsystem shall comply with the requirements of chapter 13.\n16.3.3 Electrical equipment located in the double wall pipe or duct specified in 16.4.3 shall comply with the\nrequirements of chapter 10.\n16.3.4 All vents and bleed lines that may contain or be contaminated by gas fuel shall be routed to a safe location\nexternal to the machinery space and be fitted with a flame screen.\n16.4 Gas fuel supply\n16.4.1 General\n16.4.1.1 The requirements of this section shall apply to gas fuel supply piping outside the cargo area. Fuel piping\nshall not pass-through accommodation spaces, service spaces, electrical equipment rooms or control stations. The\nrouteing of the pipeline shall take into account potential hazards, due to mechanical damage, in areas such as stores\nor machinery handling areas.\n16.4.1.2 Provisions shall be made for inerting and gas freeing that portion of the gas fuel piping systems located in\nthe machinery space.\n16.4.2 Leak detection\nContinuous monitoring and alarms shall be provided to indicate a leak in the piping system in enclosed spaces and\nshut down the relevant gas fuel supply.\n16.4.3 Routeing of fuel supply pipes\nFuel piping may pass through or extend into enclosed spaces other than those mentioned in 16. 4.1, provided it fulfils\none of the following conditions:\n1.\n2.\nit is of a double wall design with the space between the concentric pipes pressurised with inert gas at a\npressure greater than the gas fuel pressure. The master gas fuel valve, as required by 16 .4 .6, closes\nautomatically upon loss of inert gas pressure; or\nit is installed in a pipe or duct equipped with mechanical exhaust ventilation having a capacity of at least 30\nair changes per hour and is arranged to maintain a pressure less than the atmospheric pressure. The\nmechanical ventilation is in accordance with chapter 12, as applicable. The ventilation is always in operation\nwhen there is fuel in the piping and the master gas fuel valve, as required by 16 .4 .6, closes automatically if\nthe required air flow is not established and maintained by the exhaust ventilation system. The inlet or the\nduct may be from a non-hazardous machinery space, and the ventilation outlet is in a safe location.\n16.4.4 Requirements for gas fuel with pressure greater than 1 MPa\n16.4.4.1 Fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps/compressors and consumers shall be protected\nwith a double walled piping system capable of containing a high-pressure line failure, taking into account the effects\nof both pressure and low temperature. A single-walled pipe in the cargo area up to the isolating valve(s) required by\n16.4 .6 is acceptable.\n16.4.4.2 The arrangement in 16 .4 .3 .2 may also be acceptable providing the pipe or trunk is capable of containing a\nhigh pressure line failure, according to the requirements of 16.4.7 and taking into account the effects of both pressure\nand possible low temperature and providing both inlet and exhaust of the outer pipe or trunk are in the cargo area.\n16.4.5 Gas consumer isolation\nThe supply piping of each gas consumer unit shall be provided with gas fuel isolation by automatic double block and\nbleed, vented to a safe location, under both normal and emergency operation. The automatic valves shall be\narranged to fail to the closed position on loss of actuating power. In a space containing multiple consumers, the\nshutdown of one shall not affect the gas supply to the others.\n16.4.6 Spaces containing gas consumers.\n16.4.6.1 It shall be possible to isolate the gas fuel supply to each individual space containing a gas consumer(s) or\nthrough which fuel gas supply piping is run, with an individual master valve, which is located within the cargo area.\nThe isolation of gas fuel supply to a space shall not affect the gas supply to other spaces containing gas consumers if\nthey are located in two or more spaces, and it shall not cause loss of propulsion or electrical power.\n16.4.6.2 If the double barrier around the gas supply system is not continuous due to air inlets or other openings, or if\nthere is any point where single failure will cause leakage into the space, the individual master valve for the space\nshall operate under the following circumstances:\n1. automatically by:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\ngas detection within the space;\nleak detection in the annular space of a double-walled pipe;\nleak detection in other compartments inside the space, containing single-walled gas piping;\nloss of ventilation in the annular space of a double-walled pipe; and\nloss of ventilation in other compartments inside the space, containing single-walled gas piping; and\n2. manually from within the space, and at least one remote location.\n16.4.6.3 If the double barrier around the gas supply system is continuous, an individual master valve located in the\ncargo area may be provided for each gas consumer inside the space. The individual master valve shall operate under\nthe following circumstances:\n1. automatically by:\n1.\nleak detection in the annular space of a double wall pipe served by that individual master valve;\n2.\n3.\nleak detection in other compartments containing singled walled gas piping that is part of the supply system\nserved by the individual master valve; and\nloss of ventilation or loss of pressure in the annular space of a double walled pipe; and\n2. manually from within the space, and at least one remote location.\n16.4.8 Gas detection\nGas detection systems provided in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall activate the alarm at 30%\nLFL and shut down the master gas fuel valve required by 16.4.6 at not more than 60% LFL (see 13.6.17)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection, testing and maintenance of the safety\narrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room such as boilers, inert gas\ngenerators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines. including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe inerting or ventilation systems for the annular space of double-wall fuel pipes.\nLeak detection systems.\nVentilation systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.\nGas detection systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.\nAutomatic and manual operation of master valves to isolate gas fuel supply systems.\nArrangements for inerting and gas freeing that portion of the gas fuel piping systems located in the\nmachinery space.\nSome or all of these procedures may be contained in the vessel’s maintenance plan and/or Cargo System Operation\nManual.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection, testing and maintenance of\nthe safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room such as\nboilers, inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and testing of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel\nsupply system.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel, inspect the LNG gas fuel supply system and the associated\nsafety arrangements.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, maintenance, testing of\nthe safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the\nengine-room such as boilers, inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and\ngas turbines.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the inspection, testing and maintenance of the safety arrangements for the\nLNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room such as boilers, inert gas generators, internal\ncombustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\nRecords of inspection, maintenance and testing of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply\nsystem.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance and testing of the safety arrangements\nfor the LNG gas fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room such as boilers, inert gas generators,\ninternal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system including:\no The inerting or ventilation systems for the annular space of double-wall fuel pipes.\no Leak detection systems.\no Ventilation systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.\no Gas detection systems in spaces containing BOG consumers.\no Automatic and manual operation of master gas fuel valves.\no Arrangements for inerting and gas freeing that portion of the gas fuel piping systems located in the\nmachinery space.\nInspections, tests and maintenance of the safety arrangements for the LNG gas fuel supply system had not\nbeen carried out in accordance with the company requirements.\nA gas detection system associated with the LNG gas fuel supply system was not set to activate the alarm at\n30% LFL and shut down the master gas fuel valve at not more than 60% LFL.\nOne or more of the safety arrangements for the LNG fuel supply system to consumers in the engine-room\nsuch as boilers, inert gas generators, internal combustion engines, gas combustion unit and gas turbines\nwas inoperative or defective in any respect – give details.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.5.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for protecting", "c": "the hull structure from low temperature exposure, and was temperature monitoring and\ncofferdam heating equipment, where fitted, in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCold spots and cofferdam temperature monitoring and heating equipment.\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIACS: Interpretations of the IMO Gas Code GC23 (July 2018) (Corr.1 Dec 2019)\nObjective\nTo ensure the hull is protected against the risk of brittle fracture in the event of a failure of the cargo\ncontainment or insulation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nAppendix 4 Cargo System Instrumentation\nA4.5 Temperature Monitoring Equipment\nTemperature sensors are fitted so that the temperatures of both the cargo and the structure around the cargo system\ncan be monitored and also meet the requirements of the IGC Code and operational needs.\nFor all LNG carriers and for other ships intended for the carriage of cargoes at temperatures below -55°C the\ntemperature of the steel around the cargo tanks has to be monitored to detect any lowering of hull steel temperature\nresulting from insulation failure.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.11.4 Pressure and temperature monitoring\nWhere cargo is carried in tanks requiring a secondary barrier at a temperature of below minus 55°C (-55°C), the IGC\nCode requires temperature indicating devices within the insulation or on the hull structure adjacent to the containment\nsystem. The thermocouples will usually be set to provide adequate warning before the lowest temperature for the hull\nsteel is approached.\n9.5.2 Ship Emergency procedures\nIncident plans\nIn developing plans for dealing with incidents, the following scenarios will commonly be considered:\n• Loss of cofferdam space heating system\nIACS: Interpretations of the IMO Gas Code GC23 (July 2018) (Corr.1 Dec 2019)\nCargo tank structure heating arrangement power supply\nInterpretation\n1.\n2.\n3.\nHeating system referred to in 4.19.1.6.1 (see below) is to be such that, in case of a single failure of a\nmechanical or electrical component in any part of the system, heating can be maintained at not less than\n100% of the theoretical heat requirement.\nWhere the above requirements are met by duplication of the system components, i.e., heaters, glycol\ncirculation pumps, electrical control panel, auxiliary boilers etc., all electrical components of at least one of\nthe systems are to be supplied from the emergency source of electrical power.\nWhere duplication of the primary source of heat, e.g., oil-fired boiler is not feasible, alternative proposals can\nbe accepted such as an electric heater capable of providing 100% of the theoretical heat requirement\nprovided and supplied by an individual circuit arranged separately on the emergency switchboard. Other\nsolutions may be considered towards satisfying the requirements of 4.19.1.6.1, provided a suitable risk\nassessment is conducted to the satisfaction of the Administration. The requirement in paragraph 2 of this\ninterpretation continues to apply to all other electrical components in the system.\nTMSA KPI 4.2.2 requires that cargo, void and ballast spaces are inspected to ensure their integrity is maintained.\nThe frequency of inspections is determined by the applicable regulations of class, flag state and national authorities.\nIn addition, industry recommendations are taken into account. Guidance for inspection of compartments is provided,\nwhich may include industry/class publications. Records are compartment specific and made to a standard format that\nmay include photographs as evidence of the compartment’s condition.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10. Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n• •\n• •\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals;\nany non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;\nappropriate corrective action is taken; and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 4 Cargo Containment\nGoal\nTo ensure the safe containment of cargo under all design and operating conditions having regard to the nature of the\ncargo carried. This will include measures to:\n.3 design for or protect the hull structure from low temperature exposure;\n4.1 Definitions\n4.1.1 A cold spot is a part of the hull or thermal insulation surface where a localized temperature decrease occurs\nwith respect to the allowable minimum temperature of the hull or of its adjacent hull structure, or to design capabilities\nof cargo pressure/temperature control systems required in chapter 7.\n4.19.1.6 The means of heating referred to in 4.19.1.5 shall comply with the following requirements:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nthe heating system shall be arranged so that, in the event of failure in any part of the system, standby\nheating can be maintained equal to not less than 100% of the theoretical heat requirement;\nthe heating system shall be considered as an essential auxiliary. All electrical components of at least one of\nthe systems provided in accordance with 4.19.1.5.1 shall be supplied from the emergency source of\nelectrical power; and\nthe design and construction of the heating system shall be included in the approval of the containment\nsystem by the Administration or recognized organization acting on its behalf.\n13.7.2 Temperature indication devices\n13.7.2.1 The number and position of temperature-indicating devices shall be appropriate to the design of the\ncontainment system and cargo operation requirements.\n13.7.2.2 When cargo is carried in a cargo containment system with a secondary barrier, at a temperature lower than 55°C, temperature-indicating devices shall be provided within the insulation or on the hull structure adjacent to cargo\ncontainment systems. The devices shall give readings at regular intervals and, where applicable, alarm of\ntemperatures approaching the lowest for which the hull steel is suitable.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment\nsystem and protecting the hull structure from low temperature exposure that included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nGuidance on the detection of cold spots by the inner hull temperature measurement system, and/or by visual\ninspection.\nOperation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment.\nOperation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted.\nActions to be taken if:\no A cold spot is detected.\no Cofferdam temperatures fall below 5°C or other stated temperature.\no There is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.\nRecords to be maintained of:\no Inner hull temperature readings\no Visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots.\no Cold spots identified and actions taken.\nThese procedures may form part of the Cargo System Operation Manual.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment\nsystem and protecting the hull structure from low temperature exposure.\nReview the records of:\no Inner hull temperature readings.\no Visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots.\no Cold spots identified and actions taken.\nVerify that the inner hull temperature monitoring system is in satisfactory condition and alarms are correctly\nset.\nWhere fitted, verify that the cofferdam heating system is in satisfactory condition.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the:\no Operation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment.\no Operation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted.\no Actions to be taken if:\n A cold spot is detected.\n Cofferdam temperatures fall below 5°C or other stated temperature.\n There is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and protecting the hull structure\nfrom low temperature exposure.\nRecords of:\no Inner hull temperature readings\no Visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots.\no Cold spots identified and actions taken.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and protecting\nthe hull structure from low temperature exposure that included:\no Roles and responsibilities.\no Guidance on the detection of cold spots by the inner hull temperature measurement system, and/or\nby visual inspection.\no Operation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment.\no Operation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted.\no Actions to be taken if:\n A cold spot is detected.\n Cofferdam temperatures falls below 5°C or other stated temperature.\n There is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.\no Records to be maintained of:\n Inner hull temperature readings\n Visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots.\n Cold spots identified and actions taken.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the:\no Operation, alarm settings and maintenance of the inner hull temperature monitoring equipment.\no Operation and maintenance of the cofferdam heating equipment, where fitted.\no Actions to be taken if:\n A cold spot is detected.\n Cofferdam temperatures fall below 5°C or other stated temperature.\n There is a failure of the cofferdam heating system.\nThere were no records of:\no Inner hull temperature readings\no Visual inspections of the inner hull structure for cold spots.\no Cold spots identified and actions taken.\nThe inner hull temperature measurement system was defective in any respect.\nThe alarms on the inner hull temperature measurement system were not set as required by company\nprocedures or inhibited.\nThe cofferdam heating system was defective in any respect.\nThe temperature in the cofferdam(s) had not been maintained as required by company procedures.\n8.6. Gas (common to all vessels under IGC Code)", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "maintenance, testing and setting of the independent cargo tank high-level and overfill\nalarms, and were these alarm systems fully operational and properly set?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank overfill alarms\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nSIGTTO: ESD Systems 2nd Edition 2021\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that independent cargo tank high-level and overfill alarms are always fully operational, properly\nset and used during all cargo loading, discharging and transfer operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nAppendix 4 Cargo System Instrumentation\nA4.3 Level Alarms, Automatic Shutdown and Emergency Shutdown.\nTo prevent over-filling of cargo tanks, high level alarms and automatic shutdown systems may be required depending\non the cargo system. These systems may be activated by floats operating a switch device, capacitance probes,\nultrasonic, radar or other approved devices.\nWhatever system is used, the setpoint may be affected by the properties of the cargo, including density or dielectric\nconstant, and adjustments should be made in accordance with the instructions provided by original equipment\nmanufacturers.\nAutomatic shutdown systems require particular care. They are normally designed to shut the main cargo tank filling\nvalve if the liquid level rises above the maximum level permitted by the IGC code.\nA4.3.1 High Level Alarms\nThe IGC Code requires tanks to be fitted with high level alarms which are independent of any alarms fitted to the\nclosed gauging system. The alarm should provide an audible and visual warning. The activation point should be set\nto alarm when the cargo is approaching the normal full condition of the tank.\nA4.3.3 Automatic Shutdown Systems\nAn additional sensor operating independently of the high liquid level alarm should automatically actuate a shut-off\nvalve to the tank in a manner that will both avoid excessive liquid pressure in the loading line and prevent the tank\nbecoming liquid full.\nCare should be taken to ensure that the activation point is set accurately, and that the operation of the device is\nchecked by simulation whenever the system is decommissioned.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n7.7.5 Commencement of loading\nThe use of automatic shutdown during topping off.\nWhen topping off tanks, it is not considered prudent for ship staff to rely on the use of the high-high level alarm\nsystem to close the tank valve. The high-high level alarm may activate the closing of the filling valve prior to the\nplanned innage being reached, due to movement of the surface of the cargo as a result of sloshing or through\nagitation of the cargo due to boiling off at the surface.\nIt is also considered prudent, during topping off and all critical valve and machinery operations, to have an observer\npresent to view/confirm the closing of the filling valve, rather than having to rely on the remote indication of the cargo\ncontrol/automation system.\nSIGTTO: ESD Systems 2nd Edition 2021\n4. Overflow Control and Vacuum Protection\nOverflow control and vacuum protection are safety systems that perform a critical function on a ship. This section\nprovides a brief overview of IGC Code requirements and gives recommendations for overflow control systems,\nincluding testing.\n4.3 Testing of Overflow Control\nThe IGC Code has specific requirements for testing overflow control systems. A function test (IGC Code 13.3.6)\nshould be carried out prior to cargo operations. This may be carried out as per the manufacturer’s instructions for a\nfunction test during the pre-arrival test.\nA proof test is a periodic test that is carried out to detect dangerous hidden faults in a safety system. The overflow\ncontrol system should be proof tested (IGC Code 13.3.5) by raising the cargo liquid level at specified intervals. The\ncargo operational manual (IGC Code 18.2) should include a description of the procedure to test the high-level alarm\n(IGC Code 13.3.5) in a safe and controlled manner.\nOverflow control systems are typically based on a float, ultrasonic or radar design. For overflow control that is\nactivated by a float-type sensor, failures caused by a damaged or punctured float can be identified by a proof test\n(IGC Code 13.3.5). This type of test is the actual scenario that the overflow control system is designed to protect\nagainst, so it also works for radar systems.\nAny alternate means of testing should clearly demonstrate how it is equivalent to a proof test. It should document how\nit addresses the possible failure modes that are specific to the system design. This alternate means of testing should\nbe documented and would, typically, require Flag State approval.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• •\nAlarms and trips.\nTank gauging equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n13.3 Overflow control\n13.3.1 Except as provided in 13.3.4, each cargo tank shall be fitted with a high liquid level alarm operating\nindependently of other liquid level indicators and giving an audible and visual warning when activated.\n13.3.2 An additional sensor operating independently of the high liquid level alarm shall automatically actuate a shut\noff valve in a manner that will both avoid excessive liquid pressure in the loading line and prevent the tank from\nbecoming liquid full.\n13.3 .3 The emergency shutdown valve referred to in 5.5 and 18.10 (i.e. cargo emergency shut-down or ESD) may\nbe used for this purpose. If another valve is used for this purpose, the same information as referred to in 18.10.2.1.3\nshall be available on board. During loading, whenever the use of these valves may possibly create a potential excess\npressure surge in the loading system, alternative arrangements such as limiting the loading rate shall be used.\n13.3.4 The high liquid level alarm and automatic shut off of cargo tank filling need not be required, when the cargo\ntank:\n• •\n.1 is a pressure tank with the volume not more than 200 m3; or\n.2 is designed to withstand the maximum possible pressure during the loading operation, and such pressure\nis below that of the set pressure of the cargo tank relief valve.\n13.3.5 The position of the sensors in the tank shall be capable of being verified before commissioning. At the first\noccasion of full loading after delivery and after each dry-docking, testing of high-level alarms shall be conducted by\nraising the cargo liquid level in the cargo tank to the alarm point.\n13.3.6 All elements of the level alarms, including the electrical circuit on the sensor(s), of the high, and overfill alarms,\nshall be capable of being functionally tested. System shall be tested prior to cargo operation in accordance with\n18.6.2.\n13.3 .7 When arrangements are provided for overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such that\ninadvertent operation is prevented. When this override is operated, continuous visual indication shall be given at the\nrelevant control station(s) and the navigation bridge.\n15.1.2 Loading limit (LL) means the maximum allowable liquid volume relative to the tank volume to which the tank\nmay be loaded.\n15.6.1 A document shall be provided to the ship, specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank\nand product, at each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature. The information in this\ndocument shall be approved by the Administration or recognised organization acting on its behalf.\n15.6.2 Pressures at which the PRVs have been set shall also be stated in the document.\n15.6.3 A copy of the above document shall be permanently kept on board by the master.\n18.6.2 Essential cargo handling controls and alarms shall be checked and tested prior to cargo transfer operations.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 11\n6.3.1 Preventive measures against liquid rising in the venting system\nProvisions shall be made to guard against liquid rising in the venting system to a height which would exceed the\ndesign head of cargo tanks. This shall be accomplished by high-level alarms or overflow control systems or other\nequivalent means, together with independent gauging devices and cargo tank filling procedures. For the purposes of\nthis regulation, spill valves are not considered equivalent to an overflow system.\nInspection Guidance\nThis question relates only to those alarm systems that are independent of the tank gauging system, and for the\npurposes of this question, “overfill alarms” means those alarm systems variously described as:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nOverflow alarms.\nOverflow control systems.\nAutomatic shut off systems.\nAutomatic shutdown systems.\nHigh-high level alarms\nExtra-high-level alarms.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank\nhigh-level and overfill alarm systems, including:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The mandatory use of the alarms during all cargo tank loading, discharging and transfer operations.\nSet points for all tank level alarms.\nTesting procedures and frequency.\nRecords of testing and maintenance to be kept.\nGuidance on the operation of shipboard automatic closing valves.\nControls on overriding of overfill alarms/automatic shutdown systems.\nProcedures, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer operations\nin the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or overfill alarm system, or a single alarm for an\nindividual cargo tank.\nThe instructions within the manufacturer’s manuals and the vessel’s maintenance plan may form part of the\nprocedures.\nThe overfill alarm system should only be overridden in exceptional circumstances, such as if the tank has been\noverfilled and it is necessary to bypass the overflow control system to discharge the tank. Such systems are\noccasionally overridden at sea during reliquefication and in bad weather conditions.\n(See IGC 13.3.4 above for those pressurised vessels where these alarm systems are not required. In older GC\nvessels, the overfill alarm sensor does not need to be independent of the high-level sensor)\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the\ncargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems.\nSight and where necessary review the document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each\ncargo tank and product at each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature.\nReview the records of testing and maintenance of the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems.\nInspect the alarm indicator panels in the cargo control room or position and verify:\no The panel was switched on with all cargo tanks being monitored.\no The audible and visible alarms were operational.\nInspect the alarm equipment on deck including the audible and visible alarm fittings, where fitted.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank high-level and\noverfill alarm systems.\no The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems or individual\ntanks alarms may be isolated and the safeguards to ensure they were always in operation during\ncargo transfer operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the maintenance, setting and testing of the cargo tank high-level and overfill\nalarm systems.\nRecords of the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems.\nThe document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at each\napplicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level\nand overfill alarm systems.\nThe company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and overfill\nalarm systems did not include:\no The mandatory use of the alarms during all loading, discharging and transfer operations.\no Set points for all alarms.\no Testing procedures and frequency.\no Records of testing and maintenance to be kept.\no Guidance on the operation of shipboard automatic closing valves.\no Controls on overriding of overfill alarms/automatic shutdown systems.\no Procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo loading, discharge or transfer\noperations in the event of a failure of the cargo tank high-level or overfill alarm system or a single\nalarm for an individual cargo tank.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedures for the maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank high-level and\noverfill alarm systems.\no The circumstances under which the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems or individual\ncargo tank alarms may be overridden and the safeguards to ensure they were always in operation\nduring cargo transfer operations.\nThere were no records of testing and maintenance of the cargo tank high-level and overfill alarm systems,\nincluding tests:\no Prior to cargo operations.\no After dry-docking or decommissioning.\nHigh-level and/or overfill alarms had not been regularly tested in accordance with the manufacturer’s\ninstructions.\nThe document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at each\napplicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature was not available on board.\nOverfill alarms were set above the applicable maximum allowable loading limit for a cargo tank.\nHigh-level and/or overfill alarms were not set at the level required by company procedures.\nHigh-level and/or overfill alarms were not in operation at the time of inspection, during loading, discharging\nor transfer operations.\nThe high-level or overfill alarm system had been overridden during cargo transfer operations.\nThe high-level or overfill alarm system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.2.", "t": "Were the Master, officers, and ratings involved with cargo operations, familiar with", "c": "the functions of the vessel’s cargo transfer Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems, and\nwas the equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nCargo transfer Emergency Shut Down (ESD)\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Cargo Manifold, Interview - Deck Rating\nPublications\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: ESD Systems 2nd Edition 2021\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to an emergency situation during cargo transfer\noperations in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: ESD Systems 2nd Edition 2021\n2.3 System Availability\nESD is an important safety system, and it should always be active when there is any cargo on the ship. The ESD\nsystem should only be switched off for short periods of time for necessary maintenance. It may be inhibited\ntemporarily for testing, but this should be for the minimum duration possible.\nIf the design of a safety system or ESD system leads the operator to switch it off unintentionally or inappropriately\nthen the reason for this should be thoroughly investigated. This should include whether the design of the system can\nbe adjusted to reduce the risk of this occurring again.\nThe ESD system should be designed to clearly indicate when it is inhibited or switched off and it should not permit\ncargo transfer operations in these conditions.\nCargo control systems should be designed to not permit cargo transfer operations unless the ESD system and ship\nshore link (SSL) are connected and active. The status of the ESD and SSL systems should be clearly visible in the\ncargo control room (CCR). Ship and terminal operators should ensure that all relevant safety systems, including ESD\nand SSL systems, are fully operational and active during cargo transfer operations\n2.4 Alarm Management Lifecycle\nThe requirements of the IGC Code are prescriptive in nature and the scope of the safety functions it covers may be\nsufficient for most gas carriers. However, for some designs of gas carriers, additional safety functions may be\nadvisable. It is important to review the need for additional safety functions in a structured manner and follow industry\nstandard best practice.\nHuman factors should also be considered and potential dangers such as alarm flooding should be avoided. Any\nchange to the alarm system on the ship should be carried out using the principles of the alarm management lifecycle\nin IEC 626829 . Any changes to the alarm system should only be made by undergoing a documented process that\ninvolves a full hazard and operability (HAZOP) study and a management of change process.\n2.5 Maintenance and Testing\nChapter 13 of the IGC Code requires automation systems to be designed, installed and tested in accordance with\nrecognised standards, with particular reference to IEC 60092-504. This provides guidance on the requirements for\ndocumentation, maintenance and testing.\nSafety systems should be designed to ensure that it is practical to test all parts of the system. Operation and\nmaintenance documentation should provide clear guidance on how to test the safety system and the required\nintervals for this to ensure that the safety system is maintained in operational condition.\nThe IGC Code (18.6.2 and 18.10.5) requires cargo ESD and alarm systems to be tested before cargo transfer. This is\ntypically carried out as part of pre-arrival tests, in the 24 hours before berthing. The SSL is tested after connection as\npart of pre-transfer tests.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• ESD system operation.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.10 Cargo emergency shutdown (ESD) system\n18.10.1.1 A cargo emergency shutdown system shall be fitted to stop cargo flow in the event of an emergency, either\ninternally within the ship, or during cargo transfer to ship or shore. The design of the ESD system shall avoid the\npotential generation of surge pressures within cargo transfer pipe work (see 18.10.2.1.4).\n18.10.1.5 A functional flow chart of the ESD system and related systems shall be provided in the cargo control station\nand on the navigation bridge.\n18.10.2 ESD valve requirements\n18.10.2.1.3 ESD valves in liquid piping systems shall close fully and smoothly within 30 s of actuation. Information\nabout the closure time of the valves and their operating characteristics shall be available on board, and the closing\ntime shall be verifiable and repeatable.\n18.10.3 ESD system controls\n18.10.3.1 As a minimum, the ESD system shall be capable of manual operation by a single control on the bridge and\neither in the control position required by 13.1.2 or the cargo control room, if installed, and no less than two locations\nin the cargo area.\n18.10.3.2 The ESD system shall be automatically activated on detection of a fire on the weather decks of the cargo\narea and/or cargo machinery spaces. As a minimum, the method of detection used on the weather decks shall cover\nthe liquid and vapour domes of the cargo tanks, the cargo manifolds and areas where liquid piping is dismantled\nregularly. Detection may be by means of fusible elements designed to melt at temperatures between 98°C and\n104°C, or by area fire detection methods.\n18.10.3.3 Cargo machinery that is running shall be stopped by activation of the ESD system in accordance with the\ncause and effect matrix in table 18.1.\n18.10.3.4 The ESD control system shall be configured so as to enable the high-level testing required in 13.3.5 to be\ncarried out in a safe and controlled manner. For the purpose of the testing, cargo pumps may be operated while the\noverflow control system is overridden. Procedures for level alarm testing and re-setting of the ESD system after\ncompletion of the high-level alarm testing shall be included in the operation manual required by 18.2.1.\n18.10.5 Pre-operations testing\nCargo emergency shutdown and alarm systems involved in cargo transfer shall be checked and tested before cargo\nhandling operations begin\n18.2 Cargo operations manuals\n18.2.1 The ship shall be provided with copies of suitably detailed cargo system operation manuals approved by the\nAdministration such that trained personnel can safely operate the ship with due regard to the hazards and properties\nof the cargoes that are permitted to be carried.\n18.2.2 The content of the manuals shall include, but not be limited to:\n.9 emergency shutdown systems.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nvessel’s cargo transfer emergency shutdown (ESD) systems which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The functions and operation of the ESD systems.\nThe actions to take in the event of an ESD system failure.\nThe requirement for functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system to be available in the cargo\ncontrol station and on the navigation bridge.\nThe contingency plans in the event of non-availability of the ESD ship/shore link system, if fitted.\nThe frequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the ESD systems, including preoperational checks.\nThe circumstances in which any part of the ESD system may be inhibited, such as for the purpose of system\ntesting.\nThe person responsible for authorising the inhibiting any part of the ESD system and the controls required to\nensure that all parts of the ESD system are reinstated as soon as the need to inhibit is over.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual may form part of these procedures.\nThe Master and officers should be familiar with the ESD systems installed on their vessel, and its initiators, which\nmay include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Emergency push-buttons.\nFire detection on deck or in a compressor house.\nHigh levels in cargo tanks.\nA signal from a ship/shore link.\nLoss of motive power to ESD valves.\nMain electric power failure (blackout).\nTank level alarm override.\nAnd its shutdown actions, which may include:\n• •\n• Cargo pumps/cargo booster pumps.\nSpray/stripping pumps.\nVapour return compressors.\n• •\n• •\n• Fuel gas compressors.\nReliquefication plant including condensate return pumps if fitted.\nGas combustion unit.\nESD valves.\nSignal to ship/shore link.\nFusible plugs may be used for the required fire detection on deck. Fusible elements should not be painted over as\nthis might affect the temperature at which they will operate.\nRatings should be familiar with the location of the manual ESD system controls and the circumstances in which they\nshould be activated.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation, inspection,\nmaintenance and testing of the vessel’s cargo transfer emergency shutdown (ESD) systems.\nSight and review the checklists used to test the ESD system before the most recent cargo operation.\nSight and review the checklists used to verify the timing and sequencing of ESD system functions.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out contained within the\nplanned maintenance system.\nReview the functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system.\nInspect the means of fire detection on the weather deck i.e. fusible plugs or area fire detection.\nInspect the emergency push buttons on the bridge, in the cargo control room and on deck.\nInspect an ESD manifold valve and verify that the connection between the ESD valve position indicator and\nthe ESD valve actuator is intact\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The purpose, operation, and testing of the ESD systems.\no The functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system.\no The ESD valve closing timings.\no The circumstances in which any part of the ESD may be inhibited, the person who may authorise\nthe inhibiting and the controls in place to ensure that the ESD system is reinstated immediately\nafter the need to inhibit is over.\nInterview a rating involved in cargo operations and verify their familiarity with the location of the manual ESD\ncontrols and circumstances in which the ESD system should be manually activated.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s ESD\nsystems.\nThe checklist used to conduct the pre-arrival tests on the ESD system prior to the previous cargo transfer\noperation.\nThe checklist used to verify the timing and sequencing of the ESD system functions.\nRecords of the inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s ESD systems.\nFunctional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the cargo ESD system.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual(s), describing the ESD systems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s\ncargo ESD systems.\nThe Master, officers and ratings involved in cargo operations were not familiar with the vessel’s ESD\nsystems at a depth relevant to their seniority.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA functional flowchart (cause-effect) of the ESD systems was not posted in the cargo control room and on\nthe bridge.\nThe status of the ESD and ship/shore link (SSL) systems was not clearly visible in the cargo control room\n(CCR).\nArea fire detection on the weather deck, if fitted, was not fully functional.\nFusible elements were painted over.\nAccess to the emergency push buttons was obstructed, or they were not ready for immediate use.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual did not describe the ESD system.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual did not contain procedures for re-setting of the ESD system after\ncompletion of high-level alarm testing.\nThere were no records of checks and tests of the ESD systems before cargo handling operations began.\nThere were no records of checks to verify the timing and sequencing of the ESD system functions.\nInformation about the closure time of the ESD valves and their operating characteristics was not available on\nboard,\nRecords of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems.\no The functional flowcharts (cause-effect) for the ESD system.\no The ESD valve closing timings.\no The circumstances in which any part of the ESD may be inhibited, the person who may authorise\nthe inhibiting and the controls in place to ensure that the ESD system is reinstated immediately\nafter the need to inhibit is over.\nAn interviewed rating, involved as part of the cargo watch, was unfamiliar with the location of the ESD\nsystem manual controls and/or the circumstances in which manual activation of the ESD should take place.\nInspection of the ESD systems indicated that actions recorded in the planned maintenance system had not\nin fact taken place.\nThe ESD systems were defective in any respect.\nCompany procedures did not include a contingency plan for the circumstances where the ESD link system, if\nfitted, was not available.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank relief valves?\nShort Question Text\nCargo tank relief valves\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Relief Valves on Gas Carriers 3rd Ed 2020\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo tank relief valves are properly inspected, maintained, tested, and set.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.1.8 Relief valves for cargo tanks and pipelines\nThe IGC Code requires at least two pressure relief valves of equal capacity to be fitted to any cargo or deck tank.\nOn some liquefied gas carriers, adjustable settings for pilot operated relief valves may be used to provide a higher\nthan normal set pressure (i.e. the sea setting) (but not exceeding the MARVS). On LPG carriers this is known as the\n‘harbour setting’ and allows a higher pressure within the tank during loading only. On Type C tanks, pilot operated\nrelief valves can be adjusted, if necessary, to reduce the MARVS to comply with the United States Coast Guard\n(USCG) regulations.\nType C tanks on recent liquefied gas carriers, which fall under the American Society of Mechanical Engineers\n(ASME) Pressure Vessel Code Div. II (Ref 2.18), may only require one MARVS setting as these more recent ASME\nrequirements align with the IGC Code requirements. The original ASME regulations impose more stringent safety\nfactors for pressure vessels design than the IGC Code requirements.\nWhenever such valves are used for more than one pressure setting, it is common for a proper record to be kept of\nchanges to the pilot valve springs. The pilot assembly cap will always be resealed after such changes, which helps to\nensure that no unauthorised adjustments can be made. When relief valve settings are changed, the high-pressure\nalarm will usually be adjusted. Generally, the valve will be tagged to show the set pressure on the fitted valve, both in\nthe cargo control room and on the valve itself. Commonly, auxiliary setting devices used for changing the pressure\nsettings will be connected to the same valve, as they are calibrated to be so. Proper records to this effect should be\nmaintained on board.\nCargo tank relief valves exhaust to atmosphere via a vent line to a vent mast riser. Vent riser drains should usually be\nprovided and be checked regularly to ensure no accumulation of rainwater in the riser. Any accumulation of water has\nthe effect of altering the relief valve operation due to increased back pressure and may cause blockage if frozen.\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Relief Valves on Gas Carriers 3rd Ed 2020\n1.1 Introduction\nRelief valves perform a safety critical function. Proper design and robust maintenance procedures are essential to\nensure that this equipment will function as required.\n3.3 Installation Design\nDepending on the grades of stainless steel used in construction, painting for corrosion prevention may or may not be\nrequired. If it is necessary to paint the relief valves, the coatings should be applied carefully, as numerous\nmalfunctions of relief valves have been caused by the blockage of small orifices by paint.\n3.4 Materials\nWhile atmospheric corrosion is a concern, there are also risks of galvanic corrosion, particularly for tanks made of\naluminium. This is because the aluminium piping flange connected to the inlet of the stainless-steel relief valve will\ncause corrosion of the aluminium, as both materials have widely different electrode potentials.\n4.2 Operational\nShip staff responsible for the maintenance and operation of relief valves are recommended to attend a manufacturers\ntraining course.\nShip staff should be familiar with the operation of the relief valves fitted on their ship. In particular they should be\naware of what to do if a relief valve malfunctions.\n4.3.1 Maintenance frequency\nCargo tank relief valve – pilot operated or spring type.\nDuring each loading\n• Visual inspection for leaks from external fittings and connections.\nContinuously monitored.\n• Seat leakage detection to be carried out by way of gas detection in vent line if fitted, and visual check for\nicing of outlet or by observing shimmering at vent outlet.\nEvery six months\n• •\n• Verify integrity of security seals.\nVisual inspection of external services for presence of corrosion or stress cracks.\nEnsure all external bolting, fasteners and mounting brackets are torqued to manufacturer’s instructions.\nAnnually\n• Verify free operation using field test kit.\nSpecial survey (every five years)\n• •\n• •\nVerify calibration of all spring settings, pilots and auxiliary setter devices.\nVerify proper operation and seat tightness of all valves in a clean environment with proper testing\narrangements.\nInspect internals of valves for wear, corrosion and the presence of soft seal lubricants. Any adverse signs\nshall require inspection of all valves and maintenance as necessary.\nVerify valve maintenance history is logged and updated as necessary.\n• Advise manufacturer of actions taken so as to allow them to update their records.\n4.5 Routine Testing\nCargo tank relief valves are critical safety equipment and should be tested as per manufacturer’s instructions.\nManufacturers should provide clear instructions on the interval and procedure for testing. The testing should include,\nbut not necessarily be limited to, the pilot and the main valve.\nThe testing routine should be included in the ships planned maintenance routines. Testing of cargo tank relief valves\nshould only be carried out under a permit to work. Testing may require the use of a field test kit.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nAppendix 3 Cargo Handling Plant and Equipment\nA3.12 Vent and Purge Masts\nDischarges from relief valves and purging systems are carried to the atmosphere through vent masts, the outlets of\nwhich are designed to promote vapour dispersal and reduce the risk of flammable mixtures being produced.\nVents are likely to collect water and should be drained frequently to guard against freezing due to the discharge of\ncold vapour. Drain should never be left open, otherwise vapour could be discharged at low level. Some vent masts\nhave provision to extinguish flames resulting from a lightning strike and a connection for the injection of carbon\ndioxide or inert gas.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• IGS and venting system\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n5.6.4 Cargo tank vent piping systems\nThe pressure relief system shall be connected to a vent piping system designed to minimize the possibility of cargo\nvapour accumulating on the decks, or entering accommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations and\nmachinery spaces, or other spaces where it may create a dangerous condition.\n8.1 General\nAll cargo tanks shall be provided with a pressure relief system appropriate to the design of the cargo containment\nsystem and the cargo being carried.\n8.2 Pressure relief systems\n8.2.1 Cargo tanks, including deck tanks, shall be fitted with a minimum of two pressure relief valves (PRVs), each\nbeing of equal size within manufacturer’s tolerances and suitably designed and constructed for the prescribed\nservice.\n8.2.3 The setting of the PRVs shall not be higher than the vapour pressure that has been used in the design of the\ntank. Where two or more PRVs are fitted, valves comprising not more than 50% of the total relieving capacity may be\nset at a pressure up to 5% above MARVS to allow sequential lifting, minimalizing unnecessary release of vapour.\n8.2.6 PRVs shall be set and sealed by the Administration or recognised organization acting on its behalf, and a\nrecord of this action, including the valves’ set pressure, shall be retained on board the ship.\n8.2.7 Cargo tanks may be permitted to have more than one relief valve set pressure in the following cases:\n1.\n2.\nInstalling two or more properly set and sealed PRVs and providing means, as necessary, for isolating the\nvalves not in use from the cargo tank; or\ninstalling relief valves whose settings may be changed by the use of a previously approved device not\nrequiring pressure testing to verify the new set pressure. All other valve adjustments shall be sealed.\n8.2.8 Changing the set pressure under the provisions of 8.2 .7 and the corresponding resetting of the alarms referred\nto in 13.4 .2 shall be carried out under the supervision of the master in accordance with approved procedures and as\nspecified in the ship’s operating manual. Changes in set pressure shall be recorded in the ship’s log and a sign shall\nbe posted in the cargo control room, if provided, and at each relief valve, stating the set pressure.\n8.2.9 In the event of a failure of a cargo tank installed PRV, a safe means of emergency isolation shall be available:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nProcedures shall be provided and included in the cargo operations manual (see 18.2)\nThe procedures shall allow only one of the cargo tank installed PRVs to be isolated.\nIsolation of the PRV shall be carried out under the supervision of the master. This action shall be recorded in\nthe ships log and a sign posted in the cargo control room, if provided, and at the PRV.\nThe tank shall not be loaded until the full relieving capacity is restored.\n8.2.10 Each PRV installed on a cargo tank shall be connected to a venting system, which shall be:\n1.\n2.\nSo constructed that the discharge will be unimpeded and directed vertically upwards at the exit;\nArranged to minimise the possibility of water or snow entering the vent system;\n8.2.14 In the vent piping system, means for draining liquid from places where it may accumulate shall be provided.\nThe PRVs and piping shall be arranged so that liquid can, under no circumstances, accumulate in or near the PRVs.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the\ncargo tank relief valves, including:\n• •\n• •\nChanging the set pressure of the cargo tank relief valves and the corresponding resetting of alarms,\nincluding record keeping.\nThe actions to take in the event of a cargo tank relief valve malfunction including emergency isolation.\nTraining requirements for the officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the cargo relief\nvalves.\nAn inspection, maintenance and testing programme, which may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan,\nincluding:\no Checks prior each cargo operation.\no Six-monthly visual inspections.\no Annual verification of free operation using a field test kit, where applicable according to the vessel\noperational manual and/or instructions.\no Five-yearly overhaul.\nWhere the operation of the cargo tank venting system is automated, procedures should give guidance on the correct\nsetting for each part of the voyage, loading, discharging, loaded passage etc.\nSome or all of these procedures may be contained in the Cargo System Operation Manual.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and\nsetting of cargo tank relief valves.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo tank relief valves.\nReview the records for any change of settings of cargo tank relief valves.\nDuring the inspection, observe the disposition and visual condition of the cargo tank relief valves and the\nventing arrangements.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, maintenance and testing\nof cargo tank relief valves.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for:\no Changing the set pressure of the cargo tank relief valves and the corresponding resetting of\nalarms, including record keeping.\no Inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo tank relief valves.\no Actions to take in the event of a cargo tank relief valve malfunction including emergency isolation.\no Where fitted, the operation of the automated cargo tank venting system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank relief valves.\nRecords of inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank relief valves.\nRecords for any change of settings of cargo tank relief valves.\nEvidence of training for the officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the cargo tank relief\nvalves.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the cargo tank\nrelief valves.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for:\no Changing the set pressure of the cargo tank relief valves and the corresponding resetting of\nalarms, including record keeping.\no Inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo tank relief valves.\no Actions to take in the event of a cargo rank relief valve malfunction including emergency isolation.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation of the automated\ncargo tank venting system.\nThere were no records available of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the cargo tank relief\nvalves including:\no Checks prior each cargo operation.\no Six-monthly visual inspections.\no Annual verification of free operation using a field test kit, where applicable according to the vessel\noperational manual and/or instructions.\no Five-yearly overhaul.\nInspections, tests and maintenance of the cargo tank relief valves had not been carried out in accordance\nwith the company requirements.\nThe officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the cargo tank relief valves had not received\ntraining in accordance with the company procedure.\nCargo tank relief valves were not sealed, or the seals were broken.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhere more than one pressure setting was permitted, there were no records available of the changes made\nto the cargo tank relief valve settings.\nWhere more than one pressure setting was permitted, there was no sign displayed in the cargo control room\nor at the cargo tank relief valve indicating the setting in force.\nWhere a defective cargo tank relief valve had been isolated, no records had been kept.\nWhere a defective cargo tank relief valve had been isolated, there was no sign displayed in the cargo control\nroom or at the cargo tank relief valve indicating the status of the valve.\nA cargo tank had been loaded despite having a defective and previously isolated cargo tank relief valve.\nA cargo tank relief valve had been painted in a manner which might cause the valve to malfunction.\nGalvanic corrosion was evident on a cargo tank relief valve.\nA cargo tank relief valve was defective in any respect.\nVent masts contained accumulated rainwater.\nVent mast drains were found to be open during the inspection.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.4.", "t": "Was a ship specific Cargo System Operation Manual provided on board, and were", "c": "the Master and officers familiar with its content?\nShort Question Text\nCargo System Operation Manual\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that all ship staff involved in cargo operations have sufficient information about cargo properties\nand operating the cargo system so that they can conduct cargo operations safely. (IMO: IGC Code Ch.18\nGoal)\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Liquefied Gas) 3rd Edition\n6.1 Introduction\nThis chapter outlines the range of cargo operations normally encountered on liquefied gas tankers and the general\nsafety precautions to be observed in connection with these operations. The procedures outlined should be\nconsidered as general guidance only. There is a considerable variation in the design of cargo containment and cargo\nhandling systems, and specific instructions should be prepared for inclusion in the cargo operations manual for\nindividual gas tankers.\nIn order to achieve the required level of safety during cargo operations, all personnel involved should:\n• •\n• Be trained appropriately in cargo operations;\nBe familiar with their role and responsibilities during cargo operations and understand the procedures in the\ncargo operations manual; and\nBe able to respond effectively to emergency situations.\nAlthough the cargo containment and handling systems have been carefully designed and have been constructed\nunder strict supervision, the required levels of safety in cargo operations can only be achieved if all parts of the\nsystems and equipment are maintained in good working order.\n6.4 General Cycle of Operations\nEvery liquefied gas tanker should be provided with copies of a suitably detailed Cargo System Operating Manual\n(CSOM) to facilitate the safe operation of the ship, taking into account the hazards and properties of the liquefied gas\ncargoes that are permitted to be carried.\nIn addition, where the gas tanker is approved to carry noxious liquid substances (NLS) identified in MARPOL Annex\nII, a Procedures and Arrangements (P&A) Manual is required to be available on board.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.2 Cargo operations manuals\n18.2.1 The ship should be provided with copies of suitably detailed cargo system operation manuals approved by the\nAdministration such that trained personnel can safely operate the ship with due regard to the hazards and properties\nof the cargoes that are permitted to be carried.\n18.2.2 The content of the manuals shall include, but not be limited to:\n1.\noverall operation of the ship from dry-dock to dry-dock, including procedures for cargo tank cooldown and\nwarm-up, transfer (including ship-to-ship transfer), cargo sampling, gas-freeing, ballasting, tank cleaning and\nchanging cargoes;\n2. cargo temperature and pressure control systems;\n3. cargo system limitations, including minimum temperatures (cargo system and inner hull), maximum\npressures, transfer rates, filling limits and sloshing limitations;\n4. nitrogen and inert gas systems;\n5. firefighting procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of extinguishing agents;\n6. special equipment needed for safe handling of the particular cargo;\n7. fixed and portable gas detection;\n8. control, alarm and safety systems;\n9. emergency shutdown systems;\n10. procedures to change cargo tank pressure relief valve set pressures in accordance with 8.2.8 and 4.13.2.3;\nand\n11. emergency procedures, including cargo tank relief valve isolation, single tank gas-freeing and entry and\nemergency ship-to-ship transfer operations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have provided on board a suitably detailed, ship specific, Cargo System Operation\nManual that documented the overall operation of the ship from dry-dock to dry-dock and described the cargo\nequipment and systems fitted.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual may be made up of more than one manual or document.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nSight the Cargo System Operation Manual and verify the contents include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nOverall operation of the ship from dry-dock to dry-dock, including procedures for cargo tank cooldown and\nwarm-up, transfer (including ship-to-ship transfer), cargo sampling, gas-freeing, ballasting, tank cleaning and\nchanging cargoes.\nCargo temperature and pressure control systems.\nCargo system limitations, including minimum temperatures (cargo system and inner hull), maximum\npressures, transfer rates, filling limits and sloshing limitations.\nNitrogen and inert gas systems.\nFirefighting procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of extinguishing agents.\nSpecial equipment needed for safe handling of the particular cargo.\nFixed and portable gas detection.\nControl, alarm and safety systems.\n• •\n• Emergency shutdown systems.\nProcedures to change cargo tank pressure relief valve set pressures.\nEmergency procedures, including cargo tank relief valve isolation, single tank gas-freeing and entry and\nemergency ship-to-ship transfer operations.\nVerify that the accompanying officer is familiar with the contents of the manual(s).\nExpected Evidence\nCargo System Operation Manual(s)\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no Cargo System Operation Manual available on board.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual available on board was not ship specific.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual available on board did not address the hazards and properties of all\nthe liquified gas cargoes that the vessel was permitted to carry.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual available on board did not document the overall operation cycle of the\nship from dry-dock to dry-dock and/or describe the cargo equipment and systems fitted.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual available on board did not include information on maximum loading\nrates.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual was not approved by the flag administration or a recognised\norganisation.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the contents of the Cargo System Operation Manual\navailable on board.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual available on board was not provided in a language understandable by\nthe officers responsible for cargo operations.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for monitoring", "c": "the integrity of the containment system and maintaining the atmosphere in the\ninterbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition, and had records been\nmaintained?\nShort Question Text\nMaintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the integrity of the containment system is monitored and that the atmosphere within the\nsystem and hold spaces are always maintained in a safe condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n1.8.6 Cargo Tank Pressures\nPressure in cargo tanks and hold or interbarrier spaces should be closely monitored, especially during cargo\noperations. Any necessary pressure adjustments should be made using the equipment provided. Particular care is\nnecessary with membrane or semi-membrane cargo containment systems which are vulnerable to damage from\nvacuum or incorrect differential pressures because of the thin barrier material.\n5.4.3 Hold and Interbarrier Spaces\nHold and interbarrier spaces may have to be filled with inert gas if the gas cargo is flammable. The appropriate\natmosphere (gas and pressure) and procedures for hold and interbarrier spaces depend on the cargo containment\nsystem.\nWhen carrying non-flammable cargoes, including ammonia, the hold or interbarrier space atmosphere may be\nmaintained under dry air.\n5.4.4 Inert Gas Quality\nWhen inert gas is used in the cargo system, including tanks, hold or interbarrier spaces, the atmosphere in each\nspace should be checked regularly to confirm that the oxygen concentration does not exceed the specified level and\nthe pressure remains above atmospheric.\n9.3.4 Tank Leakage\nCargo tank leakage to the hold space or interbarrier spaces is detected by the gas detection equipment, and constant\nmonitoring will give continuous information on the change of a vapour concentration. The stability or rate of change of\nequipment readings will indicate the magnitude of the leak and, together with constant monitoring of the hold or\ninterbarrier space pressure and temperature, will enable the operator to establish the leak rate. All leakages from\ncargo tanks should be regarded as serious and reported immediately.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n7.2.3 Drying – hold spaces and interbarrier spaces.\nHold spaces, interbarrier spaces on membrane tanks and annular spaces on spherical tanks will also be dried. These\nspaces will be exposed to low temperatures and, in the case of interbarrier and annular spaces on gas carriers\ncarrying refrigerated cargoes, the temperatures will be very low. If the interbarrier and annular spaces have any\nmoisture in them when the tanks are cooled down, the water vapour will condense into the insulation and then\nexpand on freezing, which may damage the insulation and reduce its performance. Hold spaces are dried to protect\nthe outer part of the insulation and to prevent the condensation that can lead to corrosion problems on the steel work.\nThese spaces are much smaller in volume than the cargo tanks and are normally dried by the process of inerting.\nThe IGC Code requires that the interbarrier and hold spaces associated with cargo containment systems for\nflammable gases requiring full secondary barriers be inerted. This is achieved using either inert gas or nitrogen. The\nIGC Code allows the interbarrier and hold spaces for cargo containment systems for certain flammable gases\nrequiring only a partial secondary barrier, such as Moss type LNG carriers, to be maintained in a dry condition and\npressurised with dry air, provided the capability exists to quickly detect a leak and inert the hold space before a\ndangerous condition can develop. For non-flammable gases, the IGC Code allows that interbarrier and hold spaces\nmay be maintained simply with dry air.\n7.8.1 Cargo temperature and pressure control.\nCondition inspections\nGas concentrations in the interbarrier spaces of membrane containment systems may vary between loaded and\nballast passages and may also be affected by the motion of the vessel in a seaway. Gas concentrations in primary\nbarrier spaces will normally remain broadly the same for each voyage. It may be prudent to establish a formalised\nand efficient recording system and trend the condition of the cargo containment system. Any leaks can be identified,\nand appropriate intervention planned and implemented, well before any large problems occur. Main parameters such\nas nitrogen consumption, oxygen content, and gas content in each installation space (primary and secondary\nspaces), local temperatures in the insulation spaces, loaded condition and weather conditions will commonly be\nmonitored and recorded.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n9.2 Atmosphere control within the hold spaces (cargo containment systems other than type C independent tanks)\n9.2.1 Interbarrier and hold spaces associated with cargo containment systems for flammable gases requiring full or\npartial secondary barriers shall be inerted with a suitable dry inert gas and kept inerted with make-up gas provided by\na shipboard inert gas generation system, or by shipboard storage, which shall be sufficient for normal consumption\nfor at least 30 days.\n9.2.2 Alternatively, subject to the restrictions specified in chapter 17, the spaces referred to in 9.2.1 requiring only a\npartial secondary barrier may be filled with dry air provided that the ship maintains a stored charge of inert gas or is\nfitted with an inert gas generation system sufficient to inert the largest of these spaces, and provided that the\nconfiguration of the spaces and the relevant vapour detection systems, together with the capability of the inerting\narrangements, ensures that any leakage from the cargo tanks will be rapidly detected and inerting effected before a\ndangerous condition can develop. Equipment for the provision of sufficient dry air of suitable quality to satisfy the\nexpected demand shall be provided.\n9.2.3 For non-flammable gases, the spaces referred to in 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 may be maintained with a suitable dry air or\ninert atmosphere.\n9.3 Environmental control of spaces surrounding type C independent tanks.\nSpaces surrounding cargo tanks that do not have secondary barriers shall be filled with suitable dry inert gas or dry\nair and be maintained in this condition with make-up inert gas provided by a shipboard inert gas generation system,\nshipboard storage of inert gas, or with dry air provided by suitable air drying equipment. If the cargo is carried at\nambient temperature, the requirement for dry air or inert gas is not applicable.\n13.4 Pressure Monitoring\n13.4.6 Hold spaces and interbarrier spaces without open connection to the atmosphere shall be provided with\npressure indication.\n13.6 Gas detection\n13.6.1 Gas detection equipment shall be installed to monitor the integrity of the cargo containment, cargo handling\nand ancillary systems, in accordance with this section.\n13.6.2 A permanently installed system of gas detection and audible and visual alarms shall be fitted in:\n.2 other enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces where cargo vapours may accumulate, including interbarrier spaces and\nhold spaces for independent tanks other than type C tanks;\n13.7 Additional requirements for containment systems requiring a secondary barrier\n13.7.1 Integrity of barriers\nWhere a secondary barrier is required, permanently installed instrumentation shall be provided to detect when the\nprimary barrier fails to be liquid-tight at any location or when liquid cargo is in contact with the secondary barrier at\nany location. This instrumentation shall consist of appropriate gas detecting devices according to 13.6. However, the\ninstrumentation need not be capable of locating the area where liquid cargo leaks through the primary barrier or\nwhere liquid cargo is in contact with the secondary barrier.\n13.7.2 Temperature indication devices\n13.7.2.1 The number and position of temperature-indicating devices shall be appropriate to the design of the\ncontainment system and cargo operation requirements.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment\nsystem and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition that\nincluded:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nGuidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include, depending upon the cargo containment\nsystem:\no Pressure.\no Nitrogen consumption.\no Temperature.\no Flammable gas levels.\no Oxygen content.\no Dew point.\nAcceptable ranges for applicable parameters.\nActions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range.\nSet points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms.\nRecords to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the atmosphere in\nthe required condition.\nThese procedures may form part of the Cargo System Operation Manual.\nWhere applicable, frequent sweeping or purging with nitrogen, with resultant use of nitrogen, may be used to reduce\nthe flammable gas levels in the interbarrier spaces. Sweeping valves should always be in the closed position when\nnot in use for purging. If found in the open position, this may indicate gas leakage into the primary space.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment\nsystem and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition.\nReview the records of the parameters monitored and actions taken to maintain the atmosphere in the\nrequired condition.\nWhere applicable:\no Verify that arrangements for purging the interbarrier spaces with nitrogen are in a satisfactory\ncondition.\no Review records of nitrogen consumption and, where fitted, the running hours of the nitrogen\ngenerator.\no Verify whether nitrogen sweeping valves have been left open or closed.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for monitoring the\nintegrity of the containment system and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold\nspaces in a safe condition.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and maintaining the\natmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition.\nRecords of the parameters monitored.\nRecords of actions taken to maintain the atmosphere in the required condition.\nRecords of nitrogen consumption and, where fitted, running hours of the nitrogen generator.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the containment system and maintaining\nthe atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe condition that included:\nRoles and responsibilities.\nGuidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include, depending upon the cargo\ncontainment system:\n Pressure.\n Nitrogen consumption.\n Temperature.\n Flammable gas levels.\n Oxygen content.\n Dew point.\no Acceptable ranges for applicable parameters.\no Actions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range.\no Set points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms.\no Records to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the\natmosphere in the required condition.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for monitoring the integrity of the\ncontainment system and maintaining the atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces in a safe\ncondition.\nThe atmosphere in the interbarrier spaces and/or hold spaces had not been maintained as required by\ncompany requirements for:\no Pressure.\no Temperature.\no Flammable gas levels.\no Oxygen content.\no Dew point.\nRecords had not been maintained of nitrogen consumption and nitrogen generator running hours.\nThe pressure in the interbarrier spaces had not been maintained at a sufficient level to prevent ingress from\nthe atmosphere.\nEquipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces was defective in any respect.\nAlarms fitted to equipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces had been inhibited.\nAlarms fitted to equipment to monitor the atmosphere in interbarrier and/or hold spaces had not been set as\nrequired by company procedures.\nHold spaces, without open connection to the atmosphere, were not provided with suitable pressure gauges.\nSecondary barrier temperature sensors had recorded a low reading indicating that liquid cargo may be in\ncontact with the barrier.\nSweeping valves were not closed after purging operations were completed.\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "management and operation of the cargo alarm systems, and had these procedures been\nfollowed?\nShort Question Text\nCargo system alarm management\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Management of Cargo Alarm Systems\n1st edition\n2019\nObjective\nTo ensure that there is an effective alarm management system in place.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Management of Cargo Alarm Systems, 1st edition, 2019\nPart 1 Introduction\n2. Scope\nThis document provides guidance for all types of gas carriers, from large LNG carriers to the smallest LPG carriers.\nAll gas carriers will need to have alarm management processes, but less complex alarm systems will be easier to set\nup.\nThe purpose of these recommendations is to encourage owners to create an alarm management system that will\naddress the design, management and operation of alarm systems.\n3.2 Alarm Management\nAlarm management also requires proper procedures to be in place to manage the many alarms that may be present\nin the system. An early stage is the collection of all relevant information relating to cargo alarms, which is then stored\non a master alarm database. Procedures are created for managing change and specifying training requirements for\noperators and maintenance staff. Completing the process are audit requirements where the system is checked\nagainst ship specific alarm performance metrics.\nPart 2 Recommendations\n6. Philosophy (A)\nThe recommended first step towards creating an alarm management system is to create a philosophy document. This\ndocument should contain the objectives of the system, i.e., how the ship-owner will address all aspects of alarm\nmanagement. This document should contain information on the system design, operation and maintenance. It should\nalso contain the philosophy that was used to classify and prioritise the alarms, colour code of alarms and\nperformance standards. The roles and responsibilities should also be defined in the philosophy document.\nRoles and responsibilities for alarm management should be defined in the philosophy document, including the\nidentities of the personnel responsible for managing changes to the system, keeping proper records and carrying out\nmaintenance. The philosophy document should be a ‘controlled document’ as defined by the ISM Code.\n11. Operation (F)\nThe operation stage comes after implementation and after a maintenance event.\nThis stage deals with alarm response procedure recommendations, alarm shelving, record keeping and refresher\ntraining for operators.\nDocumentation on specific alarm response procedures should be readily available to the operator. This information\nshould include the alarm tag name and number, type, setpoint, potential causes, operator action etc.\nIt is recommended that operator access to shelve or modify alarms should be controlled and only allowed as\nspecified in the philosophy document. Proper authorisation and reauthorisation procedures should be in place and all\ndocumentation should be maintained. Watch handover should include a list of shelved alarms, if any.\nDepending on the requirements of the class of alarms in the system, refresher training may be required for operators.\nThis should have been identified and documented in the alarm philosophy stage.\n12. Maintenance (G)\nThe section on maintenance in alarm management covers the condition when an alarm is removed from service for\ntesting and repair and subsequently returned to service. If any alarms are temporarily not in service, then suitable\ninterim procedures should be in place until the fault is rectified.\n14. Management of Change (I)\nManagement of change is an important part of the lifecycle. This philosophy is in line with the ISM Code requirements\nfor ships.\nTo preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the system, it is important that changes are properly authorised and are\nin accordance with the alarm philosophy document. There should be procedures in place to cover the addition,\nremoval or modification of alarms and to ensure that changes have the desired effect.\nFor example, a change in the setpoint of an alarm should be monitored to verify that it has the desired effect. It is\nimportant to ensure that there is a proper technical basis for any change and that it is in line with the alarm philosophy\ndocument. If the change is temporary, then the time limit for the change should be clearly stated. Proper records\nshould be kept of any permanent changes to the alarm system, and these should be retained for the life of the\nsystem. The records should include the reason, date, type and person authorising the change. Any training\nrequirements identified should be fed back to the operator training standard.\nManagement of change records should be stored on the ship, and ashore with the company, for the life of the alarm\nsystem. These records may be stored electronically but should be in a format appropriate for archiving and searching.\nEditable records are not appropriate for archiving.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide Liquefied Gas 3rd Edition\n7.2.5 Control and Alarm Systems\nGas tanker cargo systems include many remote control and automatic alarm and trip systems. It is important that\nthese control systems are kept in good working order and maintained in accordance with the recommendations of\noriginal equipment manufacturers.\nIf there is a need to bypass or override any alarm system, or if any alarm is disabled, a risk assessment should be\nundertaken, and appropriate controls should be put in place to ensure continued safe operation.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Alarms and trips\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.6.2 Essential cargo handling controls and alarms shall be checked and tested prior to cargo transfer operations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the management and operation of the cargo alarm\nsystems that included, as applicable:\n• •\n• •\n• Roles and responsibilities including the identities of the personnel responsible for managing changes to the\nsystem, keeping proper records and carrying out maintenance.\nAuthorisation required before changing a set point or overriding an alarm.\nRequirements for risk assessment before changing a set point or overriding an alarm.\nActions to be taken when an alarm is temporarily out in service.\nRecords to be kept, including any changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms have\nbeen overridden.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the management and operation of the\ncargo alarm systems.\nReview the records of any changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms have been\noverridden. Verify that they had been risk assessed and authorised as required and time limits set as\nappropriate.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the\nmanagement and operation of the cargo alarm systems.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the management and operation of the cargo alarm systems.\nRecords of any changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms have been overridden.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the management and operation of the cargo alarm systems that\nincluded, as applicable:\no Roles and responsibilities, including the identities of the personnel responsible for managing\nchanges to the system, keeping proper records, and carrying out maintenance.\no Authorisation required before changing a set point or overriding an alarm.\no Requirements for risk assessment before changing a set point or overriding an alarm.\no Actions to be taken when an alarm is temporarily out in service.\no Records to be kept, including any changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when\nalarms have been overridden.\nThe company procedures were not aligned with the systems that were fitted onboard with regards to the\ncontrols to prevent unauthorised adjustment of an alarm set point or the overriding of an alarm.\nThe password and/or key control to operate the adjustment of alarm set points or the override of an alarm\nwere freely available and not under the control of those identified by the company procedure for managing\nchanges to the cargo system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the management and operation\nof the cargo alarm systems.\nThere were no records of changes made to alarm systems and/or settings, and when alarms had been\noverridden, or records were incomplete e.g., no risk assessments where required.\nAn alarm was observed to have been overridden or disabled but there was no record of the required risk\nassessment, authorisation and/or authorisation.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.7.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vessel’s inert gas system and its\nassociated equipment, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nInert gas system\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Engine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the inert gas system always delivers inert gas in accordance with the requirements for the cargo\ncarried.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n2.7.2 The use of inert gas\nOn board gas carriers, inert gas may be used to prevent the formation of a flammable mixture in cargo tanks during\ncargo grade change, preparation to load the first cargo after dry dock or when gas freeing prior to dry dock,\ninspection or repairs. Inert gas may also be used in the hold or interbarrier spaces.\n4.9 Inert Gas and Nitrogen Systems\nGas carriers use a number of types of inert gas:\n• •\n• Inert gas from combustion type generators\nnitrogen from shipboard production systems\nliquid nitrogen taken from the shore (either by road tanker or barge).\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n5.4.4 Inert Gas Quality\nInert gas used for atmosphere control should be suitable for the intended purpose, regardless of its source. In\nparticular, inert gas should:\n• •\n• Be chemically compatible with the liquefied gas cargo and the materials of construction of the cargo system\nthroughout the full range of operating temperatures and pressures. In some cases, for purity reasons, this\nmay require the use of nitrogen rather than combustion produced inert gas;\nHave a sufficiently low dew point to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and damage to insulation at\nthe minimum operating temperature;\nHave an oxygen concentration not exceeding 5%. For cargoes which can react to form peroxides, the\noxygen concentration should not exceed 0.1%;\n• •\nHave a low concentration of carbon dioxide to prevent freezing at the anticipated service temperature; and\nHave minimal capacity for accumulating a static electrical charge.\nWhen inert gas is used in the cargo system, including tanks, holds or interbarrier spaces, the atmosphere in each\nspace should be checked regularly to confirm that the oxygen concentration does not exceed the specified level and\nthat the pressure is above atmospheric. All instruments and equipment used in the system should be maintained in\ngood condition and calibrated in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment manufacturers.\nPersonnel should be aware that an inert gas/cargo vapor mixture may become s flammable mixture if it should\nescape or be vented to the atmosphere.\n5.4.5 Inert Gas Hazards and Precautions\nIt is recommended that a means is provided to monitor the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces\ncontaining equipment, including nitrogen generators, inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant systems,\nthat may cause an oxygen-deficient environment.\nCare should be taken to ensure that cargo vapour is prevented from flowing back along inert gas supply lines into the\nIG generator. Non-return valves should be tested for effectiveness at regular intervals. Any temporary connection\nbetween the inert gas plant and the cargo system should be disconnected and tightly blanked after use.\n7.2.13 Inert Gas Systems\nShips may have the means to produce nitrogen gas on board by physical separation from the atmosphere, using the\npressure swing absorption method or the membrane method.\nShip’s personnel should be aware that the exhaust from the nitrogen generator plant is oxygen-rich and be fully alert\nto the personal safety and flammability hazard which this presents at vent piping flanges/fittings and within the area of\nthe vent exhaust.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• •\n• Roles and responsibilities.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nTank cleaning.\nRecord keeping.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n9.4 Inerting\n9.4.1 Inerting refers to the process of providing a non-combustible environment. Inert gases shall be compatible\nchemically and operationally at all temperatures likely to occur within the spaces and the cargo. The dew points of the\ngases shall be taken into consideration.\n9.4.2 Where inert gas is also stored for firefighting purposes, it shall be carried in separate containers and shall not\nbe used for cargo services.\n9.4.3 Where inert gas is stored at temperatures below 0oC, either as a liquid or as a vapour, the storage and supply\nsystem shall be designed so that the temperature of the ship's structure is not reduced below the limiting values\nimposed on it.\n9.4.4 Arrangements to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system that are suitable for the cargo\ncarried, shall be provided. If such plants are located in machinery spaces or other spaces outside the cargo area, two\nnon-return valves or equivalent devices and, in addition, a removable spool piece shall be fitted in the inert gas main\nin the cargo area. When not in use, the inert gas system shall be made separate from the cargo system in the cargo\narea except for connections to the hold spaces or Interbarrier spaces.\n9.4.5 The arrangement shall be such that each space being inerted can be isolated and the necessary controls and\nrelief valves, etc., shall be provided for controlling pressure in these spaces.\n9.4.6 Where insulation spaces are continually supplied with an inert gas as part of a leak detection system, means\nshall be provided to monitor the quantity of gas being supplied to individual spaces.\n9.5 Inert gas production on board\n9.5.1 The equipment shall be capable of producing inert gas with an oxygen content at no time greater than 5% by\nvolume, subject to the special requirements of chapter 17. A continuous-reading oxygen content meter shall be fitted\nto the inert gas supply from the equipment and shall be fitted with an alarm set at a maximum of 5% oxygen content\nby volume, subject to the requirements of chapter 17.\n9.5.2 An inert gas system shall have pressure controls and monitoring arrangements appropriate to the cargo\ncontainment system.\n9.5.3 Spaces containing inert gas generation plants shall have no direct access to accommodation spaces, service\nspaces or control stations, but may be located in machinery spaces. Inert gas piping shall not pass through\naccommodation spaces, service spaces or control stations.\n9.5.4 Combustion equipment for generating inert gas shall not be located within the cargo area. Special consideration\nmay be given to the location of inert gas generating equipment using a catalytic combustion process.\n17.1 General\nThe requirements of this chapter are applicable where reference thereto is made in column “I” in the table of Chapter\n19.\n17.6 Exclusion of air from vapour spaces\nAir shall be removed from cargo tanks and associated piping before loading and then, subsequently excluded by:\n1.\n2.\nintroducing inert gas to maintain a positive pressure. Storage or production capacity of the inert gas shall be\nsufficient to meet normal operating requirements and relief valve leakage. The oxygen content of inert gas\nshall, at no time, be greater than 0.2% by volume; or\ncontrol of cargo temperatures such that a positive pressure is maintained at all times.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvessel’s inert gas system and its associated equipment which included:\n• Roles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Description of the inert gas system fitted on board.\nProcedures to ensure that instruments and equipment used in the system are maintained in good condition\nand calibrated in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment manufacturers.\nArrangements to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system.\nGuidance on the maximum percentage of carbon dioxide that is acceptable to avoid ‘dry ice’ formation.\nGuidance on dew point limitations to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and damage to insulation at\nthe minimum operating temperature.\nArrangements for checking regularly to confirm that the oxygen concentration does not exceed the specified\nlevel and that the pressure is above atmospheric when inert gas is used in the cargo system, including\ntanks, holds or interbarrier spaces.\nArrangements for monitoring the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces containing\nequipment, including nitrogen generators, inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant systems,\nthat may cause an oxygen deficient environment.\nA record of inspection and maintenance of the inert gas plant, including defects and their rectification, should be\nmaintained on board.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s Cargo System Operation Manual and planned\nmaintenance system.\nWhere a nitrogen generator is fitted:\n• •\nIt is recommended a warning sign be posted at an appropriate place to warn of the dangers of the oxygenenriched waste gases from the nitrogen generator.\nIt is recommended that a warning sign is posted at each entrance to the space(s) containing the air\ncompressor, nitrogen generator, nitrogen receiver or buffer tank warning of the dangers of asphyxiation in a\nnitrogen enriched atmosphere.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the inert gas system.\nReview the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nReview the records of checks of the inert gas system, before, during and after operation.\nReview the records of checks to confirm that the oxygen concentration did not exceed the specified level\nand that the pressure was above atmospheric when inert gas was used in the cargo system, including tanks,\nholds or interbarrier spaces.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the inert gas system.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the inert gas system.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ntesting and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nRecords of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nRecords of checks of the inert gas system, before, during and after operation.\nRecords of checks to confirm that the oxygen concentration did not exceed the specified level and that the\npressure was above atmospheric when inert gas was used in the cargo system, including tanks, holds or\ninterbarrier spaces.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas\nsystem that included, as applicable:\no Roles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\no Description of the inert gas system fitted on board.\no Procedures to ensure that instruments and equipment used in the system are maintained in good\ncondition and calibrated in accordance with the recommendations of original equipment\nmanufacturers.\no Arrangements to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system.\no Guidance on the maximum percentage of carbon dioxide that is acceptable to avoid ‘dry ice’\nformation.\no Guidance on dew point limitations to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and damage to\ninsulation at the minimum operating temperature.\no Arrangements for checking regularly to confirm that the oxygen concentration does not exceed the\nspecified level and that the pressure is above atmospheric when inert gas is used in the cargo\nsystem, including tanks, holds or interbarrier spaces.\no Arrangements for monitoring the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces containing\nequipment, including nitrogen generators, inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant\nsystems, that may cause an oxygen deficient environment.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nWhere a nitrogen generator was fitted, the accompanying officer was not familiar with the dangers from:\no An oxygen deficient atmosphere as a result of nitrogen leakage.\no The oxygen-enriched exhaust from the nitrogen generator.\nInspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system had not been carried out in accordance with the\ncompany procedures.\nThe continuous-reading oxygen content meter had not been calibrated in accordance with the\nrecommendations of original equipment manufacturers.\nNon-return valves to prevent the backflow of cargo vapour into the inert gas system had not been tested for\neffectiveness at regular intervals.\nThere were no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the inert gas system.\nThere were no records of checks to confirm that the oxygen concentration did not exceed the specified level\nand that the pressure was above atmospheric when inert gas was used in the cargo system, including tanks,\nholds or interbarrier spaces.\nThere were no records of checks of the inert gas system, before, during and after operation.\nThere was no evidence that the oxygen content in enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces containing equipment,\nincluding nitrogen generators, inert gas (IG) generators or nitrogen cycle refrigerant systems, that may\ncause an oxygen deficient environment had been monitored.\nWhere the inert gas plant was contained in an enclosed room or space, there were no safe entry procedures\nposted at each entrance to the room.\nThe inert gas delivered was not suitable for the intended purpose, because:\no It was not chemically compatible with the liquefied gas cargo and the materials of construction of\nthe cargo system throughout the full range of operating temperatures and pressures.\no The dew point was not sufficiently low enough to prevent condensation, freezing, corrosion and\ndamage to insulation at the minimum operating temperature.\no The oxygen concentration exceeded 5%, (or 0.2% or less, as required, for cargoes which can react\nto form peroxides).\no It did not have a low concentration of carbon dioxide to prevent freezing at the anticipated service\ntemperature.\nThe continuous-reading oxygen content meter and alarm system was defective in any respect.\nTemporary connections (e.g., spool-pieces) had not been removed from between the inert gas system and\nthe cargo system following inerting operations.\nThe inert gas system was defective in any respect.\nWhere the entry procedures posted at the entrance(s) to the space or spaces containing the inert gas system were\nnot in alignment with the enclosed space entry procedure in the SMS, or entry into a space containing the inert gas\nsystem was authorised during the inspection without full compliance with the enclosed space entry procedure, make\nan observation under question 5.5.1.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.8.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for managing", "c": "cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds, and were the manifold\narrangements in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nGas vessel cargo manifolds\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Rating, Cargo Manifold\nPublications\nSIGTTO: LNG Marine Loading Arms and Manifold Draining\nPurging and Disconnection Procedure\nIMO: ISM Code\nSIGTTO/OCIMF: Recommendations for Liquefied Gas Carrier Manifolds 2nd Ed 2018\nIMO: IGC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo and vapour manifolds are always safely connected, disconnected, and monitored\nthroughout cargo transfer operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO/OCIMF: Recommendations for Liquefied Gas Carrier Manifolds 2nd Ed 2018\n3. Protection from Cargo Spill\n3.4 Gratings\nManifold drip tray gratings should be of a material that is not adversely affected by spilled cargo. All manifold gratings\nshould be secured to the drip tray structure to provide a firm, non-skid, working surface that is free from any\nprotrusions that personnel may trip on, and would not interfere with operations.\nThe grating support structure and the drip tray structure should be designed with sufficient additional load bearing\ncapacity to take the loading from the loading arm jacks. In the absence of any other requirements, it is recommended\nthat gratings should be designed to withstand a load of 1 tonne per sq. metre. For LNG carriers, consideration should\nalso be given to the load (including dynamic loading) from STS equipment.\n3.5 Drainage – LPG\nFor LPG carriers, it is recommended that the protected area and drip tray should be provided with means to drain off\nany water that may accumulate.\n3.6 Drainage – LNG\nFor LNG carriers, it is recommended that the protected area should be provided with a drain line capable of leading a\nspill overboard. The drain line should be fitted with a valve that would be closed during normal operation and which\ncan be opened from a remote location. The discharge from the line should point vertically downwards or otherwise so\nas not to deluge the jetty or its associated equipment with drained liquid. The discharge from the line should be in the\nmanifold area so that the LNG carrier’s hull is protected by the water curtain specified in Section 3.7.\n3.7 Water Curtains for LNG Carriers\nThe hull of LNG carriers should be protected by a water curtain at the ship’s side that extends over at least the full\nlength of the potential spillage area. For ship to ship (STS) transfer using hoses, consideration should also be given\nto the provision of an effective water curtain or suitable screen. This is to protect the deck under the manifold\nplatform.\n4. Manifold Design\nEnsuring the integrity of the manifold design is typically addressed by specifying the:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nPipe schedule\nAllowable loads for the manifold support\nMinimum mechanical properties of material used\nPressure rating of flanges, reducers and spool pieces.\nInformation on the pipe schedule, materials used, allowable loads used in the design of the support and pressure\nrating should be available on board and certified by a Classification Society. This information will assist in the ship\npersonnel's awareness of the limitations of the manifold design. This information will also allow engineering\ncalculations to be carried out at a future date, if required under special circumstances.\n5.3 Marking of Manifolds\nIt is recommended that the cargo manifold should be permanently and clearly marked, at a suitable location, with its\ndesigned safe working loads. The manifold arrangement should be marked on the ship side shell.\n6.5 Access and Exits from the Manifold Area\nSafe access is to be provided for the connecting and disconnecting of arms/hoses. It is recommended that there\nshould be two independent means of exit for personnel from the manifold area to enable evacuation in the event of\nan emergency.\nAnnex 1 – Manifold Strainers\nThe use of filters in the cargo manifold helps prevent debris from getting into the cargo tanks or shore tanks.\nFilters may be conical or basket type.\nWhen using filters in the manifold, the pressure differential across the filter should be monitored to check for filter\nblockage. The ship and terminal should agree on a suitable method to monitor the pressure before commencing\ncargo operations.\nSIGTTO: LNG Marine Loading Arms and Manifold Draining, Purging and Disconnection Procedure\nThe principal objective is to disconnect the MLAs in a manner that eliminates any risk of liquid release and reduces\nthe release of cargo vapour to the atmosphere to an absolute minimum. For this operation to be conducted safely and\nin a timely manner, it is essential that there is a carefully thought out procedure in place and that there is good\ncommunication between the ship’s staff and the shore operational staff, both of whom bear responsibility for safe\nconduct of the operation.\nThe process has a number of logical steps:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\nLining up to drain the system from the MLA, and/or manifold, to shore or ship tank.\nIsolation of liquid and vapour valves on either side of the manifold connection.\nRemoval of liquid from the MLA, and/or manifolds, to shore or ship tank.\nPurging of flammable vapours from the connection.\nVerification that the target conditions (flammable gas concentration) have been achieved.\nDisconnection of the manifold.\n5. Verification\nThis is a key aspect of ensuring the safety of the disconnection procedure. The vent in way of the manifold is opened\nand the vapour is tested using a meter calibrated for measuring methane in nitrogen. A typical target level is 2% by\nvolume in nitrogen to ensure a margin of safety when disconnection occurs and the vapour and nitrogen mixture is\nachieved. As a final check, briefly crack open the drain to the drip tray to ensure that no liquid is lying in the bottom of\nthe line.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n1.2.53\nToxic products are those defined by a “T” in column “f” in the table of Chapter 19.\n3.8.2\nBow or stern loading and unloading lines that are led past accommodation spaces, service spaces or control\nstations shall not be used for the transfer of products requiring a type 1G ship. Bow or stern loading and unloading\nlines shall not be used for the transfer of toxic products as specified in 1.2.53, where the design pressure is above 2.5\nMPa.\n5.7.3 Water curtain\nFor cargo temperatures below -110°C, a water distribution system shall be fitted in way of the hull under the shore\nconnections to provide a low-pressure water curtain for additional protection of the hull steel and the ship's side\nstructure. This system is in addition to the requirements of 11.3.1.4 and shall be operated when cargo transfer is in\nprogress.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for managing cargo and vapour connections at the cargo\nmanifolds. These procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Manifold connection via hose or marine loading arm.\nIn LNG vessels, procedures for disconnection, including:\no Lining up to drain the system from the MLA, and/or manifold, to shore or ship tank.\no Isolation of liquid and vapour valves on either side of the manifold connection.\no Removal of liquid from the MLA, and/or manifolds, to shore or ship tank.\no Purging of flammable vapours from the connection.\no Verification that the target conditions (flammable gas concentration) have been achieved, using a\nmeter calibrated for measuring methane in nitrogen.\no Disconnection of the manifold.\nThe fitting and monitoring of pressure gauges at each manifold connection outboard of the manifold valve.\nThe fitting of blanks to all unused manifold connections.\nThe fitting of blanks or caps to all vents, drains and sample points, except while in use.\nThe use of fixed and portable drip-trays and the management of drained or spilled cargo.\nThe management of vapour manifolds and connections.\nSafe work on elevated manifold platforms, if fitted.\nThe supporting of cargo hoses during cargo transfer.\n• •\n• •\nRestrictions on the use of the mid-ships hose-handling crane(s) during cargo operations.\nThe management of bow and stern manifolds, if fitted.\nThe hazards associated with low temperature cargoes.\nThe use of manifold strainers\nThe offshore manifolds on LNG carriers are often pressurised with nitrogen and it is normal that the space between\nthe manifold valve and the flange is under pressure. This does not indicate valve leakage. Valve leakage would be\nindicated by frosting.\nGratings on LNG tanker manifold drip trays are sometimes made of two different materials; gratings near to the\nconnections may be of stainless steel, and the gratings on the periphery made of composite material. The stainlesssteel gratings are designed to bear the point load of the cargo arm supports in the event of a PERC’s release. If,\nhowever, the loading arm supports are located on the composite section, the vessel should confirm that they are\nconstructed of sufficient strength to take the point load.\nManifold drip trays for LNG transfers should be kept as dry as reasonably practical. Water should not be introduced\ndeliberately, or rain-water allowed to accumulate. This will prevent rapid phase transition in the event of a spill.\nManifold drip-tray drains to deck should be fitted with valves and either capped or plugged.\nPressure gauge stems should be fitted with valves and capped whenever gauges are not fitted.\nIt is generally accepted that steel blanks should be of the same thickness as the flanges to which they are attached,\nbut this will not necessarily result in the pressure capability being the same as that of the associated pipework. It is\nthe pressure rating of the blank which is important, and blanks made of materials such as titanium have a superior\nstrength and may therefore be significantly thinner for the same pressure rating as a mild steel blank. If such blanks\nare fitted, documentation should be on board to prove that the pressure rating is adequate for the service.\nManifold strainers may be fitted at the option of the terminal or the vessel. The provision of the strainers may be by\nthe terminal or by the vessel. Where fitted they must be in good order and frequently checked and cleaned as\nrequired. Many strainers are designed for one-way flow only. They should not be by-passed.\nManifold valves and lines should be clearly marked as to whether they are liquid or vapour.\nNon-essential personnel should be kept clear of the manifold area during cargo operations and access should be\nvisibly restricted.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing cargo and vapour connections at\nthe cargo manifolds.\nInspect cargo and vapour manifolds, including bow and stern manifolds where fitted, and verify that the\narrangements were in alignment with industry best practice and, where applicable, regulation.\nInterview a deck rating on manifold watch to verify their familiarity with:\no The hazards associated with low temperature cargoes.\no The identification of potential manifold leakage.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for managing cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds.\nInformation on the allowable loads for the manifold supports and pressure rating of flanges, reducers, and\nspool pieces, certified by the vessel’s Class Society.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures which described the management of cargo and vapour connections at\nthe cargo manifolds to prevent and detect leakages.\nOn an LNG carrier, there were no detailed disconnection procedures.\nOn an LNG carrier, the meter used to verify that target conditions (flammable gas concentration) for\ndisconnection had been achieved was not calibrated for measuring methane in nitrogen.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures which described the management\nof cargo and vapour connections at the cargo manifolds.\nOn an LNG carrier, the accompanying officer was not familiar with the:\no Detailed disconnection procedures.\no Function of the manifold drain line and the means of remotely opening it in the event of a cargo spill\ninto the drip tray.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedures for monitoring the pressure differential\nacross the filter to check for possible blockage.\nA rating on manifold watch was not sufficiently familiar with:\no The hazards associated with low temperature cargoes.\no The identification of potential manifold leakage.\nA manifold strainer had been by-passed.\nA manifold connection was:\no Secured with damaged bolts or bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.\no Not fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.\no Made using improvised arrangements such as a G-clamp or similar device.\nWhere a hose or marine loading arm was secured by camlocks, one or more cams had not properly\nengaged with the manifold flange.\nA marine loading arm was improperly supported by jacks or similar arrangements.\nThe jack for a marine loading arm was supported by items not designed to support the load, such as empty\noil drums.\nThe jack for a marine loading arm was supported on gratings that were not designed to support such a load.\nCargo hoses were not properly supported during cargo transfer.\nA manifold pressure gauge was:\no Not fitted on the outboard side of the manifold valve.\no Missing from an unused manifold connection.\nA manifold pressure gauge stem was not fitted with a valve or cock and/or was not capped when not in use.\nA manifold blank flange was not:\no As thick as the end flange it was bolted to and there was no supporting documentation to show it\nwas of the same working pressure rating as the line or system it was connected to.\no Made of steel or other approved material.\no Secured with bolts of an inappropriate diameter, length or material.\no Fully bolted, i.e. without a bolt in every hole in the flange.\nThere was a cargo or bunker leak from an unused manifold.\nAn unused manifold was not blanked.\nThere was no permanent or portable drip-tray underneath a manifold connection.\nManifold drip-tray drains to deck were not fitted with valves and capped.\nThe midships hose-handling crane was being used to handle stores etc. whilst cargo operations were taking\nplace.\nThere were not two independent means of exit for personnel from the manifold area to enable evacuation in\nthe event of an emergency.\nAccess to the manifold area for non-essential personnel was not visibly restricted.\nManifold gratings were not secured to the drip tray structure to provide a firm, non-skid, working surface.\nManifold drip tray gratings were constructed of a material that would be adversely affected by spilled cargo.\nThe manifold drip tray on an LNG carrier contained water.\nThe hull water curtain was not in operation during an LNG cargo transfer operation.\nThere was no information available on board on the allowable loads for the manifold supports and pressure\nrating of flanges, reducers and spool pieces, certified by the vessel’s Class Society.\nThe cargo manifold was not permanently and clearly marked, at a suitable location, with its designed safe\nworking loads.\n• •\n• Manifold valves and lines were not clearly marked as to whether they were liquid or vapour.\nBow or stern loading and unloading lines that led past accommodation spaces, service spaces or control\nstations were being used for the transfer of products requiring a type 1G ship.\nBow or stern loading and unloading lines were being used for the transfer of toxic products as specified in\nIGC 1.2.53, where the design pressure was above 2.5 MPa.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the use,", "c": "inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework,\nand were these items in satisfactory condition and properly fitted when in use?\nShort Question Text\nManifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Cargo Manifold\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nSIGTTO/OCIMF: Recommendations for Liquefied Gas Carrier Manifolds 2nd Ed 2018\nObjective\nTo ensure manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework meet the required pressure\nrating for the cargo transfer system and will not leak at the flange face when used.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO/OCIMF: Recommendations for Liquefied Gas Carrier Manifolds 2nd Ed 2018\n4. Manifold Design\nThe recommendations in this section are provided for two types of material, i.e. carbon steel and stainless steel. The\nchoice of material is usually dictated by the temperature of the product carried.\nCarbon steel may be used to construct fuel oil bunker manifolds. This may also be used to construct some types of\nLPG carrier manifolds. Stainless steel is typically used to construct LNG carrier, LPG carrier and LNG bunker\nmanifolds.\nEnsuring the integrity of the manifold design is typically addressed by specifying the:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nPipe schedule\nAllowable loads for the manifold support\nMinimum mechanical properties of material used\nPressure rating of flanges, reducers and spool pieces.\nInformation on the pipe schedule, materials used, allowable loads used in the design of the support and pressure\nrating should be available on board and certified by a Classification Society. This information will assist in the ship\npersonnel's awareness of the limitations of the manifold design. This information will also allow engineering\ncalculations to be carried out at a future date, if required under special circumstances.\n5. Manifold Specification and Fittings\n5.5 Reducers and Spool Pieces\nIf necessary, reducers and spool pieces should be fitted with a lifting lug. This lifting lug should be placed as near as\npossible to the centre of gravity and at a location that will not interfere with either the operation of the quick\nconnect/disconnect coupler (QC/DC) or with the bolting of flanges.\nIf the reducer or spool piece flange connection is a solid flange without bolt holes, it is recommended that it should be\nprovided with a blank flange that uses QC/DC fittings for securing the blank on completion of cargo transfer.\nThe required reducer or spool piece should be bolted directly to the outboard end of the distance piece. It is\nrecommended that no more than one reducer or spool piece should be bolted to the distance piece. This is because if\nmore than one reducer is fitted, the design criteria defined in Section 4 could be exceeded.\nReducers and spool pieces for LNG carriers should be carried in accordance with the requirements of the trade.\nIt is recommended that use of cranked or offset reducers, Y-pieces, or additional spool pieces should be avoided\nunless sufficient engineering studies have been carried out that support safe use. If such equipment is used,\ncertificates that indicate suitability should be available.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.5 Preparation for cargo transfer\n6.5.1 General\nCargo hoses, loading arms and gaskets should be suitable for the cargo and in good condition. The responsible\ncargo officer should check the condition of the ship shore flange connection. Flexible hoses should be suspended\nfrom suitable equipment and should not be subjected to excessive bending or dynamic forces and should not put\nexcessive strain on the cargo manifold. This is particularly relevant when the cargo manifold is extended by\nunsupported reducing pieces. Care should be taken not to damage mechanical loading arms during cargo operations.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nChapter I Part 38\n38.10-1 Valves, fittings and accessories.\n(a) All valves, flanges, fittings, and accessory equipment shall be of a type suitable for use with liquefied flammable\ngases, and shall be made of steel or grade A malleable iron, acceptable for the service temperature and pressure\naccording to the requirements of part 56 of subchapter F (Marine Engineering) of this chapter. Other materials may\nbe specially considered and approved by the Commandant.\n(b) All valves, flanges, fittings, and accessory equipment shall have a pressure rating at operating temperatures not\nless than the maximum allowable pressure to which they may be subjected. Piping which is not protected by a relief\nvalve or which can be isolated from its relief valve by other valves shall be designed for the greatest of the cargo\nvapor pressure at 115 °F., or the maximum allowable pressure of the cargo tank, or the requirements of §38.10–\n10(a). Cargo liquid piping which may be subject to liquid full conditions shall be fitted with relief valves. The escape\nfrom piping systems relief valves shall be piped to a venting system or to a suitable vapor recovery system. Provision\nshall be made for the proper venting of all valves, fittings, etc., in which pressure build up may occur, especially in\nrefrigerated systems, because of an increase in product temperature.\n38.10–10 Cargo piping.\n(a) The piping shall be designed for a working pressure of not less than the maximum pressure to which it may be\nsubjected but in no case less than the design pressure of the cargo tanks. In the case of piping on the discharge side\nof the liquid pumps or vapor compressors, the design pressure shall not be less than the pump or compressor\ndischarge relief valve setting; or, provided the piping is not protected by relief valves, the design pressure shall not be\nless than the total discharge head of the pump or compressor.\n(b) Piping subject to tank pressure shall be seamless drawn steel or electric resistance welded steel. Pipe used in\nrefrigerated tank systems shall be of a material which is suitable for the minimum service temperature to which it may\nbe subjected, according to the requirements of part 56 of sub- chapter F (Marine Engineering) of this chapter.\n(c) Piping shall be provided with adequate support to take the weight of the piping off valves and fittings and to\nprevent excessive vibration and stresses on tank connections.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• Cargo/bunker line pressure testing\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the use and inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces\nand other portable pipework that included guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• The correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nProvision of test certification.\nSuitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces.\nRegular inspection.\nRecords to be maintained of inspections.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework should have the same or greater certified rating as\nthe fixed manifold piping to which it is connected.\nReducers and spool pieces should be made of suitable material compatible with the cargo and comply with relevant\nindustry standards. Where long reducers or spool pieces are used the resulting lengths should be properly supported\nto prevent undue stress.\nOther portable pipework may include cargo Y pieces, spiders or other hard configurations.\nThis question will apply to all manifold reducers, spool pieces and other items of portable pipework carried onboard\nfor use in cargo or bunker operations unless they are clearly marked as out of service for refurbishment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use and inspection of manifold\nreducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nReview the inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nReview the records of inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nDuring the inspection, observe the disposition and visual condition of the manifold reducers, spool pieces\nand other portable pipework.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection of manifold reducers,\nspool pieces and other portable pipework.\nRequest that the blanks or covers are removed from at least one stored reducer or spool piece and verify\nthat the presentation flanges are undamaged and free from pitting or scoring.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the use and inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable\npipework.\nThe inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nRecords of the inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the use, inspection and testing of manifold reducers, spool pieces\nand other portable pipework that included guidance on:\no The correct use of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\no Provision of test certification.\no Suitable storage arrangements, including the protection of flange faces.\no Regular inspection.\no Records to be maintained of inspections.\nThere was no inventory of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the use and inspection of\nmanifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework.\nTest certification was not available for a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework.\nThere were no records available for the inspection of manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable\npipework as required by company procedures.\nInspection of the manifold reducers, spool pieces and other portable pipework indicated that the required\ninspections had either not been performed or were ineffective.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework did not have the same certified rating\n(MAWP) as the fixed manifold piping to which it was connected.\nThe position of handles or lugs on reducers in use during cargo transfer operations interfered with quick\nacting coupling devices or the bolting of flanges.\nMore than one spool piece or reducer was fitted between the fixed manifold flange and the flange presented\nfor connection.\nThe flange face of a manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework was visibly damaged,\ncorroded or in an unsatisfactory condition.\nWhere a long reducer or spool piece was in use, it was not properly supported to prevent undue stress.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time of the\ninspection was defective in any respect.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework in use for cargo transfer at the time of the\ninspection had been repaired but there was no evidence that it had been pressure tested on completion of\nthe repairs.\nA manifold reducer, spool piece or other item of portable pipework was not made of a suitable material\ncompatible with the minimum cargo temperature recorded in the Certificate of Fitness.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.10.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for carrying", "c": "out emergency discharge operations, and was any required additional equipment in\nsatisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency discharge operations\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel will be able to discharge the cargo safely in the event of equipment failure.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition\n4.2.6 Emergency cargo pumps\nEmergency cargo pumps are usually found on vessels that are fitted with submerged cargo pumps where other\nmeans of removing cargo from a tank, in the event of total pump failure, are not available.\nAn emergency cargo pump is typically only fitted on membrane ships, although some LPG very large gas carriers\n(VLGCs) of Type A tank design may also be outfitted with an emergency cargo pump.\nEach membrane ship carries an emergency cargo pump that can be used in the event of failure of either one or both\ncargo pumps in a particular tank. The cargo tanks are equipped with an emergency pump well. This pump well has a\nfoot valve that is held closed by highly loaded springs. The emergency pump is lowered down the well after purging\nthe well with nitrogen (N2). The weight of the pump overcomes the compression of the springs to open the foot valve.\nIt is prudent to maintain a small flow of N2 while the pump is being installed.\nIt is standard practice to reduce and maintain cargo tank pressure to near atmospheric pressure throughout the\ninstallation/fitting.\nWhen not in use, the emergency pump is stowed in a special case (coffin) that has connections to introduce N2. This\nensures that the pump can be kept in a ‘dry’ atmosphere prior to use.\nSome LPG carriers have permanently installed emergency pumps; others employ a well and foot valve system similar\nto membrane ships.\nFull instructions for fitting and operating the emergency pump will be found in the ship’s cargo operations manual.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n5.6 Cargo transfer arrangements\n5.6.1 Where cargo transfer is by means of cargo pumps that are not accessible for repair with the tanks in service, at\nleast two separate means shall be provided to transfer cargo from each cargo tank, and the design shall be such that\nfailure of one cargo pump or means of transfer will not prevent the cargo transfer by another pump or pumps, or other\ncargo transfer means.\n5.6.2 The procedure for transfer of cargo by gas pressurisation shall preclude lifting of the relief valve during such\ntransfer. Gas pressurization may be accepted as a means of transfer of cargo for those tanks where the design factor\nof safety is not reduced under the conditions prevailing during the cargo transfer operation. If the cargo tank relief\nvalves or set pressure are changed for this purpose, as is permitted in accordance with 8.2.7 and 8.2.8, the new set\npressure shall not exceed Ph as is defined in 4.13.2.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific procedures for safely carrying out emergency discharge\noperations in the event of equipment failure.\nIn general,\n• •\n• •\nLNG vessels are fitted with two cargo pumps on each tank.\nLNG membrane vessels are equipped with an emergency cargo pump that can be installed in the tank if\nboth cargo pumps were to fail.\nLNG Moss vessels are not provided with an emergency cargo pump; if both cargo pumps were to fail, any\nremaining cargo would be transferred to another tank by pressurising the vapour space above the liquid.\nThis operation may require the resetting of the cargo tank relief valves to compensate for the increase in\npressure from the normal set pressure.\nFully and semi-pressurised LPG Carriers use the compressors for emergency discharge operations.\nWhere an emergency cargo pump is provided, procedures should include guidance on:\n• •\n• •\nPreparing and installing the emergency cargo pump.\nOperating the emergency cargo pump.\nStoring the emergency cargo pump.\nInspection and testing of the emergency cargo pump.\nWhere emergency transfer is achieved by pressurisation, procedures should include guidance on:\n• Resetting the cargo tank relief valves, where necessary.\nWhere emergency transfer is achieved through other means such as eductors, procedures should include guidance\non:\n• The drive medium for the eductors and avoiding contamination between cargo grades.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge\noperations.\n• •\nVerify that the accompanying officer is familiar with the company procedures for carrying out emergency\ndischarge operations.\nWhere an emergency cargo pump is provided:\no Inspect the emergency cargo pump where possible.\no Verify that inspections and tests had been conducted in accordance with company procedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations.\nWhere carried, the inspection and testing records for the emergency cargo pump.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no ship-specific company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations using an\nemergency cargo pump or via pressurisation as applicable.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for carrying out emergency\ndischarge operations.\nWhere emergency discharge procedures involved an emergency cargo pump, the pump was:\no Defective in any respect.\no Not stored in the required ‘dry’ atmosphere.\nWhere carried, there were no records of the inspection and testing of the emergency cargo pump.\nWhere emergency discharge procedures involved pressurisation, they did not give guidance on resetting the\ncargo tank relief valves where necessary.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.11.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the regular", "c": "inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion\narrangements, and were these arrangements in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo and vapour line insulation and expansion arrangements are regularly inspected and\nproperly maintained.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nAppendix 3 Cargo Handling Plant and Equipment\nA3.11 Expansion Bellows\nBellows may be used to accommodate thermal contraction and expansion in a number of applications including:\n• In pipe work systems to accommodate lateral and axial movement;\nIf used properly, bellows pieces are very durable, but they are vulnerable to misuse and for this reason expansion\nloops and offsets may be used instead. If bellows are intended to be fitted, the design will take careful account of\npressure, temperature, diameters, pipe layout and movements. All associated parts, including anchor points and\nsupports, are vital to safe operation within design limits.\nThe following precautions should be observed:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Bellows should never be subjected to unnecessary shocks such as pressure surge;\nEvery effort should be made to protect bellows from internal and external damage. Personnel should not\nstand on or mishandle bellows units;\nFor low temperature service, a flexible sleeve may be fitted to protect the unit from excessive ice build-up.\nSuch sleeves should not be permanently removed;\nThe design efficiency of anchor points, supports, guides or constraints should be maintained. Their\noperation should never be impaired, for example by incomplete reassembly, change of position,\nmisalignment of pipe work, or any other action which would place stress on the unit for which it was not\ndesigned;\nBellows should be inspected regularly for cracks, corrosion, cleanliness and signs of excessive wear;\nBefore replacement units are installed, it should be determined whether pre-compression or extension is\nnecessary;\nWhen bellows are stored, they should be properly protected against over-extension, compression,\nmisalignment and mechanical damage;\n• •\nWhen pressure tests are carried out, bellows should be prevented from extending beyond design limits in\norder to avoid damage or possible bellows failure; and\nTemporary tie-bars or constraints should be removed before cargo service and replaced with normal\nconstraints.\nA3.13 Pipeline Supports\nPipeline supports may be of a number of designs. They provide secure mountings which support pipework and\nprevent transverse movement, but will ensure correct alignment and, at the same time, permit expansion and\ncontraction of pipes without imposing stress.\nAll supports or anchor points should be correctly assembled and securing devices should be locked securely. Some\ndesigns require bolts to be fully tightened but in others clearance is provided. The arrangement should be checked\nbefore reassembly. If relative movement is to be provided, all moving surfaces should be clean and, if necessary,\nlubricated.\nIn some designs, pipework may be supported by load bearing insulating chocks. The correct type of material should\nbe used, and pieces found to be missing should be replaced to prevent transverse movement and damage.\nIf the system or part of it is being pressure tested, special care is necessary to ensure that adequate support is given,\nand that any side forces which may be created are controlled. Sudden pressurisation or depressurization of the\nsystem should be avoided.\nA3.14 Insulation\nInsulation materials intended for use with cold cargoes are easily damaged by high temperatures.\nAll insulation should be protected against deterioration or mechanical damage in order to preserve the integrity of the\nship’s structure and, at the same time, prevent a level of cargo boil off which could exceed plant capacity.\nInsulation boundaries should be adequately vapour/water sealed to prevent corrosion of the adjoining material. The\nsealing should be inspected periodically. During maintenance, care should be taken to exclude moisture which may\nbe absorbed by the insulation and reduce its effectiveness.\nOccasionally repairs to insulation may be required. Insulation materials should be regarded as flammable and be\nprotected from flames or sparks, with proper firefighting precautions taken. The material may also be toxic and\npersonnel working with it may therefore require additional protection. Adequate ventilation during work should be\nprovided.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n5.7 Installation requirements\n5.7.1 Design for expansion and contraction\nProvision shall be made to protect the piping, piping system and components and cargo tanks from excessive\nstresses due to thermal movement and from the movements of the tank and hull structure. The preferred method\noutside the cargo tanks is by means of offsets, bends or loops, but multi-layered bellows may be used if offsets,\nbends or loops are not practicable.\n5.7.2 Precautions against low temperature\nLow temperature piping shall be thermally isolated from the adjacent hull structure, where necessary, to prevent the\ntemperature of the hull from falling below the design temperature of the hull material. Where liquid piping is\ndismantled regularly, or where liquid leakage may be anticipated, such as at shore connections and at pump seals,\nprotection for the hull beneath shall be provided.\n5.8.4 Expansion joints\nWhere bellows and expansion joints are provided in accordance with 5.7.1, the following requirements apply:\n1.\n2.\nif necessary, bellows shall be protected against icing; and\nslip joints shall not be used except within the cargo tanks.\n5.12.3 Cargo piping insulation system\n5.12.3.1 Cargo piping systems shall be provided with a thermal insulation system as required to minimise heat leak\ninto the cargo during transfer operations and to protect personnel from direct contact with cold surfaces.\n5.12.3.2 Where applicable, due to location or environmental conditions insulation materials shall have suitable\nproperties of resistance to fire and flame spread and shall be adequately protected against penetration of water\nvapour and mechanical damage.\n5.12.4 Where the cargo piping system is of a material susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in the presence of saltladen atmosphere, adequate measures to avoid this occurring shall be taken by considering material selection,\nprotection of exposure to salty water and/or readiness for inspection.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour\npipeline insulation and expansion arrangements. Inspections should cover all cargo and vapour lines and include:\n• •\n• Pipeline insulation and covers where fitted.\nExpansion bellows, bends and/or loops.\nPipeline supports, clamps and insulating chocks.\nMore comprehensive inspections of pipeline insulation involving techniques such as profile radiography, ultrasonic\nspot readings, and/or insulation removal may be performed during repair periods.\nRecords should be maintained of inspections and include details of any repairs made to insulation or expansion\narrangements.\nThese procedures and associated records may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the regular inspection and maintenance of\ncargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements.\nReview the records of the regular inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and\nexpansion arrangements.\n• •\nDuring the inspection of the main deck inspect the cargo and vapour pipeline insulation, where fitted, and\nexpansion arrangements.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection and maintenance of the\ncargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the regular inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation\nand expansion arrangements.\nRecords of the regular inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion\narrangements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the regular inspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour\npipeline insulation and expansion arrangements.\nInspection and maintenance of cargo and vapour pipeline insulation and expansion arrangements had not\nbeen carried out in accordance with the company procedures.\nA section of cargo or vapour pipeline insulation had been removed and not replaced.\nCargo or vapour pipeline insulation was cracked or otherwise damaged (give details).\nIcing on pipework insulation indicated a local failure of the insulation.\nThere was evidence of corrosion on the pipework underneath the insulation.\nBellows were found to be defective in some respect e.g. mechanical damage, cracks, corrosion, pin-hole\nleaks, or signs of excessive wear.\nBellows were fitted with temporary tie-bars or constraints.\nA flexible sleeve was missing from a bellows where previously fitted.\nPipelines were not free to move within their clamps.\nPipe workload bearing insulating chocks were:\no Constructed of the incorrect material.\no Wholly or partly missing.\nCargo and/or vapour pipeline insulation arrangements were defective in any respect.\nCargo and/or vapour pipeline expansion arrangements were defective any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.12.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures relating to the", "c": "safety, rescue and recovery equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IGC Code, and\nwas the equipment ready for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nIGC safety, rescue and recovery equipment\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the safety, rescue and recovery equipment required by the IGC Code is always ready for\nimmediate use in the event of an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n8.7.5 Rescue and Recovery Equipment\n8.7.5.2 Stretcher\nWhen selecting a stretcher for enclosed space rescues the following should be considered:\n• •\n• In enclosed spaces where a vertical lift is required the stretcher should be able to secure the casualty\nproperly and prevent injury;\nThe stretcher and casualty should be able to pass through the enclosed space openings and around tight\ncorners; and\nThe stretcher should be capable of being handled by rescuers wearing full protective equipment.\n8.7.5.3 Breathing Apparatus\nThe following should be considered:\n• •\nThe design of the apparatus should be lightweight and enable the wearer to access confined spaces without\nthe need to remove it; and\nRadio communication should be possible when using the breathing apparatus.\n8.7.5.4 Resuscitation Equipment\nThe following should be considered:\n• •\n• It should be light, portable and preferably capable of being recharged on board;\nIt should be provided with a manual and automatic resuscitation system; and\nDue to the potential fire risk, pure oxygen should not be used for resuscitation in an enclosed space.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet. Cargoes with specific hazards may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Aromatic hydrocarbons.\nToxic cargoes.\nIncompatible cargoes.\nHigh vapour pressure cargoes.\nCargoes containing mercaptans and/or H2S.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 11\nFire protection and fire extinction\n11.6 Firefighter's outfits\n11.6.1 Every ship carrying flammable products shall carry firefighter's outfits complying with the requirements of\nregulation ll-2/10.10 of the SOLAS Convention, as follows:\nTotal cargo capacity\nNumber of outfits\n5,000 m3 and below\n4\nAbove 5,000 m3\n5\n11.6.2 Additional requirements for safety equipment are given in chapter 14.\n11.6.3 Any breathing apparatus required as part of a firefighter's outfit shall be a self-contained compressed airoperated breathing apparatus having a capacity of at least 1,200 â„“ of free air.\nChapter 14\nPersonnel protection\n14.1.2 Personal protective and safety equipment required in this chapter shall be kept in suitable, clearly marked\nlockers located in readily accessible places.\n14.1.3 The compressed air equipment shall be inspected at least once a month by a responsible officer and the\ninspection logged in the ship's records. This equipment shall also be inspected and tested by a competent person at\nleast once a year.\n14.2 First-aid equipment\n14.2.1 A stretcher that is suitable for hoisting an injured person from spaces below deck shall be kept in a readily\naccessible location.\n14.2.2 The ship shall have onboard medical first-aid equipment, including oxygen resuscitation equipment, based on\nthe requirements of the Medical First Aid Guide (MFAG) for the cargoes listed on the International Certificate of\nFitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk shown in appendix 2.\n14.3 Safety equipment\n14.3.1 Sufficient, but not less than three complete sets of safety equipment shall be provided in addition to the\nfirefighter's outfits required by 11.6.1. Each set shall provide adequate personal protection to permit entry and work in\na gas-filled space. This equipment shall take into account the nature of the cargoes, listed on the International\nCertificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquified Gases in Bulk shown in appendix 2.\n14.3.2 Each complete set of safety equipment shall consist of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\none self-contained positive pressure air-breathing apparatus incorporating full face mask, not using stored\noxygen and having a capacity of at least 1,200 â„“ of free air. Each set shall be compatible with that required\nby 11.6.1;\nprotective clothing, boots and gloves to a recognized standard;\nsteel-cored rescue line with belt; and\nexplosion-proof lamp.\n14.3.3 An adequate supply of compressed air shall be provided and shall consist of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nat least one fully charged spare air bottle for each breathing apparatus required by 14.3.1;\nan air compressor of adequate capacity capable of continuous operation, suitable for the supply of highpressure air of breathable quality; and\na charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare breathing apparatus air bottles for the breathing\napparatus required by 14.3.1.\n14.4.4 The protective clothing required under 14.3.2.2 shall be gastight.\nInspection Guidance\nRe IGC 14.3.1, for vessels delivered before 01 July 2016, a minimum of two sets of safety equipment are required,\nfor vessels delivered after 01 July 2016, a minimum of three.\nA 'competent person' in the context of the question may be a member of the crew provided that:\n• •\n• The crew member who conducted the annual service had attended a manufacturer's training course for the\nspecific type of SCBA carried on board within the five years prior the last service.\nThe specialist testing equipment required to complete the annual service in accordance with the\nmanufacturer's instructions was available on board at the time of the annual service.\nA copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the member of the crew who conducted the\nannual service was retained with the maintenance records.\nThe operator should have developed procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the\nIGC Code, giving guidance on:\n• •\n• •\nStowing and maintaining readiness of the equipment.\nInspection and testing of the SCBAs.\nNon-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use and required rest periods.\nUse of the oxygen resuscitation equipment.\nThe protective suits provided should be gastight, for use in a flammable atmosphere, and suitable for all the cargoes\nlisted on the vessel’s International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquified Gases in Bulk, appendix 2.\nFor vessels carrying toxic cargoes, the safety equipment referred to above should provide full protection. The\nprotective suits themselves should be fitted with integral gloves and boots and capable of providing adequate\nprotection against the product, as indicated in the resistance table provided by the manufacturer. The responsible\nofficer should be aware of any limitations as they relate to the cargoes being carried. Such protective suits are not\nrequired if the vessel does not carry toxic cargoes.\nSome of these procedures may form part of the onboard maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the use of the safety equipment, including\nSCBAs, required by the IGC Code.\nReview the records of inspection and testing of the SCBAs forming part of the safety equipment required by\nthe IGC.\nReview the documentation supporting the appointment of a crew member as the designated competent\nperson responsible for annual inspection and testing of the SCBAs required by the IGC, where applicable.\nInspect at least one set of safety equipment required by the IGC Code.\nInspect the stretcher and oxygen resuscitation equipment.\nIf the vessel is over 5000m3 total cargo capacity, verify that there are five firefighter’s outfits on board, in\naddition to the minimum of two or three safety equipment sets required.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with company procedures for the use of the\nsafety equipment, including SCBAs and oxygen resuscitation equipment, required by the IGC Code.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for the use of the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IGC Code.\nRecords of inspection and testing of the SCBAs forming part of the safety equipment required by the IGC.\nEvidence that the protective suits were suitable for:\no All the cargoes listed on the International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquified Gases\nin Bulk.\no Use in a flammable atmosphere.\nWhere annual testing of the SCBAs had been conducted by a 'competent person' who was a member of the\ncrew, a copy of the manufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board\nfor the crewmember who performed the service.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures relating to the safety equipment, including SCBAs, required by the IGC\nCode, giving guidance on:\no Stowage and maintaining readiness of the equipment.\no Inspection and testing of the SCBAs.\no Non-emergency use of the SCBAs, including maximum individual daily use and required rest\nperiods.\no Use of the oxygen resuscitation equipment.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures relating to the safety equipment,\nincluding SCBAs and/or oxygen resuscitation equipment, required by the IGC Code.\nThere were fewer than two/three complete sets of safety equipment on board, in addition to the four or five\nsets required by the IGC for fire-fighting purposes.\nA set of safety equipment did not contain:\no one self-contained, positive pressure air-breathing apparatus incorporating full face mask, not using\nstored oxygen, having a capacity of at least 1,200 â„“ of free air and compatible with those forming\npart of the firefighter’s outfits.\no protective clothing, boots and gloves to a recognized standard;\no steel-cored rescue line with belt; and\no explosion-proof lamp.\nFor the safety equipment required by the IGC, the vessel was not equipped with:\no at least one fully charged spare air bottle for each breathing apparatus.\no an air compressor of adequate capacity capable of continuous operation, suitable for the supply of\nhigh-pressure air of breathable quality; and\na charging manifold capable of dealing with sufficient spare breathing apparatus air bottles for the\nbreathing apparatus.\nThe protective suits forming part of the safety equipment were not suitable for:\no All the cargoes listed on the International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquified Gases\nin Bulk\no Use in a flammable atmosphere.\no Gastight\nWhere annual testing of the SCBAs had been conducted by a 'competent person' who was a member of the\ncrew, there was no evidence that the crewmember who performed the service was in possession of a valid\nmanufacturer's training course certificate for the specific type of SCBA carried on board.\nThe oxygen resuscitation was not in satisfactory condition and/or the oxygen bottle was not fully charged.\nRecords of monthly inspection or annual inspection and testing of the SCBA were either missing or\nincomplete.\no\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.13.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures addressing", "c": "the protective equipment required by the IGC Code, and was this equipment in\nsatisfactory condition and suitable for the products being handled?\nShort Question Text\nProtective equipment required by the IGC Code\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure crew members are protected from exposure to hazardous conditions when engaged in cargo\noperations.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n3.11.2 Personal protective equipment\nPersonal protective equipment (PPE) including appropriate protective clothing should be worn as necessary to\nprotect those involved in cargo operations from the hazards associated with the cargo. The suits, gloves, boots,\ngoggles, face-shields and other items used should be suitable for the cargo. Many plastics become brittle and crack\nwhen subjected to low temperatures, or can be dissolved by the cargo, although clothing of PVC or similar material is\nless susceptible to absorption and should be worn when exposure to vapour or liquid emissions is involved.\nIn particular, gloves should be worn when handling cold equipment, valves or sampling devices. Face protection\nshould be worn to protect against liquid contact, including when dismantling cargo equipment or conducting sampling.\nRespiratory protection should be worn during cargo operations involving toxic or asphyxiating gases.\nAppendix 10 of this Guide provides an example of a matrix that may be used to describe the PPE required to be worn\nby personnel when undertaking a number of shipboard tasks. The matrix should be adapted to suit the requirements\nof individual operators and ships and should be included in the SMS.\nWhen considering the PPE required for handling a particular cargo, reference should be made to the\nrecommendations contained in the relevant cargo safety data sheets provided in Appendix 1 of this Guide.\nCargo vapour may be absorbed into working clothing in sufficient quantities to create a hazard when taken into the\naccommodation and associated areas.\nWhen dealing with cryogenic liquids certain additional precautions should be taken, including:\n• •\nEye protection. Even for minor risks of liquid splashes, suitable eye and face protection should be worn\ncombining goggles and a face shield;\nHand protection. Loose fitting insulated gloves should be worn whenever a risk of splashes is present and\nwhen handling material that could have been in contact with cryogenic liquid. It should be possible to quickly\ndiscard the gloves should liquid be spilt on them;\n• •\nBody protection. For minor risks of small quantities of liquid splashed, non-absorbent PPE can be used (e.g.,\na leather apron or a splash suit). Care should be taken that no liquid can get trapped in pockets or cuffs; and\nFoot protection. Splashed liquid can enter safety shoes. It is therefore recommended that boots are worn.\nCare should be taken that spilled liquid cannot enter boots by wearing trousers over them.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.4 requires that the company has procedures that address cargo specific hazards for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 14 Personnel protection\n14.1 Protective equipment\n14.1.1 Suitable protective equipment, including eye protection to a recognized national or international standard, shall\nbe provided for protection of crew members engaged in normal cargo operations, taking into account the\ncharacteristics of the products being carried.\n14.1.2 Personal protective and safety equipment required in this chapter shall be kept in suitable, clearly marked\nlockers located in readily accessible places.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IGC\nthat included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• A list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and considering the\nproducts to be carried.\nWhat protective equipment is required to be worn for the different types of operations on board, and\nproducts handled, preferably in the form of a PPE matrix.\nCrew training in the correct use of the protective equipment.\nChecks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working area.\nAssessment of a user’s fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions.\nGuidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a chemical suit, if applicable.\nHow protective equipment should be cleaned and stored.\nActions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment.\nFrequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, company procedures, including the PPE matrix where provided,\naddressing the protective equipment required by the IGC Code.\nReview the records of inspections of the protective equipment.\nInspect a representative sample of the protective equipment in the storage location(s).\nObserve, where possible, protective equipment in use on deck.\n• •\nInterview the officer in charge of cargo operations to verify their familiarity with company procedures,\nincluding the PPE matrix where provided, addressing the protective equipment required by the IGC Code.\nRequest a deck officer or rating to demonstrate or describe the selection and donning of a full set of\nprotective equipment including a protective suit.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures, including PPE matrix where provided, addressing the protective equipment required\nby the IGC Code.\nRecords of inspections of the protective equipment.\nAn inventory of the protective equipment available onboard required by the IGC Code.\nSDS for the products being handled.\nChemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.\nEvidence that protective suits were suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures addressing the protective equipment required by the IGC that included:\no A list of protective equipment to be available on board based upon risk assessment and\nconsidering the products to be carried.\no What protective equipment was required to be worn for the different types of operations on board,\nand products handled, preferably in the form of a PPE matrix.\no Crew training in the correct use of the protective equipment.\no Checks to be made that protective equipment is being correctly worn prior to entering a working\narea.\no Assessment of a user’s fitness to wear particular protective equipment in given climatic conditions.\no Guidelines for the maximum time a person is allowed to work in a chemical suit, if applicable.\no How protective equipment should be cleaned and stored.\no Actions to be taken if defects are identified in protective equipment.\no Frequency of inspection of the protective equipment and records to be kept.\nThe officer in charge of cargo operations was not familiar with the company procedures addressing the\nprotective equipment required by the IGC Code.\nA crew member was observed not wearing adequate protective clothing where there was a risk of accidental\nexposure to toxic or corrosive products or their vapours.\nA crew member was observed wearing protective clothing incorrectly where there was a risk of accidental\nexposure to toxic or corrosive products or their vapours.\nProtective equipment in use did not provide the degree of protection specified as being required in the SDS\nof a cargo being handled.\nSafety spectacles were being used as eye protection against splashes.\nProtective equipment was not stored in an easily accessible, ventilated space, designed for the purpose.\nProtective equipment in use was stored within the accommodation in an unauthorised space or spaces.\nItems of the protective equipment required by company procedures were not available on board.\nThere was no chemical resistance list available for the protective suits provided on board.\nThere was no evidence that chemical suits were suitable for use in a flammable atmosphere.\nAn item of protective equipment in use was in poor condition.\nGloves, boots and/or head gear were of inferior chemical resistance to that of the protective suits provided.\nSuitable protective equipment was not available in the quantity and range of sizes required to fit the crew on\nboard.\nA deck officer or rating was unfamiliar with the selection and donning of a full set of protective equipment\nincluding a protective suit.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.14.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe", "c": "operation and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant, and was the equipment in\nsatisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nReliquefaction plant\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Compressor Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure the safe operation of the reliquefaction plant.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n7.8.2 Operation of the reliquefaction plant on refrigerated LPG carriers\nOn a loaded voyage, and depending on cargo temperature, ambient temperature and the design of tank insulation,\nthe plant may be operated continuously or intermittently. If it is necessary to reduce the temperature of the cargo\nbefore reaching the discharge port, to comply with the receiving terminals requirements or charterparty stipulations\nfor example, the plant will potentially operate continuously for long periods of time.\nBefore starting the reliquefaction plant it is necessary to ensure that, for example, oil levels in the compressors are\ncorrect and that the glycol/water cooling system is ready for operation. This will require a check to make sure the\nheader tank is full and that the cooling fluid is circulating.\nThe lubricating oil in the compressors will need to be compatible with the cargo being handled and may need to be\nchanged, depending on the change of grades of cargo carried on a specific voyage.\nBefore starting a cargo compressor, the condenser cooling system will normally be operating with sea water\ncirculating or the refrigerant system in cascade systems running. Compressors should always be started and stopped\nin accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. Compressor outlet valves will normally be opened fully, and inlet\nvalves opened slowly to minimise the risk of damage from liquid carry-over. The jacket cooling water outlet\ntemperature should be adjusted in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. The following conditions,\namongst others, will usually be checked regularly during operation:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSuction, interstage and discharge pressures.\nLubricating oil pressures.\nGas temperature on the suction and delivery side of the compressor (note: high discharge temperature\nswitches may only initiate an alarm and not a protective trip of the compressor). Compressor parameters\nshould be plotted against the appropriate Mollier diagram for the cargo to show if the operation is as efficient\nas the design condition.\nCurrent drawn by the electric motor.\nOil leakage from the shaft seal.\nCondenser cooling water temperature (inlet and outlet).\nCompressor discharge temperature limits should generally be set in accordance with the compressor manufacturer\nand cargo operation manual requirements. For example, butadiene, mixed C4 and VCM vapours have reduced\ntemperature limits to prevent polymerisation reaction in the vapour phase.\nStopping the compressor will normally be followed by closure of the inlet and outlet valves. The glycol/water system\nwill usually be left running to provide crankcase heating or, alternatively, the lubricating oil heater will be switched on.\n7.8.3 Operation of the reliquefaction plant on LNG carriers\nWhere fitted, the primary means of tank pressure control is through the reliquefaction plant. The gas combustion unit\n(GCU) is the secondary means of tank pressure control that is used, either through excess BOG mode or if there is a\nfault with the reliquefaction plant.\nFor the reliquefaction plant operation there are two modes of tank pressure control available: laden and ballast.\nOn loaded passage, depending on the temperature of cargo loaded, ambient temperature and the design of the tank\ninsulation spaces, the load and operation of the reliquefaction plant can be operated at maximum efficiency. Cargo\nconditioning is carried out keeping in mind the requirements of the discharge terminal with respect to the cargo\ntemperature and vapour pressure. The vapour pressure required to be maintained is entered as the set point value in\nthe reliquefaction controller. This governs the load and flow through the reliquefaction plant to maintain the actual\npressures in accordance with the setpoint. Excess BOG is normally disposed of via the GCU.\nIf a ship has previously completed a warm ballast passage it normally takes about 2 days for the insulation spaces to\ncool down fully after the loading. During these first days the generation of cargo vapour is usually higher.\nThe following will usually need to be checked regularly:\n• •\n• Cargo tank liquid levels so the condensate return can be lined up.\ncargo tank pressures so that the BOG compressor flow and the reliquefaction load can be adjusted to\noptimise the operation and fuel consumption.\nBOG, condensate and refrigeration system parameters, such as:\no suction and discharge pressures of each stage\no LNG condensate return temperature and pressures\no dew point\no flow rates\no seal gas pressures and temperatures\no machinery lube oil levels, temperature, pressure, shaft bearing temperatures and vibration levels.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.9.2 Reliquefaction and Boil-Off Control\nIn addition to the specific operating instructions for the reliquefaction system installed on board, the following should\nbe noted:\n• •\n• •\n• If two or more cargoes are carried simultaneously, they should be segregated throughout all cargo\noperations, including during reliquefaction. Particular care is required with incompatible cargoes;\nGas detection equipment in spaces containing reliquefaction plant, instrumentation and controls should\nalways be activated. Upper and lower sample points, if fitted, should be selected according to the relative\nvapour density of the cargo;\nVentilation equipment for the reliquefaction plant space should be started well in advance of activating the\nplant;\nFilters on the suction side of compressors should be checked and carefully cleaned if necessary. If they are\nblocked, the efficiency of the plant may be significantly reduced;\nThe lubricants used for all machinery should be compatible with the cargoes carried and suitable for the\ntemperatures and pressures experienced both in operation and when stopped. Oil levels should be checked,\nand crankcase heaters started, if necessary, before plant or machinery started;\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAll plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment should be tested on a regular basis;\nThe precautions against ice and hydrate formation, reactivity, and cargo contamination should be observed;\nAll pipelines and valves should be checked and verified to ensure that they are correctly set before starting\nthe plant or machinery;\nTo prevent overheating, the cooling water supply to condensers should be established and the refrigerant\nsystem, if fitted, started before cargo compressors are run;\nCargo compressor should never be operated with discharge valves shut;\nSub-atmospheric pressures should normally be avoided in any part of the system to prevent the ingress of\nair;\nRefrigerant or cargo vapour compressors should be started with suction valve slightly open to control the\nload on the compressor. The plant should be started on the minimum setting and the capacity increased\ngradually as necessary;\nCare should be taken to prevent liquid cargo from entering compressors and potentially causing severe\nmechanical damage if liquid separation equipment is not fitted. This could be a significant problem which\nmay require shutdown of compressors, particularly during heavy weather and during the spray cooling of\ncargo tanks.\nOperation of the reliquefaction plant may be affected by any incondensable gases in the vapour drawn from\nthe cargo tanks. These incondensable gases may originate from the cargo itself or maybe residual inert gas\nfrom previous purging. Incondensable gases will cause abnormally high condenser pressures and will\nreduce condensation of the cargo vapour. To establish full condensation, the incondensable gases should\nbe vented regularly. Problems with incondensable gases mainly arise during the early stages of\nreliquefaction;\nReliquefaction plant liquid level should be checked regularly during operation to prevent overfilling of\nreceivers or condensers, which may be caused by sticking control valves or expansion valves.\nComprehensive records should be maintained so that any unexpected changes can be quickly identified,\nand remedial action taken;\nIf condensate is returned to more than one tank simultaneously, or if vapour is taken from several tanks and\nis returned to a single tank, the liquid level should be checked regularly, and remedial action taken to avoid\npossible overfilling; and\nIt is recognised that high level alarms may not be engaged to avoid excessive spurious alarms due to cargo\nmovement in a seaway. Operating procedures should address the need to carefully monitor tank levels,\nparticularly if reliquefaction returns are to a single tank.\nFlammable vapour/air mixtures should never be passed through cargo compressors.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• Cargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n7.1.3 Venting of the cargo to maintain cargo tank pressure and temperature shall not be acceptable except in\nemergency situations. The Administration may permit certain cargoes to be controlled by venting cargo vapours to\nthe atmosphere at sea. This may also be permitted in port with the authorization of the port Administration.\n7.3 Reliquefaction of cargo vapours\n7.3.1 General\nThe reliquefaction system may be arranged in one of the following ways:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\na direct system, where evaporated cargo is compressed, condensed and returned to the cargo tanks;\nan indirect system, where cargo or evaporated cargo is cooled or condensed by refrigerant without being\ncompressed;\na combined system, where evaporated cargo is compressed and condensed in a cargo/ refrigerant heat\nexchanger and returned to the cargo tanks; and\nif the reliquefaction system produces a waste stream containing methane during pressure control operations\nwithin the design conditions, these waste gases, as far as reasonably practicable, are disposed of without\nventing to atmosphere.\nNote: The requirements of chapter 17 and 19 may preclude the use of one or more of these systems or may specify\nthe use of a particular system.\n7.3.2 Compatibility\nRefrigerants used for reliquefaction shall be compatible with the cargo they may come into contact with. In addition,\nwhen several refrigerants are used and may come into contact, they shall be compatible with each other.\n17.1 General\nThe requirements of this chapter are applicable where referenced thereto is made in column ‘i’ in the table of chapter\n19. These requirements are additional to the general requirements of the Code.\n17.4 Refrigeration systems\n17.4.1 Only the indirect system described in 7.3.1.2 shall be used.\n17.4.2 For a ship engaged in the carriage of products that readily form dangerous peroxides, recondensed cargo\nshall not be allowed to form stagnant pockets of uninhibited liquid. This may be achieved either by:\n1.\n2.\nusing the indirect system described in 7.3.1.2, with the condenser inside the cargo tank; or\nusing the direct system or combined system described in 7.3.1.1 and.3 respectively, or the indirect system\ndescribed in 7.3.1.2 with the condenser outside the cargo tank and designing the condensate system to\navoid any places in which liquid could collect and be retained. Where this is impossible, inhibited liquid shall\nbe added upstream of such a place.\n17.4.3 If the ship is to consecutively carry products as specified in 17.4.2 with a ballast passage between, all\nuninhibited liquid shall be removed prior to the ballast voyage. If a second cargo is to be carried between such\nconsecutive cargoes, the reliquefaction system shall be thoroughly drained and purged before loading the second\ncargo. Purging shall be carried out using either inert gas or vapour from the second cargo, if compatible. Practical\nsteps shall be taken to ensure that polymers or peroxides do not accumulate in the cargo system.\n18.10 Cargo emergency shutdown (ESD) system\n18.10.1.2 Auxiliary systems for conditioning the cargo that use toxic or flammable liquids or vapours shall be treated\nas cargo systems for the purpose of ESD. Indirect refrigeration systems using an inert medium, such as nitrogen\nneed not be included in the ESD function.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the\nreliquefaction plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment, including, as applicable:\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\nDescription of the reliquefaction system, its components and its functions.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Procedures for start-up and shut-down of the system.\nRegular checks including:\no compressor lubrication oil levels,\no suction filters\no reliquefaction plant liquid level during operation to prevent overfilling of receivers or condensers.\nPeriodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the equipment including pressure tests of the condensers\nand calibration of the instrumentation.\nCompatibility of compressor lubrication oil with the cargoes carried.\nCompatibility of refrigerants with the cargoes carried and other refrigerants in use.\nSegregating reliquefaction systems for incompatible cargoes.\nReliquefaction of inhibited cargoes.\nDealing with incondensable gases.\nPrevention of overfilling of cargo tanks via reliquefication including setting high-level alarms.\nIntegration of the reliquefaction system into the cargo ESD system or any independent shutdown system for\nthe reliquefaction plant.\nThe secondary tank pressure management system to be used at sea in the event of a shutdown of the\nreliquefaction system.\nAll or part of the above may be contained in the Cargo System Operation Manual and the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of\nthe reliquefaction plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and testing of the reliquefaction equipment.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, maintenance, testing of\nthe reliquefaction equipment.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ntesting and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown\nequipment.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the reliquefaction plant and its associated equipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant, machinery,\ninstrumentation, control and shutdown equipment.\nRecord of inspection, maintenance and testing of the reliquefaction system.\nTest records for safety relief valves fitted to reliquefaction system.\nRecords of regular checks of reliquefaction plant liquid level during operation.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant,\nmachinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment that included, as applicable:\no Roles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\no Description of the reliquefaction system, its components and its functions.\no Procedures for start-up and shut-down of the system.\no Regular checks including:\n compressor lubrication oil levels,\n suction filters\n reliquefaction plant liquid level during operation to prevent overfilling of receivers or\ncondensers.\nPeriodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the equipment including pressure tests of the\ncondensers and calibration of the instrumentation.\no Compatibility of compressor lubrication oil with the cargoes carried.\no Compatibility of refrigerants with the cargoes carried and other refrigerants in use.\no Segregating reliquefaction systems for incompatible cargoes.\no Reliquefaction of inhibited cargoes.\no Dealing with incondensable gases.\no Prevention of overfilling of cargo tanks via reliquefication including setting high-level alarms.\no Integration of the reliquefaction system into the cargo ESD system or any independent shutdown\nsystem for the reliquefaction plant.\no The secondary tank pressure management system to be used at sea in the event of a shutdown of\nthe reliquefaction system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, testing and\nmaintenance of the reliquefaction plant, machinery, instrumentation, control and shutdown equipment.\nInspection, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant had not been carried out in accordance with\nthe company procedures.\nRefrigerant in use was not compatible with the cargo.\nCompressor lubricating oil level was found to be low.\nCompressor lubricating oil was not compatible with the cargo.\nThere were no records of regular checks of reliquefaction plant liquid levels during operation to prevent\noverfilling of receivers or condensers.\nCompressor discharge temperature limits were not set in accordance with the compressor manufacturer and\ncargo operation manual requirements.\nThe reliquefaction plant was defective in any respect.\nThere were no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the reliquefaction plant including safety\nrelief valves, where fitted.\nCargo was being or had been vented to atmosphere to control tank pressure without flag and/or port state\nauthorisation.\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.15.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the safe", "c": "operation and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers, and was\nthe equipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Compressor Room\nPublications\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the safe operation of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.4 Cargo heaters\nOrdinarily, refrigerated cargo will need to be heated before it can be transferred into pressurised storage systems, to\navoid low temperature embrittlement of the cargo tanks and pipelines. Heating can take place while loading a cold\ncargo into a pressurised ship or when discharging a refrigerated cargo into pressurised tanks ashore.\n4.4.1 Direct cargo heaters\nA cargo heater is usually a conventional horizontal shell and tube type exchanger and is normally mounted in the\nopen air on the ships deck. The cargo passes through one side of the tubes while the sea water flows on the other\nside before going overboard. They are known as direct heaters.\nThere is a requirement for temperature controls and alarms to avoid freezing as this is a risk that always has to be\nguarded against.\nFor safety reasons, the cargo flow into direct heaters will usually need to be controlled so that the sea water outlet\ntemperature never falls below 5oC, to help protect the heater against freezing in the event of a sudden loss of water\nflow.\nConsideration should also be given when the heater is used in river berths, where the water is ‘fresh’ (which freezes\nat about 0oC) rather than ‘salt’ (which freezes at about minus 2oC (-2oC)).\nBefore start-up, it is prudent to test both cargo and water sides for leakage and test water flow shutdowns as well.\nSpecific instructions will, ordinarily, be available on board to cover the testing, operation and maintenance of the\nparticular heater installed. They will, amongst other things:\n• •\nIdentify the various alarms fitted to protect the unit.\nIndicate how to test these alarms before use.\n• •\n• Provide correct start-up sequence and procedures.\nExplain how to regulate cargo flow during operations.\nState how to shut down the heater correctly after use.\nIt is common practice to start the heating water flow some time before cold cargo is admitted to allow conditions to\nstabilise and, after the transfer is completed, to keep the water flow running until well after any liquid cargo has been\ndrained off from the unit (typically one hour before and one hour after operations).\nAfter use, some heaters require fresh water washing and isolation from the sea water system to prevent corrosion\nwhen not in use. In some cases, the cargo heater may have to be isolated and filled with an anti-corrosive.\nSome designs include a fixed gas detection sensor to monitor the overboard water from the cargo heater and provide\nan early warning of leakage in service. If a fixed system is not installed, it is usually possible to fit a hose from the\noverboard water vent so that it can be checked regularly with a portable gas detector.\nOther variants on direct type heaters have been fitted, such as a system where the sea water flow is heated by steam\nor thermal oil from a boiler before passing into the heater. This type of system would overcome the limitation of direct\nsystems in cases where the sea water is too cold. However, large quantities of sea water are required to heat the\ncargo at a reasonable rate and, therefore, a high capacity energy source is needed.\n4.4.2 Indirect cargo heaters\nIndirect cargo heaters use an intermediate circuit between the cargo and the heat source. Examples include steam\nheated glycol system, where glycol tank is heated by steam and the warm glycol is passed through the cargo heater\nand returned to the glycol tank to be reheated and recirculated.\nAnother type of alternative ‘indirect heater’ is shown in Figure 4.36. In this case, an intermediate fluid in the lower\nheat exchanger is evaporated by the sea water and condenses against the cold tubes in the upper exchanger, which\nhave cold liquid cargo passing inside them. The intermediate fluid may be a refrigerant gas with a suitable\nevaporation point or the cargo itself.\n4.5 Cargo Vaporisers\nA means of producing cargo vapour from liquid is often required on gas carriers. For example, vapour may be needed\nto gas-up cargo tanks after they have been gas-freed or to maintain cargo tank pressure during discharge if no\nvapour return line is provided from the shore. On LNG carriers there is also a requirement to occasionally produce\nvapour to supplement BOG to provide sufficient for use in the propulsion system.\nLPG carriers usually only have a single vaporiser, while on LNG carriers it is common practice for two vaporisers to\nbe installed, one high duty (large capacity) for use when gassing up the LNG carrier and another low duty (low\ncapacity) unit for use in maintaining the vapour supply to the engine room.\nCargo vaporisers may be vertical or horizontal shell and tube heat exchangers. They are used with either steam or\nsea water as the heating source and so are similar in construction to the cargo heaters described in Section 4.4. The\nmain difference in the design is that a heater simply warms the liquid cargo, while a vaporiser is intended to change\nthe phase of the cargo from a liquid to a vapour.\nIf sea water is the heating medium in the vaporiser, care may need to be taken to prevent freezing and subsequent\nbursting of the tubes if, for example, the cargo vapour pressure inside the vaporiser becomes too low.\nAs a general principle, the heating medium is started first and the cold liquid introduced very carefully until the\npressure in the unit has reached the required value and the liquid level is correct. At this stage the outlet valve can be\nopened to supply vapour to the system and adjusted to ensure that pressure is maintained such that the liquid level in\nthe vaporiser is adequate.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n1.8.9 Cargo Heaters\nCargo heating systems should be leak tested prior to use. When initially operated, the heater system should be\nsubjected to enhanced monitoring until steady state conditions are achieved.\nThe routine inspection and pressure testing recommendations of the original equipment manufacturer should be\nfollowed.\n7.2.3 Heat Exchangers\nHeat exchangers may be used for a number of purposes, including:\n• •\n• •\n• Condensing and reliquefying cargo vapour;\nVaporising cargo liquid;\nPuddle heating;\nInter-cooling; and\nDrying.\nFor ships with multiple heat exchangers, it should be confirmed that the heat exchangers in use are compatible with\nthe particular cargo. The specific instructions for the operation concerned should be observed, especially with regard\nto the sequence for introducing the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ phases, and the relative pressures of each. The equipment should\nbe kept free from fouling.\nCargo heaters using water should be operated with care, particularly if the cargo is at low temperature. In order to\navoid blocking the equipment with ice or causing damage, the water supply should be established first and the cargo\nliquid supply carefully regulated to prevent the water freezing. Furthermore, when the temperature of water supplied\nto cargo heaters is close to freezing, such equipment should not be used. At all times original equipment\nmanufacturers’ recommendations on the use of equipment should be followed.\nAppendix 3 Cargo Handling Plant and Equipment\nA3.4 Heat Exchangers\nHeat exchangers may be fitted for any of the following purposes and may use sea water, fresh water, steam or other\nliquids (e.g., glycol) as a heating or cooling medium:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• As vaporisers (for cargo or nitrogen liquid);\nAs heaters (for liquid or vapour);\nAs heaters for cofferdam heating systems on LNG carriers;\nAs condensers (for cargo vapour or refrigerant gas);\nAs driers (for inert gas, cargo vapour or compressed air);\nAs intercoolers (in refrigeration plants); and\nAs coolers (for water or lubricating oil).\nReference should be made to instruction manuals provided by original equipment manufacturers of the equipment\nfitted. Particular attention should be paid to the following points:\n• •\n• Hot or cold phase flow should be established in the correct sequence. Many heat exchangers have special\ninternal coatings or bi-metal tubing which is easily damaged by temperatures only slightly different from\nnormal operating temperatures. Care should be taken with heat exchangers using water in order to prevent\nfreezing of the water;\nHeat exchangers should be pressure tested or otherwise checked for leaks at regular intervals;\nInstrumentation and associated equipment such as pressure and temperature switches, float controllers or\nrelief valves should be functioning correctly; and\n• For those heat exchangers using water, any fouling will lead to loss of efficiency, leading to sub-cooling and\nfreezing when used as a cargo heater, or overheating when used as a cooler.\nAppendix 6 Basic Thermodynamic Theory\nA6.7.7 Condensers, Heat Exchangers and Evaporators\nThese items of plant are designed to affect a heat exchange from one substance to another across a barrier. They\nmay be described as ‘evaporators’ when used to convert liquid to vapour, as ‘condensers’ when used to convert\nvapour to liquid, and as ‘heat exchangers’ when the main purpose is to effect a heat exchange without evaporation or\ncondensation necessarily occurring. In cargo systems the same heat exchangers may act as condensers for one\noperation, and as evaporators in another. Shell and tube condensers are used extensively and are either water\ncooled, or refrigerant cooled as in cascade systems.\nCondenser efficiency is directly proportional to the total surface area of the tubes, their conductivity, and the rate of\nflow and temperature differential between the substances passing through.\nRefrigerant efficiency will be lost in the condenser when:\n• •\n• •\n• The temperature of the cooling medium is comparatively high;\nThe rate of flow of the cooling medium is low;\nThe conductivity of the tubes is insulated by scale or deposit formation;\nWhen there is a decrease in the tube surface area due to leaking tubes which have been plugged; or\nWhen a ‘backup’ of condensate covers the cooling tubes or shell and restricts the heat exchange area.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nRecord keeping.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 7 Cargo pressure/temperature control.\n7.8 Availability\nThe availability of the system and its supporting auxiliary services shall be such that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nIn case of a single failure of a mechanical non-static component or a component of the control systems, the\ncargo tanks pressure and temperature can be maintained within their design range without affecting other\nessential services;\nRedundant piping systems are not required;\nHeat exchangers that are solely necessary for maintaining the pressure and temperature of the cargo tanks\nwithin their design ranges shall have a standby heat exchanger, unless they have a capacity in excess of\n4.\n25% of the largest required capacity for pressure control and they can be repaired on board without external\nsources. When an additional and separate method of cargo tank pressure and temperature control is fitted\nthat is not reliant on the sole heat exchanger, then a standby heat exchanger is not required; and\nFor any cargo heating or cooling medium, provision shall be made to detect the leakage of toxic or\nflammable vapours into an otherwise non-hazardous area or overboard in accordance with 13.6. Any vent\noutlet from this leak detection arrangement shall be to a safe location and be fitted with a flame screen.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo\nheaters, vaporisers and condensers that include, as applicable:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\nDescriptions of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers, their components and functions.\nPressure testing.\nProcedures for start-up and shut-down of the system, including tests of both cargo and water sides for\nleakage and test water flow shutdowns.\nEnsuring the equipment in use is compatible with the cargo being handled.\nIdentification of the alarms required to be tested to ensure the unit is protected.\nThe correct sequence for hot or cold phase flow.\nAvoiding freezing of alarms and temperature controls.\nGas detection monitoring during use.\nRegulating cargo flow.\nThe control of the cargo flow rate into direct heaters.\nPrecautions when using sea water as the heating medium to prevent freezing and subsequent tube damage\nif the cargo vapour pressure inside the vaporiser becomes too low.\nThe precautions when using fresh water as opposed to salt water at river berths.\nFlushing requirements after use.\nAll or part of the above may be contained in the Cargo System Operation Manual and the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of\nthe cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.\nReview the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ntesting and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and\ncondensers.\nRecords of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers.\nTest records for safety relief valves fitted to cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers.\nRecords of checks of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers prior, during and after operation.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters,\nvaporisers and condensers that included, as applicable:\no Roles and responsibilities for operation, testing and maintenance.\no Descriptions of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers, their components and functions.\no Pressure testing.\no Procedures for start-up and shut-down of the system, including tests of both cargo and water sides\nfor leakage and test water flow shutdowns.\no Ensuring the equipment in use is compatible with the cargo being handled.\no Identification of the alarms required to be tested to ensure the unit is protected.\no The correct sequence for hot or cold phase flow.\no Avoiding freezing of the alarms and temperature controls.\no Gas detection monitoring during use.\no Regulating cargo flow.\no The control of the cargo flow rate into direct heaters.\no Precautions when using sea water as the heating medium to prevent freezing and subsequent tube\ndamage if the cargo vapour pressure inside the vaporiser becomes too low.\no The precautions when using fresh water as opposed to salt water at river berths.\no Flushing requirements after use.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, testing and\nmaintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers.\nInspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers and condensers, including pressure\ntesting, had not been carried out in accordance with the company procedures.\nThere were no records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers\nincluding safety relief valves, where fitted.\nThere were no records of checks of the cargo heaters, vaporisers, condensers prior, during and after\noperation.\nA cargo heater, vaporiser or condenser was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.16.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the filling limits (FL) and loading limits", "c": "(LL) for the cargo tanks, and was this information readily available in the cargo control\nroom or position?\nShort Question Text\nFilling Limits (FL) and Loading Limits (LL)\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo tanks are never over-filled.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n2.2 Cargo information\nThe IGC Code requires the following information to be available to every ship and for each gas cargo carried:\nDetails of the maximum filling limits allowed for each cargo that may be carried at each loading temperature, the\nmaximum reference temperature and the set pressure for each relief valve.\n6.8 Cargo Loading\nFilling limit regulations should be observed. The maximum liquid level in each cargo tank should be calculated and,\nwhere appropriate, information exchanged with shore/terminal representatives.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n7.7.8 Cargo tank loading limits\nChapter 15 of the IGC Code recognises the large thermal coefficient of expansion of liquefied gas and gives\nrequirements for maximum allowable loading limits for cargo tanks. This is to avoid tanks becoming liquid-full under\nconditions of surrounding fire.\nAs provided for in the IGC Code, the maximum value to which any tank may be filled is governed by the flowing\nformula:\nLL = FL x (rR/rL)\nWhere:\nLL = loading limit expressed in % which means the maximum liquid volume relative to the tank volume to which the\ntank may be loaded.\nFL = filling limit, which is 98% unless certain exceptions apply\nrR = relative density of cargo at the reference temperature\nrL = relative density of cargo at the loading temperature\nThe default value of the filling limit (FL) of cargo tanks is 98% at the reference temperature. An FL value greater than\n98% may be permitted provided that the conditions specified in the IGC Code are satisfied.\nWhere cargo vapour pressure/temperature control is provided, R is the temperature of the cargo on termination of\nloading, during transport or at unloading, whichever is greater.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations is in\nplace for all types of vessel within the fleet. The planning procedure is specific to the vessel type and cargo to be\ncarried. This may include:\n• Cargo stowage, cargo segregation, pipeline and valve management, heating requirements and final ullages.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n15.1 Definitions\n15.1.1 Filling limit (FL) means the maximum liquid volume in a cargo tank relative to the total tank volume when the\nliquid cargo has reached the reference temperature.\n15.1.2 Loading limit (LL) means the maximum allowable liquid volume relative to the tank volume to which the tank\nmay be loaded.\n15.1.3 Reference temperature means (for the purpose of this chapter only):\n.1 when no cargo vapour pressure/temperature control, as referred to in chapter 7, is provided, the temperature\ncorresponding to the vapour pressure of the cargo at the set pressure of the PRVs (pressure relief valves); and\n.2 when a cargo vapour pressure/temperature control, as referred to in chapter 7, is provided, the temperature of the\ncargo upon termination of loading, during transport or at unloading, whichever is the greatest.\n15.3 Default filling limit\nThe default value for the filling limit (FL) of cargo tanks is 98% at the reference temperature. Exceptions to this value\nshall meet the requirements of 15.4\n15.4.2 In no case shall a filling limit exceeding 99.5% at reference temperature be permitted.\n15.6 Information to be provided to the master\n15.6.1 A document shall be provided to the ship, specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank\nand product, at each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature. The information in this\ndocument shall be approved by the Administration or recognised organization acting on its behalf.\n15.6.2 Pressures at which the PRVs have been set shall also be stated in the document.\n15.6.3 A copy of the above document shall be permanently kept on board by the master.\nInspection Guidance\nIn order to safely plan cargo loading operations, the vessel must be provided with a document specifying the\nmaximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at each applicable loading temperature and\nmaximum reference temperature. This document must be approved by the flag administration or the vessel’s class\nsociety on its behalf. It may form part of a flag/class approved Cargo System Operation Manual.\nThis information should be readily available in the cargo control room or location and the officer responsible for cargo\nplanning should be familiar with the contents. Cargo tanks should not be loaded above these loading limits (LL).\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight and where necessary review the approved document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits\nfor each cargo tank.\nReview the loading plans for the current and previous cargo and verify that:\no The maximum liquid level in each cargo tank had been pre-calculated.\no Cargo tanks had not been loaded above the loading limits (LL).\nInterview the officer responsible for cargo planning to verify their familiarity with filling limits (FL), loading\nlimits (LL) and reference temperatures, and their application when planning cargo stowage.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe approved document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product,\nat each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature.\nLoading plans for the current and previous cargo.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no document available specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and\nproduct, at each applicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature.\nThe document specifying the maximum allowable loading limits for each cargo tank and product, at each\napplicable loading temperature and maximum reference temperature had not been approved by the flag\nadministration or the vessel’s class society on its behalf.\nThe officer responsible for cargo planning was not familiar with filling limits (FL), loading limits (LL) and/or\nreference temperatures, and their application when planning cargo stowage.\nA cargo tank(s) had been loaded above the specified loading limit (LL).\nThe maximum liquid level in each cargo tank had not been pre-calculated for the current and/or previous\nloading operation.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.17.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system,\nand was the system in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nVent mast fire suppression system\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n2.8.2 Electrical Storms\nTo provide a safe means of extinguishing a vent mast fire, consideration should be given to fitting a nitrogen injection\nsystem to the vent masts, together with remote valves to control the flow.\n10.4 Vent Mast Fires\nIgnition can be caused at the vent mast by a lightning strike or other source of ignition when venting a flammable\nvapour. Any venting operation should therefore be suspended in the vicinity of an electrical storm.\nIn the event of a fire at the vent mast, the following action should be considered:\n• •\n• Stop venting;\nInject inert gas into the vent, if possible, using the fixed nitrogen fire suppression inlet, if fitted; and\nSpray the mast head with water.\nVenting may be resumed when the mast head and its surroundings are cool, and the electrical storm is over.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: IGC Code\n18.2 Cargo operations manuals\n18.2.1 The ship shall be provided with copies of suitably detailed cargo system operation manuals approved by the\nAdministration such that trained personnel can safely operate the ship with due regard to the hazards and properties\nof the cargoes that are permitted to be carried.\n18.2.2 The content of the manuals shall include, but not be limited to:\n.4 nitrogen and inert gas systems;\n.5 firefighting procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of extinguishing agents;\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nvent mast fire suppression system, that include:\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities for inspection, testing and maintenance.\nDescription of the vent mast fire suppression system, its components and its functions.\nRequirements for regular inspection, testing and maintenance of the equipment including checking the level\nin any portable gas cylinders.\nActions to be taken in the event of a fire at the vent mast, including instructions for the release of the system.\nAll or part of the above may be contained in the Cargo System Operation Manual and the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.\nReview the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the vent mast fire suppression system.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel, inspect the vent mast fire suppression system and its\nassociated equipment.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire\nsuppression system.\nRecord of inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual and/or FFA manual.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast\nfire suppression system that included:\no Roles and responsibilities for inspection, testing and maintenance.\nDescription of the vent mast fire suppression system, its components and its functions.\nRequirements for regular inspection, testing and maintenance of the equipment including checking\nthe level in any portable gas cylinders.\no Actions to be taken in the event of a fire at the vent mast, including instructions for the release of\nthe system.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system.\nInspection, testing and maintenance of the vent mast fire suppression system had not been carried out in\naccordance with the company procedures.\nThe vent mast fire suppression system was defective in any respect.\nThe Cargo System Operation Manual and/or FFA manual did not include instructions for the use of the vent\nmast fire suppression system.\no\no\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.18.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for detecting", "c": "water leakage into hold or insulation spaces and for dealing with any water or liquid\ncargo that may have accumulated in these spaces?\nShort Question Text\nWater or liquid cargo leakage into a hold or insulation space\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure any water or cargo liquid leakage into hold or insulation spaces is safely removed.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n9.3.1 Water Leakage into Hold or Interbarrier Space\nIf water leaks into a hold or interbarrier space, it may damage the insulation and in the case of a membrane tank\nsystem, result in insulation and membrane damage as well as potential membrane corrosion. These spaces are\nnormally equipped with a water detection alarm system which will indicate if leakages occur. Pumping arrangements\nare provided to remove any leakage.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n9.5.2 Ship emergency procedures\nIncident plans\nIn developing plans for dealing with incidents, the following scenarios will commonly be considered:\n• Water leakage into a hold or interbarrier space.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n3.7 Bilge, ballast and oil fuel arrangements\n3.7.1 Where cargo is carried in a cargo containment system not requiring a secondary barrier, suitable drainage\narrangements for the hold spaces that are not connected with the machinery space shall be provided. Means of\ndetecting any leakage shall be provided.\n3.7.2 Where there is a secondary barrier, suitable drainage arrangements for dealing with any leakage into the hold\nor insulation spaces through the adjacent ship structure shall be provided. The suction shall not lead to pumps inside\nthe machinery space. Means of detecting such leakage shall be provided.\n3.7.3 The hold or interbarrier spaces of type A independent tank ships shall be provided with a drainage system\nsuitable for handling liquid cargo in the event of cargo tank leakage or rupture. Such arrangements shall provide for\nthe return of any cargo leakage to the liquid cargo piping.\n3.7.4 Arrangements referred to in 3.7.3 shall be provided with a removable spool piece.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific procedures for detecting water leakage into a hold or\ninsulation space and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in these spaces that\nincluded guidance on the:\n• •\n• •\n• Means of detecting any water leakage into hold or insulation spaces.\nPumping arrangements for removing any water leakage into these spaces.\nWhere required, arrangements for removing any liquid cargo leakage into these spaces.\nTesting requirements for the water detection and pumping arrangements.\nInventory and maintenance of any portable equipment required for the pumping arrangements.\nThese procedures may form part of the ship emergency procedures, Cargo System Operation Manual and/or the\nvessel’s maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for detecting water leakage into a hold or\ninsulation space and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in these spaces.\nReview the records of tests of the water detection and pumping arrangements.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel, inspect:\no The water detection alarm system, if fitted.\no If practical, the pumping arrangements.\no Where required, portable equipment required for the pumping arrangements.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for:\no Detecting water leakage into a hold or insulation space and for dealing with any water or liquid\ncargo that may have accumulated in these spaces.\no Testing the water detection alarm system and pumping arrangements.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures for detecting water leakage into a hold or insulation space and for dealing with any\nwater or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in these spaces.\nRecords of tests of the water detection and pumping arrangements.\nWhere required, the inventory of portable equipment required for the pumping arrangements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no ship-specific company procedures for detecting water leakage into a hold or insulation space\nand for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have accumulated in these spaces that included\nguidance on the:\no Means of detecting any water leakage into hold or insulation spaces.\no Pumping arrangements for removing any water leakage into these spaces.\no Where required, arrangements for removing any liquid cargo leakage into these spaces.\no Testing requirements for the water detection and pumping arrangements.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the ship-specific company procedures for detecting water\nleakage into a hold or insulation space and for dealing with any water or liquid cargo that may have\naccumulated in these spaces.\nThere were no records of tests of the water detection and pumping arrangements.\nTests of the water detection and pumping arrangements had not been carried out as required by company\nprocedures.\nThe means of detecting any water leakage into hold or insulation spaces were defective in any respect.\nThe water detection alarm system was inhibited.\nThe pumping arrangements for removing any water leakage into these spaces were defective in any\nrespect.\nThe arrangements for removing any liquid cargo leakage into these spaces were defective in any respect.\nA removable spool piece that formed part of the arrangements for removing liquid cargo leakage had been\nleft in place.\nAny item of portable equipment required for the pumping arrangements was not available onboard.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.19.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps and the testing of their\nassociated safety devices and alarms, and had these procedures been followed?\nShort Question Text\nSubmerged motor electric cargo pumps\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the submerged motor electric cargo pumps are always operated safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.2.3 Submerged motor pumps\nSubmerged motor pumps are installed at the bottom of cargo tanks and enable very low pump-down levels to be\nachieved.\nThe pump and electrical motor are integrally mounted on the same shaft, which eliminates the need for a mechanical\nseal or coupling. Power is supplied to the motor through specially sheathed cables. Electrical cabling is passed\nthrough a hazardous area junction box in the tank dome and then, by flexible stainless steel armoured insulated\npower cables, to the motor terminals.\nThe pumps are cooled and lubricated by cargo flow and are prone to damage due to loss of flow. Therefore, the\npump is protected from dry running by safety devices such as an under-current relay, a low discharge pressure\nswitch or a low tank level switch.\nThe electric drive motors of submerged pumps are not ‘certified safe’ – so it is prudent to ensure there is always\nsome cargo liquid level and a positive pressure in the tank during operation to avoid any risk of flammable\natmospheres developing. For the same reason, it is prudent to isolate submerged cargo pump motors from the\nelectrical supply. This isolation capability is a requirement of the IGC Code.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 10 Electrical installations\n10.2.9 Submerged cargo pump motors and their supply cables may be fitted in cargo containment systems.\nArrangements shall be made to automatically shut down the motors in the event of low-liquid level. This may be\naccomplished by sensing low pump discharge pressure, low motor current or low liquid level. This shutdown shall be\nalarmed at the cargo control station. Cargo pump motors shall be capable of being isolated from their electrical\nsupply during gas-freeing operations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed ship-specific procedures for the operation of the submerged motor\nelectric cargo pumps and the testing of their associated safety devices and alarms that included guidance on:\n• •\nArrangements for isolating the pumps from the electrical supply and the occasions when this must be done\ne.g., during gas-freeing operations.\nSettings and periodic tests of the associated safety devices such as:\no Low pump discharge pressure alarm.\no Low motor current alarm.\no Low liquid level alarm.\nThe junction boxes of submerged motor electric cargo pumps should be visually inspected prior to each discharge.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation of the submerged motor\nelectric cargo pumps and the testing of their associated safety devices and alarms.\nInspect the submerged motor electric cargo pump monitoring system panel and verify that the monitoring\nsystem is fully operational.\nReview the test records for the submerged motor electric cargo pump monitoring system and verify that the\nrequired safety device and alarm tests have been completed at the frequency defined by the company.\nReview the records of visual inspection of the junction boxes of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps\nprior to each discharge.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the actions to be taken in the event of:\no A low liquid level alarm and cargo pump shutdown.\no Gas-freeing operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures for the operation of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps and the testing of their\nassociated safety devices and alarms.\nRecords of tests of the safety devices and alarms.\nRecords of visual inspection of the junction boxes of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps prior to\neach discharge.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation of the submerged motor electric cargo pumps and the\ntesting of their associated safety devices and alarms that included guidance on:\no Arrangements for isolating the pumps from the electrical supply and the occasions when this must\nbe done e.g., during gas-freeing operations.\no Settings and periodic tests of the associated safety devices such as:\n Low pump discharge pressure alarm.\n Low motor current alarm.\n• •\n• •\n•  Low liquid level alarm.\nThe submerged motor electric cargo pump monitoring system was defective in any respect.\nThe required safety device and alarm tests had not been completed at the frequency defined by the\ncompany.\nThe submerged motor electric cargo pumps were not fitted with arrangements to automatically shut down\nthe motors in the event of low-liquid level.\nThe submerged motor electric cargo pumps were not capable of being isolated from their electrical supply.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the actions to be taken in the event of:\no A low liquid level alarm and cargo pump shutdown.\no Gas-freeing operations.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.20.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and interbarrier space relief valves?\nShort Question Text\nLiquid line, hold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Relief Valves on Gas Carriers 3rd Ed 2020\nObjective\nTo ensure liquid line, hold, and insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves are properly inspected,\nmaintained, tested, and set.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Recommendations for Relief Valves on Gas Carriers 3rd Ed 2020\n1.1 Introduction\nRelief valves perform a safety critical function. Proper design and robust maintenance procedures are essential to\nensure that this equipment will function as required.\n3.3 Installation Design\nDepending on the grades of stainless steel used in construction, painting for corrosion prevention may or may not be\nrequired. If it is necessary to paint the relief valves, the coatings should be applied carefully, as numerous\nmalfunctions of relief valves have been caused by the blockage of small orifices by paint.\n3.4 Materials\nWhile atmospheric corrosion is a concern, there are also risks of galvanic corrosion, particularly for tanks made of\naluminium. This is because the aluminium piping flange connected to the inlet of the stainless-steel relief valve will\ncause corrosion of the aluminium, as both materials have widely different electrode potentials.\n4.2 Operational\nShip staff responsible for the maintenance and operations of relief valves are recommended to attend a\nmanufacturers training course.\nShip staff should be familiar with the operation of the relief valves fitted on their ship. In particular they should be\naware of what to do if a relief valve malfunctions.\n4.3.1 Maintenance frequency\nLiquid line piping relief valve – pilot operated or spring type.\nEach loading\n• •\nVisual inspection for leaks on all external fittings and connections. Verify lifting lever is free.\nSeat leakage detection to be carried out by way of visual checking for outlet flange frosting.\nEvery six months\n• •\n• Verify integrity of security seals.\nVisual inspection of external services for presence of corrosion or stress cracks.\nEnsure all external bolting, fasteners on mounting brackets are torqued to manufacturer’s instructions.\nAnnually\n• Verify free operation using field test kit.\nSpecial survey (every five years)\n• •\n• •\nVerify proper operation and seat tightness of all valves.\nInspect internals of valves. Inspect for wear, corrosion and damage to soft seals. Any adverse signs shall\nrequire an inspection of all relief valves and repair as necessary.\nVerify presence of valve maintenance history log an update as necessary.\nAdvise manufacturer of actions taken so as to allow them to update their records.\nPilot operated hold/insulation/inter-barrier space relief valve.\nEvery 6 months\n• •\n• •\n• Visual observance of leaks. All external fittings and connections to be checked.\nInternal visual inspection for the purpose of leakage detection.\nVerify integrity of security seal for spring adjusting screw chamber.\nVisual inspection of external services for presence of corrosion or stress cracks.\nEnsure all external bolting, fasteners and mounting brackets are torqued to manufacturer’s instructions.\nAnnually\n• Verify free operation using field test kit.\nSpecial survey (every five years)\n• •\n• •\n• Verify calibration of all spring settings.\nVerify proper operation and seat tightness.\nInspect internals of valves for wear, corrosion on the presence of soft seal lubricant. Any adverse signs shall\nrequire inspection of all relief valves and repair as necessary.\nVerify presence of valve maintenance history log an update as necessary.\nAdvise manufacturer of actions taken so as to allow them to update their records.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• IGS and venting system\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IGC Code\n5.2.2.4 Relief valves discharging liquid cargo from the piping system shall discharge into the cargo tanks.\nAlternatively, they may discharge to the cargo vent mast, if means are provided to detect and dispose of any liquid\ncargo that may flow into the vent system. Where required to prevent overpressure in downstream piping, relief valves\non cargo pumps shall discharge to the pump suction.\n5.5.6 All pipelines or components which may be isolated in a liquid full condition shall be protected with relief valves\nfor thermal expansion and evaporation.\n8.1 General\nHold spaces and inter-barrier spaces, which may be subject to pressures beyond their design capabilities, shall also\nbe provided with a suitable pressure relief system.\n8.2.2 Inter-barrier spaces shall be provided with pressure relief devices. For membrane systems, the designer shall\ndemonstrate adequate sizing of inter-barrier space PRVs.\n8.2.6 PRVs shall be set and sealed by the Administration or recognised organisation acting on its behalf, and a\nrecord of this action, including the valves’ set pressure, shall be retained on board the ship.\n8.2.12 Means shall be provided to prevent liquid overflow from vent mast outlets, due to hydrostatic pressure from\nspaces to which they are connected.\n8.2.13 If cargoes that react in a dangerous manner with each other are carried simultaneously, a separate pressure\nrelief system shall be fitted for each one.\n8.2.14 In the vent piping system, means for draining liquid from places where it may accumulate shall be provided.\nThe PRVs and piping shall be arranged so that liquid can, under no circumstances, accumulate in or near the PRVs.\n13.4.6 Hold spaces and interbarrier spaces without an open connection to the atmosphere shall be provided with\npressure indication.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the\nliquid line, hold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves, including:\n• •\n• The actions to take in the event of a relief valve malfunction.\nTraining requirements for the officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the relief valves.\nAn inspection, maintenance and testing programme, which may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan,\nincluding:\no Checks prior each loading.\no Six-monthly visual inspections\no Annual verification of free operation using a field test kit\no Five-yearly overhaul.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and\nsetting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and\ninter-barrier space relief valves.\nDuring the inspection, observe the disposition and visual condition of the liquid line, hold, insulation and\ninter-barrier space relief valves.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, maintenance, testing and\nsetting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line, hold,\ninsulation and inter-barrier space relief valves\nRecords of inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line, hold, insulation and inter-barrier\nspace relief valves\nEvidence of training for the officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the relief valves.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line,\nhold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedures for the inspection, maintenance, testing and setting of the liquid line,\nhold, insulation and inter-barrier space relief valves.\no The actions to take in the event of a relief valve malfunction.\nThere were no records available of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the relief valves\nincluding:\no Checks prior each loading.\no Six-monthly visual inspections.\no Annual verification of free operation using a field test kit.\no Five-yearly overhaul.\nInspections, tests and maintenance of the relief valves had not been carried out in accordance with the\ncompany requirements.\nThe officer responsible for the maintenance and operation of the relief valves had not received training in\naccordance with the company procedure.\nA relief valve had been painted in a manner which might cause the valve to malfunction.\nGalvanic corrosion was evident on a relief valve.\nA liquid line, hold, insulation or inter-barrier space relief valve was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.6.21.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures that gave", "c": "guidance on cargo tank environmental control during inerting, gas freeing and gassing\nup operations, thermal load hazards during tank cool-down, and the minimum cargo\ntemperature?\nShort Question Text\nInerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations\nVessel Types\nLPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGC Code\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure inerting, gas freeing, gassing up and tank cool-down operations are carried out in a safe manner.\nIndustry Guidance\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n7.3.1 Principles of atmosphere changing.\nTank atmosphere changing is required for several cargo operations, such as inerting, gassing up, purging and\naeration of the tank. On LPG carriers grade changes between, for example, LPG and ammonia will require an\natmosphere change. The two methods of changing atmosphere are displacement and dilution.\n7.5 Gassing-up\nOn an LPG carrier with a reliquefaction plant, neither nitrogen nor carbon dioxide, which are the main constituents of\ninert gas, can be condensed by the plant. This is because, at cargo temperatures, both gases will be above their\ncritical temperatures and, therefore, incondensable. Removal of inert gas from the cargo tank is therefore necessary.\n7.6 Cool-down\nThe primary purpose of cool-down is to avoid thermal stress on the tanks. A secondary benefit is the avoidance of the\nexcessive tank pressures that could occur if cold liquid is introduced into a warm tank. The rate at which a tank can\nbe cooled down can usually be confirmed from the ships operating manual. In some cases, a maximum temperature\ndifference between the top and bottom of the tank may also be specified. The lower the temperature of the cargo to\nbe loaded, the more important the cool-down process becomes.\nLNG carriers have an additional requirement during cool-down of managing the nitrogen pressure in the Interbarrier\nspaces on membrane type LNG carriers and in the annular space on Moss and SPB type LNG carriers.\n7.6.1 Refrigerated LPG cargoes\nAs the cargo containment system cools down, thermal contraction of the tank, combined with a drop in temperature\naround it, tends to cause a pressure drop in the adjoining hold space. Pressure control systems supplying air or inert\ngas will usually maintain these spaces at suitable pressures, but a watch will usually be kept on appropriate\ninstruments as the cool-down proceeds.\nDifficulties that may occur during cool-down can be the result of inadequate gassing up (too much inert gas\nremaining) or from inadequate drying. In this latter case, ice or hydrates may form and ice-up valves and pump\nshafts. In such cases, and subject to the approval of the charterer, antifreeze can be added, provided, for example,\nthat it is compatible with the cargo or that the addition will not damage the electrical insulation of a submerged cargo\npump. Throughout the cool-down, deep well pump shafts should be turned frequently by hand to prevent the pumps\nfrom freezing up.\n7.6.2 LNG\nOn Moss type ships the rate of cool-down is critical for the management of stress in the equatorial ring, where the\nskirt attaches to the tank, and so the readings from the temperature sensors fitted to the skirt will be compared with\nthe cool-down table in the LNG carrier’s operating manual. Nitrogen pressure in the annular space will be monitored\nas it cools with the tank and the flow of nitrogen to the annular space will be increased to compensate for the falling\npressure. The cargo manual will specify the temperature to which the equator must be cooled before loading can\nbegin which is typically in the range of -110° C to -124° C.\nFor membrane type LNG carriers, the rate of cool-down of the membrane is not normally as critical. However, the\npressure in the tank and the pressure of the nitrogen in the interbarrier spaces will still be closely monitored as they\ntypically limit the rate of cool-down. As with the annular space in the Moss type ship, the nitrogen pressure will fall as\nthe membrane cools. The flow of nitrogen will usually be increased to maintain the required pressure. This puts a\nhigh demand on the LNG carrier’s nitrogen generators, both of which will normally be in use for this operation. The\ncargo manual will specify the temperature the tank must be cooled down to before the tank can be considered ready\nfor loading but, typically, cool-down is considered complete when the temperature sensors in each tank indicate an\naverage temperature over the whole tank of -130° C.\nThe ship designers and builders will include the information in the ships operating manuals, but for general reference,\nthe representative cool-downtime is normally 24 to 36 hours for a Moss type LNG carrier and normally 10 to 12 hours\nfor a membrane type LNG carrier.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) 3rd Edition\n6.6 Inerting and Gassing-Up\n6.6.1 General\nThe term ‘inerting’ generally refers to the replacement of air or cargo vapour by inert gas before loading or gasfreeing respectively, to prevent the formation of flammable mixtures.\nThe term ‘gassing-up’ generally refers to the introduction of a suitable cargo vapour to displace an existing cargo tank\natmosphere. The extent of ‘gassing-up’ and the vapours used will normally be laid down by the IGC Code or shippers\nrequirements. Shippers should always be consulted about the atmosphere required on arrival at the loading port or\nterminal.\nInerting or gassing up operations may take place at sea if the ship is suitably equipped, or in harbour. In either case,\ndue consideration should be given to ensuring safe venting of cargo vapour to the atmosphere and any local\nregulation should be observed. Venting is not normally permitted in port. If venting is unavoidable, venting operation\nshould be carefully controlled to prevent dangerous vapour concentrations in the vicinity of the ship. Facilities may\nhowever be available for venting cargo vapours safely using a shore flare system.\nDuring inerting or gassing up the relevant gas concentration should be monitored regularly at different tank levels to\nensure safe concentrations. This is particularly important in tanks with internal structures.\n6.7.2 Cool-down of Tanks and Pipelines\nCool-down of cargo tanks and pipelines is undertaken to control thermal stresses and loading rates should be\nrestricted during cool-down. If cargo tanks are fitted with spray equipment it should be used, and the liquid should be\ndistributed around the inside of the tank as evenly as possible to minimise thermal stresses. Spray cooling is\nessential for very cold cargoes, including ethylene and LNG. Certain restrictions on the rate of cool-down may also\napply to LPG carriers.\nCargo pipework and equipment should be cooled down by circulating cargo liquid at a controlled rate. The system\nshould reach liquid cargo temperature sufficiently slowly to prevent undue thermal stresses in the materials or\nexpansion/contraction of fittings. The cargo liquid used can come from the shore, shipboard storage vessels or cargo\ntanks. The temperature sensors will indicate when cargo liquid is present on the tank bottom, but the liquid should be\nintroduced slowly until the bottom is completely covered.\nThe cool-down of tanks may cause a pressure reduction in sealed hold or interbarrier spaces and dry air, inert gas or\ndry nitrogen should be introduced in order to maintain a positive pressure. This is usually done by automatic\nequipment. However, pressure gauges should be observed regularly during cool-down to ensure that acceptable\npressures are maintained.\n6.7.4 Minimum Cargo Tank Temperature\nFully pressurised, and some semi-pressurised, gas tankers have a minimum allowed cargo tank temperature, which\nis higher than the atmospheric boiling point for one or more of the product which the ship is certified to carry.\nIn order to avoid cooling fully pressurised (and some semi-pressurised) cargo tanks to below their minimum permitted\ntemperature and risking brittle fracture, these cargo tanks should be pressurised until the corresponding cargo liquid\ntemperature is above the minimum permitted cargo tank temperature.\nAt the end of discharge any remaining liquid should be thoroughly stripped before the tank vapours are evacuated, in\norder to prevent the temperature of any remaining liquid from dropping below the minimum permissible tank\ntemperature.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet. The procedures include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nPlanning.\nCargo and ballast handling.\nMaintaining safe tank atmospheres.\nTank cleaning.\nRecord keeping.\nThe procedures clearly identify the designated person(s) in charge of cargo, ballast and/or bunkering operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGC Code\n4.1.3 Design temperature for selection of materials is the minimum temperature at which cargo may be loaded or\ntransported in the cargo tanks.\nChapter 9 Cargo containment system atmosphere control\nGoal\nTo enable monitoring of the integrity of the containment system and to ensure that the atmosphere within the system\nand hold spaces is maintained in a safe condition at all times that the ship is in service.\n9.1 Atmosphere control within the cargo containment system\n9.1.1 A piping system shall be arranged to enable each cargo tank to be safely gas-freed, and to be safely filled with\ncargo vapour from a gas-free condition. The system shall be arranged to minimise the possibility of pockets of gas or\nair remaining after changing the atmosphere.\n9.1.2 For flammable cargoes, the system shall be designed to eliminate the possibility of a flammable mixture existing\nin the cargo tank during any part of the atmosphere change operation by utilising an inerting medium as an\nintermediate step.\n9.1.4 A sufficient number of gas sampling points shall be provided for each cargo tank and cargo piping system to\nadequately monitor the progress of atmosphere change. Gas sampling connections should be fitted with a single\nvalve above the main deck, sealed with a suitable cap or blank.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that give guidance on cargo tank environmental control\nduring inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during tank cool-down, and the\nminimum cargo temperature, and include as applicable:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nGuidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include:\no Pressure in interbarrier spaces during cool-down.\no Nitrogen consumption/flow.\no Temperature.\no Rate of cool-down.\no Flammable gas levels.\no Oxygen content.\no Humidity.\no Removal of inert gas from the cargo tank.\nAcceptable ranges for applicable parameters.\nActions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range.\nSet points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms.\nRecords to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the atmosphere in\nthe required condition.\nMaximum allowable temperature differential between the top and bottom of the cargo tank.\nControl of ice or hydrates and use of anti-freeze.\nPressurising cargo tanks to maintain the liquid temperature above the minimum permitted cargo tank\ntemperature.\nThese procedures may form part of the Cargo System Operation Manual.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that give guidance on cargo tank\nenvironmental control during inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during\ntank cool-down, and the minimum cargo temperature.\nReview records of inerting, gassing up and cooling down operations including:\no Parameters monitored.\no Evidence that gas concentration monitoring was carried out at different tank levels during inerting\nor gassing up operations.\no Actions taken to maintain the interbarrier / hold space pressure.\no Nitrogen consumption and, where fitted, running hours of the nitrogen generator.\nReview the Certificate of Fitness and note the minimum allowable cargo temperature.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures that give guidance on cargo tank environmental control during inerting,\ngas freeing and gassing up operations.\no Thermal load hazards during tank cool-down\no The minimum cargo temperature.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures that give guidance on cargo tank environmental control during inerting, gas\nfreeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during tank cool-down, and the minimum cargo\ntemperature.\nRecords of inerting, gassing up and cooling down operations including:\no Parameters monitored.\no Evidence that gas concentration monitoring was carried out at different tank levels during inerting\nor gassing up operations.\no Actions taken to maintain the interbarrier / hold space pressure.\no Nitrogen consumption and, where fitted, running hours of the nitrogen generator.\nCertificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures that gave guidance on cargo tank environmental control during inerting,\ngas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during tank cool-down, and the minimum cargo\ntemperature, and included as applicable:\no Guidance on parameters to be monitored, which may include:\n Pressure in interbarrier spaces during cool-down.\n Nitrogen consumption/flow.\n Temperature.\n Rate of cool-down.\n Flammable gas levels at different levels in the tank.\n Oxygen content.\n Humidity.\n Removal of inert gas from the cargo tank.\no Acceptable ranges for applicable parameters.\no Actions to be taken if a parameter is out of the acceptable range.\no Set points for any automatic pressure control systems and alarms.\no Records to be maintained for each applicable parameter, and actions taken to maintain the\natmosphere in the required condition.\no Maximum allowable temperature differential between the top and bottom of the cargo tank.\no Control of ice or hydrates and use of anti-freeze.\no Pressurising cargo tanks to maintain the liquid temperature above the minimum permitted cargo\ntank temperature.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that gave guidance on cargo tank\nenvironmental control during inerting, gas freeing and gassing up operations, thermal load hazards during\ntank cool-down, and the minimum cargo temperature.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the minimum cargo temperature at which the vessel was\ncertified to load.\nThere were no detailed records available for previous inerting, gassing up and cooling down operations.\nRecords indicated that the parameters required to be monitored had not been met and/or maintained during\nany stage of an inerting, gassing up and cooling down operation.\nThere was no evidence that gas concentration monitoring was carried out at different tank levels during\ninerting or gassing up operations.\n8.7. Shuttle Tanker Cargo Operations", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the purpose and operation of the", "c": "vessel’s Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems, and was the equipment in good working\norder, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nBLS Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Bow Loading Area\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel is able to execute a controlled ESD 1 or ESD 2 operation.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n1.2.8 Inspection and test regimes\nThe SMS should detail procedures for, and records of, tests and inspections. Tests and inspections relevant to\noffshore operations are:\nAlarms and Emergency Shutdown (ESD) tests.\n5.4.4 Cargo transfer radio telemetry and ESD systems\nManual ESD1/ASD1 activation points (push buttons) should be located at strategic positions around the bow loading\ntanker…\n5.4.6 Cargo system Failure Mode Effects and (and Criticality) Analysis\nA maintenance and test programme should be developed based on the FME(C)A. The maintenance part should be\nincluded in the Class-approved planned maintenance system for the tanker. The test programme should include all\ninterlock and safety barriers that are required to be tested at intervals in compliance with field-specific operational\nprocedures.\nNorwegian Oil and Gas: Recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers. Guideline No.140.\n9.1 Bow Loading System\n• The (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) OLST should under all circumstances be able to execute a controlled\nESD 1 and ESD 2 operation\n13.2 Emergency shut down and “green line” testing operations\nEach (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) OLST should utilise and keep updated checklists for regular\ntesting/preparation of the following equipment (but not limited to):\n• •\nESD1\nESD2\nAppendix A Bow Loading System\nA.9.2.1 Emergency Shut Down Class1 (ESD 1)\n• Total time for the ESD 1 should be 28-35 seconds.\nA.9.2.2 Emergency Shut Down Class 2 (ESD 2)\n• For ESD 2, the total time, excluding opening of chain stopper, should be 38 (+/-2) seconds.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nvessel’s ESD systems which defined:\n• •\n• •\nThe circumstances under which the ESD systems would be activated.\nThe actions to take in the event of an ESD system failure.\nThe frequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the ESD systems\nThe requirement to complete and retain checklists developed for the regular testing/preparation of the ESD\nsystem.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation, inspection,\nmaintenance and testing of the ESD systems.\nSight and review the checklists used to prepare/test the ESD systems.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out contained within the\nplanned maintenance system.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, and testing of the\nESD systems with particular emphasis on the sequence and timing of the ESD system actions.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the ESD systems.\nCompleted checklists for the preparation/testing of the ESD systems.\nThe inspection, maintenance and test records for the ESD systems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures that defined the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nESD systems.\nThere were no checklists available for preparation/testing of the ESD systems.\nThe ESD systems had not been tested as required by company procedures.\nThe vessel’s planned maintenance system did not include the ESD systems or the required inspections,\nmaintenance and tests.\nRecords of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems.\nThe responsible officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the ESD system.\nInspection of the ESD systems indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact taken\nplace.\nEither or both of the ESD systems were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures, including", "c": "appropriate arrival checklists, detailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried\nout when approaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and/or bow loading operations,\nand had these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nChecks when approaching an offshore terminal.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Bow Loading Area\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\nObjective\nTo ensure DP and bow loading shuttle tankers carry out all necessary checks and actions when approaching\noffshore terminals.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n9.6 Approach to terminals\nFurther guidance can be found in the checklist in appendix F1.\n9.6.1 Pre-arrival preparations\nPrior to arriving at the station-keeping position the DP bow loading tanker should ensure that all equipment is tested\nand fully operational, as laid down in the FSOG (Field Specific Operating Guidelines). All appropriate checklists\nshould be completed, and the terminal advised.\nThe DP bow loading tanker and terminal should liaise to confirm that all PRS (Position Referencing Systems) and\nradio telemetry systems are working properly, and all functional checks have been completed.\nThe field DP software should be selected and used to approach the terminal following the instructions in the FSOG.\nAll systems should be confirmed fully operational, and the DP bow loading tanker should be in auto DP mode before\nrequesting permission to enter the terminal’s 500m zone.\nAppendix F3: Example DP bow loading tanker checklists\nThis appendix includes examples of checklists for use by the offtake tanker and includes the following:\n• •\n• •\n• Checklist 1 - Field Arrival Checklist - Checklist to commence withing 12 hours of arrival at the 10nmz.\nChecklist 2 - Bow Loading Checklist- Checklist to be completed within 24 hours of arrival at the 10nmz.\nChecklist 3 - Engine Room Field Arrival Checklist - Checklist to be completed before arrival at the 3nmz.\nChecklist 4 - DP Arrival Checklist - Commence checklist before arrival at the 3nmz and complete checks\nbefore cargo transfer commences.\nChecklist 5 - Radio Telemetry Checklist - Commence checklist upon arrival at the 3nmz and finish checks\nupon completion of cargo transfer.\n• Checklist 6 - Emergency Towing Trial Checklist - Checklist to be completed on completion of any trial at the\noffshore terminal.\nNotes:\nChecklists provide guidance on important steps associated with the operation. Detailed descriptions of systems and\nequipment should be obtained from operating procedures and manufacturers’ manuals. All steps of the cargo transfer\noperation should be risk assessed as appropriate.\nIt is recommended that completed checklists are retained in accordance with the company’s document retention\nprocedures within the SMS. Any malfunctions should be reported to relevant stakeholders.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• •\nBerth to berth passage planning.\nSupporting checklists.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\n4 Operational requirements\n4.1 Before every DP operation, the DP system should be checked according to applicable vessel specific location\nchecklist(s) and other decision support tools such as ASOG (Activity Specific Operational Guidelines) in order to\nmake sure that the DP system is functioning correctly, and that the system has been set up for the appropriate mode\nof operation.\n4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instructions should be incorporated into the vessel-specific\nDP operations manuals:\n.1 location checklist (see paragraph 4.1);\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, including appropriate arrival checklists, detailing the\nnecessary checks and actions to be carried out when approaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and /or bow\nloading operations.\nThese checklists may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Location Checklist.\nField Arrival Checklist.\nBow Loading Checklist.\nEngine Room Field Arrival Checklist.\nDP Arrival Checklist.\nRadio Telemetry Checklist.\nEmergency Towing Trial.\nCompleted checklists should be retained on board.\nAny identified defects or malfunctions should be reported to the offshore terminal, and to the vessel operator as\nappropriate.\nNot all bow loading shuttle tankers are outfitted with DP systems and in this case, this question should be addressed\nbased on the necessary actions to be carried out when approaching an offshore terminal to conduct bow loading\noperations at the terminals serviced.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures, including appropriate arrival checklists,\ndetailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried out when approaching an offshore terminal prior to\nDP and /or bow loading operations.\nReview completed arrival checklists for the previous two offshore loading operations.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures and arrival\nchecklists.\nSelect two items from any of the arrival checklists in use and verify that the accompanying officer was\nfamiliar with the tests or checks required to be completed.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures, including appropriate arrival checklists, detailing the necessary checks and actions to\nbe carried out when approaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and /or bow loading operations.\nCompleted arrival checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures detailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried out when\napproaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and /or bow loading operations.\nThe company procedures detailing the necessary checks and actions to be carried out when approaching an\noffshore terminal prior to DP and /or bow loading operations did not include appropriate arrival checklists.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures detailing the necessary checks and\nactions to be carried out when approaching an offshore terminal prior to DP and /or bow loading operations.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company checklists used when approaching an offshore\nterminal.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with any actions they were responsible for completing or verifying\nwithin the checklists used when approaching an offshore terminal.\nRecords indicated that arrival checklists:\no Had not been utilised.\no Had not been fully completed.\nChecklists in use were insufficiently detailed or insufficiently ship-specific.\nThere was no evidence that a defect or malfunction identified when completing an arrival checklist had been\nreported to the offshore terminal and to the vessel operator as appropriate.\nReview of completed checklists indicated that although a defect or malfunction had been identified, the\nvessel had proceeded in contravention of FSOG or ASOG.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the equipment for control and monitoring", "c": "of the Bow Loading System (BLS), and was the equipment in good working order,\nregularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nControl and monitoring of the Bow Loading System (BLS)\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Bow Loading Area\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel’s telemetry and green line systems will safely start, control and stop cargo transfer\noperations.\nIndustry Guidance\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\n9.3 Green line control system\nThe BLS and cargo loading system should be provided with a “green line” control system according to Appendix A.9.\nSpecifications are to be approved by field operator(s).\nWhen the “green line” is completed, a “loading permit” signal should be transmitted to the adjacent offloading\ninstallation via the telemetry system. Any interruption in the “green line” should automatically initiate an ESD1 on the\nshuttle tanker and shut down of the crude export from the installation.\n9.4 Telemetry system\nA telemetry system should be a fail to safe design and capable of securing a safe start, control and stopping of the\ncargo transfer from the OLT (offshore loading terminal) to the OLST (offshore loading shuttle tanker). System\nreliability should be achieved by the use of duplicated fail-safe telemetry systems operating in parallel and duplicated\nUHF radio transceivers with automatic changeover.\n9.5 Online flow-monitoring\nOLSTs designed for BLS loading operations where the export line/offloading hose (i.e., system from OLT cargo\npumps to OLST manifold) is submerged should be equipped with an online flowrate monitoring system.\n9.7 Cargo loading system FMEA\nA Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) for the BLS and cargo loading system should be carried out for each OLST\nprior to first offshore loading. This should be made available for field operator(s) review.\nThe BLS and cargo loading system should as a minimum be designed and verified according to these requirements:\n• A single failure, in the cargo loading and storage system, should not lead to a pressure rise exceeding the\ndesign pressure of the cargo loading and storage system.\n• •\n• No single failure is to cause a single-configured valve to close or open uncontrolled.\nThe vessel should under all circumstances be able to execute a controlled ESD 1 and ESD 2 operation.\nEach active component should be designed with a fail-safe specification.\n13.2 Emergency shut down and “green line” testing operations\nEach OLST should utilise and keep updated checklists for regular testing/preparation of the following equipment (but\nnot limited to):\n• •\n• Telemetry system.\nInterlock, ‘green line’ systems.\nGLF (green line failure), e.g., chain stopper tension, hose in position, cargo system ready, DP/vessel\npositioning, crude oil pressure high, hydraulic system pressure/accumulated pressure, hose tension.\nAppendix A Bow Loading System\nA.3 Bridge Equipment\nThe bridge should include all necessary equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS and its operation. This\nshould be reflected in the layout of the bridge where the BLS controls should be installed next to the DP manoeuvring\nstations.\nA.3.3 BLS data logger\nThere should be installed a BLS data logger system that should continuously record:\n• •\n• •\nHose tension.\nHawser tension.\nStatus/operation of all equipment in the “green line” system.\nAll operator commands/warnings/alarms generated by the BLS control system.\nThe time for the above activities should be recorded and the timing for the logged data should be based on GMT. The\ndata logger should have the capacity for storing data for minimum 1 year and the data should be readily available for\nexport.\nA.3.4 Tension monitoring\nTension meters for monitoring of hawser and hose tension should be installed. These meters should be readable\nboth from the BLS operator panel and the DP console(s). The meters should be illuminated and have a dimmer unit\nlocated in the operator panel.\nEquipment for calibration of corresponding load cells should be on-board.\nA.13 BLS FMEA\nIn addition, a cargo handling system FMEA should be performed for the BLS by a recognised 3rd party. Similar\nformat to the IMCA guidelines for FMEA should be followed and should be approved by field operator(s).\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel within the fleet. The transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nequipment for control and monitoring of the BLS which set out:\n• •\n• Guidance on the use of the green line, interlocks and telemetry systems to ensure safe start, control and\nstopping of cargo transfer offshore.\nThe actions to take in the event of a green line failure (GLF).\nThe frequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the telemetry and green line systems,\nincluding sensors e.g., tension monitoring load cells, and where fitted, cargo flow meters.\nAn FMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS should be available on board and the Master and officers\nshould be familiar with the contents.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and\ntesting of the equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS.\nSight, and where necessary review, the FMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out contained within the\nplanned maintenance system.\nReview completed checklists for the regular testing/preparation of the BLS including the telemetry system\nand green line system.\nReview test/calibration records of the tension monitoring load cells, and where fitted, cargo flow meter.\nReview the BLS data logger records if readily available.\nInspect the:\no BLS operator panel.\no BLS data logger.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation and testing of the\nequipment for control and monitoring of the BLS with particular emphasis on the:\no Green line and telemetry systems.\no Green line input sensors.\no BLS and cargo system interlocks.\no FMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the equipment for control\nand monitoring of the BLS.\nFMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS.\nThe inspection, maintenance and test records for the equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS.\nCompleted checklists for the regular testing/preparation of the BLS including the telemetry system and green\nline system.\nTest/calibration records of the tension monitoring load cells, and where fitted, the cargo flow meter.\nBLS data logger records.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the equipment\nfor control and monitoring of the BLS which set out:\no Guidance on the use of the telemetry and green line systems to ensure safe start, control and\nstopping of cargo transfer offshore.\no The actions to take in the event of a green line failure (GLF).\no The frequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the telemetry and green line\nsystems, including sensors e.g., tension monitoring load cells, and where fitted, the cargo flow\nmeter.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:\no Functions of the green line and telemetry systems.\no Actions to take in the event of a green line failure.\no Input sensors to the green line system.\no FMEA report for the cargo loading system and BLS.\nThere was no FMEA report available for the cargo loading system and BLS.\nThe tension monitoring information was not readable from the BLS operator panel and the DP console(s).\nThe tension monitoring load cells had not been calibrated as required by company procedures.\nThere was no on board equipment for the calibration of the tension load cells.\nWhere fitted, the cargo flow control meter had not been tested/calibrated as required by company\nprocedures.\nThe BLS operator panel was not installed next to the DP manoeuvring stations.\nThe company procedures did not include checklists for the regular testing/preparation of the following\nequipment:\no Telemetry systems.\no Green line systems.\no GLF (Green Line Failure) input sensors, e.g., chain stopper tension, hose in position, cargo system\nready, DP/vessel positioning, crude oil pressure high, hydraulic system pressure/accumulated\npressure, hose tension.\nThe equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS was defective in any respect.\nThe green line system was defective in some respect, but observation/records showed it had been\noverridden to allow cargo operations to be carried out.\nThe equipment for control and monitoring of the BLS was not included in the onboard planned maintenance\nsystem.\nThere was no BLS data logger fitted.\nThere were no BLS data logger records available.\nThe BLS data logger was defective in any respect.\nThe BLS data logger did not record the following:\no Hose tension.\no Hawser tension.\no Status/operation of all equipment in the “green line” system.\no All operator commands/warnings/alarms generated by the BLS control system.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the Bow Loading System (BLS),\nincluding alarms and indicators, and was the BLS area well maintained and free from oil.\nShort Question Text\nBow Loading System (BLS) operation, inspection, testing and maintenance.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nABS : Shuttle Tanker Advisory\nSeptember 2019\nObjective\nTo ensure the BLS is operated safely and regularly inspected, tested, and maintained.\nIndustry Guidance\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for Offshore Loading Shuttle Tankers Guideline No. 140\n(NB/CC = New building/Conversion candidate)\n14.2 BLS competence requirements\nFor competence and training related to BLS equipment, BLS maker guidelines for operation and maintenance should\nas a minimum be followed. Adequate competence and training related to BLS equipment will be required.\nAppendix A Bow Loading System\nA.5 Forecastle platform deck\nA.5.9 Manifold room\nOn the forecastle deck, a manifold room should be installed with bulkheads, doors and coamings.\nThere should be gutter bars/open drains leading to main cargo deck (scuppers should be used during offshore\nloading operations).\nA.5.10 Loading Manifold\nSafeguards should be in place to prevent a slam-shut situation of the coupler valve.\nThe closing-time for the coupler valve during tubing/hydraulic hose rupture should not be less than 20 seconds during\nsaid accidental scenario and not exceed normal closing time of 25-28 seconds.\nA.5.11 BLS operator console forward\nOne operator console for the BLS should be installed. The following functions should be operated from this console:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPosition of the loading manifold.\nOperation of coupler claws.\nOperation of chain stopper movement or operation of the adjustable roller fairlead.\nOperation of traction winch.\nOperation of hose handling winch.\nOperation of bypass valves for relevant cylinders.\nOperation of the bow door.\nOperation of the retractable bow roller (if installed).\nA.5.13 Pressure relief arrangement (NB/CC)\nA pressure relief arrangement should be provided to cater for possible surge pressures in the event of a blocked\noutlet/quick closing of valve(s) downstream the loading manifold. Pressure setting for the relief arrangement should\nbe 7.0 barg. Necessary valves for maintenance should be provided. The arrangement should have some means of\nmonitoring, verifying its status.\nA.5.14 Inboard valve\nSafeguards should be in place to prevent a slam-shut situation of the inboard valve. The closing-time for the inboard\nvalve during tubing/hydraulic hose rupture should be minimum 28 seconds during said accidental scenario (i.e., min.\n3 seconds after the coupler valve has closed).\nA.5.16 Access to Bow Loading Area and forecastle\nAll doors should be self-closing. An airlock should be installed for access/escape via the staircase. All steps should\nbe of a non-slip type. Loss of pressure in the airlocks should be alarmed (i.e., when 2 doors are open\nsimultaneously). This alarm should be of visual and an audible type. When one door is open a visual alarm should be\ntriggered (i.e., a red lamp flashing), if both doors are open an audible alarm in connection with a visual alarm should\nbe triggered.\nA.5.17 Watchman cabin\nThe following equipment should be installed in the cabin:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nGeneral alarm.\nFire alarm.\nFire extinguisher.\nSound powered telephone.\nHVAC (ambient temperature -20/+50ºC) (NB/CC).\nA suitable desk with chair.\n1 off CCTV monitor (NB/CC).\nMinimum 2 escape sets (EEBD).\nA.5.19 Hydrant/flushing line\nA 2½” or 3” hydrant should be installed and connected to the fire water system. The hydrant should be used for\nconnection of a hose for flushing of the manifold after the loading is completed.\nA.5.20 Crude oil line\nAn isolating valve should be installed aft of the collision bulkhead for easy inerting/gas freeing of the bow cargo piping\n(ref. SOLAS and class requirements).\nA.5.21 Bow door\nA bow door should be installed for the protection of the BLS equipment when the OLST is in transit, and for being\nused as a working platform during maintenance and service of the loading equipment.\n• •\nAppropriate railing and securing wires should be provided for use when the door is used as a working\nplatform.\nWhen the bow door is open a detachable rail should be installed across the opening.\nA.6 Hydraulic room\nInside the forecastle and in a safe area at main deck level, a separate hydraulic room with a door to the forecastle\narea should be installed.\nA.7 Electrical equipment room (NB/CC)\nTo avoid possible spray/mist due to liquid leakage, the electrical equipment related to the BLS should be installed in a\nseparate electric room with A-60 insulation.\nNo piping/tubing containing liquid (incl. hydraulic tubing) should be installed or pass through the electrical equipment\nroom.\nABS: Shuttle Tanker Advisory, September 2019\nSection 3 - Design and Operational Issues\nPressure Test\nConnection Tightness Test\nThe tightness of the NSV (North Sea Valve) connection with the BLS (Bow Loading System) coupler should be tested\nbefore each loading. The test must take place with open Coupler Valve and closed Crude Valve or Inboard Valve, so\nthat the test is limited to the bow piping (BLS area). The test should be carried out by the F(P)SO with a pressure of\nfive bar for ten minutes. The shuttle tanker will monitor the pressure until the test has ended. The results of the test\nwill be logged. After the conclusion, the system must be depressurized by the F(P)SO\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Records of the tests and checks are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nBow Loading System (BLS), including:\n• •\n• •\n• BLS coupler valve tightness tests.\nCoupler and inboard valve closing-time checks.\nBLS operator console alarm and indicators tests.\nOther test requirements.\nArrangements for flushing and gas-freeing the bow cargo piping.\nThese procedures may incorporate the BLS manufacturer’s instruction manuals and may form part of the vessel’s\nmaintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the Bow Loading System (BLS).\nReview the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS including:\no BLS coupler valve tightness tests.\no Coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks.\no BLS operator console alarm and indicators tests.\no Other test requirements.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the BLS including:\no Manifold room.\no Loading manifold.\no Forward BLS operator console.\no Pressure relief arrangements, where fitted.\no Inboard valve.\no Access to the bow loading area and forecastle.\no Watchman’s cabin.\no Manifold flushing arrangements.\no Crude oil line.\no Bow door(s).\no Hydraulic room.\no Electrical equipment room, where fitted.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the BLS.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the Bow Loading System\n(BLS).\nRecords of inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS including:\no BLS coupler valve tightness tests.\no Coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks.\no BLS operator console alarm and indicators tests.\no Other test requirements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the Bow\nLoading System (BLS), including:\no BLS coupler valve tightness tests.\no Coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks.\no BLS operator console alarm and indicators tests.\no Other test requirements.\no Arrangements for flushing and gas-freeing the bow cargo piping.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the BLS.\nThere were no records, or records were incomplete, of inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS\nincluding:\no BLS coupler valve tightness tests before each loading operation.\no Coupler and inboard valve closing-time checks.\nBLS operator console alarm and indicators tests.\nOther test requirements.\nThe BLS area was not free of oil.\nArrangements for draining the manifold room were inadequate.\nThe controls, alarms and/or indicators of the forward BLS operator console were defective in any respect.\nWhere fitted, there was no means of monitoring and verifying the status of the pressure relief arrangements.\nAccess doors to the bow loading area were not self-closing or were lashed open.\nThe audible and/or visible alarms for the air lock doors to the bow loading area were defective in any\nrespect.\nAn item(s) of the required equipment in the watchman’s cabin was missing or defective e.g., fire\nextinguisher, EEBDs.\nThe bow door(s) were not provided with:\no Appropriate railing and securing wires for use when the door is used as a working platform.\no A detachable rail installed across the opening when the door is open.\nThe condition of the hydraulic room was unsatisfactory in any respect, e.g., hydraulic leaks.\nWhere fitted, the condition of the electrical equipment room was unsatisfactory in any respect, e.g., hydraulic\npiping passed through the room.\nThe BLS was defective in any respect.\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n•", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the deluge system in the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was the equipment in good\nworking order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nDeluge system in the bow loading system (BLS) area\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Bow Loading Area, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that those measures specifically designed to prevent or extinguish fires in the BLS area of shuttle\ntankers are effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\n11 Fire Fighting for Offshore Loading\nA fire water system should be installed in the BLS area. The system should serve two purposes:\n• •\nSupply of deluge (water only) to the BLS equipment and bow slot to prevent that any possible sparks\ncreated during emergency disconnection (ESD 2) may cause a fire.\nSupply of water for the foam fire-fighting system. The foam system should be operated from the fire-fighting\npanel on the bridge.\nAppendix F BLS Fire Fighting System\nF.1 BLS water deluge logic\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe deluge logic should include start of a fire pump and opening of required valve(s) within the set time\ncriteria for deluge at ESD2.\nFire pumps connected with the BLS deluge system should be redundant according to DP Class 2\nphilosophy; if one pump fails to start or stops while deluge is active a second fire pump should automatically\nstart. All fire pumps interconnected to the BLS deluge system should have an auto-priming function ensuring\nwater supply when started.\nActivation of ESD 2 should automatically provide deluge water before the coupler claws start opening,\nregardless of sequence of ESD commands initiated.\nThe fire-fighting system should have fully pressurized deluge in all water nozzles before the coupler claws\nstarts to open.\nIt should be possible to activate the BLS deluge system from dedicated operator panels close to the BLS\nOperator Panel on the bridge and in the watchman’s cabin.\nThe deluge system should be fully operative in a black-out situation. A prerequisite for this design is that\nthere is power at the emergency switch board to run the emergency fire pump and power the deluge valve\nHPU.\n• Valve(s) required for BLS deluge should be possible to open manually in case of valve control failure.\nF.2 BLS water deluge system\nThe BLS water deluge system should as minimum meet the following requirements:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMinimum two nozzles should be installed on the inside (port and starboard side) and minimum two on the\noutside (port and starboard side) of the manifold.\nThe nozzles should spray the wire rollers and the manifold.\nOne main deluge valve to be located as close as possible to the deluge distribution piping.\nThe main deluge valve should be automatically opened when ESD 2 is activated, or the deluge function is\nactivated from the bridge (applicable for all operational modes).\nOnly the deluge should be activated (no foam), and the fire-fighting system should have fully pressurized\ndeluge in all water nozzles before the coupler claws starts to open.\nThe deluge valve controls should have dual supply of power, i.e. main and emergency power securing\npower if any or all main switchboards fail. Alternatively, the deluge valve should fail safe to open position in\ncase of loss of power.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed water spray or water mist systems for:\n• •\n• Weekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\n• Five-year servicing)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the deluge\nsystem fitted in the BLS area which defined the:\n• •\n• Operation of the BLS deluge system in the event of an emergency disconnection.\nActions to take in the event of a BLS deluge system valve control failure.\nFrequency of inspection and testing of the BLS deluge system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation and maintenance of\nthe BLS deluge system.\nInspect the dedicated operator panels for the BLS deluge system on the bridge and in the watchman’s\ncabin.\nInspect the piping and control valves for the BLS deluge system and, if safe to do so, verify that control\nvalves can be manually operated freely.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, and maintenance carried out on the BLS deluge\nsystem contained within the maintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, and testing of the\nBLS deluge system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the testing, maintenance and operation of the BLS deluge system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manuals for the BLS deluge system.\nThe maintenance and test records for the BLS deluge system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the testing, maintenance and operations of the BLS deluge system.\nOperating instructions for the BLS deluge system were not posted close to the operator panels.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the BLS deluge system or the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the BLS deluge system were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the BLS deluge system.\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the BLS deluge system.\nInspection of the BLS deluge system indicated that actions recorded in the maintenance plan had not in fact\ntaken place.\nThe BLS deluge system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the fixed foam fire extinguishing system in the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was\nthe equipment in good working order and regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nFixed foam fire extinguishing system in the bow loading system (BLS) area\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Bow Loading Area\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nObjective\nTo ensure that those measures specifically designed to prevent or extinguish fires in the BLS area of shuttle\ntankers are effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for Offshore Loading Shuttle Tankers Guideline No. 140\n11 Fire Fighting for Offshore loading\nA fire water system should be installed in the BLS area. The system should serve two purposes:\n• •\nSupply of deluge (water only) to the BLS equipment and bow slot to prevent that any possible sparks\ncreated during emergency disconnection (ESD 2) may cause a fire\nSupply of water for the foam fire-fighting system. The foam system should be operated from the fire-fighting\npanel on the bridge\nAppendix F BLS Fire Fighting System\nThe BLS fire-fighting system should as a minimum meet the following requirements:\n• •\n• •\n• A fire water monitor should be installed in the fore mast or on the forecastle and be remotely operated from\nthe bridge\no The monitor should have pan and tilt functions that allow coverage of the whole area of the\nforecastle and platform deck\nPiping/nozzles should not be located in the restricted area as shown in Appendix A 5.9 Fig 4.\nAll external piping, with risk of containing water, should have electric heat tracing\no Alternative means of avoiding freezing may be considered (e.g. high pressure blowing, drains at\nlow points etc.)\nThe system should be of the ‘self-draining-type’ in order to avoid ice-build-up in the piping during cold\nweather conditions\nThe BLS foam system should as a minimum cover the bow manifold and bow manifold room\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n5.4.6 Cargo System Failure Mode Effects (and Criticality) Analysis\nAn FME(C)A is a desktop study that identifies failure modes and is used to examine and assess all types of failures in\na bow loading tanker cargo system. …. including:\n• The fire-fighting system, which covers the bow area, cargo pump room and VOC area including foam\nsystem.\nA maintenance and test programme should be developed based on the FME(C)A. The maintenance part should be\nincluded in the Class-approved planned maintenance system for the tanker. The test programme should include all\ninterlock and safety barriers that are required to be tested at intervals in compliance with field-specific operational\nprocedures.\nA typical test programme will include the following:\n• Foam fire monitors in forward area\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to foam fire-extinguishing systems for:\n• •\n• •\nMonthly tests and inspections.\nQuarterly tests and inspections.\nAnnual tests and inspections.\nFive yearly tests and inspections)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code.\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BLS\nfixed foam fire extinguishing system which described the:\n• •\n• •\nOperation of the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system in the event of a fire in the BLS space and/or\nemergency disconnection of the loading hose.\nActions to take in the event of a BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system failure.\nFrequency of inspection, testing and maintenance of the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system.\nThe frequency of shore-based analysis of the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system foam concentrate.\nThe first test of foam concentrates should be performed not more than 3 years after being supplied to the ship, and\nafter that, every year.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance\nof the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system.\nInspect the space(s) containing the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system foam concentrate tanks(s) and\npump(s) and verify that:\no The system operating instructions were posted near the control panel and in the space(s)\ncontaining the BLS foam system foam concentrate tanks(s) and pump(s).\no The system valves were clearly identified, and the system instructions indicated their required\nstatus in the standby and operational conditions.\no A copy of the foam concentrate annual test certificate indicated that it was fit for continued use.\no The foam tank was filled to the required level.\nInspect the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system control panel on the bridge and verify that:\no The system operating instructions were posted near the system control panel.\no The remote control of the forward monitor was functioning correctly.\nInspect the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system piping, monitor(s), applicator(s) and isolating valves.\nWhere safe to do so, operate an isolating valve and monitor to verify that they are free to move through their\nfull range.\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan, including annual foam concentrate test results.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the BLS fixed\nfoam fire extinguishing system with reference to:\no Extinguishing spill fires.\no Precluding ignition of spilt oil, not yet ignited.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BLS fixed foam fire\nextinguishing system.\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing\nsystem, including annual foam concentrate test results.\nThe system manual showing the quantity of foam concentrate required to be in the storage tank to meet the\nsystem design criteria.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the BLS fixed foam fire\nextinguishing system.\nThe BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system operating instructions were not posted near the control panel\nand in the space(s) containing the BLS foam system foam concentrate tanks(s) and pump(s).\nThe valves and/or system controls were not clearly identified to their purpose and required status during\nsystem operation.\nThe foam storage tank was not filled to the required level.\nThe foam concentrate test had not been carried out within the required time frame.\nThe foam concentrate test certificate indicated that the foam was not fit for continued use.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose and operation of the vessel’s BLS fixed foam\nfire extinguishing system.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system or all the required inspections, tests and\nmaintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete, including the required foam\nconcentrate tests.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the vessel’s BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system indicated that actions recorded in the\nplan had not in fact taken place.\nThe BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system isolation valves or monitors were not free to move through\ntheir full range of motion.\nThe BLS fixed foam fire extinguishing system was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.7.", "t": "Are all items of DP equipment in satisfactory condition and are they included in the", "c": "Planned Maintenance System (PMS)?\nShort Question Text\nDP equipment condition and maintenance\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure all DP systems and sub-systems are maintained in good working order.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company strategy.\nThe company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system, for\nexample:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nNavigation equipment.\nEngine machinery.\nDeck machinery.\nCargo handling machinery/equipment.\nHull structure.\nElectronic equipment.\nThe spare parts inventory may be standalone or integrated into the planned maintenance system.\nThe planned maintenance system, which may be computer-based, covers all identified onboard equipment and\nmachinery and includes a schedule of planned maintenance tasks and a record of completed planned and unplanned\nmaintenance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 the company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulation and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company.\nInspection Guidance\nAll items of DP equipment should be included in the vessel’s planned maintenance system, i.e.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPower Systems.\nControl System Computers (including reboot requirements).\nThruster Systems (including calibration requirements).\nPosition Reference Systems.\nEnvironmental and Motion Sensors.\nOperator Control Stations.\n• Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) and Batteries (with expiry dates).\nAny items of defective equipment should be entered in the vessel’s Defect List.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Refer to the FME(C)A to identify the systems and sub-systems that make up the DP system.\nSelect three sample items of equipment from the FME(C)A and verify that they are included in the PMS.\nReview the latest shore maintenance reports for the DP system and note any recommendations or\ndeficiencies recorded.\nReview the DP data log and alarm history and note any malfunctions recorded.\nReview the DP log book and note any malfunctions recorded.\nInterview the accompanying officer and confirm the status of any malfunctioning equipment identified.\nVerify that any defective equipment identified has been entered in the vessel’s Defect List.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Planned Maintenance System.\nFME(C)A.\nDP log book.\nDP data log.\nShore maintenance reports.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• An item of DP equipment was defective in any respect.\nAn item of DP equipment (give details) was not included in the Planned Maintenance System.\nA necessary task (give details) was not included in the Planned Maintenance System, e.g., calibration of\nthrusters, routine rebooting of computer systems.\nNecessary data (give details) was not included in the Planned Maintenance System, e.g., battery expiry\ndates.\nMaintenance tasks associated with DP equipment were overdue or deferred without shore authorisation.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.8.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the vessel’s DP FMEA, was the latest", "c": "version available on board, and were any modifications to the DP system included?\nShort Question Text\nDP FMEA\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\nIMCA: M 166 Rev. 2 October 2019 – Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)\nIMCA: M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels. Rev 2.1\nObjective\nTo ensure that the FMEA is properly managed and that the appropriate vessel personnel are familiar with its\ncontents.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO:MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems\n1.2.13 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) means a systematic analysis of systems and sub-systems to a\nlevel of detail that identifies all potential failure modes down to the appropriate sub-system level and their\nconsequences.\n1.2.14 FMEA proving trials means the test program for verifying the FMEA.\nIMCA: M 166 Rev. 2 October 2019 – Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)\n1.2 The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)\nThe findings of the FMEA should be used to rectify and improve the design or incorporated into the operations,\nemergency and maintenance manuals and procedures. These findings can then be fed into the risk assessment for\neach vessel task and ‘standing orders’. It is necessary, for example, that:\n• •\nThe DP operators (DPOs) and engineering staff need to know what corrective actions are required should\nthe vessel’s DP system be subjected to a specific failure;\nThe DP operators (DPOs), engineering staff and key onshore personnel need to know what the impact on\nredundancy is if an item of equipment fails or is taken out of service. Therefore, it would be beneficial to\ncross-reference the FMEA with the planned maintenance system (PMS).\n1.7 The Uses of an FMEA\nCrew Training:\nThe crew should have access to and become familiar with the FMEA to increase their knowledge of the operation of\ntheir vessel over and above that contained within the DP operations manual.\n2.4 The FMEA Report\nThe FMEA report should be a self-contained document containing a full description of the system under analysis,\nbroken down into its component parts with their functions. The standards and guidelines followed during the analysis\ntogether with the class rules applicable to the vessel should be stated. The worst case failure design intent (WCFDI)\nshould also be specified. The failure modes and their causes and effects should be able to be understood without any\nneed to refer to other plans and documents not in the report. The analysis assumptions and system block diagrams\nshould be included where appropriate.\nTwo levels of reporting are recommended; a comprehensive executive summary (or management, overview) and a\nmain report (with building blocks or subsections relating to each discipline). Operational assumptions should be\nincluded in the top level executive summary, together with a summary of the conclusions which should state the worst\ncase failure determined from the analysis.\nThe FMEA report should be kept up to date to reflect any changes made to the system, hardware or software, during\nthe life cycle of the vessel and in the light of any information gathered at a later date that was not available at the time\nof the FMEA. The FMEA should have a revision history section and be fully auditable with changes properly recorded\nduring the process.\nOne secondary purpose of the FMEA document is to assist in the training of crew; therefore, it is vital that all changes\nand modifications to the systems are analysed by the FMEA practitioner to determine any changes to post failure DP\ncapability and updated in the document as and when they occur.\n2.5.1 FMEA Management and Ongoing QA\nDuring the life of a vessel, inevitably modifications will be made to either improve the system operation or alter it to\nprovide additional or different functions. The FMEA should be kept on board for reference and review by the vessel’s\nstaff on a regular basis so that any modifications to the vessel’s system will prompt the need for a possible update of\nthe FMEA. Such modifications may include hardware and/or software changes.\nIn order for DP related modifications to be managed, an FMEA management procedure should be put in place so that\nany changes are recorded and analysed and the FMEA updated where appropriate.\nThe vessel’s FMEA should be identified as a controlled document which is part of the quality management system of\nthe vessel so any changes to the FMEA contents will be identified through the audit trail.\n2.7 Updating of an FMEA\nThe FMEA will become out of date if it is not maintained regularly and systematically, due to changes in operating\nprocedures, modifications to DP hardware and software, to confirm compliance with the latest industry guidance, etc.,\nover the life cycle of the vessel. If this happens, it is likely that another FMEA revision will be incurred later. A\nsystematic FMEA review through the vessel’s life cycle should be an ongoing process which should be formally\ncompleted at least once every five years.\n3.3 DP FMEA Proving Trials\nThe DP FMEA proving trials are a series of controlled failure mode tests which are intended to prove the findings of\nthe desktop FMEA and, where there are any doubts about any failure modes from the desktop analysis, eliminate\nthese doubts by carrying out onboard testing in a safe and practical manner.\n3.4 DP Annual Trials and Five-Yearly Periodical Trials\nDP FMEA proving trials: As described in this document, the DP FMEA proving trials are a component part of the\nFMEA. For a new build vessel, commissioning tests should be carried out prior to the DP FMEA proving trials being\nundertaken. The system should be fully commissioned prior to the DP FMEA proving trials as all parts of the system\nneed to be functioning as designed, otherwise the system’s response to a failure during FMEA testing cannot be\ndetermined with certainty.\nFive-yearly periodical trials: IMO requires that a complete test of the DP system at intervals should be carried out\nperiodically, but not exceeding a period of five-years. Some classification societies recommend that the DP FMEA\nproving trials should be repeated every five-years. Others require that the five-year tests validate the redundancy\nconcept that is established during the initial proving trials but allow for a shortened test schedule when compared with\nthe initial proving trials. It should be noted that often tests completed during the initial proving trials were designed to\nanswer a particular question the FMEA practitioner may have raised. Therefore, re-testing the complete proving trials\nevery five[1]years may not be necessary, unless it is required by class. It is recommended that the five-yearly\nperiodical trials programme is carefully planned, the intent clearly specified and then verified through testing.\nAppendix 1\nSpecifying an FMEA\nObjective of FMEA\nThe main objective of the DP FMEA is to identify the single point failures in any part of the vessel’s DP system and/or\nits sub-systems which, if they were to occur, would cause loss of the position keeping capability of the vessel. The\ncauses and consequences of any such failures should be noted and obvious corrective actions which can be taken to\navoid such failures should be described in the final FMEA report. The FMEA should also prove that the requirements\nwith respect to redundancy, independency and separation are achieved in the design.\nFinal Documentation Required\nThe final FMEA report after the DP FMEA proving trials should be supplied with its companion documents. The\ncompanion documents should include the completed registers and documentation to demonstrate and verify that all\nrecorded technical queries both historically and currently have been effectively closed out and the method of close\nout recorded, together with the preliminary annual trials document as required.\n1.20 DP Operations with Closed Main Bus Tie breakers\nWhen generators in different redundancy groups are running in parallel, this will introduce the possibility that a single\nfailure may propagate between systems. In such cases, it is required that protective measures are implemented in\nthe system in order to ensure the required integrity between the redundancy groups. In the past, because such\nprotective measures could not be shown to be effective, the safest mode of operation identified through the FMEA\nprocess in many cases stated that the bus tiebreaker between the main switchboards be opened. Operating with the\nbus tiebreakers open has the benefit that a failure in one main switchboard will not propagate to the other main\nswitchboard via the bus tie, resulting in a partial blackout rather than a full blackout. Positioning capability would still\nbe available, albeit reduced, at the level dictated by the redundancy concept. However, operating with the bus tie\nbreakers open may also have some downsides, notably an increase in the amount of generators required online,\nhence an increase in fuel consumption, emissions, the amount of maintenance required and an increase in operating\ncosts. For DP 2 and DP3 vessels it is required by all of the classification societies that analysis of the relevant failure\nmodes associated with closed bus tiebreaker operation are addressed in the FMEA.\nIMCA: M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels. Rev\n2.1\n4.6.3 Review of the FMEA\n10) The fail-safe condition of thrusters\nIMO, IMCA and class rules and guidelines require thrusters to fail safe. Thrusters should not fail to uncontrolled\nthrust magnitude or direction. The fail-safe condition is generally accepted to be fail ‘as set’, ‘to zero thrust’, or\n‘propeller stop’. Uncontrolled changes in thruster direction are acceptable if at the same time the thrust is set to zero.\nThese tests should include failure of the local pitch/speed and azimuth command and feedback loops. The test\nshould include demonstration of the ‘prediction errors’ intended to alert the DPO to the fact that the thruster is\nmalfunctioning.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nThese procedures may include:\n• Actions upon equipment failure.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10. Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the:\n• •\n• The FMEA is reviewed and updated as required due to changes in operating procedures or modifications to\nDP hardware and/or software.\nThe latest copy of the FMEA is available on board.\nThe Master, DPOs and engineers are familiar with the content of the FMEA.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight and review the FMEA, including:\no Results of proving trials.\no Whether recorded technical queries after proving trials had been effectively closed out, and the\nmethod of close out.\no Record of any modifications to the onboard DP systems.\no The FMEA revision history.\no Fail-safe condition of thrusters.\no Relevant failure modes associated with closed bus tiebreaker operation.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the FMEA, including for example:\no Actions to be taken in the event of a given DP system or sub-system failure.\no The fail-safe condition of thrusters i.e. ‘fail as set’, ‘fail to zero thrust’ or ‘propeller stop’.\no Relevant failure modes associated with closed bus tiebreaker operation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe latest FMEA document, and associated documents.\nThe Planned Maintenance System (PMS).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure that the:\no FMEA is reviewed and updated as required due to changes in operating procedures or\nmodifications to DP hardware and/or software.\no Latest copy of the FMEA is available on board.\no Master, DPOs and engineers are familiar with the content of the FMEA.\nThe FMEA was not identified as a controlled document within the vessels quality management system or\ninclude a revision history.\nThe FMEA was not written in the working language of the ship.\nThe latest FMEA report and associated documents were not available on board.\nTechnical queries recorded in the FMEA after proving trials had not been effectively closed out.\nOn a newly delivered vessel, FMEA proving trials had not been carried out.\n• •\n• •\nThe FMEA had not been:\no carried out by an authorised organisation.\no reviewed and updated as required due to changes in operating procedures or modifications to DP\nhardware and/or software.\no systematically tested, reviewed, and verified over a five year period.\nWhere the vessel is permitted to operate with closed bus tie in accordance with a field operators manual or\nlocal regulations, the FMEA did not include analysis of the relevant failure modes associated with closed bus\ntiebreaker operation.\nThruster failure modes did not meet accepted requirements to ‘fail as set’, ‘fail to zero thrust’ or ‘propeller\nstop’.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the FMEA, including for example:\no Actions to be taken in the event of a given DP system or sub-system failure.\no The fail-safe condition of thrusters i.e. ‘fail as set’, ‘fail to zero thrust’ or ‘propeller stop’.\no Relevant failure modes associated with closed bus tiebreaker operation.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.7.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the gas and fire detection systems in the bow loading system (BLS) area, and was the\nequipment in good working order, regularly tested, maintained and calibrated?\nShort Question Text\nGas and fire detection systems in the bow loading system (BLS) area\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that those measures specifically designed to prevent or extinguish fires in the Bow Loading\nSystem (BLS) area of shuttle tankers are effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nAppendix F BLS Fire Fighting System\nF.3 Fire and gas detection\nIn the centre area of the BLS manifold room, detectors should be installed underneath the forecastle platform deck.\nThe following fixed detection sensors should as a minimum be installed and connected to the vessels fire and gas\ndetection systems, giving alarms on the bridge when activated:\n• •\n• •\n2 smoke detectors (for enclosed manifold rooms)\n2 flame detectors\n2 gas detectors\nRotating yellow light(s) when having a fire or gas alarm (NB/CC)\nOCIMF: Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations.\n5.4.6 Cargo system Failure Mode Effects (and Criticality) Analysis.\nAn FME(C)A is a desktop study that identifies failure modes and is used to examine and assess all types of failures in\na bow loading tanker cargo system. …. including:\n• The fire-fighting system, which covers the bow area, cargo pump room and VOC area including foam\nsystem.\nA maintenance and test programme should be developed based on the FME(C)A. The maintenance part should be\nincluded in the Class-approved planned maintenance system for the tanker. The test programme should include all\ninterlock and safety barriers that are required to be tested at intervals in compliance with field-specific operational\nprocedures.\nA typical test programme will include the following:\n• •\nSmoke and flame detectors in bow area\nGas detectors in bow area\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed fire detection and alarm systems for:\n• •\n• Weekly tests and inspections.\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections.)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fire and\nhydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area which defined:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Actions to be taken in the event of a fire or gas alarm in the BLS area.\nThe frequency of gas sensor calibration.\nThe required alarm activation set point for gas detectors in the BLS area\nThe frequency of verification of the gas alarm activation point settings.\nThe frequency of testing of the BLS smoke and flame detectors.\nThe frequency of testing of the associated alarms and indicators.\nThe actions to take in the event that the fire or gas detection system fails.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance\nof the fire and hydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.\nInspect the central control station for the BLS gas detection system and verify that:\no The gas detecting system was fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\no The alarm activation settings were in accordance with company procedures.\nReview the inspection and calibration data for the BLS gas detecting system available in the cargo control\nroom and verify that:\no Each gas detector sensor had been calibrated at the frequency defined by the company.\no The associated alarms had been tested at the frequency defined by the company.\nInspect the fire detection control panel and verify that:\no The system was fully operational.\no The system was not indicating any faults.\nReview the test data for the fire detection system and verify that:\no Flame and smoke detectors had been tested as required by company procedures.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests, calibration and maintenance carried out contained\nwithin the maintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, calibration and\ntesting of the fire and hydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fire and hydrocarbon gas\ndetection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manuals for the fire and hydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted\nin the BLS area.\nThe maintenance, calibration and test records for the fire and hydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems\nfitted in the BLS area.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fire and\nhydrocarbon gas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the operation and maintenance of the fire and hydrocarbon\ngas detection and alarm systems fitted in the BLS area.\nThe alarm activation set point of one or more gas sensors was not in accordance with company procedures.\nThe gas detecting sensors had not been calibrated in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions at the\nfrequency defined by the company.\nThe associated alarms and signals had not been tested at the frequency defined by the company.\nThe calibration gas used for calibration of the hydrocarbon sensors was out of date or not appropriate for\nuse with the system.\nFlame and smoke detectors had not been tested as required by company procedures.\nOne or more smoke, flame or hydrocarbon gas sensors was out of service.\nThe gas detecting system in the BLS area was defective in any respect.\nThe fire detection system in the BLS area was defective in any respect.\n8.8. OBO / Combination Carriers", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.8.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers, and were\nthe hatch covers in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo hold hatch covers\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the cargo hold hatch-covers of combination carriers are properly maintained and gas tight.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n14.1.4\nVenting of cargo holds\nThe vent system on combination carriers is similar to that of conventional tankers, with the vent lines from the cargo\nholds leading to either individual P/V valves on each tank outlet or to a main cargo vent/IG common line that expels\nthe hydrocarbon vapour through a riser at a safe height above the deck or to an IG system pipeline. Typically, the P/V\nvalves are located on the top of the hatch covers. They are disconnected and stored when carrying dry cargo. The\ncargo tank vent and IG line connection to the cargo holds is arranged to prevent liquid ingress.\nDuring the carriage of dry bulk cargoes, the holds are isolated from the liquid cargo pipeline and gas venting systems\n14.1.6\nHatch covers\nThe hatches of OBOs are much larger than on oil tankers, but as they need to remain gas and liquid tight when\ncarrying oil cargoes, they are normally of the dual seal type.\nClosing device maintenance and operation is critical. Their tension should be checked regularly and adjusted evenly,\nand the screw threads should be cleaned and lubricated.\nWhen closing hatch covers, the closing devices should be evenly and progressively pulled down in the correct\nsequence and in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe sealing arrangements should be positively tested prior to loading a liquid cargo, by pressurising the holds with IG\nand applying a soapy solution to the sealing arrangements. Any leakage noted should be fixed by further adjusting\nthe closing devices in the affected area.\nThe cover joints should also be examined for gas leakage when the compartment is loaded with liquid cargo. Any gas\nor liquid leaks that cannot be stopped by adjusting the closing devices should be marked or noted, so that the jointing\nmaterial can be examined at the earliest opportunity and the joint made good. Additional sealing, e.g., by tape or\ncompound, may be needed. A risk assessment should be conducted to identify the measures necessary to mitigate\nthe risk.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\n10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\ninspections are held at appropriate intervals;\nany non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;\nappropriate corrective action is taken; and\nrecords of these activities are maintained.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance, and testing of the\ncargo hold hatch-covers. These procedures may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan and may also include the\nmanufacturer’s instruction manuals.\nThe sealing arrangements of the hatch-covers should be pressure tested with inert gas prior to loading a liquid cargo,\nand the results recorded.\nThe cargo handling procedures should include the optimum pressure range to ensure the effectiveness of the hatch\nsealing arrangements.\nThe sealing arrangements should be further examined after loading a liquid cargo. Any gas and/or liquid leaks that\ncannot be immediately rectified should be subject to risk assessment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and if necessary, review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance, and\ntesting of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\nReview the records of inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\nReview risk assessments pertaining to any gas or liquid leaks from the hatch-covers.\nInspect the hatch-covers, paying particular attention to the:\no Sealing arrangements.\no P/V valves, where fitted to the hatch-covers.\no The corners of hatch coamings and adjacent decks.\no Any damage to the hatch-covers or coamings etc caused by discharging equipment.\no The hatch-cover hydraulic systems.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, maintenance, and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance, and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\nRecords of inspection, maintenance and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\n• Risk assessments pertaining to any gas or liquid leaks from the hatch-covers.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance, and testing of the cargo\nhold hatch-covers.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\nmaintenance, and testing of the cargo hold hatch-covers.\nThe accompanying officer was not aware of the optimum tank atmosphere pressure range to maintain an\neffective hatch seal.\nThe sealing arrangements of the hatch-covers were not of the dual-seal type.\nThe hatch-covers were not included in the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nThe hatch-covers were not subject to regular inspection, with the results recorded.\nThere was ongoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the flanges of the P/V valves fitted on top of the hatchcovers.\nThe hatch-cover sealing arrangements had not been pressure tested using inert gas prior to loading a liquid\ncargo.\nThere was ongoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the sealing arrangements of the hatch-covers.\nOngoing gas and/or liquid leakage from the hatch-covers had not been subject to risk assessment.\nThere was oil leakage from the hatch-cover hydraulic system.\nThere was visible cracking at the corner of a hatch-coaming or in the adjacent deck.\nThere was unrepaired grab damage to the hatch-covers or coamings.\nNote: Any physical defects observed should also be considered under Questions 2.4.1 and/or 2.4.2 Defect Reporting", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.8.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for changing", "c": "cargo modes, including ship-specific checklists, and were there records to show that\nthese procedures had been followed?\nShort Question Text\nChanging between wet and dry cargoes\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the changeover from wet to dry and vice versa in combination carriers is carried out safely and\nthat all the necessary actions are completed.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n14.1.11 Cargo changeover checklists\nThe following checklists are a generic guide to help each OBO develop its own specific checklists.\n14.1.11.1 Oil to dry bulk cargo\nWhen changing the cargo from oil to dry, the following should be done:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Wash cargo holds and tanks, including access trunks.\nFlush all main suctions into cargo holds and tanks and strip dry.\nEnsure all cargo holds and tanks are gas free.\nEnsure that cargo deck heaters or fixed heating coils are free of oil before blanking ends.\nComplete hand hosing and digging of holds and sumps.\nDrain cargo holds and cargo suction wells.\nBlank off cargo suctions and droplines to holds by fitting watertight bolted covers inside cargo holds.\nEnsure sounding pipes to bilge wells are open and clear of obstructions.\nFit main and stripping suction recess doors. Also, fit heating coil connecting pipe recess doors.\nWash cargo pipeline system, including pumps, deck lines and bottom lines.\nEnsure gauging system is stowed or blanked as necessary, in accordance with manufacturer’s\nrecommendations.\nDrain, vent and verify all gas lines and risers are gas free.\nBlank off gas lines to holds.\nSet up venting system.\nCheck hatch cover sealing arrangements and closing devices.\nCheck ballast lines, void spaces and cofferdams for flammable gas. Ventilate and verify as gas free.\nIf slops are retained, ensure designated pipeline blanks are fitted, slop tanks are inerted and the venting\nsystem is in operation.\n14.1.11.2 Dry bulk cargo to oil\nWhen changing the cargo from dry to oil, the following should be done:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sweep holds clean, and lift cargo remains out of hold for disposal.\nWash cargo remnants from bulkheads, stripping slowly to remove water, but let solid residues settle.\nRemove remaining solid residues from the tank top and sumps and verify that the stripping suction is clear.\nRemove suction doors and attach securely to stowage positions.\nClose off sounding pipes to sumps. Lower and secure heating coils in place, connect and ensure tight.\nRemove requisite blanks from gauging system and render fully operational.\nRemove blanks from main cargo suctions and stripping discharges to after hold.\nWash all stripping lines thoroughly to remove solid residues. Check valve seats are not damaged by solid\nresidues and test stripping valves for tightness.\nCheck and clean all cargo system strainers.\nCheck and clean all hatch cover sealing arrangements, closing devices, trackways, etc.\nRemove blanks from gas lines.\nSet up venting system.\nProve all valves and NRVs in cargo system.\nInert cargo holds prior to loading.\nVerify tightness of hatch covers, tank cleaning covers, access hatches and all openings into cargo spaces.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.1 requires that procedures for cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and bunkering operations are in place for\nall vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa.\nThese procedures should include ship-specific checklists to facilitate the change.\nRecords of changeover operations should be maintained, including completed checklists and details of hold\ninspections and corrective actions taken, if required, after the carriage of dry cargoes with regard to damage caused\nby discharging equipment.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and if necessary, review, the company procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice\nversa.\nReview records of cargo mode changeovers, including completed checklists.\nReview records of hold inspections and corrective actions taken, if required, after the carriage of dry cargoes\nwith regard to damage caused by discharging equipment.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures, including\nappropriate checklists, for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa.\nRecords of cargo mode changeovers, including completed checklists.\n• Records of hold inspections prior to changeover.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa.\nThe procedures for changing cargo mode from wet to dry and vice versa did not include ship-specific\nchecklists to facilitate the changeover.\nThe ship-specific cargo mode changeover checklists had not been completed as required by company\nprocedures.\nThere were no records available of previous cargo mode changeovers.\nRecords showed that the company procedures had not been followed during a previous cargo mode\nchangeover.\nThere were no records of hold inspections and corrective actions taken prior to cargo mode changeover.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for changing cargo mode from wet\nto dry and vice versa.\n8.99. All types", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.1.", "t": "Were the Master and all officers directly involved in cargo transfer operations", "c": "familiar with the company procedure for planning cargo and ballast transfers, and were\nrecords available to demonstrate that cargo operations had been planned in accordance\nwith the company procedure and conducted in accordance with the agreed plan?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and ballast transfer planning and execution.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure cargo and ballast transfer operations are planned and conducted in accordance with company\nprocedures and industry best practice guidance.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.1 General.\nAll cargo operations should be carefully planned and documented well in advance. The plans should be discussed\nwith all personnel on the ship and at the terminal. Plans may need to be modified after consultation with the terminal\nand following changing circumstances, either onboard or ashore. Any changes should be communicated, understood\nand formally recorded.\n21.5 Agreed loading plan.\nOn the basis of the information exchanged, the Responsible Officer and Terminal Representative should draw up a\nwritten operational agreement that covers:\n• •\n• •\nTanker’s name, berth, date and time\nNames of tanker and terminal representatives.\nCargo distribution on arrival and departure.\nFor each product:\no Quantity\no Tanker’s tanks to be loaded.\no Shore tanks to be discharged.\no Lines to be used tanker/terminal.\no Cargo transfer rate.\no Operating pressure.\no Maximum allowable pressure.\no Temperature limits.\no Venting system.\no Sampling and gauging procedures.\n• Any restrictions because of:\no Electrostatic properties\no Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valve closing times.\nThis agreement should include a loading plan that indicates the expected timing and covers:\n• •\n• •\n• The loading sequence for the tanker’s tanks, taking into consideration:\no De-ballasting operations.\no Tanker and shore tank change over.\no Avoiding cargo contamination.\no Pipeline clearing for loading.\no Other operations that may affect flow rates.\no Trim and draught of the tanker.\no Need to ensure that permitted stresses will not be exceeded.\nThe initial and maximum loading rates, topping off-rates and normal stopping times, including:\no Nature of the cargo to be loaded.\no Arrangement and capacity of the tanker’s cargo lines and gas venting system or vapour return, if\napplicable.\no Maximum allowable pressure and flow rate in the tanker/terminal hoses or MLAs.\no Precautions to avoid static electricity.\no Any other flow control limitations.\nThe method of tank venting to avoid or reduce gas emissions at deck level, accounting for:\no TVP of the cargo to be loaded.\no Loading rates.\no Atmospheric conditions, including wind speed (see section 2.1.3.2) and electrical storms.\nBunker or storing operations.\nEmergency stop procedure.\nOnce the loading plan has been agreed, it should be signed by the Responsible Officer and Terminal Representative\n21.6 Agreed discharge plan.\nOn the basis of the information exchanged, the responsible Officer and Terminal representative should draw up a\nwritten operational agreement that covers:\n• •\n• •\n• Tanker’s name, berth, date and time\nNames of tanker and terminal representatives.\nCargo distribution on arrival and departure.\nFor each product:\no Quantity\no Shore tanks to be filled.\no Tanks to be discharged.\no Lines to be used tanker/terminal.\no Cargo transfer rate.\no Maximum allowable pressure.\no Temperature limits.\no Venting system.\no Sampling and gauging procedures.\nAny restrictions because of:\no Electrostatic properties.\no ESD valve closing times.\nThe discharge plan should include the details and expected timings of:\n• The discharge sequence for the tanker’s tanks, including:\no Tanker and terminal tank change over.\no Avoiding cargo contamination.\nPipeline clearing for discharge.\nAny COW or other tank cleaning.\nAny other movements or operations that may affect flow rates.\nTrim and freeboard of the tanker.\nNeed to ensure that permitted stresses will not be exceeded.\nBallasting operations.\nThe initial and maximum discharge rates, accounting for:\no Specification of the cargo to be discharged.\no Arrangements and capacity of the tanker’s cargo lines, shore pipelines and tanks.\no Maximum allowable pressure and flow rate in the tanker/terminal hoses or MLAs.\no Precautions to avoid static electricity.\no Any other limitations.\nBunkering or storing operations.\nThe ESD procedure.\no\no\no\no\no\no\n• •\n• Once the discharge plan has been agreed it should be signed by the Responsible Officer and the Terminal\nRepresentative.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.5 Preparation for Cargo Transfer\n6.5.1 General\nAll personnel directly involved in cargo operations should be formally briefed regarding the cargo handling plan. A\ncopy of the handling plan should be provided to all involved, and watchkeeping officers should sign that they have\nread and fully understood the plan. The plan should include information exchanged with the responsible terminal\nrepresentative and should provide details of required communications, routine checks between ship and terminal as\nwell as planned and emergency shutdown (ESD) procedures.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition\n6.6 Discussions Prior to Cargo Transfer\nThe cargo transfer operation should be planned and confirmed in writing to help to assure full mutual understanding.\nThe items to be addressed will commonly include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe cargo transfer arm connection, leak test, purging and cool down procedure\nSSL link tests\npermission, or not, to continue gas burning mode in engine room (for power generation) during cargo\ntransfer\nthe order of loading or discharging\nthe total quantities of cargo to be transferred\nthe sequence of discharging and receiving tanks\ncritical stages of the transfer operation\nthe intended transfer rates (including topping off rates) and constraints\nthe transfer temperature and pressures to be expected\nuse of cargo heater or vaporiser\nthe vapour handling method, temperature and pressures\nthe cargo transfer arm draining, purging and disconnection procedure\nsimultaneous cargo and ballast handling, for stress and ship stability purposes, will commonly be noted on\nthe cargo plan\nreconfirm any earlier pre-charter advice, the previous three cargoes carried by the ship and the dates of\ncarriage should be noted to identify and assess any possible cargo contamination problems, particularly\nafter the carriage of ammonia\n• •\n• •\n• the appropriate cargo information and safety data sheets (SDS) should be provided (see Section 9.25) and\nshould be posted in prominent places on board the ship and within the terminal. Similar detail for cargo\ninhibitors, where applicable, should be provided by the terminal\na review of port and jetty regulations should be made, including berth operating limits, firefighting capabilities\nand other emergency procedures. Similarly, ship regulations and emergency procedures should be\ncommunicated to terminal personnel. Particular importance will usually be paid to ESD valve closure times\nand to the agreed emergency shutdown procedures\nequipment and procedures for normal and emergency communications between the ship and the terminal\nshould be defined and understood. Where portable radios are provided, adequate spare battery capacity\nshould be made available. A common language should be established\nany planned drills.\nany further information or procedures relevant to the operation should be discussed.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations is in\nplace for all types of vessel within the fleet which will include, as applicable to vessel and cargo type:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities for the operations.\nStability, stress, draught and trim calculations for key stages of the operation.\nFree surface effect restrictions.\nHighlighting limitations on number and location of slack tanks.\nCargo stowage, cargo segregation, pipeline and valve management, heating requirements and final ullages.\nBallast and bunkering operations where applicable.\nTank cleaning including Crude Oil Washing (COW).\nGas and chemical specific operations.\nInitial, bulk and final loading/discharging rates.\nManagement of tank atmosphere.\nStatic precautions.\nCold weather precautions.\nCargo data and hazards of particular cargoes (such as H2S).\nShip/shore interface and communications.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe company should have developed procedures for planning cargo and ballast transfers which described:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The factors that must be considered and documented within a cargo and ballast transfer plan.\nThe operations which require a cargo and ballast transfer plan to be developed, such as loading,\ndischarging, ballast exchange, internal transfer etc.\nThe requirement to document the cargo tank atmosphere management processes and operational limits that\nwill be utilised during cargo transfer operations.\nThe activities that must be included in the cargo and ballast transfer plan, such as tank cleaning, crude oil\nwashing, gas freeing, sampling, blending and the management of doping and additives, where applicable to\nthe operation.\nThe review and approval process for cargo transfer plans.\nThe process to update a cargo and ballast transfer plan when circumstances change.\nThe record keeping requirements for cargo and ballast transfers such that sufficient detail is recorded, within\naggregated documents, to accurately reconstruct a cargo operation for investigative purposes should the\nneed arise.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for planning cargo and ballast transfers.\nReview a recent cargo and ballast transfer plan and verify that it:\no Contained the information required by the company procedures.\no Included draught, trim and stress calculations for key stages of the cargo and ballast operation.\no Was signed by the Chief Officer, deck officers and, where necessary, engineer officers for\nunderstanding.\no Was signed by the Master for approval.\no Was signed by the Terminal Representative.\nReview the records of the same cargo and ballast operation and verify that:\no The sequence of cargo and ballast transfer followed the plan as presented.\no The atmosphere of the cargo tanks was maintained according to the plan.\no The venting or vapour management system was used in accordance with the plan.\no Crude oil washing or other specialist cargo operations were completed in accordance with the plan.\no Requests for increasing and decreasing cargo transfer rates were noted with confirmation that the\nrequested rate was achieved.\no Sufficient detail was included within the aggregated cargo records to reconstruct the progress of\nthe cargo operation and determine which tanks, pumps and lines were involved at any point during\na cargo transfer.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for planning cargo and ballast transfers.\nThe company procedures for cargo and ballast operation record keeping.\nThe plans for recent cargo and ballast transfer operations.\nThe records for recent cargo and ballast transfer operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure:\no That required cargo and ballast transfer plans to be prepared with defined content applicable to the\nvessel type and the equipment and systems fitted.\no Which defined the record-keeping requirements for cargo and ballast transfer operations.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the:\no Company procedures for cargo and ballast transfer planning.\no Company requirements for maintaining records of cargo and ballast operations.\nThe reviewed cargo and ballast transfer plan was:\no Missing key information required by the company procedures.\no Missing draught, trim and stress calculations at key stages of the cargo and ballast operation.\no Not signed by all deck officers and, where required, engineer officers and/or was not approved by\nthe Master.\nWhere the cargo and/or ballast sequence or operations had to be updated due to changes in circumstances,\nthe cargo and ballast transfer plan had not been updated and then re-approved by the Master and\nacknowledged by the officers involved in the cargo/ballast operation.\nThe reviewed cargo and ballast transfer records:\no Indicated that the cargo and ballast plan was not followed.\no Indicated that cargo-related operations were conducted which were not included in the cargo and\nballast transfer plan.\nDid not comply with company record keeping requirements.\nDid not include sufficient detail, within the aggregated cargo records, to reconstruct the progress of\nthe cargo operation and determine which tanks, pumps and lines were involved at any point during\na cargo transfer.\nThe cargo space venting or tank atmosphere management was not conducted in accordance with the cargo\nplan.\no\no\n•", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.2.", "t": "Were the Master and all officers with a direct responsibility for cargo, tank", "c": "cleaning or ballast operations familiar with the requirements of the ISGOTT Ship/Shore\nSafety Checklist (SSSCL) and, were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in use with all\napplicable provisions and agreements maintained throughout?\nShort Question Text\nShip/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo verify that there are good communications between the tanker and terminal, from pre-arrival to post\ndeparture, to ensure compliance with agreed safe operational procedures.\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 25 The Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nThe responsibility for the safe conduct of operations while a tanker is at a terminal is shared between the tanker’s\nMaster and the Terminal Representative. Before cargo or ballast operations start, the Master (or their representative)\nand the Terminal Representative should communicate and:\n• •\n• Agree in writing the transfer procedure and sequence of products, including the maximum loading or\nunloading rates and initial and topping-off rates (see part 6 of the SSSCL).\nAgree in writing the action to be taken in an emergency while the tanker is at the terminal.\nComplete and sign the SSSCL sections appropriate to the operation.\nThe Master, tanker personnel, Terminal Representative and shore personnel should all follow ISGOTT guidelines and\nrecommendations throughout the ship’s stay at the terminal. Each should cooperate with the other in the mutual\ninterest of safe operations. All parties should agree appropriate actions and record them on the SSSCL.\n25.2 Composition of the Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nAll relevant statements should be reviewed and the associated responsibility for compliance accepted, either jointly or\nsingly. Each Statement provides a primary reference where additional guidance on the subject may be found in\nISGOTT Sixth Edition. This may be shown either as:\n1.\n2.\nA complete chapter or technical section with multiple cross references to the topical issue, e.g. gas\nmeasurement (2.4).\nA specific sub-paragraph within a technical section, e.g. fendering (22.4.1).\nSome statements in part 5B (bulk liquid chemical) and part 5C (liquified gas) have no linked guidance to ISGOTT\nSixth Edition. Guidance on these technical topics should be sought from the relevant Chemical or Liquid Gas Safety\nGuides produced by ICS or SIGTTO.\n• •\nFigure 25.1: Oil tanker flowchart\nFigure 25.2: Chemical tanker flowchart\n• Figure 25.3: Gas tanker flowchart.\n25.4.5 Summary of repetitive checks during and after transfer\nRepetitive checks to be undertaken at intervals agreed in the pre-transfer conference by the tanker and terminal\nrepresentative are provided to:\n• •\n• Act as an aide memoire for tanker and terminal personnel to monitor key operational items during the period\nof operations.\nProvide a basis for status checks at watch or shift handovers.\nEnable decision making in the event that conditions change during the course of the operations.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel in the fleet.\nThe transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may include:\n• •\nPre-arrival checks.\nShip shore safety checklist including ship/shore interface and communications.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that required the relevant sections of a Ship/Shore safety\nchecklist (SSSCL), conforming to the guidance provided in ISGOTT Sixth Edition Chapter 25, are completed by the\nvessel during every cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operation at a terminal or during defined ship to ship transfer\noperations.\nThe relevant sections of the SSSCL may be provided by the terminal or the ship may use one developed or provided\nby the company. Duplication is not expected but the vessel must confirm that any checklists provided by the terminal\nmeet the guidance provided by ISGOTT Sixth Edition as a minimum.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which required the relevant sections of a\nSSSCL in accordance with ISGOTT Sixth Edition to be completed during every cargo, tank cleaning or\nballast operation at a terminal or during defined ship to ship transfer operations.\nReview the sections of the SSSCL that had been completed and were in use to monitor the ongoing\noperation and for each checklist:\no Select at least one item and request that an officer having responsibility for cargo operations\ndescribes how the check is performed or documented.\no Select at least one item that required some form of documented evidence and verify that the\nevidence was available.\no Compare the SSSCL remarks against the list of open defect reports recorded in the defect\nreporting system as provided by the vessel during the opening meeting and verify that any\ndefective equipment relevant to the SSSCL had been declared appropriately.\nReview Part 6, pre-transfer agreements, of the SSSCL and:\no Verify that each agreement had been properly completed if it was applicable to the operation.\no Select any two items and verify that the agreements had been understood and complied with\nduring the operations to that point.\nVerify that the cargo and ballast transfer plan had been updated to reflect the agreements\ndocumented in the pre-transfer conference.\nReview Part 8, repetitive checks during and after transfer and verify that:\no Repetitive checks were being completed in accordance with the pre-transfer agreement.\no A responsible officer had conducted the repetitive checks on deck at least once during each watch\nperiod.\nDuring the balance of the inspection verify that all items included in the relevant sections of the SSSCL and\nagreed during the pre-transfer conference were maintained in compliance with the guidance provided in\nISGOTT Sixth Edition.\no\n• •\nWhere the inspection was being conducted at anchor or idle, the inspector should review the SSSCL used during a\nrecent cargo operation and compare the responses in the SSSCL with Bridge Log Book and cargo records.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which required the relevant sections of a SSSCL in accordance with ISGOTT Sixth\nEdition to be completed during every cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operation at a terminal or during defined\nship to ship transfer operations.\nThe SSSCL for the ongoing operations and for at least two previous operations.\nCargo operational records for the ongoing operation and at least two previous operations.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which required the relevant sections of a SSSCL in accordance with\nISGOTT Sixth Edition to be completed during every cargo, tank cleaning or ballast operation at a terminal or\nduring defined ship to ship transfer operations.\nThe relevant sections of the SSSCL in use were not in alignment with the guidance provided in ISGOTT\nSixth Edition.\nThe sections of the SSSCL relevant to the operation being undertaken or reviewed had not been completed\nor were not in use.\nThere were open defect reports for equipment or systems relevant to the SSSCL which had not been\nbrought to the attention of the Terminal Representative through a documented remark in the relevant\nsections of the SSSCL.\nInspection of the vessel determined that equipment or systems relevant to the SSSCL were defective and\nthere was neither an open defect report in the defect reporting system nor a documented remark in the\nrelevant sections of the SSSCL.\nItems in the relevant SSSCL checklists had been answered as \"yes\" when there was evidence that the item\nreported on was not in accordance with the referenced guidance provided in ISGOTT Sixth Edition.\nThe vessel was found to be violating any of the documented agreements identified in SSSCL Part 6, tanker\nand terminal pre-transfer agreements.\nThe cargo and ballast transfer plan had not been updated, where required, to reflect the documented\nagreements reached during the tanker and terminal pre-transfer meeting.\nInspection of the vessel determined that any item included in SSSCL Part 8, repetitive checks was not\nmaintained in the required condition.\nThe accompanying officer or any officer having a responsibility for cargo operations was unfamiliar with the\nrelevant sections of the SSSCL applicable to the vessel or any check or declaration made therein.\nA responsible officer had not conducted the repetitive checks required by the SSSCL Part 8 on deck at least\nonce during each cargo watch period.\nWhere the vessel was in breach of the conditions of the SSSCL and an observation is being considered, the\ninspector should be guided by the ISGOTT6 references provided within the SSSCL. For specific Gas and Chemical\ncargo related concerns, the inspector should be guided by the relevant Chemical or Liquid Gas Safety Guides\nproduced by the ICS.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.3.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures which", "c": "provided guidance on the level of supervision and support for cargo / port operations,\nand were operations supervised and supported by an appropriate team in accordance\nwith the company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nCargo operations team composition.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that there are always enough properly supervised personnel on duty for the management of cargo\noperations, means of access, moorings and any other planned operations while in port or at a terminal.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n7.9 Manning levels\nNot having enough people available on board or at the terminal can lead to accidents and incidents. Marine\nregulations require:\n• •\nFlag States to issue ships with a minimum safe manning document.\nShips to be appropriately manned to undertake all aspects of safe operations onboard…\n…Both ship and terminal should consider how many people are needed for both regular operations and any\nemergencies that might be encountered.\n12.1.6 Loading Procedures\n12.1.6.4 Supervision\nThe following safeguards should be maintained throughout loading:\n• •\nA responsible officer should be on watch and enough crewmembers should be on board to deal with the\noperation and security of the ship.\nA watch of the tank deck should be maintained…\n23.11 Manning requirements\nThe level of manning should ensure that all operations related to the tanker/terminal interface are carried out safely. It\nshould also ensure that emergency situations and security can be managed at all times during the tanker’s stay at the\nterminal.\nShip Shore Safety Checklist\nPart 5a. Tanker and terminal: pre-transfer conference.\nItem 35 Operation supervision and watchkeeping is adequate (7.9, 23.11)\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) Fifth Edition\n6.6 Monitoring Cargo Operations\nCargo operations should be continually monitored and be under the control of a watchkeeping officer.\nWhile many of the watchkeeping officer’s functions require them to be based in the CCR (cargo control room), their\nresponsibilities extend to the entire cargo operation, including the supervision of cargo deck watches. It is good\npractice that at regular intervals the officer is relieved by another responsible person so that an inspection can be\nmade of the cargo deck to ensure that the cargo operation is proceeding safely and according to the cargo handling\nplan.\nA crew member should always be on watch on the cargo deck and be in constant radio contact with the\nwatchkeeping officer. The ship’s access and manifold area should never be left unattended. The duties of the deck\nwatch will also include making regular safety rounds of the deck, including a check that the moorings are correctly\nadjusted and that there is equal tension on all lines. This will require a second person in addition to the access and\nmanifold watch.\nDuring the safety rounds all areas of the cargo deck should be inspected to ensure there are no leaks or other\ndevelopments that could affect the safety or the cargo operation, and that access to the ship is clear and safe.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nAppendix 8 Ship/Shore Safety Checklist\nA8.4 Ship/Shore Safety Checklist Guidelines\n22. Action - There is an effective deck watch in attendance on board and adequate supervision of operations on the\nship and in the terminal.\n22. Remark- The operation should be under constant control and supervision on the ship and in the terminal.\nSupervision should be aimed at preventing the development of hazardous situations. However, if such a situation\narises, the controlling personnel should have adequate knowledge and the means available to take corrective action.\nThe controlling personnel on the ship and in the terminal should maintain effective communication with their\nrespective supervisors.\nAll personnel connected with the operations should be familiar with the dangers of the substances handled and\nshould wear appropriate protective clothing and equipment.\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition.\n1.7.1 Line management principles\nThe objective of good line tending is to ensure that all lines share the load to the maximum extent possible and the\nship’s movement is limited in the berth (off or along the berth face).\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel within the fleet.\nThe transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Cargo hose/arm connection including supervision of third party personnel.\nCargo survey and sampling.\nPre-operational checks including an independent verification of line setting prior to the start of operations.\nStarting cargo operations.\nBulk cargo transfer.\nTopping off/stripping.\nDraining/blowing lines and disconnection of hoses.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The company should ensure that each ship is:\n.2 appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations onboard.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to provide guidance on the minimum number of personnel\nthat should form the cargo operations team on duty during cargo operations.\nThe procedures should consider the various stages of a cargo operation and describe the level of supervision and\nsupport required in the cargo control room and on deck while:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Connecting or disconnecting cargo hoses or marine loading arms.\nCommencing loading or discharging operations.\nBulk loading and/or discharging.\nTopping off cargo tanks.\nCrude oil washing or cargo tank cleaning.\nStripping cargo tanks.\nDraining lines.\nThe procedure should additionally consider that:\n• •\nMoorings and the means of access must be properly tended throughout all port operations, and that cargo\noperations such as topping off, sounding tanks during stripping and surveying activities may distract the\ndeck support rating(s) for considerable periods of time.\nSimultaneous operations may require additional personnel to be on duty to supervise and conduct any\nSIMOPS without impacting the cargo operation and mooring system management.\nThe cargo / port operations planning documentation should include details of the supervision and manning required\nfor the various stages of operations.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and\nsupport levels required during cargo / port operations.\n• •\nReview the cargo / port operations planning documentation for a recent cargo operation and verify that the\nsupervision and support levels identified for the various stages of the operation were in accordance with the\nguidance provided by the company procedures.\nDuring the balance of the inspection verify that the supervision and support available for cargo / port\noperations was maintained in accordance with the cargo / port planning documentation and the company\nguidance for cargo operations team.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and support levels required during\ncargo / port operations.\nThe cargo / port planning documentation for the current operations and the previous three months or six\ncargo / port operations whichever is the lesser.\nThe Bridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and support levels required\nduring cargo / port operations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures that provided guidance on the\nsupervision and support levels required during cargo / port operations.\nThe cargo / port planning documentation did not include the level of supervision and support required during\nthe various stages of cargo / port operations.\nThe cargo / port planning documentation was not developed in alignment with the company procedures that\nprovided guidance on the supervision and support levels required during cargo / port operations.\nThe level of supervision and support in the cargo control room and on deck observed during the inspections\nwas not in alignment with the company procedures that provided guidance on the supervision and support\nlevels required during cargo / port operations.\nThe cargo operation team supervisors and/or support were observed to be involved with a conflicting\noperation (SIMOPS) and distracted from their designated duties documented within the cargo / port plans.\nOperations identified by the company procedures as requiring senior officer supervision, such as, crude oil\nwashing, commencing loading/discharging operations or completing loading/discharging operations were not\nsupervised as required.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.4.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for checking", "c": "and testing cargo and ballast system valves, and were the valves and the remote control\nsystem in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and ballast valve testing.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that cargo and ballast system valves always operate as designed.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n12.1.3 Valve operation\nValves that control liquid flow should be closed slowly. The time that it takes for power operated valves to move from\nopen to closed, and from closed to open, should be checked regularly at their normal operating temperature.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\n4.1.4 Cargo Valves\nIsolating valves for cargo tanks must meet the requirements of the IGC Code...\nThe types of valve normally found on gas carriers are ball, globe, gate or butterfly valves. These valves are usually\nfitted with pneumatic or hydraulic actuators.\nSystem design will usually be such that valves will default to a safe position in the event of an actuator power failure.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast\nsystem valves, including manifold valves, which included the:\n• •\n• •\n• Frequency of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.\nRecords to be kept of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.\nProcedure for checking of the time taken for power operated valves to move from open to closed, and from\nclosed to open.\nProcedure for verifying the accuracy of local and remote valve indicators.\nProcedure for testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the vessel.\nThese procedures may form part of the planned maintenance system and should refer to:\n• •\nThe valve manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe ship’s drawings which identified the designed opening and closing times for each size, type and service\nof power operated valve fitted in the cargo and ballast systems.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo\nand ballast system valves.\nReview the records for valve testing which included:\no The actual times recorded for opening and closing.\no The verification of the accuracy of local and remote valve indicators.\nDuring the course of the inspection, observe the operation of cargo and ballast system valves to verify their\ncondition and satisfactory operation.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.\no The required times for opening and closing of each size, type and service of power operated valve\nfitted in the cargo and ballast systems.\no The actions to take if the opening and closing times for cargo or ballast system valves were not in\naccordance with the designed valve operating speed.\no The procedure to operate the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable\nto the vessel.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.\nThe manufacturer's operation and maintenance manual for the power operated valves fitted in the cargo and\nballast systems.\nThe ship's drawings which identified the design opening and closing times for each size, type and service of\npower operated valve fitted in the cargo and ballast systems.\nRecords of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves\nwhich included the:\no Frequency of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.\no Records to be kept of checks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves.\no Procedure for checking of the time taken for power operated valves to move from open to closed,\nand from closed to open, and the optimum times.\no Verification of the accuracy of local and remote valve indicators.\nProcedure for testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to\nthe vessel.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedures for the regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.\no The emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the vessel.\nThere were no records of regular checking and testing of cargo and ballast system valves.\nChecks and tests of cargo and ballast system valves did not include:\no Checking and recording the time taken for power operated valves to move from open to closed,\nand from closed to open.\no Verifying that the local and remote valve indicators were showing the correct position of the valve.\no Testing the emergency valve control mode and local hand pumps, as applicable to the vessel.\nRecords indicated that power operated valves were not operating in the optimum times.\nA cargo or ballast system valve indicator was observed to be indicating the incorrect position of the valve.\n(e.g. the valve signal was set to full open or full closed, but the valve indicator did not reflect the order by\nshowing an intermediate position or by continuing to flash).\nA hydraulically operated cargo or ballast system valve was isolated from the hydraulic system due to\nsuspected hydraulic leakage.\nA cargo or ballast system valve designed to be remotely operated was disconnected from the remote control\nsystem and was being operated manually.\nThe valve hydraulic system was not maintained at normal operating pressure during cargo transfer\noperations due to suspected hydraulic oil leakage in the system.\nThe valve hydraulic system or pneumatic system was not set to automatically maintain the normal system\noperating pressure throughout cargo and ballast transfer operations.\nThere was evidence of excessive hydraulic oil loss from the valve hydraulic system.\nA cargo or ballast system valve was observed to be defective in any respect.\nThe cargo and ballast system valve remote control system was defective in any respect.\nThere was no functional emergency valve control mode local hand pump available.\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n•", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.5.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison of the fixed cargo tank level\ngauging system, and was the system in satisfactory condition and fully operational?\nShort Question Text\nFixed cargo tank level gauging system.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the fixed tank level gauging system is always fully operational, reliable and accurate.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n12.8.6 Cargo tank monitoring systems\nTank monitoring equipment often has multiple functions, such as radar or other remote gauging, temperature\nmeasurement, tank pressure sensors and level alarms. It may be integrated with other cargo monitoring or control\nequipment or with loading computers or control systems. Manufacturers may refer to the multi-function units as cargo\ntank monitoring systems.\nWhether provided as a complete system or as separate elements, planned maintenance procedures should be\nestablished to ensure maintenance, test and calibration of this equipment per the manufacturer’s instructions.\nA risk assessment should identify procedures to enable work to continue if tank monitoring equipment fails. If\ntemporary exchange with a unit from another tank is considered, check the compatibility. The equipment may need to\nbe recalibrated.\nIMO: IBC Code\n13.1.1 Cargo tanks shall be fitted with one of the following types of gauging devices:\nOpen device: which makes use of an opening in the tanks and may expose the gauger to the cargo or its vapour. An\nexample of this is the ullage opening.\nRestricted device: which penetrates the tank and which, when in use, permits a small quantity of cargo vapour or\nliquid to be exposed to the atmosphere. When not in use, the device is completely closed. The design shall ensure\nthat no dangerous escape of tank contents (liquid or spray) can take place in opening the device.\nClosed device: which penetrates the tank, but which is part of a closed system and keeps tank contents from being\nreleased. Examples are the float-type systems, electronic probe, magnetic probe and protected sight-glass.\nAlternatively, an indirect device which does not penetrate the tank shell, and which is independent of the tank may be\nused. Examples are weighing of cargo, pipe flow meter.\n13.1.2 Gauging devices shall be independent of the equipment required under 15.19.\n13.1.3 Open gauging and restricted gauging shall be allowed only where:\nopen venting is allowed by the Code; or means are provided for relieving tank pressure before the gauge is operated.\n13.1.4 Types of gauging for individual products are shown in column j in the table of chapter 17.\nIMO: IGC Code\n13.1.1 Each cargo tank shall be provided with a means for indicating level, pressure and temperature of the cargo.\nPressure gauges and temperature indicating devices shall be installed in the liquid and vapour piping systems, in\ncargo refrigeration installations.\n13.1.2 If loading and unloading of the ship is performed by means of remotely controlled valves and pumps, all\ncontrols and indicators associated with a given cargo tank shall be concentrated in one control position.\n13.1.3 Instruments shall be tested to ensure reliability under the working conditions and recalibrated at regular\nintervals. Test procedures for instruments and the intervals between recalibration shall be in accordance with\nmanufacturer's recommendations.\n13.2 Level indicators for cargo tanks\n13.2.1 Each cargo tank shall be fitted with liquid level gauging device(s), arranged to ensure that a level reading is\nalways obtainable whenever the cargo tank is operational. The device(s) shall be designed to operate throughout the\ndesign pressure range of the cargo tank and at temperatures within the cargo operating temperature range.\n13.2.2 Where only one liquid level gauge is fitted, it shall be arranged so that it can be maintained in an operational\ncondition without the need to empty or gas-free the tank.\n13.2.3 Cargo tank liquid level gauges may be of the following types, subject to special requirements for particular\ncargoes shown in column \"g\" in the table of chapter 19:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nindirect devices, which determine the amount of cargo by means such as weighing or in-line flow metering.\nclosed devices which do not penetrate the cargo tank, such as devices using radio-isotopes or ultrasonic\ndevices.\nclosed devices which penetrate the cargo tank, but which form part of a closed system and keep the cargo\nfrom being released, such as float type systems, electronic probes, magnetic probes and bubble tube\nindicators. If closed gauging device is not mounted directly onto the tank, it shall be provided with a shutoff\nvalve located as close as possible to the tank; and\nrestricted devices which penetrate the tank and, when in use, permit a small quantity of cargo vapour or\nliquid to escape to the atmosphere, such as fixed tube and slip tube gauges. When not in use, the devices\nshall be kept completely closed. The design and installation shall ensure that no dangerous escape of cargo\ncan take place when opening the device. Such gauging devices shall be so designed that the maximum\nopening does not exceed 1.5 mm diameter or equivalent area unless the device is provided with an excess\nflow valve.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n5.5.3.2 Tankers fitted with a fixed inert gas system shall be provided with a closed ullage system.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and\ncomparison of the fixed tank level gauging system, based on the manufacturer’s instructions, which included the:\n• •\n• •\nProcedure and frequency for tests and calibrations.\nProcedure and frequency for comparison checks against portable equipment or secondary tank level\ngauges, where practicable.\nProcedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo transfer operations in the event of a failure\nof the fixed tank level gauging system or individual cargo tank fixed gauging device.\nRecords to be maintained.\nThese procedures and records may form part of the vessel’s planned maintenance system.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing,\ncalibration and comparison of the fixed tank level gauging system.\nReview the records of maintenance, testing, calibration, and comparison checks of the fixed tank level\ngauge system.\nRequest the accompanying officer to demonstrate the use of the fixed tank level gauging system to verify\noperation and familiarity.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison\nchecks of the fixed tank level gauging system.\no The actions to take if the fixed gauging system or an individual cargo tank fixed gauging device is\ndefective or unreliable.\no The setting and monitoring of any level alarms built into the fixed tank level gauging system.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison checks of the\nfixed tank level gauging system.\nThe manufacturer’s instruction manual for the fixed tank level gauging system.\nRecords of maintenance, testing, calibration, and comparison checks of the fixed tank level gauge system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison\nchecks of the fixed tank level gauging system based on the manufacturer’s instructions.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\nThe company procedures for the operation, maintenance, testing, calibration and comparison\nchecks of the fixed tank level gauging system.\no The actions to take if the fixed gauging system or an individual cargo tank fixed gauging device is\ndefective or unreliable.\no The setting and monitoring of any level alarms built into the fixed tank level gauging system.\nTesting and calibration of the fixed tank level gauging system had not been performed in accordance with\nthe company procedures and/or manufacturer’s instructions.\nThere were no records available of testing and calibration of the fixed tank level gauging system.\nFixed tank level gauges had not been regularly checked against portable equipment or secondary tank level\ngauges, where practicable, and records of the comparison maintained.\nThere were significant discrepancies in the comparison between the fixed tank level gauges and the\nportable or secondary gauges.\nThere was no procedure, based on risk assessment, to enable continued cargo transfer operations in the\nevent of a failure of the fixed tank level gauging system.\nThe fixed tank level gauging system was inoperative, and gauging was being performed using portable\nequipment.\nThe fixed tank level gauging system was unreliable, and gauging was being performed using portable\nequipment.\nLevel alarms built into the fixed ullaging system, if any, were permanently silenced or inhibited\nThe fixed tank level gauging system was defective in any respect.\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Where the vessel was not fitted with fixed cargo tank level gauging equipment, select “Not Answerable” in each of\nthe response tools then select \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.6.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedure and", "c": "manufacturer’s instructions for the periodic testing of the stability and loading\ninstrument(s), and were records maintained to confirm that tests had been completed in\naccordance with the procedure?\nShort Question Text\nStability and loading instrument(s)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nIACS: Unified Requirement S1 Requirements for the Loading Conditions\nLoading Manuals and Loading Instruments\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS: Unified Requirements L5 Computer Software for Onboard Stability Calculations\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel’s stability and loading instrument(s) provides accurate stress and stability\ncalculations.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS Unified Requirements S1 Requirements for Loading Conditions, Loading Manuals and Loading\nInstruments\nS1.1.2 Definitions\nLoading Instrument\nA loading instrument is an instrument, which is either analogue or digital, by means of which it can be easily and\nquickly ascertained that, at specified read-out points, the still water bending moments, shear forces, and the still\nwater torsional moments and lateral loads, where applicable, in any load or ballast condition will not exceed the\nspecified permissible values.\nAn operational manual is always to be provided for the loading instrument.\nSingle point loading instruments are not acceptable.\nS1.1.3 Annual and Special Survey\nAt each Annual and Special Survey, it is to be checked that the approved loading guidance information is available on\nboard.\nThe loading instrument is to be checked for accuracy at regular intervals by the ship's Master by applying test loading\nconditions.\nAt each Special Survey this checking is to be done in the presence of the Surveyor.\nS1.2 Loading Conditions, Loading Manuals and Loading Instruments\nS1.2.1 General\nAn approved loading manual is to be supplied for all ships except those of Category II with length less than 90m in\nwhich the deadweight does not exceed 30% of the displacement at the summer load line draft.\nIn addition, an approved loading instrument is to be supplied for all ships of Category I of 100m in length and above.\nS1.2.3 Condition of Approval of Loading Instruments\nThe loading instrument is subject to approval, which is to include:\n• •\n• •\n• verification of type approval if any\nverification that the final data of the ship has been used\nacceptance of number and position of read-out points\nacceptance of relevant limits for all read-out points\nchecking of proper installation and operation of the instrument on board, in accordance with agreed test\nconditions, and that a copy of the operation manual is available.\nIn case of modifications implying changes in the main data of the ship, the loading instrument is to be modified\naccordingly and approved.\nThe operation manual and the instrument output must be prepared in a language understood by the users. If this\nlanguage is not English, a translation into English is to be included.\nThe operation of the loading instrument is to be verified upon installation. It is to be checked that the agreed test\nconditions and the operation manual for the instrument is available on board.\nIACS Unified Requirements L5 Computer Software for Onboard Stability Calculations\n1. General\nAn operation manual is to be provided for the onboard computer stability software.\n• •\nThe language in which the stability information is displayed and printed out as well as the operation manual\nwritten shall be the same as used in the ship’s approved stability information. The society may require a\ntranslation into a language considered appropriate.\nIn case of modifications implying changes in the main data or internal arrangement of the ship, the specific\napproval of any original stability calculation software is no longer valid. The software is to be modified\naccordingly and re- approved.\n8. Installation Testing\nTo ensure correct working of the computer after the final or updated software has been installed, it is the\nresponsibility of the ship’s Master to have test calculations carried out according to the following pattern in the\npresence of a Society surveyor:\nFrom the approved test conditions at least one load case (other than light ship) shall be calculated. Note: Actual\nloading condition results are not suitable for checking the correct working of the computer.\nNormally, the test conditions are permanently stored in the computer. Steps to be performed:\n• Retrieve the test load case and start a calculation run; compare the stability results with those in the\ndocumentation.\n• •\n• Change several items of deadweight (tank weights and the cargo weight) sufficiently to change the draught\nor displacement by at least 10%. The results are to be reviewed to ensure that they differ in a logical way\nfrom those of the approved test condition.\nRevise the above modified load condition to restore the initial test condition and compare the results.\nConfirm that the relevant input and output data of the approved test condition have been replicated.\nAlternatively, one or more test conditions shall be selected, and the test calculation performed by entering all\ndeadweight data for each selected test condition into the program as if it were a proposed loading. The\nresults shall be verified as identical to the results in the approved copy of the test conditions.\n9. Periodical Testing\nIt is the responsibility of the ship’s master to check the accuracy of the onboard computer for stability calculations at\neach Annual Survey by applying at least one approved test condition. If a Society surveyor is not present for the\ncomputer check, a copy of the test condition results obtained by the computer check is to be retained on board as\ndocumentation of satisfactory testing for the surveyor’s verification.\nAt each Special Survey this checking for all approved test loading conditions is to be done in presence of the\nsurveyor.\nThe testing procedure shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 8.\n10. Other Requirements\nProtection against unintentional or unauthorised modification of programs and data shall be provided.\nThe program shall monitor operation and activate an alarm when the program is incorrectly or abnormally used.\nThe program and any data stored in the system shall be protected from corruption by loss of power.\nError messages with regard to limitations such as filling a compartment beyond capacity, or exceeding the assigned\nload line, etc. shall be included.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include\n• Loading computer or alternative calculations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex I\nChapter 4 Regulation 28\nAll oil tankers shall be fitted with a stability instrument, capable of verifying compliance with intact and damage\nstability requirements approved by the Administration having regard to the performance standards recommended by\nthe Organization.\nIMO: IBC Code\n2.2.6\nAll ships subject to the Code shall be fitted with a stability instrument, capable of verifying compliance with intact and\ndamage stability requirements approved by the Administration having regard to the performance standards\nrecommended by the Organization.\nIMO: IGC Code\n2.2.6\nAll ships subject to the Code shall be fitted with a stability instrument, capable of verifying compliance with intact and\ndamage stability requirements approved by the Administration having regard to the performance standards\nrecommended by the Organization.\nInspection Guidance\nBy IMO regulation, all oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers must be fitted with a stability instrument, capable\nof verifying compliance with intact and damage stability requirements.\nIt is a class requirement that all oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers over 100 metres in length must be fitted\nwith a loading instrument for calculating SF/BMs etc.\nIn most cases these requirements will be combined in one stability and loading instrument, which may be computer\nbased.\nClass approvals for stability and loading instruments are made under a type approvals process. Type-approval\ncertificates are generally valid for periods of not more than five years.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1221 states that the validity of the type approval certificate itself has no influence on the operational\nvalidity of a product accepted and installed onboard ship and that a product manufactured during the period of validity\nof the relevant type approval certificate need not be renewed or replaced due to the expiry of such type approval\ncertificate.\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures requiring the vessel’s stability and loading instrument to be\ntested regularly, at least at annual and special surveys, using approved test conditions and with test records\nmaintained.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the testing of the stability and loading\ninstrument.\nReview a recent test of the stability and loading instrument and verify that the condition used was an\napproved test condition and that the test was conducted in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.\nVerify that the stability and loading instrument had been tested at Special Survey in the presence of a class\nsurveyor.\nVerify that the accompanying officer was able to demonstrate the damage stability function of the\ninstrument.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the management and testing of the stability and loading instrument.\nThe stability and loading instrument instruction manual.\nThe records for the regular tests of the stability and loading instrument accuracy by vessel staff.\nThe records for the annual tests of the stability and loading instrument at the time of annual survey.\nThe records for the tests in the presence of a class surveyor at the time of special survey.\n• Where a vessel was exempt from carrying a stability and/or loading instrument under IMO regulations or\nclass requirements, a copy of the appropriate certificate indicating that the instrument was not required.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure requiring the periodic testing of the vessel’s loading instrument.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures or the manufacturer’s instructions for\ntesting the loading instrument.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the damage stability functions of the loading instrument.\nThe vessel had not completed the periodic verification of the loading instrument accuracy in accordance with\nthe company procedures or the manufacturer’s instructions.\nRecords were not available for the periodic verification of the loading instrument accuracy.\nRecords were not available for the verification of the loading instrument accuracy at Special Survey in the\npresence of a Class Surveyor.\nThe loading instrument in use was defective in any respect.\nThe vessel did not have a loading instrument but there was no clear evidence that the vessel was exempt\nfrom the requirement to carry such a device.\nWhere the vessel was exempt from carrying a loading instrument, provide details of why the vessel was exempt as a\ncomment within the hardware response tool", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.7.", "t": "Where the vessel was subject to loading restrictions and/or intact stability", "c": "concerns at any phase of a voyage or cargo operation, had the company developed\nprocedures to manage these restrictions and/or concerns, and were the Master and\ncargo officers familiar with the company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nLoading limitations\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel is never loaded in such a manner that any structural limitations are exceeded due\nto tank filling level, or intact stability is compromised by unmanaged free surface effect.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.2 Stability, stress, trim and sloshing considerations\nOil tankers usually have a high metacentric height in all conditions, so they remain inherently stable. While tanker\npersonnel have always had to take account of longitudinal bending moments and vertical shear forces during cargo\nand ballast operations, the actual stability of the ship has seldom been a major concern. Masters and officers should\naccount for free surface and sloshing effects during all stages of cargo and ballast operations. Double hull tankers,\nparticularly those without centreline bulkheads in cargo tanks and/or having U-shaped ballast tanks, may face\npotential issues from large free surface effects influencing their stability.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.9.3 Sloshing\nWithin a particular range of cargo tank filling levels, the pitching and rolling of the ship and the liquid free surface can\ncreate high impact pressure on cargo tanks. This effect is called ‘sloshing’ and can cause structural damage,\nparticularly to membrane containment systems. Filling levels within this range should therefore be avoided.\nGuidance on acceptable filling limits should be sought from the operator, ship designer and/or Classification Society\nTMSA KPI 6.2.1 requires that a comprehensive procedure for planning cargo, ballast and bunkering operations is in\nplace for all types of vessel within the fleet which includes:\n• •\n• Stability, stress, draught and trim calculations for key stages of the operation.\nFree surface restrictions,\nHighlighting limitations on numbers and location of slack tanks.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have identified whether the vessel was subject to:\n• •\n• •\nRestrictions in the density of the cargoes that may be loaded onboard or in any individual tanks.\nRestrictions in the filling height for any tanks onboard and the phases of operations for which the restrictions\nare in place.\nIntact stability concerns due to large width cargo tanks, double bottom tanks without a centreline bulkhead or\n“U” section ballast tanks.\nAny other loading limitations or stability concerns.\nWhere the vessel is subject to any of the above restrictions or concerns the vessel operator should have developed\nprocedures to:\n• •\n• Warn the vessel staff of the limitations imposed.\nInstruct the vessel staff to avoid any limitations or concerns entirely, or where this is not possible,\nAdvise the actions to take to mitigate the restrictions and/or concerns.\nWhere a vessel had undergone any weight variations, such as the installation of a scrubber or ballast water treatment\nplant or, major structural modifications, the vessel operator should have arranged for the loading instrument and\nstability booklet to be updated as appropriate.\nThe vessel operator should have declared any loading limitations or stability concerns through the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire which will be inserted in the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the vessel loading and stability manual, identify whether the vessel was subject to any loading\nrestrictions or stability concerns and verify that the vessel operator’s declaration in the pre-inspection\nquestionnaire was correct.\nWhere the vessel was subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, review the company procedures\nthat addressed the issues and verify that:\no Cargo and ballast plans had been developed to address the loading limitations or stability\nconcerns.\no Warning signs had been posted to inform the cargo officers of the loading limitations and/or stability\nconcerns.\no Cargo and ballast records confirmed that the company procedures relating to the limitations and\nconcerns had been complied with.\nWhere a vessel had undergone any weight variations, such as the installation of a scrubber or ballast water\ntreatment plant or, major structural modifications, verify that the loading instrument and stability booklet had\nbeen updated as appropriate.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel’s loading and stability manual.\nThe company procedures that addressed any loading limitations or stability concerns.\nRecent cargo plans and records to demonstrate that the company procedures to address any loading\nlimitations or stability concerns had been complied with.\nEvidence that the impact of any equipment installations or structural modifications had been assessed and\nthe loading instrument and stability manual updated as appropriate.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel operator had not correctly declared any loading limitations or stability concerns applicable to the\nvessel through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThe vessel was subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but the vessel operator had not\ndeveloped procedures to manage the issues onboard the vessel.\nThe vessel was subject to loading limitations or stability concerns, but there were no warning signs posted to\nnotify the officers with cargo related responsibilities of the issues onboard the vessel.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the loading limitations or stability concerns applicable to the\nvessel, where they existed.\nThe cargo plans had not been developed to address loading limitations or stability concerns where they\nexisted.\nVessel records determined that the guidance provided by the company procedure to address loading\nlimitations or stability concerns had not been complied with.\nThe vessel had undergone weight variations due to the installation of a scrubber or ballast water treatment\nsystem, or major structural modifications, but there was no evidence that the loading instrument and/or\nstability booklet had been updated to take account of the changes where appropriate.\nWhere the vessel had been confirmed as not being subject to any loading limitations or stability concerns this\nquestion should be answered as N/A under the Process response tool.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.8.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "selection, inspection, testing and storage of cargo transfer hoses, and were the hoses in\nsatisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo transfer hoses.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nSIGTTO: Floating LNG installations 1st edition 2021\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nOCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum\nChemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Handling\nStorage\nUse\nMaintenance and Testing of STS Hoses. First Edition.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure ship supplied cargo transfer hoses are always fit for purpose.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Handling, Storage, Use, Maintenance and Testing of STS Hoses. First Edition.\n3 Composite hose assemblies\nComposite STS hose assemblies are typically used for liquified gas and chemical transfers. These hoses are\nresistant to cryogenic cargoes, high-aromatic-content cargoes and various other cargoes that are not compatible with\nrubber compounds.\nComposite STS hoses are very different from rubber hose assemblies, and it is important that users understand\nthese differences as well as their properties. Composite hoses are lightweight and flexible, but it is important that the\nmanufacturers’ minimum bend radius (MBR) guidance is strictly followed.\n4.6 Bend radius\nCare should be taken when handling and supporting hose strings to avoid any kinking or over-stressing that may\ncause damage or reduce service life. To prevent damage when handling or supporting hoses, the hose’s MBR should\nbe taken into account. Helix-free rubber STS hoses should not be bent beyond six times their nominal bore. The MBR\nfor storage and operation should be confirmed with the manufacturer.\n5.8 Inspection and testing\nTests and inspections should be conducted every twelve months as a minimum. The testing and inspection frequency\nshould take into account the types of products handled through the hose, the age of the hose, and the severity of\nservice conditions. A decision, dependent on the testing and inspection regime, can then be made about whether to\nretire a hose or keep it in service.\n5.8.9.1 Hose service life\nThe service life of a hose depends on factors such as age, handling, throughput and storage conditions. There are\nvarious approaches to gauging the life of a hose during the time it is in service. Service life expectancy should be\nbased on a combination of testing and visual inspection…\n…Test records should be kept for each hose. It is recommended that the temporary and permanent elongations be\ncompared to previous readings to facilitate trending and to give early indication of maximum elongation exceedance.\nSIGTTO: Floating LNG installations 1st edition 2021\n2.5.3 Gas transfer system\nEquipment should be designed, constructed and tested in compliance with BS EN 1474-3 (Reference 12) for\nhoses….and certified to the required SIL(safety integrity level), determined in the owner’s risk analysis.\nAnnex 3 Reference List\n12. BS EN 1474-3 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas – Design and testing of marine transfer\nsystems – Offshore transfer systems\nOCIMF*: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\n9.2.7 Marking\nEach transfer hose should be permanently marked with the information required by the appropriate international\nstandard and other applicable regulations, such as the IGC Code. Information provided will include details such as:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe manufacturers name or trademark.\nIdentification of the standard specification for manufacture.\nMaximum allowable working pressure.\nMonth and year of manufacture and manufacturers serial number.\nIndication that the hose is electrically continuous, electrically discontinuous or semi-continuous.\nThe type of service for which it is intended e.g. oil, product, petroleum gas.\nOCIMF* A joint publication by OCIMF/SIGTTO/ICS/CDI\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n18.2.6 Inspection, testing and maintenance requirements for cargo hoses\nHoses in service should have a documented inspection at least annually to confirm their suitability for continued use.\nHoses should be retired in accordance with defined criteria (see section 18.2.6.5).\nAll hoses should be certified, fit for purpose, in good physical condition, and should have been pressure tested. A\nrecord of all hose certificates should be maintained and made available for review by appropriate parties on request.\n18.2.6.2 Visual examination\nA visual examination should be carried out before each use and consist of examining the:\n• •\n• •\nHose assembly for signs of damage, slippage or misalignment.\nInternal liner, where applicable.\nHose cover to determine if any cuts, gouges or abrasions have penetrated to a liquid barrier.\nFor crushed or kinked areas, longitudinal ridges or bulges.\nAdditionally, for composite hoses:\n• Pitch angle and spacing between wraps in outer helix wire, excessive corrosion, rust or scaling on wire\nhelices.\nA hose assembly exhibiting any of the above defects should be removed from service for a more detailed inspection\nto determine suitability for continued use. When a hose assembly is withdrawn from service following a visual\ninspection, the reason for withdrawal and the date should be recorded.\n18.2.6.3 Hydrostatic pressure testing\nHose assemblies should be hydrostatically tested to check their integrity. The intervals between tests should be\ndetermined in accordance with service experience but, in any case, should not be more than 12 months. Testing\nintervals should be shortened for hoses handling particularly aggressive products, for products at elevated\ntemperatures or for older hoses.\nIf the rated pressure of a hose has been exceeded, it should be removed and retested before further use. A record\nshould be kept of the service history of each hose assembly.\n18.2.6.4 Electrical continuity and discontinuity test\nSince electrical continuity can be affected by any of the physical hose tests, a check on electrical resistance should\nbe carried out before, during and after the pressure tests.\n18.2.6.6 Explanation of pressure rating for hoses\nMaximum Working pressure (MWP)\nThe MWP is the maximum hose pressure capability. This pressure rating is expected to account for dynamic surge\npressures and is used by BS and EN Standards for designing hoses.\n18.2.9 Extended storage\nNew hoses or hoses removed from service for a period of two months or more, should as far as practicable be kept in\na cool, dark, dry storage in which air can circulate freely. They should be drained and washed out with fresh water\nand laid out horizontally on solid supports, spaced to keep the hose straight. No oil should be allowed to come into\ncontact with the outside of the hose.\nIf the hose is stored outside, it should be well protected from the ultraviolet rays of the sun.\nSIGTTO: Liquified Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals. Fourth Edition.\nFor LNG, hoses can be of composite construction or of corrugated stainless steel, but the composite type is generally\npreferred.\nFor LPG, hoses may be of similar construction to those used for LNG, but hoses of synthetic rubber manufacture may\nalso be used.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\n156.170 - Equipment tests and inspections\n(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no person may use any equipment listed in paragraph (c) of\nthis section for transfer operations unless the vessel or facility operator, as appropriate, tests and inspects the\nequipment in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) of this section and the equipment is in the condition\nspecified in paragraph (c) of this section.\n(b) During any test or inspection required by this section, the entire external surface of the hose must be accessible.\n(c) For the purpose of paragraph (a) of this section:\n(1) Each non-metallic transfer hose must:\n(i) Have no unrepaired loose covers, kinks, bulges, soft spots or any other defect which would permit the discharge of\noil or hazardous material through the hose material, and no gouges, cuts or slashes that penetrate the first layer of\nhose reinforcement as defined in § 156.120(i).\n(ii) Have no external deterioration and, to the extent internal inspection is possible with both ends of the hose open,\nno internal deterioration;\n(iii) Not burst, bulge, leak, or abnormally distort under static liquid pressure at least 1.5 times the maximum allowable\nworking pressure;\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10 Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IBC Code\n5.7.1 Liquid and vapour hoses used for cargo transfer shall be compatible with the cargo and suitable for the cargo\ntemperature.\n5.7.2 Hoses subject to tank pressure or the discharge pressure of pumps shall be designed for a bursting pressure\nnot less than 5 times the maximum pressure the hose will be subjected to during cargo transfer.\n5.7.3 …. Thereafter, before being placed in service, each new length of cargo hose produced shall be hydrostatically\ntested at ambient temperature to a pressure not less than 1.5 times its specified maximum working pressure but not\nmore than two-fifths of its bursting pressure. The hose shall be stencilled or otherwise marked with the date of testing,\nits specified maximum working pressure and, if used in services other than the ambient temperature services, its\nmaximum and minimum service temperature, as applicable. The specified maximum working pressure shall not be\nless than 1 MPa gauge.\nIMO: IGC Code\n5.11.7.1 Liquid and vapour hoses used for cargo transfer shall be compatible with the cargo and suitable for the\ncargo temperature.\n5.11.7.2 Hoses subject to tank pressure, or the discharge pressure of pumps or vapour compressors, shall be\ndesigned for a bursting pressure not less than five times the maximum pressure the hose will be subjected to during\ncargo transfer.\n5.11.7.3 …. Thereafter, before being placed in service, each new length of cargo hose produced shall be\nhydrostatically tested at ambient temperature to a pressure not less than 1.5 times its specified maximum working\npressure, but not more than two fifths of its bursting pressure. The hose shall be stencilled, or otherwise marked, with\nthe date of testing, its specified maximum working pressure and, if used in services other than ambient temperature\nservices, its maximum and minimum service temperature, as applicable. The specified maximum working pressure\nshall not be less than 1 MPa gauge.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the selection, inspection, testing, storage and retirement\nof cargo transfer hoses that included the:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSelection of compatible hoses for specific cargo service.\nInformation to be clearly marked on the hoses including:\no The manufacturers name or trademark.\no Identification of the standard specification for manufacture.\no Maximum working pressure.\no Month and year of manufacture and manufacturers serial number.\no Indication that the hose is electrically continuous, electrically discontinuous, or semi-continuous.\no The type of service for which it is intended e.g. oil, product, petroleum gas.\no Last hydrostatic test date and test pressure.\no Any operational restrictions for use of the hose such as minimum bend radius (MBR) or maximum\nflow rate.\nDetails and frequency of:\no Hydrostatic tests.\no Tests for electrical continuity.\nRecords and documentation to be maintained, including:\no Inspection and pressure/elongation/electrical continuity test data.\no Compatibility data.\no Service history.\nHose retirement criteria.\nGuidance on hose storage.\nHoses should be tested to 1.5 times their MWP.\nCryogenic hoses can only be safely tested under controlled conditions ashore which may include liquid nitrogen as\nthe test medium. Cargo hoses used on LNG carriers should be pressure tested prior to each use, however, vessels\nthat are conducting transfers using hoses on a regular basis, may have an alternative documented procedure in place\nto ensure the integrity of the transfer hoses.\nCryogenic hoses should be protected from sunlight and weather and kept covered except when in use. Blank flanges\nmust be fitted to each end each and the hoses charged internally with nitrogen.\nPortable cargo pump hoses should be tested and maintained as per manufacturers guidelines.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing and\nstorage of cargo transfer hoses.\nReview the certificates, compatibility data, inspection records, service history and, hydrostatic and electrical\ncontinuity test records for the cargo transfer hoses.\nInspect ship supplied cargo transfer hoses which were either in use and/or stored onboard.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing and storage of cargo transfer hoses.\no The inspections that must be conducted before a cargo transfer hose is used.\no Any limitations or special handling considerations for the hoses provided onboard.\no The records that must be maintained for cargo transfer usage.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing, storage, and retirement of cargo transfer\nhoses.\nCargo transfer hose certificates and compatibility data.\nInspection records.\nHydrostatic, elongation and electrical continuity test records.\nCargo transfer hose usage history.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the selection, inspection, testing, storage, and retirement of cargo\ntransfer hoses.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the selection, inspection,\ntesting, storage, and retirement of cargo transfer hoses.\nA ship supplied cargo transfer hose:\no Was not clearly marked with the required information.\no Had not been inspected within the last 12 months to confirm suitability for continued use.\no Had not been pressure tested within the last 12 months to confirm suitability for continued use.\no Had not been retired in accordance with the company set criteria.\no Had visual damage as detailed in the guidance but had not been withdrawn from service.\no Had not been tested for electrical continuity since the last hydrostatic test.\no Was not compatible with the cargo being handled and/or the cargo temperature.\no Had a maximum working pressure of less than 1MPa (approximately 145 psi or 10.2 kg/cm2).\no Was stored or used with a bend radius less than the minimum bend radius (MBR) information\nprovided by the manufacturer.\nIt could not be confirmed if a ship supplied cargo transfer hose was compatible with the cargo being handled\nand/or the cargo temperature.\nThere was no:\no Record of the service history of ship supplied cargo transfer hoses.\no Valid certificate and/or documentation on board for a ship supplied cargo transfer hose.\no Documentary evidence for hydrostatic test data marked on a ship supplied cargo transfer hose.\no Record of the temporary and permanent elongation during pressure testing for each cargo transfer\nhose.\nCargo transfer hoses were stored in unsuitable conditions or in an unsuitable manner.\nCargo transfer hoses on an LNG carrier had not been pressure tested prior to each use or in accordance\nwith an alternative documented procedure to ensure their integrity.\nPortable cargo pump hoses were:\no Damaged or in poor condition.\no Had not been tested and maintained in accordance with manufacturers guidelines.\nFlow rate through a cargo transfer hose exceeded the maximum permitted flow rate stated by the hose\nmanufacturer where flow rate was a limiting design factor.\nShip supplied cargo transfer hoses were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.9.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "periodically verifying the accuracy of cargo and ballast system controls and indicators,\nand were legible and up-to-date pipeline and/or mimic diagrams available at the cargo\ncontrol location(s) and in the pumproom(s) as applicable?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and ballast system controls, indicators, mimics and displays.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Cargo Control Room, Pumproom\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure accurate information and data is available to the officer in charge of cargo operations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n11.3 Cargo and ballast systems\n11.3.1 Operation manual\nThe ship’s crew should have access to up-to-date drawings and information on the cargo and ballast systems as well\nas an operation manual.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nPipeline and/or mimic diagrams should be updated to reflect any modifications made to the cargo and or ballast\nsystems.\nCargo and ballast system controls and indicators should be accurate and fully operational, including, where fitted:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDraft, trim and list monitoring.\nControl and monitoring of cargo and ballast pumps and associated plant.\nControl of cargo and ballast system valves and indication of status.\nTemperature monitoring in cargo and ballast plant and pipeline systems.\nPressure and vacuum monitoring in cargo and ballast plant and pipeline systems.\nCargo and ballast system information mimics/displays\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that:\n• •\n• All cargo and ballast system pressure, temperature and level sensors are periodically verified for accuracy.\nCargo information displays and mimics are checked periodically to verify that information is being transferred\nand displayed correctly.\nCargo and ballast system controls incorporated into cargo information displays and mimics are functioning\nproperly.\nThese procedures may form part of the maintenance plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight the pipeline and/or mimic diagrams in the cargo control room or cargo control position as appropriate.\nInspect cargo and ballast system controls and indicators in the cargo control room / pump control station and\nverify that:\no Where fitted, remote pressure indicators are connected and displaying a value which is appropriate\nto the status and operation of the system or pipeline being monitored.\no Where fitted, remote temperature indicators are connected and displaying a value which is\nappropriate to the status and operation of the system or pipeline being monitored.\no Where fitted, the draught, list and trim indicators are displaying an accurate value.\no Cargo and ballast pump speed controls are fully functional and that the pumps are being controlled\nfrom the cargo control room / pump control station and not from the machinery space or locally.\no Cargo and ballast system mimic diagrams or displays, where fitted, are showing the correct status\nof valves, pumps, temperatures, pressures, levels and any other monitoring function designed to be\ndisplayed.\nWhere the vessel is provided with a cargo and/or ballast pumproom:\n• •\nSight the pipeline and/or mimic diagrams\nInspect the cargo and ballast system and verify that:\no Where fitted, pressure indicators are connected and displaying a value which is appropriate to the\nstatus and operation of the system or pipeline being monitored.\no Where fitted, temperature indicators are connected and displaying a value which is appropriate to\nthe status and operation of the system or pipeline being monitored.\nThe degree of automation and monitoring provided on an inspected vessel will determine what will be in scope while\naddressing this question. The following principle should be adopted:\n• •\n• •\n• If a cargo or ballast system or plant monitoring device or system is provided, it should be functioning and\naccurate.\nIf the information from an individual monitoring device or system is transmitted to a central mimic diagram or\ninformation display, then the information displayed should be accurate.\nIf a cargo or ballast pump or component of plant is designed to be remotely controlled, then the remote\ncontrol and status indication should be functioning.\nWhere a cargo or ballast system is designed to operate automatically then the system should be maintained\nto permit automatic operation where required or permitted.\nWhere isolated faults develop which cannot be rectified with the staff and resources available onboard, they\nshould be addressed through the defect reporting system.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedures which ensured that:\no All cargo and ballast system pressure, temperature and level sensors are periodically verified for\naccuracy.\no Cargo information displays and mimics are checked periodically to verify that information is being\ntransferred and displayed correctly.\nCargo and ballast system controls incorporated into cargo information displays and mimics are\nfunctioning properly.\nCargo and ballast system plant and pipeline diagrams where no suitable mimic diagram or display was\navailable in the space.\nRecords of periodic cargo and ballast system pressure sensor accuracy verification.\nRecords of periodic cargo and ballast system temperature sensor accuracy verification.\nRecords of periodic draught gauge accuracy verification.\no\n• •\n• •\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Legible and up to date pipeline and/or mimic diagrams were not available in the pumproom(s) and/or at the\ncargo control location(s).\nPipeline and/or mimic diagrams had not been updated to reflect modifications or additions to the pipeline\nsystems.\nPipeline systems were not marked/identified consistently with the cargo systems mimic diagram or display.\nThere was no company procedure which ensured that:\no All cargo and ballast system pressure, temperature and level sensors are periodically verified for\naccuracy.\no Cargo information displays and mimics are checked periodically to verify that information is being\ntransferred and displayed correctly.\no Cargo and ballast system controls incorporated into cargo information displays and mimics are\nfunctioning properly.\nThere were no records for the periodic verification of sensor, information display, or cargo and ballast\nsystem control accuracy and/or function checks.\nA cargo or ballast pump was being controlled from the machinery space or the main deck local control\nstation due to a defect in the remote control system.\nA cargo or ballast pump speed/electrical load indicator was inaccurate or out of service.\nThe draught gauges were inaccurate.\nThe local and/or remote pressure sensor displays for the cargo or ballast system/plant were inaccurate.\nThe local and/or remote temperature sensor displays for the cargo or ballast system/plant were inaccurate.\nThe cargo systems mimic diagram or display was indicating incorrect information such as:\no Cargo or ballast pump status.\no Cargo or ballast plant status.\no Cargo or ballast pipeline pressure or temperature.\no Draught, list or trim.\no Cargo tank level.\no Cargo tank pressure.\no Cargo tank temperature.\no Cargo and ballast valve remote control system hydraulic pressure.\no Cargo or ballast system valve position. (this includes manual indication)\no Inert gas system status.\no Inert gas system valve position. (this includes manual indication)\no The venting system valve position. (this includes manual indication)\no The stripping system valve position and status. (this includes manual indication)\no Cargo and ballast system alarms.\no Cargo system controls and indicators were defective in any respect.\nWhere a single sensor or remote display input was defective or inaccurate, but the issue was in the process of being\naddressed through an open defect report, then no observation should be made.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.10.", "t": "Were the Master and officers a familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks,\nprocess plant and cargo pipelines and, were these arrangements in satisfactory\ncondition?\nShort Question Text\nCargo system bonding arrangements.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGC Code\nIMO: IBC Code\nIACS: Requirements Concerning Electrical And Electronic Installations\nObjective\nTo ensure the earthing and bonding arrangements for the cargo tanks, process plant and piping systems on\nboard are maintained as required by class rules and international regulations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n3.2.2 Bonding\nThe most important counter measure to prevent an electrostatic hazard is to bond all metallic objects together to\neliminate the risk of discharges between objects that might be charged to different voltages if they were electrically\ninsulated. To avoid discharges from conductors to earth, it is normal practice to require bonding to earth (earthing or\ngrounding). On ships, bonding to earth is effectively accomplished by connecting metallic objects to the metal\nstructure of the ship, which is naturally earthed through the sea.\nThe best method of ensuring bonding and earthing will usually be a metallic connection between the conductors.\nAlternative means of bonding are available and have proved effective in some applications, for example semiconductive (dissipative) pipes and O-rings rather than embedded metallic layers, for GRP pipes and their metal\ncouplings.\nIACS: Requirements Concerning Electrical and Electronic Installations\nE9 Earthing and bonding of cargo tanks/ process plant/piping systems for the control of static electricity\nE9.1 The hazard of an incendive discharge due to the build-up of static electricity resulting from the flow of\nliquids/gases/vapours can be avoided if the resistance between the cargo tanks/process plant/piping systems and the\nhull of the ship is not greater than 106 ohm.\nE9.2 This value of resistance will be readily achieved without the use of bonding straps where cargo tanks/process\nplant/piping systems are directly or via their supports, either welded or bolted to the hull of the ship.\nE9.3 Bonding straps are required for cargo tanks/process plant/piping systems which are not permanently connected\nto the hull of the ship, e.g.\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\nindependent cargo tanks.\ncargo tanks/piping systems which are electrically separated from the hull of the ship.\npipe connections arranged for the removal of spool pieces.\nwafer-style valves with non-conductive (e.g. PTFE) gaskets or seals.\nE9.4 Where bonding straps are required, they should be:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nclearly visible so that any shortcomings can be clearly detected.\ndesigned and sited so that they are protected against mechanical damage and that they are not affected by\nhigh resistivity contamination e.g. corrosive products or paint.\neasy to install and replace.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• •\nCargo handling machinery/equipment.\nHull structure.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: IBC Code\nChapter 10 Electrical Installations\n10.2 Bonding\nIndependent cargo tanks shall be electrically bonded to the hull. All gasketed cargo-pipe joints and hose connections\nshall be electrically bonded.\nIMO: IGC Code\nChapter 5 Process pressure vessels and liquid, vapour and pressure piping systems\n5.7.4 Bonding\nWhere tanks or cargo piping and piping equipment are separated from the ship's structure by thermal isolation,\nprovision shall be made for electrically bonding both the piping and the tanks. All gasketed pipe joints and hose\nconnections shall be electrically bonded. Except where bonding straps are used, it shall be demonstrated that the\nelectrical resistance of each joint or connection is less than 1MΩ.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for\nindependent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines. These may form part of the planned maintenance\nsystem.\nEffective bonding of independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines may be achieved in a number of\nways, such as direct structural connection to the deck or bonding straps.\nAll bonding arrangements should be maintained to the original design and size.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the\nbonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines.\nDuring the course of the inspection, examine visible bonding arrangements, such as bonding straps, for\ncargo tanks/process plant/piping systems which are not permanently connected to the hull of the ship.\nWhere the application of bonding straps or other forms of bonding was inconsistent or apparently missing,\nreview the ship’s drawings to confirm whether bonding straps or arrangements were required in the area of\nconcern.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their understanding of the bonding arrangements fitted to the\nvessel and their purpose.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for independent\ncargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines.\nThe ship’s drawings or instruction books showing bonding arrangements as fitted.\nRecords of inspections and maintenance of the bonding arrangements.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the inspection and maintenance of the bonding arrangements for\nindependent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the inspection and maintenance\nof the bonding arrangements for independent cargo tanks, process plant and cargo pipelines or the\nparticular arrangements on board the vessel.\nBonding straps or other bonding arrangements, where required by the original vessel design, were:\no Missing\no Mechanically damaged\no Functionally compromised by high resistivity contamination e.g. corrosive products or paint.\no Coated in paint hampering effective inspection.\nBonding arrangements were defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "8.99.11.", "t": "Was there a procedure in place to complete an independent check of the entire", "c": "cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system prior to commencement of cargo\noperations to ensure that valves, vacuum breakers, sampling connections, drains and\nunused connections or interconnections were correctly set, and blanked or capped,\nwhere appropriate?\nShort Question Text\nIndependent verification of cargo piping systems line up.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the entire cargo system integrity and line up is independently verified by a second person\nbefore every cargo operation.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\n12.1.2 Setting of lines and valves\nBefore starting any loading or discharging, the ship’s cargo pipelines should be set in line with the loading or\ndischarging plan and checked independently and by other personnel under the control of the Responsible Officer. If a\nchange in the line-up is required during a change of grades, the valves should be checked in the same way. The\nresponsible officer should document the completion of the task and sign it.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals) - Fifth Edition\n6.4 Preparations for Cargo Operations\n6.4.5 Preparing the cargo system prior to arrival\nOnce a cargo operation plan has been made and the lines and valves have been set, the entire system should be\nchecked by a responsible officer to ensure that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The valves and lines are correctly lined up and the valves correctly set. The system line-up is therefore\nverified by two persons independently.\nDrain valves, plugs, and sampling connections are all closed and capped where necessary;\nUnused flanges are securely blanked;\nP/V valves are correctly set;\nIf vapour return is to be used, the vapour lines are correctly set;\nHatches, lids and openings to cargo tanks not required to be open for a specific reason are securely closed,\nand\nUnless it is to be used, the stern cargo pipeline is isolated from the tanker’s main pipeline system at a point\nforward of the accommodation.\nICS: Tanker Safety Guide (Gas) - Third Edition\n6.5 Preparation for Cargo Transfer\n6.5.1 General\nPre-arrival checks should be made by the ship to ensure that:\n• •\n• ...The ship’s pipeline system is set for the relevant operation and all valves have been checked;\nThe stern cargo line, if fitted, is isolated if it is not to be used;\nAny removable pipe sections or hoses connecting the cargo system to the ship’s inert gas plant have been\nremoved and blind flanges properly fitted;...\nTMSA KPI 6.2.2 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of cargo transfer operations for each type\nof vessel within the fleet.\nThe transfer procedures are specific to the vessel type and cargo to be carried. These may include:\n• •\nPre-arrival checks\nPre-operational checks including an independent verification of line setting prior to the start of operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting\npipeline system is independently cross-checked by a second person under the control of the responsible officer prior\nto commencement of cargo operations. The procedure should describe:\n• •\n• Who may conduct the independent cross-checks of the cargo pipelines.\nWhen the cross-checks should be completed.\nWhere the verification of the cross-checks should be recorded.\nCargo pipeline system drains, stub pieces, sampling connections and vacuum breakers should be fitted with valves\nand either capped or blanked.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that that the entire cargo liquid,\nvapour and venting pipeline system is independently cross-checked by a second person under the control of\nthe responsible officer prior to commencement of cargo operations.\nReview the cargo records for a recent cargo operation and verify that the independent cross-checks on the\nentire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system had been completed and documented in accordance\nwith the company procedure.\nDuring the course of the inspection, verify that all cargo pipeline system drains, stub pieces, sampling\nconnections and vacuum breakers were closed and capped or blanked as necessary.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no\no\no\nThe procedure and process to ensure that that the entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline\nsystem is independently cross-checked by a second person under the control of the responsible\nofficer prior to commencement of cargo operations.\nWho was required to conduct the independent cross-checks in accordance with the company\nprocedure.\nHow and where the result of the independent cross-check was recorded.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures to ensure that that entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline system is\nindependently cross-checked by a second person under the control of the responsible officer prior to\ncommencement of cargo operations.\nCargo records which demonstrated that the independent cross-checks of cargo system pipelines had been\ncompleted and documented before cargo operations commenced.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure that that the entire cargo liquid, vapour and venting pipeline\nsystem is independently cross-checked by a second person under the control of the responsible officer prior\nto commencement of cargo operations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that that the entire cargo\nliquid, vapour and venting pipeline system is independently cross-checked by a second person under the\ncontrol of the responsible officer prior to commencement of cargo operations.\nThere was no documentary evidence that the independent cargo system pipeline cross-checks had been\ncompleted before commencing cargo operations.\nThe valve for a cargo pipeline drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker was not closed\nduring cargo operations.\nA cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker was not fitted with a\nvalve.\nA cargo pipeline system drain, stub piece, sampling connection or vacuum breaker was not capped or\nblanked as necessary during cargo operations.\n9. Mooring and Anchoring\n9.1. Mooring Equipment Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.1.1.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "testing and correct operation of the mooring winch brakes, and were records available to\ndemonstrate that brakes had been tested periodically, after maintenance or when there\nwas evidence of premature brake slippage?\nShort Question Text\nTesting and correct operation of the mooring winch brakes\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that mooring winches function as designed, shedding excess load at a defined value in\naccordance with the Ship Design MBL.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\n6.3.4.1 Brake holding load\nOCIMF recommends that the primary brake should be set to hold 60% of the ship design MBL on the first layer.\nSplit drum winches should not have more than one layer of mooring line on the tension section of the drum because it\ncan reduce the brake holding capacity of the mooring winch.\n6.4.5.1 Effect of layers of mooring line on brake holding load\nUndivided drum winch\nFor undivided winch drums, it is recommended to ask the manufacturer for guidance on maintaining the OCIMF\nrecommended value for brake rendering. This may require ship operational experience to identify the normal layer in\nuse for most mooring operations.\n6.4.6 Winch brake testing\n6.4.6.4 Supervision of testing\nWinch testing should be carried out under the supervision or in the presence of a responsible person familiar with the\noperation of the winches, the test procedure and the ship’s safety management system. This may be a person\ndesignated by the Master, Chief Engineer or a repair superintendent.\n6.4.6.5 Method of testing\nOnce the brakes are tested and calibrated, the torque setting should be recorded. For conventional screw brakes, a\ntag should be attached stating the torque value. For spring applied brakes the spring compression distance should be\nrecorded and the mechanism secured with a seal.\nA stopper arrangement, e.g. locking nut on the threaded end, should not be used on the tightening screw. Stopper\narrangements can impede the brake setting and reduce the brake holding load.\nTMSA KPI 6A.1.2 requires that maintenance, testing and routine inspections of mooring and anchoring equipment is\nincluded in the planned maintenance system. The planned maintenance system covers all mooring equipment. This\nequipment may include:\n• Winches and windlasses.\nWinch and windlass brake testing is conducted according to industry guidelines or local regulations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 3-8\nTowing and Mooring Equipment\n1 This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2007 but does not apply to emergency towing\narrangements provided in accordance with regulation 3-4.\n2 Ships shall be provided with arrangements, equipment and fittings of sufficient safe working load to enable the safe\nconduct of all towing and mooring operations associated with the normal operation of the ship.\n3 Arrangements, equipment and fittings provided in accordance with paragraph 2 shall meet the appropriate\nrequirements of the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration under regulation I/6*.\n4 Each fitting or item of equipment provided under this regulation shall be clearly marked with any restrictions\nassociated with its safe operation, taking into account the strength of its attachment to the ship’s structure.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed mooring procedures which are in alignment with MEG4 and the\ninformation recommended for inclusion within the Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP). The procedures\nshould provide guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe frequency of winch brake testing (MEG4 6.4.6.1).\nThe method of winch brake testing (MEG4 6.4.6.2).\nThe method of ensuring the correct torque is applied (MEG4 6.4.6.5).\nThe primary brake holding load – adjusted to 60% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4 6.3.4.1).\nThe use of split drum winches – not more than one layer of mooring line on the tension side (MEG4 6.3.4.1),\nand/or\nThe use of undivided drum winches (6.4.5.1)\n• The reeling of lines onto drums – band brakes are designed to work effectively in only one direction (MEG4\n6.3.4.2).\nIt is recognised that the testing of mooring winch brakes is often completed by engineer officers or shore-based\ncontractors. The intent of the question is to establish that the Master and deck officers are familiar with the\nrequirement for brake testing, the operation of the mooring winch brake systems and, the indicators during operation\nwhen maintenance and further testing is required.\nThe vessel operator should have uploaded one photograph relating to the brake mechanism for a representative\nmooring winch to the document portal prior to the inspection. This will be linked to this question within the inspection\neditor.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for the testing and operation of the vessel’s\nmooring winch brakes.\nReview the Mooring System Management Plan and verify that it contained the mooring winch brake testing\nrecords or, where records were integrated within the ships document control system, that the location of the\nmooring winch brake testing records was identified.\nReview the mooring winch brake testing records and verify that the brakes had been tested and adjusted to\nrender at 60% of the ship’s design MBL at least annually and after completion of any modification or\nmaintenance, or where there had been evidence of premature brake slippage or related malfunctions.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel verify that winches were marked with:\no The correct reeling direction (MEG4 6.3.4.2).\no The date of the last brake test ((MEG 6.4.6.1).\no The primary brake holding load value as set (MEG4 6.3.6).\no The torque setting value where a brake is set with a torque wrench (MEG4 6.4.6.5).\no The pressure gauge setting value where a brake is initially applied by a hydraulic assist (MEG4\n6.4.6.5).\no Where applicable, an indicator to show that a brake was set to the correct value.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel verify that:\no The lines were reeled on the winch drums in the correct direction (MEG4 6.3.4.2).\no Where winches were provided with split drums, that there was no more than a single layer of line\non the tension side of a drum (MEG4 6.3.4.1).\no Where winches were provided with split drums, that the number of turns of mooring line on the\ntension side of a drum were at least the minimum number as indicated within the Line Management\nPlan (MEG4 6.3.3.1).\no The winch brakes were set in accordance with any instructions or indicators provided.\no The winch drum brake assemblies including brake lining material and brake drum surface were in\napparent good order and well maintained.\no The brake test equipment was safely stored as per manufacturer’s instructions, if kept onboard.\nWhere safe to do so and the appropriate personnel are available during the physical inspection, observe the\nadjustment of a mooring line.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe company mooring procedures which included the use and testing of mooring winches fitted to the\nvessel.\nThe Mooring System Management Plan, where provided.\nThe Line Management Plan.\nThe mooring winch brake testing records.\nThe calibration test certificate for the brake testing equipment pressure gauge where testing equipment\ncarried.\nThe winch manufacturer’s instructions for the testing of the mooring winch brakes.\n• Mooring winch maintenance records since the last annual winch test where repairs or component\nreplacement had been performed on any part of a winch drum brake assembly or mechanism.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which provided instructions for the use and testing of the mooring\nwinches brakes fitted to the vessel.\nThe vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP) which was in alignment\nwith MEG4.\nThe accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, setting and\ntesting of the mooring winch brakes.\nThe accompanying deck officer or observed crew were not familiar with the operation and setting of the\nmooring winch brakes.\nThe brake testing equipment was not maintained in good condition, or the hydraulic jack pressure gauge\nhad not been calibrated before use where brake testing equipment was carried.\nThe mooring winch brakes had not been periodically tested in accordance with the company procedure or\nthe Mooring System Management Plan requirements.\nThe mooring winch brakes had not been tested on completion of any repairs or maintenance which affected\nthe mooring winch brake mechanism assembly.\nThe mooring winch brakes had not been retested where there had been evidence of premature brake\nslippage or related malfunctions.\nThe mooring winch drums were not marked with the date of the previous test, the primary brake load\ncapacity, the reeling direction or the brake setting torque or hydraulic brake assist setting pressure (as\napplicable to the brake type).\nThe brake on any single mooring drum in active mooring service was observed to be incorrectly set.\nA stopper arrangement, e.g. a locking nut on the threaded end, was used on the tightening screw of the\nbrake to set the brake torque.\nA mooring line was reeled onto a mooring drum in the wrong direction for the correct operation of the brake\nmechanism.\nWhere the vessel was provided with split drums there was more than one layer of line on the tension side of\na drum.\nWhere the vessel was provided with split drums there were insufficient turns of line, as determined by the\ncompany procedure or MSMP, on the tension side of the drum.\nThe mooring winch drum brake mechanisms, brake drums or brake band linings were apparently defective\non any mooring winch. This would include where brake drums had more than a light layer of superficial\nsurface rust.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.1.2.", "t": "Was the vessel satisfactorily moored in accordance with both the terminal mooring", "c": "plan and the mooring configurations permitted by the vessel’s Mooring System\nManagement Plan?\nShort Question Text\nWas the vessel satisfactorily moored\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel is always moored safely in accordance with a terminal’s published mooring plan\nand the acceptable mooring line configurations identified within the vessel’s Mooring System Management\nPlan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nSection 1.9.2 Mooring System Management Plan Structure.\nPart B – Mooring equipment design philosophy\n• •\n5. Assumptions on the standard mooring pattern and considerations for redundancy provisions, including\nsub-optimal line distribution to cover unpredicted events (e.g. storm surges, shore mooring hooks out of\nservice).\n8. Alternate mooring patterns to meet the standard environmental criteria assessment and designed-in\noptions when the optimal mooring pattern is unachievable in some real-world scenarios (e.g. hooks,\ndolphins or mooring winches out of service, breast lines not in an optimal perpendicular lead, etc.).\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include;\n• •\n• Conventional berths.\nConventional buoy moorings.\nDouble-banking at berths.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed the Mooring System Management Plan to include optimal, sub-optimal\nand alternate mooring patterns permissible to assist vessel staff in evaluating a terminal’s published or proposed\nmooring plan prior to mooring.\nThe mooring patterns should identify:\n• •\n• •\n• The minimum number of lines that must be deployed in each service (spring, breast, head and stern) to\nmeet the design mooring constraint requirement for the standard environmental criteria at a conventional\ntanker jetty.\nThe minimum number of lines that must be deployed in each service (breast, quarter and stern) to meet the\ndesign mooring constraint requirement for the standard environmental criteria at a conventional buoy\nmooring (multi-buoy mooring).\nEnvironmental conditions where additional mooring lines are required to be utilised and in what service.\nThe permissible alternative mooring configurations where shore hooks or bollards are not in the optimal\nposition or are out of service.\nThe horizontal angles of lines to the perpendicular of the ship’s fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines\n(in true elevation) with the vessel in the least favourable load state that are permitted for mooring lines in\neach service in the standard or alternative mooring patterns.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure for evaluating proposed mooring configurations which do\nnot conform to, or modify, the criteria upon which the Mooring System Management Plan was developed. This should\ninclude double banking operations at a berth.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Review the Mooring System Management Plan and identify the permissible mooring configurations that may\nbe used by the vessel to meet optimal, sub-optimal and alternate mooring arrangements.\nReview the published terminal mooring plans for recent terminal visits and verify that there was a process to\nconfirm that the vessel could comply with both the terminal mooring layout and the mooring patterns\npermitted by the Mooring System Management Plan.\nWhere the vessel was moored at the time of the inspection, verify that the mooring pattern employed was in\naccordance with both the mooring plan published by the terminal and the Mooring System Management\nPlan. (Where the number of mooring lines required to be utilised between the terminal and vessel mooring\nplans was different, the plan requiring the higher number of lines should be followed.)\nWhere the terminal mooring plan required the use of swamp lines or other shore-lines to supplement the\nvessel’s mooring system, verify that these lines had been utilised.\nVerify that the vessel’s mooring lines were deployed within the permitted horizontal angles to the\nperpendicular of ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines as documented within the Mooring\nSystem Management Plan.\nWhere the vessel was required to undertake a mooring analysis as part of the terminal acceptance process,\nverify that the vessel had moored in accordance with the mooring analysis provided to the vessel.\nWhere the vessel was involved in a double banking operation* verify that;\no A mooring analysis was available to confirm that both the inside and outside vessel were provided\nwith adequate restraint,\no That the inside vessel was not bearing the load of both vessels on its own moorings unless the\nmooring analysis determined that the moorings deployed were sufficient for the forces of both\nvessels,\no That both the inside and outside vessels were moored in accordance with the agreed mooring plan.\nThe mooring of a bunker barge or small coastal tanker to the outboard side does not constitute a double banking\noperation*.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe Mooring System Management Plan.\nThe terminal mooring plan, showing the positioning of a similar sized vessel in relationship to the terminal\nmooring fittings, published in either the terminal handbook or an industry standard publication.\n• •\n• The passage plan, pilot card, cargo plan or risk assessment which showed the specific mooring layout that\nwas used at the terminal or berth.\nWhere the vessel was required to be subject to a terminal compatibility assessment prior to berthing, the\nmooring plan determined during the mooring assessment.\nWhere the vessel was engaged in a double-banking alongside a berth, the agreed mooring plan for both the\ninside and outside vessels.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP) which was in alignment\nwith MEG4.\nThe Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to include the permissible mooring\nconfigurations for optimal, sub-optimal and alternative mooring arrangements for conventional tanker berths\nand, where used, conventional buoy moorings.\nThe Mooring System Management Plan was not developed to show the maximum permitted deviation from\nthe horizontal angles of lines to the perpendicular of the ships fore and aft axis and vertical angles of lines.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the process for comparing the published or proposed\nterminal mooring plan with the mooring configurations permitted within the Mooring System Management\nPlan.\nThe vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the published terminal mooring plan.\nThe vessel was moored in a pattern that was not in accordance with the mooring configurations permitted by\nthe Mooring System Management Plan.\nThe vertical angle (in true elevation) of any mooring line exceeded the limit identified within the Mooring\nSystem Management Plan.\nThe vessel had deployed fewer lines than required by either the published terminal mooring plan or the\nmooring configurations permitted by the Mooring System Management Plan.\nThe vessel had not utilised supplementary shore-lines required by the terminal mooring plan.\nWhere the vessel had been subject to a mooring analysis for the terminal or berth, the actual mooring\nconfiguration was not in accordance with the plan developed through the mooring analysis.\nWhere the vessel was double banked there was no analysis available to demonstrate that the mooring plan\nhad been verified as providing sufficient restraint for both the inside and outside vessels.\nWhere the terminal had not published a mooring plan and the vessel could demonstrate that it had made efforts to\nobtain the plan through its operator or agent then make a comment under the Process response tool.\nWhere the vessel is not moored at the time of inspection, the inspector should follow the Suggested Inspector Actions\nas far as possible, reviewing the Mooring System Management Plan and recent/planned mooring layouts against\nterminal mooring plans.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.1.3.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers, and ratings involved with mooring operations,", "c": "familiar with the content of the Line Management Plan and was the plan maintained in\naccordance with company instructions with mooring line, mooring tail and joining\nshackle certificates available for each item included within the Line Management Plan?\nShort Question Text\nLine Management Plan (LMP) implementation.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nObjective\nTo ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are always in serviceable condition and\nmanaged to avoid failure in service.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nChapter 5.4.2 Line Management Plans.\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019\n2.6 Taking care of mooring equipment\nLine and tail certificates\nYou need to know what kinds of lines are on board, where they are, and how to find their service records in the line\nmanagement plan. All lines and tails used for mooring need a certificate.\n• •\n• Label certificates clearly.\nRegularly check their condition.\nKeep certificates/inspection records in an easily accessible file.\nSection 3.4 Synthetic fibre tails\n• Keep a record of which tail is fitted to each mooring line, and when, and give this data to your supervisor so\nthat the line management plan can be updated.\n3.8 Care of mooring lines\n• •\nGuidance on mooring line care, use and replacement can be found in your line management plan.\nDo not move lines or tails from one winch to another without approval. Make sure records in the line\nmanagement plan are updated with any approved change of position. Tracking a line’s history is critical to\nknow how used it is, as required by the line management plan.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement of wires,\nropes, tails and ancillary equipment. The procedures may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nInspection methods and frequency\nMaintenance requirements.\nRetirement criteria\nMinimum spares\nStowage requirements\nRecord keeping\nThe records may include:\n• •\n• •\nDate of bringing rope/wires into service.\nIdentification and tagging of all equipment.\nCertification for all ropes/wires/tails/joining shackles.\nDates of end for ending.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a Line Management Plan (LMP) in alignment with MEG4 Table 5.2 which\nshould give guidance on:\n• •\n• •\nMaintenance; including line installation, storage, repair, line maintenance and wear zone management.\nInspection; including routine inspection and detailed inspection. (detailed in MEG4 5.4.3)\nService life and retirement criteria; including determination of expected service life and planned retirement\ncriteria policy. (it may also include residual strength testing, but this is not a required aspect of an LMP)\nGeneral; including hazards and precautions, operator’s SMS and ship HSE procedures, training and\ncompetence requirements, and roles and responsibilities.\nThe LMP can be a standalone tool, or it may be integrated into existing safety or maintenance management systems.\nIt can be available as hard or electronic copy, or both. LMP information should be stored in a location that is easy for\nall users to access, e.g. on a computer system that can be accessed from both the ship and shore or compiled in a\nsingle physical location. It should be easy for the system users to access the LMP information from a single physical\nor virtual location. This is necessary for access by all officers and crew who will be involved in mooring operations.\nThe vessel should retain manufacturer’s product certificates onboard which will be referenced to the location of each\nmooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle onboard, both in use and available as spares.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the mooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle certificates and verify that the vessel has an\neffective process in place to identify each individual item and associate it with its location onboard and its\nmanufacturer’s product certificate.\nReview the Line Management Plan (LMP) and verify that, as a minimum, the four key categories and their\nsubcategories identified in table 5.2 (MEG4) had been addressed and populated with the relevant\ninformation.\nIdentify the stated service life criteria for mooring lines and mooring tails and verify that the lines and tails in\nservice were within the company’s stated service life criteria. This may be elapsed time or hours in service\nsince being brought into service and will be defined within the LMP.\n• •\n• •\n• Review the inspection history for the mooring lines and mooring tails and verify that inspections had been\ncarried out as required by the inspection intervals defined within the LMP.\nReview the inspection history and where a line had parted in service verify that an incident investigation\nreport was onboard that identified the causes of the line failure.\nReview the maintenance records and verify that mooring lines had been “end for ended” or moved to a\ndifferent service in accordance with the LMP to meet the wear zone management expectations.\nIdentify whether the vessel operator permitted the splicing of mooring lines and if so verify that the persons\npermitted to conduct the splicing had been identified within the LMP. Where specialist training was required\nverify that the identified persons had received the training.\nDuring the physical inspection:\no Randomly inspect several accessible mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles and verify\nthat they were in apparent good order and that they were tagged or marked to permit identification\nwithin the LMP and the associated retained product certificate.\no Where the vessel was provided with mooring tails connected to the mooring lines verify that the\nconnection method was in accordance with the LMP and MEG4 5.8.4, connection devices (MEG4\nfigure 5.20) or cow hitch (MEG4 Figure 5.21) and that these were correctly fitted.\no Interview at least one rating involved in mooring operations and verify that they were familiar with\nthe location of the LMP and, who was responsible for the splicing of the mooring lines or any other\nrelevant item that would confirm familiarity with the LMP and its content.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe Line Management Plan.\nThe manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles onboard.\nThe SMS procedures that were referenced in the general section of the Line Management Plan.\nIncident investigation reports for any in service mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle failures.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe vessel was not provided with a Line Management Plan (LMP).\nThe vessel had not retained manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and\njoining shackles onboard referenced against each item’s location.\nThe LMP was not developed in alignment with the sections and subsections of MEG4 table 5.2, as a\nminimum.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the content of the LMP and how the information was to be\nrecorded and managed within it.\nAn interviewed rating who was involved with mooring operations was unfamiliar with the existence of the\nLMP or content relevant to their role onboard.\nThe LMP had not been maintained accurately. (Inspection determined that lines, tails or shackles were in\nthe wrong location or items were onboard which were not included in the LMP).\nMooring line, mooring tail and joining shackle inspections had not been completed and documented in\naccordance with the LMP.\nMooring lines, mooring tails or joining shackles in use or provided as spares were in a condition that\nindicated the inspection processes required under the LMP were ineffective.\nJoining shackles were fitted the wrong way around according to the shackle design.\nMooring wires were connected to mooring tails using a cow hitch or an inappropriate shackle.\nA mooring line or mooring tail was in service beyond the stated company retirement criteria.\nA mooring line or mooring tail was in service which had suffered damage to such an extent that it should\nhave been taken out of service for repair or retirement.\nSplicing of mooring lines had been undertaken onboard but the resulting splices were not in accordance with\nthe line manufacturer’s instructions.\nMooring lines had not been “end for ended” or rotated in service in accordance with the line management\nplan wear zone management process.\n• A mooring line, mooring tail or joining shackle had parted in service during the previous six months but there\nwas no incident investigation report onboard to document the causes of the failure.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.1.4.", "t": "Did all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles, including those carried as", "c": "spares, meet industry guidelines?\nShort Question Text\nMooring lines, tails and mooring shackles.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nObjective\nTo ensure that mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles are fit for the intended purpose to prevent\nline failure in service.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nChapter 5.2 – Mooring system design and line selection\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.4 requires that procedures are in place for the inspection, maintenance and replacement of wires,\nropes, tails and ancillary equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have provided the vessel with a Mooring System Management Plan (MEG4 1.9) which\nconsisted of the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Part A – General ship particulars\nPart B -Mooring equipment design philosophy (MEG4 1.9.2.2).\no 4. Design loads, safety factors and strength for required mooring lines and fixed equipment.\nPart C – Detailed list of mooring equipment (MEG4 1.9.2.3).\no 3. Loose equipment (mooring lines, tails, pennants, joining shackles etc.).\nPart D – Inspection, maintenance and retirement strategies/principles.(MEG4 1.9.2.4)\no 4. A Mooring Line Management Plan covering all mooring ropes and wires in use including joining\nshackles.\nPart E – Risk and change management, safety of personnel and human factors\nPart F – Records and documentation\nPart G – Mooring System Management Plan Register\nMooring lines shall have a Line Design Break Force (LDBF) of 100-105% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4 5.2.1).\nSynthetic mooring tails shall have a Tail Design Break Force (TDBF) of 125-130% of the Ship Design MBL (MEG4\n5.8.2).\nThe LDBF for nylon (polyamide) mooring lines should be specified as break tested wet, because nylon lines change\nstrength characteristics once exposed to water and generally do not fully dry to their original construction state.\nConnection devices (joining shackles) should have a safety factor of three, i.e. the breaking load is three times the\nsafe working load (SWL). The safe working load of the joining shackle should always be equal to, or greater than, the\nworking load limit (WLL) of the lines in the mooring system. (MEG4 5.8.4.1).\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the Mooring System Management Plan and identify the values for Ship Design MBL and the working\nload limit (WLL) of the lines.\nReview the detailed list of mooring equipment and loose equipment and verify that;\no The mooring lines had a Line Design Break Force (LDBF) in the range of 100-105% of the Ship\nDesign MBL.\no The mooring tails, where provided, had a Tail Design Break Force (TDBF) in the range 125-130%\nof the Ship Design MBL.\no The joining shackles, where provided, had a Safe Working Load (SWL) equal to, or greater than,\nthe working load limit (WLL) of the mooring lines in the system. (it is not expected that the SWL and\nWLL exactly match).\nWhere the vessel had a summary list of all mooring system loose equipment with the values of LDBF and\nTDBF tabulated, verify that the values for the components were accurate by spot-checking the values\nagainst several manufacturer’s product certificates.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The Mooring System Management Plan.\nThe list of loose equipment (mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles)\nThe file of manufacturer product certificates for all mooring lines, mooring tails and joining shackles.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel was not provided with a Mooring Systems Management Plan (MSMP).\nThe vessel did not have a file containing the manufacturer’s product certificates for all mooring lines,\nmooring tails and joining shackles carried onboard.\nOne or more mooring lines onboard, in service mounted on a winch, or loose or carried as a spare, had a\nLine Design Break Force (LDBF) that was lower than 100% of the Ship Design MBL.\nOne or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a Tail Design Break\nForce (TDBF) that was lower than 125% of the Ship Design MBL.\nOne or more of the mooring joining shackles carried onboard, either in use or carried as a spare, had a Safe\nWorking Load (SWL) that was less than Working Load Limit (WLL) for the mooring lines in use onboard.\nWhere one or more mooring lines carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a LDBF of\ngreater than 105% of the ship design MBL, make a comment in the Hardware response tool describing how\nmany lines were affected and what the actual LDBF was as a percentage of the ship design MBL.\nWhere one or more mooring tails carried onboard, either in service or carried as a spare, had a TDBF of\ngreater than 130% of the ship design MBL, make a comment in the Hardware response tool describing how\nmany tails were affected and what the actual TDBF was as a percentage of the ship design MBL.\n9.2. Emergency Towing Arrangement", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and all officers familiar with the vessel specific emergency towing", "c": "procedure, and was the emergency towing equipment, where fitted, in satisfactory\ncondition and ready for immediate use?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency towing procedure and equipment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck, Bridge, Forecastle, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that the vessel crew are familiar with the emergency towing procedure, and that the emergency\ntowing equipment, where required to be fitted, is ready for immediate use.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1255 Guidelines for Owners/Operators on Preparing Emergency Towing Procedures.\n4.1 The Emergency Towing Booklet (ETB) should be ship specific and be presented in a clear, concise and ready-touse format (booklet, plan, poster, etc.).\n4.6 A minimum of three copies should be kept on board and located in:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nthe bridge;\na forecastle space; and\nthe ship’s office or cargo control room.\nTMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and\ncover all credible emergency scenarios.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The Company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II – I Regulation 3-4\n1 Emergency towing arrangements on tankers.\n1.1 Emergency towing arrangements shall be fitted at both ends on every tanker of not less than 20,000 tonnes\ndeadweight.\n2 Emergency towing procedures on ships.\n2.2 ships shall be provided with a ship-specific emergency towing procedure. Such a procedure shall be carried\nonboard the ship for use in emergency situations and shall be based on existing arrangements and equipment\navailable on board the ship.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have provided the vessel with an emergency towing procedure in the form of an\nEmergency Towing Booklet (ETB) in accordance with SOLAS regulation and supporting IMO Marine Safety Circulars.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nReview the vessel specific emergency towing procedure (Emergency Towing Booklet - ETB).\nVerify a copy of the ETB was available on the bridge, in the ship’s office or cargo control room and in the\nforecastle space.\nWhere fitted, inspect the emergency towing arrangements fitted to the vessel and verify that the emergency\ntowing procedure (ETB) is aligned with the equipment provided.\nInspect the physical condition of the emergency towing equipment and confirm that all visible and accessible\nparts are functional with evidence of recent maintenance.\nVerify, by sampling, that the ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) is present\nin the correct location.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify they understand how to deploy the emergency towing\nequipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• Vessel specific emergency towing procedure (Emergency Towing Booklet - ETB).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not based on the existing arrangements and equipment fitted\non board.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific emergency towing procedure (ETB).\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the emergency towing equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the process of deploying the emergency towing equipment\nfitted to the vessel.\nThe emergency towing procedure (ETB) was not available on the bridge, in the ship’s office or cargo control\nroom and in the forecastle space.\nThe emergency towing arrangements were defective in any respect.\nThe ancillary equipment listed in the emergency towing procedure (ETB) was missing, in the wrong location\nor defective in any way.\nThe emergency towing equipment was not ready for immediate use in any respect.\n9.3. Mooring and Anchoring Procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and deck officers familiar with the company procedures for", "c": "anchoring operations, and were records available to confirm that recent anchoring\noperations had been conducted in compliance with company expectations?\nShort Question Text\nAnchoring operations\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Forecastle\nPublications\nOCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition\nIACS Unified Requirements A: Requirements concerning Mooring\nAnchoring and Towing\nIACS: UR A3 Anchor Windlass Design and Testing\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO: ISM Code\nINTERTANKO: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nObjective\nTo ensure that anchoring operations are conducted within the limitations of the equipment fitted to the\nvessel\nIndustry Guidance\nIntertanko: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nAppendix 2\nPlanning of the anchoring operation\nThere are procedures for:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSelection of anchoring position\nPlanning including toolbox talk\nMethods of anchoring\nEquipment design limitations and characteristics\nEmergency anchoring\nRoles and responsibilities\nRequirements for risk assessments for anchoring\nUse of main engine (and thrusters if fitted)\nAnchoring\nThere are procedures for:\n• •\n• Anchoring in extreme depths (beyond 82.5 metres)\nAnchoring in deep waters\nAnchoring methods\n• Protection of personnel and safe operation of equipment\nAt anchor\nThere are procedures for:\n• Anchor watches, including actions to be taken when dragging or action to be taken when bad weather is\nexpected\nHeaving up the anchor\nThere are procedures for:\n• •\n• Emergency departure from an anchorage\nHeaving up anchor in extreme depth\nProtection of personnel and safe operation of equipment\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\n2.4.10 Planning an anchorage\nChecklist B12 Anchoring and Anchor Watch.\nOCIMF: Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition\n3.1.3 Limitations of the Anchoring System.\nTypically, a windlass is required to heave in the weight of an anchor and chain from a depth of between 82.5 and\n100m, depending upon individual Class requirements. The windlass is not designed to break out the anchor from the\nseabed and may not be designed to lift chain lengths in excess of Class minimum requirements.\nThe weakest component in most anchoring systems is the windlass motor. The two main failure modes of motors are\nassociated with heaving when there is too much weight on the cable and walking out the cable with excessive way on\nthe vessel.\nWhen attempting to recover anchors in extreme conditions, the windlass will heave until its pulling force is exceeded\nby the tension in the chain. At this time, the windlass may start to render and such rendering may lead to damage to\nthe motor’s components. This could lead to catastrophic failure and the associated risk of personal injury.\n5.1 Anchoring Procedures\nIt is recommended that the procedures used for anchoring operations are developed by shore and vessel\nmanagement using risk assessment methodology and that these are included within the SMS. As a minimum, the\nprocedures should:\n• •\n• Include the use of checklists to ensure that all bridge and forecastle preparations are correctly made.\nIdentify any precautions to be taken with a particular vessel and describe the distinctive features of the\nequipment fitted.\nPrescribe the use of appropriate PPE by the anchor party.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.2 requires that procedures address all aspects of anchoring operations likely to be undertaken by\nfleet vessels. Procedures for anchoring operations have been developed, following risk assessments, which address:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSelection of anchoring position.\nMethods of anchoring.\nEquipment design limitations and characteristics.\nEmergency anchoring.\nAnchor watches, including actions to be taken when dragging or at onset of bad weather.\nEmergency departure from an anchorage.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIACS Unified Requirements A: Requirements Concerning Mooring\nIACS: UR A3 Anchor Windlass Design and Testing\nNote\n1. This UR is to be uniformly implemented by IACS Societies:\ni) when an application for certification of an anchor windlass is dated on or after 1 July 2018; or\nii) installed in new ships for which the date of contract for construction is on or after 1 July 2018.\n6. Marking\nWindlass shall be permanently marked with the following information:\n(a) Nominal size of chain (e.g. 100/3/45 means chain dia./grade/breaking load)\n(b) Maximum anchorage depth, in metres.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed anchoring procedures and supporting checklists in alignment with\n• •\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.2 and its best practice guidance.\nOCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures First Edition 2010:\no 5.1 Anchoring Procedures.\no 5.1.1 General.\no 5.1.2 Preparations for anchoring.\no 5.1.3 Methods of anchoring.\no 5.1.4 Commonly used anchoring procedures.\no 5.2.1 Watchkeeping Responsibilities.\no 5.2.2 Securing the Cable at Anchor.\nThe procedures should provide specific guidance on the environmental limits for:\n• •\n• Safe anchoring operations as determined by company risk assessment processes.\nRemaining at anchor.\nRecovering the anchor and proceeding to sea.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the company procedures for anchoring operations.\nVerify that the anchoring procedures gave guidance relating to:\no The maximum depth of water for normal anchoring operations.\no The maximum recommended wind strength and wave height for anchoring.\no The weather conditions when the company requires the vessel to depart an anchorage.\no The required level of supervision for the anchoring party.\no The minimum composition of the anchoring party.\no The required checks on the windlass, anchors, stoppers and power systems prior to use.\nReview a recent anchoring operation to:\no Verify that the necessary appraisal and planning checklists were completed prior to the operation.\no Verify that checks on the windlass, anchor, stopper and power systems had been completed prior\nto the operation.\no Verify that the weather conditions during the time at anchor were within the company guidelines for\nremaining at anchor.\no Verify that the depth of water at the anchoring location was within the limits provided by the\ncompany.\nDuring the physical inspection:\n• •\n• •\nInspect the windlass, anchors, chain and stoppers and verify that they were in satisfactory condition.\nVerify that the accompanying officer was familiar with the anchor brake adjustment setting and other checks\non equipment required to be completed prior to and after anchoring.\nVerify that the anchors were free to be used in an emergency – anchor chain not hard up against the\nstopper bar when in port or at sea.\nVerify that, when the vessel was in port, the anchor lashings were removed unless specifically required to be\nin place in accordance with terminal regulations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for anchoring operations.\nRecords and checklists for recent anchoring operations.\nRecent checklist and/or maintenance record to demonstrate that the windlass brake setting had been\nchecked.\nBridge Log Book and bell book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures with supporting checklists which covered the process of anchoring and\nincluded:\no The selection of an anchorage taking into account the proximity and density of other vessels at\nanchor, the quality of the seabed and the proximity of navigational dangers.\no The maximum depth of water permitted for normal anchoring operations.\no The required level of supervision of the anchoring party.\no The minimum composition of the anchoring party.\no The maximum environmental conditions permitted for anchoring.\no The environmental conditions at which the vessel would be expected to have departed an\nanchorage.\no The checks required to be carried out for the anchoring equipment and power system prior to, and\nupon completion of, anchoring operations.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for anchoring operations.\nThe vessel had anchored, or remained at anchor, with environmental conditions in excess of the limits\nprovided by the company.\nThe vessel had anchored in a water depth that exceeded the limit set by the company.\nThe maximum anchorage depth in metres was not either marked on the windlass or posted on the bridge.\nThe checks required to be completed prior to and during anchoring operations had not been completed as\nrequired.\nThe anchoring systems (windlass, anchor, chain, stoppers, power system) were defective in any respect.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate how to verify that the windlass brake was correctly\nadjusted.\nWhen in coastal waters and port the anchors were not free to use in an emergency – the chain was resting\nagainst the stopper bar preventing it being lifted without the use of the windlass.\n9.4. Mooring and Anchoring Team Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master, deck officers and deck ratings familiar with the company", "c": "procedure that defined mooring team supervision and composition for the various\nmooring and anchoring operations likely to be undertaken, and was evidence available\nthat each mooring work space had been supervised and manned in accordance with\ncompany expectations?\nShort Question Text\nMooring team supervision and composition\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\nIMO: STCW Code\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019\nINTERTANKO: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that mooring and anchoring operations are always properly supervised with enough personnel\nassigned to conduct the operations safely and efficiently at each mooring or anchoring workspace.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Mooring Equipment Guidelines. Fourth Edition 2018 (MEG4)\n1.9 Mooring System Management Plan\n1.9.2.5 Part E – Risk and change management, safety of personnel and human factors\nE.3 Manning and Training\n• •\n• •\nSafe manning levels including minimum required by Class, Flag and/or the ship’s SMS.\nManufacturer’s instructions and standard operating procedures.\nOutline competency requirements for undertaking mooring operations and operating mooring machinery\noperator and/or industry).\nInduction, familiarisation and training requirements necessary before personnel undertake mooring\noperations, including any ship-specific requirements and periodic refresher training.\nE.5 Mooring operations plans and procedures\n• •\n• •\nRisk-based mooring operations plans and procedures should be detailed and include pre-arrival briefings,\nship/shore mooring arrangements, safety and occupational health issues and required crew resources.\nContingency plans for mooring operations with appropriate control measures and operational procedures.\nRequirements for operations supervision at each mooring work space and overall control of mooring\noperations (e.g. Master/Pilot) are to be detailed.\nCommunications methods both primary and secondary should form a part of the operations plans.\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019.\nChapter 2.5 Common risks and hazards (list not complete)\n• •\n• •\n• •\nLack of communications and planning.\nNo risk assessment before mooring operations.\nNot enough crew.\nIneffective training on the hazards of the job.\nInadequate information or unclear instructions.\nPoor supervision.\nOCIMF Anchoring Systems and Procedures 2010 edition\n5.1.2 Preparation for Anchoring\nIt is recommended that a certificated/licensed deck officer supervises anchoring operations and that only experienced\ncrew members are assigned to anchor work.\nIntertanko: Anchoring Guidelines: A Risk-Based Approach v.3 June 2020\nAppendix 3- Worked example on risk-based approach – Hazid technique\nDescription of Identified Hazards\n– Inadequate supervision / communication\nPossible Consequences\n– Personnel injury, equipment damage\nControl Measures to Protect: Personnel – Environment – Company – Asset from Harm\n1.\n2.\n3.\nAnchoring operations shall be planned, co-ordinated and supervised by the Master.\nA responsible and qualified Officer should be in charge of the anchor party.\nEfficient communication between the Bridge and the anchoring team should be tested before the operation\nand a backup system (i.e. availability of a second UHF, talk-back system) should be ensured.\nCommunications procedures should be familiar to all personnel that will participate in the task (Working\nchannels and reporting methods).\nTMSA KPI 6A.3.1 requires that procedures identify requirements for personnel involved in mooring operations. The\nrequirements may include:\n• •\n• •\n• Designated person in charge at each location.\nMinimum numbers of people required at each station.\nToolbox talk prior to mooring operations.\nMinimum training and experience requirements.\nSupervision of third-party personnel.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is:\n1.\n2.\nmanned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international\nrequirements; and\nappropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.\nIMO: STCW Code\nTable A-II/1 – Specification of minimum standards of competence for officers in charge of a navigational watch on\nships of 500 gross tonnage or more.\n• •\n• Function - Navigation at the operational level\nCompetence - Manoeuvre the ship\nKnowledge, understanding and proficiency - Ship manoeuvring and handling - .5 proper procedures for\nanchoring and mooring.\n• •\n• Function - Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board at operational level.\nCompetence - Application of teamworking and leadership skills\nKnowledge, understanding and proficiency - Knowledge and ability to apply effective resource management.\nTable A-II/5 – Specification of minimum standards of competence of ratings as able seafarer deck\n• •\n• Function - Navigation at the support level\nCompetence - Contribute to berthing, anchoring and other mooring operations\nKnowledge, understanding and proficiency - Working knowledge of the mooring system and related\nprocedures…\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures aligned with the Mooring System Management Plan (MSMP)\nwhich described:\n• •\n• •\n• The onboard roles permitted to supervise mooring and anchoring teams.\nWhere the identified supervisor was not a licenced officer, the additional training and competency\nevaluations that an individual must have undertaken prior to undertaking a supervisory role.\nThe minimum number of ratings that must form part of the mooring team(s) for the various types of mooring\nand anchoring activities expected to be conducted onboard the vessel.\nThe roles and responsibilities of the mooring and anchoring team members.\nHow the mooring team will be informed of expectations around the mooring or anchoring operation, for\nexample, though the use of toolbox talks or risk assessment review.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the supervision and composition\nof mooring and anchoring teams.\nReview the sections of MSMP relating to Manning and Training, and Mooring Operations Plans and\nProcedures and verify that they had been developed to include detail of the mooring team composition and\nworkspace supervisor.\nWhere the company procedure required the review of a risk assessment prior to a mooring or anchoring\noperation, review the risk assessment for a recent operation and verify that it reflected the operation\nundertaken.\n• Interview one deck officer and one rating involved in mooring operations to understand who supervised\nmooring and anchoring operations during recent operations and whether there was a clear understanding of\nthe company expectations around mooring team composition, supervision and toolbox talks prior to each\noperation.\n• While conducting the review of hours of rest records, consider the required mooring and anchoring team\ncomposition and verify that vessel records gave an accurate representation of the vessel complement\ninvolvement in mooring and anchoring operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure which defined the mooring and anchoring team composition and workspace\nsupervision expectations.\nThe hours of rest records for the previous full month.\nThe vessel’s Mooring System Management Plan sections:\no Manning and Training – Safe manning levels required by the ship’s SMS,\no Mooring Operations Plans and Procedures - Requirements for operations supervision at each\nmooring workspace.\nWhere an unlicenced crewmember was nominated as an acceptable mooring or anchoring workspace\nsupervisor, the records of the training courses and competency assessment required by the relevant\nsections of the MSMP.\nWhere required to be reviewed prior to an operation by company procedures, the risk assessments for\nrecent mooring and anchoring operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMSMP sections, relating to Manning and Training and Mooring Operations Plans and Procedures, had not\nbeen developed to specify the mooring or anchoring team composition or identified the required level of\nsupervision at each mooring workspace.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unable to identify the company procedure defining who should\nsupervise each mooring and anchoring workspace and the minimum workspace composition when\nrequested to do so.\nAn interviewed deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the company\nexpectations with regards to mooring or anchoring team composition or workspace supervision.\nReview of hours of rest or other records determined that the company expectations relating to mooring or\nanchoring team composition or supervision had not been complied with.\nWhere an unlicenced crew member was permitted to supervise an anchoring or mooring workstation there\nwas no evidence that they had completed the training courses or the competency assessment as required\nby the company for fulfilling the role.\nWhere the company procedure permitted an unlicenced crewmember to supervise a mooring or anchoring\nworkspace enter a comment in the Process response tool and describe the circumstances in which this was\npermitted.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.4.2.", "t": "Were the deck officers and ratings involved with mooring operations familiar with", "c": "the safe operation of the mooring winches and the dangers of working with and around\nmooring lines during mooring operations and while under tension?\nShort Question Text\nDangers of working with and around mooring lines\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019\nObjective\nTo ensure that vessel personnel are aware of the dangers of working with mooring equipment and near lines\nunder tension.\nIndustry Guidance:\nOCIMF: Effective Mooring. Fourth Edition 2019.\nSection two- General mooring safety practices.\nSection three- Mooring lines\n3.5 Stoppers for wires not mounted on winch drums\n3.6 Stoppers for synthetic fibre mooring lines\n3.7 Snap-back.\nSection four- Mooring winches\n4.7 Winch safety reminders.\nTMSA KPI 6A.1.1 requires that procedures for mooring and anchoring operations are in place for all vessel types\nwithin the fleet which include:\n• •\n• •\nRoles and responsibilities.\nPlanning including toolbox talk.\nRequirements for risk assessments.\nMooring arrangement and layout.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed mooring procedures which include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The role of the supervisor and their responsibilities.\nThe role of the supporting ratings and their responsibilities.\nThe hand signals that should be used during mooring operations.\nThe requirement for a toolbox talk or risk assessment review prior to commencing mooring operations.\nThe areas that should be considered as hazardous due to potential snap-back from parted mooring lines.\nThe safety features of a mooring winch that must be tested prior to use and be consistently used during\nwinch operation.\nWhere stoppers are to be used, the correct type and application for the lines in use.\nProcedures may reference industry guidance such as OCIMF: Effective Mooring.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the mooring procedure which included operational safety during\nmooring operations and in areas where mooring lines were under tension.\nDuring the physical inspection verify that:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe winch drums were out of gear and pins were available to lock the clutch in position while engaged and\ndisengaged.\nThe mooring winch control levers were free to move and returned to the neutral position when released.\nThe mooring winch control levers were clearly marked with the direction of heave and slack.\nThat there was no evidence that the mooring winch controls had been tied or secured to permit unmanned\noperation.\nThe winch controls were mounted to give the operator a clear sight of the operational working area and\nother mooring team members.\nThe working platforms around the winches gave uninterrupted safe access to mooring drums and winch\ncontrols.\nThe winch controls were sited to make sure that the operator was not at risk from moving parts.\nStoppers in use were appropriate for the types of mooring line in service and were of sufficient strength.\nWarning signs and barriers were in place to warn personnel of the dangers posed by mooring operations\nand mooring lines under tension.\nInterview one deck officer and one rating who had been involved in mooring operations to establish how\nthey had been informed of the dangers of snap-back and how to keep safe during mooring operations.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company mooring procedure which defined operational safety during mooring operations or in areas\nwhere mooring lines were under tension.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which included the considerations for operational safety during mooring\noperations or in areas where mooring lines were under tension.\nA deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the company mooring procedure\nwhich defined the considerations for operational safety during mooring operations and in areas where there\nwere mooring lines under tension.\nA deck officer or rating involved in mooring operations was unfamiliar with the danger of snap-back and how\nthis was communicated onboard the vessel prior to and after mooring operations.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Interviews with deck officers or ratings involved in mooring operations indicated that toolbox talks were not\ntaking place prior to each mooring operation.\nShip’s personnel or visitors were observed stepping over lines under tension when there was a route which\navoided the need to do so.\nThere were no warning signs or barriers to prevent personnel from approaching a mooring line under\ntension.\nThe mooring drums were left in gear while the drum was in active mooring service with the brake applied.\nThe safety locking pins for the winch drum clutch mechanisms were missing or not used.\nThe mooring winch control levers were stiff and did not return to the neutral position when released.\nThe mooring winch controls were not clearly marked with the direction of heave and slack.\nThere was evidence that mooring winch controls had been fastened in the heave or slack position at some\npoint in the past.\nThe winch control and drum access platforms were damaged, uneven or had missing plates.\n9.5. STS Operation Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.5.1.", "t": "Were the appropriate industry checklists used during STS operations, and were", "c": "comprehensive records of these operations maintained?\nShort Question Text\nSTS operations checklists\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nOCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum\nChemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that all stages of an STS operation are conducted in accordance with industry best practice\nguidance.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition. *\n\"At sea\" Indicates offshore waters or partially sheltered waters where transfers may be undertaken between vessels\nunderway or at anchor.\n\"In Port\" Used to indicate where STS operations are conducted under the jurisdiction of a port or harbour authority\nand includes operations that may involve berthing alongside a Discharging ship or Mother ship at anchor or alongside\na terminal.\n3.4 Use of checklists\nChecklists are an important risk management tool aimed at ensuring that operations are conducted in a safe manner.\nThey are essential reminders of the principal safety factors to be considered, but they should be supplemented by\ncontinuous vigilance throughout the whole operation.\nIt should be noted that the checklists have been developed to specifically address factors that are relevant to the STS\noperation and the questions are supplementary to those contained in standard pre-transfer checklists, such as the\nInternational Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT) Ship/Shore Safety Checklist.\nAppendix E: Operational/safety checklists\n• •\nAt sea ship to ship operations:\no Checklist 1 - Pre-fixture information (for each ship)\no Checklist 2 - Before operations commence\no Checklist 3 - Before run-in and mooring\no Checklist 4 - Before cargo transfer\no Checklist 5 - Before unmooring\nIn port STS operations:\no Checklist 6 – An example of a Pre-transfer checklist\no Checklist 6A – An example of Checks during transfer\nAppendix G: Example checklist for transfers involving vapour balancing\nAppendix L: Example liquefied natural gas ship to ship transfer compatibility questionnaire\n* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:\n• STS operations (including reverse STS).\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to requiring:\n• •\nChecklists identified by the OCIMF* STS Transfer Guide for “at sea” or “in port” cargo specific operations\nare completed before, during and after each relevant STS operation and, as required by an individual\nchecklist.\nChecklists are retained onboard along with other STS related records applicable to the type of STS\noperation, which may include;\no The JPO (Joint Plan of Operations) as provided by the service provider.\no Risk assessment as submitted by the Service Provider.\no Detailed Mooring Plan of participating vessels.\no Copies of certificates of fenders and hoses.\no Notification to coastal authorities.\no Details of Drills associated with the specific STS Operation.\no Records of Crew Experience.\no Post operation feedback/ assessment by the Master.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which required the vessel to use the checklists\nidentified by the OCIMF* STS Transfer Guide.\nWhere the vessel was involved in an STS operation, review the STS checklists completed during the\noperation thus far and verify that the correct checklists, including a standard pre-transfer checklist, had been\nutilised and that they had been completed appropriately.\nWhere the vessel had conducted STS operations during the previous twelve months, select the records for\nan STS operation at random and verify that the following records were available as applicable to the\noperation:\no The JPO (Joint Plan of operations) as provided by the service provider,\no Risk assessment as submitted by the Service Provider,\no Detailed Mooring Plan of participating vessels.\no Copies of certificates of fenders and hoses,\no Notification to coastal authorities,\no Details of Drills associated with the specific STS Operation,\no Records of Crew Experience,\no Post operation feedback/ assessment by the Master.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure which required the vessel to use the checklists identified by the OCIMF* STS\nTransfer Guide.\nThe company procedure which required the retention of STS checklists and records.\nWhere the vessel was undertaking an STS operation at the time of the inspection, the STS checklists,\nstandard pre-transfer checklist and, vapour balancing checklist where this was taking place.\nThe records for STS operations completed during the previous twelve months or, where numerous\noperations had been undertaken, records for the previous six operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which required the vessel to use the checklists identified by the OCIMF*\nSTS Transfer Guide.\nThere was no company procedure which required that comprehensive STS records were maintained\nonboard.\nThe accompanying deck officer was not familiar with the company procedure for the use of checklists during\nSTS operations.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure for the retention of records relating\nto STS operations.\nReview of checklists in use at the time of the inspection or from past STS operations indicated that the\nwrong STS checklists were used i.e. “at sea” checklists were used for “in port” operations or vice-versa.\nIndividual STS checklists were either not used or missing.\nReview of individual STS checklists identified that items had been checked off, but the required evidence\nwas missing.\nStandard pre-transfer checklists had not been used to supplement the STS checklists.\nWhere vapour balancing had been conducted there was no vapour balancing checklist used.\nPhysical inspection of the vessel during an STS operation determined that checks required by the STS\nchecklists had not been accomplished.\nRepetitive checks required by the STS checklists had not been completed.\nReview of records for past STS operations identified that checklists or required records were missing.\nReview of completed “in port” pre -transfer STS checklists indicated that the confirmation of checks and\nsignatures required from the second vessel, and the terminal where applicable, involved in the STS\noperation had not been completed.\nWhere the ship had never been involved in an STS operation as described by the OCIMF joint industry publication\nand there was no future intention to do so, select “Not Answerable” in each of the response tools then select \"Not\nApplicable - as instructed by question guidance\".", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.5.2.", "t": "Where the vessel was involved in an “at sea” STS operation, was an accurate Joint", "c": "Plan of Operation available onboard, were the Master and deck officers familiar with its\ncontent, and were operations being conducted in accordance with its requirements?\nShort Question Text\nSTS Joint Plan of Operation (JPO)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Interview - Deck Officer, Interview - Deck Rating, Documentation\nPublications\nOCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum\nChemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that each “at sea” ship to ship (STS) operations is planned and executed taking into consideration\nthe operational and environmental requirements for the specific transfer location, vessels and cargo transfer\noperations involved.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF*: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\n\"At sea\" indicates offshore waters or partially sheltered waters where transfers may be undertaken between vessels\nunderway or at anchor.\n\"Joint plan of operation (JPO)\" An operation-specific plan that includes, as appropriate, reference to ship\ncompatibility, manoeuvring, approach, mooring and transfer and, if applicable, references the ship-specific STS\noperations plans.\n3.10.4 Electrical isolation\nIt is necessary to ensure that electrical isolation in maintained between the ships involved in STS operations during\ntransfer line connection/disconnection and cargo transfer operations. This is to reduce the risk of high energy sparks\nbeing produced due to the electrical potential difference between the hulls.\nTo eliminate the potential for incendive arcing between the two ships, when presenting the hose string for connection\none of the following arrangements should be used:\n• •\n• A single insulating flange fitted at the manifold of one ship or within each hose string and all hoses in the\nstring electrically continuous; or\nA single length of electrically discontinuous hose fitted in each hose string; or\nHoses that are specially constructed to prevent static build up and limit electrical conductance to an\ninherently safe level.\n5.2 Joint Plan of Operation\nPrior to commencement of any STS operation a Joint Plan of Operation (JPO) should be developed to ensure that all\nparties involved, including the STS service provider, are in alignment with regard to how the operation is to be\nconducted.\nIn all cases the person in overall advisory control (POAC), STS Superintendent or transfer organizer should establish\nagreement and consensus between all parties.\nThe JPO should include a compilation of information from various sources.\nFor a particular location, a generic template may be used. Information may include the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Details regarding rendezvous location and designated lightering area, including relevant risk assessment(s).\nBrief description regarding how the STS operation will be conducted, for example approach and mooring\nunderway or with one vessel at anchor, transfer at anchor or underway, unmooring with one vessel at\nanchor or while underway.\nDetails regarding any local or government regulatory requirements and mandatory notifications.\nCommunication protocols.\nSecurity requirements.\nProcedures associated with any personnel transfers.\nDetails regarding any service craft and launches.\nEnvironmental operating parameters/limits for each stage of the STS operation. These should include\nenvironmental and operational limits that would trigger suspension of the transfer operation and\ndisconnection and unmooring of the vessels.\nFender configuration and rigging arrangements.\nMooring plans and arrangements and sequence of running lines, including use of any specialist mooring\nequipment.\nDetails of transfer and associated equipment, including the number, type and dimensions of cargo (and\nwhere applicable vapour) hoses and method of rigging/support.\nMaximum and minimum draught and freeboard anticipated during operations, including details of the stage\nof operations they relate to.\nEmergency and spill containment procedures.\nSequence of actions in case of spillage of cargo.\nCo-ordination of plans for cargo hose connection, draining, purging and disconnection, as appropriate.\nDetailed unmooring sequence.\nFor double banking operations, the suitability of the berth and strength of mooring points should be\nconfirmed.\nIn addition, the JPO should include details of the cargo transfer plan(s) or make reference to their content.\nOCIMF* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:\n• STS operations (including reverse STS).\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which required that a JPO is developed, available onboard\nand reviewed by vessel staff prior to an STS operation commencing.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Review the Joint Plan of Operations for the STS operation and verify that:\no The plan contained all information required by the OCIMF* guidance.\no The risk assessment(s) had been developed to address the risks of the specific location and type of\nSTS operation being undertaken.\no The means for eliminating the potential for incendive sparking between the two ships had been\naddressed.\no There was evidence that any mandatory notifications to comply with local or government\nrequirements had been made.\no That the vessel had been moored in accordance with the agreed mooring plan.\no That the vessel was complying with any environmental operating parameters.\no The unmooring sequence was documented.\n• Interview one deck officer and one deck rating to gauge their level of understanding of the Joint Plan of\nOperation for the STS operation being undertaken.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures which required the development of a Joint Plan of Operation for every STS\noperation.\nThe vessel’s STS Operations Plan.\nThe Joint Plan of Operation for the STS operation, developed by the STS service provider, the STS\norganiser, the STS Superintendent or the Person in overall advisory control (POAC) depending on the\ncircumstances of the operation.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no procedure which required that a Joint Plan of Operation (JPO) was developed for every STS\noperation.\nThe vessel did not have onboard a JPO which reflected the specific STS operation being undertaken.\nThe JPO did not include all information required by the OCIMF* STS Guide relevant to the operation being\nundertaken.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure which required a JPO to be\ndeveloped for every STS operation.\nThe accompanying deck officer was unfamiliar with the content of the JPO.\nAn interviewed deck officer or deck rating had not been briefed regarding the content of the JPO prior to the\ncommencement of the STS operation.\nThe risk assessment contained in the JPO did not reflect the location or type of STS operation that was\nbeing undertaken.\nThe JPO did not address the measures in place to eliminate the potential for incendive arcing between the\ntwo vessels.\nThe measures to eliminate incendive arcing identified within the JPO had not been implemented.\nThere was no evidence that the mandatory notifications to comply with local or government regulations had\nbeen made.\nThe vessel was not moored in accordance with the JPO.\nThe vessel had continued the STS operation or cargo transfer operations despite the environmental\noperating parameters being exceeded.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.5.3.", "t": "Were the Master, officers and deck ratings familiar with the vessel’s STS", "c": "Operations Plan?\nShort Question Text\nSTS Operations Plan\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Cargo Control Room, Main Deck, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nOCIMF: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum\nChemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that ship to ship (STS) mooring & cargo operations are always planned and conducted in a\nconsistent manner.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF*: Ship to Ship Transfer Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gases. First Edition.\n1.1 Introduction\nThe requirements of MARPOL Annex I, chapter 8, The Prevention of Pollution During Transfer of Oil Cargo Between\nOil Tankers at Sea, should be adhered to for all applicable operations involving oil cargoes.\nThe requirement for vessels to be provided with an STS operations plan should be considered for adoption by\nvessels involved in the STS transfer of other cargoes as recommended best practice.\n7.2 Responsibility for cargo operations\nWhere applicable, a copy of the ship’s approved STS operations plan should also be available on the bridge, CCR\nand ECR.\nOCIMF* a joint publication by OCIMF, CDI, ICS & SIGTTO.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation which may include:\n• STS operations (including reverse STS).\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex 1\nChapter 8 – Prevention of pollution during transfer of oil cargo between tankers at sea.\nRegulation 40\n1.\n2.\n3.\nthe regulation contained in this chapter apply to oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and above engaged in the\ntransfer of oil cargo between oil tankers at sea (STS operations).\nthe regulations contained in this chapter shall not apply to oil transfer operations associated with FPSOs\nused for the offshore production and storage of oil and FSUs used for the offshore storage of produced oil.\nthe regulations in this chapter shall not apply to bunkering operations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel Operator should have developed an STS Operations Plan as follows:\n• •\nFor vessels involved in transfer of MARPOL Annex 1 cargo – Administration approved.\nFor vessels involved in transfers of all other liquid cargoes – As recommended best practice.\nCopies should be available in the following locations:\n• •\n• Bridge.\nCargo transfer control station.\nEngine Room.\nAnd should contain the following information:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• A step-by-step description of the entire STS operation.\nA description of the mooring and unmooring procedures and arrangements, including diagrams where\nnecessary, and procedures for tending the oil tankers’ moorings during the transfer of cargo.\nA description of the cargo and ballast transfer procedures, including those used while underway or anchored\nand procedures for connecting and testing the integrity of cargo hoses and hose to manifold interface,\ntopping off cargo tanks and disconnecting cargo hoses.\nThe titles, locations and duties of all persons involved in the STS operation.\nProcedures for operating the emergency shutdown and communication systems and for rapid breakaway.\nA description of the drip trays and procedures for emptying them.\nProcedures for reporting spillages of oil into the water.\nAn approved contingency plan.\nA cargo and ballast plan.\nThe Master should ensure that the STS Operations Plan on board is current and should require all personnel on\nboard to follow the procedures in the plan.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Review the STS Operations Plan and verify that:\no A copy of the STS Operations Plan is located on the bridge, in the cargo transfer station and in the\nEngine room.\no Where the vessel carries MARPOL Annex 1 cargo, the STS Operations plan has been approved by\nthe administration.\no Where the vessel did not carry MARPOL Annex 1 cargo, the STS Operations Plan was developed\nin alignment with Annex A of the OCIMF* Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.\no Where the vessel was involved in an STS operation, that the STS Operations Plan had been\nupdated with:\n The mooring plan for the current operation.\n\n• The cargo plan for the current operation.\nWhere the vessel was involved in an STS operation during the inspection or had conducted an STS\noperation within the previous two months, interview one rating and gauge their familiarity with the location\nand content of the STS Operations Plan.\nExpected Evidence\n• The vessel’s STS Operations Plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel did not have an STS Operations Plan. (irrespective of whether the vessel had been involved in\nSTS operations.)\nWhere the vessel had been involved in the STS transfer of Annex 1 cargo the STS plan had not been\napproved by the vessel’s Administration. (except where specifically exempted by MARPOL Annex 1\nRegulation 40)\nWhere the vessel was not involved in the carriage of Annex 1 cargo, the content of the STS Operations Plan\nwas not in alignment with Annex A of the OCIMF Ship to Ship Transfer Guide.\nThe onboard STS Operations Plan were found to be outdated or incomplete.\nOne or more copies of the STS Operations Plan was missing from the following locations; bridge, cargo\ntransfer control station or engine room.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the location and content of the STS Operations Plan.\nAn interviewed deck rating who was onboard during a recent STS operation was unfamiliar with the location\nand content of the STS Operations Plan.\nWhere the ship had never been involved in an STS operation as described by the OCIMF joint industry publication\nand there was no future intention to do so, select “Not Answerable” in the Process and Human response tools then\nselect \"Not Applicable - as instructed by question guidance\".\n9.6. Single Point Mooring", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.6.1.", "t": "Were the vapour collection system manifold arrangements suitable for hose", "c": "handling at buoy moorings?\nShort Question Text\nVapour hose securing arrangement for buoy moorings.\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Manifold\nPublications\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment\nObjective\nTo ensure that vapour collection system manifolds are suitably designed and equipped to facilitate hose\nhandling at buoy moorings.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/CDI: Recommendations for Oil and Chemical Tanker Manifolds and Associated Equipment\nSection five\nHose support at ship’s side\nA means of adequately supporting hoses in way of the ship’s side abreast of the manifolds should be provided.\nSection nine\nDeck fittings to facilitate hose handling at buoy moorings\nVessels likely to conduct operations at buoy moorings (SPM, CBM and tandem berthing) should follow the guidance\nin this section, which is on the design of deck fittings in way of the manifold for use when hoisting and hanging-off\nhoses.\nDetails of all deck fittings in way of the manifold should be included in the vessel’s mooring arrangement plan.\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include:\n• •\nConventional buoy mooring, Single Point Moorings.\nTandem mooring to F(P)SO.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nFor vapour collection system manifolds on vessels likely to conduct operations at buoy moorings (SPM, CBM and\ntandem berthing):\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The vapour manifolds should be supported to the same strength as the cargo manifolds.\nThe hose rails should be of the same strength and construction throughout their length, extend beyond the\nvapour manifolds to permit use at buoy moorings and be fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft\nends of the hose rails.\nA closed chock should be fitted at the ship's side in line with the vapour manifolds.\nA cruciform bollard should be fitted in line, or nearly in line with the vapour manifolds to allow securing of the\nvapour hose hang-off chain.\nTwo deck pad-eyes of a size sufficient to secure a 16-inch floating hose should be provided, one to either\nside of the line from the closed chocks to the vapour manifolds.\nFittings for securing the vapour hose should be permanently marked with their safe working load (SWL).\nMeans to thoroughly drain the vapour manifold should be provided at the lowest point in the vapour\ncollection system line to avoid risk of liquid carry-over into the floating hose.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Inspect the vapour collection system manifolds and verify that the required fittings are in place.\nExpected Evidence\n• The vessel’s mooring arrangement plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\nFor a vapour return system manifold (VRSM) which was designed for use at single buoy moorings:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe vapour manifolds were not supported to the same strength as the cargo manifolds.\nHose rails did not extend beyond the vapour manifolds.\nHose rails serving the vapour manifolds were not:\no Of the same strength and construction throughout their length.\no Fitted with stopper plates at both the forward and aft ends of the hose rails.\nThe vapour manifolds were not fitted with the necessary:\no Closed chocks.\no Cruciform bollards.\no Deck pad-eyes.\nThe fittings for securing the vapour hose were not permanently marked with their safe working load (SWL).\nThere were no means to drain the vapour manifold to avoid risk of liquid carry-over into the floating hose.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.6.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for mooring at", "c": "an SPM or F(P)SO and were the fittings required accurately described in the HVPQ?\nShort Question Text\nSPM mooring arrangements.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle, Documentation\nPublications\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the vessel is appropriately equipped and will be able to safely moor to an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations. First Edition 2018.\n5.3.2 Bow mooring equipment overview\nOCIMF has published recommendations for conventional tanker bow mooring equipment in a range of earlier\npublications and the current recommendations are repeated in this section…\n…Conventional tankers that are likely to trade to F(P)SOs and SPM buoys should be equipped with bow chain\nstopper s designed to accept 76mm chafe chain in accordance with figure 5.2.\nTechnical operators of conventional tankers that are expected to trade to F(P)SOs or SPM buoy terminals are\nrecommended to fit bow chain stoppers in accordance with table 5.1\n5.3.3 Bow chain stoppers\nBow chain stoppers, foundations and supporting structure should be adequate for the expected loads. The tanker\nshould hold a copy of the manufacturer’s type approval certificate for the bow chain stoppers. The certificate should\nconfirm that the bow chain stoppers are constructed in strict compliance with a recognised standard that specifies\nSWL, yield strength and safety factors. The tanker should also hold a certificate confirming the strength of the bow\nchain stopper foundations and supporting structure, substantiated by detailed engineering analysis or calculations\nand an inspection of the structure. An independent authority, such as a Classification Society, should issue both\ncertificates. Bow chain stoppers, foundations and supporting structures should be kept in good order and surveyed at\nleast once every five years. Bow chain stoppers should be permanently marked with the SWL and appropriate serial\nnumbers, so that the certificates can be easily cross-referenced.\nBow chain stopper manufacturers should provide basic operating, maintenance and inspection instructions, which\nshould be followed without modification. For example, wedges should not be used between the pin and tongue of\nbow chain stoppers. Where appropriate, manufacturers should also provide guidance on maximum component wear\nlimits.\nSMIT type towing bracket fittings should not be used as bow chain stoppers.\n5.3.4 Bow fairleads\nBow fairleads should be of at least equivalent SWL to the bow chain stoppers.\nBow fairleads, foundations and supporting structure should be adequate for the expected loads. The tanker should\nhold a copy of the manufacturer’s type approval certificate for the bow fairleads confirming the bow fairleads are\nconstructed in strict compliance with a recognised standard that specifies SWL and safety factor. The tanker should\nalso hold a certificate confirming the strength of the bow fairlead foundations and associated supporting structure,\nsubstantiated by detailed engineering analysis or calculations and an inspection of the structure. An independent\nauthority, such as a Classification Society, should issue both certificates. Bow fairleads, foundations and supporting\nstructure should be kept in good order and surveyed at least once every five years.\n5.3.5 Position of winch stowage drums and possible pedestal rollers\nThere should be no obstructions or fittings (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to the route of the pick-up line or\nchain, to ensure that if the line is allowed to run free during letting go, it is unlikely to snag on any such structure.\nOn all conventional tankers, winch stowage drums used to stow the pick-up line should be capable of lifting at least\n15 tonnes and be of sufficient size to accommodate 150m of 80mm diameter rope. Using winch warping drums to\nhandle pick-up lines is considered unsafe and should be avoided. This is because the combined weight of the pick-up\nline and buoys can lead to the line slipping and jerking on the drum end if not effectively handled.\nTMSA KPI 6a.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels.\nProcedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring operation, which may include:\n• •\nSPMs\nTandem mooring to Floating, (Production), Storage and Offloading (F(P)SO).\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals that included:\n• •\n• Preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\nInstructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\nInspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers.\nThe vessel operator should have confirmed via the HVPQ 10.6 whether the ship meets the latest OCIMF\nrecommendations for equipment employed in the bow mooring of conventional tankers at single point moorings, and\nsupplied the following details:\n• •\nSingle Point Mooring (SPM) Equipment\no Details of the bow chain stoppers.\no Details of the closed bow fairleads.\no Distance between bow fairleads.\no Distance between the bow fairlead and the bow stopper.\no Distance from the bow stopper to the roller lead or winch drum.\no The lead from the bow stopper to the winch drum.\no The capacity of the winch drum.\nBow Mooring Arrangement Diagram.\nThis question will only be assigned to vessels where HVPQ question 10.6.2 (are bow chain stoppers fitted) is\nanswered affirmatively.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\nSight, and where necessary review, the certificates for the bow stoppers and closed bow fairleads,\nparticularly if these have been modified or retro-fitted.\nSight, and where necessary review, the records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers\nInspect the arrangements at the bow for mooring to an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.\nDuring the inspection verify, as far as practicable, that the HVPQ accurately describes the arrangements for\nmooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for mooring at\nSPM or F(P)SO terminals.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\nMooring arrangement plan(s).\nCertificates, issued by an independent authority, such as a Classification Society, for the:\no Bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.\no Closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.\nRecords of inspection and maintenance of the bow stoppers, which may form part of the maintenance plan.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals that included:\no Guidance on preparations for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\no Instructions for safe mooring at SPM or F(P)SO terminals.\no Inspection and maintenance instructions for the bow stopper(s).\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for mooring at SPM or F(P)SO\nterminals, as they related to their duties.\nThe actual physical arrangements for mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO terminal were not as described in the\nHVPQ - provide details.\nThere was no certificate, issued by an independent authority, such as a Classification Society, available for\nthe:\no Bow stopper(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.\no Closed bow fairlead(s) and/or foundations and supporting structure.\nThe bow stopper(s) was not permanently marked with the SWL and appropriate serial number.\nThe SWL of the closed bow fairlead(s) was less than the SWL of the bow stopper(s).\nThere were no records of inspection and maintenance of the bow stopper(s).\nThere was an obstruction or fitting (e.g. a hatch with securing dogs) close to the route of the pick-up line or\nchain.\nAt the SPM or FS(P)O terminal where the inspection took place:\no The winch stowage drum was not of sufficient size to accommodate the pick-up line.\no The winch warping drum had been used to handle the pick-up line.\no Wedges had been used between the pin and tongue of the bow chain stopper(s).\no A Smit type towing bracket had been used as a bow chain stopper.\nA bow stopper(s), roller lead(s) or closed bow fairlead(s) was defective in any respect.\n9.7. Shuttle Tanker Mooring Systems", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "9.7.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore\nterminals, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nShuttle tanker bow mooring system\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\nObjective\nTo ensure the bow mooring system is regularly inspected, tested, and maintained, and operated safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations\n5.4.1 Bow mooring equipment overview\nA typical mooring system for bow loading tankers consists of the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nHydraulic power-pack.\nTraction winch.\nStowage drum, fitted with guide rollers, for messenger line and pick-up line (may be a rope bin).\nChain stopper (for securing the chafe chain), with on-load releasable pawl.\nChain stopper load cell (for sensing hawser loads).\nBow fairlead (for the mooring hawser).\nIndicators for hawser load and hydraulic oil pressure at the cargo control station.\nMaintenance crane.\nThe principal mooring equipment on the bow loading tanker consists of the chain stopper, (which typically has an\nSWL of between 250 and 500 tonnes depending on yield factor used), and the traction winch. The traction winch may\nbe used not only for retrieving the mooring but also to haul the cargo hose into close proximity to the coupler. For\nsafe mooring operations, the chafe chain (usually 76mm diameter stud link chain) must match the size of the chain\nstopper on the bow loading tanker and the traction winch must be able to safely accommodate the expected loads.\nDP bow loading tankers are normally fitted with a single fairlead with slightly different shape and dimensions to\nconventional tankers. The single fairlead is mounted on a raised platform at the bow and can sometimes be moved\nforward and aft on hydraulic rams.\nBow loading tankers with bow mooring systems are fitted with specialised hydraulic bow chain stoppers. The mooring\nequipment should be linked electronically and mechanically to the ESD system, with appropriate interlocks integral to\nthe BLS and the green line system.\n5.4.1.1 Fairlead\nThe fairlead should be fitted with a roller complete with roller bearings in the bottom of the fairlead.\nThe roller and all parts in contact with the chafing chain should be covered with stainless steel material (nonsparking). The structural strength of the fairlead and its supporting structure should be based on a safety factor of 1.0\nagainst the yield criterion when applying a load equal to MBL (typical 500 tonnes) of the corresponding chafing\nchain’s weak link. The design force should be established at an angle of 90 degrees off the ship’s centreline in the\nhorizontal plane and ± 30 degrees in the vertical plane.\nThe foundation should be designed to support and guide the lower part of the Offshore Loading System (OLS)\nmessenger line in the transverse direction during the connection of the hose. The internal opening in the fairlead\nshould be minimum 500mm x 500mm. A spark-free cladding should cover the substructure of the fairlead openings\n(forecastle platform deck, foundations etc.), which may be hit by the chafing chain during an ESD2 release.\nTo allow consideration for the widest possible range of terminals, operators of these tankers may wish to assess the\nsuitability of these specialised bow chain stoppers for use at conventional terminals and provide engineering\ninterlocks incorporated into the control systems to ensure the chafe chain cannot be accidentally released.\nProcedures and crew training to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain should also be addressed.\nOn all bow mooring tankers, winch stowage drums used to stow the pick-up line should be capable of lifting at least\n15 tonnes and be of sufficient size to accommodate 150m of 80mm diameter rope, in addition to any small\nmessenger line. Remotely operated winch stowage drums may give some additional snap-back injury protection to\nthe winch operator.\nNorwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore loading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140\nA.2 Operation\nThe mooring and coupling operation should be performed as per the relevant Field Offloading Manual.\nA.5.1 Fairlead\nA spark-free cladding should cover the substructure of the fairlead-openings (forecastle platform deck, foundations\netc.) which may be hit by the chafing chain during an ESD 2 release.\nA.5.2 Hardwood protection on deck\nThe deck area between the chain stopper and the fairlead should be protected by 75 mm thick hardwood. The width\nof the hardwood layer should be twice the width of the fairlead, i.e., 1m.\nThe hardwood should be fixed to the deck by recessed stud bolts/nuts, and a hardwood plug should cover the top.\nA.5.3 Chain stopper\nThe chain stopper should be of the self-locking type, remote operated and designed for 84 mm chain (range 76 - 89\nmm). The closing/opening time of the chain stopper should not exceed 30 sec.\nThe structural strength of the chain stopper including the release mechanism and its supporting structure should be\nbased on a safety factor of 1.0 against the yield criterion when applying a load equal to MBL of 500 tonnes.\nA tension meter with a minimum range 0-350 tonnes should be installed to measure the tension in the hawser during\nthe loading operation.\nEither the fairlead or the chain stopper should have the possibility to adjust the hose handling wire/rope relative to the\nloading manifold to enable the SPM-auto function.\nA.5.4 Guide roller\nA guide roller with (Working Load Limit) WLL 900 kN and equipped with a 0-100 T tension meter should be installed\nin front of the traction winch. The load cell should read the mooring forces during winch operations.\nA.5.5 Traction winch\nThe traction winch should be of the twin drum type designed for 25-120 mm synthetic fibre rope.\nThe winch should be designed for bridge and local control. The winch should be equipped with a failsafe disc brake\nsystem suitable for emergency release of the OLS, which requires an automatic release speed adjustable between 1\nand 2 m/s. The static weight of the OLS hose should be as per field operator requirements. The “Loading Permitted”\nsignal should not be obtained unless the dog-clutch on the traction winch has been disengaged in OLS-mode, i.e.,\ninterlocked (i.e., chain stopper is open).\nA manual brake release should be supplied to release the failsafe brake in the event of a power failure. This should\nbe placed in a safe area, which protects the operator for any possible debris during the release of the brake.\nWinch capacity requirements:\nPulling force: minimum 700 kN WLL\n• •\n• •\n• Speeds: minimum 2 steps; approx. 0-8 m/min. and 0-50 m/min.\nHigh speed, minimum: 50 m/min.\nBrake capacity, minimum: 900 kN WLL.\nBrake disc to be of stainless-steel material (NB/CC).\nRendering function according to field specific requirements or typically, 120% of maximum dynamic hose\ntension (NB/CC).\nThe static capacity of the foundations should be in accordance with the capacity of the traction winch. The winch\nshould have a bolted cover to protect the brakes. Motors, cables, valves and pipes should be properly protected from\nmechanical impact. Any hydraulic piping for the traction winch motor should have a flexible configuration to reduce\nstress in the pipes during pressure shock. Such pipes should have an “expansion loop” between the deck and the\nhydraulic motor.\nNecessary guide rollers between the traction winch and the rope pulling unit for correct entering of the rope into the\nrope pulling unit should be installed.\nA.5.6 Rope pulling unit\nA rope pulling unit should be installed to ensure that the rope enters directly to a stowing arrangement. The rope\npulling unit should provide necessary back tension for the traction winch. The back tension should be adjustable from\n0 to 4 kN.\nFor air driven rope pulling units dry and clean air should be provided as well as lubrication pan and water trap.\nFor rotating stowage arrangements, the control panel should include control of the rotation.\nThe following operational requirements should be fulfilled:\n• •\n• •\nThe operator should be protected from accidental contact with the rotating reels and the rope.\nThe operator should have a free view to the stowing tank, and it should be possible to see the entire bottom\nof the tank from the operating position.\nIt should be easy for the operator to reach all the controls from the operating position.\nThe rope pulling may be automatically controlled via the traction winch and with the possibility of\nmanual/local control.\nA.5.8 Service crane\nA service crane should be installed on the platform deck. The crane should be designed and installed for general\nlifting operations and maintenance of the BLS equipment located on the platform deck. It should be installed as far\nforward as possible, but still being able to service the rope pulling unit and all the other equipment installed on the\nplatform deck. The crane should fulfil the following requirements:\n• •\n• WLL 50 kN at 10m working radius.\nSlewing sector of 360° (continuous).\nSelf-contained type (electro/hydraulic).\nG.3 Messenger line cutter\nThe (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) OLST should have a messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting\nthe line if sucked into the thruster(s) / propeller(s).\nTMSA KPI 6A.2.1 requires that detailed procedures address each different type of mooring operation likely to be\nundertaken by fleet vessels. Procedures have been developed following risk assessments for each type of mooring\noperation, which may include:\n• •\nTandem mooring to F(P)SO.\nDP operations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the\nbow mooring system for offshore terminals. These procedures may be incorporated in Field Operations Manuals and\nthe vessel’s maintenance plan. In addition to routine operation, inspection, testing and maintenance, they should also\ngive guidance on:\n• •\n• Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.\nUse of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.\nUse of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the\nthruster(s)/propeller(s).\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and\nmaintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.\nReview the records of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore\nterminals.\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel inspect the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:\no Bow fairlead.\no Hardwood deck protection.\no Chain stopper.\no Guide roller.\no Traction winch.\no Manual brake release.\no Rope pulling unit.\no Service crane.\nHydraulic power-pack.\nMessenger line cutter.\nWhere necessary, compare the observed condition with the records of inspection, testing and maintenance\nof the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.\no\no\n• •\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:\no Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.\no Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.\no Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the\nthruster(s) / propeller(s).\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system\nfor offshore terminals.\nRecords of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow\nmooring system for offshore terminals.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of the bow mooring system for offshore terminals including:\no Measures to prevent accidental release of the chafe chain from the bow stopper.\no Use of the traction winch manual brake release in the event of a power failure.\no Use of the messenger line cutter device designed to enable cutting the line if sucked into the\nthruster(s) / propeller(s).\nThere were no records, or records were incomplete, of inspection, testing and maintenance of the bow\nmooring system for offshore terminals.\nThere were no records to show that the time taken for the chain stopper to open and close had been tested,\nand that operation was within the recommended 30 seconds.\nThe chain stopper was not marked with its SWL.\nThe bow fairlead was not constructed of stainless steel or was not covered with a spark free cladding.\nThe deck area between the chain stopper and the fairlead was not protected by 75mm thick hardwood, or\nthere were sections of hardwood missing or damaged.\nRecess studs bolts/nuts, fixing the hardwood layer to the deck were not covered with hardwood plugs, or\nsome of the plugs were missing.\nThere was no tension monitor installed to measure the tension in the hawser during the loading operation.\nThe manual brake release for the traction winch for use in the event of a power failure was not located in a\nsafe area that would protect the operator from debris during the release of the brake.\nTraction winch motors, cables, valves and pipes were not properly protected from mechanical impact.\nThe traction winch was not fitted with a bolted cover to protect the brakes.\nThe rope pulling unit was not fitted with protection devices to prevent the operator from accidentally coming\ninto contact with the rotating reels.\nThe operators view of the rope stowing area was obscured in some way.\nThe bow mooring system for offshore terminals was defective in any respect.\n10. Machinery Spaces\n10.1. Engineering Procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.1.1.", "t": "Had the Chief Engineer prepared Standing Orders, supplemented by Daily Orders,", "c": "which emphasised and reinforced the company expectations with regards to engine\nroom management and, if so, had all engineer officers signed to acknowledge their\nunderstanding of the same?\nShort Question Text\nChief Engineer's standing and daily orders\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that all engineer officers are aware of the key expectations of both the company and the Chief\nEngineer with respect to the management of the vessel’s machinery spaces.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n2.1.2 Standing Orders\nThe safety management manual and its associated operational procedures, along with standing orders and\ninstructions, form the basis of command and control on board.\nThe Chief Engineer should issue written standing orders for the engineering team. These should reflect the Chief\nEngineer’s own requirements, and take into account the Master’s standing orders, the circumstances of the ship and\ntrade, and the experience of the engineering team on board.\nStanding orders and instructions should not conflict with the SMS. However, they provide a good opportunity to give\nspecific guidance about the occasions when the Chief Engineer should be consulted or called to the engine room.\nOn joining the ship, all relevant engineer officers should read, sign and date the standing orders. A reference copy of\nthe orders should be readily available in the ECR.\n2.1.3 Night and Day Orders\nThe Chief Engineer should issue night orders and day orders in the engineering department order book. These\norders provide specific instructions to address circumstances and requirements outside the normal routines. All\nEOOWs should fully understand and acknowledge these orders when going on or off watch.\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines.\nShore management, having responsibility for establishing and maintaining technical standards on board, should\nprepare overall inspection guidelines and procedures based on their established operational and maintenance\nphilosophy.\nTMSA KPI: none defined.\nIMO: ISM Code\n5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to\n.3 issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner.\n(The Chief Engineer issues orders on behalf of the Master)\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which require the Chief Engineer to create Standing Orders,\nsupplemented by Daily Orders, which reiterate key machinery space management expectations of the company\nalong with any additional expectations of the Chief Engineer.\nThe Standing Orders should include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nUMS procedures and arrangements for periodic inspections of the machinery space.\nEntry into the machinery space during periods of UMS including use of the dead man alarm and/or\ncommunicating procedures to be utilised.\nThe actions to be taken when a machinery space alarm is activated, particularly when equipment involved\nwas identified as critical.\nThe actions to be taken when machinery or equipment is found to be defective.\nInstructions for the supervision and documentation of bilge water, sludge, fuel oil and lube oils transfers and\ndisposal.\nInstructions for the supervision and documentation of incinerator use.\nInstructions and limitations for hot and cold work in the machinery space workshop.\nCalling the Chief Engineer.\nThe Daily Orders should include:\n• The anticipated time(s) of:\no Changing the engine room status for navigational operations.\no Conducting machinery tests for navigational operations.\no Changing the number of generators to accommodate operational needs.\no Commencing the changing of fuel grades or other measures to comply with environmental\nrestrictions.\no When the incinerator and/or oily water separator may be used in compliance with regulations and\ncompany procedures.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which outlined the requirement for the Chief\nEngineer to develop Standing Orders and Daily Orders along with their expected content.\nReview the Chief Engineer’s Standing and Daily Orders and verify that the content of each was aligned with\nthe company expectations, reflected the equipment fitted to the vessel and, in the case of the daily orders,\nthe vessel’s operation.\nReview the Engine Room Log Book and other records for a recent operation and verify that the instructions\ngiven in the daily orders had been complied with.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for developing the Chief Engineer’s Standing Orders and for writing Daily Orders.\nThe current Chief Engineer’s Standing Orders signed by the Chief Engineer and all engineer officers.\nThe Daily Order Book with each dated and timed entry signed by the Chief Engineer, and subsequently,\neach watchkeeping officer before taking over their watch or period of duty.\n• The Engine Room Log Book and other records to support the changes of machinery space operating mode\nand the status of machinery.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure defining the requirement for the Chief Engineer to prepare Standing and\nDaily Orders.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the content of the Chief Engineer’s Standing or Daily\norders.\nThe Chief Engineer had not prepared their own Standing Orders which were signed and dated at the time of\ntaking over the responsibilities as Chief Engineer.\nThe engineer officers onboard at the time of the inspection had not signed the Standing Orders, (unless they\nhad only joined that day).\nThe content of the Standing Orders was in contradiction to the company procedures for managing the\nmachinery space or any machinery or equipment.\nThe Standing Orders did not define the Chief Engineer’s expectations in respect of:\no Entry into the machinery spaces during periods of UMS.\no The actions to be taken when a machinery space alarm is activated, particularly when equipment\ninvolved was identified as critical.\no The actions to be taken when machinery or equipment is found to be defective.\no Supervision and documentation of bilge water, sludge, fuel oil and lube oils transfers and disposal.\no Instructions for the supervision and documentation of Incinerator use.\no Instructions and limitations for hot and cold work in the engine room workshop.\nThe Chief Engineer had not prepared Daily Orders which were signed, dated and timed, to supplement their\nStanding Orders (not generally required for days where vessel was operating with periodically unmanned\nmachinery spaces and in open ocean).\nThe watchkeeping engineer officers had not signed the Chief Engineer’s Daily Orders for understanding.\nReview of Engine Room Log Books and/or other records indicated that instructions contained within the\nChief Engineer’s Standing or Daily orders had not been followed. (A negative observation should not be\nraised where a change in circumstances, such as a delay in mooring/unmooring had occurred.)", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.1.2.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for testing main propulsion, steering gear, thrusters and power generation\nplant prior to use and at critical points during a voyage or operation, and were checklists\nand log book entries completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nTesting main propulsion, steering gear, thrusters & power generation plant\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Steering Gear\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition\nIMO SOLAS\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 33.\nObjective\nTo ensure that all machinery required for safe navigation is tested to verify full functionality and availability\nat key stages of a voyage or operation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nAnnex A Manoeuvring Checklists\nA1 preparations for arrival\nA2 preparations for departure\nA3 Steering gear checks\nICS: Bridge Procedures Guide. Fifth Edition.\nChapter 3.18 Periodic Checks of Navigational Equipment\nOperational checks on navigational equipment should be undertaken when preparing for sea and prior to port entry\n(see Checklists B1, B6 & B7) and at any other time required by the SMS.\nBefore entering restricted or coastal waters, it is important also to check that full control of engine and steering\nfunction is available.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter V Regulation 26\nSteering gear: testing and drills\n1.\nWithin 12 hours before departure, the ship’s steering gear shall be checked and tested by the ship’s crew.\nUSCG: CFR Title 33\nPart & Section 164.25. Test before entering or getting underway.\n(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section no person may cause a vessel to enter into or get\nunderway on the navigable waters of the United States unless no more than 12 hours before entering or getting\nunderway, the following equipment has been tested:\n• •\n• •\n• Primary and secondary steering gear.\nAll internal vessel control communications and vessel control alarms.\nStandby or emergency generator.\nStorage batteries for emergency lighting and power systems inf vessel control and propulsion machinery\nspaces.\nMain propulsion machinery, ahead and astern.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for preparing and testing all machinery necessary to ensure\nthat the vessel can be safely and efficiently manoeuvred at all stages of the voyage.\nThe procedures and supporting checklists should include all checks and/or tests required by international and local\nregulations and reflect the equipment fitted to the vessel.\nThe procedures should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhich items of machinery and equipment are required to be checked and/or tested pre-arrival, predeparture and/or pre-transit.\nWhat functions of each item of machinery or equipment is required to be checked and/or tested.\nWho will conduct the checks and/or tests.\nWhen the checks and tests are required to be carried out.\nThe record keeping requirements for the checks and tests that have been completed.\nThe actions to take when equipment is found to be defective during the testing process.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the machinery tests required to\nbe carried out pre-arrival, pre-departure and at defined stages during a voyage or operation.\nReview a recently completed pre-arrival, pre-departure and/or pre-transit machinery check list or record and\nverify that the required tests were completed in compliance with the company expectations.\nRandomly select an item from the pre-arrival, pre-departure and/or pre-transit machinery check list and\nverify that the accompanying engineer officer understood how to complete the test or check.\n• •\n• Review the Engine Room Log Book and other items such as printers and data loggers as necessary to verify\nthat the required machinery tests had been completed at the appropriate points within a recent voyage or\noperation.\nWhere defects or abnormalities were present during machinery tests which could not be immediately\nrectified by onboard staff, verify that the defect had been communicated to the bridge and entered into the\ndefect reporting system for later rectification.\nWhere safe to do so, request the accompanying engineer officer to demonstrate the local operation of the\nsteering gear.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures which defined the pre-arrival, pre-departure and/or pre-transit machinery testing\nrequirements.\nCompleted pre-arrival, pre-departure and pre-operational machinery checklists or the required wipe-clean\nchecklist along with the supporting logbook entries to verify satisfactory completion of the required tests.\nEvidence that machinery and equipment defects detected during the testing program had been noted and\neither immediately repaired by onboard staff or that the defect had been communicated to the bridge and\nentered in the defect reporting system for later repair.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no documented procedure for testing and checking equipment and machinery at defined points in\nthe voyage.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the machinery testing process or any test or check\nthat was required to be carried out by the vessel specific checklist.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the local operation of the steering gear.\nChecklists did not reflect the equipment fitted to the vessel or the tests and/or checks required to be carried\nout at defined points prior to and within the voyage.\nMachinery and equipment tests and/or checks required by the company procedures had not been completed\nand documented.\nDefects detected during the equipment and machinery testing process had not been recorded as either\nbeing repaired immediately or entered into the defect reporting system for later rectification.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.1.3.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with company procedures", "c": "for periodic rounds and monitoring of the machinery space, and were log book entries\nand checklists available to confirm that the rounds had been completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nPeriodic rounds of machinery space for non-UMS vessels\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines\nObjective\nTo ensure that the machinery spaces had been effectively monitored to manage machinery in operation and\non standby.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n8.5 Periodic Checks on Machinery and Related Equipment\nThe EOOW should use all their senses as appropriate when verifying the correct operation of systems and machinery\nduring frequent engine room rounds. Any abnormalities should be investigated immediately and rectified as\nappropriate. The Chief Engineer should be informed of any problems encountered and actions taken.\n8.9.3 The Complete Engine Room Round\nThe most important duty of a watchkeeper is to carry out comprehensive and frequent rounds. This is essential to\nensure trouble free operation of all engine room machinery.\nAnnex B Engine Room Checklists and Permits\nB1 Preparations for Change of Watch\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines\nShore management, having responsibility for establishing and maintaining technical standards on board, should\nprepare overall inspection guidelines and procedures based on their established operational and maintenance\nphilosophy.\nTMSA KPI none defined\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 31\nMachinery Controls.\n.3 Where the main propulsion and associated machinery, including sources of main electrical supply, are provided\nwith various degrees of automatic or remote control and are under continuous manual supervision from a control\nroom the arrangements and controls shall be so designed, equipped and installed that the machinery operation will\nbe as safe as if it were under direct supervision.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, supplemented by checklists, which described the\nrequirement for monitoring the machinery space(s) and include:\n• •\nRequirements for routine machinery space rounds by the engineer officer on watch.\nVessel and operation specific checklists developed to ensure machinery space rounds are conducted\nthoroughly with local instrument readings recorded for comparison with remote values.\nChecklists should be adapted to reflect the equipment and machinery fitted onboard the vessel being inspected.\nThe vessel operator should have declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire whether the vessel had a UMS\nnotation.\nThis question will be assigned to vessels which do not have a UMS notation.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the requirement for routine\nmonitoring of machinery and machinery spaces.\nReview checklists and vessel logbooks and verify that the required machinery space rounds had been\ncompleted in accordance with the company procedures.\nVerify that the machinery space round checklists in use covered all sections of the machinery space and all\nprincipal machinery applicable to the vessel and the various operations undertaken.\nSelect an item from one of the checklists presented and verify that the accompanying officer was familiar\nwith the required check, how to perform it and what data needed to be recorded.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures which defined the requirement for routine monitoring of machinery spaces.\nChecklists for machinery space rounds.\nEngine room operational records for recent voyages.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure that required periodic machinery space rounds.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for monitoring the\nmachinery spaces.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted during\nthe machinery space rounds and included on the checklists.\nThere were no vessel specific checklists for periodic rounds of the machinery space.\nThe periodic rounds of the machinery spaces had not been carried out in accordance with the company\nprocedure.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.1.4.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with company procedures", "c": "for periodic machinery space rounds and monitoring of the machinery space during both\nmanned and unmanned (UMS) periods, and were log book entries and checklists\navailable to confirm that the inspections had been completed as required?\nShort Question Text\nPeriodic machinery space rounds during both manned and unmanned (UMS) periods\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines\nObjective\nTo ensure that the machinery spaces had been monitored to effectively manage machinery in operation and\non standby while in both manned and unmanned modes.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n7.6.1 Pre-UMS Rounds and Checklist\nBefore changing over to unattended operation, the EEOW should complete a round of spaces, following a checklist\nwhich lists all the parameters to be tested and verified.\nSee checklist B2: Preparations for UMS\n8.9.3 The Complete Engine Room Round\nThe most important duty of a watchkeeper is to carry out comprehensive and frequent rounds. This is essential to\nensure trouble free operation of all engine room machinery.\nAnnex B\nEngine Room Checklists and Permits\nB1 Preparations for Change of Watch\nOCIMF: Recommendations on Engineering Watch/Duty Period Handover and Inspection Routines\nShore management, having responsibility for establishing and maintaining technical standards on board, should\nprepare overall inspection guidelines and procedures based on their established operational and maintenance\nphilosophy.\nTMSA KPI none defined\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 31\nMachinery Controls\n.3 Where the main propulsion and associated machinery, including sources of main electrical supply, are provided\nwith various degrees of automatic or remote control and are under continuous manual supervision from a control\nroom the arrangements and controls shall be so designed, equipped and installed that the machinery operation will\nbe as safe as if it were under direct supervision.\nChapter II-1\nPart E - Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nRegulation 46 – General.\nRegulation 47 – Fire precautions.\nRegulation 48 – Protection against flooding.\nRegulation 49 – Control of propulsion machinery from the navigation bridge.\nRegulation 50 – Communication.\nRegulation 51 – Alarm system.\nRegulation 52 – Safety systems.\nRegulation 53 – Special requirements for machinery, boiler and electrical installations.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, supplemented by checklists, which described the\nrequirement for monitoring the machinery space(s) in both the manned and unmanned mode and include:\n• •\n• •\n• Requirements for routine machinery space rounds by the engineer officer on watch.\nRequirements for machinery space rounds and checks prior to beginning an unmanned period.\nMaximum period which a machinery space may be operated in the unmanned mode according to the\ngoverning rules of Class and/or Flag.\nVessel and operation specific checklists developed to ensure machinery space rounds are conducted\nthoroughly with local instrument readings recorded for comparison with remote values.\nCircumstances in which unmanned machinery space operations will be permitted which should include the\nproper functioning of all systems required to be fitted under SOLAS II-1 Part E.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the requirement for routine\nmonitoring of machinery during manned operation and prior to and during unmanned machinery space\nperiods.\nReview checklists and vessel logbooks and verify that the machinery space rounds had been completed in\naccordance with the company procedure during both manned and unmanned periods.\nVerify that the machinery space round checklists in use covered all sections of the machinery space and all\nprincipal machinery applicable to the vessel and its operation.\nVerify that the pre-UMS period checklist included checks of the proper functioning off all systems required to\nbe fitted under SOLAS II-1 Part E.\n• Select an item from one of the checklists provided and verify that the accompanying engineer officer was\nfamiliar with the purpose of the check and how to carry it out.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures which defined the requirement for routine monitoring of machinery during manned\noperation and, prior to and during unmanned machinery space periods.\nChecklists for machinery space rounds during manned operation and prior to unmanned machinery space\noperation.\nMachinery space operational records for recent voyages.\nMachinery space alarm records for recent voyages.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no procedure that required periodic machinery space rounds during manned periods and prior to\nunmanned periods.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for monitoring the\nmachinery spaces during manned and unmanned operation.\nThere were no vessel specific checklists for periodic inspections of the machinery space during manned\nperiods and prior to unmanned operation.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with any of the checks required to be conducted during\nthe machinery space rounds and included on the checklists.\nThe periodic rounds of the machinery spaces had not been carried out in accordance with the company\nprocedures.\nThe machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode for a period exceeding that permitted by\ncompany procedures and/or class rules.\nThe machinery space had been operated in the unmanned mode in circumstances where company\nprocedures required the machinery space to be operated in the manned mode.\nThe vessel had been operated in the manned mode during open sea passages due to reliability concerns\nwhere the cause of the concern was not entered into the defect reporting system for rectification.\nThe vessel had been operated in the UMS mode with equipment and/or systems required under SOLAS II-1\nPart E out of service or defective.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.1.5.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the operation,", "c": "inspection and testing of the means provided to control propulsion machinery and\nrelated auxiliary systems locally in the event of failure of a remote-control system?\nShort Question Text\nLocal control of propulsion machinery\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure the engineer officers can respond promptly and effectively in the event of a failure of the remote\ncontrol of propulsion machinery or a related auxiliary system.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n10.2.2 Emergency Operation\nAll members of the engineering team should be trained and proficient in the local and emergency procedures for\nstarting and manoeuvring the main engine. Periodic drills will help to maintain this proficiency. Clear instructions on\nthis procedure should be posted next to the manual/emergency starting and manoeuvring stations.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 31\nMachinery controls\n2 Where remote control of propulsion machinery from the navigating bridge is provided and the machinery spaces\nare intended to be manned, the following shall apply:\n.6 it shall be possible to control the propulsion machinery locally, even in the case of failure in any part of the remotecontrol system.\nChapter II-1 Regulation 49\nAdditional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\nControl of propulsion machinery from the navigating bridge\n4. It shall be possible for all machinery essential for the safe operation of the ship to be controlled from a local\nposition, even in the case of failure in any part of the automatic or remote-control systems.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the means\nprovided to control propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally, in the event of failure of a remotecontrol system which defined:\n• •\nThe actions to take in the event of a failure of a remote-control system\nThe frequency of inspection and testing of the local control systems.\nShip-specific operating instructions should be posted at each local control station.\nA means of communicating with the navigation bridge should be provided at each local control station.\nLocal control is normally provided at or near the concerned machinery, but for specific arrangements local control can\nalso be from a separate location or compartment e.g. controlling the pitch of a controllable pitch propeller (CPP).\nIf fitted, the navigation and engineer officers should be aware of the vessel’s specific CPP failure mode (e.g. full\nahead, full astern or zero pitch). It is recommended that a notice indicating the failure mode is in place in the\nmachinery space and on the navigation bridge.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation, inspection and\ntesting of the means provided to control the propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally.\nInspect the manual controls or HMIs (human machine interfaces) at local control stations and the\ninstructions posted nearby.\nReview inspection and testing records available at local control stations or in the engine control room.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections and tests carried out contained within the planned\nmaintenance system.\nInterview the accompanying engineer officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The operation, inspection and testing of the local control systems.\no The means of communication with the navigation bridge from the control station(s)\nIf the vessel was fitted with a CPP, interview a navigation officer to verify their familiarity with the failure\nmode of the CPP.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the means provided to control the\npropulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally.\nThe inspection and test records for the local control systems.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the means provided to\ncontrol the propulsion machinery and related auxiliary systems locally.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the\npropulsion local control systems.\nShip specific operating instructions for the local control systems were not posted close to the control\nlocations\nThe planned maintenance system did not include the means provided to control the propulsion machinery\nlocally or the required inspections and tests\nRecords of inspections and tests carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the local control locations indicated that actions recorded in the planned maintenance system\nhad not in fact taken place.\nThe means of communication from any local control location was not ready for immediate use or was\ndefective\nThere was no notice posted, either on the navigating bridge or the machinery space, indicating the failure\nmode of the CPP, if fitted.\nAn interviewed navigation officer was unaware of the CPP failure mode, if fitted.\nThe local control systems were defective in any respect.\n10.2. Machinery Status", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.1.", "t": "Were the officers familiar with the starting procedure for the emergency generator", "c": "and were records available to demonstrate that the emergency generator had been tested\naccording to company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency generator\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nExterior Decks\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MSA: MGN 52. Testing of Emergency Sources of Electrical Power\nObjective\nTo ensure the emergency generator will supply alternative power when needed.\nIndustry Guidance\nU.K. MSA: MGN 52 Testing of emergency sources of electrical power.\n6. It is to be ensured that the emergency generator prime mover can be satisfactorily started by all means fitted for\nthis purpose including manual starting where this is provided in compliance with the Regulations and also including\nany cold starting arrangements.\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of standby arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 44\n2 Each emergency generating set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with starting devices\napproved by the Administration with a stored energy capability of at least three consecutive starts. A second source\nof energy shall be provided for an additional three starts within 30 minutes unless manual starting can be\ndemonstrated to be effective.\nChapter II-1 Regulation 43\n(2. The generator should be capable of providing full load requirements for at least 18 hours.)\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n2.2.3.4 Oil fuel pipes, which if damaged would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank having\na capacity of 500 litres and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the\ntank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the\nspace in which such the tanks are situated. The controls for remote operation of the valve for the emergency\ngenerator fuel tank shall be in a separate location from the controls for remote operation of other valves for tanks\nlocated in machinery spaces.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the starting and testing of the emergency generator.\nThese procedures should include:\n• •\n• •\n• Primary and secondary starting arrangements.\nArrangements for supplying the emergency switchboard.\nDescription of the fuel system.\nInstructions for testing the emergency generator and switchboard, including on-load tests and testing of\nconsumers for continued satisfactory performance.\nThe required frequency of testing and method of recording the results.\nStarting instructions for the emergency generator should be prominently and clearly displayed adjacent to the\nequipment. These instructions are not for the use of the qualified engineering personnel, but for others who might be\nrequired to start the generator in an emergency and there should be instruction on how to put power on the\nemergency switchboard if there is no automatic system. All officers should be fully familiar with these starting\ninstructions.\nWhere the emergency generator starting source relies on a single starter motor, a spare starter motor should be\navailable. This spare starter motor should be tested periodically.\nPeriodic testing of the emergency generator should be carried out under load, but to do this may require the vessel to\nbe blacked out. This testing under load is not to be conducted during an inspection.\nThe requirement to provide full load requirements for at least 18 hours may not necessarily mean a full fuel tank. A\nminimum quantity to provide enough fuel for this requirement should have been established and marked on the tank\nlevel gauge.\nIf necessary, the emergency generator fuel tank should be charged with fuel designed for use in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nThe position and identification of the closing devices for the emergency generator fuel supply must be clearly marked.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the emergency generator.\nSight and review the starting instructions posted adjacent to the equipment.\nInspect the general condition of the emergency generator, the emergency switchboard and the emergency\ngenerator space.\nVerify that electrical insulation matting was in place in front of and behind the emergency switchboard.\nVerify that the emergency generator was set to start and supply power to the emergency switchboard\nautomatically in the event of power interruption.\nProvided it is safe to do so, witness the starting of the emergency generator by primary and secondary\nmethods.\nVerify that the voltage and frequency displayed on the emergency switchboard when the emergency\ngenerator was running were appropriate.\nSight the level in the emergency generator fuel tank.\n• •\n• •\n• Where the vessel was operating in sub-zero temperatures verify that the fuel in the tank was designed for\nuse in sub-zero temperatures.\nWitness a test of the quick closing valve for the emergency generator where permitted.\nWitness the operation of the emergency generator space fire-flaps.\nWhere necessary, check maintenance records for the emergency generator verify that:\no The emergency generator had been routinely run on load for sufficient time to ensure that normal\nrunning temperatures and pressures had been achieved.\no Emergency consumers had been put on load to verify their connection to the emergency\nswitchboard and continued satisfactory performance.\no The quick closing fuel valve had been tested in accordance with company procedures\no The spare starter motor had been tested in accordance with company procedures\nInterview a deck officer, if present, to verify their familiarity with emergency generator starting and operating\nprocedures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the operation and testing of the emergency generator.\nThe ship specific procedure for starting the emergency generator and connecting it to the emergency\nswitchboard.\nOnboard records for the testing of the emergency generator, fuel quick closing valve and spare starter\nmotor, where provided.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for operating, testing and maintaining the emergency generator.\nThe emergency generator was not set up to start and supply power to the emergency switchboard\nautomatically in the event of a power interruption.\nShip specific starting instructions were not posted adjacent to the equipment.\nPosted starting instructions were unclear or inadequate.\nOfficers were not familiar with the ship specific starting procedure for the emergency generator and\nconnecting it to the emergency switchboard.\nThe emergency generator would not start within three attempts by either the primary or secondary means.\nThe voltage or frequency delivered by the emergency generator to the emergency switchboard was outside\nacceptable limits.\nThe emergency generator or emergency switchboard was defective in any respect.\nThere was no spare starter motor, where required.\nThere was no evidence that the spare starter motor had been tested in accordance with company\nprocedures.\nEngineer officers were not familiar with the operating and testing procedures for the emergency generator or\nquick closing valve.\nRecords for testing the emergency generator or fuel quick closing valve were not available or incomplete.\nThe emergency generator had not been run onload in accordance with the company procedure.\nElectrical consumers connected to the emergency switch board had not been put onload to verify their\ncontinued satisfactory performance in accordance with company procedures.\nThere was not enough fuel in the tank to run for 18 hours or the required level had not been established and\nmarked on the fuel level gauge.\nThe vessel was or had been trading in sub-zero temperatures but the fuel in the tank was not designed for\nuse in sub-zero temperatures.\nThe fuel quick closing valve did not operate correctly.\nThe fuel quick closing valve was closed at the time of inspection.\nThe fuel quick closing valve was not readily accessible in an emergency.\nThe fire-flaps serving the space did not operate correctly.\nElectrical insulation mats had not been positioned in front and behind the emergency switchboard.\nThe emergency generator exhaust piping was wasted or in poor condition.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.2.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the ship’s emergency\nbatteries, and were the batteries fully charged and in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nBattery emergency source of power.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure that the emergency source of electrical power is always ready in all respects.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 43\nEmergency source of electrical power in cargo ships\n3 The emergency source of electrical power may be either a generator or an accumulator battery, which shall comply\nwith the following:\n3.2 Where the emergency source of electrical power is an accumulator battery it shall be capable of:\n1.\n2.\n3.\ncarrying the emergency electrical load without recharging while maintaining the voltage of the battery\nthroughout the discharge period within 12% above or below its nominal voltage;\nautomatically connecting to the emergency switchboard in the event of failure of the main source of electrical\npower; and\nimmediately supplying at least those services specified in paragraph 4.\n5.3 No accumulator battery fitted in accordance with this regulation shall be installed in the same space as the\nemergency switchboard. An indicator shall be mounted in a suitable place on the main switchboard or in the\nmachinery control room to indicate when the batteries constituting either the emergency source of electrical power or\nthe transitional source of electrical power referred to in paragraph 3.2 or 4 are being discharged.\n7 Provision shall be made for the periodic testing of the complete emergency system and shall include the testing of\nautomatic starting arrangements.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nemergency battery source of electrical power, including:\n• •\n• •\nInspection of the batteries.\nAssessment of the condition of the batteries.\nPeriodic testing of the complete emergency battery system including bringing it onload as part of a blackout\nsimulation test.\nThe battery retirement criteria based on the maximum service life and/or functional condition.\nThese activities should be integrated into the ship’s operational maintenance routine.\nEmergency batteries must be capable of supplying the designed power load for up to 18 hours (refer to SOLAS Ch II1 Reg 43) and should be maintained in a fully charged condition.\nTo assess the condition of a battery, specific gravity and voltage are measured and may be compared with a\nstandard chart provided by the manufacturer.\n• •\n• •\nThe electrolyte level in the batteries should be just above the top of the plate.\nThe battery should be clean and dry with no dirt deposits or spilled electrolyte on the casing.\nAll the battery terminals should be clean and protected with petroleum jelly.\nThe small vents in the cell caps should be clear.\nWhere the vessel is fitted with sealed, maintenance free, gel or NiFe batteries, the manufacturer’s instructions for the\nrequired tests and checks should be available in the battery space.\nFor all types of batteries, the terminals should be provided with plastic/rubber caps or other protective devices to\nprevent the terminals shorting or arcing to another metal body during maintenance or other work near to the battery\nlocation.\nThe vessel operator should have declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire what source of emergency\nelectrical power was provided onboard.\nThis question will only be allocated to vessels where the source of emergency electrical power was declared as\nbatteries.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and if necessary, review the company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing\nof the emergency battery source of electrical power.\nReview the records of:\no Inspection of the batteries.\no Assessment of the condition of the batteries.\no Periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system including bringing it onload as part of a\nblackout simulation test.\nInspect the emergency battery compartment to verify the batteries are in satisfactory physical condition.\nDuring the inspection of the machinery space, verify that the emergency batteries are fully charged, and the\nbattery charger is functional.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency\nbattery source of electrical power.\no The periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system including bringing it onload as part\nof a blackout simulation test.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency battery source\nof electrical power.\nRecords of:\no Inspection of the batteries.\no Assessment of the condition of the batteries.\no Periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system.\no The date the batteries were installed.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency\nbattery source of electrical power, including:\no Inspection of the batteries.\no Assessment of the condition of the batteries.\no Periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system.\no The battery retirement criteria based on either the maximum service life and/or functional condition.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the regular inspection,\nmaintenance and testing of the emergency battery source of electrical power.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the periodic testing of the complete emergency battery\nsystem including bringing the system online as part of a blackout simulation test.\nThere were no records of the regular inspection, maintenance and testing of the emergency battery source\nof electrical power.\nThere were no records of the periodic testing of the complete emergency battery system including bringing\nthe system on load as part of a blackout simulation test.\nRecords indicated that regular inspection, maintenance and/or testing of the emergency battery source of\nelectrical power had not taken place in accordance with company procedures.\nRecords of testing of voltage and specific gravity indicated that the batteries were not in satisfactory\ncondition.\nThe batteries had not been replaced in accordance with the company defined retirement criteria.\nThe batteries were not in satisfactory physical condition.\nThe metal terminals of the batteries were exposed and not protected by rubber or plastic caps or other\nprotective devices to prevent arcing or shorting.\nThe battery locker or compartment was being used for storage or contained inappropriate material.\nThe batteries were not fully charged.\nThe battery charger was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.3.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the exhaust gas cleaning\nsystem (EGCS), and were required safety and regulatory measures being complied with?\nShort Question Text\nExhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.883 Guidance on indication of ongoing compliance in the case of the failure of a single monitoring\ninstrument\nand recommended actions to take if the Exhaust Gas Cleaning System (ECGS) fails…\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MARPOL\nOCIMF Guide for Implementation of Sulphur Oxide Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.259(68) 2015 Guidelines for exhaust gas cleaning systems\nObjective\nTo ensure the EGCS is operated safely in accordance with company procedures and applicable regulations\nand local/national limitations.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Guide for Implementation of Sulphur Oxide Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems\n5.6 Safety and crew training\nIMO has identified the following as potential safety hazards associated with EGCS:\n• •\n• •\nHandling and proximity of exhaust gases.\nStorage and use of pressurised containers of pure and calibrated gases.\nPosition of permanent access platforms and sampling locations.\nHazards associated with the handling of caustic materials.\nCrews should be adequately trained to handle hazardous reactants or chemicals used (or chemicals that are created\nas a result of the process) and be trained to deal with possible medical emergencies. The required Personal\nProtective Equipment (PPE) is dictated in the associated Safety Data Sheet (SDS) of the hazardous chemicals that\nwill be handled. Health, safety and environmental risk assessments associated with EGCS should be performed to\nidentify hazards and to facilitate the reduction of uncertainties associated with costs, liabilities or losses.\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nThe use of Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems (EGCS), often known as scrubbers, is an equivalent means of\ncompliance with MARPOL Annex VI, regulation 14, while still using high sulphur fuel oil. On ships where these are\ninstalled, most EGCS use wet technologies: open loop, closed loop or hybrid types. Some EGCS are dry, and some\nare non-thermal plasma systems.\n• When using EGCS:\n• •\nThe bridge team should communicate with the engineering team to ensure that the EGCS is in use and that\nemissions meet exhaust and wash water regulations when entering an ECA; and\nThe engineering team should carry out regular spot checks, recording all parameters.\nThe EGCS Record Book should be kept up to date, usually including occasions whenever the:\n• •\n• •\nShip enters or leaves an ECA or area of local emission control;\nEGCS starts and stops (for each individual engine fitted with a scrubber);\nSystem undergoes any maintenance (including cleaning filters and sensors); and\nSystem goes out of compliance. This should include the time and position when it started, and when and\nwhere the system was brought back into compliance, along with any measures taken to reduce the extent of\nnon-compliance.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• •\nOnboard HSSE requirements.\nVessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nRegulation 4\n1. The Administration of a Party may allow any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus to be fitted in a ship or other\nprocedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods used as an alternative to that required by this Annex if such\nfitting, material, appliance or apparatus or other procedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods are at least\nas effective in terms of emissions reductions as that required by this Annex, including any of the standards set forth in\nregulations 13 and 14.\nIMO: Resolution MEPC.259(68) 2015 Guidelines for exhaust gas cleaning systems\n2.1.1 the purpose of these guidelines is to specify the requirements for the testing, survey certification and verification\nof EGC systems under regulation 4 of MARPOL Annex VI to ensure that they provide effective equivalence to the\nrequirements of regulations 14.1 and 14.4 of MARPOL Annex VI.\n8 Onboard Monitoring Manual (OMM)\n8.1 An OMM should be prepared to cover each EGC unit installed in conjunction with fuel oil combustion equipment,\nwhich should be identified, for which compliance is to be demonstrated.\n8.2 The OMM should, as a minimum, include:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nthe sensors to be used in evaluating EGC system performance and washwater monitoring, their service,\nmaintenance and calibration requirements;\nthe positions from which exhaust emission measurements and washwater monitoring are to be taken\ntogether with details of any necessary ancillary services such as sample transfer lines and sample treatment\nunits and any related service or maintenance requirements;\nthe analysers to be used, their service, maintenance, and calibration requirements;\nanalyser zero and span check procedures; and\nother information or data relevant to the correct functioning of the monitoring systems or its use in\ndemonstrating compliance.\n8.3 The OMM should specify how the monitoring is to be surveyed.\n8.4 The OMM should be approved by the Administration\nIMO: MEPC.1/Circ.883 Guidance on indication of ongoing compliance in the case of the failure of a single\nmonitoring instrument, and recommended actions to take if the Exhaust Gas Cleaning System (EGCS) fails…\nSystem malfunction\n2 As soon as possible after evidence of a malfunction (e.g. alarm is triggered), the ship should take action to identify\nand remedy the malfunction.\n3 The ship operator should follow the process to identify and remedy the malfunction in the Exhaust Gas Cleaning\nSystem – Technical Manual that is approved at the time the EGCS is certified or in other documentation provided by\nthe EGCS manufacturer.\n5 An EGCS malfunction event should be included in the EGCS Record Book including the date and time the\nmalfunction began and, if relevant, how it was resolved, the actions taken to resolve it and any necessary follow-up\nactions.\n6 A system malfunction that cannot be rectified is regarded as an accidental breakdown. The ship should then\nchange over to compliant fuel oil if the EGCS cannot be put back into a compliant condition within one hour. If the\nship does not have compliant fuel oil or sufficient amount of compliant fuel oil on board, a proposed course of action,\nin order to bunker compliant fuel oil or carry out repair works, should be communicated to relevant authorities\nincluding the shipʹs administration, for their agreement.\nNotifications to relevant Authorities\n12 Any EGCS malfunction that lasts more than one hour or repetitive malfunctions should be reported to the flag and\nport stateʹs Administration along with an explanation of the steps the ship operator is taking to address the failure.\nAt their discretion, the flag and port state's Administration could take such information and other relevant\ncircumstances into account to determine the appropriate action to take in the case of an EGCS malfunction, including\nnot taking action.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, based on risk assessment(s), for the operation, calibration\nand maintenance of the exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS). These should include:\n• •\n• The identification of associated hazards such as:\no Exposure to chemicals used in, or produced by, the EGCS.\no Exposure to exhaust gases.\no The location of the equipment and sampling locations.\no Storage and use of pressurised containers of calibration gases.\no Storage of chemicals used in, or produced by, the EGCS.\nThe proper management and disposal of spent/waste chemicals and/or residual sludge/wastewater.\nCrew training requirements.\n• •\n• •\n• PPE and signage requirements.\nInstructions for routine operations, calibration and maintenance.\nAny restrictions imposed on the use of the type of EGCS fitted by local and/or national regulation.\nActions to be taken in the case of system failure or deviation from normal operation.\nRecords to be kept (may be electronic or hard copy).\nThe following documents are required to be on board and may form part of these procedures:\n• •\n• •\nSox Emissions Compliance Plan.\nEGCS Technical Manual.\nOnboard Monitoring Manual.\nEGCS Record Book or electronic logging system.\nThe ship’s maintenance plan may also contain part of the procedures.\nThis question will only be allocated to vessels fitted with an EGCS. The vessel operator should have declared\nwhether an EGCS was fitted through the Pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight and where necessary, review the:\no Company procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\no Required documentation for the EGCS.\no Risk assessments for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\no The planned maintenance records for the EGCS.\nAs far as it is safe and practicable, inspect the EGCS.\nDuring the Inspection of the EGCS, request that the accompanying officer describes:\no The routine operation of the EGCS plant with reference to any checklists provided by the company\nor manufacturer for this purpose.\no The action to take in the case of system failure or deviation from normal operation.\no How to close the EGCS overboard valve (normally open) in an emergency.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\nAny checklists provided for the routine operation of the EGCS.\nThe planned maintenance records for the EGCS.\nRisk assessments for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\nRecords of crew training or familiarisation in the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\nSox Emissions Compliance Plan.\nEGCS Technical Manual.\nOnboard Monitoring Manual.\nEGCS Record Book or electronic logging system.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the exhaust gas\ncleaning system (EGCS) that included:\no The identification of associated hazards.\no Crew training requirements.\no PPE and signage requirements.\nInstructions for routine operations, calibration and maintenance.\nActions to be taken in the case of system failure or deviation from normal operation.\nRecords to be kept (may be electronic or hard copy).\nThere were no risk assessments available for the operation, calibration and maintenance of the EGCS.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, calibration and\nmaintenance of the EGCS.\nThere was evidence that the vessel had operated the EGCS in locations where the company procedure or\nlocal/national regulations prohibited its use.\nThere was evidence that spent/waste chemicals and/or residual sludge/wastewater had not been managed\nand disposed of in accordance with the company procedures and/or any applicable regulation.\nThe chemicals and/or compressed gasses used or produced by the EGCS were not stored in accordance\nwith company procedures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the routine operation of the EGCS.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with how to close the EGCS overboard valve in an emergency.\nThere was no evidence of crew training or familiarisation in the operation, calibration and maintenance of the\nEGCS.\nThe following documents were not available on board:\no Sox Emissions Compliance Plan.\no EGCS Technical Manual.\no Onboard Monitoring Manual.\no EGCS Record Book or electronic logging system.\nThe maintenance and calibration of the EGCS was not included in the planned maintenance system.\nThe maintenance and calibration of the EGCS had not been carried out as required by the planned\nmaintenance system.\nThe EGCS record book had not been maintained as required by company procedures.\nThe EGCS was or had been defective but there was no evidence that notifications had been made to the\nrelevant Authorities as required by IMO: MEPC.1/Circ.883.\nThe EGCS was defective in any respect.\no\no\no\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.4.", "t": "Were seawater pipelines, sea chests and seawater pumps in satisfactory", "c": "condition and free of temporary repairs?\nShort Question Text\nSeawater pipelines\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure there are no weak points in seawater systems that might lead to failure and machinery space\nflooding.\nIndustry Guidance\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Engine machinery.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe condition of seawater pipelines, sea chests, storm valves, hull penetrations and seawater pumps should be\ncarefully checked to ensure that they are in satisfactory condition. All coatings should be checked for failure,\nparticularly pitting and/or hard rust.\nSpecial attention should be paid at the following locations:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nOutboard of ship-side valves.\nPipe bends and elbows.\nClips and supports, where there may be wear and thinning due to vibration.\nFixed expansion joints (bellows) for deformation.\nWet areas or locations of localised leakage where there may be accelerated corrosion.\nHidden areas where there may be unnoticed problems.\nAny necessary local repair should be treated as temporary only. Permanent repairs usually involve the removal and\nreplacement of a length of piping. After the repair has been completed, pipe supports, or clips should be refitted. A\npermanent repair should only be done with classification society approved materials, and subsequently examined and\napproved by a class surveyor.\nThe following are not acceptable as a permanent repair.\n• •\n• •\nWelded doublers.\nExpansion joints.\nMismatched materials e.g. mild steel and stainless steel.\nMaterial of different thickness in the same piping run.\nPatent couplings are not acceptable as a permanent repair except where they had been fitted as part of the original\ndesign. Where such couplings are installed, inspectors should ascertain that they conform with the original\nplans/design.\nFour types in use are:\n• •\n• •\nGrip type joining couplings with axial restraint.\nFlex type joining couplings without axial restraint (i.e. not pull-out resistant).\nOpen flex type repairing couplings.\nRepair clamps for damage control.\nFlexible hoses should never be used to replace a failed metal pipe, except as an unavoidable emergency repair.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nDuring the tour of the machinery spaces, inspect seawater pipelines, sea chests, storm valves, hull\npenetrations and seawater pumps.\nIf necessary, review machinery space pipeline drawings and specifications.\nExpected Evidence\n• Machinery space pipeline drawings and specifications.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nA seawater pipeline, sea chest, storm valve, hull penetration or seawater pump was corroded with pitting or\nhard rust/scale (give details and location).\nA seawater pipeline, sea chest, storm valve, hull penetration or seawater pump was leaking (give details and\nlocation).\nFixed expansion joints (bellows) in a seawater pipeline were deformed.\nA pipeline was worn/thinned in way of a clip or support.\nA series of pipe clips and/or supports in a single pipe length were heavily corroded or missing.\nThere was a temporary repair on a seawater pipeline e.g. a clamp or bandage (give details and location).\nThere was an unacceptable ‘permanent’ repair on a seawater pipeline e.g. a doubler plate or coupling (give\ndetails and location).\nPipe clips or supports had not been replaced after a pipeline repair.\nThere was no evidence of class approval for a completed repair to a seawater pipeline.\nFlexible hose(s) had been rigged as a replacement for a failed metal pipe.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.5.", "t": "Were the officers familiar with the company procedure for testing the bilge", "c": "monitoring devices within their area of responsibility, and were records available to\ndemonstrate that the bilge monitoring devices and associated alarms had been tested in\naccordance with the company procedure?\nShort Question Text\nBilge monitoring devices\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Forecastle, Bridge, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators\n2009.\nIMO SOLAS\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the flooding detection systems fitted on board are always fully operational.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\nChapter 12.1.15.7 Miscellaneous\nA high-level alarm in the pumproom bilge which activates audible and visual alarms in the cargo control room, engine\nroom and the navigating bridge.\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n8.4 Alarms and Actions\nHigh-level alarms for engine room bilges should be tested at least once every watch and as part of pre-UMS checks...\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company strategy.\nThe company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system, for\nexample:\n• •\n• Engine machinery\nCargo handling machinery/equipment\nHull Structure\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 48\nProtection against flooding. (vessels with UMS notation)\n1 bilge wells in periodically unattended machinery spaces shall be located and monitored in such a way that the\naccumulation of liquids is detected at normal angles of heel and trim and shall be large enough to accommodate\neasily the normal drainage during the unattended period.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\nProbability of Ignition. (Tankers)\n5.10.1 Protection of cargo pump-rooms in tankers:\n.4 All pump-rooms shall be provided with bilge monitoring devices together with appropriately located alarms.\nChapter XII Regulation 12\nHold, ballast and dry space water ingress alarms. (OBO Carriers)\n1 Bulk carriers shall be fitted with water level detector…\n2 The audible and visual alarms specified in paragraph 1 shall be located on the navigation bridge.\nIMO: Resolution A.1021 Codes on Alerts and Indicators, 2009. (excludes tanker pump room bilge alarm)\n3.3 the following alerts are classified as alarms:\n.4 Bilge alarm. An alarm which indicates an abnormally high level of bilge water.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a process to identify all bilge level monitoring or flooding detection\ndevices fitted to the vessel, whether required by regulation or not, and a procedure to require that each device and its\nassociated alarm is periodically tested to verify that:\n• •\n• The level monitoring or flooding device activates its associated alarm at the correct level.\nAny delay programmed into the activation circuit remains in accordance with the design criteria.\nThe remote warning alarm is activated in the locations required by regulation or by design of the shipbuilder\nwhere a device is fitted in addition to any regulatory requirement.\nThe job instructions in the planned maintenance system may form part of the procedure.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which required that bilge level monitoring\ndevices and their associated alarms and indicators were periodically tested.\n• Review vessel records and verify that the vessel had identified all bilge alarms fitted to the vessel and that\nthe periodic checks required by the company procedure had been completed as required.\n• During the physical inspection request, that one bilge alarm is tested and verify that:\no The alarm was activated in the required locations.\no The delay in alarm activation, if any, was in alignment with the alarm design criteria.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedure that required all bilge level monitoring devices and water level detectors and their\nassociated alarms and indicators were identified and periodically tested.\nThe vessel records to demonstrate that each bilge level monitoring device, its activation delay and its\nassociated alarm had been tested in accordance with company procedures.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure which required that all bilge level monitoring devices and water level\ndetectors were periodically tested.\nThe accompanying deck or engineer officer was not familiar with company procedure for the testing of the\nbilge level monitoring devices and water level detectors within their area of responsibility.\nThere were no records available to demonstrate that the periodic testing of all bilge level monitoring devices\nand water level detectors and their associated alarms, including any activation delay, had been completed in\naccordance with company procedures.\nA bilge level monitoring device and / or water level detector and/or its associated alarm was defective in any\nrespect.\nThere was evidence that bilge level monitoring devices or water level detectors and/or their associated\nalarms and indicators had been modified or prevented from activating as designed.\nOne or more of the following spaces was not protected by a bilge level monitor or water level detector:\no Cargo pumproom,\no Ballast pumproom,\no Main machinery space,\no Bow thruster space.\no For OBO carriers only, in ballast tanks forward of the collision bulkhead.\no For OBO carriers only, in any dry or void space other than a chain locker forward of the foremost\ncargo hold.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.2.6.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor\nand emergency air reservoir, and was the equipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nEmergency compressed air machinery starting system.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nObjective\nTo ensure the emergency compressed air machinery starting system is always ready in all respects.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n8.9.3 The Complete Engine Room Round\n• Check the emergency generator and make sure it is ready for starting, synchronising and paralleling in auto.\nAlso check the emergency air compressor, if fitted;\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 26\n3 Means shall be provided whereby normal operation of propulsion machinery can be sustained or restored even\nthough one of the essential auxiliaries becomes inoperative. Special consideration shall be given to the\nmalfunctioning of:\n.9 an air compressor and receiver for starting or control purposes;\n4 Means shall be provided to ensure that the machinery can be brought into operation from the dead ship condition\nwithout external aid.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for:\n• •\nThe operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.\nThe use of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir for bringing machinery into operation\nfrom the dead ship condition.\nThe emergency air compressor should be regularly tested to the starting pressure of the diesel generator. It may be\npowered by a hand-started diesel engine or an electric motor. If driven by an electric motor, this should be supplied\nby the emergency source of power.\nThe emergency air reservoir should be permanently maintained at the required pressure.\nThe vessel operator should have declared the motive power of the emergency compressor through HVPQ question", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.4.3.", "t": "The information provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.", "c": "Suggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight and where necessary, review the company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the\nemergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.\nReview the records of regular inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor.\nDuring the inspection of the machinery space:\no Observe the condition of the emergency air compressor.\no Verify that the emergency air reservoir is at the required pressure.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with:\no The company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air\ncompressor and emergency air reservoir.\no The actions necessary to use the emergency air compressor and/or emergency air reservoir to\nstart a main generator engine.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for:\no The operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air\nreservoir.\no The use of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir for bringing machinery into\noperation from the dead ship condition.\nRecords of regular inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for:\no The operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air\nreservoir.\no The use of the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir for bringing machinery into\noperation from the dead ship condition.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with:\no The company procedures for the operation, inspection and testing of the emergency air\ncompressor and emergency air reservoir.\no The actions necessary to use the emergency air compressor and/or emergency air reservoir to\nstart a main generator engine.\nThere were no records of regular inspection and testing of the emergency air compressor and emergency air\nreservoir.\n• •\n• Records indicated that the emergency air compressor and emergency air reservoir had not been regularly\ninspected and tested in accordance with company procedures.\nThe emergency air reservoir was not at the required pressure.\nThe emergency air compressor was defective in any respect.\n10.3. Safety Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.1.", "t": "Was suitable deck insulation provided to the front and rear of electrical", "c": "switchboards, and was it in good order?\nShort Question Text\nSwitchboard deck insulation.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Engine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nObjective\nTo ensure that people are protected from injury when working on or around switchboards.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n20.13 Electrical equipment\n20.13.1 The risks of electric shock are much greater on-board ship than they are normally ashore because wetness,\nhigh humidity and high temperature (including sweating) reduce the contact resistance of the body. In those\nconditions, severe and even fatal shocks may be caused at voltages as low as 60V. It should also be borne in mind\nthat cuts and abrasions significantly reduce skin resistance.\n20.15 High-voltage systems\n20.15.1 Additional precautions are necessary to ensure safety when work is to be undertaken on high-voltage\nequipment (designed to operate at a nominal system voltage in excess of 1000V).\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n111.30-11 - Deck coverings.\nNon-conducting deck coverings, such as non-conducting mats or gratings, suitable for the specific switchboard\nvoltage must be installed for personnel protection at the front and rear of the switchboard and must extend the entire\nlength of, and be of sufficient width to suit, the operating space.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the vessel:\n• Identify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 45\nPrecautions against shock, fire and other hazards of electrical origin\n2 Main and emergency switchboards shall be so arranged as to give easy access as may be needed to apparatus\nand equipment, without danger to personnel. The sides and the rear and, where necessary, the front of switchboards\nshall be suitably guarded. Exposed live parts having voltages to earth exceeding a voltage to be specified by the\nAdministration shall not be installed on the front of such switchboards. Where necessary, non-conducting mats or\ngratings shall be provided at the front and rear of the switchboard.\nInspection Guidance\nInsulating matting is only required at the front and rear of switchboards.\nIndividual machinery starter boxes throughout the machinery space are not considered switchboards and do not\nrequire insulating matting in front or behind them.\nSome decks are made from composite insulating material and will not need extra insulation. Where this is the case\nand insulation matting is not provided, ship’s drawings should be available to demonstrate the extent and safe\nworking voltage of the composite deck covering installed.\nInsulation matting should be suitable for the specific switchboard voltage but should be rated not less than IEC\n61111:2009 Class O or equivalent which has a safe working voltage of up to 1000 volts. Switchboards with voltages\nhigher than 1000 volts should be protected with matting of a higher rating as appropriate, for example Class 1 with a\nsafe working voltage up to 7500 volts.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• During the course of the inspection of the machinery spaces, verify that:\no Switchboards were provided with the required deck insulation of an appropriate safe working\nvoltage.\no Insulating matting or composite deck material was complete and undamaged.\nExpected Evidence\n• Certification, marking or other documentary evidence of the safe working voltage rating for the deck\ninsulation in use.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nSwitchboards were not provided with deck insulation to the front and/or rear.\nThe deck insulation matting or composite insulating deck covering was incomplete or damaged.\nThe deck insulation matting or composite insulating deck covering provided was not suitable for the specific\nvoltage of the switchboard.\nThere was no certification, marking or other documentary evidence of the rating of the deck insulation\nprovided.\nIf the insulation matting presented a trip hazard this should be recorded as an observation under question 5.8.2", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.2.", "t": "Were the engineer officers familiar with the purpose and setting of the insulation", "c": "monitoring devices provided on the primary and secondary distribution systems, and\nwere the distribution switchboards free of significant earth faults?\nShort Question Text\nElectrical distribution system switchboard earth monitoring.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nObjective\nTo ensure that any significant earth faults are promptly addressed to prevent injury to personnel from\nelectrical shock.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n10.7.5 Earth Faults\nEarth faults may occur within electric equipment, such as broken insulation on conductors. To maintain supply to\nessential equipment (for example, the steering gear) the electrical circuits for this equipment will usually have an\ninsulated neutral system. This means that a single earth fault does not interrupt the system. But if another earth fault\noccurs, the two faults combine to cause a short circuit that trips the system. So to maintain the safe operation of the\nship it is vital that the initial earth fault is found and fixed before the second one occurs.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n20.13 Electrical equipment\n20.13.1 The risks of electric shock are much greater on-board ship than they are normally ashore because wetness,\nhigh humidity and high temperature (including sweating) reduce the contact resistance of the body. In those\nconditions, severe and even fatal shocks may be caused at voltages as low as 60V. It should also be borne in mind\nthat cuts and abrasions significantly reduce skin resistance.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer. Safety inspections of the vessel:\n• Identify hazards and potential hazards to health, safety and the environment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 45\n4.2 When a distribution system, whether primary or secondary, for power, heating or lighting, with no connection to\nearth is used, a device capable of continuously monitoring the insulation level to earth and of giving an audible or\nvisual indication of abnormally low insulation values shall be provided.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n111.05-21 Ground detection.\nThere must be ground detection for each:\n• •\n• •\n(a) Electric propulsion system;\n(b) Ship's service power system;\n(c) Lighting system; and\n(d) Power or lighting distribution system that is isolated from the ship's service power and lighting system by\ntransformers, motor generator sets, or other devices.\nInspection Guidance\nSignificant earth faults - it is good practice that as near to infinity as possible, but not less than 5 megohms, be\nmaintained on the Insulation Monitoring Device (IMD) of a 440-volt system. For a 220-volt system, not less than 2\nmegohms is acceptable due to the large number of parallel circuits.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure which:\n• •\n• Provided guidance for the setting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v, 440v and any other voltages used for\nthe primary or secondary distribution systems.\nWhere a vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD, provided guidance on interpreting\nthe indications for low insulation faults.\nRequired that the causes of earth faults are investigated and corrected with the aim to maintain the\ninsulation values as close to infinity as possible.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• If necessary, review the company procedure which provided guidance on the required alarm set point for the\nIMDs.\nDuring the inspection of the machinery spaces, examine the IMDs on each primary or secondary distribution\nsystem switchboard and note any indications:\no Below 5 megohms on 440-volt systems, and/or below 2 megohms on 220-volt systems.\no For systems with any other voltage, below the setting value identified within the company\nprocedure.\nWhere safe to do so, request that a responsible officer:\no Demonstrates that the alarm setting point for an IMD was set in accordance with company\nprocedures to provide the required audible and/or visual alarm if abnormally low insulation values\nwere detected.\no Operate the test device of the IMD to demonstrate that it was monitoring the insulation level to\nearth.\n• Where a switchboard(s) was only provided with an earth indication lamp(s) as the IMD, the inspector should\ndetermine:\no Whether vessel staff can demonstrate a satisfactory understanding of the lamp display, and can\ndescribe the criteria that triggers the need for an investigation to identify low insulation faults, and\no How the vessel staff quantify the insulation values when identifying and correcting earth faults.\nExpected Evidence\n• The company procedure which:\no Provided guidance for the setting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v, 440v and any other voltages\nused for the primary or secondary distribution systems.\no Where a vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD, provided guidance on\ninterpreting the indications for low insulation faults.\no Required that the causes of earth faults are investigated and corrected with the aim to maintain the\ninsulation values as close to infinity as possible.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure which:\no Provided guidance for the setting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v, 440v and any other voltages\nused for the primary or secondary distribution systems.\no Where a vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD, provided guidance on\ninterpreting the indications for low insulation faults.\no Required that the causes of earth faults are investigated and corrected with the aim to maintain the\ninsulation values as close to infinity as possible.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedure which provided guidance for the\nsetting values for the IMDs for 110v, 220v, 440v and any other voltages used for the primary or secondary\ndistribution systems.\nWhere the vessel was only provided with earth insulation lamps as the IMD, the accompanying officer was\nnot familiar with the company procedure which provided guidance on interpreting the indications for low\ninsulation faults.\nThe accompanying officer was not able demonstrate the IMD alarm setting point or describe how to interpret\nthe earth low insulation indicator lamps.\nAn IMD was inoperative or defective in any respect.\nAn IMD alarm set point had been adjusted to inhibit the generation of alarms:\no When abnormally low insulation values were detected.\no When detecting insulation values lower than the guidance provided in the company procedure.\nThe Insulation Monitoring Device for a 440-volt system showed an insulation resistance of less than 5\nmegohms (specify indication).\nThe Insulation Monitoring Device for a 220-volt system showed an insulation resistance of less than 2\nmegohms (specify indication).\nThe Insulation Monitoring Device for any primary or secondary distribution system showed an insulation\nresistance value of less than that required by the company procedure (specify required value and\nindication).\nWhere specific electrical consumers, such as electric deepwell pumps, were causing a significant earth fault during\noperation, an observation should be made irrespective of whether this was considered normal by the manufacturer.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.3.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation, including\nthe operation and testing of the dead man alarm, if fitted?\nShort Question Text\nEntry into the machinery space during UMS.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Engineer Officer, Bridge, Engine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators\n2009.\nObjective\nTo ensure safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n4.4.2 Unattended Machinery Space (UMS) Operation\nThe EOOW should inform the bridge before switching to Unattended Machinery Space (UMS) operation, whenever\npeople enter and exit unattended machinery spaces and when the engine room is switched back to attended\noperation.\nWhen the EOOW needs to enter the machinery space outside of normal working hours – e.g. for night rounds – they\nshould:\n• •\n• Inform the bridge on entering and exiting the machinery space;\nSay how long they intend to remain there; and\nEstablish a method for confirming their safety (for example, regular agreed calls to the bridge and use of the\ndeadman alarm – see section 7.6.2).\n7.6.2 The Deadman Alarm\nThe EEOW should report to the bridge whenever entering or leaving an unattended machinery space. On entering\nthe space for any reason, they should use the deadman alarm system if fitted. This alarm has to be reset at specified\nintervals by the person entering the unattended machinery space. If not, a warning is triggered on the bridge and\nother locations. This helps to ensure the safety of anybody entering an unattended machinery space. On ships\nwithout a deadman alarm, the bridge should be contacted at least once every 15 minutes.\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators, 2009.\n3.3 The following alerts are classified as alarms:\n.1 Machinery alarm. An alarm which indicates a malfunction or other abnormal condition of the machinery and\nelectrical installations.\n.6 Engineers’ alarm. An alarm to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform, as\nappropriate, to alert personnel in the engineers’ accommodation that assistance is needed in the engine-room.\n.7 Personnel (dead man) alarm. An alarm to confirm the safety of the engineer on duty when alone in the machinery\nspaces.\n8 Requirements for particular alarms\n8.1 Personnel (dead man) alarm\n8.1.1 The personnel alarm (dead man) should automatically set off an alarm on the navigation bridge or in the\nofficers’ quarters, as appropriate, and, if it is not reset from the machinery spaces in a period satisfactory to the\nAdministration, this should be in a period not exceeding 30 min.\n8.1.2 A pre-warning signal should be provided in the machinery spaces which operates 3 min before the alarm\nrequired by 8.1.1 is given.\n8.1.3 The alarm system should be put into operation:\n.1 automatically when the engineer on duty has to attend machinery spaces in case of a machinery alarm;\n.2 or manually by the engineer on duty when attending machinery spaces on routine checks.\n8.1.4 The alarm system should be disconnected by the engineer on duty after leaving the machinery spaces. When\nthe system is brought into operation in accordance with 8.1.3.1, disconnection should not be possible before the\nengineer has acknowledged the alarm in the machinery spaces.\n8.1.5 The personnel (dead man) alarm may also operate the engineers’ alarm.\n8.3 Engineers’ alarm\nIn addition to manual operation from the machinery space, the engineers’ alarm on ships with periodically unattended\nmachinery spaces should operate when the machinery alarm is not acknowledged in the machinery spaces or control\nroom in a specified limited period of time, depending on the size of the ship but not exceeding 5 min.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1\nPart C – Machinery installations\nRegulation 38\nEngineer's alarm\nAn engineer's alarm shall be provided to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform as\nappropriate and shall be clearly audible in the engineers' accommodation.\nPart E - Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\nRegulation 51\nAlarm system\n1 An (machinery) alarm system shall be provided indicating any fault requiring attention and shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nbe capable of sounding an audible alarm in the main machinery control room or at the propulsion machinery\ncontrol position, and indicate visually each separate alarm function at a suitable position;\nhave a connection to the engineers' public rooms and to each of the engineers' cabins through a selector\nswitch, to ensure connection to at least one of those cabins. Administrations may permit equivalent\narrangements;\nactivate an audible and visual alarm on the navigating bridge for any situation which requires action by or\nattention of the officer on watch;\nas far as is practicable be designed on the fail-to-safety principle; and\nactivate the engineers' alarm required by Regulation 38 if an alarm function has not received attention locally\nwithin a limited time.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for entry into the machinery space during periods of\nunmanned operation which included but were not necessarily limited, to the following requirements:\n• •\n• •\n• During unattended periods, no-one enters the machinery spaces alone, for example to carry out final\nevening checks, without first informing the bridge.\nDuring unattended periods, contact should be maintained with the bridge at frequent predetermined periods\nduring any entry, unless a dead man alarm is fitted.\nA rating should not be assigned any duty which involved them attending the engine room alone during\nunattended periods.\nWhere a single engineer maintains a watch, contact is maintained with the bridge or cargo control room at\nfrequent predetermined periods, unless a dead man alarm system is fitted.\nThe dead man alarm, if fitted, is regularly tested and the results recorded.\nSafe entry requirements should be clearly posted at the normally accessible entrance to the machinery space\nincluding the requirements to use the dead man alarm (where fitted) during rounds in the machinery space.\nA dead man alarm is not a SOLAS requirement.\nThe question will only be allocated to a vessel which is certified for unmanned machinery space (UMS) operations\nand identified by HVPQ question 12.1.10 being answered in the affirmative.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s)\nduring UMS operation.\nReview the records of testing of the dead man alarm (where fitted).\nReview the Bridge and Engine Room Log Books to ascertain the status of machinery space operation and\nrecords of entry during recent unattended periods.\n• •\n• During the inspection of the machinery space, interview an engineer officer to verify their familiarity with the\ncompany procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.\nDuring the inspection of the bridge, interview a navigation officer to verify their familiarity with the company\nprocedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.\nWhere possible and safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer manually start the dead man\nalarm, if fitted, and note the time taken to activate the alarm.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation.\nRecords of testing of the dead man alarm (where fitted).\nEngine Room Log Book.\nBridge Log Book.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s) during UMS operation\nrequiring that:\no During unattended periods, no-one enters the machinery spaces alone, for example to carry out\nfinal evening checks, without first informing the bridge.\no During unattended periods, contact should be maintained with the bridge at frequent predetermined\nperiods during any entry, unless a dead man alarm is fitted.\no A rating should not be assigned any duty which involved them attending the engine room alone\nduring unattended periods.\no Where a single engineer maintains a watch, contact is maintained with the bridge or cargo control\nroom at frequent predetermined periods, unless a dead man alarm system is fitted.\no The dead man alarm, if fitted, is regularly tested and the results recorded.\nAn engineer officer was not familiar with the company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s)\nduring UMS operation.\nA navigation officer was not familiar with the company procedures for safe entry into the machinery space(s)\nduring UMS operation.\nSafe entry requirements were not clearly posted at the normally accessible entrance to the machinery space\nincluding the requirements to use the dead man alarm (where fitted) during rounds in the machinery space.\nThere was no evidence that the dead man alarm, if fitted, had been regularly tested as required by company\nprocedures.\nThe dead man alarm activation period was observed to be greater than that specified by the company\nprocedures and/or greater than 30 minutes.\nThe dead man alarm, if fitted, was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.4.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the operation of the", "c": "engineers’ alarm, and was the alarm in good order, tested regularly and the results\nrecorded?\nShort Question Text\nEngineers' alarm.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Engineer Officer, Engine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators\n2009.\nObjective\nTo ensure the engineers’ alarm is in good order and regularly tested.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n4.6.2 Engineers’ Call Alarm\nThe engineers’ call alarm should be used in any engine room emergency. All engine room personnel should be\ntrained and familiarised in their emergency duties and where to assemble upon hearing the engineers’ call alarm.\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators, 2009.\n3.3 The following alerts are classified as alarms:\n1. Machinery alarm. An alarm which indicates a malfunction or other abnormal condition of the machinery and\nelectrical installations.\n6. Engineers’ alarm. An alarm to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform, as\nappropriate, to alert personnel in the engineers’ accommodation that assistance is needed in the engine-room.\n7. Personnel alarm. An alarm to confirm the safety of the engineer on duty when alone in the machinery spaces.\n8. Requirements for particular alarms\n8.1 Personnel alarm\n8.1.1 The personnel alarm should automatically set off an alarm on the navigation bridge or in the officers’ quarters,\nas appropriate, and, if it is not reset from the machinery spaces in a period satisfactory to the Administration, this\nshould be in a period not exceeding 30 min.\n8.1.2 A pre-warning signal should be provided in the machinery spaces which operates 3 min before the alarm\nrequired by 8.1.1 is given.\n8.1.3 The alarm system should be put into operation:\n1.\n2.\nautomatically when the engineer on duty has to attend machinery spaces in case of a machinery alarm;\nor manually by the engineer on duty when attending machinery spaces on routine checks.\n8.1.4 The alarm system should be disconnected by the engineer on duty after leaving the machinery spaces. When\nthe system is brought into operation in accordance with 8.1.3.1, disconnection should not be possible before the\nengineer has acknowledged the alarm in the machinery spaces.\n8.1.5 The personnel (dead man) alarm may also operate the engineers’ alarm.\n8.3 Engineers’ alarm\nIn addition to manual operation from the machinery space, the engineers’ alarm on ships with periodically unattended\nmachinery spaces should operate when the machinery alarm is not acknowledged in the machinery spaces or control\nroom in a specified limited period of time, depending on the size of the ship but not exceeding 5 min.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1\nPart C – Machinery installations\nRegulation 38\nEngineer's alarm\nAn engineer's alarm shall be provided to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform as\nappropriate and shall be clearly audible in the engineers' accommodation.\nPart E - Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\nRegulation 51\nAlarm system\n1 An (machinery) alarm system shall be provided indicating any fault requiring attention and shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nbe capable of sounding an audible alarm in the main machinery control room or at the propulsion machinery\ncontrol position, and indicate visually each separate alarm function at a suitable position;\nhave a connection to the engineers' public rooms and to each of the engineers' cabins through a selector\nswitch, to ensure connection to at least one of those cabins. Administrations may permit equivalent\narrangements;\nactivate an audible and visual alarm on the navigating bridge for any situation which requires action by or\nattention of the officer on watch;\nas far as is practicable be designed on the fail-to-safety principle; and\nactivate the engineers' alarm required by Regulation 38 if an alarm function has not received attention locally\nwithin a limited time.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for the operation and testing of the engineers’ alarm that included:\n• •\nA description of its operation.\nRequirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.\nThe engineers’ alarm must be capable of manual operation from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring\nplatform as appropriate to indicate that assistance is needed.\nIn UMS ships, the engineers’ alarm should act as a back-up in the event the machinery alarm is not acknowledged\nwithin a specified time, but not exceeding 5 minutes (A.1021(26) 8.3).\nIn addition, the engineers’ alarm may be configured to sound if the (personnel) dead man alarm is not reset within the\nspecified time.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and if necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the engineers’\nalarm.\nReview the records of regular testing of the engineers’ alarm.\nInterview an engineer officer to verify their familiarity with the operation and testing of the engineers’ alarm,\nand request they identify the locations of the alarm activation points within the machinery space.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation and testing of the engineers’ alarm.\nRecords of regular testing of the engineers’ alarm.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation and testing of the engineers’ alarm that included:\no A description of its operation.\no Requirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation and testing of the\nengineers’ alarm.\nThe accompanying officer could not identify the locations of the engineers’ alarm activation points within the\nmachinery spaces.\nThere were no records of the regular testing of the engineers’ alarm.\nRecords indicated the engineers’ alarm had not been tested as required by company procedures.\nThe engineers’ alarm was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.5.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the operation of the machinery", "c": "alarm, and was the alarm in good order, tested regularly and the results recorded?\nShort Question Text\nMachinery alarm\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nInterview - Deck Officer, Interview - Engineer Officer, Bridge, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators\n2009.\nObjective\nTo ensure the machinery alarm is in good order and regularly tested.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n8.4 Alarms and Actions\nThe EOOW should be familiar with the engine room’s control and alarm systems. All alarms must be acknowledged\nand acted on. Any alarms that cannot be cleared should be reported to the Chief Engineer.\nIf it is necessary to inhibit an alarm, this should be done in line with SMS procedure. The reason for inhibiting the\nalarm should be addressed as soon as possible. Rather than accepting a long list of permanently inhibited nuisance\nalarms, it is better to address the underlying cause.\nThe IMO Code on Alerts and Indicators 2009, provides guidance on alarm management.\nHigh-level alarms for engine room bilges should be tested at least once every watch and as part of pre-UMS checks.\nAll other alarms should be tested as per the ship’s PMS.\nAt the start of every watch, the EOOW should check that the alarm printers and the automation system are displaying\nthe right time and date. This is important for demonstrating compliance during inspections and incident investigations.\nIMO: A.1021(26) Codes on Alerts and Indicators, 2009.\n3.3 The following alerts are classified as alarms:\n1. Machinery alarm. An alarm which indicates a malfunction or other abnormal condition of the machinery and\nelectrical installations.\n6. Engineers’ alarm. An alarm to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform, as\nappropriate, to alert personnel in the engineers’ accommodation that assistance is needed in the engine-room.\n7. Personnel alarm. An alarm to confirm the safety of the engineer on duty when alone in the machinery spaces.\n8. Requirements for particular alarms\n8.1 Personnel alarm\n8.1.1 The personnel alarm should automatically set off an alarm on the navigation bridge or in the officers’ quarters,\nas appropriate, and, if it is not reset from the machinery spaces in a period satisfactory to the Administration, this\nshould be in a period not exceeding 30 min.\n8.1.2 A pre-warning signal should be provided in the machinery spaces which operates 3 min before the alarm\nrequired by 8.1.1 is given.\n8.1.3 The alarm system should be put into operation:\n1.\n2.\nautomatically when the engineer on duty has to attend machinery spaces in case of a machinery alarm;\nor manually by the engineer on duty when attending machinery spaces on routine checks.\n8.1.4 The alarm system should be disconnected by the engineer on duty after leaving the machinery spaces. When\nthe system is brought into operation in accordance with 8.1.3.1, disconnection should not be possible before the\nengineer has acknowledged the alarm in the machinery spaces.\n8.1.5 The personnel alarm may also operate the engineers’ alarm.\n8.3 Engineers’ alarm\nIn addition to manual operation from the machinery space, the engineers’ alarm on ships with periodically unattended\nmachinery spaces should operate when the machinery alarm is not acknowledged in the machinery spaces or control\nroom in a specified limited period of time, depending on the size of the ship but not exceeding 5 min.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors.\nThe documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nRecords of familiarisation are maintained.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1\nPart C – Machinery installations\nRegulation 38\nEngineer's alarm\nAn engineer's alarm shall be provided to be operated from the engine control room or at the manoeuvring platform as\nappropriate and shall be clearly audible in the engineers' accommodation.\nPart E - Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces\nRegulation 51\nAlarm system\n1 An (machinery) alarm system shall be provided indicating any fault requiring attention and shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nbe capable of sounding an audible alarm in the main machinery control room or at the propulsion machinery\ncontrol position, and indicate visually each separate alarm function at a suitable position;\nhave a connection to the engineers' public rooms and to each of the engineers' cabins through a selector\nswitch, to ensure connection to at least one of those cabins. Administrations may permit equivalent\narrangements;\nactivate an audible and visual alarm on the navigating bridge for any situation which requires action by or\nattention of the officer on watch;\nas far as is practicable be designed on the fail-to-safety principle; and\nactivate the engineers' alarm required by Regulation 38 if an alarm function has not received attention locally\nwithin a limited time.\nInspection Guidance\nThe operator should have developed procedures for the operation and testing of the machinery alarm that included:\n• •\nA description of its operation.\nRequirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.\nThe question will only be allocated to a vessel which is certified for unmanned machinery space (UMS) operations\nand identified by HVPQ question 12.1.10 being answered in the affirmative.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight and if necessary, review the company procedures for the operation and testing of the machinery\nalarm.\nReview the records of regular testing of the machinery alarm.\nInterview an engineer officer to verify their familiarity with the operation and testing of the machinery alarm.\nDuring the inspection of the bridge, interview a navigation officer to verify their familiarity with the separate\nfunctions of the machinery alarm panel.\nRequest that, if safe and permitted to do so by the terminal, the machinery alarm is tested during the\ninspection.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation and testing of the machinery alarm.\nRecords of regular testing of the machinery alarm.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for the operation and testing of the machinery alarm that included:\no A description of its operation.\no Requirements for regularly testing the alarm and recording the results.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation and testing of the\nmachinery alarm.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the separate functions of the machinery alarm\npanel in the engine room.\nA navigation officer was not familiar with the separate functions of the machinery alarm panel on the bridge.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no records of the regular testing of the machinery alarm.\nRecords indicated the machinery alarm had not been tested as required by company procedures.\nThe audible alarm in the engine room was not operative.\nThe visual display of the separate alarm functions in the engine room was not fully functional.\nThe audible and visible alarm on the bridge was not fully functional.\nThe audible and visible alarm in public rooms and in the engineers' cabins was not fully functional.\nThe machinery alarm was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.6.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for the", "c": "operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight doors, and were the watertight\ndoors in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nWatertight doors.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nBridge, Engine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure watertight doors are regularly tested and ready to operate in an emergency.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n5.4.3 Watertight Doors\nMany lives have been lost and serious injuries caused as a result of incorrectly operated watertight doors. These\ndoors are designed to close against any obstructions during an emergency in order to limit the spread of fire or\nflooding.\nPersonnel should never try to cross through a watertight door if it is moving and is not fully open…\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of standby arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-I Regulation 13-1\n2. Doors provided to ensure the watertight integrity of internal openings which are used while at sea are to be sliding\nwatertight doors capable of being remotely closed from the bridge and are also to be operable locally from each side\nof the bulkhead. Indicators are to be provided at the control position showing whether the doors are open or closed,\nand an audible alarm is to be provided at the door closure. The power, control and indicators are to be operable in the\nevent of main power failure. Particular attention is to be paid to minimizing the effect of control system failure. Each\npower-operated sliding watertight door shall be provided with an individual hand-operated mechanism. It shall be\npossible to open and close the door by hand at the door itself from both sides.\n3. Access doors and access hatch covers normally closed at sea, intended to ensure the watertight integrity of\ninternal openings, shall be provided with means of indication locally and on the bridge showing whether these doors\nor hatch covers are open or closed. A notice is to be affixed to each such door or hatch cover to the effect that it is\nnot to be left open\nChapter III Regulation 19\n3.5.2 Each fire drill shall include;\n5. checking the operation of watertight doors, fire doors, fire dampers and main inlets and outlets of ventilation\nsystems in the drill area; and\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight\ndoors.\nThere are two types of watertight door:\n• •\nDoors used while at sea, e.g. for routine access.\nDoors and hatch covers normally closed at sea.\nAll watertight doors must have indicators on the bridge showing whether they are open or closed.\nDoors and hatch covers normally closed at sea must be marked to indicate they must not be left open.\nWatertight doors which are used while at sea:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nMust be horizontally sliding doors\nMay be powered by hydraulic cylinders or electric motors\nAre made watertight either by steel to steel or with a rubber gasket.\nMust be capable of being remotely closed from the bridge with local audible alarm and light.\nMust be capable of manual and emergency operation adjacent to the door.\nMust have instructions for use, local control, remote control and emergency operation, clearly posted.\nWatertight sliding doors should not be left in the emergency “doors closed” mode on the bridge. This should be used\nfor emergency and testing use only. The doors should be tested regularly, at least at every fire drill.\nThe vessel operator should have declared whether the vessel was outfitted with any watertight doors required by\nSOLAS II-I Reg 13-1 thorough the Pre-inspection questionnaire.\nThis question will only be allocated to vessels provided with watertight doors.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and if necessary, review the company procedures for the operation, inspection and regular testing of\nwatertight doors.\nReview records of the inspection and testing of watertight doors.\nDuring the tour of the bridge inspect the indication and control panel for the watertight doors.\nDuring the course of the inspection inspect the watertight doors and request the accompanying officer to\ndemonstrate remote and/or local operation of a sliding watertight door.\n• •\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for the operation,\ninspection and regular testing of watertight door.\nInterview a rating and request that they describe or demonstrate the local operation of a watertight door.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight doors.\nRecords of the inspection and testing of watertight doors.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures for the operation, inspection and regular testing of watertight doors.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for the operation, inspection and\nregular testing of watertight doors.\nAn interviewed rating was unable to describe or demonstrate the local operation of a watertight door.\nThe rubber gasket on a sliding watertight door was damaged, in poor condition or missing.\nThere was hydraulic oil leakage from the operating mechanism of a sliding watertight door.\nA sliding watertight door could not be closed from the bridge.\nThe local audible alarm and/or light for a sliding watertight door was inoperative when the door was remotely\nclosed from the bridge.\nThe watertight doors open/closed indication on the bridge was not fully operative.\nA sliding watertight door could not be operated using the manual and/or emergency operation adjacent to\nthe door.\nThere were no instructions for use, local control, remote control and emergency operation, clearly posted\nadjacent to a sliding watertight door.\nThe remotely operated sliding watertight doors had been left in the emergency “doors closed” mode on the\nbridge.\nA door or hatch cover that was required to be normally closed at sea was not clearly marked to that effect.\nA door or hatch cover that was required to be normally closed at sea was indicated as closed on the bridge\nbut was in fact open, or vice-versa.\nWatertight doors had not been tested at least at every fire drill.\nA watertight door was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.7.", "t": "Was gas welding and cutting equipment in good order, and spare oxygen and", "c": "acetylene cylinders stored apart in a well-ventilated location outside of the\naccommodation and engine room?\nShort Question Text\nGas welding and cutting equipment.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Exterior Decks\nPublications\nUK HSE: Safety in gas welding\ncutting and similar processes\nIMO: ISM Code\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\nBCGA: Code of Practice 7. The safe use of oxy-fuel gas equipment (individual portable or mobile cylinder supply)\nBCGA: Technical Information Sheet 29. Oxy-Fuel Gas Equipment – Selection and Assembly\nObjective\nTo ensure gas welding and cutting equipment is properly installed and in satisfactory condition.\nIndustry Guidance\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\n24.4.1 Personal protective equipment complying with the relevant standard specifications or their equivalent must be\nworn by the operator and as appropriate by those assisting with the operation to protect them from particles of hot\nmetal and slag and protect their eyes and skin from ultra-violet and heat radiation. The operator should normally\nwear:\n• •\n• •\nwelding shields or welding goggles with appropriate shade of filter lens to EN 169 (goggles are only\nrecommended for gas welding and flame cutting);\nleather gauntlets;\nleather apron (in appropriate circumstances); and\nlong-sleeved natural-fibre boiler suit or other approved protective clothing.\n24.4.2 Clothing should be free of grease and oil and other flammable substances.\n24.8.1 Compressed gas cylinders should always be handled with care, whether full or empty. They should be\nproperly secured and stored in a location appropriate to their intended use and risks, which an inadvertent release of\ngas may present. The cylinders should be so secured as to be capable of quick and easy release, e.g. in the case of\nfire. Where appropriate, cylinder trolleys should be used to transport cylinders from one place to another.\n24.8.2 If the cylinder design permits protective caps over the valve, such caps should be screwed in place when the\ncylinders are not in use or are being moved. Where the cylinder design does not permit protective caps over the\nvalve, the valve system should be protected from inadvertent damage, e.g. from impact. Valves should be closed\nwhen cylinders are empty.\n24.8.3 Care should be taken in the storage of flammable gases used for hot work. The storage should:\n• be separated according to type of gas, and empty cylinders kept separate from full ones;\n• •\n• •\nbe well ventilated;\nnot be subject to extremes of temperatures;\nnot contain any sources of ignition, including electronic devices; and\nbe prominently marked ‘No smoking’ and have safety signs in accordance with the standards in Chapter 9,\nSafety signs and their use, Annex 9.1.\n24.8.4 The following precautions also need to be taken in the case of compressed gas cylinders:\nCylinders’ valves, controls and associated fittings should be kept free from oil, grease and paint; controls should not\nbe operated with oily hands.\nGas should not be taken from such cylinders unless the correct pressure-reducing regulator has been attached to the\ncylinder outlet valve.\nCylinders found to have leaks that cannot be stopped by closing the outlet valve should be taken to the open deck\naway from any sources of heat or ignition and slowly discharged to the atmosphere.\n24.9 Gas welding and cutting\n24.9.4 Non-return valves should be fitted adjacent to the torch in the oxygen and acetylene supply lines.\n24.9.5 Flame arrestors should be provided in the oxygen and acetylene supply lines and will usually be fitted at the\nlow-pressure side of regulators, although they may be duplicated at the torch.\n24.9.21 To prevent a build-up of dangerous concentrations of gas or fumes during a temporary stoppage or after\ncompletion of the work, supply valves on gas cylinders and gas mains should be securely closed and blowpipes,\nhoses and moveable pipes should be removed to lockers that open onto the open deck.\nUSCG: Code of Federal Regulations. Title 46.\n56.50-103 Fixed oxygen-acetylene distribution piping.\nc. Acetylene distribution piping and pipe fittings must be seamless steel. Copper alloys containing less than 65\npercent copper may be used in connection with valves, regulators, gauges, and other equipment used with acetylene.\nd. Oxygen distribution piping and pipe fittings must be seamless steel or copper.\ng. Pipe joints on the low-pressure side of the regulators shall be welded.\nBCGA: Code of Practice 7. The safe use of oxy-fuel gas equipment (individual portable or mobile cylinder\nsupply)\nAppendix 1 Guidance on inspection and maintenance\nProvides detailed guidance in a table format for inspection and maintenance of oxy-fuel gas equipment which\nincludes:\nFlashback arrestors and regulators:\n• •\nInspect and check annually. (Typically, this will include a creep test to ensure regulator integrity)\n5 years from date of manufacture or manufacturer’s recommendations, replace with a new, or refurbished\nunit.\nNote 1: Components such as elastomers, seals and diaphragms, will wear and deteriorate from their date of\nmanufacture whether in gas service or not. Items stored out of gas service for one year or over should receive checks\nin accordance with the annual requirements.\nBCGA: Technical Information Sheet 29. Oxy-Fuel Gas Equipment – Selection and Assembly\nFlexible Hoses\nThe good condition of hoses is of vital importance to safety. Hoses shall be protected from heat, mechanical\ndamage, traffic, sparks, hot splatter, slag and contamination, for example, by oil or grease. Always discard hoses\nwhen the general condition shows signs of deterioration (refer to BCGA CP 7 (2). Localised repairs are not\nrecommended. Correct hose connections, properly fitted and tested and retained by suitable clips or ferrules, are\nessential. Hoses are not to be secured using worm drive clips.\nUK HSE: Safety in gas welding, cutting and similar processes\nTurn the gas supply off at the cylinder when the job is finished or before the cylinders are moved or transported.\nGas leaks are often the result of damaged or poorly maintained equipment, poor connections or not closing valves\nproperly after use.\nLeaking hoses should not be repaired, but they can be shortened to remove a damaged section.\nMake sure the blowpipe is fitted with spring-loaded non-return valves.\nProtecting cylinders from flashbacks: Fit flashback arresters to both the oxygen and fuel gas hoses near to the\nregulators. For long lengths of hose, fit arresters on both the torch and the regulator.\nOxygen leaks also increase the fire risk. Clothing contaminated with oxygen, even fire-retardant clothing, will catch\nfire easily and burn very fiercely. Oxygen can cause explosions if used with incompatible materials. In particular,\noxygen reacts explosively with oil and grease.\nYou must take the following precautions:\n• •\nnever allow oil or grease to come into contact with oxygen valves or cylinder fittings;\nonly use equipment designed for use with oxygen. In particular, check that the regulator is safe for oxygen\nand for the cylinder pressure.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nFixed piping for the distribution of oxygen and acetylene carried in cylinders should be of welded construction and\nbolted flanges are prohibited. Acetylene piping must be steel, oxygen piping should be steel or copper. Rubber or\nbraided lines should not be used. However braided lines may be used for the short length from the cylinder heads to\nthe manifolds within the storage space. In open air locations it may be acceptable for a short length of piping from\nthe bottle to an isolation valve to be flanged. This is the only exception, however.\nAcetylene is 92.3% carbon and 7.7% hydrogen, is lighter than air and is highly flammable with an LEL of 2.5%.\n• •\n• •\n• Acetylene cylinders are normally coloured maroon.\nThe colour of oxygen cylinders, although commonly blue, may vary.\nThe use of propane in gas cutting and welding systems is prohibited.\nThe contents of a gas cylinder should always be confirmed from the label.\nAcetylene hoses are normally red, oxygen hoses are normally blue.\nOxygen and acetylene should be kept in separate compartments except in the case of the cylinders that are in use,\nwhich may be stored in the same compartment. Cylinders should be stowed away from heat sources and should not\nbe in heavy traffic areas to prevent accidental knocking over or damage from passing or falling objects. Cylinders\nshould be stored with the valve end up. Storage areas should be free of combustible material and not exposed to salt\nor other corrosive chemicals.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nInspect the gas cutting and welding equipment including:\no Cylinder storage location.\no Distribution piping and manifolds.\no In use and spare cylinders.\no Regulators and flashback arrestors.\no Oxygen and acetylene hoses.\no Torches/blowpipes and non-return valves.\no Associated PPE.\nReview the records of periodic inspection and replacement of flashback arrestors and regulators in the gas\ncutting and welding equipment.\nExpected Evidence\n• Records of periodic inspection and replacement of flashback arrestors and regulators in the gas cutting and\nwelding equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nGas cylinders were not properly secured in their location.\nGas cylinders were not secured such that they could be easily released in the case of fire.\nProtective caps were not screwed in place on cylinders not in use or being moved.\nThe valve on an empty cylinder was open.\nA supply valve on a gas cylinder had been left open after completion of work.\nOxygen and acetylene cylinders were stored together.\nEmpty cylinders were not kept separate from full ones.\nCylinders were stored with the valve end down.\nThe cylinder storage location was:\no Subject to extreme temperatures.\no Exposed to salt or other corrosive chemicals.\nThe cylinder storage location was not:\no Well ventilated and outside of the accommodation and engine room.\no Away from heavy traffic areas.\no Free of sources of ignition and/or combustible material.\no Clearly marked with suitable signage, including ‘No Smoking’.\nCylinders’ valves, controls and associated fittings were contaminated with oil, grease or paint.\nA gas cylinder was in use without the correct pressure-reducing regulator.\nSpring-loaded non-return valves were not fitted adjacent to the torch in the oxygen and acetylene hoses.\nFlashback arrestors were not provided in the oxygen and acetylene hoses at the low-pressure side of\nregulators.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nFlashback arrestors were not fitted on both the torch and the regulator for long lengths of oxygen and\nacetylene hose.\nAcetylene distribution piping and pipe fittings were not of seamless steel.\nOxygen distribution piping and pipe fittings were not of seamless steel or copper.\nThere were bolted flanged joints in the fixed piping for the distribution of oxygen and/or acetylene.\nRubber hoses were used in the oxygen and/or acetylene distribution piping.\nThere was no evidence that flashback arrestors and regulators had been\no Inspected and checked annually.\no Replaced with a new or refurbished unit 5 years from the date of manufacture or as per\nmanufacturer’s recommendations.\nOxygen and/or acetylene hoses were in visibly poor condition or damaged.\nLeaking oxygen and/or acetylene hoses had been repaired rather than cropped or replaced.\nPropane was in use in the gas welding and cutting system.\nThe appropriate PPE was not available for gas cutting and welding operations.\nThe PPE for gas cutting and welding operations was contaminated with oil, grease or other flammable\nsubstances.\nThe gas cutting and welding equipment was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.3.8.", "t": "Were engineer officers and ratings familiar with the safety precautions for the use", "c": "of electric welding equipment, were these safety precautions posted, and was the\nequipment in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nElectric welding equipment.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Interview - Engine Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers\nObjective\nTo ensure that electric welding equipment is always used safely.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n9.5 Electric welding equipment\nElectric welding equipment should be carefully inspected before each use to ensure it is in good condition. If\nnecessary, it should be correctly earthed. When using electric arc equipment, pay special attention to ensure:\n• •\n• •\n• Electrical supply connections are made in a gas free space.\nExisting supply wiring is adequate to carry the electrical current demand without overloading, causing\nheating.\nInsulation of flexible electrical cables is in good condition.\nCable route to the work site is the safest possible, only passing over gas freed or inerted spaces.\nEarthing connection is next to the work site and the earth return cable leads directly back to the welding\nmachine. The ship’s structure should not be used as an earth return.\nUK MCA: Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers.\n24.4.1 Personal protective equipment complying with the relevant standard specifications or their equivalent must be\nworn by the operator and as appropriate, by those assisting with the operation to protect them from particles of hot\nmetal and slag and protect their eyes and skin from ultra-violet and heat radiation. The operator should normally\nwear:\n• •\n• •\nwelding shields or welding goggles with appropriate shade of filter lens to EN 169 (goggles are only\nrecommended for gas welding and flame cutting);\nleather gauntlets;\nleather apron (in appropriate circumstances); and\nlong-sleeved natural-fibre boiler suit or other approved protective clothing.\n24.4.2 Clothing should be free of grease and oil and other flammable substances.\nPrecautions to be taken during electric arc welding\n24.7.1 In addition to the protective clothing specified in section 24.4.1, the welding operator should wear nonconducting safety footwear complying with BS 7193:1989. Clothing should be kept as dry as possible as some\nprotection against electric shock; it is particularly important that gloves should be dry because wet leather is a good\nconductor.\n24.6 Electric welding equipment\n24.6.1 In order to minimise personal harm from electric shock, electric welding power sources for shipboard use\nshould have a direct current (DC) output not exceeding 70V, with a minimum ripple. Further information on DC power\nsources is given in section 24.6.11.\n24.6.2 When DC equipment is not available, AC output power sources may be used providing they have an integral\nvoltage-limiting device to ensure that the idling voltage (the voltage between electrode and workpiece before an arc is\nstruck between them) does not exceed 25 V rms. The proper function of the device (which may be affected by dust or\nhumidity) should be checked each time a welding set is used. Some voltage-limiting devices are affected by their\nangle of tilt from the vertical, so it is important that they are mounted and used in the position specified by the\nmanufacturers. This requirement can be affected by adverse sea conditions.\n24.6.7 Cables should be inspected before use; if the insulation is impaired or conductivity reduced, they should not be\nused.\n24.6.10 A local switching arrangement or other suitable means should be provided for rapidly cutting off current from\nthe electrode should the operator get into difficulties, and also for isolating the holder when electrodes are changed.\n24.7.8 When the welding operation is completed or temporarily suspended, the electrode should be removed from the\nholder.\n24.7.10 Spare electrodes should be kept dry in their container until required for use.\nTMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety\nOfficer.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nComprehensive safety precautions for electric welding should be posted in the engine room workshop or other\nappropriate location.\nElectric cables should not be worn damaged or spliced.\nElectrode holders should be fully insulated.\nThe maximum output voltage of the electric welding equipment should be:\n• •\nRectifiers and inverters delivering DC: 70 V.\nTransformers delivering AC: 25 V.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Inspect the electric welding equipment including the nameplate, local switching arrangement, electric\ncabling, electrode holder and spare electrodes.\nSight the safety precautions for electric welding posted in the engine room workshop or other appropriate\nlocation.\nInterview the accompanying officer or if available, an appropriate rating e.g. a fitter, to verify their familiarity\nwith the safety precautions for using the electric welding equipment provided onboard.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nSafety precautions for electric welding.\nEquipment nameplate or documentation confirming the output voltage of the electric welding equipment.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the safety precautions for electric welding.\nAn interviewed rating was not familiar with the safety precautions for electric welding.\nSafety precautions for electric welding were not posted in the engine room workshop or other appropriate\nlocation.\nEquipment, such as welding curtains or screens, required by the safety precautions for electric welding were\nmissing or in unsatisfactory condition.\nThe supply wiring was not adequate to carry the electrical current demand without overloading.\nThere was evidence that the ship's structure had been used as the earth return.\nIn the case of a welding work station, the earthing connection was not next to the work site with the cable\nleading directly back to the welding machine.\nInsufficient earth return cable was provided to match the length of the welding cable.\nThe insulation of flexible electrical cables was worn, damaged or spliced.\nThe electric welding power source had a direct current (DC) output exceeding 70V.\nThe electric welding power source had an alternating current (AC) output exceeding 25V.\nThere was no local switching arrangement or other suitable means provided for rapidly cutting off current\nfrom the electrode.\nAn electrode had been left in the holder after completion of work.\nThe electrode holder was not fully insulated.\nSpare electrodes were not stored in suitably dry conditions.\nThe electric welding equipment was defective in any respect.\nThe appropriate PPE was not available for electric welding operations.\nThe PPE for electric welding operations was contaminated with oil, grease or other flammable substances.\n10.4. Planned Maintenance Systems", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.4.1.", "t": "Were the responsible vessel staff familiar with the company procedure for", "c": "managing and using the planned maintenance system, and was the system updated with\nan accurate record of onboard maintenance and spare parts in accordance with the\nprocedure?\nShort Question Text\nPlanned maintenance system (PMS)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Cargo Control Room\nPublications\nOCIMF: Safety Critical Equipment and Spare Parts Guidance. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS: A Guide to Managing Maintenance in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code.\nObjective\nTo ensure that vessel structure, machinery and equipment is maintained in accordance with class\nrequirements, manufacturer’s recommendations and company instructions.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Safety Critical Equipment and Spare Parts Guidance. First Edition.\n4. Safety critical spare parts and safety management systems\nIt is recommended that a proactive risk-based approach to the carriage of safety critical spare parts is taken for the\nmanagement of hazardous situations. This approach may need to be above and beyond minimum regulatory\nrequirements. Companies should apply this approach to both new-builds and to existing vessels\nIACS: A guide to managing maintenance in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code.\nIntroduction\n… The objective must be to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the ship and its equipment, and compliance with\nall the applicable regulations. How this is achieved will depend on the size and complexity of the company and the\ntypes of ships that it operates. The system may be entirely electronic, entirely paper-based, or a combination of the\ntwo, and the level of shore-based supervision will vary from one organization to another. All that matters is that the\nsystem works, and that it works in a way that best suits the company. If it does, it can pose no threat to the\ncompany’s ISM certification.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company strategy.\nThe company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system, for\nexample:\n• •\n• Navigation equipment.\nEngine machinery.\nDeck machinery.\n• •\n• Cargo handling machinery/equipment.\nHull structure.\nElectronic equipment.\nThe spare parts inventory may be standalone or integrated into the planned maintenance system.\nThe planned maintenance system, which may be computer-based, covers all identified onboard equipment and\nmachinery and includes a schedule of planned maintenance tasks and a record of completed planned and unplanned\nmaintenance.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 the company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions\nof the relevant rules and regulation and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a planned maintenance system along with procedures to ensure that it is\nmanaged correctly. The procedures should define:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nWhich structure, machinery, equipment and components are managed through the planned maintenance\nsystem.\nThe identities and responsibilities of vessel staff for management and use of the planned maintenance\nsystem.\nThe responsibility for completing planned and unplanned tasks within the due date, but where this is not\npossible, any grace periods allowable before escalating the matter to shore-based management.\nThe process for gaining shore-based approval for deferring a planned or unplanned task beyond the due\ndate and any grace period permitted elsewhere in the procedure.\nThe process for maintaining an accurate inventory of spare parts, including minimum stock inventory for\nequipment identified as critical.\nThe management and reporting of defective equipment either through the planned maintenance system as\nan unplanned maintenance task or a separate defect reporting system.\nThe planned maintenance system should establish:\n• •\nThe inspection, maintenance and test schedules for the structure, machinery, equipment, components and\nassociated alarms.\nThe identification of critical systems, their alarms and components.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing the planned maintenance system\nprovided onboard.\nReview the planned maintenance system filtered for overdue planned or unplanned tasks and identify tasks\nthat were either overdue by the original due date or by more than the company’s documented grace period\nwhere such periods had been defined.\nReview the planned maintenance system filtered for deferred planned or unplanned tasks and verify that any\nsuch tasks had been deferred in accordance with company procedures and with documented management\napproval.\nReview the planned maintenance system filtered for equipment identified as critical, select a piece of\nequipment and verify that the spare parts listed either met or exceeded the stated minimum required stock\nlevel.\nSelect one item from the listed spare parts for the critical equipment reviewed above and note the part\nnumber, minimum stock level, reported stock level, store location and box number for later physical\nverification.\n• Select one item of non-critical equipment and select one spare part listed as being available and note the\npart number, reported stock level, store location and box number for later physical verification.\n• Interview one deck officer and one junior engineer officer regarding their responsibilities for conducting and\nrecording planned maintenance tasks and, where the planned maintenance system was computer-based,\nrequest that they demonstrate the records for one task assigned to them.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• The company procedure for managing the planned maintenance system provided onboard.\nThe planned maintenance system.\nThe manufacturer’s instructions for operating the planned maintenance system provided onboard. (where\nthe system was computer based)\nThe spare parts inventory with critical equipment and spare parts identified, if not contained within the\nplanned maintenance system.\nThe defect reporting system if not incorporated within the planned maintenance system.\nWhere a vessel is not provided with a computer based planned maintenance system, it is an expectation that vessel\nstaff will prepare records in advance to permit the required inspector actions to be undertaken quickly and efficiently.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for managing the planned maintenance system.\nThe accompanying responsible officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing the planned\nmaintenance system.\nThe accompanying responsible officer was unfamiliar with the operation of the planned maintenance\nsystem.\nAn interviewed deck officer or junior engineer was unfamiliar with the process of completing and recording\ntasks assigned to them within the planned maintenance system\nDefects to structure, machinery or equipment were recorded in the planned maintenance system but were\nnot transferred to the defect reporting system, if not a combined system.\nDefects to structure, machinery or equipment were entered in the defect reporting system but the work\nnecessary to rectify the defect had not been entered into the planned maintenance system as an unplanned\ntask against the appropriate vessel component.\nPlanned or unplanned maintenance tasks within the planned maintenance system were overdue, either by\nthe original due date or by more than the permitted grace period allowed by the company procedure, where\ndefined, without documented shore-based approval on a case by case basis.\nAn item of equipment required for the safe operation of the vessel was not included in the planned\nmaintenance system.\nTasks had been deferred within the planned maintenance system without documented shore management\napproval.\nSpare parts inventories for equipment identified as critical were not marked/tagged with minimum stock\nlevels.\nSpare parts inventory listed in the planned maintenance system for equipment identified as critical was less\nthan the required minimum stock.\nSpare parts listed in the planned maintenance system for either critical or non-critical equipment were not\nfound in the designated store location, or the stock levels were incorrect as compared to the stock declared\nin the planned maintenance system.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.4.2.", "t": "Did the vessel operator subscribe to a lube oil and hydraulic oil analysis program", "c": "and was a procedure in place to act on the results and trends identified by the analysis?\nShort Question Text\nLube oil and hydraulic oil analysis program\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nChief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIACS Rec. 36 Recommended procedure for the determination of contents of metals and other contaminants in stern\ntube lubricating oil.\nIACS: UR_Z21 Surveys of Propeller Shafts and Tube Shafts.\nObjective\nTo ensure that the quality of lube oils and hydraulic oils is monitored, and action taken when necessary to\navoid machinery damage.\nIACS: UR_Z21 Surveys of Propeller Shafts and Tube Shafts.\n1.2.14 Lubricating oil analysis\nLubricating oil analysis is to be carried out at regular intervals not exceeding six (6) months taking into account IACS\nRec. 36.\nThe documentation on lubricating oil analysis is to be available on board. Oil samples, to be submitted for the\nanalysis, should be taken under service conditions\nIACS Rec. 36 Recommended procedure for the determination of contents of metals and other contaminants\nin stern tube lubricating oil.\n1 General\nAs provided by paragraph 1.2.14 of IACS UR Z21(Rev.4), a lubricating oil analysis should be carried out at the\nrequired intervals.\nThe documentation on lubricating oil analysis is to be available on board. Each analysis, to be performed by an\nappropriate method, should include the minimum parameters as listed:\n• •\n• •\nwater contents, refer Section 4\nchloride contents, refer Section 4\ncontents of bearing metal particles, refer Section 4 and 6\noil ageing (resistance to oxidation), refer Section 5\nTMSA KPI 4.3.3 requires that performance indicators have been developed to monitor fleet reliability. The\nperformance indicators are measured for individual vessels and fleet wide.\nExamples of possible performance indicators include:\n• Results of lub oil and hydraulic oil analyses.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have established an oil analysis programme to monitor the quality of lubrication and\nhydraulic oils used in key items of machinery. The programme should be aligned with manufacturer’s\nrecommendations and Classification Society requirements.\nThe vessel operator should have developed a procedure setting out the actions to be taken when a deficiency in a\nsampled oil is identified in an oil analysis report. This procedure may form part of the vessel’s maintenance plan.\nThe oils subject to routine analysis may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nStern tube lubricating oil\nMain engine sump oil\nMain engine stuffing box/piston rod scraper ring drain oil\nAuxiliary engine sump oil\nEmergency generator engine sump oil\nCargo and ballast pump turbine gearcase oil\nDeep-well pump system hydraulic oil.\nDeep-well pump power pack sump oil\nSteering system hydraulic oil.\nBow and stern thruster gearcase oil\nControllable pitch propeller hydraulic oil\nMooring system hydraulic oil\nCargo and ballast system valve remote control system.\nMooring winch and windlass gearcase oil.\nHose handling crane hydraulic oil\nCargo system thermal heating oil\nThe vessel operator should have declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire whether the vessel was enrolled\nin a lube oil testing programme, and if so:\n• •\nWhich oils were subject to routine analysis.\nThe frequency of analysis for each oil included in the programme(s).\nThis data will be inserted in the inspection editor and reproduced in the final inspection report.\nWhere the vessel was not enrolled in a lubricating and hydraulic oil analysis program this question will not be\nallocated and marked as no in the final report.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\nReview the vessel’s lubricating and hydraulic oil analysis records and verify that:\n• •\nEach oil declared as being included within the lube oil analysis program had been tested within the required\ntime frame.\nWhere the results of oil analysis had resulted in either a “critical” (red) or “warning” (amber) alert:\no The testing company or shore-based management had provided recommendations or instructions\nto rectify the condition.\no There was evidence available that the recommendations or instructions to rectify the situation\nprovided by the testing company or shore based management had been complied with.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe lubricating and hydraulic oil analysis programme information documenting the oils subject to analysis.\nThe lubricating and hydraulic oil analysis records for the previous two cycles of analysis.\nWhere analysis had resulted in a “critical” (red) or “warning” (amber) status, any follow up communications\nfrom shore-based management.\nMaintenance records to demonstrate that the recommended or instructed actions had been taken to correct\nany “critical” or “warning” status.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The vessel did not have a programme for the routine sampling and analysis of lubricating and hydraulic oils.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for managing the lubricating and\nhydraulic oil analysis programme.\nOne or more oils required to be sampled and analysed had not been landed for analysis in alignment with\nthe programme, unless the analysis due date was during the previous voyage or there was objective\nevidence of vessel had not been able to land the samples in previous ports / regions.\nOne or more oils analysed during the previous two cycles of oil analysis had resulted in a “critical” (red)\nstatus.\nThere was no evidence that the recommended or instructed actions to correct the condition of an oil\nanalysed with a “critical” or “warning” status had been undertaken.\n10.5. Conventional Bunkering Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, and ratings involved in bunkering", "c": "operations, familiar with the company bunkering procedures, and were records available\nto demonstrate that bunker operations had been planned and conducted in accordance\nwith the company procedure?\nShort Question Text\nConventional bunkering operations\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Engine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nObjective\nTo ensure that bunkering operations are planned and conducted in accordance with Industry best practice\nguidance.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nChapter 24.1 Bunkering in General\nBunkering is a critical operation and requires care to ensure safety and to reduce the risk of pollution.\nBunkering operations should be planned and carried out in-line with legislation, standards and best practice\nguidelines to minimize the risk from the flammability, toxicity, cryogenic nature, volatility or pressure of the fuel being\nhandled.\nVessel operators should manage the risks by ensuring that the crew is familiar with the management procedures for\nbunker operations and that they have all completed the appropriate training.\nThe crew designated to bunkering on board should have no other tasks during the operation. This is particularly\nimportant when bunkers are being loaded at the same time as cargo. Spills often occur when staff are distracted by\nother jobs.\n24.6 Bunker checklists\nSafe bunker operations depend on good communications between the bunker vessel and the receiving ship, from\npre-arrival to post-departure, and on complying with the agreed safe procedures at all stages. The bunker checklists\nare a way to ensure that all the appropriate checks are formally agreed, carried out and recorded.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: pre-arrival\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: checks after mooring\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: pre-transfer conference\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: pre-bunkering\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: repetitive checks\nISGOTT Bunker checklist: Post bunkering\nTMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel\ntype within the fleet\nOperational procedures address:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPre-arrival checks.\nPipeline/hose connection including supervision of third-party personnel.\nBunker safety checklist including interface and communications.\nBunker tank gauging.\nAgreed initial bulk transfer and topping off rates.\nDraining/blowing lines and disconnection of hoses.\nBunker sample analysis.\nMonitoring of bunker tank atmospheres for hydrocarbon gas, benzene and H2S\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed bunkering procedures which require a formal bunkering plan to be\ndeveloped for each bunkering operation.\nThe procedure and supporting checklists should consider the following:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nDetermining that there is adequate space for the volume of bunkers to be loaded.\nEstablishing maximum loading volume for all tanks.\nControls for the setting of bunker system valves.\nDetermining loading rates for the start of loading, bulk loading and topping-off.\nSpecial precautions when loading into double bottom tanks.\nArrangements of bunker tank ventilation.\nInternal tank overflow arrangements.\nVerification of gauging system operation and accuracy.\nAlarm settings on overfill alarm units.\nCommunication with the terminal to establish when bunkering can be undertaken.\nCommunications with the bunker supplier prior to commencement, to establish and record the loading\nprocedure to be followed and to determine how quantity and quality checks may be carried out, particularly if\nsafe access is needed between the ship and a barge.\nMethods of managing the handling of bunkers which have or may have a hydrogen sulphide (H2S) content.\nTesting procedures for determining the presence of hydrocarbon or H2S vapours.\nMethod of determining the temperature of the bunkers during loading.\nCommunications procedure for the operation, including emergency stop.\nManning requirements to execute the operation safely.\nMonitoring of the bunkering operation and checking it conforms to the agreed procedure.\nChanging over tanks during loading.\nContainment arrangements and clean-up equipment to be available.\nDraining manifolds upon completion of bunkering.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for bunkering operations.\nReview a recent bunker transfer plan and verify that it:\nIdentified the personnel involved in the bunkering operation and their designated duties.\nEnsured that personnel involved in the bunkering operation were not assigned conflicting tasks\nduring the bunkering.\no Contained all information required by the company procedures.\no Identified checks for flammable and toxic gas vapours within bunker tank ullage spaces that were\nrequired to be taken before, during and after bunkering.\no Was signed for understanding by all officers involved in the bunkering operation.\no Was signed by both the Master and Chief Engineer for approval.\nReview the records of the same bunker operation and verify that:\no Checklists were completed before, during and after the bunkering operation to ensure that all\nrequired safety and environmental protection measures were completed.\no The bunker transfer followed the plan as presented.\no The atmosphere of ullage spaces within the bunker tanks were tested in according with the plan.\no Records were sufficiently detailed to identify which tanks were being loaded at any given time.\no\no\n• •\nWhere the vessel was involved in a bunkering operation during the inspection or had been involved in a\nbunkering operation during the previous two months, interview one engine room rating to gauge their\nfamiliarity with the bunkering plan and their role in the bunkering operation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedure for developing bunker transfer plans.\nThe company procedure for bunker operation record keeping.\nThe plans for recent bunker transfer operations.\nThe records for recent bunker transfer operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure that required bunker transfer plans to be prepared with defined content in\nalignment with ISGOTT Chapter 24 and TMSA KPI 6.2.5.\nThere were no supporting checklists for pre-arrival, checks after mooring, pre-transfer conference, prebunkering, repetitive checks or post-bunkering.\nThere was no company procedure which defined the record-keeping requirements for bunkering operations.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for bunker transfer planning.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company requirement for maintaining records of\nbunkering operations.\nWhere interviewed, an engine room rating was unfamiliar with the duties assigned to them within the\nbunkering plan during a recent bunkering operation.\nBunker tank ullage space atmosphere checks for flammable or toxic vapours required to be taken before,\nduring or after the bunkering operation had not been taken and recorded in accordance with the company\nprocedure.\nThe reviewed bunkering plan was missing key information required by the company procedure.\nThe bunkering plan did not identify the personnel, and their assigned roles, required to be involved in the\nbunkering operation.\nThe reviewed bunkering plan was not signed by all officers involved and/or was not approved by the Master\nand Chief Engineer.\nThe reviewed bunker transfer records indicated that the bunkering plan was not followed.\nThe reviewed bunkering records were insufficiently detailed to permit the reconstruction of the bunkering\noperation for comparison with the bunker transfer plan.\nChecklists required to be completed before, during and/or after the bunkering operation had not been\ncompleted.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.5.2.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "procedures for bunker fuel oil sampling and analysis, and were records available to\ndemonstrate that samples had been taken and retained or analysed in accordance with\nthe procedure?\nShort Question Text\nBunker fuel oil sampling and analysis\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nIMO: MARPOL\nIMO Resolution MEPC.182(59) 2009 Guidelines for the sampling of fuel oil for determination of compliance with the\nrevised MARPOL Annex VI\nIACS: No.151 (July 2017) Recommendation for petroleum fuel treatment systems for marine diesel engines.\nObjective\nTo ensure that marine distillate and residual fuel oils meet the defined quality and environmental standards\nfor use onboard in propulsion and power generating machinery.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS No.151 (July 2017) Recommendation for petroleum fuel treatment systems for marine diesel engines.\n3.4 Verification requirements.\n3.4.2.4 Records of fuel sample analysis according to ISO 8217 (latest revision) should be retained on board the ship\nand should be presented to the surveyor during regular surveys.\n3.4.2.5 It is recommended that a drip sample of fuel should be taken during bunkering at the bunker manifold in\naccordance with ISO 3170 or 3171 and ISO 13739, where applicable.\n3.4.2.6 It is recommended that once a new bunker has started to be used, a fuel system audit is performed by a\nresponsible person on board, taking fuel samples from before and after the treatment plant and at the engine fuel rail.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel\ntype within the fleet:\nOperational procedures address:\n• Bunker sample analysis.\nSpecific guidance is provided for:\n• The unavoidable use of new bunkers before the receipt of analysis results.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nChapter 3 Regulation 18\n8.1 The bunker delivery note shall be accompanied by a representative sample of the fuel oil delivered...\nResolution MEPC.182(59) 2009 Guidelines for the sampling of fuel oil for determination of compliance with\nthe revised MARPOL Annex VI\nThe primary objective of these Guidelines is to establish an agreed method to obtain a representative sample of the\nfuel oil for combustion purposes delivered for use on board ships.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which required bunker samples to be taken or obtained\nduring each bunkering operation as follows:\n• •\n• A representative sample of each delivery of fuel oil delivered accompanied by a bunker delivery note to be\nretained for MARPOL Annex VI compliance verification purposes.\nRepresentative samples of each delivery of marine residual fuel oil delivered for quality analysis and\nretention in accordance with the contracted fuel quality testing service provider.\nWhere sampling for quality analysis was not required at every bunkering, the frequency of taking samples of\nmarine distillate fuel for retention and analysis in accordance with contracted fuel analysis testing services.\nThe procedures should provide guidance as to the actions to be taken in the circumstance that:\n• •\n• •\nFuel oil analysis determine that the required specification was not met.\nThe vessel suffered any problems relating to fuel oil quality.\nFuel quality was found to contravene MARPOL Annex VI.\nThe use of new bunkers before receipt of analysis results was unavoidable.\nThe vessel operator should have provided details of the marine distillate and marine residual fuel analysis program\nthrough the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing fuel oil samples, arranging fuel\noil analysis and, where necessary, the remedial actions to be taken where fuel oil quality raises a concern.\nReview recent bunkering records and verify that bunker samples had been taken and either retained or\nanalysed as required by company procedures.\nReview recent bunker analysis reports and verify that any advisory notes had been complied with.\nReview Oil Record Book Part 1 and verify that recent bunkering operations were accurately recorded.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe company procedures for managing fuel oil samples, arranging fuel oil analysis and remedial actions to\nbe taken where fuel oil quality raises a concern.\nBunker delivery notes for the previous twelve months.\n• •\nBunker analysis reports for the previous twelve months.\nOil Record Book Part 1 covering all fuel oil bunkering operations for the previous six months and the last\nbunkering if more than six months previously.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for managing fuel oil samples, arranging fuel oil analysis and the\nremedial actions to be taken where fuel oil quality raised a concern.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was not familiar with the company procedures for fuel oil sampling,\nsample retention or fuel oil analysis.\nBunker delivery notes were not available for each delivery of marine distillate and residual fuel oil.\nBunker samples had not been retained for each delivery of marine distillate and residual fuel oil.\nThere was no company requirement to arrange for fuel oil analysis on every occasion marine residual fuel oil\nwas loaded for consumption onboard.\nThere was no guidance regarding the required frequency of marine distillate fuel oil analysis.\nFuel oil analysis had not been performed in accordance with company procedure and/or the instructions\nfrom the fuel oil analysis contractor.\nFuel oil samples had not been retained in accordance with company procedures or as required by MARPOL\nannex VI.\nThere was no evidence that advisory notes contained within bunker analysis reports had been complied\nwith.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.5.3.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer and senior engineer officers familiar with the company", "c": "and vessel specific fuel changeover procedures, and were records available to\ndemonstrate that fuel grade changeovers had been completed in compliance with the\nprocedures and MARPOL regulations?\nShort Question Text\nFuel change over procedures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: MARPOL\nJoint Industry Guidance: The supply and use of 0.50% sulphur marine fuel\nOCIMF / INTERTANKO Recommendations on the Hazard Assessment of Fuel Change Over Processes (July 2013)\nObjective\nTo ensure that fuel grade changeovers are conducted in accordance with regulations while maintaining the\nsafe and continuous availability of propulsion and electrical power.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\n10.3.4 Changeover Procedure\nThe issues associated with changing between different grades of fuel can be managed by using a system-specific\nprocedure. All ships should have a system-specific changeover calculator, which should give enough time to ensure a\ncomplete and smooth change between different grades.\nSee checklist B4: Fuel changeover for examples of fuel changeover procedures.\nJoint Industry Guidance: The supply and use of 0.50%- sulphur marine fuel.\nAny new crew members joining a ship should be familiarized and trained before participating in the fuel switching\nprocess. The proper implementation of fuel switching and reliable operation of the propulsion machinery during\nswitching and while operating on the different grades of fuel is essential. This is particularly the case if switching is\nbeing carried out close to ports and coastal waters where there is the greatest risk to the ship and the environment\nfrom loss of, or reduction in, the ship’s propulsion power. Great care should be taken when switching fuel so as to\navoid situations that may jeopardize the safety of the ship, e.g. by considering the distance to the coastline and the\ndensity of traffic\nOCIMF / INTERTANKO: Recommendations on the Hazard Assessment of Fuel Changeover Processes (July\n2013).\n5 Summary\nIt is recommended that fuel changeover procedures are subjected to a thorough hazard analysis (HAZID) to identify\nrisks and necessary preventative and mitigation measures\nTMSA KPI 10.2.4 requires that the environmental management plan includes procedures for fuel management in\norder to ensure regulatory compliance, energy efficiency and reduced emissions.\nOnboard fuel management procedures may include:\n• Requirements prior to entering and leaving Emission Control Areas.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: MARPOL\nAnnex VI\nRegulation 14\n1. The sulphur content of any fuel oil used on board ships shall not exceed the following limits:\n1.3. 0.50% m/m on and after 1 January 2020.\n4. While ships are operating within an emission control area, the sulphur content of fuel oil used on board ships shall\nnot exceed the following limits:\n4.3. 0.10% m/m on and after 1 January 2015.\n6. Those ships using separate fuel oils to comply with paragraph 4 of this regulation and entering or leaving an\nemission control area set forth in paragraph 3 of this regulation shall carry a written procedure showing how the fuel\nchangeover is to be done, allowing sufficient time for the fuel oil service system to be fully flushed of all fuel oils\nexceeding the applicable sulphur content specified in paragraph 4 of this regulation prior to entry into an emission\ncontrol area. The volume of low sulphur fuel oils in each tank as well as the date time and position of the ship when\nany fuel changeover operation is completed prior to the entry into an emission control area or commenced after exit\nfrom such an area shall be recorded in such logbook as prescribed by the Administration.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures, based on risk assessment, describing the changeover of\nfuel grades used onboard.\nDue to the complexity of vessel types, available fuels, regulation and means to maintain compliance, there will be a\nvariety of changeovers required. Procedures should be developed for the following fuel changeovers, as applicable to\nthe vessel:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nNon-compliant residual fuel oil with use of a scrubber to compliant residual or distillate fuel oil.\nCompliant residual fuel oil to compliant distillate fuel oil.\nCompliant residual fuel oil to non-compliant residual fuel oil with use of a scrubber.\nCompliant distillate fuel oil to compliant residual fuel oil.\nLNG to compliant residual or distillate fuel oil.\nCompliant residual or distillate fuel oil to LNG.\nIncompatible fuel grades.\nThe use of cargo condensate or other forms of novel fuel sources.\nThe fuel changeover procedures, supplemented by checklists where applicable, should be vessel specific and\ndescribe in detail the process to change from one grade of fuel to another.\nWhere the fuel change process could potentially lead to blackout or loss of propulsion, the company should define the\ncircumstances or location where the fuel grade changeover may take place.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures describing the changeover of fuel grades\nonboard.\nReview fuel change over records for a recent voyage where fuel grades had been changed and verify that\nthe change had been completed in accordance with the company procedures.\nReview the location of the vessel during the changeover process and verify that it was completed in\naccordance with any geographic or situational safety restrictions put in place by the company.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures describing the changeover of fuel grades onboard .\nThe vessel specific procedures for changing of fuel grades for main engines, generators and boilers.\nOnboard records demonstrating that fuel changes had been completed in accordance with MARPOL Annex\nVI regulations, company procedures and vessel specific instructions, including:\no Engine Room Log Book\no Any other Log Book used to record fuel changeovers as required by MARPOL Annex VI,\nRegulation 14.6 (which may be an electronic log book).\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure describing the changeover of fuel grades onboard.\nThere were no ship specific fuel grade changeover procedures.\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures describing the changeover\nof fuel grades onboard .\nThe accompanying engineer officer was unfamiliar with the vessel specific fuel grade changeover\nprocedures.\nRecords for changing of fuel grades were either missing or inaccurate.\nEntries had not been made in the appropriate Log Book to record the volume of low sulphur fuel oils in each\ntank as well as the date, time and position of the ship on:\no The completion of the fuel changeover process prior to entering an ECA.\no The start of the fuel changeover process when departing an ECA.\nThe vessel had conducted a fuel changeover in contravention of any geographical or situational safety\nrestrictions contained within the company procedures.\nThe vessel had been operating at any stage of the voyage in contravention of MARPOL Annex VI\nregulations.\n10.6. LNG Bunkering Management", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose and operation of", "c": "the LNG fuel tank water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck, and was\nthe equipment in good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nLNG fuel tank water-spray system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nIMO: IGF Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\n(These guidelines set out requirements applicable to fixed water spray or water mist systems for:\n• •\n• •\nWeekly tests and inspections\nMonthly tests and inspections\nAnnual tests and inspections\nFive-year servicing)\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: IGF Code\n6.5 Regulations for portable liquefied gas fuel tanks\n6.5.1 The design of the tank shall comply with 6.4.15.3. The tank support (container frame or truck chassis) shall be\ndesigned for the intended purpose.\n6.5.2 Portable fuel tanks shall be located in dedicated areas fitted with:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nmechanical protection of the tanks depending on location and cargo operations.\nif located on open deck: spill protection and water spray systems for cooling; and\nif located in an enclosed space: the space is to be considered as a tank connection space.\n11.4 Regulations for fire main\n11.4.1 The water spray system required below may be part of the fire main system provided that the required fire\npump capacity and working pressure are sufficient for the operation of both the required numbers of hydrants and\nhoses and the water spray system simultaneously.\n11.4.2 When the fuel storage tank(s) is located on the open deck, isolating valves shall be fitted in the fire main in\norder to isolate damaged sections of the fire main. Isolation of a section of fire main shall not deprive the fire line\nahead of the isolated section from the supply of water.\n11.5 Regulations for water spray system\n11.5.1 A water spray system shall be installed for cooling and fire prevention to cover exposed parts of fuel storage\ntank(s) located on open deck.\n11.5.2 The water spray system shall also provide coverage for boundaries of the superstructures, compressor rooms,\npump-rooms, cargo control rooms, bunkering control stations, bunkering stations and any other normally occupied\ndeck houses that face the storage tank on open decks unless the tank is located 10 metres or more from the\nboundaries.\n11.5.3 The system shall be designed to cover all areas as specified above with an application rate of 10 l/min/m2 for\nthe largest horizontal projected surfaces and 4 l/min/m2 for vertical surfaces.\n11.5.4 Stop valves shall be fitted in the water spray application main supply line(s), at intervals not exceeding 40\nmetres, for the purpose of isolating damaged sections. Alternatively, the system may be divided into two or more\nsections that may be operated independently, provided the necessary controls are located together in a readily\naccessible position not likely to be inaccessible in case of fire in the areas protected.\n11.5.5 The capacity of the water spray pump shall be sufficient to deliver the required amount of water to the\nhydraulically most demanding area as specified above in the areas protected.\n11.5.6 If the water spray system is not part of the fire main system, a connection to the ship's fire main through a stop\nvalve shall be provided.\n11.5.7 Remote start of pumps supplying the water spray system and remote operation of any normally closed valves\nto the system shall be located in a readily accessible position which is not likely to be inaccessible in case of fire in\nthe areas protected.\n11.5.8 The nozzles shall be of an approved full-bore type, and they shall be arranged to ensure an effective\ndistribution of water throughout the space being protected.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed a maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and firefighting systems and appliances which should include the water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck.\nMaintenance tasks may include:\n• •\n• Periodic removal of the installed orifice plates and piping end caps and flushing any debris from the system.\nCleaning the in-line filters.\nBack flushing the system with fresh water.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nInspect the space(s) containing the remote controls for the water-spray system for cooling and fire\nprevention on deck.\nReview the operating instructions for the system posted in the space(s) and verify that the system valves\nand controls are properly marked and set.\nReview inspection and servicing data available in the space(s).\nInspect the system piping, particularly on the underside, for external indications of corrosion and for\npatching.\nExamine a random sample of nozzles for evidence of clogging by debris.\nRequest an accompanying crew member to randomly check the isolating valves and stop valves to verify\nthey are operating freely.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the\nmaintenance plan.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the water\nspray system with reference to:\no Starting the pumps.\no The purpose and location of the isolating valves and stop valves.\no The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck piping.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the water-spray system for cooling and fire\nprevention on deck\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe operating instructions for the system were not posted at the control station.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the location, purpose and operation of the vessel’s waterspray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck.\nAccess to the system controls was obstructed.\nThe system valves and controls were not properly marked or set.\nStop valves or isolating valves did not operate freely.\nThe stop valves or isolating valves were not clearly marked.\nThere was evidence of clogged or overpainted water spray nozzles.\nThere was hard rust, deterioration or temporary repairs to the system pipework.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the vessel’s water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck or, all the required\ninspections, tests and maintenance.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nInspection of the water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck indicated that actions recorded\nin the maintenance plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe water-spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.6.2.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer, and those officers and ratings, involved in LNG", "c": "bunkering operations, familiar with the functions of the vessel’s LNG (or other lowflashpoint fuel) bunkering Emergency Shut Down (ESD) systems, and was the equipment\nin good working order, regularly inspected, tested and maintained?\nShort Question Text\nLNG gas fuel bunkering ESD system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Manifold\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGF Code\nIACS: Rec 142. LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to an emergency while bunkering LNG (or other lowflashpoint fuel) in accordance with the shipboard emergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n24.3.2 Transfer equipment requirements for LNG bunkering\nDifferent types of equipment are used to perform LNG bunker transfers: rigid arms, hybrid systems, (rigid structure\nhandling flexible lines) and flexible hoses.\nAll LNG transfer systems must be equipped with ERS and ESD systems connected via a bunkering safety link. The\nprimary function of the bunkering safety link is to connect the supplier’s and receiver’s ESD systems, ensuring that in\nan emergency, either one can initiate a shutdown of liquid and vapour transfer, in a safe coordinated and controlled\nmanner.\nSGMF: Gas as a marine fuel. Recommendations for linked emergency shutdown (ESD) arrangements for LNG\nbunkering. Version 1\nPurpose\nThis Technical Guidance Note (TGN) provides recommendations for the Emergency Shutdown System\narrangements, integration, data and voice communication and interfaces for the LNG bunkering of gas-fuelled\nvessels. It specifically addresses the functional safety principles of the linked ESD system to ensure a controlled\nshutdown of the bunkering operation in the case of an emergency.\nThe document responds to the demand for a common approach across the industry for emergency shutdown. It also\naddresses concerns regarding differing interpretations of emergency shutdown functional requirements, the functional\nsafety principles, and the means of control between a gas fuel supplier and a receiver gas-fuelled vessel over the\nbunkering operation.\nIACS: Rec 142. LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\n2.1.6 Emergency Shut-Down (ESD)\nThese are systems installed as part of the LNG transfer system that are designed to stop the flow of LNG and/or\nprevent damage to the transfer system in an emergency. The ESD may consist of two parts, they are:\n• •\nESD - stage 1, is a system that shuts the LNG transfer process down in a controlled manner when it\nreceives inputs from one or more of the following; transfer personnel, high or low level LNG tank pressure\nalarms, cables or other means designed to detect excessive movement between transfer vessels or vessel\nand an LNG bunkering facility, or other alarms.\nESD - stage 2, is a system that activates decoupling of the transfer system between the transfer vessels or\nbetween a vessel and an LNG bunkering facility. The decoupling mechanism contains quick acting valves\ndesigned to contain the contents of the LNG transfer line (dry break) during decoupling.\n2.1.7 Emergency Release Coupling (ERC)\nThe ERC is normally linked to the ESD system where this may be referred to as ESD2 as per SIGTTO “ESD\narrangements & linked ship/shore systems for liquefied gas carriers”.\nAn emergency release coupling is activated:\n• •\nBy excessive forces applied to the predetermined section, or\nBy manual or automated control, in case of emergency.\n2.1.8 Emergency Release System (ERS)\nA system that provides a positive means of quick release of the transfer system and safe isolation of receiving vessel\nfrom the supply source.\n5.5 ESD systems\nThe bunkering facility and receiving ship should be fitted with a linked ESD system such that any activation of the\nESD systems should be implemented simultaneously on both bunkering facility and receiving ship. Any pumps and\nvapour return compressors should be designed with consideration to surge pressure in the event of ESD activation.\nThe bunkering line should be designed and arranged to withstand the surge pressure that may result from the\nactivation of the emergency release coupling and quick closing of ESD valves.\nOn ESD activation, manifold valves on the receiving ship and bunkering facility and any pump or compressor\nassociated with the bunkering operation are to be shut down except where this would result in a more hazardous\nsituation (see Table 3).\nAn ESD activation should not lead to LNG being trapped in a pipe between closed valves. An automatic pressure\nrelief system is to be provided that is designed to release the natural gas to a safe location without release to the\nenvironment.\nIf not demonstrated to be required at a higher value due to pressure surge considerations, a suitably selected closing\ntime up to 5 seconds should be selected, depending on the pipe size and bunkering rate from the trigger of the alarm\nto full closure of the ESD valves, in accordance with the IGF Code.\nThe emergency shutdown system ESD should be suitable for the capacity of the installation. The minimum alarms\nand safety actions required for the transfer system are given in Table 3 below:\nTable 3: Alarms and safety actions required for the transfer system\n• •\nLow pressure in the supply tank\nSudden pressure drop at the transfer pump discharge\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• High level in the receiving tank\nHigh pressure in the receiving tank\nLNG leakage in bunker station (gas detection/low temperature detection)\nGas detection in the ducting around the bunkering lines (if applicable). Alert at 20% LEL, ESD activation at\n40% of LEL\nManual activation of shutdown from either the ship to be bunkered or the bunkering installation (ESD1)\nManual activation of the emergency release coupling from either the ship to be bunkered or the bunkering\ninstallation (ESD2)\nSafe working envelope of the loading arm exceeded\nFire detection (any fire detection on receiving ship or bunker facility)\nElectrical power failure (supplied by independent source of energy, e.g. battery)\nNotes:\n• •\n• Alert is to be made at both the delivery and receiving ends of the transfer system to clearly identify the\nreasons for the ESD activation.\nIn each case, audible/visual alert to be made at bunker station/discharging station and ESD system to be\nactivated.\nWhere the parameter that triggers the ESD is such that closure of vapour connection valves and shut down\nof vapour return compressors would increase the potential hazard (for example a receiving tank high level\nalarm) these are to remain open/active where appropriate.\nThe manual activation position for the ESD system should be outside the bunker station and should have a clear view\nof the manifold area (the ‘clear view’ may be provided via CCTV).\nLNG bunker transfer should not be resumed until the transfer system and associated safety systems (fire detection,\netc.) are returned to normal operation condition.\nTMSA KPI 6.1.2 requires that procedures for pre-operational tests and checks of cargo and bunkering equipment are\nin place for all vessel types within the fleet. Tests and checks of equipment may include:\n• ESD system operation.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7. The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGF Code\n8 Bunkering\n8.5.7 A ship-shore link (SSL) or an equivalent means for automatic and manual ESD communication to the bunkering\nsource shall be fitted.\n15 Control, Monitoring and Safety Systems\n15.4.2 Overflow control\n.1 Each liquefied gas fuel tank shall be fitted with a high liquid level alarm operating independently of other liquid level\nindicators and giving an audible and visual warning when activated.\n.2 An additional sensor operating independently of the high liquid level alarm shall automatically actuate a shutoff\nvalve in a manner that will both avoid excessive liquid pressure in the bunkering line and prevent the liquefied gas\nfuel tank from becoming liquid full.\n.4 All elements of the level alarms, including the electrical circuit and the sensor(s), of the high, and overfill alarms,\nshall be capable of being functionally tested. Systems shall be tested prior to fuel operation in accordance with\n18.4.3.\n.5 Where arrangements are provided for overriding the overflow control system, they shall be such that inadvertent\noperation is prevented. When this override is operated continuous visual indication is to be provided at the navigation\nbridge, continuously manned central control station or onboard safety centre.\n15.5 Regulations for bunkering control\n15.5.1 Control of the bunkering shall be possible from a safe location remote from the bunkering station. At this\nlocation the tank pressure, tank temperature if required by 15.4.11, and tank level shall be monitored. Remotely\ncontrolled valves required by 8.5.3(manifold valve) and 11.5.7 (water spray system) shall be capable of being\noperated from this location. Overfill alarm and automatic shutdown shall also be indicated at this location.\n15.5.3 If gas is detected in the ducting around the bunkering lines an audible and visual alarm and emergency\nshutdown shall be provided at the bunkering control location.\n18.2 Functional requirements\n.3 the ship shall be provided with operational procedures including a suitably detailed fuel handling manual, such that\ntrained personnel can safely operate the fuel bunkering, storage and transfer systems.\n18.4 Regulations for bunkering operations\n18.4.2.1 The fuel handling manual required by 18.2.3 shall include but is not limited to:\n.8 emergency shutdown and emergency release systems, where fitted: and\n.9 a description of the procedural actions to take in an emergency situation, such as leakage, fire or potential fuel\nstratification resulting in rollover.\n18.4.2.2 A fuel system schematic/piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) shall be reproduced and permanently\nmounted in the ship's bunker control station and at the bunker station.\n18.4.3 Pre-bunkering verification\n18.4.3.1 Prior to conducting bunkering operations, pre-bunkering verification including, but not limited to the following,\nshall be carried out and documented in the bunker safety checklist:\n.1 all communications methods, including ship shore link (SSL), if fitted.\n.4 operation of remote-controlled valves.\n18.4.4.4 The ship shore link (SSL) or equivalent means to a bunkering source provided for automatic ESD\ncommunications, shall be compatible with the receiving ship and the delivering facility ESD system.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the\nvessel’s LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system which defined the:\n• •\n• •\nFunctions and operation of the ESD systems.\nActions to take in the event of an ESD system failure.\nContingency plans in the event of non-availability of the ESD ship/shore link system, if fitted.\nFrequency and method of inspection, maintenance and testing of the ESD systems, including preoperational checks.\nThe fuel handling manual may form part of these procedures.\nThe Chief Engineer and engineer officers should be familiar with the bunkering ESD systems installed on their vessel,\nits initiators and its shutdown actions.\nDeck officers and ratings involved in the bunkering operation should be familiar with the manual activation of the\nbunkering ESD systems.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that defined the operation, inspection,\nmaintenance and testing of the vessel’s bunkering emergency shutdown (ESD) systems.\nSight and review any checklists used to conduct tests of the bunkering ESD systems.\nIf necessary, review the records of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out contained within the\nplanned maintenance system.\nInspect the bunker station and the remote bunker control station, including control panels and the fuel\nsystem schematic/piping and instrumentation diagram.\nWhere the ESD system is fitted with an override function, verify that there are clear procedures to ensure\nthat this function can only be used under the direct authority of the Master.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose, operation, and testing of the\nbunkering ESD systems.\nInterview a rating and verify their familiarity with the location of the manual bunkering ESD controls and\ncircumstances in which the bunkering ESD system should be manually activated.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nThe company procedures for the operation, inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s bunkering\nESD systems.\nThe completed checklist used to conduct the pre-arrival tests on the bunker ESD system prior to the\nprevious LNG bunker transfer operation.\nRecords of the inspection, maintenance and testing of the vessel’s bunkering ESD systems.\nThe fuel handling manual.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe Chief Engineer and officers directly involved in bunker operations were not familiar with the vessel’s\nbunkering ESD systems.\nInstrumentation and controls at the bunker control station were not fully operative.\nA fuel system schematic/piping and instrumentation diagram was not posted at the bunker station or at the\nremote bunker control station.\nThere was no fuel handling manual available.\nThe fuel handling manual did not describe the bunkering ESD system.\nThere was no record of checks and tests of the bunkering ESD systems before bunkering operations began.\nRecords of inspections, maintenance and tests carried out were incomplete.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the purpose, operation and testing of the ESD systems.\n• •\n• •\n• •\nAn interviewed rating directly involved in LNG bunkering operations was not familiar with the location of the\nmanual control of the bunker ESD or the circumstances under which it should be activated.\nInspection of the bunkering ESD systems indicated that actions recorded in the planned maintenance\nsystem had not in fact taken place.\nThe ESD link system was not available for use.\nCompany procedures did not include a contingency plan for the circumstances where the ESD link system, if\nfitted, was not available.\nThe bunkering ESD system was defective in any respect.\nThe bunkering ESD system had been overridden during a bunkering operation without the documented\nauthorisation of the Master.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.6.3.", "t": "Were the Chief Engineer, and those officers and ratings involved in LNG", "c": "bunkering operations, familiar with the company LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel)\nbunkering procedures, and were records available to demonstrate that bunker operations\nhad been planned and conducted in accordance with the company procedures?\nShort Question Text\nLNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering procedures.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Control Room, Chief Engineer's Office, Interview - Engine Rating\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition.\nIMO: IGF Code\nObjective\nTo ensure that LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering operations are planned and conducted in\naccordance with industry best practice guidance.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals. Sixth Edition\n24.1 Bunkering in General\nBunkering is a critical operation and requires care to ensure safety and to reduce the risk of pollution.\nBunkering operations should be planned and carried out in line with legislation, standards and best practice\nguidelines to minimize the risk from the flammability, toxicity, cryogenic nature, volatility or pressure of the fuel being\nhandled.\nVessel operators should manage the risks by ensuring that the crew is familiar with the management procedures for\nbunker operations and that they have all completed the appropriate training.\nThe crew designated to bunkering on board should have no other tasks during the operation. This is particularly\nimportant when bunkers are being loaded at the same time as cargo. Spills often occur when staff are distracted by\nother jobs.\n24.3 Liquefied Natural Gas fuelled ships and Liquefied Natural Gas bunkering\nThe cryogenic nature and volatility of LNG means that its properties, characteristics, and behaviour are very different\nto conventional marine fuels. This means additional precautions are needed as described below.\n24.3.2.4 Boil-Off Gas and pressure control\nBoil-Off Gas (BOG) is produced by LNG fuel systems when the storage tanks absorb heat from the environment.\nAdditional BOG may be produced during bunkering operations due to flashing, etc. If this BOG is not managed, it\nmay result in an increase of temperature and pressure in the storage tank. Eventually the pressure relief valves may\noperate, allowing a release of LNG to the environment.\nVapour control during bunkering operations is critical and can be handled in several different ways including:\n• •\n• •\n• Vapour return Line (VRL) allowing the vapour displaced from the receiving tank to be returned to the\nsupplier’s tank.\nPressure accumulation in suitably constructed tanks.\nBOG and LNG conditioning provisions, such as sub-cooler.\nBurning of BOG in an approved consumer, such as a Gas Combustion unit (GCU) or Dual Fuel Diesel\nEngine (DFDE).\nCooling via top spraying/filling in storage tanks.\nPersonnel responsible for LNG bunkering operations should be fully familiar with the means fitted to their ship or\nfacility to control BOG and the associated procedures.\nThe IGF Code states that venting of fuel vapour for the control of the tank pressure is not acceptable except in\nemergency situations and that LNG fuelled ships must be fitted with means of maintaining tank pressure below the\nset pressure of the relief valves, with the ship in idle condition, for 15 days.\n24.5 Alternative fuels\nThe characteristics and behaviour of alternative fuels, such as Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), hydrogen (H2),\nammonia (NH4) and methanol (CH3OH), are significantly different to conventional marine fuels and LNG. Risks\nshould be mitigated and avoided. Throughout the alternative fuel bunker chain, each element should be carefully\ndesigned and constructed. Dedicated safety, operational and maintenance procedures should be in place to be\nexecuted by trained personnel.\nMost of the guidelines in section 24.1 apply to all possible alternative fuels.\n24.6 Bunker checklists\nSafe bunker operations depend on good communication between the bunker vessel and the receiving ship, from prearrival to post-departure, and on compliance with the agreed safe procedures at all stages. The bunker checklists\nhelp to ensure that all the appropriate checks are formally agreed, carried out and recorded.\n24.7 Liquefied Natural Gas bunkering safety checklists\nISO have produced LNG bunker checklist to support the IGF Code. These are contained in ISO 20519:2017 Ships\nand marine technology - Specification for bunkering of liquefied natural gas fuelled vessels.\nIn addition, the International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) has developed harmonised checklists for\nknown LNG bunkering scenarios: STS, shore to ship and truck to ship. These checklists are available on the\nlngbunkering.org website and aim to standardised procedures across different ports/countries. ISO 20519 allows\nalternative checklist to be used as long as they contain at least the same information that is listed in its own\nchecklists.\nThe checklists developed by IAPH may be used in place of the standard ISO 20519 checklists if:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nBoth parties agree to use the alternative checklists.\nThe competent authorities permit their use.\nThe checklists are used from pre-operations through to the completion of the transfer (no mixing of\nchecklists).\nTMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel\ntype within the fleet.\nOperational procedures address:\n• •\nPre-arrival checks.\nPipeline/hose connection including supervision of third-party personnel.\n• •\n• •\nBunker safety checklist including interface and communications.\nBunker tank gauging.\nAgreed initial bulk transfer and topping off rates.\nDraining/blowing lines and disconnection of hoses.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGF Code\n1 Preamble\nThe current version of this Code includes regulations to meet the functional requirements for natural gas fuel.\nRegulations for other low-flashpoint fuels will be added to this Code as, and when, they are developed by the\nOrganization. In the meantime, for other low-flashpoint fuels, compliance with the functional requirements of this\nCode must be demonstrated through alternative design.\n18 Operation\n18.2 Functional requirements\n1.\nthe ship shall be provided with operational procedures including a suitably detailed fuel handling manual,\nsuch that trained personnel can safely operate the fuel bunkering, storage and transfer systems;\n18.4 Regulations for bunkering operations\n18.4.1 Responsibilities\n18.4.1.1 Before any bunkering operation commences, the master of the receiving ship or his representative and the\nrepresentative of the bunkering source (Persons in Charge, PIC) shall:\n1.\n2.\n3.\nagree in writing the transfer procedure, including cooling down and if necessary, gassing up; the maximum\ntransfer rate at all stages and volume to be transferred;\nagree in writing action to be taken in an emergency; and\ncomplete and sign the bunker safety check-list.\n18.4.2 Overview of control, automation and safety systems\n18.4.2.1 The fuel handling manual required by 18.2.3 shall include but is not limited to:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\n6.\n7.\n8.\noverall operation of the ship from dry-dock to dry-dock, including procedures for system cool down and\nwarm up, bunker loading and, where appropriate, discharging, sampling, inerting and gas freeing;\nbunker temperature and pressure control, alarm and safety systems;\nsystem limitations, cool down rates and maximum fuel storage tank temperatures prior to bunkering,\nincluding minimum fuel temperatures, maximum tank pressures, transfer rates, filling limits and sloshing\nlimitations;\noperation of inert gas systems;\nfirefighting and emergency procedures: operation and maintenance of firefighting systems and use of\nextinguishing agents;\nspecific fuel properties and special equipment needed for the safe handling of the particular fuel;\nfixed and portable gas detection operation and maintenance of equipment;\nemergency shutdown and emergency release systems, where fitted; and\n9.\na description of the procedural actions to take in an emergency situation, such as leakage, fire or potential\nfuel stratification resulting in rollover.\n18.4.3 Pre-bunkering verification\n18.4.3.1 Prior to conducting bunkering operations, pre-bunkering verification including, but not limited to the following,\nshall be carried out and documented in the bunker safety checklist:\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4.\n5.\nall communications methods, including ship shore link (SSL), if fitted;\noperation of fixed gas and fire detection equipment;\noperation of portable gas detection equipment;\noperation of remote controlled valves; and\ninspection of hoses and couplings.\n18.4.3.2 Documentation of successful verification shall be indicated by the mutually agreed and executed bunkering\nsafety checklist signed by both PIC's.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunkering procedures and suitable\nbunker safety checklists (e.g., ISO or IAPH) which included:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The preparation of a detailed bunker transfer plan for each operation.\nRoles and responsibilities for personnel involved in the bunkering operation.\nDescription of the bunkering system, including emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency release systems\n(ERS), where fitted.\nHazards when connecting/disconnecting hoses or hard arms.\nPre-bunkering verification of:\no All communication methods, including ship shore link (SSL), if fitted.\no Operation of fixed gas and fire detection equipment.\no Operation of portable gas detection equipment.\no Operation of remote controlled valves.\no Inspection of hoses and couplings.\nProcedures for cooling down and if necessary, gassing up.\nLine draining method and nitrogen purging sequence/arrangements.\nMethod for tank pressure control and boil-off gas (BOG) return if provided.\nProtection arrangement for the ship’s side against possible leaks.\nMaximum tank filling limits, transfer rates and topping off rates.\nManning for deck and control room operations.\nActions to be taken in an emergency.\nRecords to be kept.\nThese procedures may form part of the Fuel Handling Manual required by the IGF Code.\nWhere the vessel uses a low-flashpoint fuel other than LNG, procedures and checklists should comply, as far as\npossible, with the requirements of the IGF Code.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for bunkering operations of LNG (or other lowflashpoint fuel).\nSight, and where necessary review the Fuel Handling Manual required by the IGF Code.\nReview a recent bunker transfer plan and verify that it:\no Identified the personnel involved in the bunkering operation and their designated duties.\no Ensured that personnel involved in the bunkering operation were not assigned conflicting tasks\nduring the bunkering.\nContained all information required by the company procedure.\nHad been signed for understanding by all officers involved in the bunkering operation.\nHad been signed by both the Master and Chief Engineer for approval.\nReview the records of the same bunker operation and verify that:\no Suitable checklists had been used consistently (e.g., ISO or IAPH).\no Checklists were completed before, during and after the bunkering operation to ensure that all\nrequired safety and environmental protection measures were completed.\no The bunker transfer followed the plan as presented.\no Records included sufficient detail, e.g., tank pressures, temperatures and transfer rates of the\ntransfer operation.\no\no\no\n• •\nWhere the vessel was involved in an LNG bunkering operation during the inspection or had been involved in\nan LNG bunkering operation within the previous two months, interview one officer or rating identified in the\nbunkering plan as having a role or responsibility in the bunkering operation, to gauge their familiarity with the\nbunker transfer plan and their role in the bunkering operation.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\nCompany procedures for bunkering operations of LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel).\nFuel Handling Manual required by the IGF Code.\nPlans for recent bunker transfer operations.\nRecords for recent bunker transfer operations, including completed checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures that included:\no The preparation of a detailed bunker transfer plan for each operation.\no Roles and responsibilities of the personnel involved in the bunkering operation.\no Description of the bunkering system, including emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency release\nsystems (ERS), where fitted.\no Hazards when connecting/disconnecting hoses or hard arms.\no Pre-bunkering verification of:\n All communication methods, including ship shore link (SSL), if fitted.\n Operation of fixed gas and fire detection equipment.\n Operation of portable gas detection equipment.\n Operation of remote controlled valves.\n Inspection of hoses and couplings.\no Guidance on cooling down and if necessary, gassing up.\no Line draining method and nitrogen purging sequence/arrangements.\no Method for tank pressure control and boil-off gas (BOG) return if provided.\no Protection arrangement for the ship’s side against possible leaks.\no Maximum tank filling limits, transfer rates and topping off rates.\no Manning for deck and control room operations.\no Actions to be taken in an emergency.\no Records to be kept.\nSuitable LNG (or other low-flashpoint fuel) bunker safety checklists (e.g., ISO or IAPH) were not available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures for bunkering operations of LNG (or\nother low-flashpoint fuel).\nThere was no suitably detailed Fuel Handling Manual available.\nWhen interviewed, a person identified as having a role or responsibility in a bunkering operation was\nunfamiliar with the duties assigned to them within the bunker transfer plan.\nThe reviewed bunker transfer plan did not contain key information required by the company procedure.\nThe bunker transfer plan did not identify the personnel, and their assigned roles, required to be involved in\nthe bunkering operation.\nThe reviewed bunker transfer plan was not signed by all officers involved and/or was not approved by the\nMaster and Chief Engineer.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThe reviewed bunker transfer records indicated that the bunker transfer plan was not followed.\nThe reviewed bunkering records were insufficiently detailed to permit the reconstruction of the bunkering\noperation for comparison with the bunker transfer plan.\nChecklists required to be completed before, during and/or after the bunkering operation had not been\ncompleted.\nMixed checklists (ISO/IAPH) had been completed at different stages of the operation.\nBunker transfer plans did not include calculations of temperature, volume and vapour pressure of the LNG\n(or other low-flash point fuel) to be transferred and/or the tank to be loaded.\nThe bunkering safety checklist had not been signed by both PICs.\nThe bunker transfer plan did not identify conditions under which bunkering should be stopped, and the\nconditions to be met before the bunkering operation could be restarted.\nA pre-bunkering verification, prior to conducting bunkering operations, had not been carried out and\ndocumented in the bunker safety checklist.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.6.4.", "t": "Were the safety measures at the bunkering control station and bunkering", "c": "manifold area in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nLNG fuel bunkering control station and manifold.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck, Aft Mooring Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: IGF Code\nIACS: Rec 142. LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\nObjective\nTo ensure safety measures at the bunker control station and in the bunker manifold area are in satisfactory\ncondition.\nIndustry Guidance\nIACS: Rec 142. LNG Bunkering Guidelines (2016)\n1.5.6 Protection of the hull plate, shell side and ship structure\nProtection from cryogenic brittle fracture of the receiving ship deck and structure caused by leakage of LNG should\nbe fitted as per IGF code requirements. When appropriate one or more of the following protective measures may be\nutilised:\n• •\n• A water curtain may be installed to protect the ship’s hull.\nA cover of suitable material grade to withstand LNG temperatures may be installed underneath the transfer\nhose to protect deck plating.\nA drip tray of suitable material grade to withstand LNG temperatures may be fitted below the pipe coupling\nto collect LNG spill.\n5.4 Leakage detection\nCCTV is recommended to observe the bunkering operation from the bridge or operation control room. The CCTV\nshould provide images of the bunker connection and also, if possible, the bunker hose, such that movement of the\ntransfer system during bunkering is visible. CCTV is particularly recommended for enclosed bunker stations. Where\nCCTV is not provided, a permanent watch should be maintained from a safe location.\nTMSA KPI 6.2.5 requires that comprehensive procedures cover all aspects of bunkering operations for each vessel\ntype within the fleet.\nOperational procedures address:\n• •\n• •\n• •\nPre-arrival checks.\nPipeline/hose connection including supervision of third-party personnel.\nBunker safety checklist including interface and communications.\nBunker tank gauging.\nAgreed initial bulk transfer and topping off rates.\nDraining/blowing lines and disconnection of hoses.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: IGF Code\n5.10 Regulations for drip trays\n5.10.1 Drip trays shall be fitted where leakage may occur which can cause damage to the ship structure or where\nlimitation of the area which is affected from a spill is necessary.\n5.10.2 Drip trays shall be made of suitable material.\n5.10.3 The drip tray shall be thermally insulated from the ship's structure so that the surrounding hull or deck\nstructures are not exposed to unacceptable cooling, in case of leakage of liquid fuel.\n5.10.4 Each tray shall be fitted with a drain valve to enable rainwater to be drained over the ship's side.\n5.10.5 Each tray shall have a sufficient capacity to ensure that the maximum amount of spill according to the risk\nassessment can be handled.\n8.5.3 A manually operated stop valve and a remote operated shutdown valve in series, or a combined manually\noperated and remote valve shall be fitted in every bunkering line close to the connecting point. It shall be possible to\noperate the remote valve in the control location for bunkering operations and/or from another safe location.\n11.5.7 Remote start of pumps supplying the water spray system and remote operation of any normally closed valves\nto the system shall be located in a readily accessible position which is not likely to be inaccessible in case of fire in\nthe areas protected.\n15.5 Regulations for bunkering control\n15.5.1 Control of the bunkering shall be possible from a safe location remote from the bunkering station. At this\nlocation the tank pressure, tank temperature if required by 15.4.11, and tank level shall be monitored. Remotely\ncontrolled valves required by 8.5.3 and 11.5.7 shall be capable of being operated from this location. Overfill alarm\nand automatic shutdown shall also be indicated at this location.\n15.5.2 If the ventilation in the ducting enclosing the bunkering lines stops, an audible and visual alarm shall be\nprovided at the bunkering control location, see also 15.8.\n15.5.3 If gas is detected in the ducting around the bunkering lines an audible and visual alarm and emergency\nshutdown shall be provided at the bunkering control location.\n18.4.6.1 Warning signs shall be posted at the access points to the bunkering area listing fire safety precautions\nduring fuel transfer.\n18.4.6.2 During the transfer operation, personnel in the bunkering manifold area shall be limited to essential staff\nonly. All staff engaged in duties or working in the vicinity of the operations shall wear appropriate personal protective\nequipment (PPE). A failure to maintain the required conditions for transfer shall be cause to stop operations and\ntransfer shall not be resumed until all required conditions are met.\nInspection Guidance\nAt the bunkering control location, which should be in a safe area, the following controls and instrumentation should be\navailable and operational:\n• •\n• •\n• Controls for the remote operated shutdown valve at the manifold.\nControls for the remote operated valves in the water spray system.\nIndicators for fuel tank pressure, temperature and tank level.\nOverfill and automatic shutdown alarm.\nAudible and visual alarms for ventilation failure and gas detection in the ducting around the bunker lines.\nIf CCTV of the bunkering manifold area is fitted, it should be operational. If it is not fitted, a manifold watch should be\nmaintained from a safe location during bunkering operations.\nAt the bunkering manifold area, suitable protection against cryogenic brittle fracture of the ship’s deck or structure\nshould be provided such as a:\n• •\n• Water curtain to protect the ship’s hull.\nThermal blanket or cover to protect deck plating.\nDrip tray of suitable size and material that is thermally insulated from the ship’s structure and fitted with a\ndrain valve.\nThe bunker manifold area should be visibly restricted to essential personnel only, and fire safety warning signs should\nalso be posted at the access points. All personnel in the vicinity of the bunkering operations should wear appropriate\nPPE taking into account the cryogenic hazards.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nInspect the bunkering manifold area.\nInspect the bunkering control location and as far as is safe and practicable, verify the controls,\ninstrumentation and alarms located there are operational.\nExpected Evidence\nNone\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• The bunkering control location was not in a safe area.\nThe bunkering control location was not equipped with one or more of the following, or one or more of the\ncontrols or instruments was not operational:\no Controls for the remote operated shutdown valve at the manifold.\no Controls for the remote operated valves in the water spray system.\no Indicators for fuel tank pressure, temperature and tank level.\no Overfill and automatic shutdown alarm.\no Audible and visual alarms for ventilation failure and gas detection in the ducting around the bunker\nlines.\nCCTV of the bunkering manifold area was fitted but not operational or in use.\nAt the bunkering manifold area, there was no suitable protection against cryogenic brittle fracture of the\nship’s deck or structure.\nThermally insulated drip tray(s) were not fitted where fuel leakage may reasonably be expected, e.g., at the\nmanifold connection.\nThe water curtain protecting the ship’s hull was not operational or was not being utilised during bunkering\noperations.\nThe bunkering manifold area was not visibly restricted to essential personnel only.\nThere were no fire safety signs at the access points to the bunkering manifold area.\nPersonnel working or on duty at the bunkering manifold area were not wearing suitable PPE.\n10.7. Fire Protection Measures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.7.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the location, purpose, testing and", "c": "operation of the vessel’s remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves, emergency fuel and\nlube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing valves, and were the systems in good\nworking order?\nShort Question Text\nRemote controls for fuel and lube oil system valves\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room, Emergency Headquarters.\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\nObjective\nTo ensure that crewmembers can respond effectively to a fire situation in accordance with the shipboard\nemergency plan.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1432 Revised guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances.\n2 Operational readiness\nAll fire protection systems and appliances should at all times be in good order and readily available for immediate use\nwhile the ship is in service. If a fire protection system is undergoing maintenance, testing or repair, then suitable\narrangements should be made to ensure safety is not diminished through the provision of alternate fixed or portable\nfire protection equipment or other measures. The onboard maintenance plan should include provisions for this\npurpose.\n3 Maintenance and testing\n3.1 Onboard maintenance and inspections should be carried out in accordance with the ship's maintenance plan,\nwhich should include the minimum elements listed in sections 4 to 10 of these Guidelines.\n3.2 Certain maintenance procedures and inspections may be performed by competent crew members who have\ncompleted an advanced fire-fighting training course, while others should be performed by persons specially trained in\nthe maintenance of such systems. The onboard maintenance plan should indicate which parts of the recommended\ninspections and maintenance are to be completed by trained personnel.\n3.3 Inspections should be carried out by the crew to ensure that the indicated weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual, twoyear, five-year and ten-year actions are taken for the specified equipment, if provided. Records of the inspections\nshould be carried on board the ship or may be computer-based. In cases where the inspections and maintenance are\ncarried out by trained service technicians other than the ship's crew, inspection reports should be provided at the\ncompletion of the testing.\n3.4 In addition to the onboard maintenance and inspections stated in these Guidelines, manufacturer's maintenance\nand inspection guidelines should be followed.\n3.5 Where particular arrangements create practical difficulties, alternative testing and maintenance procedures\nshould be to the satisfaction of the Administration.\nTMSA KPI 3.1.4 requires that formal familiarisation procedures are in place for vessel personnel, including\ncontractors. The documented procedures may include familiarisation with:\n• Vessel specific operations and equipment.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new\nassignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarisation with their duties.\nInstructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.\nIMO: SOLAS\nRemote controls for fuel and lube oil valves\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n2.2.3.4 Oil fuel pipes, which, if damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank\nhaving a capacity of 500 l and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on\nthe tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in\nthe space in which such tanks are situated. In the special case of deep tanks situated in any shaft or pipe tunnel or\nsimilar space, valves on the tank shall be fitted, but control in the event of fire may be effected by means of an\nadditional valve on the pipe or pipes outside the tunnel or similar space. If such an additional valve is fitted in the\nmachinery space it shall be operated from a position outside this space. The controls for remote operation of the\nvalve for the emergency generator fuel tank shall be in a separate location from the controls for remote operation of\nother valves for tanks located in machinery spaces.\nEmergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs\nChapter II-2 Regulation 5\n2.2.3 Means of control shall be provided for stopping forced and induced draught fans, oil fuel transfer pumps, oil fuel\nunit pumps, lubricating oil service pumps, thermal oil circulating pumps and oil separators (purifiers). However,\nparagraphs 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 need not apply to oily water separators.\n2.2.4 The controls required in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 and in regulation 4.2.2.3.4 shall be located outside the space\nconcerned so they will not be cut off in the event of fire in the space they serve.\nChapter II-2 Regulation 14\n2.2 Maintenance, testing and inspections\n2.2.1 Maintenance, testing and inspections shall be carried out based on the guidelines developed by the\nOrganization, (Refer to the Revised Guidelines for the maintenance and inspection of fire protection systems and\nappliances (MSC/Circ.1432)) and in a manner having due regard to ensuring the reliability of fire-fighting systems and\nappliances.\n2.2.2 The maintenance plan shall be kept on board the ship and shall be available for inspection whenever required\nby the Administration.\n2.2.3 The maintenance plan shall include at least the following fire protection systems and firefighting systems and\nappliances, where installed:\n.6 emergency shut down of fuel supply.\n2.2.4 The maintenance programme may be computer-based.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures which defined the frequency and method of inspection,\ntesting and maintenance of:\n• •\nThe remote controls for fuel and lube oil quick closing valves.\nThe emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for the inspection, testing and maintenance of\nthe remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank\nquick closing valves.\nInspect the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs as\nshown on the vessel’s fire control plan and ensure they are:\no In good order.\no Not obstructed.\no Clearly marked and identified with the equipment they control.\nInspect the oil tank quick closing valves and ensure they are:\no In good order.\no Properly armed.\no Not secured open by external means.\nWhere necessary review the inspection, testing and maintenance records for:\no The fuel and lube oil quick closing valves including their remote-control systems.\no The emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-off.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the location, purpose and operation of the\nremote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs, and oil tank\nquick closing valves.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures for the inspection, testing and maintenance of the remote controls for fuel and\nlube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing valves.\nThe vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nThe records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the remote controls for fuel and lube oil\nvalves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing valves.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• There was no company procedure for the inspection, testing and maintenance of the remote controls for fuel\nand lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs and oil tank quick closing valves.\nThe remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs were not\nclearly marked and identified.\nThe access to remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs\nwas obstructed.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Quick closing valve(s) were not properly armed.\nQuick closing valve(s) were secured open by external means.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with:\no The purpose, location and operation of the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and\nemergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs.\no The purpose, location and operation of the oil tank quick closing valves.\nThe maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances did\nnot include the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs,\nand quick closing valves or all the required inspections, tests and maintenance.\nThere was no maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and\nappliances available.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the maintenance plan for the vessel’s fire protection systems\nand fire-fighting systems and appliances.\nRecords of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out were incomplete.\nInspection of the remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs,\nand quick closing valves indicated that actions recorded in the plan had not in fact taken place.\nThe remote controls for fuel and lube oil valves and emergency fuel and lube oil pump shut-offs, or quick\nclosing valves were defective in any way.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.7.2.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the measures to prevent fire in the", "c": "machinery spaces caused by flammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface and, were the\nprotective measures provided regularly inspected and properly maintained?\nShort Question Text\nFire prevention in machinery spaces - hot surfaces and oil spray\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room\nPublications\nIMO SOLAS\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIACS: Recommendation No.18. Fire Prevention in Machinery Spaces of Ships in Service – Guidance to Owners.\nObjective\nTo ensure fire prevention measures relating to hot surfaces and flammable liquids in the machinery space\nare understood and properly maintained.\nIndustry Guidance\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ.1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms\nPart 2 Chapter 2 Piping system\n2 Flexible pipes, hoses and hose assemblies\n2.5.1 Hose assemblies should be inspected frequently and maintained in good order or replaced when there is\nevidence of distress likely to lead to failure. Any of the following conditions may require replacement of the hose\nassembly:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• leaks at fitting or in flexible hose.\ndamaged, cut or abraded cover.\nkinked, crushed, flattened or twisted flexible hose.\nhard, stiff, heat cracked or charred flexible hose.\nblistered, soft, degraded or loose cover.\ncracked, damaged or badly corroded fittings; and\nfitting slippage on flexible hose.\n5 Insulation materials\n5.3 Inspection and maintenance\nA regular check of equipment should be made to confirm that the insulation is in place. When maintenance or repair\nof equipment has been carried out, checks should be made to ensure that the insulation covering the high\ntemperature or hot surfaces has been properly reinstalled or replaced; surface temperature should be measured if\nconsidered necessary.\n7 Pipe fittings\n7.2 Installation\nPipe fittings, including flanged connections should be carefully tightened without exceeding permissible torque. If\nnecessary, suitable spray shields or sealing tape should be used around flange joints and screwed pipe fittings to\nprevent oil spraying onto hot surfaces in the event of a leakage.\nPart 3 Chapter 1 Control of flammable oils\n2 Spray shields for joints of pressurized flammable oil piping systems\n2.1 Application\nSpray shields should be fitted around flanged joints, flanged bonnets and any other flanged or threaded connections\nof oil fuel and lubricating oil systems having an internal pressure exceeding 0.18 N/mm2 which have the possibility of\nbeing in contact with potential ignition sources by direct spray or by reflection. The purpose of spray shields is to\nprevent the impingement of sprayed flammable oils onto a high temperature surface or other source of ignition.\n2.2 Design and installation\n2.2.1 Many types of spray shields are possible to avoid spray at flanged connections. For example, the following may\nbe treated as spray shield:\n• •\n• thermal insulation having sufficient thickness\nanti-splashing tape made of approved materials\nan anti-spray cover wrapped around the side of flange\n2.3 Inspection and maintenance\nSpray shields should be inspected regularly for their integrity and any which have been removed for maintenance\npurposes should be refitted on completion of the task according to the manufacturer’s instructions\n3 Jacketed high-pressure fuel lines of internal combustion engines\n3.1 Application\n3.1.1 All external high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors are\nrequired to be protected with a jacketed piping system capable of containing fuel from a high-pressure line failure.\n3.4 Inspection and maintenance\nRegardless of the system selected, little additional maintenance or periodic inspection is required to keep the\njacketed fuel lines in proper working order. However, jacketed pipes should be inspected regularly and any drainage\narrangement which may have been disconnected for maintenance purposes should be refitted on completion of the\ntask.\nPart 3 Chapter 2 Control Of Ignition Source\n1 Insulation of hot surfaces and high temperature surfaces\n1.2 Inspection and maintenance\n1.2.1 A regular check of equipment or material should be made to confirm that the insulation is correctly installed.\nWhen maintenance or repair to equipment has been carried out, checks should be made to ensure that the insulation\ncovering the heated surfaces has been properly reinstalled or replaced. Special attention should be paid to the\nfollowing:\n• •\n• insulation areas where vibration may be present.\ndiscontinuous part of exhaust gas piping and turbo charger; and\nother suspect parts.\nIACS: Recommendation No.18 (Rev.2). Fire Prevention in Machinery Spaces of Ships in Service – Guidance\nto Owners.\n1.1 Based in past experience it is known that the combination of combustible materials and sources of ignition are the\nmain causes of machinery space fires. The combustible material involved in the majority of cases oil, i.e. fuel oil,\nlubricating oil, thermal oil or hydraulic oil…\n1.2 There is a large variety of potential ignition sources and the most common are hot surfaces, e.g. exhaust pipes\nand steam pipes, overheating of machinery or ignition from electrical installations due to short circuiting or sparks\ncaused by operation of switchgear…\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s maintenance strategy. The company identifies all equipment and machinery\nrequired to be included in the planned maintenance system, for example:\n• Engine machinery.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the\nprovisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the\nCompany.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-2 Regulation 4\n2.2.5.2 External high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors shall be\nprotected with a jacketed piping system capable of containing fuel from a high-pressure line failure. A jacketed pipe\nincorporates an outer pipe into which the high-pressure fuel pipe is placed, forming a permanent assembly. The\njacketed piping system shall include a means for collection of leakages and arrangements and shall be provided with\nan alarm in case of a fuel line failure.\n2.2.5.3 Oil fuel lines shall not be located immediately above or near units of high temperature including boilers, steam\npipelines, exhaust manifolds, silencers or other equipment required to be insulated by paragraph 2.2.6. As far as\npracticable, oil fuel lines shall be arranged far apart from hot surfaces, electrical installations or other sources of\nignition and shall be screened or otherwise suitably protected to avoid oil spray or oil leakage onto the sources of\nignition. The number of joints in such piping systems shall be kept to a minimum.\n2.2.6.1 Surfaces with temperatures above 220 degrees C which may be impinged as a result of a fuel system failure\nshall be properly insulated.\n2.2.6.2 Precautions shall be taken to prevent any oil that may escape under pressure from any pump, filter or heater\nfrom coming into contact with heated surfaces.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures that set out the actions to be taken to ensure the integrity of\nmeasures in place to prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface.\nThe procedures should require that periodic inspections of the machinery space take place to verify fire prevention\nmeasures remain properly fitted or applied. The inspections should be included in the planned maintenance system\nas a distinct task or tasks.\nAn appropriate ship-specific checklist should have been developed to facilitate the inspection of the fire prevention\nmeasures in all machinery spaces.\nThe procedure may also include the identification of risk areas and the detection of “hot-spots” using laser-based\ninfrared heat tracers or thermographic imaging.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures that set out the actions to be taken to ensure\nthe integrity of the measures in place to prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid\nspraying onto a hot surface.\nWhere necessary review the records of periodic inspections of the fire prevention measures in the\nmachinery spaces including associated checklists.\nDuring the inspection of the machinery spaces, check that:\no There was no evidence of leakage from the fuel or lube oil piping systems within the machinery\nspace.\no The outer protective skin of fuel oil pump discharge lines were free from damage or deterioration.\no Flexible fuel hoses were free from damage or deterioration.\no Any drainage arrangement for jacketed fuel lines which may have been disconnected for\nmaintenance purposes had been refitted on completion of the task.\no Spray shields were fitted around flanged joints, flanged bonnets and any other threaded\nconnections in fuel oil piping systems under high pressure which were located above or near units\nof high temperature and that these were in good order.\no The insulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines and exhaust\nmanifolds was adequate and had been properly reinstalled or replaced after maintenance or repair\nof machinery and their associated systems.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their understanding of:\no Which protective measures were required to be fitted, and to which systems, to provide effective\nfire protection in the machinery spaces.\no How and when the checks of the protective measures were required to be conducted.\nRequest the accompanying officer to demonstrate the correct functioning of one dedicated engine fuel oil\nsystem leakage alarm.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The company procedures that set out the actions to be taken to ensure the integrity of measures in place to\nprevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface.\nThe records of periodic inspections of the fire prevention measures relating to hot surfaces and flammable\nliquids in the machinery spaces.\nThe ship-specific checklist to facilitate the inspection of the fire prevention measures, which included the\nmeasures relating to hot surfaces and flammable liquids, in the machinery spaces.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\nThere was no company procedure that set out the actions to be taken to ensure the integrity of the\nmeasures in place to prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a flammable liquid spraying onto a\nhot surface.\nThe records of periodic inspections verifying that fire prevention measures in the machinery spaces relating\nto hot surfaces and flammable liquids were missing or incomplete.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• There was no ship-specific checklist to facilitate the inspection of the fire prevention measures, which\nincluded the measures relating to hot surfaces and flammable liquids in the machinery spaces.\nThe accompanying officer was unfamiliar with the company procedures that set out the actions to take to\nensure the integrity of the measures in place to prevent fires in the machinery spaces caused by a\nflammable liquid spraying onto a hot surface.\nThe accompanying office was unfamiliar with the fire prevention measures required to be fitted in the\nmachinery spaces.\nThere was ongoing leakage from the fuel or lube oil piping systems within the machinery space.\nThe outer protective skin of a fuel pump discharge line was visibly damaged or in poor condition.\nA flexible fuel hose was visibly damaged or in poor condition.\nThe drainage arrangement for jacketed fuel lines was found to be disconnected.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate the correct functioning of a dedicated engine fuel oil\nsystem leakage alarm.\nA dedicated engine fuel oil system leakage alarm was not functioning correctly.\nA spray shield was missing or was in poor condition around a flanged joint, flanged bonnet or any other\nthreaded connection in fuel oil piping systems under high pressure which were located above or near units\nof high temperature.\nMain or auxiliary engine indicator cocks were not capped with their insulated covers fitted while the engine\nwas running.\nInsulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines and exhaust manifolds was\nmissing or improperly installed.\nInsulation covering high temperature or hot surfaces, such as steam pipelines and exhaust manifolds was\ndamaged or soaked in oil.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.7.3.", "t": "Were the main engine crankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature", "c": "monitors or equivalent devices and associated alarms in good order?\nShort Question Text\nMain engine crank case monitoring.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO SOLAS\nIACS Unified Requirements M67 Type Testing Procedure for Crankcase Oil Mist Detection and Alarm Equipment\nObjective\nTo ensure the monitoring arrangements to warn of potential crankcase explosion are always effective.\nIndustry Guidance\nICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide. First Edition.\nEmergency checklists\nC6 – Oil Mist in Crankcase\nIACS: Unified Requirements M67 Type Testing Procedure for Crankcase Oil Mist Detection and Alarm\nEquipment\n6.3 The oil mist detector monitoring arrangements are to be capable of detecting oil mist in air concentrations of\nbetween:\n(a) 0 and 10% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) or\n(b) between 0 and a percentage of weight of oil in air determined by the Manufacturer based on the sensor\nmeasurement method (e.g. obscuration or light scattering) that is acceptable to the Society taking into account the\nalarm level specified in 6.4.\nNote: The LEL corresponds to an oil mist concentration of approximately 50mg/l (~4.1% weight of oil in air mixture).\n6.4 The alarm set point for oil mist concentration in air is to provide an alarm at a maximum level corresponding to not\nmore than 5% of the LEL or approximately 2.5mg/l.\nTMSA KPI 4.1.1 requires that each vessel in the fleet is covered by a planned maintenance system and spare parts\ninventory which reflects the company’s strategy.\nThe company identifies all equipment and machinery required to be included in the planned maintenance system, for\nexample:\n• Engine machinery.\nIMO: ISM Code\n8.1 The Company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to\nthem.\nIMO: SOLAS\nChapter II-1 Regulation 47\nFire precautions\n2. Internal combustion engines of 2250 kW and above or having cylinders of more than 300 mm bore shall be\nprovided with crankcase oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, testing and maintenance of the crankcase\noil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices which described:\n• •\n• Alarm set points.\nActions to be taken in the event of an alarm.\nTesting procedures and frequency.\nThese procedures may refer to the vessel’s maintenance plan and/or the manufacturer’s instructions for the\nequipment.\nEquivalent devices to oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature monitors include splash-oil temperature\nmonitors, crankcase pressure monitors, and recirculation arrangements.\nThe vessel operator should have declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire what system, if any, is fitted to\nthe main and/or auxiliary engines to warn of potential crankcase explosions. This information will be inserted in the\ninspection editor and the final report.\nThe question will only be allocated where a crank case monitoring system was fitted and HVPQ 12.1.1 was recorded\nas Motor or Diesel-Electric.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary, review the company procedures for the operation and maintenance of the\ncrankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices.\nWhere necessary, review the records for the testing and servicing of the crankcase oil mist detectors, engine\nbearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices.\nWhere possible, verify that the alarm for oil mist concentration in air is set at a maximum level corresponding\nto not more than 5% of the LEL or approximately 2.5mg/l.\nIf safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer tests the alarm for the oil mist detector or equivalent\ndevice in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures for the operation of the crankcase oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature\nmonitors or equivalent devices.\nManufacturer’s instructions for the operation and maintenance of the oil mist detectors, engine bearing\ntemperature monitors or equivalent devices.\n• •\nRecords for the testing and servicing of the oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or\nequivalent devices.\nWhere oil mist detector(s) were fitted, evidence that the sensors had been calibrated in accordance with the\nmanufacturer’s instructions and at the recommended frequency.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere was no company procedure for the crankcase oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors\nor equivalent devices which described:\no Alarm set points.\no Actions to be taken in the event of an alarm.\no Testing procedures and frequency.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the action to be taken in the event of an alarm from the\ncrankcase oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device.\nThe accompanying officer was unable to demonstrate a test of the oil mist detector or equivalent device\nalarm.\nThe testing and servicing of the oil mist detectors, engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent\ndevices had not been completed in accordance with company procedures.\nThe calibration of the oil mist detector sensors had not been completed in accordance with the\nmanufacturer’s instructions and/or at the recommended frequency.\nThe alarm for the oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device was\ninoperative.\nThe alarm set point for the oil mist detector was set above 5% of the LEL or approximately 2.5mg/l.\nThe oil mist detector, engine bearing temperature monitor or equivalent device was defective in any respect.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "10.7.4.", "t": "Where hydraulic power packs were located within the main engine compartment,", "c": "were fire protection measures provided, and if so, where they in satisfactory condition?\nShort Question Text\nHydraulic power packs fire protection measures.\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nOCIMF: Safety Critical Equipment and Spare Parts Guidance. First Edition.\nISO 16437:2012 Ships and marine technology - Lifesaving and fire protection — Atmospheric oil mist detectors for\nships\nObjective\nTo ensure the machinery space is protected from a fire or explosion resulting from a hydraulic oil mist\ncaused by high pressure leakage.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: Safety Critical Equipment and Spare Parts Guidance. First Edition.\n3.2 Safety critical equipment\nSafety critical equipment is an individual piece of equipment, a control system or an individual protection device which\nin the event of a single point failure may:\n• •\nResult in a hazardous situation which could lead to an accident, or\nDirectly cause an accident that results in harm to people or the environment.\nAt the highest level, the company may consider loss of key vessel safety critical functions, which may include (but are\nnot limited to) the following:\n• Gas detection, oil mist detection, temperature monitoring.\nISO 16437:2012 Ships and marine technology - Lifesaving and fire protection — Atmospheric oil mist\ndetectors for ships\n1.1 This International Standard specifies requirements, test methods and performance criteria for resettable oil mist\ndetectors for use in fire hazard alarm systems installed on marine vessels. Oil mist detectors may be installed where\nan identified risk of fire caused by ignition of flammable liquids, such as hydraulic, fuel and lubricating oil systems,\nexists.\n1.2 This International Standard specifies requirements for the following detectors:\n• •\n• point type detectors employing a point aspirating sampling device or relying on dispersion of oil mist;\naspirating detectors, whereby the sampling point is separated from the sensing unit(s) and uses a pipe\nnetwork for carrying the sampling air to the sensing unit(s);\nopen path or beam type detectors, whereby the concept of the point detector is expanded to a sampling path\nwhich can be 20m or more, as opposed to a few centimetres in the point type detector.\nTMSA KPI 4A.1.4 requires that procedures are in place to record the testing of critical equipment and systems that\nare not in continuous use. Testing is performed in accordance with mandatory requirements and manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIMO: ISM Code\n10.3 The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may\nresult in hazardous situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of\nsuch equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of standby arrangements and\nequipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.\nIMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1321 Guidelines for measures to prevent fires in engine-rooms and cargo pump-rooms.\nPart 3 Chapter 5 Equipment installation\n5 Hydraulic power packs\n5.1.1 Hydraulic power packs of more than 50 kW with a working pressure more than 100 bar should be installed in\nspecially dedicated spaces, with a separate ventilation system.\nInspection Guidance\nIn vessels fitted with deep-well pumps driven by hydraulic power packs, pressure in the transmission pipes can be\nvery high with the attendant risk of a flammable oil mist developing in the event of a leak.\nWhere the power packs are located within the main machinery space, but not in a specially dedicated space, it is\nadvisable that an oil mist detector be fitted. The oil mist detector should be regularly tested in accordance with\nmanufacturers’ recommendations.\nWhere the power packs are fitted in the main machinery space, and in a specially dedicated space, this is intended to\nprevent hydraulic oil mist or vapours from reaching an ignition source in an adjacent compartment, and therefore:\n• •\n• •\nThe space should have a separate ventilation system.\nDoors should be self-closing and kept closed when the power packs are in operation.\nAny wire runs, kick-pipes, or other passes through a bulkhead to the space should be sealed with a fireretardant putty or similar material.\nHowever, doors, hatches, wire runs etc. do not need to be watertight.\nSome hydraulic power units are designed to encapsulate the aggregate pumps and high pressure piping. A save-all\nand level alarm are provided to warn of hydraulic oil leakage within the encapsulation. This design prevents hydraulic\nmists or vapours from reaching an ignition source.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nDuring the tour of the main machinery space, inspect the hydraulic power packs and their location and:\no If fitted in the main machinery space, determine whether:\n An oil mist detector is fitted, or\n The design encapsulated the pumps and high pressure piping and provided warning of\nleakage by means of a level alarm or other means.\no If fitted in a specially dedicated space, verify that:\n Doors were closed.\n Any wire runs, kick-pipes, or other passes through a bulkhead to the space were sealed.\n The separate ventilations system was in operation.\nIf fitted, and safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer demonstrate the testing of the oil mist\ndetector.\n• •\nIf fitted, and safe to do so, request that the accompanying officer demonstrates the testing of the level alarm\nor other means of leak detection for an encapsulated power pack system.\nIf fitted, review the records of regular testing of the oil mist detector and/or level alarm.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nIf fitted, records of regular testing of the oil mist detector.\nIf fitted, records of regular testing of the level alarm or other means of leak detection.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Hydraulic power packs of more than 50 kW with a working pressure more than 100 bar were not installed in\nspecially dedicated spaces with a separate ventilation system.\nThe hydraulic power packs were located within the main machinery space, not in a specially dedicated\nspace, but there was either:\no No oil mist detector fitted, or\no No encapsulation of the pumps and high pressure piping protected by a leak detection device.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the fire protection measures associated with the hydraulic\npower packs.\nIf fitted, the oil mist detector had not been regularly tested in accordance with manufacturers’\nrecommendations.\nIf fitted, the oil mist detector was defective in any respect.\nIf fitted, the level alarm or other means of leak detection had not been regularly tested in accordance with\nthe manufacturer’s recommendations.\nIf fitted, the level alarm or other means of leak detection was defective in any respect.\nWhere a hydraulic power pack system was of an encapsulated design, parts of the encapsulation had been\nremoved or were damaged.\nWire runs, kick-pipes, or other passes through a bulkhead to the specially dedicated space were not sealed\nwith a fire-retardant putty or similar material.\nA door to the specially dedicated space was left/tied open while the hydraulic power packs were in\noperation.\nThere were leaks from the hydraulic power packs or associated pipework.\n11. General Appearance and Condition – Photograph Comparison\n11.1.1 to 11.1.36: All vessels", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.1.", "t": "Was photograph no.1, bow area from dead ahead, representative of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nBow area from dead ahead\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle\nObjective\nTo ensure that the condition of the vessel is accurately reflected in the SIRE 2.0 vessel inspection report.\nTMSA KPI 12.1.2 requires that an inspection plan covers all vessels in the fleet, with at least two inspections of each\nvessel a year.\nThe inspection process provides company management with a comprehensive overview of the condition of the fleet\nat specified intervals.\nInspection Guidance\nTHE GUIDANCE BELOW APPLIES TO ALL CHAPTER 11 PHOTOGRAPH COMPARISON QUESTIONS.\nThe vessel operator should have developed an inspection programme which provides shore management with an\naccurate understanding of a managed vessel’s cosmetic and physical condition at least twice a year.\nThe vessel operator should have uploaded a standard set of photographs, as specified by the SIRE 2.0 programme\nfor the ship type, at the time of requesting an inspection.\nPhotographs will remain in the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database for twelve months or until they are superseded by a more\nrecent photograph.\nIt is recommended that photographs are refreshed at approximately six months intervals, but operators may leave\nolder photographs on the database for continued use in further inspections.\nBy uploading photographs to the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database, the vessel operator is warranting that the images were\nrepresentative of the true condition of the ship at the date the photographs were taken.\nBy leaving a photograph older than six months on the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database for review during an inspection, the\nvessel operator is warranting that the photograph remained representative of the true condition of the ship at the time\nof requesting an inspection.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nDuring the physical inspection of the vessel, review the photograph provided by the vessel operator for the\nlocation specified and verify that it represented the condition as seen.\nIn the case of more general views of the ship, the inspector should not restrict the review of the ship's\ncondition to exactly what is shown in the photograph but consider the photograph to represent the average\ncondition for all similar areas. Photographs that selectively show recently upgraded areas are not to be\nconsidered as representative.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nThe appropriate photograph will be inserted in the inspection editor for review.\nWhere no photograph was uploaded to the OCIMF SIRE 2.0 database the question will be automatically\nentered as Not Seen in the final report\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• The photograph uploaded for a specified location did not represent the actual condition of the vessel as it\nexisted at the time of the inspection.\n• Where the photograph uploaded for a specified location was representative of the actual condition of the\nvessel as it existed at the time of the inspection, but the condition of an item pictured was considered to\nwarrant further review by the user of the report:\no Select photo representative - item to be highlighted.\no Add additional photographs as considered necessary.\no Add a comment to identify the areas that are considered to merit further review.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.2.", "t": "Was photograph no.2, hull forward end starboard side, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nHull forward end starboard side\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.3.", "t": "Was photograph no.3, hull forward end port side representative, of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nHull forward end port side\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.4.", "t": "Was photograph no.4, hull aft end starboard side, representative of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nHull aft end starboard side\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.5.", "t": "Was photograph no.5, hull aft end port side, representative of the condition as", "c": "seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nHull aft end port side\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.6.", "t": "Was photograph no.6, transom from right astern, representative of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nTransom from right astern\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.7.", "t": "Was photograph no.7, forecastle port side looking towards fairleads,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nForecastle port side looking towards fairleads\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.8.", "t": "Was photograph no.8, forecastle starboard side looking towards fairleads,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nForecastle starboard side looking towards fairleads\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle\nPublications", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.9.", "t": "Was photograph no.9, port or starboard windlass, representative of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nPort or starboard windlass\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nForecastle", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.10.", "t": "Was photograph no.10, forward main deck showing condition of deck (and", "c": "external framing), representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the\ninspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nForward main deck showing condition of deck (and external framing)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.11.", "t": "Was photograph no.11, Forward main deck showing condition of piperack,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nForward main deck showing condition of Piperack\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.12.", "t": "Was photograph no.12, one mooring winch including the brake setting", "c": "arrangement, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the\ninspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nOne mooring winch including the brake setting arrangement\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMooring Decks", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.13.", "t": "Was photograph no.13, one hose crane with an overall view, representative of", "c": "the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any\nareas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nOne hose crane with an overall view\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.14.", "t": "Was photograph no.14, one hose crane hoisting winch, stowed wire and limit", "c": "switches, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection\nand, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nOne hose crane hoisting winch, stowed wire and limit switches\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.15.", "t": "Was photograph no.15, starboard manifold looking from aft to forward,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nStarboard manifold looking from aft to forward\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Manifold", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.16.", "t": "Was photograph no.16, starboard manifold looking forward to aft representative", "c": "of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of\nany areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nStarboard manifold looking forward to aft\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Manifold", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.17.", "t": "Was photograph no.17, aft main deck showing condition of deck (and external", "c": "framing), representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection\nand, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nAft main deck showing condition of deck (and external framing)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.18.", "t": "Was photograph no.18, aft main deck showing condition of Piperack,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nAft main deck showing condition of Piperack\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.19.", "t": "Was photograph no.19, poop deck looking from midships to starboard including", "c": "fairleads, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection\nand, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nPoop deck looking from midships to starboard including fairleads\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.20.", "t": "Was photograph no.20, aft emergency towing equipment storage arrangement,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nAft emergency towing equipment storage arrangement\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.21.", "t": "Was photograph no.21, aft emergency towing equipment deployment system,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nAft emergency towing equipment deployment system\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nAft Mooring Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.22.", "t": "Was photograph no.22, lifeboat and davit, representative of the condition as", "c": "seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nLifeboat and davit\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nLifeboat deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.23.", "t": "Was photograph no.23, the emergency generator or accumulator batteries,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nThe emergency generator or accumulator batteries\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nExterior Decks", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.24.", "t": "Was photograph no.24, engine room general view showing top of main engine,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nEngine room general view showing top of main engine\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.25.", "t": "Was photograph no.25, one generator engine, representative of the condition as", "c": "seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nOne generator engine\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.26.", "t": "Was photograph no.26, the oil filtering equipment, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nThe oil filtering equipment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.27.", "t": "Was photograph no.27, the incinerator, representative of the condition as seen", "c": "onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nThe incinerator\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.28.", "t": "Was photograph no.28, one boiler from the front, representative of the condition", "c": "as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nOne boiler from the front\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.29.", "t": "Was photograph no.29, one boiler from the top showing control equipment,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nOne boiler from the top showing control equipment\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.30.", "t": "Was photograph no.30, purifier room general view, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nPurifier room general view\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.31.", "t": "Was photograph no.31, main engine side showing local control station,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nMain engine side showing local control station\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.32.", "t": "Was photograph no.32, steering gear room general view showing access,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nSteering gear room general view showing access\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nSteering Gear", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.33.", "t": "Was photograph no.33, main steering gear, representative of the condition as", "c": "seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for\nconcern?\nShort Question Text\nMain steering gear\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nSteering Gear\n11.1.40 to 11.1.42: Addition for Crude / Product / Chemical / Shuttle / OBO", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.40.", "t": "Was photograph no.40, IG system pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device,", "c": "representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so,\nwas it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nIG system pressure/vacuum-breaking (P/V) device\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.41.", "t": "Was photograph no.41, IG system first non-return device (deck seal or double", "c": "block and bleed arrangement), representative of the condition as seen onboard at the\ntime of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nIG system first non-return device (deck seal or double block and bleed arrangement)\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.42.", "t": "Was photograph no.42, one main cargo pump and, if in pump room, including", "c": "bilges, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nOne main cargo pump and, if in pump room, including bilges\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical\nROVIQ Sequence\nPumproom, Main Deck\n11.1.50 to 11.1.52: Additional for LPG Pressurised", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.50.", "t": "Was photograph no.50, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge", "c": "valve, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nA cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.51.", "t": "Was photograph no.51, electric motors for deepwell pumps, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nElectric motors for deepwell pumps\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.52.", "t": "Was photograph no.52, compressor / motor room, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nCompressor / motor room\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck\n11.1.60 to 11.1.62: Additional for LPG Refrigerated", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.60.", "t": "Was photograph no.60, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge", "c": "valve, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nA cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.61.", "t": "Was photograph no.61, electric motors for deepwell pumps, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nElectric motors for deepwell pumps\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.62.", "t": "Was photograph no.62, compressor room internal view, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nCompressor room internal view\nVessel Types\nLPG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCompressor Room\n11.1.70 to 11.1.72: Additional for LNG Membrane Type", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.70.", "t": "Was photograph no.70, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge", "c": "valve, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nA cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.71.", "t": "Was photograph no.71, a cargo tank vapour dome including cargo system relief", "c": "valves, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nA cargo tank vapour dome including cargo system relief valves\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.72.", "t": "Was photograph no.72, compressor house internal view, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nCompressor house internal view\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCompressor Room\n11.1.80 to 11.1.82: Additional for LNG Moss Type", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.80.", "t": "Was photograph no.80, a cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge", "c": "valve, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and,\nif so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nA cargo tank liquid dome including load and discharge valve\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.81.", "t": "Was photograph no.81, general view of one Moss sphere, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nGeneral view of one moss sphere\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nMain Deck", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.82.", "t": "Was photograph no.82, compressor house internal view, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nCompressor house internal view\nVessel Types\nLNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCompressor Room\n11.1.90 to 11.1.95: Additional for Specialised Bow Loading Shuttle Tanker", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.90.", "t": "Was photograph no.90, bow mooring arrangement from forward looking aft", "c": "showing chain stopper, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of\nthe inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nBow mooring arrangement from forward looking aft showing chain stopper\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.91.", "t": "Was photograph no.91, bow mooring arrangement from aft looking forward", "c": "showing winch, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the\ninspection and, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nBow mooring arrangement from aft looking forward showing winch\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.92.", "t": "Was photograph no.92, general view of hose connection area, representative of", "c": "the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any\nareas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nGeneral view of hose connection area\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.93.", "t": "Was photograph no.93, hose coupling arrangement, representative of the", "c": "condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of any areas\nfor concern?\nShort Question Text\nHose coupling arrangement\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.94.", "t": "Was photograph no.94, general view forward bow thruster room, representative", "c": "of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection and, if so, was it free of\nany areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nGeneral view forward bow thruster room\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "11.1.95.", "t": "Was photograph no.95, forward bow thruster room showing one azimuth", "c": "thruster, representative of the condition as seen onboard at the time of the inspection\nand, if so, was it free of any areas for concern?\nShort Question Text\nForward bow thruster room showing one azimuth thruster\nVessel Types\nOil\nROVIQ Sequence\nBow Loading Area\n12. Ice Operations\n12.1. Ice operations training", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.1.1.", "t": "Where the vessel traded in polar waters, had the Master, Chief Mate and officers in", "c": "charge of a navigational watch undertaken the additional training required by the Polar\nCode?\nShort Question Text\nPolar Code training\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation\nPublications\nIMO: Polar Code\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Development of a Polar Water Operational Manual.\nObjective\nTo ensure that ships operating in polar waters are appropriately manned by adequately qualified, trained and\nexperienced personnel.\nIndustry Guidelines\nOCIMF: Guidelines for the Development of a Polar Water Operational Manual.\nSection 2.1.6 Human Resources Management.\nGuidance: The PWOM should provide guidance for the human resources management, taking into account the\nanticipated ice conditions and requirements for ice navigation, increased levels of watchkeeping, hours of rest, fatigue\nand a process that ensures that these requirements will be met.\nThe following should be considered:\n• Certification, experience and training:\no Provide information and procedures about the certification, training and familiarisation of personnel.\nTMSA KPI 5.3.2 requires that a formal programme ensures that Senior Officers receive appropriate ship-handling\ntraining before promotion to Master or assignment to a new vessel type.\nShip-handling experience is gained by training under supervision on board, as a part of a documented competency\ndevelopment system, and may be supplemented by:\n• Specialist training e.g. navigation in ice.\nIMO: ISM Code\n6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in\nsupport of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.\nIMO: STCW Code\nRegulation V/4\nMandatory minimum requirements for the training and qualification of Masters and deck officers on ships operating in\npolar waters.\n1 Masters, chief mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch on ships operating in polar waters shall hold a\ncertificate in basic training for ships operating in polar waters, as required by the Polar Code.\n3 Masters and chief mates on ships operating in polar waters, shall hold a certificate in advanced training for ships\noperating in polar waters, as required by the Polar Code.\nIMO: Polar Code\nChapter 12 Manning and training.\n12.3.1 In order to meet the functional requirements of paragraph 12.2 above while operating in polar waters, masters,\nchief mates and officers in charge of a navigational watch shall be qualified in accordance with Chapter V of the\nSTCW Convention and the STCW Code, as amended as follows (for tankers):\n• •\n• Ice Free- not applicable.\nOpen waters – Basic training for master, chief mate and officers in charge of a navigational watch.\nOther waters – Advanced training for master and chief mate. Basic training for officers in charge of a\nnavigational watch.\n12.3.2 The administration may allow the use of a person(s) other than the master, chief mate or officers of the\nnavigational watch to satisfy the requirements for training. As required by paragraph 12.3.1, provided that….\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to identify the necessary mandatory and non-mandatory\ntraining required to be completed by each individual onboard before being assigned to a vessel or prior to promotion.\nThe training for navigation officers assigned to a vessel issued with a Polar Code certificate and operating within\nwaters governed by the Polar Code will include;\n• •\nBasic training for officers in charge of a navigational watch.\nAdvanced training for Master and Chief Mate.\nWhere the vessel operator uses a person(s) other than the Master or Chief Mate to fulfil the role of Ice\nNavigator, then the Master and Chief Mate will only be required to have obtained the basic training. Such\narrangements should be described in the procedures.\nThis question will only be generated if the vessel has been issued with a Certificate for Ships Operating in Polar\nWaters as declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• Review the vessel’s Polar Water Operational Manual (IMO Structure) section 2.1.4, Human Resources\nManagement, and identify the bridge manning requirements for ice operations, noting particularly where the\nMaster or Chief Mate may be substituted as Ice Navigator by a person other than the Master or Chief Mate.\nReview the certificates for training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters for the Master, Chief Mate and\nofficers in charge of the navigational watch and verify that each had the appropriate training certificate.\nWhere the Master and/or Chief Mate had been substituted by a person(s) other than the Master and/or Chief\nMate for the role of ice navigator review a copy of the Certificate of Competency and certificate of advanced\ntraining for ships operating in polar waters for the persons engaged as Ice Navigator.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• The vessel’s Polar Water Operational Manual.\nThe training certificates for ships operating in polar waters for the Master, Chief Mate and officers in charge\nof a navigational watch.\nA copy of the certificate of competency and advanced training for the person(s) who had substituted for the\nMaster and/or Chief Mate in the role of ice navigator.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• The Polar Water Operational Manual did not define what additional training the Master, Chief Mate and\nofficers of the navigational watch must have to comply with the company Ice Navigator policy and the\nCertificate for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.\nWhere the Master and/or Chief Mate were not substituted they were not in possession of a certificate of\nAdvanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (unless the vessel was operating in open waters\nonly).\nWhere the Master and/or Chief Mate were not required to have Advanced Training for Ships Operating in\nPolar Waters, due to substitution or exclusively open water operations, the Master and/or Chief Mate did not\nhave a certificate for Basic Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.\nThe officers in charge of a navigational watch were not in possession of a certificate for Basic Training for\nShips Operating in Polar Waters.\nThe person(s) used to substitute for Master and/or Chief Mate in the role of Ice Navigator did not have the\nappropriate certificate of competency and Advanced Training for Ships Operating in Polar Waters.\n12.2. Sub-zero LSA & FFA procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.2.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the", "c": "operability of the life-saving and fire-fighting systems and equipment in sub-zero\ntemperatures, and had these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nLife-saving and fire-fighting systems and equipment in sub-zero temperatures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Exterior Decks, Main Deck\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Polar Code\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nObjective\nTo ensure the continuing operability of life-saving and fire-fighting equipment when operating in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\n5.4 Safety and Life Saving Equipment\nPeriodic inspections of all safety-related systems should be undertaken during the exposure to extreme temperatures\nto ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken.\nAll available space heaters and engine sump heaters and/or heat lamps should be fully utilised. Ships that do not\nregularly trade in such conditions may require additional equipment to be supplied.\nSurvival Craft\nAll life rafts should be rated for safe operation according to the environmental conditions likely to be experienced.\nIce accretion should be regularly removed from the life rafts, cradles, cradle release pins and launching equipment to\nretain their preparedness for launching and inflation.\nSimilar precautions should be taken for lifeboats, rescue boats and their launching appliances. Particular checks\nshould be made to ensure that brake release securing pins are free to be extracted.\nAn ice removal mallet should be readily available in the vicinity of survival craft. Care should be exercised when using\nmallets to avoid permanently damaging any equipment.\nThe overall condition of the gel coat of lifeboats should be inspected for any damage, particularly penetration of the\ngel coat and fibre sub-structure, in good time prior to entering the cold zone. Repairs should be undertaken in a warm\ndry climate to limit water ingress, which, if subjected to freezing, can cause severe damage to the boat’s structure.\nLifeboat Engines\nLifeboat engines should at all times remain available for immediate use and be capable of starting within two minutes\nin the environmental conditions likely to be experienced.\nThe process of starting an extremely cold engine is quite different from normal starting procedures. The correct\nprocedure should be drawn to the attention of all persons likely to be involved in starting the engine in very cold\nconditions to ensure they are familiar with the operation.\nManufacturer’s instructions for the grade of oil to be added to the cold starting pots, if fitted, should be followed. This\noil should be readily available in the lifeboats. It should be borne in mind that in cold conditions the performance of\nthe starting batteries might be diminished.\nIf fitted, heaters in lifeboat engines should be used. Consideration should also be given to fitting trace heating around\nthe doors of enclosed lifeboats to ensure that they do not freeze in the closed position.\nLifeboat Fuel Systems\nAn appropriate grade of diesel or gas oil should be used to prevent waxing in fuel systems leading to lack of engine\nstart and impaired reliability. When replacing the fuel grade, lifeboat fuel tanks and the fuel line contents should be\nchanged out and the engine run on the new fuel to ensure that the system is properly flushed and primed.\nLifeboat Cooling Water Systems\nThe lifeboat cooling system, if of a recirculating self-contained type, should be adequately protected with an antifreeze solution. If the system is not self-contained it should be checked to ensure that no obstructions or\ncontamination prevent the natural drainage of the system.\nLifeboat Water Spray Systems\nThe spray systems, including pumps, on the lifeboats, should be drained of water. In some classes of boat, if the\nspray pump is frozen it will inhibit starting of the lifeboat engine by locking the propeller shaft.\nLifeboat Water Rations\nPrecautions should be taken to avoid the freezing of water rations stowed in lifeboats.\nStern Launched Lifeboats\nIt is not safe to free-fall release a stern launched lifeboat onto ice. It will be necessary to break the ice, either by\njudicial use of the ship’s engines or by other craft. The lifeboat may be winched out and down to rest upon the ice\nsurface.\nRescue Boats with Water Jet Engines\nThe rescue boat should be maintained in a condition that will allow immediate use but will also protect the boat from\nthe extremes of weather.\nSubsidiary LSA Equipment\nImmersion Suits\nCommonly supplied immersion suits have a design operational range in immersed (seawater) temperatures from\nminus 1.9°C up to 35°C. Immersion suits are available that have enhanced insulation properties.\nTPAs (Thermal Protective Aids)\nTPAs should be effective within a temperature range appropriate to the temperatures likely to be encountered.\nLifebuoys\nIt should be ensured that lifebuoys are not iced into position and are free to be removed and used.\nExternal Pyrotechnics\nThe release pins for bridge wing lifebuoys/smoke floats should be well greased to ensure their proper operation.\nEPIRBs\nEPIRBs should be maintained ice-free.\nBreathing Apparatus and Oxygen Therapy Units\nIn sub-zero conditions, the use of compressed air/oxygen breathing, or resuscitation apparatus should be considered\nwith care. The hazards involved include the freezing of the demand valve and exhale valve due to the freezing of\nexhaled vapours from the user leading to premature emptying of the gas bottle or failure of the system. The effect of\nlow temperature (below minus 4°C) on the lungs of the user, can lead in protracted cases to frostbite of the lung\ntissue.\nEye Wash Stations\nEye wash fluid is typically effective in a fluid temperature range of 5°C to 25°C. Below 5°C the effectiveness of the\nfluid may be reduced. At 0°C fluid temperature, it is recommended not to use the fluid except in cases of extreme\nurgency as it may cause damage to the eye. Consideration should be given to temporarily withdrawing exposed\neyewash stations into the accommodation while the vessel is operating in sub-zero conditions.\nHard Hats\nThe safe operating temperature range for hard hats is marked within the hat by the manufacturer. Some hard hats\nare certified for safe operation to minus 40°C and their use should be considered.\n5.5 Fire-Fighting Systems and Equipment\nFire extinguishing systems should be designed or located so that they are not made inaccessible or inoperable by ice\nor snow accumulations or low temperatures.\nEquipment, appliances, systems and extinguishing agents should be protected from freezing and the minimum\ntemperatures anticipated for the voyage.\nPrecautions should be taken to prevent the nozzles, piping and valves of any fire extinguishing system from\nbecoming clogged by impurities, corrosion or ice build-up.\nThe exhaust gas outlets and pressure/vacuum arrangements on gas detection systems should be suitably protected\nfrom ice build-up that could interfere with the system’s effective operation.\nWater or foam extinguishers should not be located in any position that is exposed to freezing temperatures. These\nlocations should be provided with extinguishers capable of operation under such conditions.\nGeneral guidance on typical operating temperatures for portable extinguishers follows. Operators should check the\nactual performance limitations of extinguishers by referencing manufacturer’s data.\nWater, Gas and Low Expansion Foam\nFire extinguishers located in exposed areas are susceptible to freezing. Foam extinguishers will be ineffective and,\nwhen they do thaw out, the foam compound will have been ‘frost damaged’, rendering them useless.\nUnprotected Foam and Water Extinguishers\nUnprotected foam and water extinguishers are rated for safe and effective operation to 1°C. If protected with ethylene\nglycol, this figure may be revised downward to minus 10°C.\nIf an additive is used, it may enable water and foam extinguishers to be operable at temperatures down to minus\n20°C.\nCO2 Extinguishers\nCO2 extinguishers are typically rated for safe and effective operation to minus 20°C. However, if operated at these\ntemperatures extreme caution should be taken to avoid contact with any part of the extinguisher or expelled gas to\navoid low temperature burns.\nDry Powder Extinguishers\nThese types of extinguishers are typically rated for safe operation from minus 30°C to 60°C. The extinguishing\nmedium presents no additional special precautions. However, the propellant, CO2 needs to be treated with caution to\navoid personnel injury through exposure to the cold gas.\nAFFF\nAFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam) extinguishers typically have a nominal safe operational range of temperatures\nbetween 5°C and 60°C.\nFire and Foam Systems Hoses and Nozzles\nMost hoses are typically rated for safe operation at temperatures down to minus 20°C and nozzles to minus 25°C.\nCold weather hoses are available that are rated to minus 40°C and are marked accordingly.\nFire and Foam Lines\nThe fire and foam lines on deck should be well drained and maintained ready for immediate use at all times.\nMonitors, hydrant valves and any other moving parts should be well greased and protected by canvas covers to avoid\nice/snow accumulation that may prevent their immediate operation. Their movement should be regularly checked to\nensure that they remain free.\nThe pipework serving water curtains and spray systems should be checked drained and empty.\nTo avoid any ‘dead-legs’, any items drawing water from the fire main, such as hawse pipe cable washer lines, should\nbe drained, particularly if a re-circulatory fire main line is in use.\nThe storage locations of fixed foam system bulk storage tanks may need heating to ensure that the temperature in\nthese spaces remains above zero. Consideration may have to be given to using temporary space heaters to maintain\nan adequate temperature.\nPortable Foam Equipment\nDrums and canisters of foam for portable branch pipe appliances are subject to the same considerations as portable\nfire extinguishers.\nFire Hose Boxes\nThe catches, locks, dogs and hinges on fire hose boxes should be kept ice-free. Spray nozzles and couplings should\nbe well greased and water free. All hoses should be completely drained of water to avoid damage and to facilitate\ntheir rapid use.\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Polar Code\nAppendix II Model table of contents for the Polar Water Operational manual (PWOM)\n1 – Operational capabilities and limitations\nChapter 2\nOperation in low air temperatures\nSystem design\nGuidance: The PWOM (Polar Water Operational Manual) should list all ship systems susceptible to damage or loss of\nfunctionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that life-saving and fire-fighting systems and\nequipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures. The procedures should list all safety systems susceptible to\ndamage or loss of functionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid\nmalfunction.\nWinterisation checklists should be used to facilitate preparations prior to entering an area of sub-zero temperatures.\nPeriodic inspections of all safety-related systems should be undertaken during the exposure to sub-zero\ntemperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken, which may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Draining fire and foam lines from the lowest point and then closing the drain valve in order to keep the\nsystem ready for operation. The drained condition of the line should be regularly checked by operating the\ndrain valve.\nRemoval of snow and ice accretions from equipment and escape and access routes.\nProtection of lifeboat cooling/water spray systems and drinking water from freezing.\nEnsuring lifeboat engines are supplied with suitable fuel.\nChecking the capacity of lifeboat batteries at low temperatures.\nThe use of space heaters as necessary.\nRelocating fire-extinguishers to avoid freezing.\nOutlining measures to be taken to ensure the operability of eye wash stations and de-contamination\nshowers.\nMaintaining air intakes and fire flaps operable.\nThese procedures may form part of a Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).\nThis question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\nWas assigned an ice class notation.\nWas assigned a winterisation class notation.\nHad been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate.\nThe vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that life-saving and fire-fighting\nsystems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nReview winterisation checklists and records of periodic inspections of safety-related systems during\nexposure to sub-zero temperatures.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to ensure that lifesaving and fire-fighting systems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nIf applicable, during the physical inspection of the vessel confirm the precautions being taken to ensure that\nlife-saving and fire-fighting systems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures to ensure that life-saving and fire-fighting systems and equipment remain operable in\nsub-zero temperatures.\nWinterisation checklists.\nRecords of periodic inspections of safety-related systems during exposure to sub-zero temperatures.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure that life-saving and fire-fighting systems and equipment\nremain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that life-saving and firefighting systems and equipment remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThe accompanying officer could not identify the locations of the drain points for the deck fire and/or foam\nline.\nThere were no winterisation checklists available for use.\nThere were no measures to ensure the operability of eye wash stations and de-contamination showers\nduring freezing temperatures.\nWhere fire and lifesaving systems were provided with insulation and/or heat tracing, either the insulation was\nmissing, or the heat tracing system was not fully functional.\nPeriodic inspections of all safety-related systems had not been undertaken during exposure to sub-zero\ntemperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken.\nLife rafts were not rated for safe operation according to the environmental conditions likely to be\nexperienced.\nExisting damage to a lifeboat hull would allow water ingress which, if subjected to freezing, could cause\nsevere damage to the boat’s structure.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the procedure for starting an extremely cold lifeboat engine.\nThe procedure for starting an extremely cold lifeboat engine was not posted in the lifeboat.\nDuring an inspection taking place when the vessel was prepared for sub-zero temperatures:\no The correct grade of oil to be added to the lifeboat engine cold starting pots was not available in the\nlifeboat.\no The heaters in the lifeboat engines were not being used.\no The doors of an enclosed lifeboat were frozen shut.\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\no\nThe lifeboat engine fuel was not an appropriate grade of diesel or gas oil.\nThe recirculating lifeboat engine cooling system was not protected with an anti-freeze solution.\nThe lifeboat spray system had not been drained.\nPrecautions had not been taken to avoid the drinking water freezing.\nThere was no ice removal mallet readily available in the vicinity of survival craft.\nEye wash stations were inoperable or unavailable.\nWater or foam fire extinguishers were exposed to freezing temperatures.\nWater or foam extinguishers had been removed to prevent freezing and not replaced with suitable\nextinguishers.\nFire and/or foam lines had not been drained from their lowest point.\nDrain valves to fire and/or foam lines had not been closed after draining.\nMonitors and hydrants were not protected by canvas covers to prevent snow/ice accumulation.\nWater curtain and spray systems had not been drained.\nThe temperature in a space containing bulk storage tanks for fixed foam systems and/or drums and\ncanisters of foam for portable branch pipe appliances was below zero.\nAny item of lifesaving or firefighting system or equipment was not operable or ready for immediate\nuse due to freezing, snow accumulation or ice accretion.\nEscape routes and access to fire-fighting and life-saving equipment were obstructed by snow\nand/or ice accumulations\nWhere a lifesaving or firefighting system was provided with a working heating arrangement (e.g. insulation and either\nrecirculation or trace heating), an observation should not be recorded if such a system was not drained down as\nwould be expected if no heating system was provided.\n12.3. Sub-zero machinery operation procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.3.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the", "c": "operability of the engine room machinery and systems in sub-zero temperatures, and\nhad these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nEngine room machinery and systems in sub-zero temperatures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nEngine Room, Engine Control Room\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Polar Code\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nTransport Canada: Mandatory Winter Navigation Information on Sea Water Cooling Types. December 2013\nObjective\nTo ensure the continuing operability of the engine room machinery and systems when operating in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\n5.3\nEngine Rooms, Machinery and Systems\nPrior to entering cold weather areas, the engine room should be prepared for the anticipated conditions. Particular\nconsideration should be given to deciding when the engine room should be manned.\nThe provision of heaters in the engine room/machinery spaces will assist in maintaining temperatures above freezing.\nThe use of hot-air-blown space heaters may also be considered within these spaces.\nThe following points should be considered to maintain the safe and effective operation of the ship’s propulsion and\nancillary systems.\nCooling System Intakes (Sea Chests)\nThe maintenance of effective cooling arrangements is a prime consideration in sub-zero sea temperatures. It is\nimportant that all seawater strainers are cleaned since a clogged filter will lead to reduced flow, resulting in rapid ice\nformation within the strainer.\nParticular care should be taken to ensure that the heating arrangements of the cooling water sea chests are working\nat optimum efficiency. Steam heating systems to sea chests should be checked to confirm their good working\ncondition and be operated continuously when the ship is in ice infested waters.\nConsideration should also be given to the following:\n• •\n• The risk of damage to the engine as a result of severely overcooling the jackets.\nOptimising the number of coolers in service.\nRaising cooling temperatures.\n• •\nAdjusting charge air coolers.\nMonitoring the scavenge temperatures to ensure that they are maintained within limits.\nWhen re-circulating cooling systems are fitted, the correct levels of cooling water should be available before entering\nsub-zero conditions and the condition of all valves and pumps should be verified. The system should be placed in\nservice before entering ice conditions.\nFuel Systems\nIt should be ensured that heating systems are operating on all bunker storage tanks, bilge tanks, bilge overflow tanks\nand main engine sump settling and service tanks. Bunker storage tank temperatures should be kept at least 5°C\nabove the minimum transfer temperature given in the fuel’s specification.\nConsideration should be given to changing over from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil prior to closing down the main engine\nso that the fuel lines are primed with diesel oil instead of fuel oil. This ensures that any cooling of fuel lines will not\nresult in oil solidifying within the lines.\nStern Tube\nStern tube oil should not contain any free water or be contaminated with water/oil emulsion. Consideration should be\ngiven to draining any water from the system or replacing the stern tube oil charge.\nIt is recommended that stern tube bearings and seals located outside the hull are designed not to leak pollutants. In\nthis context, non-toxic biodegradable lubricants are not considered to be pollutants.\nThe temperature of the stern tube cooling water tank should be closely monitored. Consideration should be given to\nsourcing a suitable additive or temporarily draining the tank when the contents approach 0°C.\nVentilation\nConsideration should be given to stopping all but one main engine room ventilation fan to maintain a reasonable\nambient temperature in the machinery space. However, suitable air flow should be maintained to allow the correct\noperation of boilers, main and auxiliary engines if they are not provided with separate ducting.\nIt should be ensured, so far as possible, that vents feeding off the main ventilation system do not blow directly onto\nfuel lines or pipes containing fuel oil or onto heavy fuel oil transfer pumps.\nVentilation fans in the steering gear space should be stopped and vent flaps closed to maintain a reasonable ambient\ntemperature.\nAccommodation heating systems should be activated, and a comfortable temperature and humidity maintained in\naccommodation spaces.\nPneumatic and manual fan flaps should be regularly operated to ensure their correct operation and to prevent\nfreezing/seizing.\nHydraulic Machinery\nHydraulic pumps should be regularly run to maintain the temperature of the oil and machinery.\nElectrical Systems\nTrace heating tape is an adhesive tape with wire contained in it that can be used to heat pipes and machinery. It\ncomes with the necessary documentation to calculate current, load and wattage. It provides a temporary, quick and\ncost-effective solution to heating pipes and machinery. If the tape is to be used in hazardous areas, it should be\nappropriately rated for such use.\nGenerators\nThe fuel temperature of any generator running on diesel or gas oil should be monitored and arrangements made for\ntemporary local heating if the temperature approaches the fuel’s cloud point.\nEmergency Generators\nThe emergency generators on some ships have electric heating on the alternator end. This should be tested to\nensure its satisfactory operation.\nThe emergency generator room external vent flaps and supply fan damper should be kept closed. Notices advising of\nthe status of the flaps and dampers should be posted in the emergency generator room and main engine control\nroom. It should be ensured that the emergency generator’s cooling water contains the correct amount of anti-freeze.\nEmergency Batteries and Battery Lockers\nEmergency batteries and power for communications equipment should be protected from extreme low temperatures.\nSpaces containing batteries may need to be provided with space heaters, depending on their location/exposure.\nGeneral service batteries are unlikely to freeze in expected conditions but, as a precaution, they can be covered with\nplastic sheet.\nWater\nWhen not Generating Water\nDomestic/Distilled Tanks.\nWhere possible, gauge glasses to these tanks should be drained. If gauge glasses are not drained there is a\npossibility that the lower section of the gauge glass will become frozen and shatter. Remote sensing gauging cannot\nbe relied upon.\nIf the evaporator is not in use, lines to the storage tanks should be drained.\nWhen Generating Water\nThe temperature of the water in the storage tanks should be monitored and water made to the tanks as necessary to\nmaintain a reasonable temperature. As the distillate from the evaporator is at about 50°C, it should prevent the water\nin the tanks becoming cold enough to freeze. The supply lines from domestic freshwater tanks to pressurising pumps\nare generally susceptible to freezing, depending upon their location, and appropriate precautions should be taken.\nBoiler water sensing lines should be protected from freezing.\nCompressed Air\nIf ice contaminates the general service and/or instrument air system, there is a possibility of problems with the\nonboard instrumentation air supply. It is recommended that driers are fitted to all air systems.\nSteering Gear\nSteering gear motors should be kept running at all times to keep the oil warm. Space heaters should be used in the\nsteering flat to ensure that the equipment is maintained at a satisfactory temperature. The use of heaters in the\nsteering flat may result in significant condensation forming on deckheads and bulkheads so equipment may have to\nbe protected from condensate dripping from these surfaces.\nLubricants and Oils\nIt should be ensured that only oils and greases are used that are suitable for the anticipated temperature.\nDiesel Oil Blends\nDiesel oil may be blended with kerosene to depress the pour point, as indicated in the table below:\nRatio Diesel/ Kerosene Pour Point °C\n• •\n• 50:50 minus 14°\n40:60 minus 18°\n30:70 minus 23°\nIt should be noted that, as the proportion of kerosene is increased, the lubricity of the blend will be reduced, and\nmachinery may require more frequent checks and maintenance. In addition, it should be ensured that the flash point\nof the final blend conforms with IMO regulations.\nTransport Canada: Mandatory Winter Navigation Information on Sea Water Cooling Types. December 2013\nMarine Safety Guide Checklist for operation in Ice Infested Waters\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Polar Code\nAppendix II Model table of contents for the Polar Water Operational manual (PWOM)\n1 – Operational capabilities and limitations\nChapter 2\nOperation in low air temperatures\nSystem design\nGuidance: The PWOM (Polar Water Operational Manual) should list all ship systems susceptible to damage or loss of\nfunctionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain\noperable in sub-zero temperatures. The procedures should list all engine room machinery and systems susceptible to\ndamage or loss of functionality by exposure to low temperatures and the measures to be adopted to avoid\nmalfunction.\nWinterisation checklists should be used to facilitate preparations prior to entering an area of sub-zero temperatures.\nPrecautions to be taken may include:\n• •\nPrior to entering an area of low temperatures, checking, where applicable:\no Fore and aft draughts are within the limits required by the ice class notation.\no Sea-chest strainers.\no Steam heating and/or other arrangements to keep sea-chests clear of ice.\no Heating systems in fuel, bilge and lubricating oil tanks.\no Heating systems for the emergency generator.\no Anti-freeze in the emergency generator cooling system.\no Water levels in recirculating cooling systems.\no Water content of stern tube oil.\no Suitability of oils and greases.\no Arrangements to ensure control air is dry.\no Arrangements to prevent the icing up of air pipes to settling and service tanks required for the\noperation of the main propulsion plant and essential auxiliaries.\nWhile operating in an area of low temperatures:\no Operating with the engine room manned when appropriate.\no Applying steam heating on sea-chests continuously.\no Using space heaters in engine, steering gear, emergency battery rooms and emergency fire pump\nspace.\no Keeping emergency generator room external vent flaps and supply fan damper closed.\no Changing over from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil prior to closing down the main engine.\no Keeping hydraulic motors, including steering motors, running continuously.\no Operating pneumatic and manual vent flaps to keep them free.\no Adjusting engine room ventilation to maintain suitable temperatures and avoid local cooling of fuel\nsystems.\no Monitoring freshwater tanks and piping for freezing.\nThese procedures may form part of a Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).\nThis question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\nWas assigned an ice class notation.\nWas assigned a winterisation class notation.\nHad been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate.\nThe vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and\nsystems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nReview completed winterisation checklists.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to ensure that\nengine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nIf applicable, during the physical inspection of the vessel confirm the precautions being taken to ensure that\nengine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\nCompany procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nWinterisation checklists.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• There were no company procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain operable in\nsub-zero temperatures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that engine room\nmachinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThere were no winterisation checklists available for use.\nCompany procedures to ensure that engine room machinery and systems remain operable in sub-zero\ntemperatures had not been complied with, which may include:\no Prior to entering an area of low temperatures, failing to check, where applicable:\n Fore and aft draughts were within the limits required by the ice class notation.\n Sea-chest strainers.\n Steam heating and/or other arrangements to keep sea-chests clear of ice.\n Heating systems in fuel, bilge and lubricating oil tanks.\n Heating systems for the emergency generator.\n Anti-freeze in the emergency generator cooling system.\n Water levels in recirculating cooling systems.\n Water content of stern tube oil.\n Suitability of oils and greases.\n Arrangements to ensure control air is dry.\n Arrangements to prevent the icing up of air pipes to settling and service tanks required for\nthe operation of the main propulsion plant and essential auxiliaries.\no While operating in an area of low temperatures, not:\n Operating with the engine room manned when appropriate.\n Applying steam heating on sea-chests continuously.\n Using space heaters in engine, steering gear, emergency battery rooms and emergency\nfire pump space.\n Keeping emergency generator room external vent flaps and supply fan damper closed.\n Changing over from heavy fuel oil to diesel oil prior to closing down the main engine.\n Keeping hydraulic motors, including steering motors, running continuously.\n Operating pneumatic and manual vent flaps to keep them free.\n Adjusting engine room ventilation to maintain suitable temperatures and avoid local\ncooling of fuel systems.\n Monitoring freshwater tanks and piping for freezing.\nAny system or equipment required to maintain the engine room machinery and equipment functional in subzero temperatures was defective in any respect.\n12.4. Sub-zero cargo and ballast operation procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.4.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the", "c": "operability of the cargo and ballast systems in sub-zero temperatures, and had these\nprocedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nCargo and ballast systems in sub-zero temperatures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Pumproom, Compressor Room, Main Deck\nPublications\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Polar Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the continuing operability of the cargo and ballast systems when operating in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\n5.1\nCargo and Ballast Systems\nCargo System Valves\nPrior to entering cold areas, all cargo, bunker, ballast and subsidiary valves that will be required to be used for\noperations should be inspected to ensure that their gearboxes contain no water and that they are well greased. A\nsmall amount of water in the gearbox of a hydraulic valve or in the valve bonnet will, when frozen, have a detrimental\neffect upon that valve and, in extreme cases, will render the valve inoperable.\nHydraulic cargo or Crude Oil Washing (COW) valves on deck should be protected with canvas covers and the valves\nshould be frequently activated while in sub-freezing temperatures to avoid freezing/blockage.\nIf any valves are left ‘cracked’ open to avoid fracturing of valve bodies, it is recommended that each open valve is\nclearly marked, both locally and on the pipeline mimic diagram.\nThe condition of portable steam hoses and their connections on deck should be verified prior to use.\nCargo Tank Pressure/Vacuum (P/V) Valves\nIt is strongly recommended that the P/V valves are thoroughly overhauled prior to entry into an area of sub-zero\ntemperatures. While on passage, valves should be protected from the effects of ice accumulation/ accretion with\ncanvas covers or steam heating. In extremely low temperatures canvas covers have been shown to be more effective\nthan steam heating. However, it should be ensured that the presence of a canvas cover does not inhibit the effective\noperation of the P/V valve.\nBefore any cargo operation commences, it is recommended that any canvas covers are removed and that\npressure/vacuum arrangements are checked to be free of ice blockage. In particular, it should be ensured that drain\nholes are clear and free to operate. Painting the seat faces of Hi-Jet valves with anti-freeze may assist in protecting\nthem from freezing in the shut position and will prevent an ice film forming.\nInert Gas (IG) Deck Water Seal Heating\nThe deck water seal heating should be operational in freezing temperatures. It should be ensured that the inlet and\noutlet of the sealing water is not frozen and/or blocked by ice. Frequent checks should be undertaken to confirm a\npositive water flow.\nP/V Breakers – Liquid (anti-freeze)\nThe deck breaker should be filled with anti-freeze (glycol as opposed to methanol based) as per the manufacturer’s\ninstructions. It is important that the correct concentration of ethylene glycol and water is used in the P/V breaker as\nexcessive concentrations may not be effective, as illustrated in the following graph.\nFrequent checks should be undertaken to ensure that the correct level is maintained in the breaker. Once clear of the\ncold weather, the density of the liquid in the P/V breaker will need to be tested and returned to the value necessary to\nensure correct operation.\nMast Vent Riser (where fitted)\nThe mast vent riser valve should be protected with grease and a canvas cover. Flame arresters should be checked\nfree of ice before the start of cargo operations. Prior to arrival, mast risers and inert gas (IG) lines should be drained\nof any liquid.\nIf fitted, automatic and manual valves on the IG main line and tank inlets should be kept greased and protected with\ncanvas covers. The operation of piston breather valves on IG lines should be checked before operations commence\nand covers should be removed and de-icer sprayed in way of the valves.\nIt is recommended that the diameter of drainage lines on mast riser systems should be at least 50 mm.\nCargo Pumps\nDeepwell Pumps\nThe motors and shafts of pumps located on deck should be protected with canvas covers to avoid delays caused by\nhaving to de-ice the pumps before discharging.\nSubmerged Hydraulic Pump Systems\nThe grade of hydraulic oil used in the submerged pump system will typically be suitable for operation in air\ntemperatures down to minus 25°C, but its properties should be verified. The hydraulic system should be started on\nlow load at least 30 minutes before the system is required for operations.\nSome thickening of the hydraulic oil, due to the increased viscosity, may be experienced when ambient temperatures\nfall to zero and below. Minimising ‘dead-legs’ will assist in the pump’s operation and, when initially starting the pump,\nit should be started very slowly to enable the warm hydraulic oil from the main to slowly displace the cold oil in the\npump and consequently warm the pump through slowly. An increase in the normal loading may be placed upon the\nsupply pump when starting a hydraulic pump, due to the change in viscosity of the hydraulic oil.\nCargo Stripping Systems\nAny systems using water seal vacuum pumps need both the pumps and the seal supply header tanks to be protected\nfrom freezing. The manufacturer’s recommendation should be followed, and the required percentage of anti-freeze\nadded to ensure safe operation.\nCOW and Tank Cleaning Systems\nCOW machine gearboxes should be protected with canvas covers. The gearbox oil should be renewed in order to\navoid damage, particularly if the presence of any moisture is suspected. Tank cleaning lines should be drained of all\nwater and isolated from the drive system. If tank cleaning is to be undertaken in cold regions, the sub-division of the\ncleaning system should be reviewed to limit the amount of pipework containing water. COW isolator valves should be\ndrained of any water.\nCargo Tank Heating Coils\nIf not in use, heating coils and lines should be drained and blown through with air. To avoid ‘dead-legs’, steam\ndelivery lines should be blanked off, preferably where they spur off from the main line.\nTank Cleaning Heater\nWhen located in an exposed location, the tank cleaning heater will need to be protected and, in any event, should be\ndrained.\nCargo Lines\nDifferences in temperature experienced by the ship can cause contraction of the deck lines that may not be taken up\nin the usual manner. There is a possibility of flange leakage and it would be prudent to check the integrity of the lines\nprior to use to ensure they are tight.\nAll cargo, ballast, tank cleaning and COW lines on deck should be well drained after their pressure testing or use.\nParticular attention should be paid to ballast systems, including ballast monitors and lines.\nAfter loading, discharging or bunkering in cold climates, ship’s lines should be drained, and the drain valves left open\nuntil the ambient temperature rises sufficiently. Where possible, it is recommended that at least one tank filling valve\nis left open to allow the line to drain, thereby preventing the line from becoming pressurised due to temperature\nchanges.\nThe pour point of the cargo being carried or to be loaded should be checked to determine whether line blockages\nmay occur if cargo operations are stopped for any reason. Similarly, bunker fuel specifications should be checked for\npour point.\nPump Rooms\nWithout compromising safety, pump room fans should be used only as required for ventilating the space to minimise\nthe effect of sub-zero temperatures inside the pump room. Pump room doors should be kept closed, if possible.\nSteam lines in the pump room, including those serving the tank-washing heater, should be drained down. If fitted,\nsteam stripping pumps may be kept warming through if they are likely to be required for cargo operations or to\nprovide some warmth in the pump room.\nIf fitted, pump room heaters should be turned on and, if provided on different floors, at least one on each floor should\nbe used to promote convection currents in the space.\nOil Discharge Monitoring Equipment (ODME)\nThe fresh water supply to the ODME should be drained down together with the water supply/flushing pump. Particular\ncare should be taken when isolating and draining down the ODME as this is a well-documented source of failure or\ndamage in cold climates.\nBallast Systems\nHydraulic ballast valves in empty tanks should be frequently activated to avoid freezing/blockage unless other\npositive means are employed to prevent freezing.\nBallast tank vents may become frozen if not protected by canvas covers or steam heating on passage. However, to\navoid the risk of over or under pressurisation of ballast tanks, the use of covers on vents should be strictly supervised\nto ensure that the vents can still operate as designed. It is recommended that any covers are removed prior to the\ncommencement of operations. Frequent removal of any accumulated ice will be required.\nIce Accumulation in Ballast Tanks\nBefore entering cold climates, the Master should determine the density of the water contained within the ballast\ntanks. The more saline the water, the lower the freezing temperature will be. Consideration may be given to\nexchanging the ballast water to increase its salinity.\nThe surface of ballast water may freeze in ballast tanks. A considerable danger exists during de-ballasting\noperations should a layer of ice remain suspended in the tank, to fall at a later time, risking damage to internal\nstructure and fittings. If possible, and if free surface stability calculations show it to be acceptable, ballast levels\nshould be kept at or below the level of the sea surface. However, sea suctions should not be too close to the sea\nsurface where there is increased risk of them getting blocked with ice.\nWhere fitted, ballast tank heating or bubbling systems should be in operation prior to entering areas with sub-zero\ntemperatures, particularly when ballast levels are above the water line.\nIf stability and the ice belt depth allow and where no ballast tank heating or bubbling systems are fitted, periodic\nlowering and re-filling of the ballast may avoid the water’s surface becoming frozen.\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Polar Code\nAppendix II Model table of contents for the Polar Water Operational manual (PWOM)\n1 – Operational capabilities and limitations\nChapter 2\nOperation in low air temperatures\nSystem design\nGuidance: The PWOM (Polar Water Operational Manual) should list all ship systems susceptible to damage or loss of\nfunctionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in\nsub-zero temperatures. The procedures should list all cargo and ballast systems susceptible to damage or loss of\nfunctionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction. Winterisation\nchecklists should be used to facilitate preparations.\nPrecautions to be taken may include, where applicable:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Testing the integrity of deck lines prior to use to ensure they are tight.\nChecking ballast water salinity and exchanging if necessary.\nWhere fitted, operating ballast tank heating or bubbling systems in good time.\nProtecting equipment on deck with canvas covers, including:\no Hydraulic cargo and COW valves.\no COW machines.\no P/V valves.\no Mast riser vent valve.\no IG main and inlet valves.\no Deepwell pump motors and shafts.\no Ballast tank vents.\nChecking that:\no Valves on deck are well greased and their gearboxes free of water.\no Deck seal heating arrangements are operational.\no Anti-freeze levels in P/V breaker and stripping system vacuum pumps are correct.\no Cargo compressors that require antifreeze and/or a heating system are identified and prepared for\ncold weather.\nDraining equipment, including:\no Cargo, COW, and tank cleaning lines and valves, after testing or use.\no Tank cleaning heater.\no Heating coils.\no Manifold drip-trays.\no Deck air-line.\no Ballast system, including ballast monitor.\no Oil discharge monitoring system.\no Pumproom steam lines, if not to be used.\nActivating hydraulic cargo, COW and ballast valves frequently while in sub-freezing temperatures to avoid\nfreezing/blockage.\nChecking P/V breaker, P/V valves and flame screens immediately before commencing and during cargo\noperations.\nStarting cargo pump and valve hydraulic systems in good time before they are needed.\nEnsuring deck seal heating is functioning and checked regularly during cargo operations.\nChecking canvas covers are removed from ballast tank vents before ballasting/deballasting.\nThese procedures may form part of a Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).\nThis question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\nWas assigned an ice class notation\nWas assigned a winterisation class notation\nHad been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate\nThe vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems\nremain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nReview completed winterisation checklists and records of equipment tests and checks prior to, during and\non completion of cargo operations.\n• •\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to ensure that\ncargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nIf applicable, during the physical inspection of the vessel confirm the precautions being taken to ensure that\ncargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nWinterisation checklists.\nRecords of equipment tests and checks prior to, during and on completion of cargo operations.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero\ntemperatures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast\nsystems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThere were no winterisation checklists available for use.\nCompany procedures to ensure that cargo and ballast systems remain operable in sub-zero temperatures\nhad not been complied with, which may include failing to:\no Test the integrity of deck lines prior to use to ensure they are tight.\no Check ballast water salinity and exchange if necessary.\no Where fitted, operate ballast tank heating or bubbling systems in good time.\no Protect equipment on deck with canvas covers, including:\n Hydraulic cargo and COW valves.\n COW machines.\n P/V valves.\n Mast riser vent valve.\n IG main and inlet valves.\n Deepwell pump motors and shafts.\n Ballast tank vents.\no Check that:\n Valves on deck are well greased and their gearboxes free of water.\n Deck seal heating arrangements are operational.\n Anti-freeze levels in P/V breaker and stripping system vacuum pumps are correct.\n Cargo compressors that require antifreeze and/or a heating system are properly prepared\nfor cold weather.\no Drain equipment, including:\n Cargo, COW, and tank cleaning lines and valves, after testing or use.\n Tank cleaning heater.\n Heating coils.\n Manifold drip-trays.\n Deck air-line.\n Ballast system, including ballast monitor.\n Oil discharge monitoring system.\n Pumproom steam lines, if not to be used.\no Activate hydraulic cargo, COW and ballast valves frequently while in sub-freezing temperatures to\navoid freezing/blockage.\no Check P/V breaker, P/V valves and flame screens immediately before commencing and during\ncargo operations.\no Start cargo pump and valve hydraulic systems in good time before they are needed.\no Ensure deck seal heating is functioning and checked regularly during cargo operations.\no Check canvas covers are removed from ballast tank vents before ballasting/deballasting.\n12.5. Sub-zero deck machinery operation procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.5.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures to ensure the", "c": "operability of the deck machinery, including mooring systems, in sub-zero temperatures,\nand had these procedures been complied with?\nShort Question Text\nDeck machinery and mooring equipment in sub-zero temperatures\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nCargo Control Room, Main Deck, Mooring Decks\nPublications\nIMO: ISM Code\nIMO: Polar Code\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nObjective\nTo ensure the continuing operability of the deck machinery when operating in sub-zero temperatures.\nIndustry Guidance\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nSection 5 The Winterisation of Ships\n5.2 Deck\nAll void spaces, empty tanks, chain lockers and spaces should be sounded prior to entering cold weather. If any\nwater is found, it should be educted dry, as far as is practical, to avoid ice damage when these residues freeze. The\nspaces should be regularly sounded to ensure that they remain water-free.\nSounding pipes, vents and remote gauges should be protected and remain operational as far as possible.\nAs well as the natural consequences of sub-zero temperatures, e.g., freezing of liquids, another area that should be\nmanaged is the accumulation of ice on deck from freezing spray and rain. Consequently, many of the actions below\nrelate to covering equipment with canvas, heavy-duty plastic sheet or similar material. Ice accumulations on\nunprotected equipment will render the equipment inoperable.\nCargo handling cranes and derricks should be operated and tested prior to the vessel entering sub-zero\ntemperatures. The operation of any heating arrangements provided, for example, in crane cabs, should also be\nconfirmed.\nThe pneumatic or electrical motors used for raising or lowering accommodation ladders should be adequately\ncovered to prevent ice accretion.\nThe main air valve to deck should be closed and the airline drained down, taking care to remove any moisture that\nmay be contained within the line, particularly at the ends. If air has to be supplied to deck, an air drier should be used.\nDeck Equipment\nWith hydraulic equipment, such as winches and hose handling cranes, particular attention needs to be paid to the\noperating temperature range of the hydraulic fluid.\nControl boxes and motion levers should be protected by canvas covers.\nFor hydraulically driven systems, oil should be circulated continuously when the external temperature is below 0°C to\nensure that the fluid systems are maintained at working temperatures. If this is to be achieved by leaving machinery\n(e.g., winches) running, careful attention should be paid to the regular lubrication of the equipment. The oil\nmanufacturer’s stated operating temperature range/viscosity should be checked for suitability. Oils may have to be\ntreated with an appropriate viscosity additive or, in extreme cases, the oil may have to be changed for a more suitable\ngrade.\nMooring wires and synthetic ropes should be protected by canvas covers to stop ice accretion until they are required\nfor use. Ice crystals can form within unprotected ropes and can cause damage to the rope’s fibres.\nIce Accretion on Windlasses\nDue to their exposed location, windlasses and winches are likely to be subjected to heavy ice accretion. Prior to\narrival in port, winches and windlasses should be proven to be operational and additional time may have to be\nallowed to clear any ice accretion. In addition, both anchors should be lowered to prove that they are free to run from\nthe pipe (i.e., not frozen in) when safe navigation permits. However, the anchors should be brought fully home prior to\nmooring.\nOther\nParticular care should be taken in sealing the chain locker, spurling and hawse pipes.\nTMSA KPI 1A.1.1 requires that management ensures that company policy and the supporting procedures and\ninstructions cover all the activities undertaken.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nIMO: Polar Code\nAppendix II Model table of contents for the Polar Water Operational manual (PWOM)\n1 – Operational capabilities and limitations\nChapter 2\nOperation in low air temperatures\nSystem design\nGuidance: The PWOM (Polar Water Operational Manual) should list all ship systems susceptible to damage or loss of\nfunctionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems,\nremains operable in sub-zero temperatures. The procedures should list all deck machinery susceptible to damage or\nloss of functionality by exposure to low temperatures, and the measures to be adopted to avoid malfunction.\nWinterisation checklists should be used to facilitate preparations prior to entering an area of sub-zero temperatures.\nPeriodic inspections of all deck machinery should be undertaken during the exposure to sub-zero temperatures to\nensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken, which may include:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Ensuring hydraulic systems contain a suitable grade of hydraulic oil.\nCirculating hydraulic system oil continuously when the external temperature was below 0°C to ensure that\nthe fluid systems are maintained at working temperatures.\nWhen leaving machinery (e.g., winches) running, paying careful attention to the regular lubrication of the\nequipment.\nOperating and testing cargo handling cranes prior to the vessel entering sub-zero temperatures.\nChecking heating arrangements in cranes are operational.\nAdequately covering the pneumatic or electrical motors used for raising or lowering accommodation ladders\nto prevent ice accretion.\nClosing the main air valve to deck and draining the airline down.\nProtecting control boxes and motion levers for deck machinery with canvas covers.\nProtecting mooring wires and synthetic ropes with canvas covers to stop ice accretion until they are required\nfor use.\nPrior to arrival in port, proving winches, windlasses and anchors to be operational.\nEnsuring the continued operability of pneumatic oil spill pumps, where provided.\nThese procedures may form part of a Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).\nThis question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\nWas assigned an ice class notation\nWas assigned a winterisation class notation\nHad been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate\nThe vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\nSight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including\nmooring systems, remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nReview winterisation checklists and records of periodic inspections of all deck machinery during exposure to\nsub-zero temperatures.\nInterview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to ensure that\ndeck machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nIf applicable, during the physical inspection of the vessel confirm the precautions being taken to ensure that\ndeck machinery, including mooring systems remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• Company procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in subzero temperatures.\nWinterisation checklists.\nRecords of periodic inspections of all deck machinery during exposure to sub-zero temperatures.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems, remains\noperable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures to ensure that deck machinery,\nincluding mooring systems, remains operable in sub-zero temperatures.\nThere were no winterisation checklists available for use.\nPeriodic inspections of all deck machinery had not been undertaken during exposure to sub-zero\ntemperatures to ensure the effectiveness of the precautions being taken.\nCompany procedures to ensure that deck machinery, including mooring systems, remains operable in subzero temperatures had not been complied with, which may include not:\no Ensuring hydraulic systems contained a suitable grade of hydraulic oil.\no Circulating hydraulic system oil continuously when the external temperature was below 0°C to\nensure that the fluid systems were maintained at working temperatures.\no When leaving machinery (e.g., winches) running, paying careful attention to the regular lubrication\nof the equipment.\no Operating and testing cargo handling cranes prior to the vessel entering sub-zero temperatures.\no Checking heating arrangements in cranes were operational.\no Adequately covering the pneumatic or electrical motors used for raising or lowering accommodation\nladders to prevent ice accretion.\no Closing the main air valve to deck and draining the airline down.\no Protecting control boxes and motion levers for deck machinery with canvas covers.\no Protecting mooring wires and synthetic ropes with canvas covers to stop ice accretion until they\nwere required for use.\no Prior to arrival in port, proving winches, windlasses and anchors to be operational.\no Ensuring the continued operability of pneumatic oil spill pumps, where provided.\nInspection of the vessel during periods of sub-zero temperatures determined that deck machinery and/or\nmooring systems required for planned or emergency use were inoperative due to freezing and/or ice\naccretion.\n12.6. Ice navigation procedures", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" }, { "id": "12.6.1.", "t": "Were the Master and officers familiar with the company procedures for navigating", "c": "in areas affected by ice, and had they received suitable training?\nShort Question Text\nNavigating in areas affected by ice\nVessel Types\nOil, Chemical, LPG, LNG\nROVIQ Sequence\nDocumentation, Bridge\nPublications\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nBIMCO: The Ice Navigation and Seamanship Handbook 1st Edition 2019\nIMO: ISM Code\nObjective\nTo ensure the Master and officers are prepared for navigating in areas affected by ice.\nIndustry Guidance\nBIMCO: The Ice Navigation and Seamanship Handbook 1st Edition 2019\nIntroduction\nAs with all navigation, careful preparation significantly reduces the risk of an accident. In icy environments\nconsideration should be given to the nature of the ice, its dangers and the regions where it is encountered, ship\nhandling, passage planning, crew training and preparing the ship for the expected weather. This manual will allow\nseafarers to acquire the necessary knowledge and understanding which, when combined with practical experience,\nwill enable safe navigation in ice.\nChapter 8 Navigation in Ice\n8.1 Passage Planning\nThe passage plan should recognise any limitations of navigation or communication equipment on board, and take into\naccount the availability of nav aids, availability and reliability of charts, SAR provision and infrastructure (all of which\nmay be limited) in the intended region.\nThe passage plan for ice will consider pack ice and iceberg limits indicated on the navigational chart and other\navailable material (some regions will have more information than others) such as:\n• •\n• Information from commercial or government sources.\nForecasts for the intended location and estimated date of passage.\nHistoric data, including previous ice information, as well as knowledge gained from local experience and/or\nprevious visits on the route.\n8.1.1 Appraisal\n8.1.2 Planning\n8.1.3 Execution\n8.1.4 Monitoring\n8.1.5 Routeing in Ice Waters\n8.2 Watchkeeping Practices\nNavigation inside ice waters requires maximum input by all participants in the watchkeeping arrangements of the\nship. This includes the navigation officers as well as the engineering personnel and relevant members of the crew.\nThe lookout and helmsman will perform vital roles within the bridge team and should be fully briefed as to their duties\nand actions.\n8.2.2 Watch Officer’s Briefing Prior to Entry into Ice Limits\n8.2.3 Under Pilotage in Ice\nThe presence of a Pilot or Ice Advisor on the bridge in ice conditions does not change the established Master/Pilot\nrelationship. However, it is important that the Master and officers closely listen to the advice and guidance of the pilot\nand or Ice Advisor. If there is any misunderstanding or lack of clarity, all personnel should be encouraged to ask for\nclarification.\n8.3 Evidence of Ice\n8.3.1 Freezing Spray\n8.4 Navigation in Pack Ice\nNavigation in pack ice requires the ship’s main engines to be kept in a state of immediate readiness with the ship on\ncontinuous manoeuvring speed.\n8.5 Visibility and Heating\n8.6 Position Fixing in Ice Conditions\n8.6.1 Charts and Positions\nIn certain remote areas, chart depths can be no more than track soundings from previous passages. The accuracy of\ncharts in the Arctic and Antarctic varies widely depending on the date of the survey. Charts in developed coastal\nregions, such as the Baltic Sea and Saint Lawrence Gulf, will be surveyed to more modern standards. In any event,\nnavigators should always be aware of the source of charted data, either by looking at the paper chart Source\nClassification Diagram or by interrogating the ECDIS CATZOC function.\n8.6.2 Floating Marks and Buoys\n8.6.3 Leading Lights and Sectored Lights\n8.7 Radar Use in Ice Conditions\n8.7.1 Settings, Tuning and Detection\n8.8 Compasses\nChapter 9 Shiphandling\n9.1 Entering the Ice\n9.2 Approaching the Ice Edge\n9.3 Underway in Ice\n9.4 Pinch Points\n9.5 Beset by Ice\n9.6 Anchoring in Ice\n9.7 Inland navigation: Canal and Lock Systems\n9.8 Damage in Ice\n9.9 Berthing in Ports with Ice\nChapter 11 Working with Icebreakers\nOCIMF: The Use of Large Tankers in Seasonal First-Year Ice and Severe Sub-Zero Conditions\nSection 8 Proficiency of Ship’s Crew\nThe safe operation of a ship trading in ice requires skill and technical proficiency in excess of those required during\nnormal operating conditions. It is, therefore, important that suitable training is offered to complement existing\nexperience. All ship’s officers and crew should be adequately trained for circumstances likely to be encountered when\noperating in low temperatures, undertaking ice navigation and/or icebreaker escort. This may take the form of inservice training, simulator training and/or Computer Based Training (CBT) and should include cold weather survival.\nThe following provides an example outline content to form the basis of an ice operations training course.\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Types of ice, its formation and properties.\nIce regulations.\nTechnical aspects of ice class and ‘winterisation’ notations, design and construction.\nShip performance in ice and cold climates.\nIce broadcasts and ice charts.\nPassage planning considerations for ice.\nOperating, navigating and ship handling in ice.\nIcebreaker operations.\nBerthing and mooring operations in ice.\nRisk assessment.\nContingency planning and emergency response.\nCargo and ballast operations in cold weather.\nEnvironmental issues.\nLimitations of shore support.\nSimulator module.\nMasters, officers in charge of a navigational watch and officers in charge of an engineering watch should have\nrelevant experience and training with regard to operating ships in ice and severe sub-zero conditions.\nTMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. These procedures\nmay include:\n• •\n• Berth-to-berth passage planning.\nActions upon encountering adverse weather, restricted visibility or ice.\nSupporting checklists.\nIMO: ISM Code\n7 The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key\nshipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various\ntasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.\nInspection Guidance\nThe vessel operator should have developed procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice, including checklists\nwhere appropriate. The procedures should include as appropriate, guidance on:\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• Passage planning in areas affected by ice.\nWatchkeeping requirements in areas affected by ice.\nPilotage in ice.\nActions to take when ice is detected.\nFreezing spray.\nNavigation in pack ice.\nPosition fixing in ice conditions.\nCharts and positions in remote locations.\nRadar use in ice conditions.\nLimitations of compasses in high latitudes.\nShiphandling in ice.\nAnchoring in ice.\nAvoiding hull and propeller/propulsion system damage in ice.\nBerthing/unberthing in ports with ice.\nWorking with icebreakers.\nThe procedures may reference or incorporate industry publications such as The Ice Navigation and Seamanship\nHandbook or equivalent best practice guidance. The procedures may form part of the Polar Waters Operational\nManual, where carried.\nMasters, officers in charge of a navigational watch and officers in charge of an engineering watch should have\nrelevant training with regard to operating ships in ice and severe sub-zero conditions.\nThis may take the form of in-service training, simulator training and/or Computer Based Training (CBT).\nThis question will only be assigned where the vessel operator had declared through the pre-inspection questionnaire\nthat the vessel met one or more of the following criteria:\n• •\n• •\nWas assigned an ice class notation.\nWas assigned a winterisation class notation.\nHad been issued with a Polar Ship Certificate.\nThe vessel traded in areas where sub-zero temperatures may be routinely expected.\nSuggested Inspector Actions\n• •\n• •\n• Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice.\nReview completed checklists for the last voyage affected by ice.\nReview the passage plan for the last voyage affected by ice.\nReview the Bridge Log Book for the last period navigating in an area affected by ice.\nReview records of crew training with regard to operating ships in ice.\n• Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for navigating in\nareas affected by ice.\nExpected Evidence\n• •\n• •\n• Company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice.\nPassage plan for the last voyage affected by ice.\nCompleted checklists for the last voyage affected by ice.\nBridge Log Book for the last period navigating in an area affected by ice.\nRecords of crew training with regard to operating ships in ice.\nPotential Grounds for a Negative Observation\n• •\n• •\n• •\n• •\nThere were no company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice that included, as appropriate,\nguidance on:\no Passage planning in areas affected by ice.\no Bridge/engine room team composition in areas affected by ice.\no Pilotage in ice.\no Actions to take when ice is detected.\no Freezing spray.\no Navigation in pack ice.\no Position fixing in ice conditions.\no Charts and positions in remote locations.\no Radar use in ice conditions.\no Limitations of compasses in high latitudes.\no Shiphandling in ice.\no Anchoring in ice.\no Avoiding hull and propeller/propulsion system damage in ice.\no Berthing/unberthing in ports with ice.\no Working with icebreakers.\nThe accompanying officer was not familiar with the company procedures for navigating in areas affected by\nice.\nThe company procedures for navigating in areas affected by ice were not supported by suitable checklists.\nChecklists for navigating in ice had not been completed to company requirements.\nThe passage plan for the last voyage affected by ice did not take into account the additional factors\npresented by navigation in areas affected by ice, such as:\no The limits of ice pack, ice bergs and sea ice.\no The verification of draughts to meet the min/max draughts required by the vessel's ice notation.\no The change in status of manoeuvring machinery.\no The change in status of bridge and/or machinery space manning levels.\nRecords showed that while navigating in an area affected by ice:\no The required bridge/engine room team composition had not been complied with.\no The vessel's draught had not been adjusted to meet the min/max draught required by the vessel's\nice notation.\nThere were no records of crew training with regard to operating ships in ice.\nWhen navigating in or near areas affected by ice, the Master, an officer in charge of a navigational watch or\nan officer in charge of an engineering watch had not received suitable training for operating ships in ice.", "s": "Part 2 (Ch.8-12)" } ]